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PREFACE TO THE TENTH EDITION
Judge Alexander R. Tiffany, its author, put out the ﬁrst
edition of this work in 1849. In the years 1851, 1858 and 1866,
he put out the second, third and fourth editions, respectively.
The ﬁfth edition was published in 1873 with Judge Andrew
Howell as its editor and he edited the succeeding editions to
the ninth inclusive, which were published in 1875, 1879, 1886
and 1894, respectively.
The editorship of the present edition has been undertaken
at the request of the family of Judge Tiffany, and while the
editor is persuaded that better can be done, yet it is hoped that
the present edition may share the favor so long shown to this
work by the bench and bar of ;\Iichigan.
There seems to be little occasion now to go outside
the decisions of our own courts for assistance in the construc

tion of our Justice Court Statutes, and while the older cases
with some exceptions are retained, few cases from the courts of
other states will be found among the new citations.
The citations of cases have been brought down to the 100th
Northwestern Reporter and to the 132nd Michigan Reports.
The Reporter citations are added for all cases since the begin
ning of the Reporter system.
Citations to statutes are to the Compiled Laws of 1897 and
to the Session Laws of 1899, 1901 and 1903. A Table of Cases
Cited has been added, the Table of Contents largely increased
and the Justice Court Acts of those cities having provisions
materially different from those of the general statute are found
in an appendix. Some matter found in older editions is omitted
and new material added in the text of this. There has been
considerable rearrangement of matter, notably in collecting the
forms in an appendix, thus removing them from the body of
the text. and in its mechanical aspects a new face has been
given to the book.
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PART I.
The Powers and Duties of Justices of the Peace,
in General.

\

\

ii.

TlFFANY’S JU STICE GUIDE
CHAPTER

I.

Or rm: Jusncs mo JURISDICTION or Jus'r1cEs’ Comvrs.

no-'0:
Fla?‘

§

OF THE JUSTICE.

Essential qualiﬁcations.
interest and relationship.
prohibited
Where
from

510.
holding

§11 .

court

Responsibility
55. Duties of.
5-t.

§12 .

for his acts.

Q13 .
Q14.

$15.
516.
517.
§18.

OI‘ JURISDICTION.
Q6.

9. As affected

in general.

$7. As to parties.
58. As affected by residence.
OF

by kind of action and
amount involved.
Justice denied,
of certain
ac
tions.
On confession of Judgment.
In covenant on bond.
in replevin.
in actions for penalties, etc.
in tort actions.
in local and transitory actions.
Against public oﬁeers.
Of proceedings without jurisdic
tion.

THE JUSTICE.

a

a

§1. Essential qualiﬁcations--Residence.-The justice must
reside in the township where he was elected.
“Whenever jus
tice of the peace shall remove from the township in which he was
elected, or by
change of boundaries of such township shall be
oﬂice.

’

placed without the same, he shall be deemed to have vacated his,
'1

regarded

1——Const., Art.
22.
The power
of justices of the peace to try civil
causes is so ﬁxed hy the constitution
necessary
they are absolutely
that
magistrates in cities as well as else
where:
Allor v. Wayne Auditors, 43
The justice
N. W., 492.
)Iich.. 100:
must reside in the township where
Mlch.,
People v. Geddes.
elected:
A suit pending before a justice
70.
at the time of his removal from the
township where he was elected will
to
abate unless properly transferred
Kidder v. Merry
some other justice:
The justice is
hew. 32 Mic-h., 470.
6.
5

a local oﬂicer for many
and the laws have always
that theory.
But in exercis
ing his judicini powers he represents
the state rather
than his township,
and his oﬂicers may be any constable
of the county as well as the sheriff,
and his juries may be summoned from
the county at large.
There is nothing
in the constitution which requires a
justice to do all his business at his
residence or at any ﬂxed office. Neither
the constitution
nor the statute has
justice to hold courts
ever required
always at one place.
He holds them,
n

3

4

-I

1

1

as

purposes,
gone on

or ran JUSTICE.

§ 2

C11.I

Interest and relationship.—A magistrate cannot act in
his own cause? And the statutes provide, “That no judge of
§2.

any court can sit as such in any cause to which he is a party, or
in which he is interested, or in which he would be excluded
from being a juror, by reason of consanguinity or affinity to
either of the parties.” 3 Nor can any judge decide or take part
in the decision of any question which shall have been argued in
the court when he was not present and sitting therein as a judge.
And further, that “No justice shall take cognizance of any
cause, or do any judicial act, when he shall be related within
the fourth degree of atiinity or consanguinity to either party
such matter, or shall have been of counsel, or shall be
directly or indirectly interested in such cause or matter, unless
the parties interested in such cause, or their agents or attorneys,
shall, with full knowledge of such disability, expressly consent
that such justice may take cognizance of such cause or do such

in any

act.’

'4

in fact, sometimes in one place and
sometimes in another, according to
And there is
temporary convenience.
nothing in any settled policy of the
constitution or laws which would pre
vent the legislature, at least, from
allowing him to hold courts outside of
Fauiks v. People, 39
his township:
Mlch., 200.
2—1 Coke's Inst., 377; Place v. But
A note sent
ternuts, 28 Barb., 503.
for collection, and in
to a justice
dorsed to him thus, “Pay to Volney
Reynolds, J. P., or order, for collec
tion." transfers the legal title of the
note to him, and makes him the agent
of the indorser for its collection; and
so long as the note remains thus in
dorsed and held by him, a suit cannot
be maintained before him to collect the
note by reason of his interest in it:
West v. Wheeler, 49 Mlch., 505; 13
N. W., 836; Moon v. Stevens, 53 Mlch.,
144; 18 N. W. 600.
But a justice to
whom a claim is sent for collection,
with instructions merely to notify the
debtor that it will be sued it not paid,
is not thereby disqualiﬁed, as an in
a
terested party. from entertaining
Moon v. Stev
suit upon the demand:
ens. 53 Mlch., 144: 18 N. W. 600.
3—C. L., Q 1109, as amended by act
245, 1893.
And the statute extends

sitting on the trial of a
cause:
Foot v. Morgan, 1 Ilill,
65-1; see Iiasceig v. Tripp, 20 Mlch.,
105 Mlch.,
216: People v. Whitney,
627; 63 N. W., 765.
in which last
case it is held that n justice is not
disqualiﬁed because
in a prosecution
under a local option law. his brother
in-law, who is the prosecuting oifﬁcer,
makes
the complaint.
The maxim is
deeply rooted in the common
law that
"no _man shall be a judge in his own
cause :"
Peninsular Ry. Co. v. How
ard. 20 Mlch., 18: Stockwell v. Town
ship Board, 22 Mlch., 341.
This doc
trine is not applicable to administra
tive acts which are pul)llc and not
private parties:
between
Clement v.
Everest, 29 Mlch., 19.
_
4—C. L., Q 711; llascelg v. Tripp,
20 Mlch., 216, 218.
Where a proceed
ing against a party for fraudulently
etc.,
concealing
property,
his
was
brought before a justice who was at
torney tor the plaintiffs in a pending
replevin suit involving the title to the
property charged to have been con
cealed,
that the justice was an
held.
interested party and thereby disquali
ﬁed to act:
Clark v. Mikesell,
81
And, al
Mlch., 45: 45 N. W.. 377.
though not interested when the pro
any subse
was commenced,
ceeding
to

a justice

civil

or

Ca.T.

ms

JUSTICE.

~

§ 2

A

judgment pronounced by a justice who is disqualiﬁed is void
and may be attacked collaterally.‘
A justice cannot, without such consent, take cognizance of a
cause, though prosecuted in the name of another, in which a
relative, within the degrees prohibited by this section, is the
plaintiﬁ in interest; and if he render judgment in the cause,
it will be absolutely void.“ And such would be the consequence
in relation to any case in which he had been of counsel,’ or is
directly or indirectly interested in the case.“
To enable a justice to try a cause in which any of the objec
tions mentioned in the preceding section (§711) exist, it will
not be sufficient that the parties appcar and make no objection,
for they may not be aware of the disability.
But it must
clearly appear that the opposite party had full knowledge of
the disability of the justice to try the cause, and with such
knowledge there must be an express assent that the justice
may try the cause notwithstanding the existence of the objec
or the proceeding will be absolutely
unavailing for the protection of the party or
And a justice ought never to grant process
cause where his opinion has been sought

tion,

void, and utterly
the justice.”

for

the

trial of

a

and expressed in
relation to the matter in controversy, nor even where the party
has made a statement of facts, and taken from him any di
rections whatever concerning them, though it be merely as to
a course of proceeding to obtain redress."

To ascertain

the degree

of relationship

tion is s party: Washington ins. Co.
Price. 1 Hopkins, 1. And so hcld
where a brother of the justice was a
stockholder
in the defendant's cor
pnrstion.
&c.,
Place v. Butternuts,
Mnn‘f. Co., 28 Barb., 503; see also
Ry. Co. v. Howard, 20
Peninsular
Mich., 18.
9—If the justice has inadvertently
issued process or proceeded in a cause
whore he is related by consanguinity
or afiinity to one ot the parties, it is
his duty, when the fact comes to his
notice, to withdraw himself from the
cause.
He cannot even render judg
ment ot nonsuit, or for costs in the
case; such judgment would be void:
Edwards v. Russell, 21 Wend., 63.
10—Cowen‘s Treatise, 2d ed., 878.

quent interest acquired by him in the
proceeding would oust him of jurisdic
A justice cannot be both
tion. lbid.
magistrate and counsel in the case:
Stensrud v. Deiamater, 56 Mich., 144:
22 N. W.. 272: sce also People v.
Whitney. 105 Mich., 827; 63 N. W.,

5-Horton

v.

~

765.

Howard,
79
Mlch..
642: 44 N. \\'., 1112, and cases cited
in the opinion.
1 lliii, 654:
v. Morgan.
6—Foot
Horton v. Howard, 79 Mlch.. 642; 44
N. W., 1112, and cases cited.
7—Carrington
v. Andrews, 12 Abb.,
348.

in which the justice

v.

_

8—Theretore. where a justice is s
stockholder in a corporation. he cannot
entertain u suit in which the corpora
3

or
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stands in reference to a party to a cause, the computation is to
be according to the rule of the common law, which in some re
spects differs from that of the civil law.
Aﬂinity is a connection formed by marriage, which places the
husband in the same degree of nominal propinquity to the
relations of the wife, as that in which she herself stands towards
them, and gives to the wife the same reciprocal connection with
the relations of the husband. The degrees of affinity are com
puted in the same way as those of consanguinity."

,

it

i_s

the relation existing among all the different
Consa-nguinity
persons descending from the same stock, or common ancestor.
Some portion of the blood of the common ancestor ﬂows ‘in the
veins of all his descendants, and though mixed with the blood
ﬂowing from many other families, yet
constitutes the kindred
or alliance by blood between any two ofthe individuals.
of two kinds, lineal and collateral.
relation by blood
is

The

Lineal consanguinity
is

is

that relation which exists among per
where one
descended from the other, as between the
son and the father, or the grandfather, and so upwards in a
direct ascending line; and between the father and the son, or
direct descending line.
the grandson, and so downwards in
a

sons,

it

a

Every generation in this direct course makes
degree, com
puting either in the ascending or descending line. This being
has been adopted
the natural mode of computing the degrees,
by the civil, the canon, and the common law.
is

Collateral consanguinity
the relation subsisting among per
the
same
common ancestor, but not from
from
each other.
It essential, to constitute this relation, that they
spring from the same common root, or stock, but in different
is

sons who descend

is

is

is

branches. The mode of computing the degree,
to discover
the common ancestor; to begin with him to reckon downwards,
and the degree the two persons, or the more remote of them,
distant from the ancestor,
the degree of kindred subsisting

them. For instance, two brothers are related to each
other in the ﬁrst degree, because, from the father to each of

between

a

is

one degree.
An uncle and
nephew are related to
other in the second degree, because the nephew
two
degrees from the common ancestor, and the rule of computa
them

_Law

Die, "Alflnity."
4

11—Bouv.

is

each
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tion is extended to the remotest

This is the mode
ship.
canon law.

degree

of computation

§2
of collateral relation
by the common and

The method of computing by the civil law, is to begin at
either of the persons in question, and count up to the common
ancestor, and then downwards to the other person--calling it
a degree for each person——both ascending and descending, and
the degrees they stand from each other is the degree in which
they stand related. Thus, from a nephew to his father is one
degree; to the grandfather, two degrees, and then to the uncle,
three, which points out the relationship.
The mode of the civil
law points out the actual degree of kindred in all cases; by the
relations may
mode adopted by the common law, diiferent
stand in the same degree. The uncle and nephew stand related

in the

second degree by the common law, and so are two ﬁrst
cousins, or two sons of two brothers; but by the civil law the
uncle and nephew are in the third degree, and the cousins are

in the fourth."
A/ﬁnity—to constitute a valid objection, must

if

be subsisting;

the marriage has been dissolved by death, the objection is
removed, unless there has been issue of the marriage."
The husband is related by aﬂinity to all the consanguinei of
hiswife, and vice versa, the wife to the husband ’s consanguinei;
for the husband and wife being considered one ﬂesh, those who
are related to the one by blood are related to the other by af
finity. But the c0ns¢m'guine1' of the husband are not at all re
Therefore, where the
lated to the consanguinei of the wife.
brother of the justice was the husband of the plaintitf’s sister,
it was held that the justice was not disqualiﬁed to act; although
the justice was related by aﬁinity to the plaintiif’s sister, there
was no such relation between him and the plaintiff."
Law Dic., “Consanguin
12—Bouv.
ity.“
13—2 Bin. Com., 435, n.: Carman
v. Newell. 1 Denio, 25. if there is issue
of the marriage remaining alive. the
aiﬁnity remains:
Cain v. Ingham, 7
Cow.. 478. n.
(0).
14—lligbee v. Leonard, 1 Denio. 186.
And the blood relatives of the wife,
while the marriage tie continues, stand
in the same degree of afilnity to the
husband as they do in consanguinity

and so the blood relatives of
husband stand in the same degree
oi’ niilnity to her:
Paddock v. Wells,
2 Barb. Ch., 331.
In the following cases the justice
was held to he disqualiﬁed by his re
lationship
to the party.
Where the
justice
and plaintiff
were cousins:
Russell, 21 Wend.. 63.
Edwards
v.
Where the justice and defendant were
second cousins:
Randall v. Iiall: La
ier's Sup. to Hill & Denio, 239. Where
to

the

her,
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Where prohibited from holding cou1't.—“No

I.

justice of

the peace shall hold any court in any bar-room or grocery, or

any other place where any intoxicating liquors shall be sold.”“‘
Nor should a justice undertake to decide upon the constitu

tionality of any

act

of the legislature."

.

§4. Responsibility for his acts.-—The capacity in which
justices act is either ministerial or judicial.
They act minis
terially in issuing process in the ﬁrst instance, in issuing subpoe
nas or writs of execution, and in making returns to appeals and
writs of certiorari, and in taking security thereon, and generally,
in doing those things which pertain to the office of a clerk rather
than to that of a judge."
They act judicially in rendering judgments, and in exercising
those powers conﬁded to them to be performed according to
their judgment and discretion."
For his ministerial acts, the justice is liable to an action at
the suit of the party injured, if he acts illegally; and even
where he commits an error while so acting, by which a party
were second
the justice and plaintiff
cousins:
Post v. Flack, 5 Denio, 66.
was a nominal
Where the plaintiff
party having no interest, the suit he
ing tor the beneﬁt of one who had
married a sister of the justice‘s wife,
both wives being alive: Foot v. Mor
gan, 1 Iiili, 654. and see Place v.
Butternuts. 28 Barb., 503.
Judgment
void.
A‘ judgment
reu
dered by a justice related to either of
pro
the parties,
within
the degrees
hibited by the statute, there being no
consent with full knowledge of the
tact, that he might try the cause, is
it is void:
not merely erroneous,
Sehoonmaker v. Ciearwater, 41 Barb.,
200: Horton v. Howard, 79 Mich., 642:
4-1 N. W., 1112, and cases cited in
opinion.
Upon Appeal or Oerttorart the fact
of the relationship
of the justice to
the party, may be shown by the return
of the justice, though the matter was
not proved. admitted, or even objected
on the trial:
Post v. Black, 5 Denio,
66.
15——C. L., § 710.
Where on the day
of trial the cause'was
called in the
bar-room of a tavern, and adjourned

to an adjoining
room
in the same
house,
but the justice had no knowi
edge
that intoxicating
liquors were
sold there, and no proof of such fact
being
offered on the trial, the court
on appeal refused to reverse the judg

ment:

Savier

v. Chipman,
1 Mich.,
whether the court will
presume that liquors are sold in a bar
room,
see Ibid., Faulks v. People, 39
Mich., 201.
16-—Ortman v. Greenman, 4 Mich.,
291.
But see a discussion of this
question in note 1, p. 230, Cooley’:
Limitations,
Constitutional
edition
116.

As

to

seven.
v. Sands, 8 Wend.,
Iioughton v. Swartout, 1 Denio,
Percival v. Jones, 2 Johnton's
Cases, 49; Rogers v. Mulliner, 6 Wend.,
601-2-3.
The issuing oi‘ a summons by
a jutice is a ministerial
act merely:
Smith v. Ihiing, 47 Mich., 614; 11 N.
W., 408.
18—Wali v. Trumbull, 16 Mlch., 228:
Tompkins v. Sands, 8 Wend., 462.
A
justice may refuse to open a case after
he
has heard the parties and
an
nounced
his conclusion:
Chivers v.
Lytie, 97 Mich., 477; 56 N. W., S62.
17-—-Tompkins

462;
589;

or ran JUSTICE.
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injured,
cliarged."
is

he

is

liable,

although

no

§ 4

corrupt

motives

are

But a justice is not liable in a civil suit for any judicial act.”
“No public oiﬁcer is responsible, in a civil suit, for judicial
determination, however erroneous it may be, and however ma
the motive which produced it; such acts, when cor
rupt, may be punished criminally; but the law will not allow
malice and corruption to be charged in a civil suit against such
an oﬂicer, for what he does in the performance of a judicial
duty. The rule extends to judges from the highest to the low
est; to jurors and all public ofﬁcers, whatever name they may
licious

in the

of judicial power.

It, of

applies
only when the judge or oﬂicer having jurisdiction of the par
ticular case, was authorized to determine it. If he transcends
the limits of his authority, he necessarily ceases, in the particu
bear,

exercise

course,

lar case, to act as a judge, and is responsible for all the conse
quences; but with these limitations, the principle of irresponsi
bility, so far as respects a civil remedy, is as old as the common
law.”2‘
“Unless the duty of the magistrate is simply and
purely ministerial, he cannot be made liable to an action for a
mistake in doing or avoiding to do anything in execution of that
duty, unless he can be ﬁxed with malice.” ‘*2

If

a justice,

from

corrupt

and malicious motives, act par
to pervert the due course

tially or oppressively, or with intent
19-Ibid.; and fioughton v. Swart~
out, 1 Denio, 589; see, Iieaid v. Ben
nett, I Doug., Mich., 513: Welch V.
Frost, 1 Mich., 30.
A justice will be
liable to a private individual for his
failure to perform any ministerial duty
in which such individual has a special
Raynsford
v.
and direct interest:
Phelps. 43 Mich., 344; 5 N. W.. 403.

21-—Weaver v. Deavendorf, 3 Denio.
117; Tompkins
v. Sands, 8 Wend.,
462; Gordon v. Farrar, 2 Doug. Micb.,

22—Linford
v. Fitzroy,
13 Ad. &
N. S., 247; Wail v. Trumbull,
16
Mich., 235.
Thus. a justice acts judi
cially in determining whether an at
torney who appears for n party in his
absence,
is authorized‘to
do so; and
is not liable for an erroneous determi
jurisdiction
nation.
When
depends
upon facts which are to be found by
the magistrate himself, his ﬁnding in
favor of jurisdiction is ll. complete pro
tectlon, even though it prove to be
But, if a justice assumes
erroneous.
when the law gives him
Jurisdiction
none. he will not be protected, for in
such a case he would falsely assume
a Judicial
character he did not pos
sess: Morton v. Crane, 39 Mich.. 526.
Rayns
And so, if he acts maliciously:
ford v. Phelps, 43 Mich., 345; 5 N. W.,

411.

403.

20—Moor v. Ames, 3 Caines, 170;
Cunningham v. Bucklin, 8 Cow.. 178,
a
No action will lie against
183.
judicial oiiicer for anything done by
Morton
him in his judicial capacity:
v. Crane, 39 Mi:-h.. 530: Raynsford v.
Phelps, 43 Mich., 344: 5 N. W. 403.
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by indictment or

Of the duties and liabilities of justices and constables.

shall ask or receive any money or other valu
able thing from a defendant or other person, as a consideration,
reward or inducement for omitting to arrest any delinquent,
or to carry him before any justice, or for delaying to take any
party to prison, or for postponing the sale of any property un
constable

der any execution, or for omitting or delaying the execution
'
of any duty pertaining to his oﬂice.” 24
“No justice of the peace or constable shall, directly or indi
rectly, buy or be interested in ‘buying, any bond, note, or other
demand or cause of action, for the purpose of commencing any
suit thereon before a. justice; nor shall any justice or constable,
either before or after suit brought, lend or advance, or agree
to lend or advance, or procure to be lent or advanced, any
money or valuable thing, to any person in consideration of, or
as a reward for, or inducement to, the placing

or having placed

in the hands of such justice or constable, any debt, demand or
of action whatever, for prosecution or colIection.”25
“No justice of the peace shall purchase, directly or indirect
ly, or be interested in the purchase of any judgment rendered
by him.” 2“
“Every justice or constable, oifending against either of the
provisions of the three last preceding sections, shall be deemed
guilty of a misdemeanor, and on conviction thereof, shall be
cause

punished by a ﬁne not exceeding ﬁve hundred dollars, or im
prisonment in the county jail not exceeding six months, or
both such ﬁne and imprisonment, in the discretion of the court;
peril. It is, accordingly, a rule of very
great antiquity. that no action will lie
against a judicial oﬂiccr for anyiact
done by him in the exercise
of his
judicial
functions. provided the act,
though done mistakenly, were within
the scope ot his jurisdiction.
This
principle of protectiqn is not conﬁned
to courts of record, but applies as wcil
to inferior jurisdictions:
Wall
v.
Trumbull, 16 Mlch., 235.
24—C. L., 5 953.
25—(‘.. L., 5 954.
26—C. L., 5 955.

23—1 Chit. Cr. Law, 873, 874; Peo
ple v. Coon, 15 Wend., 277; Jenkins v.
Wnldron. 11 Johns.. 127.
A ministerial officer has a line of
conduct marked out for him, and has
nothing to do but to follow it; and he
must be held liable for any failure to
do so which results in the injury of
A judicial oiilcer, on the
another.
other hand, has certain powers con
according
flded to him to be exercised
to his judgment or discretion: and the
law would be oppressive which should
compel him to decide correctly at his
8
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and every such conviction shall operate as a forfeiture of the
of the justice or constable so convicted.” 2"

oﬂice

OF JURISDICTION.

The jurisdiction of the justice of the peace in civil suits de
pends wholly upon statute law."

§6. In g'enera1.—By statute, it is provided in regard to
courts held by justices of the peace, that “Each of said courts
is hereby vested with all such powers, for the purpose of exer
cising jurisdiction conferred by this chapter," as are usual in
courts of record, except the power of setting aside a verdict and
arresting judgment thereon.” 3°
Jurisdiction is the power to hear and determine the subject
matter in controversy between the parties to a suit.“ The term
“jurisdiction” pertains either to the subject matter or to the
parties. The jurisdiction of courts as to subject matter is con
ferred by iaw, and in no case by the consent of partie." Jus
tice's courts are courts of inferior and limited jurisdiction, and
are conﬁned strictly to the powers conferred upon them by the
statute." They have no jurisdiction by implication merely.“
27-0.

L.. I 956.
Warner,
Doug.
28—Wight
v.
1
(Mlch.), 384; Clark v. iiolmes, Ibld.,
390; Hartford Fire ins. Co. v. Owen,
30 Mich., 441.
29—Chupter 34, C. L., 1897.
30-C. L., 5706: and see, Phelps v.
Town. 14 Mich., 3'74, 381; Van Sickle
A jus
19 Mich., 49-54.
V. Kellogg,
tlce's court possesses the some general
powers for the exercise of jurisdiction
as do courts of record, except the
power of setting aside verdicts and
iiodges v. Bagg,
arresting Judgrneuts:
81 l\Iich., 243; 45 N. W.. 841; Wagner
v. Kellogg. 92 Mich., 616; 52 N. W..
A Justice may disregard a void
1017.
judgment rendered by him and proceed
as though it had never been rendered:
Hodges v. Bagg. 81 Mich.. 243; 45 N.
He may order a jury though
W.. 841.
it ls expressly waived by the parties:
Van Sickle v. Kellogg, 19 Mich., 49.
5 Selden.
31——i‘cople v. Sturtevant,
263-266; (‘ooley Const. Lim., 575, Ed.
7: see also Constitution oi’ Michigan,
art. vi. 5 18. and notes to this section
in Comp. Laws, 1897.

0

v. Eckhart,
Const.,
32—Burcke
3
137; Spear v. Carter, 1 Mich., 19-23.
Nor can want ot jurisdiction
over the
subject matter be waived by the par
ties:
Moore v. Ellis, 18 Mich., 77:
i-‘arrnnd v. Bentley, 6 Mich., 282;
Allen v. Carpenter, 15 Mich., 32;Att'y
Gen. v. Moliter, 26 Micll., 444; Thomp
son v. Mich. Mutual
Beneﬁt Associa
lion, 52 Mir-h.. 522: 18 N. W.. 247.
Nor can a court acquire jurisdiction
by a false assertion
of mcts upon
depends:
which jurisdiction
Noyes v.
Butler, 6 Barh.. 613; Harrington
v.
People, Ib|'d., 607.
33—Wight v. Warner, 1 Doug. Mich.,
394; Clark
Holmes, IMd., 390:
v.
Spear v. Carter, 1 Mich., 19.
Justices
of the peace have no common
law
jurisdiction
They are
in civil cases.
conﬁned strictly to the authority which
the statute has conferred, and can take
nothing by implication:
Bronson .1. in
Hoose v. Sherriil, 16 Wend.. 38.
34—Wight v. Warner, 1 Doug. Mich.,
384.

Our
them

does
constitution
as courts exercising

not regard
special and
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This, however, is to be understood with the qualiﬁcation, that
wherever jurisdiction is given by the statute, all those incidental
powers necessary to make it effectual or requisite to attain the
end, are also impliedly conferred thereby.“

In all actions before justices of

everything neces
sary to confer jurisdiction must appear aﬂirmatively upon the
face of the proceedings; nothing will be presumed in favor of
the peace,

their authority to hear and determine the matter.“
§7. Jurisdiction as to parties.-As a general rule, a justice
has jurisdiction of every person found in thc county, whether
a resident or not, who sues or is sued, in his own right.
School d~istricts.-—“Justices of the peace shall have jurisdic
tion in all cases of assumpsit, debt, covenant and trespass on the
districts, when the amount claimed, or mat
ter in controversy, shall not exceed one himdred dollars; and
the parties shall have the same right of appeal as in other
case, against school

37
cases.”
l
Corpm-ations.—

All

actions against corporations, except mu

nicipal corporations, shall be cognizable before a justice of the
peace, in like manner and with the like restrictions as the same
are or may be by law before a justice of the peace when brought
against an individual.”38
diction must be shown; but after juris
diction of the cause and parties is
once made to appear, and the question
is whether it had afterward been lost,
it will be presumed in support of his
judgment that jurisdiction
continued,
and that his acts were regular and
valid unless the
contrary
appears:
Saunders v. Tioga Mfg. Co., 27 Mich.,

limited powers in the strict sense, but
fixes in such courts an exclusive juris
diction in civil cases to one hundred
dollars, and a concurrent one to three
hundred dollars, except as it may be
They
otherwise provided by statute.
are
for such purposes the ordinary
All courts are
tribunals of justice.
judicially to know the extent
bound.
of their powers, and their authority
is in no sense contrary to the course
of the common law, any more than
Goodseli
that oi.’ the circuit courts:
v. Leonard, 23 Mlch., 374.
ilart, 1 Comst., 30;
35—Stief
v.
Robbins v. Gorham. 25 N. Y., 594;
21 Barb., 508;
Voorhees v. Martin,
Goodsell v. Leonard, 23 Mich., 374.
36—Spear v. Carter, 1 Mich., 21;
Wall v. Trumbull, 16 Mich., 235; Saun
Mfg. Co., 27 Mich.,
ders v. Tioga

520.

And so of all courts, in special pro
ceedings not according to the course
of the common law: \\'lght v. Warner,
1 Doug., 384, 390; Chandler v. Nash, 5
Mich., 416: Elliot v. Dudley, 8 Mich.,
64; Piatt v. Stewart, 10 Mich., 260;
Allen v. Carpenter, 15 Mich., 25, 32;
Wall v. Trumbull, 16 Mich., 228, 235.
3o7—C. L., 54721.
See Thompson v.
Crockery School District, 25
Mich.,
483.

520.

Nothing is to be presumed for the
purpose of giving the justice jurisdic
tion in the ﬁrst instance—such juris

38-0. L., I753: Root v. Mayor, etc.,
of Ann Arbor, 3 Mich., 433. The pro

10

vision in a city charter, that the enr
poration mny sue and be sued in all
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Unincorporated voluntary associatiions.-—VVhenever
any unin
corporated voluntary association, club, or society, shall be formed

in this

of

or more, having some
or
in chanccry may be
distinguishing
name, actions at law
brought by or against such association, club, or society, by the
name by which it is known: Provided, that this act shall not
take away the right of the litigant to proceed against all the
state,

composed

ﬁve members

members of such association, club, or society,
shall so elect to proceed.”

if

such litigant

Erecuiors and Adrmnistrators.-— (‘Y
l\o justice of the peace shall
"'
"
actions against executors and ad
have cognizance of
ministrators, as such, except in the cases specially provided by

'

law.

’ ’4°

courts of law, etc., dbes not confer
in actions
upon justices jurisdiction
against the city; therefore, a plaintiif
suing such a corporation in the circuit
court on a demand less than one hun
dred dollars, ls entitled to his costs if
he recover judgment. Gurney v. Mayor
of St. Clair, 11 Mich., 202: see Brig
ham v. Eglinton, 7 i\ilch., 291.
Jus
in suits
tices have no jurisdiction
Eaton
against municipal corporations:
Rapids v. Iloupt. 63 .\ilch., 371: 29
N. W., 880; Com'r of llighways v.
Supervisors, 77 hilch., 228; 43 N. \\’.,
Although
this 5753 prohibits
870.
municipal corporations from being sued
before justices of the peace, yet suits
may be brought by such corporations
Hart v. Town
before those oﬂlcers:
sh’ip of Port lluron. 46 Mich., 428; 9
Rapids v.
N. W., 481; see. Eaton
Houpt, 63 Mk-h., 371: 29 N. W., 860.
A commissioner of highways is re
garded under C. 11.. 51 10476-10483, as
a municipal corporation, and a justice
of
of the, peace has no jurisdiction
suits against such an omcer, unless
conferred by the amendment of 1887 to
110482; see, Com‘r of Highways v.
Supervisors. 77 .\1lch., 228; 48 N. W..
870.
See as to the jurisdiction of
justices of the peace in actions for
damages resulting from obstructions to
highways:
C. L., 5704, and Knorr v.
('|rcult Judge, 78 Mich., 168; 43 N. W.,
1099.

Foreign Corporations.
Express com
panies incorporated under the laws of
other states and doing business within
11

this state, may be sued before justices
of the peace in counties where they
are doing business.
C. I.., 55263; Gui
lagher v. American Express Co., 56
l\iich., 13; 22 N. \V., 96.
See, also,
Eaton Rapids v. lioupt, 63 Mich., 373:
Jebb v. Chicago and Grand C. Ry. Co.,
67 Mlch., 162; 34 N. \\'., 538.
But as to Foreign insurance Com
panies, see C. I... §§ 10015-10021,
and
ilartford Fire ins. Co. v. Owen, 30
Mich., 441.
This case holds that the
statute referred to providing for ser
vice of process on foreign insurance
companies is not applicable to Justice's
courts.
39—C. L., 510025.
This act held
constitutional in United States Hester
Co. v. Iron Moulders Union of N. A.,
129 Mich., 354; 88 N. W., 889.
Re
covery mny be had in such an action
by such a plaintii! though individual
members appear in court and say they
do not want the action to proceed:
Detroit L. G. B. v. First Michigan Ind.
I., — Mlch., —; 96 N. W., 934 (0ct.,
1903).
40—C. L., I704. This statute has
limited the general jurisdiction of jus
tices of the peace by specifying certain
cases or classes of cases in which they
shall have no jurisdiction:
Basom v.
Taylor, 39 .\ilch., 684.
And it denies
any jurisdiction
to justices
in suits
against executors and administrators
as such:
Ibid.
But a justice, upon
the authority of 5 93s1. c. 1... 18:51,
is held to have jurisdiction
of an
action of replevln against an adminis
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§8. Jurisdiction as aifected by residence of parties.-The
jurisdiction of justices of the peace is in some measure con
trolled by the residence of the parties.
The statute provides
that,

“Every action commenced in such court shall be brought be
fore some justice of the peace of the city or township where:
First, The plaintiffs or any of them reside; or,
Second, Where the defendants or any of them reside; or,

Third, Before some justice of another township or city, in
the same coimty, next adjoining the residence of the plain_tiff
or defendant, or one of the plaintiffs or defendants:
Provided,
however, That no justice of the peace of any of the townships
in the county of Wayne shall have jurisdiction over any cause
or proceeding, where both parties to the same or one or more
of the plaintiffs and one or more of the defendants reside in the

of the pro
city of Detroit at the time of the commencement
ceeding or cause, nor in case where the original cause of action
existed in favor of a plaintiff and against a defendant, both
residents of said city, and has been assigned to a non-resident
of said city; or,
Fourth, Before

some justice of a city in the same county,
township or townships next adjoining the resi
dence of the plaintiff or defendant, or one of the plaintiffs or
defendants:
Provided, That nothing herein contained shall
change or limit the jurisdiction of a justice of the peace where

formed from

a.

the same has been prescribed by the charter

of an incorporated

city."’41

“But if

a defendant shall have absconded

from his residence,
of the township

such action may be brought before any justice

or city in which such defendant or his property may be; and if
the plaintiifs be all non-residents of the county, or if the de
fendant be a non-resident of the county, then such action may
trator:

Trunk Ry.

Singer Mtg. Co. v. Benjamin,
Mich.. 330; 21 N. W., 358; 23
N. W., 25.
41—C. L., §707.
cornering npon each other
--Towns
and contiguous at the corners merely
are adjoining towns within the mean
ing of the statute:
iinlmes v. Carley,
31 N. Y.. 289: Jebb v. Chicago
Grand

Co., 67 Mich., 160; 34 N.
W., 538.
Where both parties are resi
dents ot the county but neither are
residents of the township where the
justice resides nor ot an adjoining
township the justice has no jurisdic
tion: Buriingame v. Marble, 95 Mich.,
5; 54 N. W., 695.

55
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be brought before any justice of the township or city where
such plaintiffs or defendants, or either of them, may be.” 42
Under the provisions of the preceding sections, if the plain
tiff be a non-resident of the county, the action may be brought
before any justice in the county. In such case it is not neces
sary that the plaintiff should be personally present in the town

The expression in relation to
ship where the justice resides.
non-resident plaintiffs, that they may bring their actions before
any justice of the township or city where such plaintiﬁ’s, or
either of them, may be, was to exclude all the restrictions before
imposed, and to authorize them to apply to any justice in the
county, at their option."
If the plaintiff is a resident of the,county, and the defendant
a non-resident, an action may be brought before a justice of
the township in which the defendant is at the time, or before a
justice of the township where the plaintitf resides, or the next

adjoining township.
The question of residence

is to be conﬁned to the parties to
the record. The fact that the demand belongs to an assignee,
who is a non-resident of the county, would not authorize the
bringing of a suit in any other than the township in which the
plaintiff or defendant resided, or the next adjoining township,“

unless brought
most cases.“

in

the name

of the

assignee,

as

it may

be

in

Jurisdiction, as affected by the character of the action
and amount involved.—“Every justice of the peace elected
in any township or city of this state, and duly qualiﬁed accord
ing to law, shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions
wherein the debt or damages do not exceed the sum of one
hundred dollars; and concurrent jurisdiction in all civil actions
§

9.

upon contract, express or implied, wherein the debt or damages
do not exceed three hundred dollars, except as provided in the
42—C. L., I708.
A justice has no
jurisdiction
person
of
the
where
neither of the parties resides in his
county:
Hall v. Shank. 57 ii!ich., 36;
23 N. W., 478. Where the plaintiil is a
non-resident of the county, the defend
ant being n resident of the county but
not n resident of the township where
the Justice resides. it ls not necessary

13

that it appear that either was present
in the township when the summons
was issued:
Weaver v. Rix, 109 Mich.,
697; 67 N. W.. 970.
Burtls,
43—[iunter
v.
10 Wend.,
538; Weaver v. Rlx. 109 Mich., 697;
67 N. W., 970.
44—IIarley v. Row. 7 Wend., 452,
45—C. L., 110054.

§10
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next section, and to hear, try and determine the same according
’
to law. ’*°

Actions of which the justice is denied jurisdiction.
—“N0 justice of the peace shall have cognizance of real actions,
actions for a disturbance of a right of way or other easement,
actions for libel or slander, or for malicious prosecutions, and
§10.

actions against executors or administrators, as such, except in
the cases specially provided by law, nor where the title to real
46-C. L., §703;

see, 3 Mich., 139.
By the Constitution,
in civil cases,
justices have exclusive jurisdiction
to
the amount of one hundred dollars:
(‘onst.. Art. 6, §18; Raymond v. liink
son, 15 Mich., 113; Phelps v.;Town,
They have exclusive
14 Mich., 381.
jurisdiction
in assumpsit where the
do not exceed
one hundred
damages
dollars:
Stortz v. Judge of Ingham
County, 38 Mich., 243.
But they have
beyond three hun
no civil jurisdiction
dred dollars: Bishop v. Freeman, 42
Mich., 533; 4 N. W., 290.
depends
Where jurisdiction
on the
amount of the demand,
it is deter
mined by the sum. claimed in the writ
or declaration, and that will be re
garded as the test, so far as to give
Strong v. Dan
the court jurisdiction:
iels, 3 Mich., 466; Inkster v. Carver,
487; Tower v. Lamb, 6
16 Mich.,
Mich., 362; Merrill v. Butler, 18 Mich.,
294.
The amount claimed in the ad
damnum clause in the declaration de
of the jus
termines the jurisdiction
tice in assumpsit.
If the amount
claimed in the writ and declaration is
within the jurisdiction
of the justice
the plaintiff will be entitled to recover
that amount, although the
amount
proved as actually due may exceed the
sum so claimed in the declaration.
It
is competent for the plaintiff to release
or abandon all oi’ his demand except
so much as the justice has jurisdiction
Cilley v.
to render judgment for:
Van Patten, 68 Mich., 80; 35 N. W.,
831.

jurisdiction
Justices
have no
in
actions founded on tort where the dam
ages claimed exceed one hundred dol
lars: Wells v. Scott, 4 Mich., 347.
if a verdict for $100 is obtained in
an action ca--tlelicto where double dam
age
are allowed by statute, doubling

14

such verdict will not oust the justice
of jurisdiction:
Rosevelt v. Hanoid,
65 Mich., 414; 32 N. W., 443.
Although the demand sued upon may
in fact exceed the justice‘s jurisdiction,
yet if plaintiﬂ claims such amount only
as is within his jurisdiction.
he may try
the cause,
and the plaintiff
will be
deemed to have abandoned all of his
demand
except the amount claimed in
the suit:
Bowditch v. Salisbury, 9
John, 365; Inhabitants, &c., v. Colfax,
1 Halstead, 115.
In repievin, where the plaintii! ai
leged the property to be worth ninety
nlne dollars, but the evidence on trial
showed it to be worth one hundred and
twenty-ﬁve dollars, the supreme court
say:
“The right of a justice to dis
pose of a cause on its merits. so far
as any objection founded on the value
of the property is concerned,
is com
plete when the parties proceed to trial
on the general issue, if not before.
If
the question of jurisdiction
as depend
ing on value, is not closed by the adi
davit for a writ, it is certainly not
open under the general issue.
That
plea is to the merits, and by going
objection, the
to trial on it without
defendant admits the justice's author
ity to investigate the matter":
Hen
derson v. Desborough, 28 Mich., 170.
See Sager v. Shutts, 53 Mich., 116;
18 N. W., 580; Humphrey v. Bayn, 45
Mich., 565; 8 N. W., 556; Chllson v.
Jennison, 60 Mich., 235; 26 N. W.,
850.

In the case last cited it was held
that judgment in replevin before a jus
tice may be taken for the value of
property in issue though it may amount
to ﬁve hundred dollars. the constitu
tional limit.
Where plaintiff in the circuit court
claims in his writ suﬂicient to give

cxusa or ACTION AND AMOUNT.
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estate shall come in question, except
Provided, That justices of the peace
actions for damages resulting from
subject to the restrictions prescribed

§11

as hereinafter

mentioned:
may have jurisdiction in
obstructions to highways,
in section 1 of this chap

t€l'."47

On confession of judg'ment.—“If any debtor shall
§11.
appear before a justice of the peace without process, and con
fess in writing, signed by him in the presence of the justice,
that he is indebted to another upon contract in a certain speciﬁed
sum, it shall be lawful for such justice, with the consent of the
creditor, to enter judgment on such confession against the debtor

for any sum not
§ 12.

exceeding

three hundred

dollars.”"

In covenant on bond.—“When there shall

be a bond

penalty exceeding one hundred and ﬁfty dollars, with
condition for the payment of a sum of money not exceeding one
hundred and ﬁfty dollars, or for the payment of several sums

with

a.

of which installments
hundred and ﬁfty dollars, an action of

of money by installments, the
shall not exceed one
covenant may be maintained

aggregate

on such condition

court jurisdiction,
hut recovers
an amount within the exclusive
jurisdiction of n justice's court, costs
will be given to the defendant: C._L.,
511257; Strong v. Daniels, 3 Mk-h.,
466; Ladd v. Duncan, 23 Mlch., 285;
Read v. ilorner, 90 Mlch., 158; 51 N.
W., 207.
47—C. L., 5704.
Have no Jurisdiction
in actions for
Fow
the disturbance of right of way:
ler v. liyiand. 48 Mich., 179; 12 N.
W., 26.
Nor where the title to real
estate shall come in question:
Stout
Brooks v.
v. Keyes, 2 Doug., 18-1:
Riggs v.
Delrymple, 1 l\iich., 145.
Sterling. 51 Mich., 159; 16 N. “".,
320: iiighway Commissioners v. With
ey. 52 .\ii<-h., 50; 17 N. W., 272.
As
to when title will be deemed in ques
tion, etc., Gay v. iiults, 55 l\iich., 327:
21 N. W., 357: Labeau v. Labeau, 61
Mich., 81; 27 N. W., 861; Ostrom v.
Potter, 71 Mich., 44: 38 N. W.. 670.
And when not: Schiatterer v. Nicko
demus. 50 Mich.. 315: 15 N. W., 489.
Disturbance of easement:
Williamson
v. Haskell. 50 Mich., 361; 15 N. W.,
512: Dolahanty v. Lucey, 101 Mich.,
113; 59 N. W., 415.
that
only

15

in a justicc’s

The provision
with
reference to
actions for disturbance of a highway
gives jurisdiction
to justices
in this
class of actions concurrent with the
circuit courts:
Knorr v. Judge, 78
Mlch., 170; 43 N. W., 1099.
48—C. L., 5705.
Beach v. Bots
ford, 1 Doug.
Mich., 202; Spear v.
Carter, 1 Mich., 22.
The confession
must be in writing and signed in the
presence of the justice by the defend
ant: Wilson v. Davis, 1 Mlch., 156;
Clark v. Holmes, 1 Doug. Mich., 390:
Judg
(‘ox v. Crlppen, 13 Mich.. 509.
ment agninst two is not warranted by
the confession of one: Clark v. Holmes.
supra; nor ls a judgment against a
partnership justified by the confession
Soper v. Fry, 37
of one partner:
Mich., 236.
The treasurer of a corporation, as
such, has no implied power to consent
to a judgment against the corporation
without the institution of a suit: Stev
ens v. Carp River Iron Co., 57 Mici1.,
See, Jones v.
427: 24 N. W., 160.
Avery. 50 Mich.. 326; 15 N. W., 494.
Whether a president of a corporation
has. 0.-r omcia, such authority. quaere:
Jones v. Avery, 50 Mich., 326; 15 N.

or
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court, and a recovery of either of such installments shall not
bar a subsequent suit for either installments which shall become
due after the commencement
of the former suit.”4°

§13. In replevin.—The jurisdiction of justices in actions
of rcplevin extends to all cascs where the value of the property
to be replevied shall not exceed one hundred dollars, as shown
by the aﬂidavit for the writ.‘

§14.

In actions for penalties and forfeitures.—“Justiccs

of the peace shall have jurisdiction of all actions for the recov
ery of penalties or forfeitures, where the amount of the penalty
or forfeiture shall not exceed one hundred dollars”?
§15.

In to1't.—But justices of the

in actions founded

tion
hundred

peace

have no jurisdic

on tort, where the damages
'

dollars.“

exceed one

Jurisdiction, as affected by the question of whether
§16.
are either local or
the action is local or tra.nsi_t-ory.—-Actions
transitory; when local, they must be tried in the county in
which the cause of action arose, or the injury was really com
mitted.

By the common law, actions

W., 494.
The docket entries must
Spear
show every statutory requisite:
v. Carter, 1 Mich.,_ 19; Allen v. Car
penter, 15 l\llch., 32; Holiister v. Gid~
dings, 24 Mich., 501.
This section is
49—C. L., 5709.
bonds,
and to
money
conﬁned
to
nmounts not exceeding onc(hundred and
Bishop v. Freeman, 42
fifty dollars:
See, Gray
1\n¢n., ssh; 4 N. W., 290.
v. Stafford, 52 Mich., 497: 18 N. W.,
It is the amount claimed and
235.
not the amount of the penalty which
determines jurisdiction on an ordinary
Durfee v. Dean, 52 Mich.,
money bond.
387; 18 N. W., 118.
As to actions
on oﬁcial bonds the rule is contra:
131
v. Cliff,
Township
of Rlchiand
Mich., 628; 92 N. W., 285, and cases
cited.
Singer Mfg. Co. v.
1—C. L., i748.
Benjamin, 55 Mich., 330: 21 N. W.,
858: 23 N. W., 25; Pistorius v. Swsrt
out, 67 Mlch., 186: 34 N. W. 547;
Dayo v. Provlnski, 90 Mich., 351; 51
If the aflldavit for the
N. W., 514.
writ is such as to give the justice
jurisdiction he may give judgment for
yalue of the property though it amount

16

occasioned

by injuries to

to the constitutional limit of ﬂve hun
dred dollars: Chilson v. Jennlson, 60
Mich.. 235; 26 N. W., 859.
2—C. L., 59799.
This section does not authorize the
collection of ﬁnes and forfeitures by
civil suit before justices in cases where
the statute, in addition to the penalty
or forfeiture,
imposes
a further
re
quirement of the defendant, such as
the giving of hail for good behavior.
Thus,
proceedings
under
C.
L..
55935, to punish for keeping billiard
tables, are criminal in character; the
judgment provided for being both a ﬁne
and security for good behavior. is an
entirety, and no right is given to prosc
cute separately for the ﬁne.
Such a
compound judgment is peculiar to crim
inal remedies, and neither {$9799 nor
§723 of C. L., 1897, warrant the re
covery of such a judgment in a civil
suit: Pardee v. Smith, 27 Mich., 33.
Scott, 4 Mich.. 347.
3—Wells
v.
But in such actions, before justices,
if the damages claimed, or the value
of the property converted, is alleged to
exceed one hundred dollars
in value,
and no objection to the jurisdiction is

Cu. I.
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real property are local, as trespass, or case for nuisances, or
waste, etc., to houses, lands, water courses, or other real prop
erty.‘

By statute, “Actions for the recovery of any real estate, or
for the recovery of the possession of real estate; actions for
trespass on land, and actions of trespass on the case, for inju
ries to real estate, shall be tried in the county where the subject

of the action shall be situated;” and “actions for slander, for
libels, and all other actions for wrongs, and upon contracts, shall
be tried in the county where one of the parties shall reside at
the time of commencing such action, unless the court shall deem
it necessary for the convenience of the parties and their wit
nesses, or the purposes of a fair and impartial trial, to order
any such issues to be tried in some other county; in which case
the same shall be tried in the county so designated.”
But by a statute subsequently enacted, it is provided, “That
all cases of trespass on lands, and in all cases of trespass upon
the case, for direct or consequential damages, on account of

injury to

property, when the defendant is not an
actual resident of the county in which such lands are situate,
or where such personal property was situated at the time of
such injury, or when such county is unorganized at the time of
committing such trespass or injury, may be prosecuted and
p'ersonal

maintained at law in any county where such defendant may be
found, as fully and eifectually in all respects as if commenced
and prosecuted in the county where such trespass or injury to
personal property was committed.”°
taken before the justice. or on appeal,
it cannot be mnde available in the su
Ibid.
preme court:
4—Watts v. Kinney, 23 Wend.. 484.
And replevin has been held to be local:
Bouv. Law Dic.. "Action." Trover in
transitory:
27
Greeley v. Stlison.
Mich., 153.
Personal actions which seek nothing
more than the recovery of money or
personal chattels. of any kind. are in
whether they
most cases transitory,
are founded on tort or on contract:
Bouv. Law Dic.. "Action."
L., $10216;
see, _l\!orse v.
5—C.
Dunham, 48 Mich., 590: 12 N. W.,
865.
Graham v. Smith, 62 Mich., 147:
Transltory actions
28 N. W., 769.
2

ngainst non-residents of the state may
be brought in any county where service
can be had:
Atkins v. Barstler. 46
Mich., 552; 0 N. W., 850; Cofrode v.
Judge. 79 Mich., 339; 44 N. W., 623.
Where an action on the case was
brought in the circuit court for the
county oi.’ Saginaw. for obstructing the
navigation of a stream by a dam in
Held, that an action
Tuscola county:
on the case for obstructing a navigable
stream. though local at the common
law, is transitory under the statute:
Barnard
v. ilinkley. 10 .\licb.. 458.
Trover for the cutting and carrying
away oi’ trees is transitory.
Greeley
v. Stilson, 27 Mich., 153.
6—C. L., 510217. This section ap

17
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In a recent case in New York, it was decided that an action
of trespass quare clausum might be brought in a justice’s court
of a ditterent county from that in which the land was situated.‘
The reasoning of the court in this case, as also in Sumner v.
Finnegan} would seem to justify the doctrine, that in respect
to justice’s courts no actions are local.”
Actions against public oiﬁcers, where to be brought,
§17.
—“In suits against public officers, or against any person spe
cially appointed to execute the duties of such officers, for any
act done by them by virtue of their offices respectively, and
in suits against other persons, who, by the command of such
do anything touching
oﬂicers, or in their aid or assistance,
the duties of such oﬂice, which are required by law to be laid
in the county where the fact happened, if it shall not appear
on the trial that the cause of such action arose within the county
where such trial is had, the jury shall be discharged, and judg
ment of discontinuance shall be rendered against the plain
tiif.”1°
has been held that a statute like this applies only to acts

under color of
where the act

of his

ofﬁce, and not to those done

it; in the latter

it,

It

done by an oiiicer by virtue

abuses

the conﬁdences

a

is

case he is not protected by
nature that his oﬂice gives him no
authority to do it; but when, in doing an act within the limits
of his authority, he exercises that authority improperly, or

of such

the law reposes

in him, to such

cases

the statute extends."
applies only

rto

a/ﬁrmati-re acts, and not to mere omissions

a

1

2

2

plies as well to persons by whose au
thorized agents and servants the tres
pass may have been committed, as to
committing’ it.
person manually
the
The statute was directly aimed at non
resident employers:
Smith v. Webster,
23 Mich., 298: see, Haywood v. John
N. W., 926.
son, 41 .‘\Ilch., 60-it
Denio, 639.
7—Graves v. MeKeon,
And if the land be out of the state
in the
the plaintiﬂ has no remedy
Ibld.
courts of the state:
8—-15 Mass., 280.
9—Pitman
v. Flint, 10 Pick., 504:
Cow. Treat., 2d ed., 27.
In an action on the case in the cir
cuit court in this state, for expelling
railroad train in
the plaintiff from

Canada. it was held that the locality
of the trespass did not oust the court
of jurisdiction
where it had obtained
control oi‘ the parties:
The Great
Western Ry. Co. v. Miller, 19 i\[ich..
305.

10—C. L.,
10218: see, Morse v.
Dunham, 48 Mich., 500; 12 N. W..
S65; Graham v. Smith, 62 Mich., 147;
28 N. W., 769.
11—Seeley v. Birdsall, 15 John., 267.
270.
But it seems to have been held
In this state, that this section covers
cases where an oﬂlcer acts under color
of oﬂiciai duty, although the proces
he is attempting to execute may be de
And it is for the court. and
fective.
not tor the jury, to determine whether
§

It
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to discharge an official duty;'2 also, to entitle him to the pro
tection of this sec_tion, he must act in obedience to his process.
lie cannot have the beneﬁt of it if he acts upon a legal war
rant beyond the jurisdiction of the court or magistrate issuing

it.“

The provision was designed for the convenience of public
by suits at a
officers, to prevent them from being harassed
distance from home; if, therefore, the oﬁicer change his resi
dence and move into another county, he may be sued in the

latter county.“
Of proceedings without jurisdiction.—Inferior courts
of special and limited jurisdiction are conﬁned strictly to
the powers conferred upon them, and their proceedings must
appear to be within those powers. They must have jurisdiction
of the person by means of the proper process for appearance
of the party, as well as of the subject matter of the suit; and
when they have thus jurisdiction of the person and the cause,
if in the further proceedings they commit error, the proceed
§18.

ings are not void, but only voidable; but on the contrary, when
they have‘ no such jurisdiction of the cause and person, their
proceedings are absolutely void, and cannot support a claim of
jurisdiction or afford any protection, and they become tres
passers who attempt by any act to enforce them."
the defendant assumed to act oiiiciaiiy
Morse v. Dun
under his process:
ham, 48 .\iich.. 590: 12 N. W., 865.
12—Elliott v. Cronk,.13 Wend., 35,
265.

13—Green
1-1-—-llopkins

v. Rumsey, 2 Wend.. 611.
v. Haywood, 13 \\‘end.,

265.

15-Clark

393.

v.

Holmes.

1 Doug.. 390.

394.

Courts and oiiicers of special and
at
limited jurisdiction must observe,
their peril. the boundaries o't their
power:
Shadboit v. Bronson. 1 Mich..
85.

89.

ii’ a court of limited jurisdiction is
sues a process which is illegal and
not merely erroneous, or undertakes
with
to hold cognizance of a cause,
of the
out having gained jurisdiction
person by having him before them. in
the manner required by law, the pro
cecdings are void. and the magistrate
attempting to enforce a
proceeding
founded on any judgment, sentence or
.

conviction, in such a case, becomes a
trcspasaer:
Bigelow v. -‘ltcarns.
19
Johns. 39; (‘olvin \'. Luther, 9 Cow.,
61; Reynolds v. Orris, 7 (‘ow., 269.
And ii‘ an execution is issued on
the Judgment. and the person of dc’
iendant is taken or his property sold.
the plaintill will also be liable as u.
trespasser:
Rogers v. liiuilincr, 6
Wend.. 597: ilarriot v. Van Cott, 5

Hill,

285.
So, a justice

is liable as a trespnsser.
voluntarily
issuing
execution
against the body ot a defendant who
was exempt from arrest on such execu
tion: Perclval v. Jones, 2 Johns. Cases,
49; and see, Rogers v. Mulliner,
6
Wend., 597.
But it is said, that it n justice has
jurisdiction
ot the subject matter of
the action and would have jurisdiction
0! the person of the defendant, it prop
er process were issued. a mere mistake
in the kind of process issued, would
not make him a trespasser it he acted

for

19

or
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The consequences would be the same, even if the process were
regular, or the party appeared, and even confessed judgment,
if the court had no jurisdiction of the cause of action)“ And

nothing will be presumed for the purpose of conferring juris
diction upon the justice in the ﬁrst instance; but such jurisdic
tion must be shown upon the face of his proceedings. He can
Consent of parties will not confer
take -nothing by implication.

jurisdiction as to the subject matter to be determined. Nor can
want of jurisdiction over the subject matter be waived by the
parties, in any case where it has not been given by the statute.
But where the court has jurisdiction of the subject matter of
the suit, but some proof or proceeding is wanting, which is
necessary to give it jurisdiction to act in the particular case,
the acts of the court may, in a measure, be rendered valid.
an attachment issued without any, or an insufficient
aﬂidavit, would not justify the court or the party, but they

if,

Thus,

would be trespassers;"
however, the defendants should ap
pear in the suit, and, without questioning the irregularity in

5 1

175.

'

i

4

18—Dewey v. Greene,
Denio, 93.
When jurisdiction of the subject and
required as a prerequisite to
person
judicial action, a defendant may waive
any irregularities
in the mode
by
which his person is sought to be sub
jected to the jurisdiction of the court,
by a voluntary
appearance.
Iie may
dispense with service. of process. as he
may waive any other personal privi

20

lege:

Burckle

v.

Eckhart,

Comst.,

137.
a

justice has no jurisdiction,
Where
his acts are as void as if he were not
a. justice.
if he has jurisdiction, but
errs in exercising it, then his acts
are not void, but voidable only. In the
former case he is personally liable. in
Savage .T., in Adkins
the latter not:
Cow., 209.
v. Brewer,
Pleading to the merits will not waive
defects in an aﬂidavit for
warrant
to arrest, if before pleading, the de
fendant has moved to quash the pro
ceedings
on that ground, and the mo
tion has been denied: Warren v. Crane,
50 Mich., 300: 15 N. W., 465.
Nor will giving bail, or procuring
an adjournment before proceeding, by
a party arrested on a. warrant, waive
any right to object to the proceedings
upon which the arrest was founded:
Brown v. Kelley, 20 Mich., 27.
See, Gunn Hardware Co. v. Denison,
83 Mich., 40, 42: 46 N. W., 940.
Upon the subject of jurisdiction
in
attachment see the subject of "Attach
ments and Proceedings Thereon," post,
a

3

1

3

6

in good faith:
Hoose v. Shcrrlll, 16
Wend., 33; Rogers v,. Muillner,
Wend,, 597.
Caines, 129.
16—Coil‘in v. Tracy,
Warner,
17—Wight
Doug.
V.
Mich., 384: see Thompson v. Thomas,
11 Mich., 274; King v.illarrington, 14
Mlch., 532.
It an aﬂidavit is necessary to be
made and delivered to the justice as a
step to the issuing of a
preliminary
warrant, he will be a trespasser if he
issues the warrant
without: such an
For, without such atiidavlt
aﬂidavit.
there is no authority to issue the proc
Shufelt,
Whitney
Deuio,
ess:
v.
502; Everston v. Sutton,
Wend.,
281; Vosburgh v. Welch, 11 John.,

3

issuing the process, should plead to the action or confess .it, the
subsequent proceedings in the case would be valid."
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THE COMMENCEMENT

OF SUITS.

be
may be instituted
commenced.—“Suits
fore a justice, either by the voluntary appearance of the parties
or by process; and when by process, it shall be either a sum
mons, a warrant, an attachment, or a writ of repievin; but no

§19.

How

process shall contain the names of the defendants in more than
one action.”1

64 Mich., 211: 31 N. W.,
A service of process to be valid
must be made in the county where is

v. Kennedy.

A party may give
1—C. L., I712.
jurisdiction by a voluntary appearance
alter a void service oi’ process: Daiiey

125.

21

or
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CH.

A SUMMONS.

II.

When deemed c0mmenced.—“Suits
shall be consid
ered as commenced at the times following:
1.-—Upon process by warrant, at time of the arrest of the
§20.

defendant;
by attachment, writ of replevin or sum
day when process shall be delivered to the con
stable; but if two or more suits be commenced by summons
or attachment, on the same day, the suit in which the process
was ﬁrst served shall be deemed to have been ﬁrst commenced.
3.—When the suit is instituted without process, at the time
when the parties shall appear before the justice and join issue. ”*
2.——Upon

mons,

process

on the

OF A SULIMONS.

§21. Essentials of the summons.-“The ﬁrst process, ex
cept as hereinafter directed, shall be a summons directed to
any constable of the county in which the justice resides, com
manding him to summon the defendant to appear before the
justice who issued the same, at a. time and place to be named
in such summons, not less than six nor more than twelve days
from the date of the same, except as hereinafter provided, to
sued: Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Owen,
Mich., 441.
Upon the question of
void service because of privilege from
service. see, Letherby v. Shaver, 73
Mlch.. 500; 41 N. W., 677.
The exceptions to
2——C. I... §714.
the rule that a writ of summons shall
be the ﬁrst process are the attach
ment,
wrlt of replevin and warrant.
The short summons is an exceptional
Borland v.
writ though a. summons:
Kingsbury. 65 Mlch., 59; 31 N. W.,
620.
It seems that 5754, C. L., 1807,
as amended by Act 68. 1901, providing
that a summons shall be the first proc
ess against a corporation excludes the
use of any other process against them:
ilewett v. Wagar Lumber Co., 38 Mlch.,

30

704.

may be issued on a
A summon
legal holiday.
it is a ministerial act
merely, and is not forbidden by the
statute:
Smith v. Ihiing, 47 Mich.,
The mere ﬁlling
614: 11 N. W., 408.
out of a summons, which is then left
in the oiiice of the justice until the
return day, or is retained by the plain
tiff in his own custody, is not the

of suit. A summons is
not issued_while
it remains in the
hands of the plaintiff:
v.
Howell
Shepard, 48 Mich., 472; 12 N. W.,

commencement

661.

Should it be important to show on
the trial, the time when the suit was
by the delivery of the proc
commenced
may
ess to the constable, that fact
be proved in thei same manner as any
other material fact; but the justice
cannot act upon his own knowledge as
to the time when the process was dc
llvered to the ofllcer for service; he
can only act upon legal evidence
ad
duced before him.
In the absence of
any other evidence, the action will be
deemed to have commenced
at the time
the process
was served as shown by
the oi‘licer’s return:
Cornell v. Moul
ton, 3 Denlo, 12; McGraw v. Walker,
Nor would the oillcer‘s
2 Hllt., 404.
endorsement on the process. of the time
when he received it, be legal evidence
of the time when it was'deiivered to
him, for such entry is not required by
the law:
Wardwell
Bosw., 408.

22

v.

Patrick,

1

CH.

II.

or

A summons.

§21

answer the plaintiﬂ? in a plea in the same summons to be men
’
tioned. '3
the plaintiff shall be a non-resident of the county, a
summons
be made returnable not less thantwo nor more
than six days irom the date thereof, and shall be served at
least two days from the time of the appearance mentioned
therein/’4
the defendant shall be a non-resident of the county, a
summons sh_a1l be made returnable and be served, as prescribed
by the preceding secti0n.”5

“If

g

“If

3—C. L., I 715. It is now held that
counting the time for the return
the day of the date
of the summons,
of issue of the summons is to he ex
cluded: and the day ot the return in
cluded: thus, a long summons issued
on the 12th may be made returnable
Chaddock
on the 18th of the month:
93 Mich., 542; 53 N. W.,
v. Barry,
in this case the prior cases on
785.
this question are reviewed. See, War
ren v. Slade, 23 Mlch.. 1: Powers’
‘Appeal, 29 Mk-h., 504. and post, 5 34,
and notes.
it seems that process from
a Justice of the peace cannot run to,
or be served in. any county except that
ilnrtford
where the justice resides:
Fire ins. Co. v. Owen, 30 hiich., 441.
tn

The provision in this section (5 715)
construed with
for a long summons,
I718 and £719. is conﬁned to cases
where both plaintii‘! and defendant are
If both are
residents of the county.
residents of the county, the long sum
mons,
Allen v.
only, is authorized:
Mills, 26 Mich., 125. And it is said
that, it there be joint debtors, one of
whom resides in and the other without
the county, a long summons is a proper
Burghardt v. Rice. 2 Denio,
process:
95; Kavanagh v. Mooney. 2 Sandi’.,
But a diifcrent rule has been
288.
held to prevail where the debt is sev
eral, or joint and svecral:
liarriott
v. Van Cott, 5 liill, 285-6.
An objection that a suit was improp
by a. long summons,
erly commenced
will he waived by joining issue upon
Hart v. Blake, 31 Mich.,
the merits:
278.

When the piaintlﬂ
4-—C. L., 5718.
is a non-resident of the county, he may

by a short summons,
or by
the ordinary long summons:
Acker
man v. Finch, 15 Wend., 652.
It was
formerly said in this state, that it
either the piaintilf or defendant was
a non-resident of the county, a short
See,
summons only, was authorized:
Alien v. Mills, 26 Mich., 125.
But it
is now held, that this 5718 is not im
perative that a short summons shall be
used when the plaintiff
is a non-resi
dent. but is permissive merely: or, in
words, a non-resident plaintiff
oth'er
may
by either a long or
commence
short summons:
Moore v. Vroomnn,
32 Micb.. 526.
Unless the defendant
is a non-resident oi the county. in
which case a short summons must be
issued:
Barnes v. Harris, 4 Comst.,
proceed

375.

1
oi’ a non-resident piaintiii!
against a corpora
may be commenced
Gallagher
tion by short summons:
v. American Express Co., 56 Mich., 13;
22 N. W., 96.

The suit

5—C. L., §719.
The language of
requires
this section imperativeiy
a
short summons when the defendant is
a non-resident of the county:
Galla
ghcr v. American
Express
Co.,
56
Mlch., 13: 22 N. W., 96; Langtry v.
Wayne Circuit Judge, 68 Mlch., 453;
36 N. W., 211.
There must be two full days be
tween the date and the return day of
a short summons,
and the same length
of time. also. between the day of ser
vice and the return day:
Evarts et al.
v. Fiske, 44 Mlch., 515; 7 N. W., 81;
Piatt v. Highway Com’rs. 38 Mich..
248.
And Sunday is not to be counted
in the two days in which a short sum
mons trom a Justice's
court may be

23
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Before issuing process in favor of a non-resident plaintiff,
security for costs must be given.“
The ﬁrst process against a corporation must be a summons,’
and when any suit shall be brought against a school district,

it shall
§22.

be commenced

In

cases

by summons.“

where

acter.—If the plaintiff

sues in a. particular char
in a particular character, it will

pla.i.ntiﬁ'

sues

be proper, though not absolutely necessary, that it should be
The omission to state in the process
mentioned in the process.
the character in which the plaintiff sues, will not preclude him
from declaring in such special character.
If,_ however, the

special character of the plaintiff be set forth in the process,
the declaration must correspond with the process in that respect,
or it will be set aside for that reason.

By public oﬂicers.--“In all cases not otherwise pro
§23.
vided by law, actions may be brought by the board of super
visors of a county; by county superintendents of the poor; by
supervisors of townships; by directors of the poor of the sev
eral townships; by inspectors of primary schools, and commis
sioners of highways of the several townships, and by assessors
of school districts, upon any contract lawfully made with them
or their predecessors

in their official character, or to enforce

Slmonson v. Durtee,
made returnable:
50 Mich., 80; 14 N. W., 706; Caupﬂeid
v. Cook,
92 Mich., 627; 52 N. W.,
1031; see, Platt v. Commissioners of
Clay. 38 Mich., 247.
While the statute (C. L., §§ 715,
has made the residence or
718, 719)
non-residence the test,
whether the
summons shall be long or short, it has
made no provision for the proof of the
tact before the justice, as :1 prerequi
site to the issuing of a long or short
summons; nor has it required
the
statement of the tact-, one way or the
other. to be entered on the docket, or
Alien v.
to appear among the ﬂies:
A presumption
Mills. 26 Mich., 127.
arises from the issuing of a long sum
mons that the defendant is a resident
oi.’ the county in which
the justice
Segar v. Shingle & Lumber
resides:
Co., 81 Mich., 344; 45 N. W., 982.
‘
-hart summons need not recite the
that the defendant is a non

resident:
Stoll v. Padiey, 98 Mich.,
13; 56 N. W., 1042.
Where a short
summons has been used defendant is
entitled to an order dismissing the
case on making it appear that its use
in the case was not justiﬂed:
Stoll
v. Padiey, supra-.
6-C. L., §713. The justice will
have jurisdiction, although security be
not given before process issue.
Such
security may be given at any time dur
ing the progress of the cause, it re
quired:
Park v. Goodwin, 1 Doug.,
56; Gray v. Wiiicox, 56 Mlch., 58;
22 N. W.. 109: Harris v. Doyle, 130
Mlch., 470; 90 N. W.,,293.
L.,
1901,
7—C.
Q754,
Amended
Public Acts, p. 101.
Hewitt v. Wagar
Lumber Co., 38 Mich., 70-l.
But in
case of foreign insurance companies.
see Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Owen. 30
Mich., 441.
8—C. L., |-1722, Amended P. A.,

24
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any liability, or any duty enjoined by law, to such oﬂicers or
the body which they represent, and to recover damages for any
injuries done to the property or rights of such oiﬁcers, or of the
bodies

represented by them.”°

“Such actions, when brought by any board of supervisors,
shall be in the name of such board as provided by law; when
brought by -any supervisor in behalf of his township, they shall
be brought in the name of such township; when brought by su
perintendents of the poor, inspectors of primary schools, com
missioners of highways, or directors of the poor, or by any
other officers authorized to sue in their name of oﬂice, they shall
be brought in the name of their respective oiﬁces, without nam
ing the persons holding

the same, and when brought by the
a. school district, they shall
be brought in the name of such district/'1”
“Such actions may be brought by such ofﬁcers, notwithstand
assessor or other person representing

ing the contract or obligation on which the same is founded may
have been made with or to any predecessors of such otﬁcers,
and notwithstanding any right of action may have accrued pre
vious to the time when the oﬁicers commencing such suit
entered upon the execution of the duties of their oﬂice. ’Y11

§24.

By 'pa.rtners._They

must

sue

in

their individual

names; they cannot sue in the name of the ﬁrm." But by
statute, “In all cases where a suit is commenced for or against
9—C. L., 510476. This statute does
not authorize a Com‘r of Highways
to bring an action tor liability to the
township:
Buckeye Twp. v. Clark. 90
Mich., 43-i; 51 N. W., 528.
See High
way Com‘r. v. Martin, 4 1\iich., 557,
and Com‘r of Highways v. Supervisor,
77 Mlch., 230; 43 N. W.. 870.
10-—-C. L., I 10477.
This statute requires suits brought
by commissioners of highways to be
brought by their name of otﬂce, and
does not allow their individual
names
to be used.
The statute treats them in
this respect as a corporation, the suits
not being eifected by change ot incum
bents, the record not showing who the
Highway Com‘rs of
incumbents are:
Port Huron v. Stockman, 5 l\iich., 528.
See, also, Johr
Supervisors,
v.
38
Mich., 532.

The overseers of two adjoining road
districts cannot join as plalntlifs in n.
suit tor an injury to a bridge which
is partly in each district: lbtd. High
way Com‘rs of Pt. Huron v. Stock
man. 5 Mich., 528.
When
two
school
are
districts
united, the newly formed district suc
ceeds tb the credits due to both, and
must be named as plaintiff in any suit
to recover such dpmnnds. and is like
wise liable for the former individual
debts oi.’ each:
Brewer v. Palmer, 13
Mich., 104, 109.
11--(7. L., 510478.
12—~Smith
v. Canﬂeid and another,
8 Mich., 493; Barber
v. Smith,
41
Mich., 138: 1 N. W., 992; McGowan
v. Lamb, 66 Mlch., 615; 33 N. W.,
881.

25
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a copartnership, and the names of all the several partners are
not known, such suit may be commenced in the partnership
name of said plaintiffs or defendants; and the plaintiffs or de
fendants shall have the right, at any time before the pleadings
are closed, to amend the same, by inserting the names of the
After the death of
parties composing such copartnership/"3
one

of two partners,

vives,

of action which sur
name of the survivor alone, as

a suit upon a cause

must be brought in the

plaintiff."
§25. By assignees.-—\Vhere

a contract has been assigned,
in
the
name
of the promisee for the use of
brought
and suit is
the assignee, naming him, the promisee is the legal plaintiff."
The assignment of a non-negotiable demand, does not, at common law, entitle the assignee to sue upon it in his own name.

But by statute" this may now be done in all cases; this statute,
however, is only permissive in its provisions, and the assignee
is still at liberty to sue in the name of the person contracting."
13———(‘.L.,
14-—'1‘eller

See, poet. § 29.
5 764.
Mich.,
Wetherel,
v.
9

464.

The surviving partner has the en
tire legal title to all the partnership
assets.
Iie has a right, acting hon
estly and with reasonable discretion
and diligence, to dispose of them as
be pleases,
to settle all debts against
any compro
the concern, to make
mise he may deem necessary, and to
turn the assets into an available and
Barry v. Briggs,
distributable form:
Until the partnership
22 i\Iich., 201.
aﬂairs have been settled by the sur
vivor, and all the debts paid, the rep
partner
resentatives of the deceased
have but an equitable interest in the
partnership property, which though in
equity it may make them tenants in
common,
subject to the debts of the
ﬁrm and a final settlement, does not
constitute them tenants in common at
law: and until such settlement, and
payment of all debts. at least. they
have no right of possession; and the
right of action at law for any tres
pass upon, or injury to. the property.
is -vested solely in the surviving part
ner:
Steiner, 27 Mich.,
Pfeifer
v.
537.

Surviving partners may recover in
their own names
for goods of the

26

ﬁrm sold by them after the decease of
their copartner, and it is not neces
sary for this purpose that they should
organize themselves into a new ﬁrm
or obtain an assignment from the
representatives of the deceased: Bas
sett v. Miller, 39 l\iich., 133; see,
Merritt v. Dickey, 38 Mich., 41. For
other cases upon the powers, duties
partners,
and liabilities
of surviving
see, Way. v. Stebbins, 47 llIlch., 298;
11 N. W., 166; Roberts v. Kelsey, 38
Mich., 602; Loomis v. Armstrong, 49
Mich., 521; 14 N. W., 505; Blodgett
580; 27 N.
v. Muskegon, 60 Mich.,
W., 686; Brown v. Watson, 06 Mich.,
2232 33 N. W., 493.
i5——Farweil v. Dewey, 12 Mich.,
436.
And proof of the assignment is
not necessary to the maintenance of
the suit, although where the interest
of the defendant may be aifected by
the ownership, as, where be claims
payment or set-offs, such proof as to
may become
necessary,
the transfer
as the validity of the defense
may
on the time of the transfer.
depend
and when the knowledge of it came to
the defendant:
Ibid.
16—C. L., 510054; Cook v. Bell, 18
Mich., 387.
17-—Sisson v. C. & T. R. R. Co., 14
Mich., 496.
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But without an assignment, A. cannot maintain a suit in his
own name on a judgment in favor of B., even though it be
averred and proved that the judgment was rendered in A.’s
favor, by the name of B., by mistake.“
9°

N

P/r.

By infants, persons under guardianship, executors
a.d.mim'stra.tors.-In
actions by infants and others who
name of the infant and that of the
guardian,
the
appear by
guardian should be so stated as to show the capacity in which
each stands.
Executors and administrators should state their

E

Q.

names and that

of

the person whom they represent.

The piaintiif, how na.med.—The name of the plain
§27.
tifI' should be given accurately and in full, both the christian
and surname. The law, however, recognizes only one christian
therefore the addition or omission of
middle name or
regarded."
its initial letter will not be
suit in favor:
Description of plaintiff in process in
a

a

name,

,u

a

Of husband and wife. to answer James Roe and Mary Roe
his wife, in
plea of,” etc.
(G

Of an admimstrator:

to answer A. B., as administrator of
and chattels, rights and credits,

all arid singular the
which were of C. D., deceased, in

a

goods

plea,”

etc.

Of an executor: to answer A . B., as executor of the last will
)7
etc.
and testament of C. D., deceased,
. . . . . .

etc.
to

answer (insert

_v.

a

a

A declaration by an assignee upon
conditional note not negotiable, need
not aver any formal assignment, but
is suliicient if it’ avers the plaintli‘!
as
to be the owner and holder;
parol assignment would be as valid
at law as it would he in equity:
Draper v. Fletcher, 26 Mlch., 154;
v. Beckwith, 85 Mich.,
see iierbstreit
93, 510.
See, Morrili v. Bissell, 99
M|cb., 410: 58 N. W., 324; Robinson
v. Watson. 101 Mich., 466; 59 N. W.,
811; Gueroid
Hoitz, 103 Mlch., 118;
W.. 278.
v.
18—Glibert

61 N.

Hantord,

13

Mich.,

27

precise name

by

19-Franklin v. Taimnze,
Johns.,
84: Rosovclt v. Gardlnier,
Cow.,
463; Milk v. Christie,
Hill, 102.
The person commencing an action is
supposed
to know the correct name
oi’ the plaintiif,
but if he does not he
cannot tor that reason proceed by a.
wrong name, or by the initials of the
Christian
or ﬁrst name:
Fisher v.
Northrup, 79 Mich.. 287; 44 N. W..
610.
But see. Barber v. Smith. 41
Mich.. 138:
N. W., 902. where
is
held
may
that other circumstances
make the use ot Christian
name un
necessary.

40.

the

it

a corporation:

5

..,”

2

Of

shcri/T: “to answer A. B., sheriif of the county of

1

in

. . . .

1

Of

a

((

or

§28
which

it is incorporated)

of (name the

'

A summons.

a corporation

in

‘

CH.

II.

created under the laws

plea,” etc.
partner, or other joint creditor:

state or country)

a

“to answer
Of a surviving
A. B., survivor of himself and C. D.,” etc.
Of an infant: “to answer A. B., who prosccutes by C. D.,
who is appointed to prosecute for the said A. B., who is an in
fant within the age of twenty-one years, as the next friend of
the said A. B., in a plea,” etc.
The defendant, how named, etc.—The true name of
§28.
the defendant should be inserted in the process, if known. The
omission of the middle name or of its initial letter, as, naming
the defendant

John Doc, when the actual

name is

John R. Doe,

is immaterial.”

When name unknown.-“When the name of any
defendant shall not be known to the plaintiff, he may be de
scribed in the process and proceedings by a ﬁctitious name;
and if a plea in abatement be interposed by such defendant, or
§29.

his name be otherwise ascertained, the justice before whom the
suit is pending shall amend the proceedings according to the
truth of the matter, and shall thereafter proceed therein, in
like manner as if the defendant had been sued by‘ his right
name.”*1 In such case, the command of the summons may be,
“To summon John Doe, the real name of the defendant being

In Donnelly v. Foote the plaintiff
unknown to the plaintiff.”
an
action,
by
commenced
capias, against James Plant, Edward
Plant and James Dorset;.James Plant only was arrested and
The plaintiff declared, and commenced his declara
gave bail.
tion by stating that the plaintiff “Complains of James Plant,
Edward Plant and John W. Dorset, defendants in this suit,
the said John W. Dorset, whose name not being known to the
said plaintiif, when the process by which this suit was com
was sued by name of James Dorset,” etc.
an action was brought against the
bail, who moved to be discharged on the ground that they were
released when the plaintiff declared against John W. instead
menced

was issued,

Judgment was obtained, and

of James Dorset. By the Court: This case comes within" the
statute. The plaintiff not knowing the christian name of Dorset,
20—See, note 19. supra, and McDonv. Heyman. 35 Mich., 334.

21—C.

ough

28
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of the defendants, issued process against him in the ﬁctitious
Before declaring, the true name was ascer
name of James.
tained to be John, and then the plaintiff declared against him
by that name, with an averment in the declaration stating the
This was entirely reg
ground for departing from the process.
ular. The statute must not receive such a construction as will
The plaintiff is not bound to stop
render it entirely nugatory.
with the issuing of process, but he may follow it up with a
judgment; and neither the bail nor any other third person can
one

be allowed to make an objection which would not be available
to the party sued. If the plaintiff had pursued his remedy
against Dorset by the ﬁctitious name mentioned in the process,
there would have been no variance, and no foundation for this
It cannot be that he has lost anything by inserting
motion.

true name, when discovered, and explaining the whole
matter on' the record.” In a previous case, one of the defend
ants, not arrested, was misnamed, and on that ground the plain
tiif was nonsuited, and the nonsuit was hoiden to be right.
The declaration contained no allegation of the plaintiﬂ?’s want
of knowledge of the defendant’s true name, and that, therefore,

the

a ﬁctitious name was used. When the parties are served with
the process, no difficulty can arise, as the defendant must plead
the misnomer, and then the plaintiff might amend, or, to such
a plea he might reply, and show that the defendant ’s name was
not known to him; and that" would be equivalent to a replication
that the defendant was known as well by the name used, as
by his real name furnished by the plea.“ The only embarrass
ment is when the defendant, misnamed, is not served with
process; in such cases it would seem necessary to set forth in
the declaration, that the name of such defendant was unknown
to the plaintiif, and therefore the ﬁctitious name was used. The
statute in this state has the words “Or his name is otherwise
ascertained,” which are not in the statute upon which the above

decisions were made; perhaps these words would, in a case like
the above, authorize an amendment in case it appeared in evi
dence that the name was inserted in the process by reason of
the plaintiﬁ"’s ignorance of the defendant’s true name.
22-19 \\'end.,

23—Waterbury

148.

611.
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may also be sued by their ﬁrm name, where all
the names of the several partners are not known.“
Copartners

by initial letter.-“In all actions on
Designation
promissory notes or other instruments in writing, any of the
parties to which are designated by the initial letter or letters,
or contraction of the christian or ﬁrst name or names, it shall
be suﬁicient in any affidavit to arrest or obtain an attachment,
§30.

and in any process or declaration, to designate such persons by
the same initial letter or letters, or contraction of the christian
or ﬁrst name or names, instead of stating the christian or ﬁrst
name or names in full.”25
When, in such cases, an afﬁdavit is
necessary to obtain process, or an attachment or warrant, the
manner in which the note was signed must be stated in the
affidavit; and, in all such cases, it must be stated in the declara
tion why the full names of the persons who executed the note
or other writing is not given.
the action is on a note signed
“J. Stiles,” in the declaration, after setting forth the making
of the note, it must say, “therein described as J. Stiles,” or as

If

be." Describing a party to a suit not upon 4
instrument by the initials of a christian name, is mis
nomer." The statute does not apply to such a case.
the

case may

written

against any of. the offi
§ 31. Against public oﬁlcers.—Actions
cers or bodies named in § 10477-of the Compiled Laws, “Shall
be brought against them by the same name in which such oﬁicers
or bodies are respectively authorized to sue, and such actions
may be commenced and prosecuted to ﬁnal judgment, in the
same manner, as'near as may be, as actions against individuals,

except as otherwise is or shall be provided by
24—C. L., 5764-.
See. the provision
in full, antv. 5 2-i; Barber v. Smith,
142; 1 N. W.. 992.
Mc
41 Mich.,
Gowan v. Lamb, 66 Mich., 620; 88 N.
W., 881.
in case any copurtner or joint
debtor shnli have compromised and
paid his proportion or shnre of the
joint indebtedness,
and shall have ob
tained from the creditor a release. it
will not be necessary to make him a
defendant with the other joint debtors
in a suit to recover the balance oi! the
Nor can he be so sued after
debt.
C. L., §§10449-10453.
his discharge:

'25—C. L.. 5763: Shaw v. Fortine,

Mich., 254; 57 N. W., 128; Ben
nett v. Libhart, 27 Mich., 489; Camp
bell v. Wallace. 46 Mich., 321; 9 N.
W., 432: Fewiass v. Abbott, 28 Mich.,
270; Fisher v. Northrup.
79 Mich..
287; 44 N. W., 610; Stever v. Brown,
119 Mich., 196; 77 N. W., 704.
26—Esdaiie v. Maciean, 15 M. & W.,
98

277.

27—Rust

v.

Kennedy,

4 M.

&

W.,

586.

23-0. L.,

full, ante,
diction

30
\

law.”"

ot

510479: see §10-177. in
But as to the juris
justices in suits against

5 23.

CH.

II.
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or
Mistake

§32
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in name

of

a.

party.-If

the

plaintiﬁ’s

christian or surname be omitted or mistaken in the summons,
the defendant may plead the omission or misnomer in abatement.
And in declaring, the name of the plaintiff must be the same
as in the process; and if it is mistaken there, it cannot be cor
rected in the declaration.” But a mistake in the summons, as
to the name of a party, may be amended; thus, where a plaintiff
was wrongly named Joseph S., the summons was amended by
inserting Jasper S., the correct name.-"°

§33. The return day.-If the day of the week and of
the month are mentioned in ﬁxing the return day of the sum
mons, and they do not correspond with each other, the variance
will be fatal. A notice of sale of real estate, by order was for
day of,” etc., when Friday was the
“The mistake
ﬁfteenth day of the month. The court said:
made in advertising the sale is suiﬁcient to render it void.
There is the utmost necessity of precision in transactions of

“Friday, the

this nature.

seventeenth

’ ’31

The time and place when and where the defendant is required
to appear must be particularly speciﬁed in the summons."
The
school districts and corporations, see.
i 7. The omission to sue a
municipal oﬂicer by his oillclal title
is not a substantial objection ll’ his
llnhllity is shown. Hart v. Township
or l'ort Huron. 46 Mlch., 428; 9 N.
\\’., 481.
29-2 Cow. Treat. 2d ed., 585:
Willard v. .\ilssanl. 1 Cow. Rep., 37.
See,
79 Mlch.,
Fisher
v. Northrup,
22-47: 4-i .\‘. \\'.. 610.
30-Brace v. Benson, 10 Wend., 213.
A court of record has power to amend
process as to the name of u party.
Thus by amendment the defendant's
name was changed from Absolem Bax
ter to Absalom Backus in the sum
Final v. Backus, 18 hiich..
mona:
218.
For the purpose of exercising
their jurisdiction, justices’ courts have
the same powers as are usual in courts
of record, excepting the power of set
ting aside verdicts and arresting judg
ment:
See C. I... i706; Phelps v.
Town. 14 .\ilch.. 374, 381: Van Sickle
v. Kellogg. 19 Mlch., 49, 54.
A jus
tice has the power of amendment, in

ant:-,

the same manner as a court of record.
judgment:
before
Near v. Van Als
tyne, 14 Wend., 230.
But where a
defendant is sued by a wrong name.
but appears by his right mime, he

may be declared against by the latter.
for by appearing he admits himself
to be the person sued, and so the
variance is immaterial:
Willard v.
Mlssani, 1 Cow., 37.
31—Wellman v. Lawrence. 15 Mass.
326.
But where a Master's summons
required the parties to appear before
him on Wednesday, the 7th (lny of
Dcc., Wednesday being the 8th, the
court held that the day of the month.
and not the day of the week. must
govern when they fall on
diﬂerent
days, and that, it the mistake had
been in naming the day of the week
that pnrt ot the summons might be
rejected as surplusage, and the sum
mons still be good, unless the party
had been mislead by it:
Inzersoll v.
Kirby. Walk. Mich., Ch. R., 27.
Smith, 17 Wend.,
32——Stewart
v.
517.

31
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it,

justice must not only state the day and hour of appearance in
the process, but he must observe
and cannot_ call the suit
before that hour.“

is

is

is

a

is

is

it

is

is

is

Time of retunii.-A long summons may be made
§34.
returnable not less than six_nor more than twelve days from
A short summons may be made returnable not less
its date.‘
than two nor more than six'days from its datef ‘The cases of
Chaddock v. Barry,3 Crozier v, Allen‘ and Lemon v. Hampton,-"
seem to have settled, for this state, a somewhat uncertain con
dition of the law as to the computaton of time for the return
and service of the summons.
The rule established by the cases
in
ﬁxing
that
the return day the day of
requires
referred_to
excluded and the day of appearance or return day
issuing
included; that in ﬁxing the day of service the return day
included and the day of service
excluded, and
matters not
summons
short
If
summons.“
that the
the last day, which
otherwise might be ﬁxed for the return day, should fall on
the settled rule
Sunday, an earlier day must be ﬁxed.’
It
of law in the case of the short summons Sunday
to be ex
cluded in the computation of time!’ A reference to the previous
cases upon this question of the computation of time
made in
the cases cited.

a

Meaning of “month" and “year.”—In the con
_ §35.
struction of the statutes of this state, unless such construction
would be inconsistent with the manifest intention of the legis
lature, the word “month” shall be construed to mean a calendar
calendar year.”
month; and the word “year”

32

7

&

-

2

2—C. L., 5718.
3-93 Mich., 542; 53 N. W., 785.
4--117 Mich., 171; 75 N. W., 300.
5-128 Mich., 182; 87 N. W., 53.
6—Crozler v. Allen, 117 Mlch., 171;
75 N. W., 300; Lemon v. Hampton,
128 Mich., 182; 87 N. W., 53.
Cow., 147;
7-110: parts Dodge,
Hill, 375.
Anon.,
8-—Simonson v. Durfee, 50 Mich.,
80; 14 N. W., 706: Caupﬂeld v. Cook.
92 Mich., 626: 52 N. W.. 1031; Crozier
v. Allen, 117 Mich., 171; 75 N. W..
See, also, upon computation of
300.
v.
time exhaustive note to Halbert
San Saba Springs L.
L. S. Asn.,
\
49 L. R. A., 193.
9-—C. L., 950, clause 10.
2

33—Sagendorp v. Shult, 41 Barb.,
Where a writ was issued in
February, and made returnable the 2d
day of April, without naming the year,
or using the word "next,” it was held
suﬂlclently certain, as it must be un
derstood as referring to April of the
Nash v. Mallory,
then current year:
17 Mlch., 232.
So. if a summons were
issued on the ﬁrst day of November,
returnable on the 10th day of No
newt, it would be considered
vember
as returnable on the 10th day of N0
vcmber next ensulng—that ls, on the
tenth day of November instant, and
would be good: Drew v. Dequindre,
Doug., Mlch.. 93.
.
1—C. L., 5715.
102.

II.

Cn.

or

A
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§36. Plea, how named in the summons.-The summons
is, to answer the plaintiff in a plea in the same summons to be
mentioned.
In debt, say, “in a plea of debt for . . . . dollars.”
In covenant, “in a plea of breach of covenant, to his dam
dollars.”

age,

In

trespass,

“in

dollars.”

In

a plea

of

trespass,

to his damage one hundred

“in

a plea of trespass on the case upon prom
three hundred dollars.”
In trorer, and all actions on the case, “in a plea of trespass
on the case, to his damage . . . . dollars.”
A variance in this respect, between the summons and declara
tion in the statement of the cause of action or plea, would be

assumpsit,

ises, to his damage

'
a mere matter of form, and should not be regarded.”
And even the entire omission of the statement of the plea,
will be of no importance."

Amount

of

damages, how stated in summons.-The
claimed in the summons must not exceed
the jurisdiction of the justice, which, in actions upon contract,
extends to three hundred, and in torts, to one hundred dollars."
If the summons (and equally so of all process) claims an
amount in damages exceeding the jurisdiction of the justice, it

§37.

amount of damages

The service and return of such a sum
on the defendant to appear, and
mons imposes
gives the court no authority to proceed in the suit. Therefore,
if the defendant in such a. case does not appear, the defect is
not cured, although the plaintiﬁf in his declaration claims dam

will vitiate the writ.

no obligation

But if the defendant
declaration—that
to
a
one claiming
proper
and
plead
appear
damages within the jurisdiction of the court—the objection
the declaration where the summons
would be obviated." So,
within the jurisdiction of the court.

if

is,

ages

10—Bowen v. Ferne. 16 John., 160;
Delaney v. Nagle. 16 Barb., 96.
1i—Ib£d., and Cornell v. Bennett,
Rarh.. 657.
9.
12-—See. ante,
Hill, 631.
13—Yager v. Hannah,

633:

Wells

v.

Scott,

347.

Mich.,

5

Perine,
Barb.,
i4—Rockweii
v.
Unless the declaration should be

ii

573.

amended.

6

5

3

see,

4

is

right, claim such damages, all subsequent proceedings would
be void."
But when, in such case, the parties are in court, the
“When the party has been regu
declaration may be amended.

33
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larly brought into court, and is present when

the motion
there is no good reason why the pleadings may not
amended in a point touching the jurisdiction of the court,
well as in relation to any other matter.”1‘
Our statute
made,

II.
is
be
as

of

the power of the court to permit
of
the amendment
pleadings to lengths limited only by the
discretion of the court if there be something substantial to
amend, and the privilege asked is really an amendment and not
a new creation."
amendments"

If

has

carried

any amount of damages, it
or
might be amended."
would probably be sufficient,
A mistake of a year in the date of the summons may be
amended; and if not amended, would not, even if the defendant
the

summons omit to state

does not appear, be regarded on

certiorari."

in English.-“All writs,

process, pro
§38. Process to be
ceedings and records in any court within this state, shall be
in the English language (except that the proper and known
names of process, and technical words, may be expressed in
the language heretofore and now commonly used), and shall be

in a fair, legible character,
in words at length, and not abbreviated; but such abbreviations
as are now commonly used in the English language may be
used, and numbers may be expressed by Arabic ﬁgures, or Ro
man numerals, in the customary manner.”2°
made out on paper or parchment,

OF SERVING THE SUMMONS.

§39. Who may serve.-The statute, C. L., § 715, requires
the summons to be directed to any constable of the county in
which the justice resides, commanding him to summon the de
fendant, etc."

And it is

also provided,

15—Woolley v. Wiiber. 4 Denio, 570.
Denison v. Smith, 33 Mlch., 155.

See

16—C.

L.. §10268.

17-Schindler
Mich.,

154;

43

Railway
v.
N. W., 911.

Co.,

77

18-—Yager v. Hannah, 6 Hill, 631.
And where the summons was'tor $25
and the declaration claimed
damages,
a larger amount, but within the juris
diction of the justice, held, that the
Dennison
variance was immaterial:
v. Collins, 1 Cow., 111: see, Pew v.
Yoare, 12 Mich., 16.

“That any sheriff, un

See,
19—See poet, “Amendnients."
Nash v. Mallory. 17 Mich., 232.
20-—C. L., 5 1115.
Publication in a
newspaper published in a foreign lan
guage
though the particular
matter
was printed therein in English is not
a good publication:
Schanie v. Wasey,
‘I0 Mich., 414; 38 N. W! 317: Visscher
v. Ottawa
Circuit Judge, 116 Mich.,
‘
666: 74 N. W., 1013.
21—Constables are ministerial
oth
cers of justices of the peace:
C. L.,
§2368; nee. Faulks
People. 39
v.
Mich., 200.
As to the powers and

34
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der sheriif or deputy sheriﬁf of any county of this state may
and shall hereafter be fully authorized to serve or execute any
and all process, civil or criminal, issued, or which may by law
be issued, by any justice of the peace, and to have and to exer
cise all the powers and duties of constables,” etc.”
And the justice may, if he shall judge it expedient, on the
request of a party, by written authority endorsed on the sum
mons, empower a proper person of lawful age, and not a. party
or interested in the suit, to serve it.”
And the statute further provides, that the ‘summons may
be served by any competent person, and proof thereof by
such person, by aiﬁdavit ﬁled in the cause. shall have the same
eiIect as if served by any constable/'2"
duties of constables and nature of the
oﬂice.
see. Allor v. Wayne Auditors,
A con
43 Mir.-h.. 76; 4 N. W., 492.
C. L.,
stable may serve the summons:

if

2367.

T15.

Parmalee v. Loomis. 2-1 .\ilch.,
242, it was said that the service by
a constable of a. summons in his own
and
favor was only an irregularity,
judgment
the
would not invalidate
collaterally:
but
it
when
attacked
seems to have been since held that a
in
constable cannot serve a summons
Mor
a suit in which he is plaintiﬂ:
A party
ton v. (‘rane, 39 Mich.. 526.
to n suit cannot serve the summons
Bush v. Mcacham,
therein himself:
53 i\iich.. 574: 19 N. W., 192.
By authority of
22——C. L., §2595.
this section a sherilf or his deputy may
serve writs and levy executions issued
by justices of the peace. directed to
“any constable," ctc.. without any spe
cial direction from the justice given
for that purpose:
Foster v. Wiley.
27 Mlch.. 2-H; see, Faulke v. People.
39 Mlch.. 200.
23—C. L., I978.
See Gadsby v.
Stimcr. 79 i\(ich., 260; 44 N. W., 606;
King v. Bates. 80 liIich.. 867: .45 N.
W., 147.
The authority of a private
person to serve a summons
must be
found on
or no Jurisdiction is
acquired, th%writ
an
he must have been se
let-ted upon sumclent inquiry to deter
mine his competency: Rasch v. Moore.
57 Mich.. 54: 23 N. W., 456; Union
Mutual
Fire ins. Co. v. Page. 61
It is not
Mlch.. 72; 27 N. W., 859.
In

that the justice
necessary.
however.
certify that the person authorized is of
Buel v. Duke,
axe and disinterested:
38 Mich., 167.
24—C. L., $716.
But a summons
cannot be directed to any one but a
constable. except by personal appoint
ment of the Justice.
It cannot be di
generally to “any
rccted
competent
pcrs0n:"
Rasch v. Moore. 57 Mich..
The plaintilf
54: 23 N. W., 456.
in a suit cannot- serve the summons
therein in his own favor:
Bush v.
.\Icacham. _53 Mlch., 574; 19 N. W.,
192.
Nor docs the statute authoriz
ing service by “any competent person"
permit such service to be made by a
private person until he has been ap
pointed by the justice for that pur
pose, after an inquiry not only as to
his age. but also into such other facts
as would bear upon the propriety oi‘
the selection.
and a determination that
he is competent.
as required by the
statute, 55 978. 979.
And this deter
mlnation must be made before the writ
is served,
and the record must show
it, or the service will not be held
good:
Rasch v. Moore. supra. Union
Mutual Fire ins. Co. v. Page, 61 Mlch..
72; 27 N. W., 859; King v. Bates. 80
And the
Mich.. 369; 45 N. W., 147.
authority to make service must be in
]Md.,- Union Mu
dorsed on the writ.
tual Fire Ins. Co. v. Page. 61 1iIlch..
And the justice
72: 27 N. W., S59.
must assure himself that the person
is not interested, lbid.
For proceed
ings. to authorize a private person to
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Where and how served—in county where issued.
summons,” under § 716, “shall in all cases, except as here
inafter otherwise provided, be served at least six days before
the time of appearance mentioned therein; and if the defendant
be found, it shall be served by delivering to him a copy thereof;
'§ 40.

“A

but if the defendant shall not be found, it shall be served by
leaving a copy thereof at the defendant’s last place of abode,
in the presence of some one of the family, of suitable age and
discretion, who shall be informed of its contents.”2°
§~ﬂ. In other counties.—“When an action on any con
tract or obligation shall have been or shall be brought before
any justice of the peace of this state against two or more joint
defendants, one or more of whom shall not reside or be found

in the county where the suit shall be brought, and one or more
of the defendants shall be served with process in the county
where suit is commenced, and due proof of such service shall
be ﬁled with the justice of the peace before whom such suit is
pending, upon application of the plaintiff in such action, at
any time within four days from the return day of the writ by
which such action was commenced, the justice shall issue one
or more alias writs of summons or other writ whereby such
suit was commenced, returnable not less than six or more than
twelve days from date of issue, directed to the sheriff or any
constable of the county or counties where such defendant or
defendants not so served may be found; and the justice shall
endorse on such alias writ or writs what defendant or defend
ants have been served in the county where such suit is com
menced,

proof of service ﬁled with such justice;
duty of such sht-riﬁ’ or constable to serve such

as shown by the

and it shall be the
process not less than six days from the return day thereof, and
make return thereof to the justice of the peace issuing the same:
vi, "0!
process,
see, post, chap.
certain matters in relation to process."
serve

As to service by copy. see iron Cliifs
v. Lahais.
52 l\iich.. 397: 18 N.
W.. 121.
Co.

Upon question of
25—-C. L.. $716.
computation of time for service. see.
ante, 5 34.
Any constable may serve
any writ. process or order lawfully di
rected to him, in any township in his

county:
C. L., § 2367.
Service can be
made only within
the county:
Hart
lord Fire Ins. Co. v. Owen, 30 Mich.,
Service, beyond the jurisdiction
441.
of the court which issued it, is of no
avail: McEwen v. Zlmmer, 38 Mich.,
765.
Service of process by merely
laying it upon the body oi’ a man tno
sick
to
understand
it is invalid:
Midier v. Judge of Superior Court, 38
.\iich., 310.
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Provided, That it shall be the duty of the justice of the peace
on the return day of the ﬁrst writ, to continue the cause upon
his own motion, and without pleadings, until the return day of
the alias writ or writs.”1
Process cannot be served on 8unciay.—“No person
§4B.
shall serve or execute any civil process from midnight pre
ceding to miilniglit. tbllowing the said ﬁrst day of the week;
but such service shall be void,” etc.”
Service on corporations.-In
suits against corpora
leaving
summons
is
“served
a copy thereof with
by
tions the
the president, cashier, secretary, treasurer, or any other oﬂicer

§43.

or agent of such corporation, or by leaving such copy at the
banking house or office of such corporation; and upon return
of such service being made, such corporation shall be deemed to
be in court, and the like proceedings, as near as may be, shall
be thereupon had, as in cases o'f suits between individuals.”~“
“Whenever in any suit or proceeding either in law or equity,

it shall

toserve any

notice, or writ
ing upon any railroad company in this state, it shall be sufficient
to serve the same upon any station agent, or ticket agent at any
station or depot along the line, or at the end of the railroad of
such company, and such service shall be deemed as good and
become necessary

process,

effectual as if made on the oﬁicers, stockholders, or members
or either of them of such company.”
Where the docket
L.. I720.
show that the action was on
in what county defendant
contract:
resides; that the alias writ was di
to the sheriif of the county
rected
where the non-resident resides; that
the justice indoraed the alias writ
showing that service had been made
on the resident defendant, the service
Reed
of the alias writ was held had:
— Mlch., —; 95 N. W.,
v. Parker,
979 (July, 1903).
2—(‘. L.. 55916; Anderson ct al. v.
If n legal paper
Birce. 8 Mlch., 280.
is made and uttered on a legal day,
it will not be void for having been
mistakenly dated on Sunday:
Van
Sickle v. People, 29 Mlch., 61.
1901,
3—C. L.. 5754. as amended.
Public Acts, p. 101.
Ree. Gallagher
v. Am. Express Co., 56 Mlch., 13: 22
1—C.

fails

to

N. W., 96; Watson v. Judge of Wayne
Circuit, 24 Mlch., 38: Hartford
Fire
ins. Co. v. Owen, 30 Mlch., 441; Am.
Express Co. v. Conant, 45 Mlch., 642,
8 N. W., 574.
This section. {754.
applies only to domestic corporations:
Reath v. Telegraph Co., 89 Mlch., 22
50 N. W., 817.
A corporation created by, and io
cated in, this state. can he sued only
in the county where it is located, un
less service of process is made person
ally on some one of the oﬂicers indi
cated hy law as the proper person
to
represent it for that purpose.
There
he no substituted
can
service under
C. L..
510468. for want of ﬁnding
such officers, except in the home coun
ty: Detroit F‘. 8: M. Ins. Co. v. Judge
of Saginaw Circuit, 23 Mlch., 492.
4—C. L.. 5 10022.
This section pur
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In suits against school districts, the summons is

leaving a. copy with the treasurer of the district, at least eight
The same rules for the
days before the return day thereof?
as
in
cases of summons gen
computation of time obtain here
erally.
§44.

of

Time of service.--Fractions of

process

are

not regarded.

a day

in the service

A summons returnable

on

the

eighth, in the morning, may be served as well in the afternoon
as the forenoon of the ﬁrst.“
Service by c0py.—When the service is by copy, the
§45.
oﬁicer should leave a copy of the summons, endorsed thus:
E. . .. R. . . ., Constable.”
“Copy——

If

there are two or more defendants, although they reside at

the same place, a copy should be

left for

each

of

the1n."'

When not on electors.-“During the day on which
any election shall be held, pursuant to the provisions of law,
no civil process shall be served on any elector entitled to vote
The statute extends to all writs, whether
at such election.”8
original or judicial, and to a warrant or summons, by which a
man is called into court to answer in a civil action as a party;
§46.

The service of an execu
and to executions against the body.
tion upon the property of a defendant is not prohibited by it.”
by Act
ports to have been repealed
In
number 260 of the P. A. of 1899.
fact it was re-enacted with a pro
viso “that in counties where the com
pany has no such station or ticket
oilice service may be made by serving
any conductor of a
upon
the same
freight or passenger train." See, City
of Detroit v. Wabash, St. Louis 8: Pa
ciﬁc Ry. Co., 63 Mlch., 714; 30 N.
W.. 321.
Both of these sections, 5 10022 and
Public Acts 1901, p. 101, amending
$754, C. L., 1897, are in force in re
lation to service oi’ process from jus
Fowler v. Detroit &
tices’ courts:
Milwaukee Ry. Co., 7 Mic-h., 79: De
troit Fire and Marine Ins. Co. v.
Judge of Saginaw Circuit, 23 Mich..
495; Simpson v. Mansﬁeld Ry. Co., 38
Mich., 628.
L., 5 4722. as amended
by
5-—C.
Public Acts 1901, p. 228.
6—Columbia Turnpike Road v. Hay

ward, 10 Wend., 422; Griﬂin v. For
rest, 49 Mich., 309; 13 N. W,, 603.
7—l'll1t£‘lll11B
v. Latimer,
5 Porter,
Ind., 67.
When under C. L., §716, service is
made by copy, it must be left at “de
fendant's last place of abode ;" leaving
the copy at his place of business is not
Halsey v. Ilnrd. 6 McLean,
suﬂicient:
14.

The copy must be left at defendant's
last place of abode, in presence
of
Leaving it
some one of the family.
in presence
of a person not shown
to he one of the family, is not sulﬁ
cient:
Laidlaw v. Morrow, 44 Mich..
547, 550; 7 N. W., 191.
An error in the copy served, if it
Mer
does not mislead, is immaterial:
rick v. Mayhue, 40 Mich., 198.
8——C. L., 53717.
Wend.,
9—Corlies
v.
20
lloimes.
681.
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Of the rei;ui'n.—“The constable serving a summons,
§47.
warrant, attachment or other process, shall return thereon, in
writing, signed by him, the time and manner of executing the
same; and, in case of a warrant, he shall in such return, state
the fact whether he has or has not notiﬁed the plaintiif.”1°
The omission of the time of service would not be an objec
tion to the jurisdiction of the justice, when the service was
personal, the error would be available only in a proceeding to
reverse the judgment, in case the defendant does not appear,

But, notwithstanding this
or appears and makes objection."
case, it will be well for a justice always to require a return
which will show a proper service.

It

should appear by the return of a summons against a cor

poration, in what manner the process

was served;

so

that the

justice may be able to determine whether it was served on the
proper person."

To give a justice jurisdiction and to authorize

him to render judgment

against a defendant

appear,

there must be a return

process.‘

3

In

a

suit against

a

showing personal service

corporation,

10—C. L., £743.
The officer's re
is con
return of service of process
clusive, in collateral proceedings, upon
the parties to the suit in which it was
issued:
Michels v. Stork. 52 l\Iich.,
260; 17 .\'. W., 833. The return to an
attachment may be amended: Kidd v.
Dougherty, .39 Mlch.. 240; 26 N. W.,
510.
So may return
to summons:
C. L., 1897. §10271.
See cases cited
in note to this section.
An error in the cupy served that
does not mislead is immaterial:
Mer
rick v. lliayhue. 40 .\iich., 196.
Substituted service in cases where
personal service is impossible, cannot
be made before the last day on which
service may be made:
Iron Ciiﬂfs Co.
v. Lahais, 52 Mlch., 394: 18 N. W.,
121; Isabelle v. Iron Cliffs Co., 57
l\ilch., 120: 23 N. W., 613.
Such serv
ice must be made by leaving the copy
at the defendant's last place of abode,
In the presence of some one of the fam
Leaving it with some one not
ily.
shown by the return to be a member

who does not

the return

of

of the constable

of the family, is insuﬂicient:
Laidlaw
v. Morrow, 44 Mich., 550-1; 7 N. W.,
191.

11—Bi-omley v. Smith, 2 Illll, 517.
the return falls to show the time of
service, and the defendant does not
appear, or, appearing, objects to the
sufficiency of the return, any judg
ment rendercd by the justice will be
Ibid., and
set aside on ecrtiarari:
Wheeler v. Lapham, 14 Johns., 481;
Stewart v. Smith. 17 Wend., 517. But
in
such case, if the defendant ap
pears,
and,
without objection to the
return, pleads in bar, the irregularity
will be waived:
Wheeler v. Lapham,
H Johns., 481; Campau v. Fairbanks,
1 Mich., 151.
12—Sherwood v. The S. 8: W. R. R.
Co., 15 Barb., 650.
13-—Manning v. Johnson, 7 Bat-b.,
457; Brown v. Cady, 19 Wend., 477:
Morton v. Franc, 39 Mich., 529; Smal
iey v. Llghthail,
37 Mich., 350; Laid
iaw v. Morrow, 44 Mich., 548; 7 N.
W., 191.

If
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that the person served is an officer of the corporation, is suf
ﬁcient evidence of that fact to give the justice jurisdiction.“
Where one of several defendants named in a summons is
served, it is not necessary to notice in the return the defendant
or defendants upon whom no service was made."
Upon a summons against several, a return that it was served
on the defendant, without naming which,,would be void.
Proceedings after service by copy.—“If it appear
by the return of the constable that the summons was not per
sonally served, and the defendant shall not appear on the return
day thereof, the plaintiff may thereupon take out a. new sum
mons against the defendant in continuation of his suit, return
§-18.

able not less than three nor more than twelve days from

the
at least two days before the
time of appearance mentioned therein, and if such summons
be returned that the defendant cannot be found after diligent
inquiry, the plaintiff may, in further continuance of his suit,
have an attachment against the defendant in actions upon con
date thereof, which shall be served

tract, on ﬁling an affidavit as to the amount claimed to be due.
and executing a. bond as in oth er cases. ”1°
14—New York & Erie Ry. Co. v.
Purdy, 18 Barb., 574: Wheeler v. N.
Y. & II. R. R. Co., 24 Barb., 414. The
statutes providing for service of proc
ess on various named corporation oili
cers, only apply to our own corpora
tions, and were not designed to reach
foreign corporations;
in cases
except
where special provision has been made
otherwise, the remedy as to foreign
corporations must be sought as at com
mon law:
Watson v. Judge of Wayne
Circuit,
Mich., 38.
By 510442
24
provision
commencing
is made for
suits against foreign corporations be
fore justices in cases where the cause
of action arises in Michigan:
Iron
Co.
Co.,
v.
Construction
61
Mich..
226; 28 N. W., 77; Ryerson v Judge,
114 Mlch., 352: 72 N. W., 131.
Serv
ice of process as commencement
of suit
against a foreign corporation for a
cause of action arising out of this state,
upon an oﬂicer of that corporation
then being casually within this state,
but not here in the performance of the
duties of his oﬂice, nor authorized by
the corporation to submit to such erv

ice, confers no jurisdiction:
Newell v.
Great Western Ry. Co. of Canada, 19
Mich., 336.
allowing
The
statutes
corporations to be sued within three
years
expiration
of
after
the
their charters, and enumerating the
oﬂicers upon whom the service may be
made,
bring them
within
the
same
rules that apply to existing corpora
tions in case such oﬂrlcers do not ex
ist, or cannot be found. and allow the
same proceedings to obtain substituted
service:
Merrill v.
C. L., 510469;
Montgomery, 25 Mich., 73.
15—Fogg v. Child. 13 Barb., 246;
1 Cow. '1‘reat., 2d ed., 504.
16—C. L., §717.
Under this stat
ute, when the defendant is not found
and service is made by copy, the plain
tiff,
appears.
unless the
defendant
must take out a new summons in con
tinuation
of the suit:
Morton
v.
Crane, 39 Mich., 529;
Smalley
v.
Lighthali,
37 Mlch., 350; Laidlaw
v.
Morrow, 44 Mich., 548; 7 N. W., 191_
When a summons is returned without
personal service. such return of non
servlee
is the evidence upon which a

40

Cu;

II.

or

A

summons.

§ 49

By this section the law allows the plaintiff, in actions upon
contract, in case a sole defendant is not personally served, and
does not appear, or

if

none of several defendants are thus served
and appear, to issue a summons returnable in the time and in
the manner speciﬁed in the section, upon which, if returned not
personally served upon the'sole defendant, or upon none, if
several,

and none, where there are several,

appear, to obtain an

attachment.
The affidavit for the attachment, in such cases, should be en
titled in the cause.
A second summons should be i mued within a reasonable time
after the return of the ﬁrst, in order to be a continuation of
the suit; and it would be advisable, if not necessary, to issue it
on the day of the return of the ﬁrst summons."

§49.

justice.-It

Transfer to another

Allen v.
summons may issue.
Mich., 127.
ﬁrst summons is returned
if
without personal service and a new
under the pro
summons is issued.
visions of this section, the plaintiff,
instead of resorting to a writ of at
tachment. may keep the suit alive by
the issue of successive writs cf sum
mons until the defendant is found
and personally served, or he may have
ilowell v. Shepard,
an attachment:
And
48 Mich., 472: 12 N. W.. 661.
it would seem that a return to a sum
mons, in order to authorize a writ of
attachment in continuation of the suit.
ought to show, in the languayze of
the statute, that "the dc/cndant could
not be found u1ter diligent inquiry.”
But see Brown v. Knnp, — Mich., —;
100 N. W., 466 (July, 1904), holding
that it is not necessary that the re
turn show that after diligent search
he was unable to find defendant and
had therefore left a copy of the sum
mons at his last place of abode, before
it is
an alias summons may issue.
also held in this case that the justice
need not wait one hour after the re
turn hour before issuing the alias writ.
it is also here held that in comput
ing the four days within which the
alias may issue the return day is to
he counted.
New summons and service thereof in
second

Mills,

26
the

41

that in

is provided

continuation, etc.:
Lahals,
52 Mich.,

Iron Cliffs
397;

18

Co. v.
W.,
N.

121.

Where
the
defendant
cannot
be
found and there is no personal service
summons,
of the
service by copy
cannot be made before the last day
making
allowed by the statute for
service.
If either the ﬁrst or second
summons is served by copy, or if the
summons is returned prior to the last
day upon which such service can be
made, the court will acquire no juris
diction to issue an attachment in con
Iron Cliﬂfs Co.
tinuation of the suit:
V. Lahais, 52 Mich., 394; 18 N. W.,
121.
It is the duty of the constable in
good faith and diligently
to endeavor
to make personal service of the sum
mons on the defendant,
and he must
diligence
during
exercise
that
the
whole time given him by law to per
form that duty, and he has no right
to make return of the summons "not
found," until the time has expired in
which he could lawfully make service.
The jurisdiction of the justice depends
upon a proper return, showing a dill
gent attempt to make such personal
service:
Isabelle v. Iron (‘ills Co., 57
Mich., 120: 23 N. W., 613.
Requi
sitcs of return: see Segar v. Shingle,
etc., Co., 81 Mich., 344: 45 N. W.,
982.

17—Bisseli

v.

Sill,

1 Wend., 210.
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of the defendant that the
justice before whom the summons is returned is a material wit
case

made to appear by aﬂidavit

ness or has

advised respecting the matters involved, that the
justice shall transfer the cause to the nearest qualiﬁed justice

in

county."

the

_

OF A WARRANT,

Of
§

THE SERVICE AND RETURN.
the Warrant.

In actions on contra.ct.—“The

50.

plaintiff

in

actions

arising out of, or founded upon contract, shall be entitled to a
warrant, upon ﬁling with the justice an aﬁidavit made by the
plaintiff, or some one in his behalf, that the plaintiff has good
reason
1.

to believe:

.

That plaintiff has a demand against the defendant for

money collected by him as a public ofﬁcer; or,
2. That the plaintiff has a demand against the defendant for
damages arising from the misconduct or neglect of the defend
ant in any professional employment or public oﬁice; or,
That there was fraud or breach of trust; or that defendant
3.
does not reside in this state, and has not, for one month imme
diately preceding the time of making the applicatioin.”1”
That_part of the third subdivision of the foregoing section
a warrant solely on the ground that the
defendant does not reside in the state, conﬂicts with Art. 6,
§ 33, of the_Constitution, which provides, that “N 0 person shall
be imprisoned for debt arising out of or founded on a contract,
express or implied, except in cases of fraud,” etc.”

in italics, authorizing

See post, chap.

viii.

a

5

5
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daugh v. Williams,
N. W., 34.
20—Chappee v.

48

Mich.,

Thomas,

172;

12

Mich.,

58.

21—It

a justice issue a warrant
an uﬂidavit, he is n tres
passer.
Without such aﬂidavlt there
is no authority to issue the process.
In such case the plaintiff is also
trespasser:
Gold v. Bisseil,
Wend..
210; Evcrtson
Sutton,
Wend.,
v.
without

a

835.

5

L.,

L.,
Q722;
19—C.
v.
Chappee
Thomas,
Mich., 53.
oﬂic%proi’essional
employ
Public
of trust—as
to
ment—i'raud—hreach
See, notes to {Q 722
what constitutes:
and 9996, C. L., 1897.
26, re
The constitution, Art. vi,
quires a showing oi’ probable cause
under oath before
warrant can issue:
Proctor v. Prout, 17 Mich., 473; Med

5 1

18-—C.

5

is,

§51. The aﬁidawit.—A warrant can in no case issue, ex
a written declaration upon
cept upon an afﬁdavitﬁl that
The affidavit should not be entitled in any cause, for
oath.
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It is
until the process is issued there is no suit in existence.
not essential that the aiﬁdavit should be signed by the deponent.
the witness be sworn, and the justice take down and certify

If

the testimony, it is a suﬂicient afﬁdavit."
281;
175;
592;
96.

Vosburgh v. Welch, 11 .'l’ohns.,
\Vhitney
1 Denio,
V. Shufeit,
Barb.,
Davis v. Marshall,
14

An aﬂidavlt for a warrant must set
forth a cause of action within the
Sin
statute authorizing a warrant:
ger Manufacturing
Co. v. .\icAiiister,
19 Mich., 215.
The Constitution
of this state de
clares that no warrant
shall issue
to arrest any person “without prob
able cause, supported by oath or af
This requires facts to be
firmation."
set out, and mere belief, without some
showing as to its foundation, is in
suﬂElcient':
De Long v. Briggs, 47
Mich., 624: 11 N. W., 412.
No arrest
can be made except on sworn evidence
of facts:
Sheridan v. Briggs, 53 Mich.,
569; 19 N. W., 189.
A statement in
the aﬂidavit
that "the deponent has
good
reason to believe
that he has
a cause of action," eic., is not probable
Facts showing that there is
cause.
probable cause,
must be sworn to:
hleddaugh v. Williams, 48 Mich., 172;
12 N. W., 34.
It seems that the amdnvit may set
forth the grounds of the application
for the warrant upon belief; but. to
show the grounds of this belief, the
atlidavlt. must set forth such
facts
and circumstances within
the plain
tiff‘s knowledge as will authorize the
justice
who issues the warrant
to
ﬁnd such a state of facts as is re
quired by the statute to authorize
'i‘hc warrant
the proceeding.
cannot
be issued upon hearsay, nor upon any
statement. however positive. founded
hearsay.
upon
if the pialntiﬂ him
self is not personally cognizant of
the facts and circumstances relied on,
he must procure the atlidavit ‘of some
one who has personal knowledge of
them:
Proctor
v. Prout,
17 .\lich.,
473.
An affidavit for a writ which
will deprive a person of his liberty,
must not only set forth the facts and
circumstances in detail. and not con
clusions or inferences from facts. but

they must be facts in the personal
knowledge of the deponent:
Sheri
dan v. Brlggﬂ. 53 Mich., 569; 19 N.
W., 189.
The facts stated in the aiiidavit as
the ground for issuing the warrant,
must be given in the same way as by
a witness on the stand.
There must
be a distinct
averment of such fact
upon knowledge, and the facts must
be such as in law tend to make out
the cause of complaint.
It is not for
the afiiant to draw his own inferences.
He must state facts which justify
The
the magistrate in drawing them.
facts must be stated upon knowledge:
And
Brown v. Kelly, 20 Mich., 33.
the atﬁdnvit must be of the same legal
quality, as evidence, as would be re
quired at the trial to establish the
facts relied on for cause of arrest:
Sheridan v. Briggs, 53 .\ilch.,. 569;
19 N. W., 189.
The aiilidavlt need
not in terms state that the facts are
sworn to on the personal knowledge
of atliant if it purports so to be and
the facts are from their nature within
his knowledge:
Pauius v. Grobbon,
See,
104 Mich., 42; 62 N. W., 160.
further, Shaw v. Ashford, 110 Mich.,
534; 68 N. W., 281.
Deleon in the aﬂidavit for a war
rant will be waived by pleading to
the merits and going to trial and judg
ment
without objection made to the
aflidavit:
Maxwell v. Deens, 46 Mich.,
35; 8 N. W., 561; Jackiin v. Soutier,
82 Mich., 648; 46 N. W., 1027.
But
if, before pleading, objection is made
to the suﬂiciency of the aﬂidavit plead
ing to the merits thereafter will be no
waiver: Warren v. Crane, 50 Mich.,
300; 15 N. W., 465.
Nor will giving
bond on arrest and obtaining an ad
journment of the cause waive defects
in the aiiidavit if objection is made
thereto before pleading to the merits:
Brown v. Kelly, 20 Mich., 32-3.
22—.\filiius
v. Shafer, 3 Denio, 60.
“As the atﬂrlavit begins with the name
of the party making it, and appears
to have been duly sworn to before a
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The form of the oath or afﬁrmation to the aﬁidavit may be as
“You do solemnly swear that the contents of this
a/ﬁdat-it by you subscribed are true ,-” or, “You do solemnly and
since-rely a/ﬁrm that the contents of this affidavit by you sub
scribed are true, and this you do under the pains and penalties

follows:

of perjury.”

If

the person is conscientiously opposed to taking an oath,
he is permitted, instead of swearing, solemnly and sincerely to
aﬂirm, under the pains and penalties of perjury."
The statute requires the ﬁling of the aﬂidavit with the jus
tice. A paper is said to be ﬁled when it is delivered to the
proper ofﬁcer, and by him received to be kept on ﬁle.“
The aﬁidavit must, in'all cases, state that the demand arises
out of, or is founded on, contract.
Affidavit for Fraud or Breach of Trust.—“In all cases on
application for a warrant under the third subdivision of section
nineteen, the person applying therefor shall, by affidavit, show
the facts and circumstances within the knowledge of the person
making such aﬂidavit, constituting the grounds of the applica

is

is,

tion, whereby the justice may the better judge of the necessity
and propriety of issuing such warrant. ’_’2“
In all cases within the third subdivision of the section above
referred to—that
where fraud or breach of trust
alleged
the facts and circumstances establishing the fraud or breach of
trust, must be stated in the afﬁdavit; the belief of the person
The plaintiif’s own
making the affidavit will not be suﬂicient.2°
v. Andrew, 51 Mich.,
W., 250.
The fact that
the attorney in the cause administers
the oath is not an incurable detect.
It may be waived:
Germaine v. Mus
105 Mich., 213; 63 N. W., 78.
kcgon.
The fact that one administers the oath
who is subsequently employed
as at
torney in the cause does not make
the aﬂidavit defective:
v.
Sullivan
Hall, 86 Mich., 7; 48 N. W.. 646.
23—C. L.,
10206.
24—Bouv. Law Dic., “Fiie."
25—C. L.,
724.
Sec. 19 referred
to, is C. L.,
722.
26—Taiman v. Bigeiow, 10 \Vend..
4'20: Proctor v. Front. 17 Mich.. 473;
Sheridan v. Briggs. 53 !\Iich.. 569;
19 N. W., 189.
16

N.

§

i()0;

5

3

a

........,”

§2640; Bradley

Q

3

it

sum
proper magistrate, we think
John.,
Jackson v. Virgil,
cientz"
540.
The jurat to an affidavit sworn
to before a justice of the peace, in the
“Sworn and subscribed this
words:
. . . . . . .. day of
but omit
nui
ting the words "before me,” is
iity by reason of the omission:
Smart,
Mich., 590.
But it has
v. Ilowe,
since been held, that where the aili
dnvit is used before the oﬂicer who ad
ministered the oath. the omission in
the jurat oi.’ the words “before me,”
In the matter of
does not vitiate it:
Teachout, 15 Mich., 346.
It is im
proper for attorneys to administer aﬂ1
.\i‘<-(‘asiin
davlts in their own causes:
By statute
v. Camp, 26 Mich.. 390.
C. L., 1897,
it is now prohibited:
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belief is neither a fact nor circumstance upon which the justice
It is not suﬁicient that ‘the plaintiﬁ
can exercise his judgment.
is satisﬁed of the unlawful acts or intentions of the defendant.
The justice must be satisﬁed, and he must be so satisﬁed from

proof of facts and circumstances; not the belief of any one.
Facts must be shown to the justice, which shall leave no rea
sonable doubt on his mind that the defendant has committed a
fraud or breach of trust. It is not enough that the affidavit is
satisfactory to the plaintiff. The justice must be satisﬁed, ahd
has no right to be satisﬁed unless upon legal proof; proof of
facts and circumstances, not belief alone?"
Nor would an affi
davit be suﬁicient which stated positively that the defendant
had committed the fraud or breach of trust, if it omitted to state
the facts and circumstances. The afﬁant may honestly believe,
and thus aﬁirm it in general terms; whereas, if called to state
the facts and circumstances upon which he reached the conclu
sion, the justice (being thus enabled to exercise his judgment

in the matter) might well differ from him.” It is suﬂicient,
however, to swear to the party ’s belief of the ground upon which

this application is made, if the facts and circumstances consti
tuting the ground of the application are set forth and are suf

All

ﬁcient.”

the affidavit;

be set forth in
cannot be supplied

the facts and circumstances must
any deﬁciency in this respect

by proof or a verbal statement to the justice.”
~

27-Loder v. Phelps. 13 Wend., 46:
Smith v. Lucc, 14 Wend., 237.
be
Facts and circumstances must
stated. from which the justice is to
judicially determine as to the neces
sity and propriety of issuing the war
rant:
Stewart v. Brown. 16 Barb..
367.
This was an attachment case.
hut the snme rules are applicable to a
Cow. Trcat.. 2d ed.. 467.
warrant.
Nor can a justice issue a warrant upon
his own knowledge of facts, or upon
that he is satisﬁed from
the pretense
such knowledge that a warrant ought
to issue, but only'upon such facts set
forth in the aﬂidavit. as would warrant
him in determining judicially that it
was a proper case for issuing the writ:
v. Tobias,
12
Ibid.. p. 480; Money
Johns., 422: 2 \\'ait‘s Law and Prac.,
Vnshurgh v. Welch. 11
2d ed.. 99;
45

Johns., 175: Loder v. Phelps. 13 Wend..
46.
See note 21, ante, p. 42.
2S—E: parts Robinson, 21 Wend.,
672: Stewart v. Brown, 16 Barb.. 367.
Wend.,
29—Johnson
v. Moss., 20
145.

30—Cornfort

v. Gillespie,

18

Wend.,

The same principle is applica
404.
ble to each of the other provisions of
this section, of the statute as to that

provision concerning fraud or breach
of trust.
The aﬂidavlt should state
It
facts and not belief or conclusions.
would not be suﬂicient to allege that
moneys
the defendant is withholding
“collected by him as a public oflicer"
or that defendant is guilty of "mis
conduct in ofﬁce" or that he is guilty
employ
of “neglect in professional
ment." The nfiidavit should state the
facts and let the court determine from
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The proof must establish at least a prima facie case under
some clause of the statute, or the justice should not issue the
warrant.
Unless such a case is made out by the affidavit, the
whole proceeding would be void, and the justice a trespasserﬁ“

In actions for tort—Pena1ties, etc.—“In actions other
§ 52.
than those founded on judgment or contract, the plaintiﬂf shall
be entitled to a warrant if he, or some person in his behalf, shall
make and ﬁle with the justice an affidavit specifying the nature
of

a statement that the deponent

the demand, and containing

has good reason to believe, either:
1.
That the defendant has committed a trespass, or other
wrong, to the damage of the plaintiff ; or,
2. That the defendant has incurred a penalty or forfeiture
by the violation of some law of this state, which the person

ﬁling such affidavit has
people of this state, or

a

right to prosecute in the

name

of the

otherwise.”-"'2

the facts whether the money withheld
was collected by defendant as a "pub
lic oﬂ"lcer;" whether there was “mis
conduct" and if there was, whether it
was “in oﬁice;" whether there was
“neglect" and if so whether it was
See,
in a professional employment.
ante, 5 51, p. 42, note 21.
v. Lascelies. 20 Wend.,
31—~Connell
77: and see, Cow. Treat., 2d ed., 487;
Loder v. Phelps, 13 Wend., 48; Vos
burgh v. Welch, 11 John., 175; Davis
v. Marshall,
14 Barb., 96.
But it seems that where there is
some proof tending to show a reason
able ground for issuing the writ, an
error in judgment by the justice as
to its suﬂiciency would not make him
See, Vosburgh v. Weich,
a trespasser:
175; Rash v. Whitney, 4
11 Johns.,
Mlch., 495, 502-3: Johnson v. Morton,
94 Mk-h., 8; 53 N. W., S16.
32—C. L.. 5 723; see, Pardee v.
Smith, 27 Mich., 33; and ante, 5 14,
note.
For the requisite of an afﬂdavit for
a warrant, see, ante, p. 42, note 21.
for a
An aﬂldavit for a warrant
tort, must set forth facts and cir
cumstances to establish the tort, so
that the justice may determine whether
there is probable ground for believ
ing that a wrong has been committed.

Mere allegations of wrong. which are
plaintiffs deductions from states of
fact not set forth. are insuﬂiclent:
Singer Manufacturing
Co. v. McAllis
ter, 19 Mlch., 215.
An affidavit for a warrant in tres
pass which sets forth the cause or
ground therefor as follows: “That de
ponent has, as he has good reason to
believe, a just cause of action against
W . . . . ..D . . . . .., of . . . . .., in the
township of . . . .
in said county.
against whom he applies for process
by
warrant
for trespass committed
by said W . . . . ..D . . . . .., upon lands
owned by this deponent,
said lands
being in," etc., is merely a statement
on belief, and of the plaintiff's
con
clusions, and is insuﬂiclent.
It states
no fact upon which the justice cnn de
termine as to whether there has been
a trespass or not, or as to whether
there is probable cause for isuing his
warrant:
De Long v. Briggs,
47
Mich., 624; 11 N. W., 412; Maxwell
v. Deens, 46 Mich., 35; 8 N. W., 581;
Meddaugh v. Williams, 48 Mich., 171;
12 N. W., 34: Warren v. Crane, 50
Mich., 300: 15 N. W.. 465.
And see
Ibid.,
affidavit there held insumcient:
p. 301.

An affidavit which
defendant has taken
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Against defendant by ﬁctitious name.--The statute
provides that, “When the name of any defendant shall not be
§53.

known to the plaintiﬂ’, he may be described in the process and
proceeding by a ﬁctitious name,” etc.-"'3
§54. Defective aﬁdavits.—Whenever a justice is satisﬁed
that the aﬂidavit upon which a warrant has been issued is
fatally defective, he should at once discharge the defendant
from arrest, and it is said that a defendant is permitted to
controvert the truth of the facts stated in the plaintiff’s afﬁdavit,
even when they make a prima facie case upon their face.-"4

Content of the warra.nt.—“A warrant shall be directed
to any constable of the county in which the justice issuing the
same resides, and shall command such constable to take the
§ 55.

defendant, and bring him forthwith before such justice, to
answer the plaintiff in a plea to be mentioned therein, and shall
require him, after he shall have arrested the defendant, to

notify the plaintiif or prosecutor of
OF

the

arrest/"“‘

THE SERVICE OF THE WARRANT.

How made.--“A warrant shall be served by arresting
§ 56.
the defendant and bringing him forthwith before the justice
issuing the same; but if such justice, on the return thereof,
shall be absent, or unable to hear'or try the cause, or if it shall
appear by the aﬁidavit of the defendant, that such justice is a
material witness in his behalf on the trial of the cause, the
constable shall take the defendant before some other justice

of the same township or city, if there be one therein qualiﬁed
to try the same, and, if not, then before some justice of an
adjoining township or city, who shall take cognizance of the
erty from the possession of his baiiee
and converted it. is suﬂicient to au
thorize the issuing oi’ a civil war
32 .\iich..
rant: Deitz v. Groesbeck.
Authority
304.
to make an aﬂldavit
for a civil warrant in n suit before
a justice for the wrongful
conversion
of goods belonging to the plaintiffs.
will be presumed. where the aﬂidavit is
made
who
by one of two plaintiffs
were
cotenants of the property con
verted:
lhid.
33-—C. I... i 765; see, ante, g 29.

34—Shannon
457.

v. Comstock, 21 Wend.,

459.

35-0.

I... 5 725.
warrant should not be returnable
at a particular time. tor that might
detain the party in custody; the law
has tlxed the time tor its return, which
is immediately:
See, Pratt v. liill.
16 Barb., 307, and cases cited.
The
warrant may be served by s sheriﬂ,
under-sheriif or deputy sheriil, as well
as by a constable. See. C. L., 5 2595.
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cause, and proceed thereon as if the warrant had been issued
by him.”3°
p
The defendant must be actually arrested and brought person
ally before the justice on a warrant, or the justice will have no

jurisdiction in

the cause, and

all

the proceedings

will

be

void.“

§57. Who exempt from arrest.-—Senators and representa
tives in congress are privileged from arrest in all cases, except
treason, felony, and breach of the peace, during their attend
ance at the sessions of their respective houses, and in going to
and returning from the same.“

Senators and representatives of this state are, except as above
mentioned, privileged from arrest, and are not subject to any
civil process, during the session of the legislature, nor for ﬁf
teen days next before the commencement

and after the termin

ation of each session.”
Ojﬁcers of the senate and house of representatives, while in
actual attendance upon the duties of their offices, are not liable
to arrest on civil process."
“All 0/ﬁcers of the several courts of record shall be liable to
arrest, and may be held to bail in the same manner as other
persons, except during the actual sitting of any court of which
they are officers; and when sued with any other person, such
ofﬁcers shall be liable to arrest, and may be held to bail as other

during the sitting of the court of which they

persons,
oi’ﬁcers.”4‘

are
'

-

Attorneys, etc.—“No attorney, solicitor or counselor is ex
empt from arrest during the sitting of the court of which he is
an ofﬁcer, unless he is employed in some cause pending and
then to be heard in such court.”42
36-0. L., 5 726. A warrant regu
lar on its face and appearing to issue
from a court or ofiicer having juris
diction of the subject matter will pro
tect an otﬁcer proceeding in a lawful
manner to serve it: Ortman v. Green
mnn. 4 Mich.. 291 ; Dunn v. Giiman, 34
256; Wheaton v. Beecher.
49
Mk-,h.,
Contra,
Mi<'h.. 348: 13 N. W.. T69.
if the court or oﬂicer had no jurisdic
People v. Rix, 6 Mich., 144;
tion:
or if the writ is bad on its face, as
where it was issued under and ex
pressly referred to an unconstitutional
'

Attorneys,

statute.
such

a

tionai

are

not

one seeking to enforce
a trespasser.
First Na

Any

writ is
Bank

etc.,

v.

Watkins,

21

Mieh..

483.
9 Cow., 61,
37-—-Coivin
v. Luther.
See, Whitehead v. Keyes, 3 Alien. 49.1.
38—Const. of U. S., Art. 1, 56.

of Mk-h., Art. 4, 57.
39-—Const.
40—C. L., 5 34.
41—C. L., Q 1117: Day v. Brett.
6 Johns., 22.

42-0. L.,

This

4s~
not

§

1117.

exemption to attorneys docs
extend to an attendance before

CH.
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from arrest while at home,
from attending court."

although

§57

thereby they

are prevented

Females cannot be imprisoned on any process in any civil
action, except for unlawful sales of spirituous liquors."
Electors are also exempt from arrest on civil process on the

is

it,

day of holding any election at which they are entitled to vote."
Parties, Witnesses, etc., Attending Court.—Every person con
nected with a cause, and attending in the course of
whether
compelled to attend by process or not, such as parties, bail, etc.,
privileged from arrest whilst going to, attending and return

a

ing from court. The privilege of witnesses at common law was
the same.“
Now, by statute, “Every person duly and in good
witness to attend any court, oﬂicer, com
faith subpoenaed as
missioner, auditors or referees, or summoned to attend any
judge, ofﬁcer or commissioner, in any case where the attend
ance of such witness may by law be enforced by attachment, or
by Warrant, shall be exonerated from arrest in any civil suit,
while going to the place where he shall be required to attend,
while remaining in attendance as such witness, and while re

turning therefrom.”"'
“The court or oi‘ﬁce.r before whom any person shall

have

witness, shall dis
in good faith to attend as
charge such witness from any arrest made in violation of the
such court shall have adjourned before such
last section; and
arrest, or before application for such discharge was made, any
judge of such court shall have the same power to discharge

if

a

been subpoenaed

such witness/’4°
“Every justice of the supreme court, circuit judge and cir
cuit court commissioner shall have the like authority to dis

L..

5

45-6.
4

46—Arebbold‘s

3717.

Pram.

2d

Am.

2

1

5

a

4

Wend., 204.
v. Russell.
4-i—C. L.. 1! SR9 and 10342: see,
27 Mich., 68,
v. Bariow.
Strickland
decided before these amendments.

48-C. L.,

ed..

49

5 Q

43--Corey

76: Clark v. Grant,
Wend.. 257;
Watson v. Superior Court Judge, 40
l\iieh., 729; Baldwin v. Branch Circuit
Judge, 48 Mich., 525; 12 N. W., 686;
Mitchell v. Huron Circuit Judge, 53
Mich., 541: 19 N. W., 176: Graham's
Prae., 2d ed., 129:
Greenieafa Evi
816.
Service of subpoena is
dence.
not essential, under the rule of the
common
Con
law. to the protection.
sent to attend as
witness is enough:
Ibid.
Not so under the statute:
10157-10161: C. L., 1897.
47-C. L.. 10157.

Q

3

N
-in
IQ

5

4

an examiner. master or judge. out of
Hill, 59;
court: Cole v. Mt-Cieiian.
see, also, Humphrey
v. (‘ummini:.
10
Gibbs v. Loomis,
Wend.. 90:
Tilhny v. Dﬂggs,
13
Johns.. 463;
.Tohna.. 252: Gilbert \'. Vanderpool. 15
lblrl,
Secor v. Bell. 18 Ibid., 52:
Cow., 368.
Gay v. Rogers,

10158.
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arrested contrary

C1-1.

to the foregoing

II.

pro

“Every arrest of a witness made contrary to the foregoing
provisions shall be absolutely void, and shall be deemed a con
tempt of the court issuing the subpoena; and every person mak
ing or procuring such arrest, shall be responsible to the witness
arrested for three times the amount of damages which shall be
found by the jury, and shall also be liable to an action at the
suit of the party who subpoenaed such witness, for the loss,
and damage sustained by him in consequence of
such arrest.”“°
“But no sheriﬁ or other oﬁicer, or person, shall be so liable,
hindrance

unless the person claiming an exemption from arrest, shall, if
required by such sheriff or ofﬁcer, make an aﬂidavit, stating,

That he has been legally subpoenaed as a witness to at
1.
tend before some court, ofﬁcer, auditors, referees or commis
sioners, specifying such court, officer, auditors, referees or com
missioners, the place of attendance, and the cause in which he
shall have been subparnaed; and,

That he has not been subpoenaed by his own procure
ment, with the intent to avoid the service of any process;
Which aiﬁdavit maybe taken by such officer, and when so
_
taken, shall exonerate such oﬁicer from all liability for not mak
ing such arrest.” ‘*1
V
By this statute a witness would not be privileged from arrest
unless he had been served with a subpoena, and is attending as
a witness."
When an arrest only is prohibited by law, the
service of a summons would not be illegal, but when service of
process is forbidden, it would include a summons.
2.

Who to be arrested.--The oﬁicer is authorized by the
§58.
warrant to arrest only the person named in the warrant.
He
his
take
care
that
he
arrest
no
other
must, at
peril,
person but
such as is described in the warrant; for if he arrest C. D. upon
warrant against A. B., C. D. may maintain an action for false
imprisonment against the oﬂicer, even although he be the person
a

actually intended to have been arrested, but by mistake is mis
51—C. L., § 10161.
52—(‘ole v. i\Ic(‘.lellnn, 4 Hill, 59.

49-—-C. L., 5 10159.
50—C. L., 5 10160.
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is,

If, however, a ﬁctitious
described as A. B. in the warrant.“
name has been inserted, the arrest of the person intended will
If a person, whose real name is William, is
be justiﬁed.“
asked, before process against him, whether his name is not John,
he cannot maintain trespass, for he shall not
and he says it
be allowed to avail

himself

of the mistake which

he himself

occasioned."

is

is

is

is

a

gen
§59. Who to make the arrest.-The arrest must, as
eral rule, be made by the officer to whom the warrant
directed,
or by the person deputized for that purpose.“
It not neces
directed
sary, however, that the officer to whom the warrant
should be the person who actually makes the arrest, or even
within sight when the arrest
made; but he must be acting in
the arrest; he cannot go upon other business, or stay at home

a

a

third person to make it."
and send
The arrest may be made by the sheriff, his deputy, or by an
under sheril‘f,-"3 as well as by
constable, and, when necessary,
the officer may require suitable.aid, and for that purpose call.
warrant.-"9
upon other persons to assist him in serving
the

a

’s

it

When to be made.—The arrest may be made at any
§60.
It must not, however,
time after the issuing of the warrant.”
will
or
be
void."
But after escape,
be made on Sunday,
without the assent of the officer, the defendant may be retaken
Where, by the contrivance of the plaintiff
on Sunday."
party had been arrested on Sunday on criminal
attorney,
process, for the purpose of effecting his arrest on civil process,
and he was detained in custody till Monday, and then arrested
on civil process, the court ordered him to._ be discharged out of

3

§

§

5

§

ii

e.

for a private per
see, C. L.,
a warrant,
serve
978 and 2367.
57—Coylc v. llurtin. 10 Johns, 85.
58——(‘. L.,
2595.
2590; Firestone v. Rice,
59—(‘. L.,
71 Mich., 377; 38 N. W., 885.
to

3

56—For authority

son

the defendant is absent,
or
out oi’ the way to avoid an ar
rest. the oﬂicer may retain the war
rant
reasonable time, for the purpose
of making service.
As to what will
be a reasonable time. will depend
on
the circumstances ot the case:
month
may not be an unreasonable time:
Arnold v. Steeves, 10 Wend., 514.
61-—C. L.,
5916: Anderson et al.
v. Biree,
Mich.. 280; see. Peck v.
Caveii, 16 Mich., 11.
62—Nieh0ls
lngersoll, 11 J'ohn.,

s

110.

60—it

keeps

a

4

1

6

Cow.,
53-—Griswold v. Sedgwlck.
Wend., 126; Scott
456; same case.
We-nd., 555: Miller v. Foley,
v. Ely,
28 Barb., 630.
54—.-inte,
53.
llarwood,
Campb.,
55—Price
v.

155.

51
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defendant was seized on Sunday and
process out
of the exchequer, it was held that the arrest was void, and
could not be made good, even by a subsequent assent.“
A
defendant who had been brought into the State on a. criminal
detained

a

till next morning, and then arrested upon

charge, is not exempt from arrest, unless the criminal pro
ceeding is merely a pretext to bring him within the power of
civil process.“
§ 61.

Where arrest may be made.--The arrest may be made
within the county.°‘-" No man can be arrested in

at any place

his own house,

if

the outer door be shut. The ofﬁcer cannot
break open an outer door or‘ window of the defendant’s house
to make an arrest ;°" but after he has obtained peaceable ad
mission at the outer door, he may break open an inner door,
even if it be the door of a lodger, after requesting ad1nittance.°3

But this privilege is conﬁned to the defendant’s dwelling house,
and does not extend to a store, barn, or any outhouse discon
nected from the dwelling house, and forming no part of the
curtilage.” And it extends only to the dwelling house of the
63—Weils

v.

Gurney,

8

B.

8:

tenant:

C.,

Swain

v.

Mianer,

8

Gray,

182.

769.

64_—Lyford v. Tyrrel, Anst.. 85.
65—William v. Bacon, 10 \\'end.,
636; Lucas v. Albee, 1 Denio, 666.
But see, Re Frank Cannon, 47 Mich.,
481; 11 N. W., 280.
66——C. L., § 2367.
67—The ofllcer may not break the
outer door to gain admittance, and it
resist:
so, the owner may
he does
People v. Hubbard, 24 Wend., 369;
Curtis v. Hubbard, 4 Hill, 437; Glover
6 Hill. 597; Stearns v.
v. Wittenhali,
Vincent, 50 Mich., 219; 15 N. W., 86.
The command of one known to be an
is suﬂlcient protection for one
otﬁcer
Firestone v. Rice,
called to assist:

protection
The
dwelling
of
the
against entry for the service of process
is in the outer door only, and it is
optional with the owner to take that
protection by closing that door against
the officer, or to waive it by allowing
him to enter.
If the oiﬂcer once gains
entrance through the outer door with
out torce or fraud, the privilege is
gone, and he may force open any other,
or inner door, ii.’ necessary, to make
complete service oi’ his process: Stearns
v. Vincent, 50 Mich., 219-220; 15 N.
W., 86.
69—llaggerty
v. Wilber, 16 Johns.,

supra-.

The curtilage is the space or yard
including the dwelling house and the
customary outbuildings standing near
thereto and used in connection there
with—and
it is said that this space
need not be surrounded by a fence;
the barn used by a family and stand
ing within eighty feet of the dwelling,
and an outbouse standing thirty-six
feet from :1 ﬁshcrman‘s dwelling, in
which he was accustomed to dry his

68—Lee v. Gansel, 1 Cowp., 1; Rat
clltte v. Burton, 3 B. 8: P., 223; Hub
bard v. Mace, 17 Johns., 127; Will
iams v. Spcnccr. 6 Johns., 352; Sted
man v. Crane, 11 Met. (i\lass.),
295.
Where a house is leased to several,
having a distinct
portion. the
each
door through which the rooms of each
immediately
are
particular
tenant
is the outer door as to such
reached

287.
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defendant; for if he be in the house of a stranger, the oﬁicer,
after demand and refusal of admission, may break open the
outer door to arrest him. But an oﬁicer cannot justify break
ing the outer door of the house of a stranger upon susp'ic1'on
that the defendant is there; he is justiﬁed or not by the event;
if the defendant was actually in the house, the oﬁicer is pro
If, after the defendant is arrested, he
tected; otherwise not."
escapes into a house, the officer will be justiﬁed in breaking
even the outer door to retake him."

How arrest to be mado.—The arrest is usually made
§ 61a.
by actual seizure of the person; but any touching, however
slight, of the defendant’s person, is suﬁicient for this purpose;
and where the officer had laid hold of the defendant ’s hand as
he held it out of the window, it was deemed sufﬁcientiz But
the manner of arrest is not conﬁned to corporeal seizure; the
law is well settled that no manual touching of the body, or
actual force, is necessary to constitute an arrest and imprison
ment.
It is suﬂicient if the party be within the power of the
ofﬁcer and submits to the arrest."
Where the oﬁicer entered
the room in which the defendant was, and locked the door, tell
ing him at the same time that he arrested him, the court held
have been held to be within the
curtilage:
2
See. People v. Taylor,
250; Pond v. People, 8 Mich.,
Mich.,
in the law'.o! burglary, and for
150.
break
the punishment of hurglarious
ing, the dwelling house is deemed to
include whatever is within the cutti
lage, even if not included within
the
dwelling. ii’ used with it for domestic
supra;
People v. Taylor,
purposes:
Mich.,
142;
I'ltcher v. People, 16
Stearns v. Vincent, 50 i\ilch., 219: 15
But it seems that for
N. W.. 86.
the purpose of protecting the owner
against an oliicer who seeks to enter
dwelling
the
process,
to serve civil
house is deemed to be only the house
or that part of the building occupied
by the family
for dwelling purposes.
Thus if the owner occupies and uses
the lower story of his building us a
store or shop, and the upper story for
a dwelling place for himself and fam
iiy, the latter only will be deemed his
house,
notwithstanding
in
dwelling
nets,

and egress to and from the store
and dwelling part may be through the
same outer door.
And in such case the
door within the building opening into
that part occupied for domestic pur
poses will be deemed the outer door
of his dwelling house:
Steurns v.
Vincent, 50 Mich.. 209, 219, 220; 15
N. W., 86.
And it is held, that when
a building is leased in distinct portions
to several tcnnnts, the door to the
part occupied by each tenant is to be
deemed the outer door of his dwelling
house, and that an oiﬂcer,
though he
may be lawfully within the building.
has no right to force such door for
the‘ service or process.
Swain v. l\iiz
ner, 8 Gray, 182.
70—~Johnson
v. Leigh, 6 'l‘aunt., 246.
71—Alien v. Martin, 10 Wend., 300:
and see, pool, as to serving execu
tions.
72—l Ventris, 396.
7.'l——(‘-old v. Bissell, 1 Wend., 215;
Wood v. Lune, 6 C. & P., 774.
gress
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arrest. Mere words, however, such as telling
a man you arrest him, or the like, cannot, of themselves, amount
If the oificer says,
arrest you,” and the
to an arrest."
but
if
the
party acquiesce in
runs
it
is
no
away,
escape;
party

it

to be a good

“I

the arrest, and goes with the oﬂicer, it will be a good arrest."
Where a sheriif’s oﬂicer, having a warrant to arrest a party
for debt, went to the party and read his warrant to him, told
him that, as he knew him, he would take his word, but that
for bail to be
put in, proceeded to the party’s attorney, to let him know
was held that

was no arrest."

it

it

it,

he must give bail, and then, having taken a fee

_

is

J

The remarks of Cowen, ., in Connah v. Hale," illustrate this
He says: “In the consideration of trespass, what
question.
better settled than that between actual force and
distinction

it

implied or constructive force? A.’s horse steps over the imagi
from B.’s. A. may himself be
nary line of his farm dividing
broken
the close, even though there
having
forcibly
sued as
was no fence.

of

S0

mere

words.

a

J

person send
Abbott, Ch.
., ‘If
other in charge for felony, and
charged he must go with him, on
prevent the necessity of actual

for

Thus, in the language of
a constable and give an

constable tell the party
which the other, in order to
force being used, expresses
an imprison
his readiness to go, and does actually go, this
ment, and gives the party thus consenting to go an action of
Again, by Best, Ch. ., ‘I should think
false imprisonment."'8
constable told me that
must go t0_
an imprisonment

'I

a

it

if

J

is

the

I

a

it

if

a

is

I

I

if

should know that
refused, he would
Union Hall; for
think
amounts to
trespass.’ 7° The distinc
compel me.
between an apparent act of authority and
tion
request; as
an oﬁicer having civil process, out of respect to the party or

the company, merely requests him to come to him, or to ﬁx
his time and go and give bail; he either going oﬂ’ and paying
no heed to the request, or afterwards volunteering to give bail.
cases, trespass against the person cannot be sus

1

8'.

Radford.

C.

&

v.

3

76—George

&

1

1

6

79—Chlnn

158.

P.,

361.

464

54

v.

Morris,

C.

Moo.,
Wend.,
8:

77-23 Wend., 462.
Ry.
78-—-Poeock v. Moore.
321; and see, Gold v. Blssell.
210, 215.

74—Rex v. Sherman, Hal-dw., 304:
M041, 173; Fuller
Genner v. Sparks,
v. Bowker, 11 Mich., 212, 213.
P.,
C.
’75—Russen v. Lucas,

2

In the latter
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No dominion is here exercised; and the person never
was in the oﬂicer’s custody.”
The assent of the officer to the escape of the defendant
whom he has arrested upon a warrant does not prevent the
oﬁicer from retaking him or arresting him anew.“
tained.5°

§ 62.

Authority and

cause

A regular oiﬁcer

for arrest to

be made known.

is not bound to exhibit his authority or process
when he arrests a defendant, but a special deputy must." But
after the party has been arrested, the ofﬁcer, if required, is
bound to inform him of the substance of the warrant.
And
even before the arrest, the oﬁicer should, ih some manner, make
known that he comes in his official character, or he may be law

fully resisted.”
§63. Aid to a.rrest.—“Any sheriif, deputy sheriff, coroner
or constable may require suitable aid in the service of process
in civil or criminal cases, in preserving the peace, or in appre
hending or securing any person for felony or breach of the
peace, when such officer may have power to perform such duty;
and when any such officer shall ﬁnd resistance made against the
execution of any process, or shall have good reason to believe
that such resistance will be made, he may take the power of the
county, and proceed therewith in proper person to execute
’
such process. "*4
B0—Russen v. Lucas. 1 Ry. & M.,
26: 1 C. 8: P.. 158; Berry v. Adamson,
6 B. & C.. 528.
81—Arnoid
v. Steeves,
10 Wend.,
515.

82—Ibid.,
2

and Bellows v. Shannon.
86.
the special deputy refuse to show

Hill,

If

his warrant when making the arrest,
the defendant will be justiﬂed in re
sisting:
Frost v. Thomas, 2-4 Wend.,
418.

'

83—Beiiows v. Shannon. 2 Hill. 86:
see. Drennan v. People, 10 Mich.. 169.
Upon the question of what is the duty
of the arresting omcer as to furnish
ing the person to be arrested with in
formation as to the authority of the
arresting oﬂicer. or as to the cause
for the arrest. there is not entire ac
cord among the authorities.
While it
may not be necessary
in ail cases to
exhibit the warrant
for the arrest.

yet it is essential that in some way
the arrested person
shall be informed
that the arresting person has author
ity to make the arrest, and as it
seems also, of the cause for the ar
rest:
Drennan v. The People, 10
Mich., 169.
See. also, State v. Taylor,
70 Vt., 1; 39 Ati., 447, and particu
iariy an exhautive note to this case
as reported in 42 L. R. A.. 673, on
“what information is an accused per
son entitied to at the time of his ar
rest."
For a very fnii discussion of the lia
bility of an officer for making an ar
rest. see note to Leger v. Warren, 62
Ohio St.. 500: 57
E.. 506. as re
ported in 51 L. R. A., pages 193-225.
For a general
84—C. L.. Q 2590.
discussion of the posse comitatus—the
authority of the commanding oti‘icer—
the duties of those commanded-their
liability
for refusal
protection——their

55

or

§64

A WARRANT,

THE SERVICE AND aaruas.

CH.

II.

constable cannot take security for the appearance of
before the justice; and such security, if taken,

The

the defendant

would be void.“

§64. Of the ret1u'n of a warra.nt.—Aithough the stat
ute“ requires the arresting officer forthwith to take the ar
rested person before the justice, it means that the oﬂicer shall
If the time be unseason
do it as soon as he reasonably can.
able, as in the night, or if there is danger of a present rescue,
the oﬁicer may secure

the defendant in a house or other safe
place until the next day, or such time as it may be reasonable
to take him before the justice. He cannot delay taking the de
fendant before the justice to give the plaintiff an opportunity
to collect his witnesses.“
So, if the justice who issued the war
rant is unable to try the cause, the ofﬁcer has a right to detain
the defendant for a reasonable time, while making a bona ﬁde
magistrate to hear it. Where the justice, upon
being brought before him, after calling the par
ties, declares himself unable to try the cause, and directed them
to go before another justice, it was held that the proceeding
did not preclude the oﬁicer from taking the defendant before
effort to ﬁnd

a

the defendant

another justice."
The defendant must be actually arrested and brought person
essential to the jurisdiction of
a judgment by confession, ren
dered upon the warrant, though upon a return ‘regular upon its

ally before the justice; this is
If it is not done,
the justice.
face,

of

the

defendant

as in custody, and made

by a person

/
to ;|oin—see note to Robinson v. State,
93 Gs... 77: 18 S. E., 1018, as reported
in 44 Am. St. Rep., 127.
85—Miilard v. Canﬂeid, 5 Wend.,
61.

86—C. L., 5 726, quoted ante, § 56.
4 B. & C..
87—Wright
v. Court,

596.

And where u justice issued a war
rant for the arrest of an individual
late on Saturday night. with an en
dorsement thereon directing that the
accused should be committed until the
following Monday for examination, and
the constable arrested the accused the
same evening and committed him to
‘

jail without ﬁrst taking him before

the

Held, that the justice had
magistrate:
his authority,
and that he
exceeded
and the constable were both trespas
sers; and the court said:
“No doubt
being
accused
justice.
on
the
the
brought before him, may detain him a
reasonable time for examination, but
the difiicuity
here is, the justice or
to be committed
dered
the accused
being brought
before
without
ﬁrst
Pratt v. Ilill. 16 Barb.. 3032
him :"
ruling in Edwards v.
see, a similar
Ferris, 7 C. & P., 542.
Steeves,
v.
8S——Arnoid
10 Weud.,
515.
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regularly authorized for that purpose, will be coram non judice,
and void; and all persons acting under it will be trespassers."
Notice of arrest to plaintiﬂ'.—The oﬂicer is required to
notify the plaintiff of the arrest.” This provision is somewhat
vague, and in some cases may be attended with difficulty, as
§ 65.

when the plaintiff resides at a distance from the justice, or the
place where the arrest is made. If the plaintiff resides out of the
county, the constable, of course, would not be required to go
But if he resides in the
out of the county to give him notice.
county, it would seem that it would be the duty of the constable
to give him notice. How the notice is to be given, whether per
or by leaving a notice at his dwelling house or place of
in his absence; and whether the notice is to be given by
the constable in person or by a messenger, or by a notice in
writing, are questions somewhat doubtful.
Probably, however,
a notice in writing from the constable,
sent by a third person,
and served by delivering it to the plaintiff, or by leaving it at
his dwelling house or place of abode, in his absence, would be
suﬁicient, if the constable could not conveniently do it in per
sonal

abode,

for it is
apprehended that the constable would not be justiﬁed in carry
ing the defendant to a. remote part of the county, in order to
notify the plaintiff ; and he cannot leave the defendant in the
custody of another person while he goes to notify the plaintiﬁ‘.
It would be proper, in all cases, when the plaintiff does not

son.

This would

seem to be sufﬁcient from necessity,

reside near the justice, that he should authorize some person
who does, to attend to the suit for him, and give the constable
information thereof, and in such case notice of the arrest to
such person would be

suﬂ"1cicnt.“1

Form of the return.-The oﬂicer is required to return,
§ 66.
upon the warrant, in writing, signed by him, the time and man
ner in which he executed the same, and whether he has or has not
notiﬁed the plaintiff .92
In case the defendant is taken before some justice other than
the one who issued the warrant, it would seem necessary that
the reason of it should be mentioned in the return."
Smith, 17 Wend., 517: Wheeler v. N.
A: H. R. R. Co.. 20 N. Y., 417.
93--C. L., 5 728; People v. Fuller,
17 W€nd., 211.

Y.

I

[;.,

89—Colvln
V. Luther. 9 Cow., 61;
Blgelow v. Stearns. 19 .‘lohns'.. 39.
90—C. L.. 5 725.
Treatise, 57.
91—Edward's
743; see. Stewart v.
92—C.
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After the defendant is brought before the justice,

he

is,

or
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in

is

is

law, still in the custody of the oﬁicer until the justice directs
If the cause adjourned by the defendant, he
his release.
to continue in the custody of the officer who made the arrest

during the
required in

time of adjournment,
case

unless he gives the security

of adjournnient.“

a

it

is

is

If the defendant
privileged or exempt from arrest, he
must plead his privilege in abatement, or move for his dis
charge before pleading in bar, for such a plea will be a waiver
discharge, since
of his right to
admits that he
properly
in court for the purposes of

the

suit.”

§

Cause to be tried, v§hen.—“When the defendant shall
be brought before the justice on a warrant, the justice shall then,
or within three days thereafter, unless the parties agree to al
67.

a

longer time, or there be an adjournment, proceed ~to
low
hear, try and determine the cause.”9°
In case the plaintiff was not notiﬁed of the arrest by the
oﬂicer, the justice might allow a reasonable time for that pur
reasonable time should be allowed the plaintiff to
make his arrangements for the trial; and until the expiration
of such time, the justice ought not, in either case, to discharge
pose.

So,

a.

is

a

is

is

it

§

material witness, etc.—It
Transfer where justice
made to appear that the justice
provided” that in case
68.

is

the defendant from custody.

a

material witness or has advised or counseled respecting the mat~
ters involved that the cause shall be transferred to the nearest
qualiﬁed justice in the county. Such showing must be by aﬁi
davit, and can be made by the defendant only. Costs up to the
time of removal with transcript fee of ﬁfty cents must be paid
The statements in the
condition of removal.”
or tendered as

merits:

Petrie

v.

Fitzgerald,

Daly.

405 .

96-C.

342.

L.,

97——-C. L.,

n

per
The exemption from arrest is
sonal privilege which can be waived,
and the waiver is complete when the
party fails to claim it at once. and
does some act in the cause in reference
on the
to his appearance or defence

viii.
30

727.
835.

QR-—-Oakley v. Dunn,
N. W.. 96.

99—Ibid.
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“ Adj u rnment"
.
Crandall,
6

v.

o

oat

95—R.andall

,

-- See,

p

94

1

aﬁidavit cannot be contradicted.”

See.

1108!, chap.

63 Mlch.,

496;

HA§_-{~,§!_l‘iI

CHAPTER
or ‘rm: warr or xrmcnainxr.
to

Issue.

umdav"

disposition
of

oi’

property

in custody of the
case ot simultaneous
ments.
°t successive
585- In "use
ments.

prop-

contracted debt.
172. Fraudulently
Q73. Abscondlng or non-resident deht-

om

591.
592.
593
594
£95.

Oi"

Lien of the attachment.
Return ot the service.
P"°°°edl“59 “ﬂer '°t“"n'
Perishable p"°p°"ty
Release
from the levy.

QQB. IHBSOIUHOII
Q97.

or snn\'11\'0 run wan‘.
I81. \\'hen and how served.
may

attach‘

8°“

§7-I. Foreign corporations.
,1-5_ For "amass on “mam
i-76‘ Bond to detpndanp
577. in case bond is defective.
$78. Liability of suretles on bond.
The writ’ content on
Q79
.80_ Amendment of_

property

law.
attach

in

{86. Service upon defendant.
587. Disposition of property attached.
B"nd t" p"e"°m "em"va|'
5_38'
389 R°c'*‘1pt°" for p'°p‘"'t5"
590. Property claimed by third per

from

county_

£82. What

III

§83. Goods
Q84.

necem

sm.y_

570. Fraudulent
eny_
‘TL Removal

."-'

IN ATTACHMENT.

PROCEEDINGS

‘69_ when

_

ff
-ll

"

."‘

("'1

Oi’ {I10 8.I[BChl119i1i.
proceed

Appeal from dissolution
|ng,_

598. Of judgment.
599. ()1 execution in attachment.

be attached.

THE WRIT

OF ATTACHMENT.

a

if

a

§

69.
When attachment to issue, aﬁidavit neceasary.—“Any
plaintiff shall be entitled to an attachment against a defendant
in any action founded on a judgment or on
contract, express
such plaintiff, or some person in his behalf, shall
or implied,
make and ﬁle with the justice a’n aﬁidavit, specifying, as near as
fur
may be, the amoimt due to the plaintiff, and containing

ther statement, either that the deponent knows, or has good
reason to believe.‘ either:
Mich., 302.
Not only must the statute
be strictly construed. but all of its re
quirements must be strictly observed.
and the cause for issuing the writ
must be plainly within the terms ex
in the statute, or the pro
pressed
ceeding
cannot be upheld:
Mathews
v. Densmore ct 01., 43 Mich., 463;
N. W., 669;

Circuit Judge.

Van Norman v. Jackson

45 Mlch.. 208;
N. W.,
Fairbanks v. Bennett, 52 Mich.,

796;
63; 17 N. W., 696; Borland
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721.
1—-C. L..
The proceeding by attachment is
special statutory remedy, and
strict
compliance with all the provisions and
requirements of the statute is neces
upon the
sary to confer jurisdiction
justice, and to authorize a judgment
under it. Greenvauit v. F.
M. Bank.
Doug., 502: Buckley v. Lowry,
Mich., 420:
Roeiofson v. Hatch,
Mich., 277; lldiliar v.
29
Bnbcock.
Mich.,
626;
Adams v. Abrams, 88

v.

Kings
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bury, 65 Mich., 59; 31 N. W., 620.
And so, in attachment against a party
not served nor appearing in the suit,
the proceeding must be strictly regu
King v. Har
lar under the statute:
But a literal
rington, 14 Mich., 532.
compliance with the prerequisites of
the statute is suﬂicient to confer juris
diction: Roelofson v. Hatch, 3 Mich.,
278.

-

for which an attach
The demand
ment is authorized under this section,
must be upon contract express or im
Wilson v.
plied, or upon judgment:
Arnold, 5 Mich., 98.
But it is not
necessary that the claim or damages
aris
a demand
should be liquidated;
of
ing upon contract, the amount
which is susceptible of ascertainment
referable to‘ the
standard
some
by
Roelofson v.
contract, is sufiicient:
Hatch, 3 Mich., 277.
A demand is
liquidated when it is certain what and
how much is due; for, although it may
appear that something is due, if it
is due, it
does not appear how much
Bouv. Law Dic.,
is not liquidated:
“Liquidated."‘
If the proceeding is to recover a
due upon judgment, it is im
demand
material in what state or county the
judgment may seem to have been ren
dered.

at
by
Must be duc.—Proceedings
tachment lie only for a debt or de
Hale v. Chandler,
mand which is due:
is
The attachment
531.
3 Mich.,
merely to obtain the beneﬁt of a lien
is en
or security, and the plaintiff
titled to a lien to the amount only of
his debt actually due when the attach
If, at the time of
ment was levied.
issuing the attachment, a part only
demands were due,
of the plaintiff's
he can take judgment only for the
of
amount due at the commencement
suit, and is not entitled to include
in his judgment any demands against
the dehtor which fell due between the
time of commencing of suit and tak
ing judgment.
And should a demand
failing due after commencement of suit
be included in the judgment, a subse
quent attaching credltor would obtain
a lien and right to hold the property
attached for all the excess over and
above what would be required to sat
isfy that part of
plaintiﬂ!’s
claim
which was actually due at the com

CH.

III.

mencement
of suit:
Hinchman
v.
Town, 10 Mich., 508; Hale v. Chand
ler, 3 Mich., 531.
The provisions of
the statute, C. L., 510586, allowing
the writ in certain cases before the
debt is due are not applicable to pro
ceedings
in Justices‘ courts.

Joint 'lndebtcdness.—A creditor is
not authorized to resort to attachment
are joint, with
when the liabilities
out all the defendants are non-resi
dents, or have absconded,
or are other»
wise subject to the process by attach
Taylor v. McDonald, 4 liam.,
ment:
Ohio, 149; Hamilton
Knight,
v.
1
Blackf.,
partnership
25.
Nor
can
property be seized on attachment un
less all the partners are implicated in
the
acts or transactions
which au
thorize the issuing of the writ.
Nor
can the separate property oi‘ one part
ner be seized, unless a good cause for
issuing the writ is shown against him:
Edwards v. Hughes, 20 Mich., 289:
Miller v. Judge of Bay Circuit, 41
Mich., 326; 2 N. W., 26; Geiges v.
Grelner, 68 Mich., 153; 36 N. W., 48;
Sword v. Judge of Lenance Circuit, 71
Mich., 284; 38 N. W., 870.
The indi
vidual property of an innocent partnes
is not liable to an attachment for a
ﬁrm debt fraudulently
contracted by
Jaﬁray v. Jen
the other partner:
nings, 101 Mich., 515; 60 N. W., 52.
The supreme
court of ‘Michigan in
Jaifray v. Jennings, supra, affirms the
doctrine that previous to the enact
ment of C. L., 5 10584, attachment was
good against all joint debtors. includ
ing partners, where it could be shown
that all participated in the cause for
the writ and that where it could not
be shown that all joint debtors par
ticipated in the cause, the property of
such only as did participate
could be
taken. This case also holds that this
statute. C. L., §10584, was enacted to
put partners in the same position as
other joint debtors, and protect inno
cent partners as other innocent joint
debtors were protected.
This case is
followed in Cottrell v. Iiathcway,
108
Mich., 619; 66 N. W., 596.
Whether
the section of the statute referred to,
found in the circuit court act, under
the construction
referred to requires
the inference that in attachment pro
ceedings
in justice‘s courts the inno
cent partner is not protected. quaere.
60
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Upon principle it would seem that so
far as this extraordinary procedure is
given because of tortious conduct it
ought not to be available against one
Mr. Freeman in a
not guilty of it.
note to Russell v. Cole, 167 .\fass., 6;
44 N. i~I.. 1057. found in 57 Am. St..
at page 439. that in the
436. says.
statute the
of a controlling
absence
decided weight of authority is in favor
of the right to seize the partnership
property in a case where the aﬂidavit
See
against one only.
cause
makes
See, also, note to
cases there cited.
Jaffray v. Jennlson. supra, as reported
in 25 L. R. A., 645.
An attachment is not the proper
of goods
process to obtain possession
which the plaintiff claims as his own:
Mendeisohn v. Smith, 27 .\iich.. 2.
The aﬂidavit for the writ is neces
Green
sary to confer jurisdiction:
vanlt v. F. 8: M. Bank. 2 Doug., 498;
Hale v. Chandler, 3 ‘.\lich., 531; Wilson
And it must
v. Arnold, 5 Mich., 98.
comply substantially with the statute.
The
\\'eiis v. Parker, 20 l\iich., i02.
writ cannot be sustained without a
The stat
good and suﬂicient affidavit.
ute
§'i'2l docs not require the affi
davit for attachment in justices‘ court
to be annexed to the writ or served
the
But it must identify
with it.
plalntiﬂs and show who all of them
Burnside v. Davis. 65 Mlch., 74;
are.
And it may be made
31 N. W., 619.
Nicolls
by an agent of the plaintiff:
But it
v. Lawrence. 30 Mich.. 395.
must appear on the face of the aili
davlt that it was made either by the
plaintiff or by some one in his behalf.
if the affidavit is made by any person
other than the piainti'ﬂ'. he must state
in the affidavit that he makes it in
Borland v.
behalf of the plaintiff:
N. “'.,
65 Mich.. 59;'31
Kingsbury,
Though the writ is fair on its
(P20.
face it will not justify the officer
in retaining possession of the property
As
if there is no suﬂicicnt affidavit:
57
pcll v. liosbein. 98 Mich., 117;
W.,

27.
the affidavit states that he is the
that is suf1i
agent of the plaintiff.
Adams v. Keilog. 63 .\Iich.,
cientl
N.

If

105: 27 N. W., 679.
The facts required to be stated in
the affidavit. in order to give the
must exist at the
court jurisdiction,

§ 69

time when the writ of attachment is
And for this reason it was for
merly required that the afﬂdavit should
be made on the same day of the issu
ing of the writ:
Wilson v. Arnold. 5
Mich., 98; Drew v. Dequindre. 2 Douz..
93-4; Fesscnden v. Hill, 6 Mich., 242.
But by amendment to 5721, made in
1870, there may be such an interval
the
between
as is therein precrihed,
making of the aﬂidavit and the issu
ing of the writ. the law trusting to
the presumption that the facts sworn
will continue to
to in the nﬂidavit
exist during the time thereafter ai
iowed for issuing the writ.
sues.

aﬂidavit
Facts,
how stated.-The
that the de
must state positively.
to the plaintiff;
fendant is indebted
indebtedness,
as
the amount of such
near as may be; that the same is
due; and (when the writ is applied
for under 57?-1) that the demand is
due upon contract, express or implied,
A statement of
or upon judgment.
and
matters upon information
these
Wil
belief, merely, is not sufficient:
son v. Arnold, 5 Mich.. 104.
The fact that the defendant is in
debted to the plaintiff must be stated
Wilson v. Arnold. 5 Mich..
positively:
98: Hale v. (‘handler. 3 Mich.. 531.
When debt is upon both express and
Buehler
implied contract. how stated:
v. DeLemos. 84 Mich.. 554; 48 N. W.,
42.

The amount of the debt may he
Wilson
stated “as near as may bez"
v. Arnold, 5 Mich., 98; Hale v. Chand
ler, 3 Mich.. 531; Wells v.‘ Parker. 26
Mich., 102. A statement of the amount
by de
“as near as can be speciﬁed
ponent," is sufficient: Barker v. Thorn,
And so is a statement
20 Mlch., 265.
of the amount “as near as deponent
Nicolls v.
can estimate the sumez"
Lawrence. 30 Mich.. 395: Roeiofson
If the amount
v. llatch. 3 Mich.. 277.
due is positively stated at n deﬁnite
sum, the words “as near as may be"
Grover v. Buck. 34
are immaterial:
Mich., 519.
An affidavit made by an
stating. "that
agent of the plaintiﬂ.
there is justly due to the plaintiff
(naming him). from the said N . . . . ..
(the defendant). the sum of thirty
nine dollars. as near as this deponent
is a suffi
can estimate the same."
ciently positive statement that the de

61
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fendant is indebted. and of its amount,
and that the demand is due, and sum
ciently shows that the aiiiant is speak
ing of his own knowledge.
The stat
ute, §721, only requires the aﬂldavit
to specify the amount of the indebt
edness,
“as near as may be,“ as in
many cases it would be diﬂicult, if
not impossible, to state the precise
amount with positive certainty:
Nic
olls v. Lawrence, 30 liiich., 305-8; see,
Grover v. Buck, 34 l\iich., 519.
But it
seems that the plaintiff is not limited
in his recovery to the amount sworn
to be due in the affidavit, if the proofs
show him to be entitled to more:
Pew
v. Yoare, 12 Mic-h., 16.
The demand must be av-erred to be
duc.—'I‘he proceedings by attachment
lie only for a debt or demand which
is due:
llale v. Chandler, 3 Mich.,
531; Wells v. Parker, 26 Mich., 102;
Mathews v. Densmore et al., 43 Mlch.,
463; 5 N. W., 669.
There must be a
present cause of action existing at the
Galloway
time of ﬁling the aﬂidavit:
v. Holmes. 1 Doug., 350: Buckley v.
Lowry, 2 Mlch., 418.
Stating that the
defendant is indebted, etc.,
is
not
equivalent to an allegation that the
Cross v. Mcltiakin, 17
demand is duc:
if, at the time of issuing
l\iich., 511.
the attachment. a part only of the

plaintiffs

demands

were

due,

he

can

judgment only for the amount
of suit. and
due at the commencement
is not entitled to include in his judg
ment any demands against the debtor
which fell due between the times of
commencing the suit and taking judg
Hinchman v. Town, 10 Mich.,
ment:
508; C. L.. § 10586, providing for
cases where debt is n'ot due, is ap
plicable to proceedings by attachment
in circuit courts only.
take

The demand must be on contract or
is
jud_qmcnt.—\\'hen _the attachment
applied for under §'i'21, the aﬂidavit
must aver that the demand is due upon
contract, express or implied, or upon
judgment:
Wilson v. Arnold, 5 Mich.,
98.
But it need not further show
Drew v.
the nature of the contract:
Dequindre, 2 Doug.. 93. The omission
in the aﬂidavlt of a statement as to
whether the amount is due upon “ex
press or implied" contract is not a
defect if it is alleged to be due upon
Hamilton,
contract:
Freer
127
v.

CH.
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381; 86 N. W., 824.
The de
if upon contract, need not be
liquidated.
if the amount is suscepti
ble of ascertainment by some standard
referable to the contract, it is sum
cient:
Roelofson v. Hatch, 3 Mich.,
Mlch.,
mand,

279.

of the cause for issuing
grounds or cause for
which an attachment may issue, as
provided in the several subdivisions of
5721, may be set forth upon the de
ponent's belief and the statement that
he has good reason for such belief:
401.
Macumber v. Beam. 22 Mich,
Where cause for issuing the writ is
permitted to be stated on belief, the
language of the statute should be fol
lowed, and the aiiiant should state
that he “has good reason to believe,“
etc.
A statement that "he is informed
believes," is not in compliance
r.nd
Kegel v. Schrenk
with the statute:
heisen, 37 Mich., 174.
An affidavit in
the alternative, that defendant has as
or
dlsposcd of or concealed,
signed,
is about to, etc., is bad because in the
' Kegel v. Schrenkheisen,
alternative:
37 Mich., 174; Dutcher v. Grand Rap
ids Fire Ins. Co., 131 Mich., 671; 92
N, W., 345.
A statement that “the
defendant, as this deponent has good
reason to believe, has disposed of his
property with intent," etc., is sulﬁ
cient:
Nicoils v. Lawrence, 30 Mich.,
But a. statement that “deponent
395.
that the defendant is about
believes
to remove," etc., without averrlng that
"he has good reason to believe it," is
bad:
Hunt v._Strew, 39 Mlch., 368.
A statement in language equivalent to
Wil
that of the statute, is sufficient:
son v. Arnold,
5 Mich., 104.
Statement

the

icrtt.--The

I

may allege as
Usually
a plaintiff
many grounds of attachment within
terms of the law as he may deem
expedient.
But in doing so, the sev
eral grounds must be stated conjunc
Therefore, an
tively or cumulatively.
which states two or more
aﬂidavlt
grounds for issuing the writ. in the
alternative, as, "that defendant has as
signed or is about to assign his prop
erty," etc., is fatally defective. Kegel
Ap
v. Schrenkheisen, 37 1\iich., 174.
proved:
Dutcher v. Grand Rapids F.
I. Co., 131 Mich., 671: 92 N. W., 345.
An allegation that defendant "fraudu
lently contracted the debt or incurred

62
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Fraudulent disposition of property.-1.
That the de
fendant has assigned, disposed of or concealed, or is about to
assign, dispose of or conceal, any of his property with the intent
§70.

to defraud

his creditors? or,

the obligation" will not invalidate the
in the disjunctive:
aiﬂdavit because
Emerson v. Steel 6: Spring Co., 100
Mlch., 127: 58 N. W., 659.
So an
allegation that defendant is about to
“assign, dispose of or conceal," etc.,
will not because in the disjunctive in
validate an attachment aiﬂdavit: Jones
v. Peck, 101 Mlch., 389; 59 N. W.,
659.
But it seems that if there is
personal service, and the defendant
appears without objection. such a de
Hills v. Moore,
fect will be waived:
In overruling the case
40 Mlch., 210.
v.
of iiills v. Moore. nee, Boriand
Kingsbury, 65 Mlch., 63-4; 31 N. W.,
625, the court said, "If the aﬂidavit
is defective in matter of substance and
its defects are not waived by a gen
eral appearance. the justice obtains no
jurisdiction over the case."
An aﬂidavit that D. and A. are not
residents of the state, and have not
resided therein for three months im
medlntely preceding the time of mak
ing the aiﬂdavlt. and that D. and A.
reside in the state of New York, suffi
ciently shows that each is a non
resident, and has not resided in this
Dorr v.
state for three months, etc.:
Clark, 7 Mlch., 312.
An niflldnvit stating that the defend
omitting to state
ant has nbsconded,
that he has absconded to the injury of
his crcditorn, is insuiﬂcient to authorize
l1ew
an attachment on that ground:
itt v. Terry, 58 Mlch., 501; 22 N. W.,
"Abscondlng"
as used in the
326.
attachment statute means more than
lt in
a temporary absence for health.
volves the design to withdraw clan
destlnely, to hide or conceal onc's self
for the purpose of avoiding legal pro
liiciiiorran, v. Moore, 113
ceedings:
Mlch., 101; 71 N. W., 505.
Against Coparfncrs,
€tc.——An
ath
davit for an attachment against co
pnrtners or joint debtors must show
that all of them are implicated in the
Edwards
acts authorizing
the writ:
An aﬂidavit
v. Hughes. 20 Mlch., 289.
that A., B. & (‘., “a copartnership
under the ﬁrm name of (naming the

ﬁrm), are indebted to deponent," etc.,
suﬂlclently alleges n joint partnership
debt:
Miller v. Bay Circuit Judge,
41 Mlch., 326; 2 N. W., 26.
An alle
gation in an aﬂidsvit for attachment
against two partners that "the said
etc.,
is a
C. 6: H. have assigned,"
suﬂlclent allegation that each has done
so:
Van Benschotcn v. Falcs,
126
Mlch., 176; 85 N. W., 476.
Not Amcndabl-c.—lt is said that the
affidavit for an attachment cannot be
amended; and that if the attachment
has been issued upon a defective am
davit, and served, the mistake cannot
amendment,
or by
be corrected by
furnishing
new and
suﬂicient
alli
dnvits:
2 Wuit‘s Law and 1"rac., 2d
ed., 150.
lt is not amenable: Freer
v. White. 91 Mlch., 74: 51 N. W., 807.
Contra, as to aﬂidavit for writ of re
plevin upon the theory that the issu
nnce of the writ does not depend upon
Taylor
the sﬂidavlt as in attachment:
Kalamazoo
100
v.
Circuit Judge,
Mlch., 181; 58 N. W., 835. The truth
only
of the aiildavit can be contested
upon an 'appiication
to dissolve the
Town,
attachment:
Bower
v.
12
Mlch., 230.
2——SuhdivL9ion
1.--it is suﬂlcient,
under this subdivision, if the intent is
to defraud any of the party's cred
Mlch.,
itors:
Allen v. Kinyon,
41
281; 1 N. W., 868; Cleiand v. Tay
lor, 3 Mlch., 201; Smith v. Rumsey,
33 Mlch., 183; Pierce v. Rehfuss, 35
Mlch., 53. The question of fraudulent
intent is one of fact:
Jackson
v.
Dean, 1 Doug., 519; Oliver v. Baton,
7 Mlch., 113: Bagg v. Jerome, Ibid.,
145: State Bank v. Chapelle. 40 Mlch.,
451.
if a conveyance is made with
intent to hinder or delay or defraud
the creditors of the grnntor it will be
fraudulent
a
Corbltt v.
to them:
Cutcheon, 79 Mlch., 43; 44 N. W.,
163: Ryan v. Meyer, 108 Mlch., 638:
66 N. W., 667; Gumberg v. Trensch,
110 Mlch., 451; 68 N. W., 236.
But
such an intent will never be presumed
without proof:
Miller v. Finley, 26
Mlch., 255; Robert v. Morrin, 27 Mlch.,
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Removal of property from county.-2. That he is
§71.
about to remove any of his property from the county in which
such application is made, or from the county where the defend
ant resides, with the like intent: or, that he has removed, or is
about to remove, himself or his property from the county, and
refuses or neglects_to pay, or to secure the payment of the
debt ;3

a

8

&

1105.

7

346.

A transfer or assignment of prop
erty, even if made for value to one
who is not a creditor. but with in
tention on the part of the vendor and
vendee to defraud the creditors of the
Jor
former, will he void as to them:
None
dan v. White. 38 Mich., 256.
but :1 purchaser for a valuable con
notice, can
and without
sideration.
assigned,
claim property fraudulently
creditor:
an attaching
as against
Dixon v. Iiili, 5 Mich., 408; Schaibie
56 N. W.,
v. Ardner, 98 i\iich..‘72;

8

C-‘I
hi Cl

But a debtor may lawfully convey
or mortgage his property in payment
of, or as security to. one creditor
rather than another, and in such or
Sweetzer v.
der as he may prefer:
Mead, 5 Mich., 110: People v. Bristol,
35 Mich., 34; Hill v. Bowman, Iln'd.,
191; Oimstead v. Mattison. 45 Mich.,
617; 8 N. W., Cl
State Bank v.
47; Root v. Hare.
Chapeiie, 40 Mich.,
62 Mich., 422; 29 N. W., 29: Johnson
13; 34 N.
67 Mich.,
v. Steiiwagen.
W., 252; Franklin Needle Co. v. Ama
zon Hosiery Co., 128 Mich., 198; S7
N. W., 211: Cole v. Cole, 126 Mich.,
569; 85 N. W., 1098.
And he may
convey
to his wife. in payment of an
antecedent debt, in preference to other
creditors:
Loomis v. Smith, 37 Mich.,
595: Allen v. Antisdale, 38 Mich., 229;
Jordan v. White. 38 Mich., 253; Dar
ling v. Hurst. 39 Mich., 765; Brig
ham v. Fawcett. 42 Mich., 542: 4 N.
W., 272; Cole v. Cole, 126 Mich.. 569;
85 N. W., 1098.
A conveyance
or se
curity made to pay or secure an hon

&

329;

debt, will be good,
although the
debtor may know that the effect will
be to hinder and delay other creditors,
it there is no intent to defraud them:
Oimstead v. Mattison, 45 Mich., 617;
N. W., 555;
Jordan v. White, 38
Mich., 258.
And even where
cred
itor takes a conveyance of property for
the sole purpose of obtaining pay
ment of an honest debt, the fact that
the vendor intended thereby to hin
der or defraud his other creditors,
will not invalidate the transfer, unless
such creditor participates in the fraud
ulent intent: Beurmann v. Van Buren,
44 Mich., 499;
N. W., 67; Hill v.
Bowman, 35 Mich., 191; Loomis v.
Smith, 37 Mich., 595; Jordan v. White,
38 Mich., 253; Andrews
v. Fillmore,
46 Mich., 315;
N. W., 431; Adams
v. Niemann. 46 Mich., 136;
N. W.,
Axle Co. v. Winans, P.
7192 Spring
Co., 106 Mich., 198; 64 N. W., 23,
and cases cited in the opinion.
See,
also, Kock v. Bostwick.
Mich.,
113
302: 71 N. W., 473.
it is enough if the effect and intent
is to delay though not to defraud:
McBryan
v. Trowbridge,
125
Mich..
542; 84 N. W., 1084.
A voluntary
transfer without fraudulent
intent is
valid as to subsequent creditors:
(‘ole
v. Brown, 114 Mich., 396; 72 N. W.,
247; Barkworth v. Palmer, 118 Mich.,
50; 76 N. W., 151.
A sale of property by the debtor be
tween the issuing and levy of the at
tachment thereon, if without
fraud.
is valid, notwithstanding
pur
the
chaser knew of the writ‘:
Hunt v.
Strew, 39 Mich., 368.
3—Subdit'£sion 2.—'I‘he removal of
property exempt from levy upon exe
cution would be no ground for issu
ing the writ. as such property cannot
be held, either upon attachment or ex
ecution:
Smith v. Ramsey. 33 Mich.,
183; see, Wyckoﬂ \-. Wyiis,
Mich.,
est

9

slight

8

Nor will it be presumed from
Buck v. Sher
circumstances:
man,
2 Doug.. 182; Howe v. Camp,
Walk. Ch., 427.
Where an honest in
tent may be as clearly inferred as a
dishonest one. the latter is not to be
Nye v. Van ilusan, 6 Mich.,
inferred:
306.
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debt.-3.

Fraudulently contracted

§ 72

That

he

fraudu

o

1'7

;‘

lently contracted the debt, or incurred the obligation respecting
which the suit was brought
§

Absconding or non-resident debtors.—4. That the de
to the injury of his creditors, or does
not reside in this state, and has not resided therein for one
month immediately preceding the time of making the applica
73.

5

\

;

5

2

2

it

6

a

2

5

5

48; Elliott v. Whitmore,
Mich.,
536-7; Ostrander v. Packer, 35 Mich.,
430: Micheis v. Stork, -H Mich., 2;
O'Donnell v. Segar,
N. W., 1034;
25 l\iich.. 367; Rosenthal v. Scott, 4-i1
!lich., 632;
N. W., 009; Buckley v.
Wheeler, 52 Mich., 1; 17 N. W., 216;
Emerson v. Bacon, 58 Mich., 526;
See, Stork v. Reynolds,
25 N. W., 503.
121 Mlch., 356; 80 N. \\'., 280.
3.—Fraud is not in
4—~Subdirla|'on
breach
mere
of con
ferable from
tract; and when an attachment is
ground of fraud, the
asked
on
the
burden of proving it is on the part
Powers v. O'Brien,
nf the plaintiff:
Fraud,
N. W., 679.
4-i .\lich., 317;
like any other fact, is to be proved by
any facts and circumstances which
It
satisfy the mind of its existence.
from circumstances.
may be inferred
and often
cannot he proved in any
O'Donnell v. ﬁegar, 25
other way:
li.iich.,
378.
The proof should be so
clear and conclusive as to leave no
rational doubt in the mind as to its
Doug.,
existence:
Buck v. Sherman.
Ibld., 230; lIub
182: Orr v. Lacey,
Mich., 155.
The
bard v. Taylor,
meaning of this is, that the proof
must be such as to create belief. and
not mere suspicion:
Fraser v. Pas
sage, 63 Mlch., 551; 30 N. W., 334;
Biish v. Collins, 68 Mich., 542: 38 N.
W., 731 Rumpus v. Bnmpus, 59 Mich.,
95; 26 N. W., 410; Pierce v. Pierce,
55 Mich., 629; 22 N. W., 81.
It is
not necessary that the proof should
leave
the mind absolutely free from
doubt.
If the testimony produces a
rational belief, it is suﬁficient:
Wat
kins v. Wallace, 19 Mich., 77.
As to

65

a

That the defendant
That such affidavit shall not

amount of proof required, fraud
stands upon the same footing as any
other fact required to he established
in civil cases:
Robert v. Morrin. 27
Mich., 308: see, Baldwin v. Buckland,
11 Mich., 390; Hough v. Dickenson, 58
Mich., 89: 24 N. W., 809.
An alle
gation that defendant
“fraudulently
contracted the debt or incurred the
obligation," will not invalidate the am
davit because in the disjunctive:
Em
Spring Co., 100 Mlch.,
erson v. Steel
127; 58 N. W., 659.
An allegation
that the defendant "is about to assign,
dispose of or conceai." etc., will not,
because
in the disjunctive, invalidate
an attachment affidavit:
Jones
v.
Peck, 101 .\lich., 389; 59 N. W., 659.
But an affidavit alleging that defend
ant “has assigned, disposed of or con
cealed,
or is about to assign, dispose
of or conceal," etc., is bad because
Kegel v. Schrenk
in the alternative:
helsen,
37 Mich.. 174;
Dutcher
v.
Grand Rapids Fire ins. Co., 131 Mich.,
671; 92 N. W., 345.
The affidavit
in the Kegel case, supra, alleges but
one cause.
The affidavits in the cases
last referred to each allege two causes
for the writ.
5-Subdivision 4.—The fact that a
dehtor has alisconded is no cause for
issuing an attachment, unless
is to
the injury of his creditors:
Hewitt v.
Terry, 56 Mich., 501; 28 N. W., 326.
“Absconding"
deﬁned.
Mcliiorran
v.
Moore, 113 iiiich., 101; 71 N. W..
505.
Non-residence in case of several
See, Dorr
defendants:
v. Clark,
Mich., 312.
A person who stays most
of the time in this state, hut claims
that his home is in another state, from
the

7

corporation:

Provided,

is

Foreign corporations.—5.

it

§74.
foreign

I:

tion

;-"

fendant has absconded

;
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insufﬁcient by reason of the intervention of a day
the date of the jurat to such aﬂidavit and the issuing

deemed

be

between

of the writ, and that when the person making such affidavit
shall reside in any other county in this state than that in which
the writ of attachment is to issue, one day's time for every
miles, by the usual post-route, from the residence of such
person to the place from which such writ shall issue, shall be
allowed between the date of such jurat and the issuing of such

thirty

writ.”°
Attachment for trespass on land.-“In all cases where
right of action for the taking of timber, or other
a party
trespass on lands, or for any injury to lands, whether direct or
consequential, it shall be lawful for the party having such right
of action to waive the tort and bring assumpsit therefor.”"
“When tort is waived, as provided in the preceding section,
§

75.

has a

the plaintiﬂ? may commence his suit by attachment against the
property of the defendant, as in other cases, and his aﬂidavit
for such attachment shall state the amount due him as near
as may be, and the fact that the damages are unliquidated shall
not prevent the bringing and maintaining
§76.

Bond to detenda.nt.—“In all

cases

of such writ.”3
of attachment, the

plaintiff shall, before issuing the attachment, ﬁle with the justice
a bond to the defendant, in the penal sum of two hundred dol
he came. and where his wife
lives and has a home of her own,
and who visits and lives with her from
time to time. is a non-resident. subject
Loder v. Littleﬂeld.
to attachment:
whence

39 Mic-h.,

512.

-

6---Subdivision
5.—It was formerly
held that justices of the peace had no
against
jurisdiction
in attachments
Brigham v. Egiinton, 7
corporations:
As to suits against tor
Mich.. 291-3.
eign corporations,
see, Gallagher
v.
American Express Co., 56 Mich., 13;
The statute, C. L.,
22 N. W., 96.
£10474, providing for service of at
tachment against foreign corporations
is permissive only and doe
not ex
clude the method of service prescribed:
§§ 730 and 731: Davidson v. Fox. 120
Mich., 385: 79 N. W., 1106; Lutz v.
Davidson Cycle_ Co., 121 Mich., 108;
79 N. W., 1126.
Intervention of a-day, eto,—Prlor to

the enactment of this,

C. L.. 5 721, in
its present form (May 6. 1879), it was
held that the aiiidavit
must be made
on the same day of the issuing of the
writ:
Drew v. Dequindre. 2 Doug.,
93: Buckley v. Lowry, 2 Mich., 418;
Wilson v. Arnold. 5 Mich., 98; Fes
'
senden v. Hill, 6 Mich., 242.

7-C. L.. § 11207. The" declaration
must show that damages accrued from
the trespass:
Lockwood v. Boom Co.,
42 Mlch., 536; 4 N. W., 292,
Recov
ery can be had for the proceeds of tim
ber taken through a trespass in an
action on the common counts:
Nelson
v, Kilbride.
113 Mieh., 637;
71 N.
W., 1089.
By suing in assumpsit the
plaintiil waives all rights of owner
ship in the property converted:
Nield
v. Burton, 49 Mich., 53; 12 N. W.,
906.

s_c.
66
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lars, with sufﬁcient sureties, to be approved by the justice in
writing thereon, signed by him, conditioned to pay the defend
ant all damages and costs he may sustain by reason of the issu
ing of the attachment, if the plaintiff shall fail to recover
judgment in such suit, and if the plaintiiT’s demand shall exceed
one hundred dollars, the penalty of such bond shall be double
the amount of such demand/’9
A regular bond must be given; a covenant or agreement in
the same terms that the bond is required to be, would not be
in compliance with the statute."
“No bond, deed of conveyance, or other contract in writing,
signed by any party, his agent or attorney, shall be deemed in
valid for wanf of a seal or scroll aﬂixed thereto by such

party.”“
In

an essential de
fect in a bond to obtain an attachment would have rendered
the proceedings void, and the justice and plaintiff would have
been trespassers in taking the property upon the attachment.”
Now, the only remedy in such a case would be to move to set
aside the proceedings, which the plaintiff could prevent by
§ 77.

case bond is defective.—Formerly,

amending the bond given, or executing a new one.‘-°'
“Whenever a bond is or shall be required by law to be given
by any person, in order to entitle him to any right or privilege
L., I 728.
10-—-Hoffman
v. Brinkerhoﬂ, 1 Denio,
It is suiilcient if this bond cou
184.
form substantially to the requirements
C. L.. Q 10409; King
of the statute:
v. Grldley. 69 Mich., 91; 37 N. W., 50;
Bublitz v. Trombley. 113 Mich., 413;
Ii’ this bond is de
71 N. W., 840.
fective in any respect it may on the
ohiigors be
application
oi’
all
the
or a new
amended
in any respect.
bond may bed given on the application
of the person required to give it bear
ing date at the time when such bond
was required to be given:
C. L.,
5 10410; Kidd v. Daugherty, 59 Mich.,
240: 26 N. W., 510; King v. Gridley,
69 Mich., 91; 37 N. W.. 50: Bublitz
v. Trombley, 113 Mich., 413; 71 N.
W., 840.
The tiling of the bond seems neces
sary to give the court jurisdiction
to
9—C.

issue

the

attachment.

And

it

held that the defect for want of a bond
might be waived by the defendant's
so far as to make valid
appearance,
against him.
any judgment rendered
such appearance.
but notwithstanding
the plaintii! had no lien on the prop
erty by vlrtue of the attachment, be
cause there was no jurisdiction
to is
sue it:
lbid.
The statute, C. L.,
510410, allowing amendment of a de
fectlve bond, would not seem to justify
the practice which would allow the
giving oi’ a bond ntter the writ is is
sued and served when there had been
no attempt to give a bond previously.
See, Ackerman v. F‘inch.,
15 Wend.,
652.

j

10417; Mee v. Benedict.
11—C. L.,
98 Mich., 260: 57 N. W.. 175, and
cases cited in the opinion.
12—Atklns v. Brewer. 3 Cow.. 206.

was
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13—See note
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conferred by law-, or to commence any proceeding, it shall not
be necessary for such bond to conform in all respects to the
form thereof prescribed by any statute, but the same shall be
and do
deemed suiiicient if it conform thereto substantially,
not vary in _any matter to the prejudice of the rights of the
party to whom or for whose beneﬁt such bond shall have been
given.”14

-

“Whenever such bond has

been heretofore, or shall hereafter
in any respect, the court oﬁicer,
and
shall
be
defective
given,
be
or body who would be authorized to receive the same, or to en
tertain any proceedings in consequence of such bond, if the
of all the
same had been perfect, may, on the application
obiigors therein, amend the same in any respect, or may, on

the application of the person required to give such bond, allow
a new one to be substituted in the place thereof, bearing date at
the time when such bond was required to be given, and such
bond shall thereupon be deemed valid from the time of the
execution of such defective bond. When application is made
to amend, said court, oﬁicer or body shall have powier to amend
such bond in any respect, and without regard to the particular
amendment applied for, so as to make said defective bond such
a one as might have been required when the latter was given.
When a new bond is allowed, it shall be such in form, penalty,
and other respects, as might have been demanded when the
defective bond was given.”15

Liability of the su1'eties.—The bond given on suing out
attachment
extends to the ﬁnal determination of the cause;
the
if the judgment rendered by the justice for the plaintiff is not
sustained on appeal, an action may be maintained upon the
§ 78.

§

5

10,
10409.
14—C. L.,
See. note
‘
ante, p. 67.
10410.
15—C. L..
10.
See. note
ante, p. 67.
16—Bail v. Gardiner. 31 Wend., 270.
And the sureties are liable for the
defendant's costs if he prevails on
certiorarl from the Justice's judgment.
There is nothing in the language of
the condition limiting defendant's dam

is

it,

the measure of damages
not
bond." In an action upon
the mere taxable costs in the attachment suit; the obligee may
recover his damages at large, for the seizure, detention and
as should arise in the suit
by the attachment:
commenced
Ben
nett v. Brown, 20 N. Y., 99.
the
ages to such

If

attachment suit after the dissolution
of the writ is prosecuted to final Judg
ment the conditions of the attachment
bond are satisfied:
Hahn v. Siefert.
64 Mich.. 647: 31 N. W., 564: Bor
land v. Kingsbury, 65 Mich., 64; 31
N. W., 620.
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deterioration of his goods, his time and trouble in defending
the suit, and expense of employing coimsel."
But if the de
fendant in the attachment suit has continued in possession of
the property levied upon, and it is not shown that he has been
subjected to costs, he is entitled to nominal damages only."
The obligors in such a bond are, when the plaintiff has failed
to recover judgment, prima facie liable for the value of the

property attached. But where the plaintiff obtained another
attachment, upon which the property was taken, judgment
obtained, and the property sold on the execution issued there
on, it was held that this might be shown to reduce the damages.
“It was still the defendant’s property, notwithstanding the
seizure on the ﬁrst attachment, and as such, was liable to be
taken on the second attachment.”1°
In this case there was
merely a failure to recover judgment; there was no “irregu
larity which made the seizure under the ﬁrst attachment void;
had there been, the property could not have been taken upon
the second attachment in favor of the plaintiﬁ‘”°—though
it
17—Cow. Treat. 2d ed.. 998: Dun
nlng v. Humphrey. 24 Wend., 31.
has
Where an
attachment
been
wrongfully slfbd out, but without mal
ice or intention to oppress on the part
recov
of the plalntiﬂ', the damages
erable against him should be limited to
injury immediately and actually
the
sustained. Mere possible or speculative
proﬁts which might have been realized,
if the store of the defendant in attach
ment had not been closed by reason
of the attachment. should not be taken
Nor, in such a case.
into account.
could he recover for the rent of a
house
which he was prevented
from
building by reason of the levy on the
building material; nor for loss of time
in being deprived of the use of the
Woodmansce,
house:
34
Plumb v.
Iowa, 116; see, Myers v. l~‘urweii. 47
MlBS., 281.
In a suit upon an attach
damages
ment bond to recover
caused
the levy of attachment issued by a

by

justice and afterwards dissolved upon
proceedings had for that purpose, the
piaintiﬂ
was allowed to recover his
counsel
fees paid on the proceedings
to dissolve. and for the loss and lu
jury to his business during the time
the oliicer was in possession
of his

store under the writ, the court hoid
ing, that there was nothing unreason
able in the allowance of the counsel
fee; that it was a necessary expense
incurred because of the suing out of
the attachment, and to get rid of the
lien. and therefore constituted a purl
of the damages suffered; that the bond
contemplates a contest over the right
to maintain the suit, and it must
he understood as embracing the ex
penditures which the suit renders nec
cssary:
Swift v. Plessner, 39 Mlch..
Where, in an attachment against
178.
one of the partners in a firm for a debt
due from him alone,
the oﬁlcer at
tached
certain articles of partnership
property and inventoried them as the
property of the partner sued, he was
held to be a trespasser, and liable
in damages at the suit of all the mem
bers of the ﬁrm for the breaking up
of their business by reason of the at
Haynes v. Knowles,
tachment:
36
Mich., 407-410.
18-—Groat v. Gillespie, IOL1 Wend..
383.

19-—Earl

v.

Spoons-r,

3

Denio,

246.

20—Hamner
92.
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v.

Wiisey,

17

Wend.,
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favor of

a

if the attachment had

be otherwise

third person, and regular.

III.

CH.
been

in

”‘-'1

5'/1

of the writ of attachment.-—“Every
attach
ment shall state the amount claimed by the plaintiff, and shall
command any constable of the county in which the justice
resides, to attach so much of the goods and chattels of the de
fendant (except such as are exempt by law from execution)
as will be suﬁicient to satisfy such demand, and safely keep
the same to satisfy any judgment that may be recovered by
the plaintiff in such attachment, and to return the same at a
Content

79.

time therein to be speciﬁed, not less than six nor more than
twelve days from the date thereof.”"
§

of the W'rit.—A justice may amend an at
tachment, even after service and return, by inserting the
amount of the debt sworn to by the applicant.”
Amendment

80.

OF SERVING

Attachment,

§81.

THE WRIT.

when and how served.--“'l‘he constable

serving such attachment, shall execute the same at least six
days before the return thereof, by seizing so much of the goods
and chattels of the defendant within his county as shall be
suﬂicient to satisfy the demand and costs, and making an in

70

a

n

a

5

writ of attachment is a sum
with a clause authorizing
seiz
ure
property:
of
Thompson
v.
Thomas. 11 Mich., 276.
But see Bor
iand v. Klngsbury, 65 Mic-h.. 59: 31
N. W., 620, where it seems to be
held that it is not a summons and a
writ for the seizure of property in
the sense that it may be
summons
though it is not good as a writ for
the seizure of property.
If it is not
a valid
writ for the attachment of
property it would seem that it gives
the justice no jurisdiction
to proceed
with the suit.
This case expressly
overrules Hills v. Moore, 40 Mlch.,
210.
The case of Hahn v. Seitert, 64
The

mons

Mlch., 647: 31 N. W., 564, is a case
where the defendant consented
to the
judgment.
23—Near v. VanAlstyne, 14 Wend..
10268; Drew
230: and see, C. L.,
v. Dequindre,
Doug. Mich., 93-98:
Far!-and v. Bentley,
Mic-h.. 281, and
note on p. 284.
As to amending. as
to the name of the party, see, Final
v. Backus, 18 Mieh., 218.
Whem only
the surname of the plaintlﬂs are given
in the writ. the detect may be cured
by amendment:
Barber v. Smith, 41
Mlch., 138:
N. W., 992.
And
mis
take in the writ as to the name of a
party may be amended
even at the
trial, ii’ the tact is then made to ap
pear; Barmon v. Cllppert, 58 Mich.,
377; 25 N. W., 371.
6

21 Wend., 394.

729.

and

2

v. Jones,

L.,

1

22-0.

5

21—0tls

copy of such attachment

a

thereof, and serving

ventory
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inventory upon the defendant, if he can be found within the
county.”24
In order to make a valid attachment of the property, the
oﬂicer must have the actual possession and custody, or con
trol, of it.” But it is not necessary that every article should
be taken hold of. If the oﬂicer is in view of the whole, with
The rules
the power of actually seizing them, it is sui’ﬁcient.2°

of an attachment, are the same as govern in
the service of an execution."
Before levying an attachment upon property, of the title to
which there is reasonable doubt, the officer has the right to
require a bond of indemnity, and may refuse to execute the
writ by seizure of such property, until the bond is given.”
as to the service

. 24—C.

L.. 5 730.
any of the provisions of the stat
ute
are not complied with by the
oﬂicer in levying or executing his writ,
Fairbanks
the lien obtained is lost:
v. Bennett, 52 Mich., 63; 17 N. W.,
606.
if the writ is regular on its
by a court oi’ com
face and issued
petent jurisdiction
the omcer will be
protected in its service.
Michels v.
Stork. 44 Mlch.. 4: 5 N. W., 1034;
Watkins v. Wallace, 19 !\Ilch.. 57.
7'imc.—A service made less than six
days before the return day is invalid:
Tunningly v. Butcher, 106 .\iich.. 35;
63 N. W., 994.
The writ must be
retained and personal service secured
if possible during the time allowed.
A return which does not show that the
oﬂicer has attempted such service up
Burgh
to the last day is not good:
v. L. R. Ermellng & (‘o.. 110 Mich.,
164: 67 N. W., 108.1. it is not fatal
to the validity
of the writ, that the
substituted service was msde before
time in which personal service
the
could be made had cxpircd/ii‘ the re
turn shows that the writ was retained
and personal service attempted during
the whole time allowed:
Matthews v.
Forsiund. 113 Mich.. 416: 71 N. W.,

It

25—l.nny v. Jackson, 5 Mass. 157,
There must be such manual seiz
ure or assertion of control as may be
made effectual to bring the property
and keep it within the dominion of the
law.
The levy must be so made as
identify
or give
to either actually
means of identifying
the property so
that the levying oﬂicer may be charged
with the property:
Quackenhush V.
Iienry. 42 Mich., 75; 3 N. W., 262.
possession
(‘onstructive
of growing
crops is suiﬂcient:
Grover v. Buck,
3-i .\iich.. 520.
Machinery bolteil to
the ﬂoor of a building need not to be
detached
in order to perfect a levy
upon it if the oﬂicer gains full control
of it:
Patch v. \\'essels.
46 .\iich.,
249; 9 N. W.. 269.
An officer is not
justified in levying upon property of
many
times the value of the claim
to he protected:
Lee v. Maxwell, 98
Mich. 496; 57 N. W., 581.
26-—-Trsln v. Wellington, 12 Mnss.,
495.
it is not necessary to s valid
attachment that the oﬂicer should re
move the property from the store or
place where the attachment is made,
if he leave it in charge of his servant
or ngent. or place
keeper
over it:
Ibid.
163.

I

854.

Place_—it
return fails
to
show
where service was made it will he pre
sumed
that service was made in the
county:
Bushey v. Raths, 45 Mich.,
Not so as to re
183: 7 N. W., 802.
turn ol city marshal:
Alverson v.
Dennison, 40 Mk-h., 179.

27—~See, poxf,

§§ 521-552.

28—-Smith v. Cicotte, 11 Mich.. 383.
When sn oliicer levies an attachment
upon property not belonging to the de
fendant in the writ, inventories it, has
it appraised. takes possession and sulr
jccts the property to his own control.
such intermeddiing would constitute a
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is,

What property may be attached.-'I‘he attachment is
§ 82.
to be served on “the goods and chattels of the defendant (ex
cept such as are exempt by law from execution) ”2°—that
articles which are strictly termed “goods and chattels.” In
Mich. Rep, 104, the question was dis
Tannahill v. Tuttle,
cussed whether the interest of the mortgagor in personal prop

6

2

6

5

it

Creditors have no rights against ex
empt property:
Waite v. Mathews, 50
Mich., 392; 15 N. W., 524; Buckley v.
Wheeler, 52 Mich., 1; 17 N. W., 216.
It is not necessary for the debtor to
claim his exemptions in order to have
the beneﬁt of them.
The
tatute de
clares the exemptions, and‘is of itself
a uﬂlcient notice of the debtor‘s rights
and claim thereto.
it contemplates
that when an officer levies upon prop
erty from which an exemption may ho
taken, he shall levy upon and appraise
the whole, and then permit the debtor
to select the amount exempt; and if
no selection is made by the debtor, the
Van
oflicer must make
for him:
derhorst v. Bacon, 38 Mich., 672:
Ostrander v. Packer, 35 Mich., 430;
Sheldon v. Rounds. 40 Mich., 427;
N. W..
Michels v. Stork, 44 Mich., 2:
1084: Stilon v. Gibbs, 53 Mich., 280.
282; 18 N. W., 815. And if the officer
fails to make such inventory and ap
praisal, and afford opportunity to the
debtor to select, or to select the ex
emptlons for him, the levy will he in
valid to the amount of the statutory
Elmore,
exemptions:
Town v.
38
Mich., 305.
When partnership prop
erty ls attached, each co-partner is
entitled to the same amount of exemp
tions a.s he would be if he were the
Skinner
sole owner of the property:
v. Shannon, 44 Mich., 86;
N. W.,
Exemption laws are
108.
remedial
and the general rule applies that they
should be liberally construed in favor
of the debtor:
Alvord v. Lent, 23
Mich., 371; Rosenthai v. Scott, 41
N, W., 909: Skinner v.
Mich., 633;
N. W., 108:
Shannon, 44 liflch., 87;
Fischer v. Mcintyre,
66 Mich.. 682:
33 N. W., 762; Hutchinson
v. Whit
more, 90 Mich., 263; 51 N. W., 451.
To be entitled to the privileges of the
exemption laws the debtor must he
citizen of the state and the prop
erty within some one of the classes

a

S

5

5

§§

it

a

a

5

converslon of the property and render
him liable.
Where the plaintiff and
his attorney directed the service of the
writ upon property which they sup
posed beionzed to the defendant in the
attachment suit, but which in fact be
longed to another, and after service of
the writ refused to assent to the re
lease of the property attached when
required by the actual owner of the
property levied on, an action of tres
pass will lie against them in favor of
such owner, even though they were
not present when the attachment was
levied, and did not in person interfere
Had the attorney,
with the property.
levy, merely
instead of directing-the
communicated to the otiicer the plain
tiff's directions to levy, the case might
Cook
have been diﬂerent as to him:
v. Hopper, 23 Mich., 511.
729.
29—C. L.,
Property
exempt
from oltach/mcnt.
—The law of exemptions and the pro
levy where exempt
cedure in making
property is involved are the same in
For
attachment as in execution levies.
a fuller discussion of this general sub
ject see, post, xxvii, §§ 526-528.
When an attachment is levied upon
from
exempt
property of _a species
amount or
speciﬁed
execution to
value,
is the duty of the attaching
oﬂlcer to have the property appraised,
and to give the defendant the oppor
tunity to select the exemptions allowed
10325,
See, C. L.,
to him by law:
The provisions of these sec
10326.
tions are applicable alike to attach
ments issuing from justices and circuit
Michels v. Stork, 44 l\iich.,
courts:
2;
N. W., 1034; and see, Elliott v.
Whitmore,
iiiich., 536-7; ivyckoﬂ v.
Mich., 48. The method of ap
Wylis,
praisai and selection of the exemption
is the same as under levies upon exe
cution.
As to the proceedings in such
cases, see, post, chap. xxvii,"Of execu
tions and the proceedings thereon."
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erty mortgaged could be taken on an attachment, although he
was entitled to possession of the property by agreement with
the mortgagee, and before condition broken.
Martin, J., re

ferring to the statute authorizing the sale of the mortgagor’s
interest on execution, says: “The directions and provisions of
this statute clearly assumes that such right or interest can only
be sold upon ﬁnal process.

The seizure by attachment is alto
in its nature: it being a seizure upon mense
process, and not necessarily accompanied by a right to execu
tion and sale.”3°
The rule so declared by Martin, J., has

gether different

declared exempt:
Wood v. Bresna
han, 63 Mich., 614; 30 N. W., 206.
Conditions existing at the time of and
just prior to the levy should determine
King
the question of the exemption:
v. Moore, 10 Mich., 5-12: O'Donnell v.
Segar, 25 Mich., 375.
30—Tannahill
3 Mich.,
v. Tuttle,
10-I; Eggleston v. Mandy, 4 Mich.,
295; Bacon v. Klmmel, 14 Mich., 201.
Goods and chattels mortgaged.—ln
this state a chattel mortgage is not a
sale, but only a security:
iluynes v.
Leppig, 40 Mich., 602. And the holder
of a mortgage on chattels does not be
come the absolute owner by breach of
the condition oi the mortgage.
Until
has a lien
foreclosure the mortgagee
only. The parties stand to each other
as debtor on one side. and creditor se
cured by lien on property on the other:
Lucklng
443;
v. Wesson, 25 Mich.,
(‘ury v. iiewitt, 26 Mich., 228; Kohl
v. Lynn. 3-i Mich., 361.
The statute
authorizing a levy
(C. L., 5 10318)
upon the interest of the general owner
of personal property encumbered by se
curity, is not conﬁned to property mort
gaged, but covers all goods and chat
tels pledged by way ot mortgage or
otherwise for the payment of money,
or the performance of any contract or
agreement:
iianna,
Worthington
v.
23 .\Iich., 530.
The levy of an attach
ment upon such mortgaged or other
wise pledged goods and chattels may be
made at any time before actual tore
Cary v. Hewitt, 26 Mich.,
closure.
228; Mucomber v. Saxton, 28 Mich.,
5162 Nelson v. Ferris, 30 Mich., 497.
And a foreclosure is not completed un
til the right oi! redemption is cut oi!
by
a sale:
Haynes v. Leppig, -40
Mich., 605.

attachment levy can only be
the mortgagor's
or
interest.
"right of redemption :" Bayne v. Pat
terson, 40 Mich., 659; Wilson v. Mon
tague, 57 Mich., 638; 24 N. W., 851.
And cannot interfere with the legal
rights oi‘ the mortgagee:
Worthing
ton v. Hanna, 23 Mich., 534.
This
right of redemption pertains to the
whole of the property mortgaged, and
is not apportionnbie:
Ibid.
Hence
the attachment or execution creditor
cannot levy upon and sell a part only
of a stock of goods, the whole of which
is mortgaged, without paying or ten
dering the full amount of the mort
gage:
Worthington
Hanna,
v.
23
Mich., 53-i ; ilnynes
Leppig,
v.
40
Mich., 606; Baldwin
v.
46
Talbot,
Mich., 19; 8 N. W.. 565.
But neither
payment nor tender of the amount due
upon the mortgage is necessary
in or
der to a valid levy and sale of the
rnortg~agor's
entire
interest
in the
King v. iiubbell, 42 Mich.,
property:
601; 4 N. W., 440.
In attaching mortgaged goods and
chattels, it is not essential that the
oﬁicer should take more than tem
porary possession of the property. lie
has a right to take possession
for
the purpose of an inventory and ap
pralsement.
This establishes and per
fects his lien; and no provision in the
mortgage giving
the mortgagee
the
privilege of taking possession
when
he deems himself insecure, can defeat
this right.
It the oiﬁcer believes the
mortgage fraudulent, or satisﬁed, he
it; but it’ he con
need not recognize
cedes its validity, it will not be neces
sary tor his protection to retain pos
session.
The mortgagee
having the
ﬁrst lien and being entitled to tore
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been changed by statute, and mortgaged chattels are now sub

ject

to attachment

against the mortgagor."

a

it,

Goods in custody of the la.w.—In the absence of a con
§ 83.
trolling statute, while goods are in the custody of an officer, by
virtue of a. levy made on attachment or other process, no other
ofﬁcer can levy upon them.“ But an oﬁicer who has seized
property under an attachment or execution, so long as he is
in the actual or constructive possession of the property, may
attach it again at the suit of the same or another plaintiif.
In the ﬁrst case, the ofﬁcer who ﬁrst levied has the actual and
exclusive control over the property; it is in the custody of
the law; no other oﬁicer can seize it imder another writ, for
and
in order to attach he must lawfully take possession of
this he cannot do. This right or immunity extends over prop
receiptor,“
erty in the hands of the bailce of the otﬁcer or

a

a

a

7

522.

in an attachment against
partners of
ﬁrm for his
debt,
individual
it is not lawtui for
the oﬂicer to seize speciﬁc articles of
partnership property, or
part oi.’ the
ﬁrm goods. as the property of the
partner sued.
It any levy can be
made in such
case on partnership
elect, it must be on the prl1'tner’a in
Thus,
terest
tn. the
whole
stock.
where in attachment against one of
the partners the oﬂicer attached cer
tain articles of partnership property
as the goods of the partner sued, and
them,
so inventoried
he was held a
trespasser, and liable to the ﬁrm for
damages
for breaklpg up their busi
Haynes v. Knowles, 36 Mich.,
ness:
407; see, Sirrine v. Briggs, 31 Mich.,
443: Hutchison v. Dubois, 45 Mich.,
143;
N. W., 714.

60. note.
one of the

7

31—IIaynes
Leppig, 40 Mich"
v.
602; King v. Hubbeii, 42 Mich., 603;
Judge
N. W., 440; Smith
v.
of
Menominee Circuit, 53 Mich., 563; 19
Ganong v. Green, 71
N. W., 184;
Mich., 7; 38 N. W., 661; Mueller v.
Provo, S0 Mlch., 481; 45 N. W., 498;
Anderson v. Cook, 100 Mich., 623; 59
N. W., 423.
Mass, 271:
32—Watson v. Todd.
Vinton v. Bradford. 13 Mass. 114.
33—'l‘hompson v. Marsh, 14 Mass.
5

7

Growing crops, it seems. are liable
King v.
to seizure on attachment:
Moore, 10 Mich., 545; Grover v. Buck,
84 Mich., 519; see, Preston v. Ryan,
45 Mich., 174;
N. W., 819; Pierce v.
Hill, 35 Mich., 194; Shutes v. Wood
ward, 57 Mich., 213; 23 N. W., 775.
Though a part of the realty, growing
crops are treated as personaity for the
purposes of levy:
Preston v. Ryan,
45 Mich.. 174:
N. W.. 819.
Partnership 1)rop(‘rt1/.
As to attach
ing partnership property, see, ante, p.

4

§

4

a

close it at
deﬁnite time, is entitled
to possession of the property, and the
oﬂicer should surrender it on demand.
But he must respect the attachment
lien in his disposition of the property
afterwards;
and will be liable to the
attaching creditor for any wrongful
injury to his lien.
The attachment
binds the mortg~agor's interest as it
then stands, and he cannot release to
the mortgagee, nor can the latter make
further advances on the mortgage se
King v. Huhbeli, 42 ‘Mlch..
curity:
603-4;
N. W., 440.
A levy of the
attachment
will terminate any au
thority
permit
i'ron:| the mortgagee,
ting the mortgagor to make sales in
Ibid.
the usual course of business:
Further upon this subject of levy
mortgaged property, see, post,
upon

269.
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A
'or one who has executed a bond to re-deliver the property.
change in the law in this respect has been made, by which
diiferent attachments of the same property may be made; the
subsequent attachments may be served on the property in the
hands of the officer, and subject to the prior attachment.’-4
several
attach
attachments.-—When
at the same time, they
must probably be served at the same time. In such cases, the
distribution of the avails of the property is not in proportion
to the amount claimed in the writs, but according to the num
ber of them, each being entitled to an equal share; but, if the
share of any plaintiff shall be more than sufficient to satisfy his
demand, the overplus must be appropriated to any other of the
demands which is not fully paid by its distributive share."
The rule would be the same in case of simultaneous service
Simultaneous

§ 84.

ments

are delivered to the same ofﬁcer

by different officers.“
Successive attachments.-“When there are several at
tachments against the same defendant in the hands of the same
oﬂicer, they shall be executed in the same order in which they
'
were received by the oﬁicer.”-'"
“Diﬁerent attachments of the same property may be made,
and one inventory shall be sufficient; the lien of the attach
ments shall be in the order in which they were served, and the
subsequent attachments shall be served on the property as in
the hands of the ofﬁcer, and subject to the prior attachment;
§ 85.

the justice who issued the attachment having the priority of
lien, shall determine all questions as to priority of liens on the
property attached.”-"8

if the second attachment is in the hands of an
_ Therefore,
oﬂicer, other than the one who served the ﬁrst writ, it must be
served on the property as in the hands of the ﬁrst officer, and
subject to the prior attachment.
The last oﬁicer cannot take
the property from the possession of the one who ﬁrst attached
it.
34—C.

36—Shove v. Dow, 13 Mass, 529;
Rockwood v. Varnum, 17 Pk-k., 289.
37—C. L., I 737.
38—C. L., 5 738.

I... Q 738.
v. Dow. 13 Mass., 529;
Slgourney v. Eaton, 14 I‘lck., 414;
Davls v. Davls. 2 C\1sh.. 111: Campbell v. Ruger, 1 Cow., 215.

35-Shove
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When it is intended to levy an attachment upon property al
ready attached, in an officer ’s custody, it is advisable to deliver
the writ to such officer to be executed by him, when it will hold
the surplus, after satisfying the previous attachment, or the
In such
whole, if the ﬁrst attachment should be discharged.
case, no overt act on the part of the oﬁicer is necessary to effect
the second levy, but a return of it on the writ will be suﬁi
cient.” If the property is in the possession of a receiptor, the
officer must also give him notice, with directions to hold it'to
answer the second writ. The bailee may decline to hold the
property for the security of the last attachment, and may re
turn it to the oi'ﬁcer.4° It has been held that an officer who has
permitted the property to go into the hands of a. receiptor can
not return a levy upon an attachment in another suit without
an actual seizure, because the court held that, in such case, he
had no constructive possession.“ But the ofﬁcer, after commit
ting the property to the custody of the receiptor, who has per
mitted the property to go again into the hands of the general
owner (the debtor), cannot attach it upon another writ without
a new seizure." Nor in such case, can he hold the receiptor
responsible beyond the amount of the debts upon which it was
attached prior to the time when the receiptor parted with the
possession.“
Service upon the defendant.-—The officer must not only
seize the goods, but he must also make the inventory, and serve
a copy of it and of the attachment on the defendant, or leave
copies thereof for him, if not found in the county, six days, at
least, before the return day of the attachment.“
§ 86.

Austin,
Mass.,
v.
16
v. Farwell, 10 N. H., 9.

89—'l‘urner
180; Whitney
40-—IMd.;

fI.,

N.

Whitney

v.
-

9.

41—Knap
42—Denny

v.

Farweil,’

10

Sprague, 9 Mass, 258.
11 Pick., 519,

v. Willard,

525.

43-—Whitney

v.

13.

Farweli,
'

10

N.

B.,

44—C. L.. 5 730.
service.-Rervlco
must be
at least six days before the re

I’cr.v0n(ll
made

turn.

etc.

Personal

service

writ, unless accompanied

oi’

the

statu
tory inventory duly certiﬁed, will not
confer Jurisdiction
justice:
on
the
White v. Prior, 88 Mlch., 647; 50 N.
W., 655; see. Langtry v. Wayne Cir
cuit Judges, 68 Mlch., 451; 36 N. W.
211.’
In the case of Wlthingtou v. South
worth. 26 Mlch., 381, it was said that
an attachment returnable on the 20th
day of the month could be served on
any day prior to the 15th: thus hold
ing, that service might be made on the
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“If

the defendant cannot be found within the county, the
constable shall leave a copy of the attachment and inventory,
certiﬁed by him, at the last place of residence of the defend
ant, if there be any such place within the county, and if not,
then by leaving the same with any person in whose possession
such goods and chattels, moneys and effects, may be found,
or in case garnishee proceedings shall be commenced simul
taneously with the issuing of said writ, and no goods, chattels,
or effects shall be found on which to levy such writ, then by
leaving a certiﬁed copy of said writ with such garnishee de
fendant/'45
before
the return day;
sixth day
thereby leaving only ﬂve days inter
vcning between the day of service and
And a like ruling was
the return day.
made
in Town v. Tabor. 34 Mich.,
26-I-5, holding that an attachment rc
turnable on the 2d day of February
might be served as late as the 27th
previous.
And so.
day of January
that nn attachment returnable on the
as late as the
17th might be served
11th of the month: Brown v. Will
iams, 89 .\iich., 755.
Upon the ques
tion of computation of time for serv
see, ante, 5 34, and
ice or return.
note.
It is the service of the attach
ment which places goods taken under
it in the custody of the law. and cre
ates a valid licn:
VnnLoan v. Kline.
i0 Johns. 129. No lien attaches, nor
are any goods bound until the attach
ment
is levied
The issuing
thereon.
of the writ does not effect any prop _
erty before levy.
Ilunt v. Straw, 39
Mich., 368.
The writ must be personally served
upon the defendant if he can be found
within the county. at any time within
the time allowed by the statute for
making service; and it is the duty
of the officer to make a diligent at
tempt to make such service:
With
lngtnn v. Southworth. 26 1\ilch.. 381.
And he must exercise that diligence
during the whole time given him by
law to perform that duty: Brown v.
89 Mich., 755; Isabelle v.
Williams.
iron Clills Co., 57 Mich., 120; 23 N.
W., 616.
45-C. L., 5 731.
Service by copg.lc/t
at
the
de
fendant's residence.-—if personal serv

ice cannot be made upon the defend
ant. the writ must be served by leaving
n certiﬁed copy thereof. and of the in
ventory. at his last place of residence.
if there is any such place within the
county:
Adams v. Abrams, 38 .\ilch.,
302.
See. Scgar v. Shingle and Lum
ber Co.. 81 Mich., at p. 347; 45 N.
W., 982.
As to the suﬂiciency of the
return when there is no last place of
residence,
etc.:
Buehier v. I)e Lemos.
84 iliich.. 554: 48 N. W., 42.
A re
stating
turn which
after
that de
fcndants have no last place of resi
dence in the county and that no prop
erty can be found within said county.
recites that "1 served garnishee sum
mons on ii. and Mci. and McA.. said
etc., and that "I
to have property,"
do further certify and return that I
a copy of the within
served
attach
ment duly certiﬁed by me on B. ii. 8..
who has acted in the capacity of agent
for said defendants,"
conferred
no
jurisdiction
on the justice to render
judgment against the defendant: Fsul
v. Bencus. 124 Mich., 25; 82 N. “C,
659.
A return, however. that the de
fondant "has no last place of resi
dence in the county," is sufficient as
against the objection that it should
show diligent search for a last place
of residence:
Davidson v. Fox, 120
Mich., 385; 79 N. W., 1106.
But as
to when personal service is necessary.
see, Langtry v. Wayne, Circuit Judge,
68 Mich., 451.
But service by copy
at the defendant's last place of resi
dence can be made only in those cases
after reasonable search
and
where.
diligence. he cannot be found in the
county during the time allowed by the
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It is the practice, especially where the
are numerous, for the constable to make
property attached on a separate piece of
a copy of it by a wafer, or otherwise, to

Ca.
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articles of property
his inventory of the
paper, and to annex
the attachment, also

that there shall be first personal serv
statute for making personal service
ice if possible.
If this is not possible,
of the writ, nor until the whole time
then, second,
service shall be
during which personal service can be
that
Wlthlngion
v.
made
left at last place of
by copy
has expired:
made
abode; and if there is, no last place
381;
Nicolls
Southworth,
26 Mlch.,
of abode in the county, then, third,
v. Lawrence, 80 Mich.,395-7;Brown v.
Williams,
Michels v.
service by copy left with the person
39 Mlch., 755;
Stork, 44 Mlch.,\2; 5 N. W. 1034;
in possession of the property attached.
Farr v. Kilgour, 117 Mlch., 227} 75 Such is the order prescribed by the
so
But see,
Matthews v.
N. W., 457.
statute. and no service is good
Forslund, 118 Mlch., 416: '71 N. W.,
long as there is opportunity to make
854, in which it is suggested that serv
service in one of the ways first re
quired, and a gnod return of substi
ice made at any time after the writ
tuted service must show that a better
come to the hands of the oﬂicer would
Town v.
service was not possible:
be good if the writ were held and ef
Tabor, 34 Mlch., 262; White v. Prior,
personal
fort made to get
service
during the whole period allowed for
88 Mlch., 648: 50 N, W., 655.
personal service: Bargh v. L. R. Erme
The service of these certiﬁed copies
ling h Co., 110 Mlch., 164; 67 N. W.,
constitutes a part of the service of
attachment, and unless such service
See,
1083,
Rolfe
is distinguished.
of the copies is made as required by
v. Dudley, 58 Mlch., 208:
2-1 N. W.
law, the justice will not acquire any
657.
The officer must if possible make
jurisdiction
personal service of the writ, and he
property
over
at
the
Therefore,
must diligently use all the time ai
tached.
where the de
fendant couid not be found, though
lowed by law for making such service
he had a residence in the county, but
he can serve by leaving copy,
before
no copies were left there, it was held
etc.: Hubbeii v. Rhinesmith, 85 Mlch.,
30; 48 N. W., 178; see, White v. Prior,
that his voluntary appearance to the
suit on the return day, while it con
88 Mlch., 647; 50 N. W., 655.
Service by copy on the person in
ferred jurisdlction of his person, gave
possession, etc.—Service by leaving a
jurisdiction
property
no
over
the
seized,
certified copy of the writ and inven
and that the attachment was
tory with the person in whose posses
' void as to the claims of the other
sion the property is found. can be attaching
or
execution
creditors:
made only in those cases where the
Watts v. Wiiiet, 2 Ililt., 212.
defendant has no last place of resi
Where a true copy of a writ of at
tachment, not certiﬁed,
dence within
the county, and cannot,
but accom
panied by a certiﬁed copy of the in
after reasonable diligence, be found
himself in the county during any part
ventory of the property attached, was
of the time within
which personal
served on the defendant, it was held
service can by law be made upon him;
the omission to certify the copy of
Nicolls v. Lawrence. 30 Mlch., 895;
the writ did not render the service
Tabor,
Mlch.,
262-5;
Town
v.
34
be
invalid. the defect or irregularity
Mlch.,
ing merely formal: Leonard v. Wood
Brown v. Williams,
39
755:
Kraft v. Baths, 45 Mlch., 20; 7 N. ward, 34 Mlch., 514.
W., 232.
If the defendant cannot be
In serving a writ of attachment, all
found in the county, it is then only
the requirements of the statute must
complied with, in order to
in cases where he has no last place of
be strictly
residence in the county, that service
confer jurisdiction
of the case upon
can be made by copy upon the person
the justice: Town v. Tabor, 34 Mlch.,
»
in possession of the goods:
262.
Watts
v. Willet. 2 Hiit., 212.
It is required
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to the copy of it. It is sufficient to endorse upon the copy of
the attachment left with the defendant, as follows:

“Copy—

. . . . . . . .

.C0nstable.”

If

a

a

is

if

a

is

it

is

it,

it does not appear from the return of the attachment that
property has been taken upon
no garnishee, the
and there
are at an end. The writ of attachment in
proceedings upon
justice’s court
not
levy
summons, and in the absence of
upon property of defendant, or one of them, the proceedings
fail unless
garnishee shall be summoned who shall be found
indebted to the defendant or defendants or to have property
or etfects in his hand subject to the attachment; or, unless the
defendant, or one of them,
there are more than one, shall
have been personally served with process or appeared.
The
contrary
true as to proceedings under the writ in circuit

court."

§

is

is

Where there
not personal service and the defend
ant does not appear the proceeding
one in rem only against
the property seized.“

Disposition of the property after service of the writ.

87.

In order to maintain the lien created by the attachment, the

a

it,

a

officer must in some form, by himself or another, retain the
second
custody of the property, to prevent the operation of
T0
of
attachment.“
preserve an attachment
personal prop
either by him
erty, the officer must continue in possession of
self or
keeper; and mere notice that an attachment was made
a

is

not enough to prevent
second attachment of
of property
As illustrating the rule that the ofﬁcer
the same property."
46—C. L.. ll 740 and 10559; Lang
try v. Judges of Wayne Circuit. 68
Mich.. 451: 36 N. W., 211.
47-Bower v. Town. 12 Mlch., 233.
Mass.,
48—Lyman
Lyman,
v.
317.
A writ tsir on its face will jus
tify
seizure of property and protect
the oﬂicer against personal responsi
bility for so doing. hut
the writ
was issued on a void aﬂidavit, the ot
ﬂcer cannot base a right to possession
Aspell v. qashein.
upon the writ:
98 i\iich.. 117: 57 N. W. 27.
An oi’
ticer, while holding property under a
writ of attachment, has no right to
make
use of it for his own conven
Tand
ience or beneﬁt,
or for proﬁt.

4

ler v. Saunders. 56 Mich., 142; 22 N.
W.. 271.
Cush.,
49—Shepard v. Butterﬂeid,
425, 430.
An oiiicer has no authority
to deliver property which he has at
tached to the pisintiif in attachment
while the suit is still pending, even
though the plaintltf is in fact the le
gal owner of it. and caused it to be
attached in ignorance of his owner
ship.
Nor can he replevin the prop
erty trom the officer while it is so
And if the suit goes
held by him.
down the oﬂicer still holds the prop
erty until notiﬁed. or until he learns
Van
that the suit is discontinued:
neter v. Crossman, 39 Mich., 610.

if

a

ll
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must act with diligence in the service of the writ, see, Springett
v. Coierick, 67 Mich., 362; 34 N. \N., 683. In this case the writ
was received by the oﬁieer at one o’clock in the morning, but
levy was not made till afternoon, though there was opportunity
In Beard v.
to levy sooner. This was held to be negligence.

Ciippert,

63 Mich., 716; 30 N.

W.,

323, the

writ was delivered

to the oﬁicer and a satisfactory indemnity bond given. Prop
erty was then pointed out to be levied upon. It was in a store
w-‘hich was locked and to which admission was denied.
The
oﬁicer made no levy and returned that he could not ﬁnd any
property on which to levy. In defending an action for neglect
of his duty an assignment of all their property by the attach
ment debtors was shown but no bond such as the assignment
statute requires was shown. Held, that the oﬂicer was liable
for not having levied in the absence of this bond.
§88. Bond to prevent removal.-“No goods or chattels at
tached shall be removed by the constable, if a bond be executed
and delivered to him by any person, with sufﬁcient surety to
be approved by such constable, in a. penalty at least double the
sum stated in the attachment

to have been sworn to, condi

tioned that such goods and chattel shall be produced to satisfy
any execution that may be issued on any judgment that shall
be recovered by the plaintiff upon such attachment; and there
upon the 0-ﬂicer shall deliver the property attached to the per
son executing such bond.”5°
To constitute a valid levy on prop
erty the oﬂicer must be within View
of the property and have it under his
control:
Brown v. Pratt, 4 Wis., 513;
65 Am. Dcc., 330.
The otllcer must
assume
dominion over the property.
He must not only have a view of the
property, but he must assert his title
to it by such acts as would render
him chargeable as a trespasser, but
of his process:
for the protection
Goode v. Longmire, 35 Ala., 668: 76
Am. Dec., 309: Davidson v. Waldron.
31 Il1., 120; 83 Am. Dec., 206; Allen
v. McCalla, 25 Ia., 464; 96 Am. Dec.,
562 Battle Creek Valley Bank v. First
National Bank, 62 Neb., 825; B8 N.
W.. 145: 56 L. R. A., 124.
In an attachment case in the cir
cuit court. it was claimed that the at

tachment ot a growing crop of wheat
was invalid, because the oﬂilcer tailed
to take possession.
In overruling the
objection. the court say, that all the
possession required is such as
the
nature of the property renders it sus
ceptihie of; and in the case of a grow
ing crop it could be constructive pos
Buck, 34
session only:
Grover
V.
Mich., 519, 521.
50--—C. L., 5 732.
It seems proper
for the oﬂlcer to take such a bond in
grow
case of the attachment of a
ing crop; and us against any wrong
ful removal or interference with the
crop, the bond would be as important
in this case as in any other:
Grover
v. Buck, 34 Mich., 519. 521-2.
It has been held. that where, a de
fendant gave bond to procure the re
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Upon the execution and delivery of this bond, the officer is
required to deliver up the property to the obligor in the bond."
The statute does not require the approval of the oﬁicer to be
in writing, yet it is advisable that it should be done so; the
mere acceptance of the bond would be a suﬁlcient approval.
For the purpose of ascertaining the sufficiency of the surety,
the ofﬁcer is authorized to administer an oath to the person
offered as surety."
The giving of the bond does not operate to discharge the
goods from the lien of the attachment; they still remain in the
custody of the law.“
In an action upon such bond, the plaintiff is not required to
show the facts necessary to give jurisdiction to the justice.“
§89. Receiptor for
a bond, is at liberty,

property.-The oﬂicer, instead of taking

if

he see ﬁt, to take a receiptor

of the

property.-"5
§ 90.

Where the property is claimed by a third

person.-“If

any person other than the defendant shall claim any goods or
chattels attached by a constable, he may, after such seizure, and
at any time before execution shall have been issued upon the

judgment obtained on such atachment, execute a bond to the
plaintiff with sufficient sureties to be approved by the constable
or by the justice who issued the attachment, in a penalty double
the value of the property attached, conditioned that in a suit
lease
of his property from attach
ment. and to prevent its removal, that
apply to a
he could not thereafter
circuit court commissioner for a dis
solution of the attachment under the
See,
provisions of C. I.., Q 10595:
18.
Paddock v. Matthews, 3 Mich.,
that
But it has also been decided,
procure an
aﬂldavit
to
where the
against
a
non-resident
attachment
debtor was insnfilcient to confer juris
diction on the court to issue the writ,
that a bond given to prevent the re
moval of the property seized under
that
writ was void. and no action
was maintainahle on it:
Caldwell v.
Colgate. 7 Barb., 253.
51—C. L.. 5 734.
52-—(‘. L.. 5 10305.
53—Van Loan v. Kline, 10 .Tohns.,
20 Wend.,
129: Sterling v. Welcome.
238.
But the lien may be lost hy the

6

neglect of the oﬂlcer to levy execution
the attached property for an un
reasonable length of time after judg
ment; Steriing v. Welcome. 20 Wend.,

on

238,

240.

Sherman, 3 Denio,
v.
seems that it may
be
shown in defense that the justice had
no jurisdiction
to issue the attach
54—\\‘hiiey

185.

But it

lloman v. Brinkerhoif. 1 Denio,
And if the defendant should
show that the attachment was void,
the piaintii! could not recover: Ibid.
55-——llarvey v. Lane, 12 Wend., 563.
The receiptor's possession
is the pos
session of the oillcer, else the delivery
receiptor would be a relin
to
the
quishment of the levy:
Mayhue v.
Snell, 37 Mich., 305.
See, Bowen v.
Culp. 36 Lfich., 224; Burk v. Webb,
32 Mich., 173.
ment:
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to be brought on such bond, within three months from the date
thereof, such claimant will establish that he was the owner of
the goods seized at the time of the seizure, and in case of his

failure to do so, that he will pay to such plaintiﬁ the value of
the property so attached, with interest.”-"°
It will be noticed
that this bond, unlike the one provided for in § 732, runs to the
plaintiff, rather than to th_e officer. It is not conditioned, as in
the other, to produce the property to satisfy the execution, but
that he will pay the value of the property if he, the obligor,
fails to establish his ownership of the goods.
The sureties in this bond may be approved either by the
constable or the justice.
The remarks in relation to this sub
ject, with regard to the next preceding bond, apply to this.‘
One surety is suﬂicient in that bond; in this there must be,at
least two.
There is a diﬂiculty in ascertaining the amount of the penalty
“How, and in what manner, is the constable to
get at the value of the property? The statute makes no pro
vision on this subject. In other cases similar to this, as in the

of this bond.

I

it,

action of replevin, for instance, the officer is authorized to ad
minister an oath to and examine witnesses, in order to ascer
tain the value. No authority of that kind is given here. With
out
an oath administered by the constable would be nuga
tory, and no indictment for perjury would lie upon it; and
hence that course should not be adopted.
know of no other

it

way, than for the constable to satisfy himself of the value, by
advising with persons of judgment, or otherwise, as he may see
ﬁt, and then to double that value, and insert
in the bond by
way of penalty. If the sureties should then refuse to execute
the bond, he might undoubtedly remove the property.”2

“Upon either of the bonds aforesaid being executed and de
livered to the constable, he shall deliver up the property seized
by him to the obligor in such bond.”-"

2—Cow. '1‘reat., 2d
3—C. L..
734.

733.
88.

5

1—See, ante,

5

56——C. L.,

§

a

is

§

91. Lien of the a.ttaohm.en_t.—The
attachment, after being
valid lien on the goods, and has preference
actually levied,
over any execution or attachment issued out of any court,

82
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whether of record or not, which has not been previously levied.‘
The lien continues until after judgment and execution is regu
larly obtained, and ceases on the issuing of the execution and
levy by virtue of it, or the eiapsing of a reasonable time after
If, after having ob
the execution is issued to make a lcvy.-"
tained judgment, the plaintiff does not take out and proceed
upon an execution with all due diligence, he loses his prefer
a

ence.°

§92. Of the return of an a.ttach;nent.—The constable serv
ing the attachment is required to return thereon, -in writing,
signed by him, the time and manner of executing the sam,e,'
and he is likewise required to return upon the writ of attach
ment, or attached thereto, a copy of the inventory of the
property attached, certiﬁed by him, and any bond which may
have been executed and delivered
foregoing provisions of the act.8

4-C.

L..

to him, pursuant

to the

the duty of the justice, on the
the suit, to examine witnesses
as to such expense from the time of
seizure to and including the day of
trial, and to determine the amount

it is

£10315.

Where an attachment has been lev
ied upon the property of s. deceased
person before his death, the lien con
tinues, and the suit may be prose
cuted to judgment after his death,
and the attached property sold on ex
ecution to satisfy it, whether commis
sioners have been appointed or not,
to hear claims against the estate:
See, (‘. L., Q 9-125, and Smith v. Jones,
15 Mich., 281.
Loan v. Kline, 10 Johns,
5—Van
129,
Welcome,
v.
20
131: Sterling
\\'end., 238.
The lien acquired by
virtue of the attachment, will remain
in force only a reasonable length of
time after judgment for the purpose of
the levy of execution thereon: Bushey
v. Baths, 45 Mich., 181-186: 7 N. W.,
802. And a bond on appeal given by the
defendant in attachment releases the
property seized.
When an appeal is
taken,
the bond given is presumed
to
insure satisfaction
of the judgment.
and there is no longer any object in
retaining the property levied upon for
that purpose:
Ibirl.
6—\'an Loan v. Kline, 10 Johns..
129; Bushey v. Raths, 45 Mich., 181;
7 N. W., 802.
Erpvnse of keeping animals, etc.
Where animals are attached. and ex
pense incurred in the keeping thereof.

trial of

thereof, and incorporate the same in
the Judgment as a part. thereof: C. L.,
5 989; Bushey v. Raths, 45 Mich., 184;
7 N. W., 802.

The olilcer holding animals under
an attachment has no right to work
them
for the expense of their keep
ing: Bushey v. Raths, 45 Mlch., 181,
186; 7 N. W., 802.
7—C. ii.
5 7-13.
8-—C.
L 5 7-H.
The
“foregoing
provisions“ referred to are, C L., Q5
732,

733.

Return
scrvlcc.—The
of personal
writ must be returned personally
served
upon
the defendant if he can
be found
county during
within
the
any of the time within which personal
service may be made.
And
if not
found, the return, in order to confer
jurisdiction
by service in any other
manner, must show the use of reason
able dlligence to make personal serv
ice, during all the time allowed by
law for making such service:
With
ington v. Southworth, 26 i\iich., 381;
.\iich.,
Brown v. Williams,
39
755.
Upon what is personal service and
how it should be made and the time
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When the constable returned upon an attachment, that he
had delivered to each of the defendants, personally, a copy of
of making, see, ante, 55 S1, 86; Farr
v. Kllgour,
117 Mich., 227: 75 N. W.,
Forsiund,
113
457;
v.
Matthews
Mich., 416; 71 N. W., 854; C. L.,
5 730.

Return of service by copy at de
fendant's residence.-If personal serv
ice of the writ cannot be made upon
the defendant. the return must show
service by leaving a certiﬁed copy of
inventory at the de
and
the writ
‘fendanfs last place of residence in the
county. if he had one: C. L., 5 T31;
Adams v. Abrams, 38 Mich.. 302. And
such return, in order to confer juris
diction, must show, not only that the
defendant could not be found in the
county, but that the otﬂcer used rea
diligence to
personal
make
sonable
service during all the time allowed
by the statute for that purpose, nor
return be made before the‘
can such
expiration of the time in which per
Town v.
sonal servlce is permitted:
Tabor, 34 Mich., 265; Brown v. Will
iams, 39 Mich., 755.
Therefore a re
turn of service by leaving a certiﬁed
copy at the defendant's usual place of
abode with his wife, is insuiﬁcient, in
that it does not show that the copy
was left at his last place of residence
in the county, nor that the defendant
could not be found therein:
Michels
v. Stork, 44 Mich., 2; 5 N. W., 1034.
As to what is essential to service by
copy left at defendant's residence,
see.
ante, note 45, Q 86; Faul v. Bencus,
124 Mich., 25; 82 N. W., 659; David
son v. Fox, 120 Mich., 385: T9 N. W.
1100.

Return of service by copy upon the
person in possession, etc.—A
return
of service by leaving a certified copy
of the writ and inventory with the
person in whose possession the prop
erty is found, must, in order to be
valid, show that the defendant could
not be found in the county. and that
he
has
no last place of residence
therein: and both of these facts must
appear in the return: Nicolis v. Law
rence, 30 Mich., 395-7; Town v. Tabor,
34
‘.Vlich.,
262.
Unless
the
de
fendant is personally served,
or ap
pears in the case, the jurisdiction
to
take any subsequent proceedings there

in will depend upon a proper return.
showing a diligent attempt to make
Withington
such
service:
v. South
worth, 26 Mich.. 381.
Where there is
no personal service on the defendant.
if the othcer fails to show by his re
turn that he retained the writ in his
hands and made diligent search for the
defendant during all the time within
which personal service might by law
have been made, his return of the serv
ice by copy either at defendant's last
place of residence, or upon the person
with whom the property was found,
will not be sufficient to confer juris
diction upon the justice to proceed
further in the case:
Brown v. Will
iams,
39 Mich., 755; Myers v. Pros
ser, 40 i\fich., -644; Kraft v. Raths,
45 l\iich., 20; 7 N. W., 232; Town v.
Tabor, 34 Mich., 362;_see.
Alverson
v. Dennison, 40 Mich.,
179.
Where
the
officer's return showed that he
served the writ on the day of its date
by taking property, and that on the
same day he served a copy of the writ
of attachment, and of the inventory,
duly certiﬁed by him, upon the person
prop
he
found
the
with
w_hom
erty, naming him, and then added,
having
any
not
“the
defendant
the
within
last place of residence
Held,
county":
that
the
service
was insuﬂicient, there being no state
ment in the return that thé defendant
was not found, or that the officer was
unable to ﬁnd him in the county. or
that he had made any attempt to ﬁnd
him to serve the writ on him: the
only reason given for substituted serv
ice on the person in whose possession
the property was found. was that the
defendant had no last place of resi
dence in the county, when for aught
have
may
that appears the ofﬁcer
known
defendant to be in the
the
county. and that service could have
been made
upon
them.
Under such
service and such a return, the de
fendant not appearing in the suit. the
justice could acquire no Jurisdiction.
only allows
The statute (§ 730)
service upon the person in whose pos
session
the property is found, when
the defendant cannot be found in the
county; or when, not being found, has
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was prima facie suﬂicient, al

though he did not state that the copies served were certiﬁed
by him.‘

§93. Proceedings after the return of the atta.chment.—“If
the attachment be returned personally served upon any of the
defendants, the justice shall proceed therein in the same man
ner as upon a summons returned personally served.”2
no last place of residence therein:
Nicolls v. Lawrence. 30 hIich., 305.
Where the defendant is not found and
not appear,
service by leaving
does
at his last place of residence,
copies
or with the person in whose posses
sion the property was found, will not
be suﬂiclent, unless the officer has dili
gently sought to make personal serv
ice during all the time given by the
service;
making
for
such
statute
therefore. a return of service by leav
ing copies, etc., made before the ex
piration of the last day upon which
personal service is permitted, will not
give the justice
Thus,
Jurisdiction.
where by the date of the ofﬁcer's re
turn of service by copy it appeared
that there still remained one day after
the date of the return within
which
personal service might have been made
if the defendant could have been found
in the county, it was held, that the
justice acquired no Jurisdiction.
In
all cases, the return should inform
the justice that lawful
service has
been made:
Town v. Tabor, 34 Mich.,
282.
A justice may acquire jurisdic
tion over the person either on a return
showing proper service of the writ,
or by the voluntary appearance of the
defendant to an insuﬂicient return.
But where the defendant appears spe
cially to object to the jurisdiction. or
to quash the writ for want of a re
turn showing proper service, his ap
pearance cannot be considered as a
submission to the jurisdiction: Mich
els v. Stork, 44 .\iich., 2; 5 N. W.,
1034.
Further upon service by copy
left with the person in possession,
see,
anfc, note 45, 5 86.
if the defendant
cannot be found within the county, it is
only in cases where he has no last place
of residence in the county, that service
can be made by leaving a copy of the
attachment
and inventory with the
person in whose possession
the goods

are found, and in such case the of
ficer's return must show not only that
the defendant could not be found, but
that he has no inst place of residence
in the county—otherwise
it is said
that the justice will acquire no juris
diction in the case. unless the de
appear in
fendant should voluntarily
So, the return to a writ
the suit.
of attachment not personally served,
must show that a copy of the writ
was left at the defendant's last place
of residence
in the county, or that
there was no such place of residence,
or the omission will be fatal: Adams
v. Abram,
38
Mich. 302; Vllet v.
Westenhaver. 42 l\iich., 593; 4 N.
448; Michels v. Stork. 44 lliich. 1»:
5 N. W., 1034; C. L., Q 731.
Service of a certified copy of the in
ventory alone is not sufficient service
upon the defendant:
Stearns v. Tay
lor, 27 Mich., B8.
But it seems that
service of copies of both the writ and
inventory, the latter, only, being cer
tiﬁed, is suiﬁcicnt:
Leonard v. Wood
ward, 34 Mich., 514.
Where a return
to the writ shows that goods have
been attached, but is silent as to the
place of seizure, it will he presumed
that the constable acting in accord
with the statute, took them “within
his county":
Bushey v.
Baths,
45
Mich., 133; 7 N. W., 802.
As to amending the return:
See,
Bushey v. Rnths, 45 Mich., 183; 7 N.
W., 802; llaynes v. Knowles, 36 Mich.,
407; Kidd v. Dougherty, 59
Mich.,
2-I0: 26 N. W., 510.
Return. when conclusive on the par
ties in collateral proceedings:
Mich
els v. Storks, 52 Mich., 260; 17 N.
W., 833.
1—\'an

Kirk

v.

“'ilds.

\
1 Barb., 520.

2—C. l.., 5 735; Boriand v. Kings
bury, 65 Mich., 59-60; 31 N. W.. 620.
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served upon any

of the defendants, and none of the defendants shall appear on
the return day thereof, the justice shall continue the cause for
not less than thirty and not exceeding ninety days; and in
such case, no hearing shall be had or judgment rendered there
on until the expiration of that time, unless the defendant shall
sooner appear and request a trial; in which case the justice
shall appoint a day for the trial of such suit, and cause notice
thereof to be given to the plaintiif.”3

Perishable fruit-s.,—The statutes authorizing the sale
§94.
of perishable fruits, levied upon without waiting for judgment,
are not as free from confusion as might be wished. C. L., §
739, being sec. 36 of the justice court act, provided for a sale,
upon the order of the justice of “animals or perishable prop
erty” seized upon the Writ, if the case was not tried on the
return day, the proceeds to be turned over to the justice and
applied as other moneys realized from sale of other property.
In 1871 was passed an act providing for the sale of peaches
and berries which might be levied upon, and requiring that
the constable should forthwith make return of such a levy to
the justice who might make an order of sale “at such time,
place and manner” as he might “deem most beneﬁcial for
3—C.

L., 5 736; Langtry

v.

Wayne

Circuit Judge, 68'Mich., 451-3; as N.
W., 211.
“'here there is no personal service,
all the proceedings against parties not
or appearing must be strictly
served
King v.
regular under the Statute:
Harrington. 14 Mich., 532. 541; “'ith
ington v. Southworth, 26 Mich., 381;
756;
Brown v. Williams,
39 Mich.,
Kraft v. Raths, 45 Mich., 21; 7 N.
W., 232; Langtry v. Judge of Wayne
Circuit. ‘)8 Mich., 451; 36 N. W., 211.
See
other cases cited, ante, 5 81,
A justice cannot render judg
no'te 24.
ment in an attachment suit within
thirty days from the return day of
the process, in case where the defend
and
ant was not personally served,
did not appear and request a trial.
An appearance specially to object to
the jurisdiction
of the justice is not‘
such an appearance as will authorize
justice to proceed
the
to judgment

the expiration of the thirty
Such an appearance as would
waive a want
of personal
service.
must be a general appearance for the
purpose of a trial:
Wright v. Rus
sell, 19 Mich., 346.
But appearing
and pleading to the merits brings the
parties before the court whether law
fully served with process or not. and
they cannot thereafter object to the
manner in which they are brought
Schott, 37 Mich.,
in:
Manhard
v.
235: Hart v. Blake, 31 Mich., 278.
See, Borland v. Kingsbury,
65 Mich.,
59; 31 N. W.. 620.
A common law certiorari, to a jus
tice, will lie to remove a cause com
by
attachment,
menced
where
no
personal service is had, and no appear
ance entered,
if the defendant had no
notice of the proceedings until after
the statutory
remedy
for review was
gone:
Withington
v. Southworth,
26
Mich., 381.
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the beneﬁt of the defendant.” This act contained a section
This act of 1871 was
statutes.
repealing all conﬂicting
amended in 1901 by act No. 59, making it applicable to “other
perishable property” and adding a section, as follows:

“Sec. 3. l\'o sale shall be made under the provisions of this
act except upon the written order of the court from which
process shall have been issued, authorizing such sale at such
time, place and manner as said court shall decree most bene
ﬁcial for the beneﬁt of defendant:
Provided, That the court
shall direct reasonable notice to be given to the defendant or
his agent of the time and the place of such application to sell.”
The act of 1871 did not purport to cover the general subject
of perishable property, and hence could not have been in
tended to repeal the section of the justice’s act referred to, un

it should be construed to do so as to peaches and berries.
The act of 1901 includes “other perishable property,” and
adds another section requiring notice to defendant of “appli
cation to sell.”
There being nothing in the act providing
for any “application to sell,” it providing that the justice
shall order a sale upon the oﬂ'1cer’s return that such property
has been levied upon, it is a little difficult to know what was
intended. The act of 1901 contains no repealing clause. The
act of 1871 requires the officer to make return forthwith. if he
levies on property within its provisions, and this requirement
is retained in the act of 1901. It seems reasonable to conclude,
that because it makes this requirement, the act of 1871 is in
conﬂict with the provisions of § 739 as .t0 peaches and berries,
and that the act of 1901 is in conﬂict with that section as to
all perishable property, for that section contemplates a return
under the general rule. This act of 1901 is in conﬂict with
itself in that in its ﬁrst section it provides that if a sheriff
shall levy on perishable property under a writ from a court
of record he, the sheriff, shall proceed to sell as he may deem
most beneﬁcial for the defendant, and in its third section it
less

provides that the sheriff shall sell as the court shall “deem
most beneﬁcial for the beneﬁt of the defendant.” While the
conclusion may not be free from question, the safer course

would

if

seem to be to have the oﬁicer make a

he levies on perishable

property,
87

return forthwith

and then to get a written
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order from the justice directing the time, place and manner
of sale. Notice of the return of such levy should be given
under the direction of the justice, and of the proposed order
of sale, to be made at a time ﬁxed in the notice.
As to what is “perishable” property within the meaning of
that term in a statute having a similar object to the one under
consideration, see, McCreery v. Berney National Bank, 116
.
Ala., 224-, 22 So., 577.
“When the cause is continued, as provided for in the thirty
third section, and it shall appear that any of the property
taken under the attachment consists of animals or perishable
property, the justice may make an order directing the oﬂicer
having the custody thereof to dispose of the same, as upon
execution, and the money realized therefor shall be paid over
to the justice, and applied as other money realized from the
sale of the property attached is applied.”4
By this section, the justice is authorized to order the sale of
“animals or perishable property” before judgment.
It is dis
cretionary in the justice whether a sale shall be made, and he
is to determine, from all the circumstances of the case, whether
a sale is expedient or not.
The following statute was enacted in 1871: “Whenever
any constable shall by virtue of any attachment or execution
issued by any justice of the peace, levy upon any peaches,
blackberries, raspberries or strawberries (or other perishable
fruit), he shall forthwith make his return to said justice, who,
by a written order, shall authorize the constable to sell such
property -at such time, place and manner as said justice shall
deem most beneﬁcial for the beneﬁt of the defendant.”5
Release of property from the attachment.—“If, at any
time before judgment, the defendant shall appear and answer
to the action, and shall give a bond to the plaintiff, in a penalty
double the amount claimed by the plaintiff, with one or more
sureties, to be approved by the justice, conditioned to pay
any judgment the plaintiff may recover against him in the
action, within thirty days after the rendition thereof, the
§ 95.

4—C- L-. 5 739The ‘Tlllffy-third"
sectlon here referred to ls the toregoing C. L., 5 736.

5—C. L., 5 10361, as amended
llc Acts, 1901, p. 90.
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justice shall there upon make an order discharging the prop
'
erty attaehed.”°
Upon the execution and delivery of this bond, the justice is
to make an order discharging the property attached.
This
order does not depend upon the validity or invalidity of the
proceedings under the writ.
the proceedings which
In case there was any irregularity
would render the attachment void, the bond would also be
The defendants are not estopped from availing them
selves of the objection that the proceedings under which the
'
property was seized were void.’
bond,
Where the attachment has been dissolved by giving
a

.

void.

it

it

is

if

the officer should not deliver the property to the debtor in case
in force, or,
upon another attachment which
has been levied upon by another officer, under another attach
he holds

ment.

it

a

is

is

made for
§9B. Dissolution of the attachment.—Provision
the dissolution of attachments on application or petition to
a circuit judge or circuit court commissioner of the county
as follows: “In all cases
where the writ issued.“ The statute
writ of attachment has been or shall be issued and
where
shall be lawful for any
served under the provisions of law,

defendant, whose property may be attached by virtue of such
writ, to apply to the judge of the circuit court, or to the

.

a

circuit court commissioner of the county where such writ was
dissolution of such attachment; which applica
issued, for
tion shall be in Writing, and shall contain the reasons for such
'
.
application.”°

5

9

5

levy taken under
742, no question of
validity of the writ need be raised.
If the bond is given the property is
to be discharged regardless of whether
the attachment was warranted or not.
C. L..
10595.
The object of the proceeding under
this statute is merely to release the
property from the lien of the attach
Hyde v. Nelson, 11 Mlch., 353.
ment:
And the right to a dissolution is not
cut oi! by the tact that other attach
ments and liens are resting upon the
property:
Schaii v. Biy, 43 Mlch.,
401;
N. W., 651: Sheldon v. Stew
art, 43 Mlch., 574$
N. W., 1067;
5

5

3

7,

7

5

742.
L..
Barb., 253.
7—Caidwell v. Colgate,
are contained
8—'I‘bese provisions
in the Act oi’ April
I851. being in
And they apply
C. L.. if 10595-10598.
as well to the dissolution of attach
ments issued by justices of the peace
as to those issued from the circuit
courts: Albertson v. Edsail. 16 Mlch.,
203.
It the attachment is unauthor
ized, the proper proceeding is to apply
for a dissolution under this statute:
Mlch., 277. See.
Roeiotson v. Hatch,
Gott v. Hoschna. 57 Mlch., 417; 24
N. W.. 123:
Under the procedure for
discharge of the property from the
8-—C.
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Upon the presentation of such application,

the judge or
shall issue a citation to the plaintiﬁ in
requiring him to show cause, on a day and at

said commissioner
attachment

Drs. K. & K. U. S. Med. 8: Surg. Ass‘n
v. Post & Tribune Co., 58 Mich., 487;
25 N. W., 477.
When to be made.-——The application
for disolution may be made at any
time before judgment. and as well af
ter defendant's appearance as before:
Hyde v. Nelon, 11 Mich., 353, 356.
But not after the defendant of claim
ant has given bond for the restoration
or release of the property, and pro
Paddock v. Mat
cured its release:
thews, 3 Mich., 18.
The defendant
cannot contest the validity of the at
tachment, or the truth of the atlidavit
for the issuing of the writ, by plea
in abatement: that can be done only
upon an application for a dissolution
of the attachment in the manner pro
vided by this act: Bower v. Town, 12
Mich., 230.
Who may app!)/.—The proceeding to
dissolve can be maintained only by the
defendant who is the owner of the
property, or has the right to the pos
session
of it.
A
person
who has
assigned
fraudulently
property
his
cannot maintain the proceeding to dis
solve an attachment
issued against
himself and levied on that property:
Nor
Chandler v. Nash, 5 Mich., 409.
can the commissioner dissolve an at
of a
tachment upon the application
defendant who is not entitled to have
the property restored to his posses
Price v. Reed, 20 Mich., 72.
sion:
But a partner not implicated in the
grounds upon which a writ of attach
ment has been issued. and upon which
partnership property has been seized,
is entitled to have the attachment dis
solved,
and the property restored to
him, for he is entitled to the posses
sion of it: Edwards v. Hughes, 20
Mich., 289.
A defendant owning and
of a part
entitled to the possession
of the property attached, is entitled
Patterson
to move for a dissolution:
v. Goodrich, 31 Mich., 225.
The application or petiﬂon must be
in writing,
must set forth and de
scribe the property taken, aver the
petitioner's right to it. and set forth
the reason for a dissolution, and must
'

veriﬁed by oath:
Osborne v. Rob
bins, 10 Mich., 277.
The application
need not be entitled in the cause in
lieyn
which the attachment issued:
v. Farrar, 36 l\iich.. 258.
The appli
cation must show that the dcfcndanfs
property was attached, because
the
jurisdiction of the oﬂicer is dependent
upon it: Osborne v. Robbins. 10 Mich.,
277; Chandler v. Nash, 5 Mich., 416.
But the application, it seems, is suf
ficient so far as showing title to the
property in the applicant, if, from its
terms, it could reasonably be inferred
that the property still continued to
belong to the applicant:
Macumber v.
Beam, 22 Mich., 395, 401.
it must
set forth and describe the property at
tached, because without such descrip
tion the property could not be known,
and no order for its return could be
made, and there would not be sutficient
certainty as to the defendant's prop
erty and right.
A statement in the
application “that on said writ of at
tachment some of the goods and chat
tels of
applicant
this
have
been
seized." is not sufficient:
Osborne v.
Robbins, 10 Mich.,
277;
Nelson v.
llyde, 10 Mich., 521; Macumber v.
Beam, 22 Mich., 401.
An application
i
not at fault for alleging the al
ternative that defendant has not “as
signed, disposed
oi‘ or concealed," etc.:
First Nat‘l Bank v. Steele. 81 Mich.,
93; 45 N. W. 579.
An application sl
ieging that defendant “has not as
disposed of. or concealed
signed,
her
property," is suﬂicient to include an
interest in property held with another:
Cottrell v. Hatheway, 108 Mich., 619;
66 N. W., 596.
The application should
allege that applicant
is entitled to
the possession of the property:
John
son v. DeWitt, 36 Mich., 95; Zook v.
Blough, 42 Mich., 487; 4 N. W., 219.
The cases of Johnson v. DeWitt, 36
Mich., 95, and Zook v. Blough, 42
Mich., 4s7, 4 N. W., 219, so far as
they hold that dissolution proceedings
will not lie when, if successful, the
defendant will not be entitled to pos
session
because the property must re
main in the custody of the law under
be
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a time and place in said citation

to be named, before the said
the
said
attachment should not be
judge or commissioner, why
other levies. are overruled in Drs. K.
U. S. hi. & S. Ass‘n. v. Post In
Tribune Co., 58 Mlch., 487; 25 N. W.,
477.
As to the suiﬂciency of the ai
iegatlon negativing the grounds upon
which the writ issued. see. Patterson
An af
v. Goodrich, 31 Mlch., 225-6.
ﬂdavit for an attachment charged that
of
defendant "has assigned. disposed
and concealed and is about to assign,
dispose of and conceal" his property
with intent. etc.
in his petition for a
dissolution of the writ defendant de
nied “that he has assigned. disposed
oi‘ and that he is about to assign, dis
The petition was held
pose of.“ etc.
Bane
bad because in the conjunctive:
v. Keys. 115 Mlch., 244; 73 N. W.,
6: K.

230.

The eitntion.—if the citation is in
suﬂicient,
proceedings
will be
the
Pearson v.
treated as if abandoned:
In Cnupfield
Creslin. 16 )ilch.. 281.
92 Mlch., 626; 52 N. W.,
v. Cook,
1031. it was held that both the day
of service and the return day of the
citation must be excluded in comput
ing time of service under the statute.
This case was followed by First Nat'l
Milling Co., 110
v.
Williams
Bank
Mlch., 15; 67 N. W., 976. holding the
a full ar
same rule, notwithstanding
gument and discussion of this ques
tion of computation of time in (‘had
dock v. Barry, 93 .\iich.. 5-I2; 53 N.
W., 785. upon principle and authority
and concluding that in computing time
under statutes like the one in ques
tion, the day of service is to be ex
cluded and the return day included.
This case of Chaddock v. Barry has
been followed in Crozier v. Allen, 117
Mlch., 171; 75 N. W., 300, and in
Lemon v. Hampton. 128 Mlch., 182;
87 N. W., 53. both of which last cases
were short summons eases in which
the language of the statute is “at least
The language
three days before." etc.
of the citation statute is “three days
it would seem
at least before," etc.
that the dllerence in language in the
as
to
two statutes was not such
require a different rule for the com
putation of time. and yet it is difficult
to understand how the court. in the

case
of Bank against Milling
Co.
could have lost sight of Chaddock v.
Barry.
it would seem that this last
case. with the later cases of Crozier
v. Allen, and Lemon v. Hampton. re
ferred to. should establish the rule of
the exclusion of the one day and the
including of the other.
If Sunday in
tervenes under this statute. it is to
be excluded
in the computation: Coup
ﬂeld v. Cook, 92 Mlch., 626; 52 N.
W., 1031; First Nat'l Bank v. Will
iams Milling Co., 110 Mlch., 15: 67
N. W. 978; Crozler v. Allen, 117 Mlch.,
171; 75
W.,
300;
N.
v.
Lemon
Hampton. 128 Mlch., 182; 87 N. W.,
53.
Service in any case must be by
reading:
Cleiand v. Clark, 111 Mlch.,
336; 60 N. W., 652.
Grounds for di~uoiuiion.—'i‘he com
missioner can dissolve an attachment
only for reasons going to show that
the plalntii'i' has not a good and legal
cause for suing out the writ.
This
includes nothing but an inquiry into
facts, or the suﬂiciency of the
the
aiildavit; all other defects in the pro
ceedings
must be passed upon by the
court, and not by the commissioner".
The
Vinton v. Mead. 17 Mlch., 388-9.
inquiry before the commissioner does
not touch the issue in the attachment
suit: it is merely to inquire into the
truth of the matters on which the
plaintiff has. by an cm parfe aﬂidavit,
been enabled to obtain the writ:
Ed
garton v. Hinchman.
7 Mlch.,
352.
to negative knowl
35-i. It is competent
edge of indebtedness
to show no in
liyde v. Nelson, 11
tent to defraud:
Mlch., 353; Dimmock v. Cole.
130
Mlch., 601; 90 N. W., 333. The issue
upon a petition to dissolve, is not
whether plaintiff had good reason to
think the defendant guilty of conduct
justifying the use of the writ, but
whether he is actually guilty of such
Brown,
42
conduct:
Blanchard
v.
Mlch., 46: 3 N. W., 246.
If a. por
tion of the debt involved in the at
tachment proceedings is
free from
fraud. the attachment must be dis
though a portion was fraudu
solved.
lently contracted.
Estlow v. Hanna,
75 Mlch., 219,’ 42 N. W., 812.
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dissolved, and the property be restored to the defendant in
’
attachment. "
“The citation shall be served three days, at least, before the
return day thereof, by reading it to the plaintiff in attachment

(or to either of them, if there be more than one), if found
within the county, and if not, then the same may be served
upon the agent or attorney of the plaintiﬁ’, by the sheriff, either
of his deputies, or any constable or other person authorized by
such judge or commissioner, and on the return day thereof,
or at such other day thereafter as the judge or commissioner
shall appoint for that purpose, he shall proceed to hear the
proofs and allegations of the parties; and if said judge or
commissioner shall be satisﬁed that such plaintiff had not a
good and legal cause for suing out such writ, the said judge
or commissioner may order such attachment to be dissolved,
and the property attached to be restored to the defendant,
and may, at his discretion, require the said defendant to enter
his appearance to the plaintiﬂ"’s action prior to the dissolution
of such attachment”?
1—C. L., 5 10596.
Unless the party follows up his ap
plication with a citation, his proceed
ings will be considered as having been
abandoned:
Pearson v. Cresiin,
16
See, further. as to service
Mich., 281.
of the citation, anfc. Q 96, note 9.
2—C. L., I 10597.
Upon the hearing before the com
missioner, the plaintiff in the attach
ment holds the aiilrmativc, and is to
The burden of proof
begin the proofs.
is on him to show the existence of
such facts as justiﬂed the issuing of
Beam, 22
Macumber v.
the writ:
lIich., 395: Brown v. Blanchard, 39
Mich., 790; Iosco County S. B. v.
Barnes, 100 Mich., 1; 58 N. W., 606;
County Sav. Bank v. Barge
Genesee
Co., 52 Mich., 164: 17 N. W., 790.
On the hearing the defendant may he
examined as to his intentions, and
may be given that the plain
evidence
tiff has been secured by coiiaterais:
Ibid.
On the hearing to dissolve, evi
dence that the defendant, a short time
previous to the attachment. made an
arrangement with a person
to take
his property under a pretended sale in
order to cover the same from the de

fendant's creditors, and that the per
son took possession of it under this
arrangement, is material, and
hould
he admitted: Parker v. Luce, 14 Mich.,
9.
Where an attachment was issued
upon
the ground that the defendant
was about to remove
his property,
with intent to defraud his creditors.
the defendant's own testimony that he
was not aware at the time that he
was llld8l)t(‘d to any one is competent
for the purpose of negativing any in
tent to defraud, because,
if he was
not aware that he was indebted to any
one he could not have entertained a
design
llyde v.
to defraud creditors:
Nelson, 11 Mich., 353; Dimmock v.
Cole, 130 Mlch., 601; 90 N. W., 333.
Where an attachment issued upon an
aﬂldavit that plaintiff had good reason
to believe
that
defendant had ab
etc.,
sconded,
to
the injury of his
creditors, the commissioner, on an ap
plication to dissolve, found that at the
time of making the aﬂldavit the pinin
tiif had good reason to believe that
the defendant had absconded,
but that
in fact the defendant had not ab
Held, that the attachment
sconded:
was properly dissolved; and, further,
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“The judge or commissioner shall have full power to issue
and, if necessary, attachments, to compel the at
subpoenas,
tendance of witnesses to testify in such cases, and may, in his
discretion, require the party moving for such dissolution to
give security for the costs of such proceedings; and may order
the costs of such proceedings to be paid by the party against
that in order to maintain the attach
ment, it must be shown that a good
and legal cause for issuing the writ
existed in fact, and not merely in the
however, well
belief of the plaintiﬂ,
that belief may have been;
founded
and that the cause for issuing the
writ actually exists at the time of the
Folsom
hearing of the application:
v. Teichner, 27 Mich., 107; Blanchard
v. Brown, 42 Mich., 46; 3 N. W., 246.
if the petition is sustained, the oﬂicer
is not only authorized to dissolve the
attachment, but to order the property
restored:
Price v. Reed, 20 Mich., 74.
have a
But the petitioner cannot
dissolution of the writ unless he con
tinues to be the owner of the prop
erty at the time of making the appli
He would not be entitled to
cation.
an order of return, to himself. of prop
erty of which he was not the owner:
Macumber v. Beam, 22 Mich., 401.
Nor is the owner entitled to a disso
lution unless he is also at the same
time entitled to the possession of the
Dewitt, 36
property:
Johnson
v.
Mich., 97. This case is expressly over
ruled in Drs. l\'. & K. U. S. Med. &.
Sur. Ass'n v. Post & Tribune Co., 58
Mich., 487: 25 N. W.. 477.
the
at
Eﬂrct of di.vsoIut|'on.—If
tachment is dissolved before the de
fcndant has appeared in the attach
ment suit, it puts an end to the suit,
unless the commissioner should require
him to appear to the action before
dissolution.
A dissolution after the
defendant has appeared to the action
is not a. discontinuance, hut the plain
tiff may proceed and obtain a per
sonal judgment against the defendant.
the same as in a suit commenced
by
Hyde v. Nelson. 11 Mich.,
summons:
356; Bower v. Town, 12 Mich., 233;
sec, Hills v. Moore, 40 Mich., 210;
Gray v. York, 44 Mich., 415; 6 N. W.,
874.
It is held in Boriand v. Kings

bury, 65 Mich., 59; 31 N. W., 620,
that the writ of attachment is not in
form a summons,
such that personal
service will give Jurisdiction
of the
person, and that unless there is a voi
untary appearance such service alone
will not justify proceeding in the
case to judgment if writ is dissolved;
thus overruling case of Hills v. Moore,
See, also, Langtry v.
40 Mich., 210.
Judge of Wayne Circuit,
Mich.,
68
451: 36 N. W., 211, holding the same
doctrine.
For a collection
of
the
Michigan cases on the subject of the
attachment, see,
dissolution
of
the
note to losco Co. Sav. Bank v. Barnes,
100 Mich., 1; 58 N. W., 606.
An order of dissolution and return
will not aifect or interfere with the
oi‘.licer's lien and custody of the prop
erty under other writs and executions:
State Bank of Fenton v. Whittle, 41
Mich., 365: 1 N. W., 957.
Findings-—Rcv:'cw,
etc.—'1‘he
com
missioner’s findings of facts on an ap
plication to dissolve, if supported by
any evidence,
are conclusive:
Shel
don v. Stewart, 43 Mich., 574; 5 N.
W., 1067.
If the proceeding to dis
solve is taken before the circuit judge
the same rule obtains.
His ﬁndings
of fact. are conclusive if there is evi
dence to support them:
Dimmock v.
Cole, 130 Mich., 601: 90 N. W., 333.
proceeding before the
The
circuit
judge may be heard at chambers:
County Sav. Bank v. Barge
Genesee
Co., 52 Mich., 164; 17 N. W., 790.
Proceedings for
dissolution
are not
superseded
by rendition
of judgment
in the case:
Gore v. Ray, 73 Mich..
390: 41 N. W., 329, and cases cited
in the opinion.
And so is his ﬁnding
of no cause. when the grounds for is
suing the writ are not supported by
any proof:
Powers v. O'Brien,
44
Mich., 317; 6 N. W., 679.
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whom the decision shall be in the premises and may issue execu
tion therefor, returnable in sixty days from its date.” 3
§97. Appeal from proceedings to dissolve.-“Either party
conceiving himself aggrieved by the determination, order or
judgment of any circuit court commissioner under the pro
visions of this act, may appeal therefrom to the circuit court
for ‘the same county, and a return may be compelled, and the
same proceedings shall be thereupon had, as near as may be,
and with the like effect, as in cases of appeal from judgments
rendered before justices of the peace, and costs shall be
awarded and collected in the circuit court in the same man
ner, and on perfecting the said appeal said attachment pro
ceedings and the levy thereunder shall be held in the same
condition and of the same force and validity, as when said
proceedings for a dissolution of said attachment were com
menced, and the oﬂicer executing said attachment shall con
tinue to have the same rights and duties under said attachment
as regards the property attached as if said proceedings had
never been commenced, and any order or judgment made by
such commissioner dissolving said attachment shall have no
force or effect to release the attached property from the at
tachment levy until the same shall be affirmed by the circuit
court, if appealed from, and no such order shall be issued in
any case by any commissioner until the expiration of ﬁve
days after the making of the same; and the said circuit court
shall also have full power and jurisdiction over said cause and
proceedings, to hear and determine the same and render judg
ment therein, as if the said proceedings had been originally
commenced before the said circuit judge thereof. And either
party to said proceedings in said appeal shall, if he so elect,
be entitled to have the issue in said proceedings tried by a
jury as in ordinary suits in said court.”1
3—C. L.. 5 10598.
The commissioner may
upon

the defeated

party:

if so desired, the original pow
er of this (supreme) court to issue
certtorari has been regarded as prac
tically
superseded."
The
supreme
court, however, has continued to re
view these proceedings on certiorari.
See, Genesee Sav. Bank v. Barge Co.,
52 Mich.. 164: 17 N. W., 790; Carver
v. Chappei, 70 Mich., 49; 37 N. W.,
879; First Nat‘i Bank v. Steele, 81

a jury,

costs
Llnn v. Rob

impose

erts, 15 Mich., 443.
Regarding this
1—C. L.. § 10599.
statute, Mr. Justice
Campbell says:
"Since the statute was so amended as
to enable the circuit court, as a court,
to hear such proceedings on appeal
from the oﬁcer, and to have the aid of
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When judgment may pass for plaintiﬂ'.—“The plain

tiif shall not have judgment in any such action, except in
one

§98

of the following

cases, to

some

wit:

“When the property of the defendants, or one of them,
if there are several, shall have been attached in the county
where the action is brought; or,
1.

“When the defendant, or one of them, where there are
2.
several, shall have been personally served with process, or
shall have appeared; or,
3.

“When

be found

a garnishee shall have been summoned, who

shall

indebted to the defendant or defendants, or to have

property or effects in his hands, subject to the attachment.”
“The return, that no property was found on the attachment,
shall not affect the proceedings against the garnishee.”3
§99. Of the execution in atta.chment.—The lien of the at
tachment upon the property taken continues until after judg
ment and execution regularly obtained, with the view to
secure the application of the property to the discharge of the
debt. It ceases on the issuing of the execution, and the elaps
ing of a reasonable time thereafter to make a levy. A levy
must be made in the usual way, as if no connection existed
between the process of attachment and the process of execu
tion.‘
Mich., 93: 45 N. W., 570; Iosco Sav.
Bank v. Barnes, 100 Mich., 1: 58 N.
W., 606; Dimmock v. Coic, 130 Mich.,
601: 90 N. W., 333.
The statute giving appeals in these
contemplates that there shall
cases.
be a hearing heforc the circuit court in
the same manner as in other appeals on
trials or tact, and anything cad be
shown there which could be shown
Drs.
before a judge or commissioner:
K. & K., U. B. Med. J: Surg. Ass'n v.
Post & Tribune Co., 58 Mich., 487:
25 N. W., 477, 480.
This statute pro
viding for review on appeal applies to
proceedings before a
circuit
court
commissioner only, and not to those
judge.
a circuit
before
Such is the
language of the statute, and. see, (fie
innd v. Clark, 111 Mich., 336: 69 N.
W., 653.
Langtry v. Wayne
2—C. L., I 740.

Judge, 68 Mich., 452; 36 N. W., 211.
The plaintiﬂ is not limited in his
recovery of judgment to the amount
sworn to be due in the aﬁidavlt on
which the attachment issued.
if by
the proof n greater amount is shown
to be due: Pew v. Yoare, 12 Mich.,
16.
The mere fact of taking Judg
ment for more than is due will not
dissolve the attachment, unless it was
done with an intent to defraud:
Hale
V. Chandler, 3 Mich., 531.
3—C. L.. i 741.

4-Van

Loan v. Kline, 10 Johns.,
Sterling v. Welcome,
20 Wend..
238.
When there is no personal serv
ice ot the attachment upon the de
fendant, and he does not nppear in the
suit. the proceeding is strictly against
his property, and no property except
that attached can be taken on the ex
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For proceedings on execution when the defendant was not

personally served, see Chapter XXVII, posts"
The manner of proceeding against garnishees in attachment
will be considered hereafter.
ecution.
But when the defendant has
served,
been
or has ap
personally
peared, the proceedings in the suit are
to be the same in all respects as upon
the return of a summons personally
served,
by sum
in a suit commenced
mons; and in such case the execution
may be levied upon
the property of
the defendant generally, as in other
cases: Bower v. Town, 12 Mich., 230

233.
The attachment lien remains for
a reasonable length of time after judg~
ment, for the purpose of the levy of

property seized:
execution on the
Bushey V. Raths, 45 Mich., 181; 7 N.
W., 802.
And then the execution levy
relates back to the levy of the at
tachment, so as to hold the interest
then owned by the defendant.
5—See C. L., 5! 898, 899.
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OF THE WRIT.

When replevin will 1ie.—In all cases not in
ter‘ specially provided for, proceedings in replevin
justice shall be governed by the two hundred and
and two hundred and fourteenth chapters of the
-Laws of eighteen hundred and seventy-one, as the
§ 100.

this chap
before a
thirteenth
Compiled
case may

be.’

“Whenever any goods or chattels shall have been unlawfully
taken, or unlawfully detained, an action of replevin may be
brought for the recovery thereof, and for the recovery of the
damages sustained by such unlawful taking or detention, ex
cept in the cases hereinafter excepted/’3
1-(‘. I... Chap. 34.
See C. L.. 1807,
2—C. L.. i 752.
chapters 294 and 295.
Those chap
ters are equally obligatory on justice-‘s
Elliott
courts as on circuit courts:
v. \\'hltmore. 5 .\ilch., 533'»-6: Rentsch
lcr v. Fox. 130 .\iich.. 499: 90 N. W.,
Replevln will lie before a jus
275.
tice to recover property wrongfully
where its
taken on federal process
value is not such as to give the fed
eral court Jurisdiction.
hut is such as
to bring it within the Justice's juris
diction.
Carew v. Matthews, 41 Mich.,
576: 2 N. W.. 829.
3—C. L., l 10648.
As to the form of the action, the
be
statute recognizes no distinction
tween replevin for taking and that for
7

detaining property, hut the action is,
in form, in all cases, for detaining
only: Trudo v. Anderson, 10 Mich.,
370; Hickey v. Hinsdale,
12 Mich.,
103; Le Roy v. East Saginaw Ry., 18
Mieh., 234.
in this state replevin is
founded on an unlawful
detention.
whether the taking was unlawful or
Sexton v. McDowd, 38 Mich..
not:
148: Hickey v. lilnadale, 12 Mlch., 99.
Unlawful
detention being the founda
tion of the action. it must obtain at
the commencement
of the suit:
Gil
Crosby, 61 Mich.. 413: 28
dos
v.
N. W.. 153: Eldridge v. Sherman, 70
Mlch., 266: 38 N. W.. 255: Adrlance
v. Rutherford.
57 Mlch., 170; 23 N.
W., 718; Pearl v. Garlock, 61 h!ich.,
419; 28 N. W., 155; Rose v. Eaton,
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“Whenever, by any statute, executors or other persons,
to maintain
suing in the right of another, are authorized
actions of trespass or trover, for any personal property, unlaw
fully taken or unlawfully detained, such persons may maintain
actions of replevin for such property.”

“No replevin shall lie for any property taken by virtue of
any warrant for the collection of any tax, assessment or ﬁne,
in pursuance of any statute of-this state.”-'*
77 Mich., 247; 43 N. W., 972; Colby
v. Postman, 115 Mich., 95; 72 N. W.,
1098; Reid, Murdock & Co. v. Ferris,
112 i\ilch., 693: 71 N. W., -184. and
If goods have been fraud
cases cited.

ulently disposed
of or concealed
to
may
replevin
be
avoid
the
writ.
maintained though it develops that he
at the
was not in actual possession
Giidos v. Cros
time the writ issued:
28 N. W., 158;
by. 61 Mich., 413;
Hail v. Kalamazoo, 131 l\iich.. 404:
W., 615.
Anything
showing
91 N.
that the plalntiit is not entitled to pos
Upham
session will defeat his action:
v. Caldwell, 100 Mich., 264: 58 N. W.,
1001.
And
See post, p. 100, note 7.
it proceeds on the idea that the prop
erty is actually withheld by the de
fendant, and is to be taken by the
oﬂicer under his process from him:
Sexton v. McDowd, 38 Mich.. 148-50.
Replevin is a possessory action, and
the plaintiff
the object is to enable
to obtain the
actual possession
of
property wrongfully detained from him
at the time the action is brought; and
ii’ the property was actually
in the
plaintiff's
possession at the time of
suing out the writ, the action cannot
be maintained; therefore, where an of
ﬂcer levied an execution upon property
in the dwelling-house of the execu
but claimed as exempt
tion debtor,
from execution, and made a/n inventory
thereof, but did not
and appraisal
remove
the same, and lett the house
and property as he found it, but still
claiming the property under the levy,
it was held that the debtor could not
maintain replevin, because he still had
the actual possession of the property:
Hickey v. Hinsdale, 12 Mlch., 99. But
where, in a similar case. the oiiicer
took
attached exempt property. and
part oi’ it away and locked the re

mainder in a trunk which was left in
the debtor's oiiice where the levy was
made,
with the understanding
with
the debtor that the oﬂicer should there
by lose no rights under the levy, it
was held that there_ was such a depri
vaiion of possession as to enable the
debtor to maintain replevin:
Maxon
v. I’errott, 17 Mich., 332.
The plain
tiii‘ must be entitled to the possession
of the property at the time the writ
issues:
Clark v. West, 23 Mich., 247;
Hunt v. Strew, 33 Mich., 85.
But
the mere present right to possession
is sutiicient without any further valu
able interest:
Woolston v. Smead, 42
.‘iiich., 57; 3 N. W., 251: Van Baalen
v. Dean, 27 Mich..
104.
A sale of
goods made on Sunday being void. the
vendor may, on a subsequent day, ten
der hutl; the purchase price and re
plevy the property:
Tucker v. Mow
rey, 12 Mich., 378.
For a discussion oi’ the law control
ling the pleadings and evidence
in a
suit in replevin, see, post, §§ 6-i9-659.
4——C. L., Q 10649.
Justices have
jurisdiction
in replevin against an ad
ministrator: Singer Mtg. Co. v. Ben
jamin, 55 Mich., 333; 21 N. W., 358;
23 N. W., 25; and to recover beasts
Swarthout,
distrained:
Pistorius v.
67 Mich., 186: 34 N. W., 547.
5—C. L., 5 10651.
Although the yarrant may have is
sued erroneously or irregularly,
it on
its face it gives authority to the oﬂicer
to collect the tax. tine, etc., replevin
cannot be sustained for property taken
upon it:
People v. Albany C. P., 7
Wend., 485.
The provision oi’ this sec
tion (I 10651). “That no replevin shall
lie tor property taken by virtue of any
warrant for the collection oi‘ any tax."
etc., must be construed to apply only
to cases where the property seized is
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“No replevin shall lie at the suit of the defendant in any
execution or attachment, to recover goods or chattels seized
by virtue thereof, unless such goods or chattels are exempted
by law from such execution or attachment; nor shall a replevin
lie at the suit of any other person, unless he shall, at the time,
have a right to reduce into his possession the goods taken or de
tained.’

’°

The plaintiff in replevin must have a general or special prop
erty in the goods taken, and zi right to their possession at the
time of the taking and detention and when the writ was issued,
that of the person. or one in privity
with the person. against whom the tax
There must be juris
was assessed.
diction to levy the tax for which the
property has been taken or replevin
will lie to recover
it.
Sec post,
§
650, note 15.
Travers v. iusiee, ii)
Mich., 98: sec Le Roy v. East Sagi
naw Ry.. 18 .\iich.. 234: .\icCoy v. An
502; 11 N. W.,
47 Mich.,
derson.
290; Hill v. Wright, 49 Mich., 230:
13 N. W., 528; Curtiss v. Witt. 110
Mich.. 131; 67 N. W., 1106; Tousey
v. Post, 91 Mich., 634; 52 N. W., 57;
ifhittairer v. Fuller, 96 Mich., 141;
65 N. W., 812: Pioneer Fuel Co. v.
liaiioy. 131 Mich., 466; 91 N. W.,
Repievin, however, will not lie
750.
for property taken by the proper oi!
ccr, the tax roll and warrant being
fair on their face: Mogg v. iiaii. 83
Mich., 578; 47 N. W., 553: Boyce v.
84 .\iich.. 490: 47 N. W..
‘Peterson.
1095: and cases cited in the opinion:
Boyce v. Stevens. 86 Mich., 549; 49 N.
W., 577: Gray v. Finn, 96 Mich., 62;
55 N. W., 615; (hirtiss v. Witt, 110
Mich., 131; 61’ N. W., 1108; Michi
gan lake Superior Power Co. v. At
wood. 126 .\iich.. 651; 86 N. W., 139;
(‘. 8: L. Co. v. Scott,
Northwestern
123 Mich., R57: 82 N. W., 76; Stever
v. Brown. 119 Mich., 196; 77 N. W.,
704.

6—(‘. I... I 10652.
As to what prop
erty is exempt, see. C. b.. I 10322.
The execution or attachment writs do
not establish rights to property against
others: their’force is spent in this
direction when they operate to protect
the oﬂicer from being held responsible
Le Roy v. East Sagi
as 0. wrongdoer:

naw Ry., 18 Mich., 239; Adams v.
iiuhbard, 30 l\iich.. 104; Gidday v.
Witherspoon.
35 Mich.,
368.
it is
not necessary that piaintiﬂ have more
than the mere right of possession
in
order to maintain replevin:
Wooiston
v. Smend, 42 Mich., 5-l: 3 N. W., 251.
A human corpse
is not "property"
such as that the next of kin can
maintain replevin for it:
Kt-yes
v.
Konkei, 119 Mich., 550; 78 N. W.,
G49.

Where goods were taken in execu
tion, they not being at the time in the
possession
of the debtor in the execu
tion, but in the possession
of a third
Held, that the third person
person:
might maintain replevin:
Judd v. Fox,
9 (Tow.. 259.
And property seized in
execution while in the possession
of
the defendant in execution. may be re
plevied by another who has the im
mediate right of possession:
Bassett
v. Armstrong. 6 Mich., 397.
And so,
property which is exempt, if taken on
execution. may be repievied by
the
judgment debtor:
Hickey v. iiinsdaie,
12 Mich., 99; Maxon v. Perrott.
17
Mich., 332: Durfee v.
McCiurg,
5
Mich., 532, 537.
A husband and wife
may join in an action to recover
ex
Shepard v. Cross, 33
empt property:
Mich., 96.

if

the judgment were void, any pre
tended execution issued upon it would
be no execution within
the meaning
of the statute, which prohibits a de

fendant in execution from bringing re
plevin for the property taken upon it:
Adams v. Hubbard. 30 Mich., 104;
iron Cliffs Co. v. Lahais, 62 Mich.,
394; 18 N. W., 121.
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the action.’ But it is not necessary that
ever have had actual possession before

as a general rule, replevin

(le bonis could be sustained

;9

would lie when
under the statute,

perhaps, the correct rule would be, that it can be brought in all
cases where trover could be supported.
The action can be maintained for the taking or detention of
personal chattels only. It does not lie for things ﬁxed to the

When one enters and ousts the owner of land,
continues in possession, cutting and removing the crops, re
plevin will not lie for them, although they were sown by the
owner." Several persons cannot join their several rights in
this action, but each must have a separate replevy; but joint
freehold."

tenants, or tenants in common, may."

If one part owner of a chattel sue alone, the non-joinder of
the other or others may be pleaded in abatement," but not in
bar." If he sues for a moiety only in his writ, the suit will be
abated." One tenant in common of personal property, can
not maintain replevin against his co-tenant for such prop
erty." A defendant may defend asserting title in

Hill,
8
7—Sharp
v. Whittenhall,
676; Wheeler v. Train, 3 Pick., 258;
3 Wend., 280.
Dunham v. Wyckoil.
Anything going to show that at the
the plain
time suit was commenced
tiﬂ had no right to the possession of
the property. is a bar to the action:
Beiden v. Laing, 8 Mlch., 500; Clark
242; Glddey v.
v. West, 23 Mich.,
Altman, 27 Mlch., 206; Hunt v. Straw,
33 Mich.. 85; Steere v. Vanderberg, 90
Plain
Mlch.. 187; 51 N. W., 205.
the
tlﬁ must recover if at all on
strength of his own title or right
not on the weakness 0!
of possession,
Upham v.
that ot the defendant:
Caldwell, 100 Mich., 264; 58 N. W.,
1001; Whitney v. Hyde. 91 Mich., 13¢
Burk v. Webb, 32
51 N. W., 696:
Mich... 173.
8—Baker v. Fales. 16 Mass, 147.
9--But this is not universally true:
Sharp v. Whittenhall,
3 Hill, 576.
10-Nlhiet v. Smith, 4 Term R.,
504: 2 Saund. Pl. & Ev., 5 Am. ed.,
669; Cresson v. Stout, 17 J0hn., 116

11——Demott
220.

12-2

v.

third

a

Hagaman,

8

Cow.,

Saund. Pl. dz Ev., 5 Am. ed.,

770.

13—Hart

v.

Fitzgerald,

2

Mass,

3

Barb.,

509.

14-Wright

v.

Bennett,

v.

Harris,

451.

1.3—D‘Wolt
515-

4

Mason,

538.

But where plalntlﬂ! brought replevin
for one hundred bushels of wheat,
pnrt of a larger quantity i-n the same
bulk. to all of which he was entitled:
Hr.’-Id. that the action was maintain
abk: Crouse v. Derbyshire, 10 Mlch.,
479.

16—Wetherell
v. Spencer. 3 Mich.,
123: Kindy v. Green, 32 Mlch., 310;
Kline v. Kline, 49 Mich.. 419: 13 N.
W.. 800: Coan v. Mole. 39 Mich.. 454.
But as t° Peillevin by the owner of an
undivided halt of property when the
defendant has no interest in the other
see. Crapo v. Seyboid, 36 Mich.,

:31.'
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person without it being necessary to make such third person
a party to the proceeding."

Writ, when and how i8sued.—“Whenever any plain
§ 101.
tiff, his agent or attorney, shall make and ﬁle an affidavit with
the justice, setting forth that his personal goods and chattels,
not exceeding in value one hundred dollars, have been unlaw
fully taken, or are unlawfully detained by any other person,
speciﬁcally describing such property, and giving the value
thereof, and stating that the plaintiff is lawfully entitled to the
possession of said property, that the same has not been taken
for any tax, assessment, or ﬁne, levied by any law of this state,
nor seized under any execution or attachment against the
goods and chattels of such plaintiff liable to execution, and
claiming damages for the detention of ‘the same, or taking the
same, not exceeding one hundred dollars, in addition,

and shall
ﬁle with such justice a bond with sufficient surety or sureties,
to be approved by the justice, and payable to the defendant in
a penalty at least double the value of the property, as sworn
and not less than one hundred dollars, with
prescribed in section ten of the one hundred and
twenty-fourth chapter of the revised statutes of eighteen hun
dred and forty-six, with the justiﬁcation of the sureties to said
to in the aﬂidavit,
the condition

bond endorsed thereon, in writing, and to be made under oath,
the justice shall issue a writ of replevin, directed to any con
stable of the county, commanding him to take the property
described, and return the same forthwith to the plaintiff. and
that he summon the defendant to appear at a time and place

therein to be named, before such justice, to answer the said
plaintiff concerning the imlawful taking or detention of the
said goods and chattels; and, in case of the neglect or refusal

of said justice to require the sureties to said bond to justify
in writing, and under oath, before issuing said writ, the said
writ upon motion shall be dismissed, and the property taken
by virtue thereof returned to the person (persons) from whom
it was taken, unless the plaintiff, on such motion being made,
shall forthwith ﬁle with the justice a new bond in the form
and penalty, in this act provided, with good and suﬂicient sure
17—-Colby

v.

Portman.

115

M1ch.,
.

95;

101

72

N.

W.,

1098.

\
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tics, who shall justify their responsibility in the manner here
inbefore provided; and the justice shall be liable to the injured
party in an action of trespass for any damage he may have
sustained by reason of said writ having been issued.”1
issuing the writ, the plaintiff,
his agent, or attorney, must make and ﬁle with the justice the
affidavit required by the foregoing section. Its ofﬁce is to con
§ 102.

The aﬂidavit.-Before

It must conform in all respects to the re
fer jurisdiction?
quirement of the statute, even although the statement omitted
be not strictly appropriate in the particular case, or the objec
tion will be fatal.
When in replevin by a supervisor, for an
assessment roll, the afﬁdavit did not contain a statement “that
the property was not taken for any assessment levied by virtue
of any law of this state,” nor, “that it was not seized under
any execution against the goods and chattels of the plaintiff
liable to execution,” the proceeding was held to be irregular.
“The nature of the property repievied in this case,” said the
judge, “is such that the omission in the aﬂidavit might be
regarded immaterial, was it not for the positive requirements
of the law, and which was expressly introduced by the legisla
1—C. L., 5 748.
Section 10
of
Chap. 124 of the revised statutes of
1846, is 5 10657 of C. L., 1897.
As
to the nature of the action and when
it will lie, see, ante, 5 100.
jurisdiction
Value of proper-I1/.—'I‘he
of the justice in replevin depends upon
the value of the property as set forth
in the aﬂfidavit and writ, and alleged
in the declaration, and not upon the
amount subsequently proved upon the
trial. Under a plea of the general ls
sue and trial on the merits, where the
aiﬁdavit and declaration have alleged
the value to be within the jurisdiction
of the court, proof on the trial that
the property exceeded one hundred doi
iars in value, will not oust the jus
tice of jurisdiction,
nor prevent the
plaintiff's
recovery:
Henderson
v.
Desborough, 28 Mlch., 170.
For the
purpose of jurisdiction,
the value of
the property is presumed to be cor
Ibid.;
rectly stated in the aﬂidavit:
Carew v. Mathews, 41 Mlch., 579:
But, unless the afiidavit
2 N. W., 829.
alleges the value of the property sought
to be replevied, not to exceed
one

hundred dollars, it will not
confer
jurisdiction
on the court; and, al
though the defect for want of such
statement may be waived, yet it will
Sager
be fatal if duly insisted on;
v. Shutts, 53 Mlch., 116; 18 N. W.,
580.
But as to when the defendant
may have judgment exceeding
$100
for the value of the property taken,
Mlch.,
see,
Chiison v. Jennlson,
60
235; ‘.36 N. W., 859.
Mlch.,
2—Elliott v. Whltmore, 5
537.
The allegations in the aﬂidavit
are only to be considered upon the
question of jurisdiction,
and cannot
Elliott
affect the trial on the merits:
v. Whitmore, 5 Mlch., 537; Blooming
305;
dale
V. Chittenden,
75 Mlch.,
42 N. W.. 836.
The aﬂidavit is not
fatally
defective because
not signed
Bloomingdale v. Chit
by the aﬁlant:
tenden, 75 Mlch., 305; 42 N. W., 836;
nor because in one place the names of
plaintiff and defendant are transposed:
Churchill v. Rea, 126 l\1ich., 175: 85
N. W., 465.
The afiidavlt for the writ
must show that the plaintiff is enti
and that the de
tled to possession,
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turc

to every action of replev-in.
to apply indiscriminately
whether brought in a justice ’s court or a court of record, and
they cannot be altered or in any manner disregarded by the

courts.“
The aﬁidavit must describe the property speciﬁcally,‘ and
give the value thereof,“ but it must not be entitled in the
cause.°
tendant. and not a stranger. unlaw
tnlly detains it.
The seizure is to
be made from the actual or construc
tive possession of the defendant: Sex
ton v. McDowd, 38 Mich., 148.
3-——Phenix. ct ai., v. Clark, 2 Mich.,
327; Dwight v. Blackmar, 2 Mich.,
330.

4—C. L., 5 T-18.
in replevln, the process must de
scribe the property to be taken; but
this description need not be so explicit
and exclusive as to supersede recourse
If, with the de
help.
to extrinsic
scrlptlon and such aid as the plaintii!
usually aﬂords. the oﬂiccr can identify
in the
the property. it is suiiicient.
great majority of cases the description
in the writ must be aided by other
means ot identification, and the oﬂicer
must use his intelligence in ascertain
ing such facts as will assist him in
applying the description to the prop
Sexton v. .\Icl)owd.
erty intended.
38 .\iich..
1-18: Farwell v. Fox, 18
For cases holding de
.\ilch.. 160.
scriptions
sufficient. see, Wattles v.
Duhols, 67 .\iich.. 313: 34 N. W., 672,
holding that a description of wheat as
of the Fultz variety when it was of
the (‘lawson variety is not tatal when
other description was good. “Snﬂicient
or said stock tot‘ boots and shoes tuily
located) to satisfy the claim of plain
goods
said
of
tiifs as mortizagees
amounting to $805." is held sutﬂcient
mortgage covered the
when piuintlﬂs‘
Pingree v. Steere. 68
entire stock:
Mich., 204; 35 N. W., 905.
“A quan
tity of wheat, rye and oats, being one
hail’ of the grain grown on the Sim
mons farm in the year 1892,” is held
good
in
Simmons v. Robinson, 101
.\iich., 240:
“24
59
N. W., 623.
Michigan Reports, one lot of books,
one
one lot of paper and envelopes,
lot of written matter":
Burt v. Ad
dison. 7-i i\iich.. 730; 42 N. W., 278.

A description in this language:
“One
sewing machine and one pool tahie,"
was held suﬂicleﬁt in Proper v. Couli
ling, 67 Mich., 244; 34 N. W., 560.
See, also.
Dillon v. Howe, 98 Mich.,
168: 57 N. W., 102; Durrell v. Rich
ardson, 119 Mich., 592; 78 N. W.,
650.
A description may be suﬂicient
though it require extrinsic evidence to
determine the meaning oi’ particular
Dages
words:
v. Brake, 125 Mich.,
64; 83 N. W., 1039.
A description of grain or other chat
tels deiined by measurement,
which is
indefinite as to quantity and not other
wise made certain, as, “a quantity of
corn. corisistirzgy of about 200 bushels,"
and not otherwise identified. is insom
clent:
Stevens v. Osman, 1 Mich., 92:
Farwell V. Fox, 18 Mich., 166.
But
the property described
as “slay oxen"
has been held suiﬂclent:
Farwell v.
Fox, 18 Mich., 166. And so. a descrip
tion giving the quantity, kind and lo
cation ot the property, so that no other
property than that claimed can he
taken,
as, “all the groceries in the
store occupied by Potter on a certain
lot in St. Joseph,” has been held good:
Krleger v. Warner. 2 Mich., nisi prius,
229.

5—\\'here the property consists of
several articles. it is suﬂicient to give
the value of the whole, and not of each
separately:
Root v. \\'oodruiI, 6 liill,
~i1S.
Unless the aﬂidavit alleges the
value of the property not to exceed
one hundred dollars, it will not confer
jurisdiction
upon the justice to issue
Sager v. Shutts, 53 Mich.,
the writ:
116; 18 N. \\'., 580; see, iienderson
v. Deshrough,
28 Mich.,
170.
The
value as alleged
in the aﬂidavit is
to be the
true value till
presumed
proceedings show to the
subsequent
contrary:
Mathews,
(‘arew
v.
41
Mich., 579; 2 N. W., S29.
6—Milliken v. Lunt, 3 Denio, 54.
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The bond.—The condition

ACTIONS.

C11.

IV.

of the bond required by

“that the plaintiﬂ’ will prosecute the suit to

104.

bond

a

§

if

if

is

this,
748,
the defendant recover judgment against him
effect, and that
return there
in the action, he will return the same property,
of be adjudged, and will pay the defendant all such sums of
money as may be recovered by such defendant against him in
the said action.”'*

The writ.—Upon making and ﬁling the affidavit and
issues, directed to any constable of the

writ of replevin

county!‘

“Such writ shall be returnable not less than six, nor more
than twelve days from the date of the same, and shall be
served not less than six days before the return there0f.”9
OF SERVING

THE

VVRIT.

The 1evy.—“Upon the receipt of such writ, with the
hereinbefore required, annexed, the sheriff [or con
stable] shall proceed to seize and take into his custody the
property described therein, and for that purpose may break
open any house, stable, outhouse or other building in which
such property may be concealed, having ﬁrst demanded de
§105.
affidavit

a

a

or cumulative remedy therto.
Brabon
v. Pierce, 34 Mlch., 39.
As to the
iiling ot
new bond, see, Hatch v.
Christmas, 68 Mlch., S7: 35 N. W.,
833; Hopkins v. Green, 93 Mlch., 395;
W., 537.
53 N.
May be
waived:
Bloomingdale v. Chittenden, 75 Mlch.,
307; 42 N. W., 836.
A bond signed
by
ﬁrm and one of the parners is
not good: llopkins v. Green, 93 Mich..
395; 53 N. W., 537.
The giving of
this bond does not operate to pass title
to the property involved:
Lindsay
v. Morse, 129 Mlch., 350; 88 N. W.,
881.

L.,
748.
L.,
749.
An objection that
the return day is Sunday, is waived
if the defendant appears, pleads to
the merits, and goes to trial Without
objection:
35
Pierce v. Rehtuess,
Mlch., 53.
Upon the question of the
return day oi’ the writ and the com
putation of time tor the return and
service, see, ante,
34 and note. "The
citation,” p. 91.

10-l

5 §

8—C.
9—-C.

5

8

a

7—In an action against the sureties
in a replevin bond, no judgment can
against
them
for an
be
recovered
amount exceeding
the penalty in the
bond and the costs oi! the suit on the
bond:
Fraser v. Little, 13 Mlch., 195.
As to suit on the bond, return of
property, etc., see, Jcnnison v. ilalre,
29 Mlch., 207.
But it seems that an
action will lie upon a replevin bond
only when
writ of return of the
property, or other execution, is re
turned unsatisﬁed:
Scott v. Scott,
As to
50 Mlch., 372; 15 N. W., 515.
the suﬂiciency of the bond when signed
by sureties only. see, Cahill's
Appeal,
48 Mlch., 616; 12 N. W., S77.
The bond remains in force until the
ﬁnal determination of the cause, and
covers
the defendant's costs in all
courts, whether on appeal or ccrtiorari:
Brabon v. Pierce, 34 i\iich., 39; Mon
12;
46 Mlch.,
roe v. Heintzman.
N. W., 571.
if plaintiﬂ appeals, the
the re
appeal bond does not supersede
plevin bond, but gives an additional

-

\
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thereof at'the building or place where the same is

concealed/’1°
The oﬂicer would be liable in trespass for levying on th‘e
property mentioned in the writ, if he take it from the posses
sion, and it be the property of, one who is a stranger to the
suit.“ In such a case, the process will be no justiﬁcation to the

plaintiff in replevin, or to those who act imder his authority
in removing the goods. The owner of the property may have
the usual remedy by_ action, or retake the property without
process, if he can do it peaceably."
(I
The oﬁlcer shall summon the defendant according to the
command of the writ, by delivering to him personally a certi
ﬁed copy of such writ, if such defendant can be found; and

if

then by leaving such certiﬁed copy at
his usual place of abode, with some person of proper age.”13
he cannot be found,

10—C. L., Q 10655.
It is to be observed that the stat
ute authorizes the breaking open of
n house
or building
to obtain
the
property only in case that property is
therein; therefore. in break
concealed
ing open the building the oﬂlcer acts
at his peril, for if the property is not
trespasser:
be
a
there
he would
Mich., 408;
Rcntschler
v. Fox, 130
90 .\i. W., 275.
11—Stimpsou v. Reynolds, 14 ilarb.,
506; Elder v. Morrison,
10 Wend.,
128; Cook v. iiopper, 28 Mich., 511.
Hut see, Shipmnn v. Clark, 4 Denio.
-H6, where it is intimated that the
writ would protect the otlicer.
v. Clark, 4 Ilenio. 446;
l2——Shipman
Spencer v. l\l'(‘-owan, 13 Wend., 256.
if the property described in the writ
is found in the actual or constructive
who
possession of a third person,
claims it, the officer
cannot be re
quired to take it without an indem
plaintiff.
nifying security from the
Although
property may be cor
the
|c<-tly described. yet, if it is not de
rained by the defendant. but is claimed
nnd apparently owned by a third per
son, the writ will not protect the oili
cer if such person is the bona ﬂdc
owner and holder:
Sexton v. Mc
Dowd, 38 .\Iich.. 148.
in an action against an ofllcer for
taking of property in
the wrongful
rcplevin. a special verdict in the re

pievin suit that the property was not
detained by the defendant therein is
not conclusive evidence that the plain
tiff in replevin was not the owner of
the property:
Ibid.
13—C. L., 5 10659.
Service by leaving a certiﬁed copy
of the writ with defendant's wife,
it not appearing that the defendant
could not be found, nor that the copy
was left with her at defendsnt‘s place
Wheeler
of abode, is not suﬂlcient:
v. Wilkins,
10 .\lich., 78.
As to certi
fying, sec, Leonard v. Woodward, 34
l\iich., 514, holding failure to certify
not to be fatal under the circum
The
stances of the particular
case.
proper practice on a motion to dis
miss for failure to certify is to allow
an alias writ to issue and complete
the service:
Anderson v. Lane, 105
Mich., 89; 62 N. W., 1027.
The stat
ute does not contemplate the service
Patterson
of a copy of the atﬂdavit:
For illus
v. Parsec, 38 l\iich., 609.
tration of defective service not nec
essarily fatal. see, Flcugel v. Lards,
108 l\Iich.. G82; 66 N. W., 585.
One
who takes a special appeal
and on
getting adverse decision in the circuit
court. then pleads the general issue
jurisdictional
question:
waives the
Clute v. Everhart, — .\iich., —; 100
N. W., 124 (June.
1904).
The service of the writ, when the
defendant is not found. should be gov

105
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§106. The return.—“Ti1e sheriﬁ (or constable) shall return
the writ at or before the return day thereof, with the aﬁidavit
thereto annexed, and the names of the persons who executed
the bond taken by him from the plaintiff, and their places of
residence; and he shall state in his return in what manner
he executed the writ; and if the goods and chattels speciﬁed
therein shall not have been replevied, he shall state in his

return the

cause

thereof/’“

Alias and pluries writs.—If the‘ constable has not
§107.
summoned the defendant, and the property has been replevied,
a summons or an alias writ may be issued, unless he shall ap
pear, and so on until he is duly summoned."
If the ﬁrst writ was not executed at all, an alias writ is to
be issued, and so on until the property is delivered and the de
fendant summoned."
An alias or pluries writ, in form, is like the ﬁrst, except that
in an alias, after the word “command,” insert “as we before
commanded you,” and in a pluries, “as we have oftentimes be
fore commanded you.” If the plaintiff cannot ﬁnd the whole
of the property, he is not bound to take any part of it except
it is presumed, by the same
rules as in case of the service ot a
writ of attachment by copy: and that
it is the otﬂcer's duty to use all rea
sonable dlllgence, during all the time
allowed by law for making personal
service, to ﬁnd the defendant and to
make such service upon him; and, that
service by leaving a certiﬁed copy of
the writ at the defendant's usual place
of abode can be made only in case
the defendant cannot be found during
any part of the time allowed by law
for making personal service, and not
until the whole time within which
personal service can be made has ex
pired.
For mode of service in at
tachment when defendant cannot be
found, see, notes to 5 86, ante.
14—C. L., Q 10661.
It is presumed that the return to a
writ of repievin, when the defendant
houid be governed
cannot be found,
by the same rules as in case of an
See,
copy:
by
served
attachment
return
The
notes to § 92, ante.
may be amended; but if not amended

erned,

,

is conclusive as made:
v.
Green
Kindy, 43 Mich., 279; 5 N. W., 297.
15—That an alias writ may issue
for no other purpose than to get serv
defendant, see, Bell v.
ice
on
the
Judge, 26 Mich., 414.
16—As to whether an alias writ
may issue under the statutes of this
Perrott,
17
state,
see, Maxon
v.
Mich., 332.
An allas may issue for
the purpose of personal service merely
where property has been seized. but
no personal service obtained in the
lite of theoriginai writ: Bell v. Judge,
The appearance of
26 Mich.,
414.
by the
defendant cannot be coerced
seizure of property and the continued
issuance of successive
writs without
expectation of service:
Lanahan v.
Judge of Kent Circuit, 106 Mich., 685;
W., 740.
64 N.
As to whether an
alias writ of repicvin for the sole
purpose of correcting a defect in the
Chap
service is authorized——quaero:
pelle v. Webster, 122 Mich., 482: 81
N. W., 341.
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at his election. But if he see ﬁt, he may accept that part of
the goods found, and, without issuing another writ, proceed in
the cause for the damages for the part not found.
Such was
the course of proceeding in such a case at common law," which
would also apply to a similar case under the statute."

to judgment.—“If the goods and chat
§108.
tels speciﬁed in any writ of replevin shall not be found, or
shall not be delivered to the plaintiff, he may proceed in the
action for the recovery of the same, or the value thereof.”1°

“If the sheriﬂ? return to the writ of replevin that the de
fendant has been duly summoned in either of the modes here
inbefore prescribed, the plaintiff shall declare within the same
time as in personal actions, and the further practice and

proceedings in the case shall be the same as in actions‘ begun
by summons.”
After such a return, proceedings may be had
against the defendant, as if he had actually appeal-ed.2°
Repiev.. 20 (6 Law Li1T—Wiik.
brary).
Bell v. Judge, 26 Mich., 414:
Mason v. Porrott. 17 Mich., 332; Anderson v. Laue, 105 Mich., 89: 62 N.
W., 1027: Lannhnn v. Judge,
106
Mic-h., 685: 64 N. W., 740.
18-—Snow v. Roy, 22 Wend., 602.

L.. I 10680: see, Hanseiman
Kegei, 60 Mich., 549-580; 27 N.
55
W.. 078: Mt-Brian~v.
Morrison.
Mk-h.. 353: 21 N. W., 368; Maxon v.
Perrott, 17 Mlcb., 334.
20—C. L., I 10669.
See replevin.
post, chap. xxxix.
19-—C.

v.
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CHAPTER
Paocnnnmcs

V.

IN Gnamsnmnwr.

authorized.
5122. Demands not due.
5109. When garnishment
§123. Claims of third person.
£110 The aﬂidavit.
as garnishees.
§1‘.£~i. (‘orporntlons
$111. The summons.
5112- 391"-‘"15! B1113’returning 8111111110111
§125. Service of process on corpora
ﬂong_
§113. Liability of garnlshee.
5114- G'"'“l5hee “mug t° aPP°1"'5125a. When garnlshee released.
5115' Ex”ml'mﬂ°n M ga"m5h°e'
§126. Garnlshees in attachment.
ionowmg emmmm
*n6‘
In attachment against foreign
§127.
flxlceediugs
'
corporations.
5128. Public ofﬂcers as garnishees.
¥:::]dd:ll:]e|g0:s‘_sconunuanee‘
executors. adminis
5129. Guardians,
§119_ I>|eM“ngs_ “.|n1_ uppeah etc_
n'at°"5' “C-' as §“l'“lsh°°5execution,
Judgment,
etc.
§120.
I121. Suit by defendant against gar- §130- Demands ll! 811“
nishee.
55131. Right of set-oﬂ.

When garmshment a.uthorized.—“In any action com
menced before a justice of the peace, founded upon contract,
express or implied, or upon judgment or decree, or after the
rendition of judgment in any case, if the plaintiif, his agent
or attorney, shall make and ﬁle with such justice an affidavit
stating that he has good reason to believe, and does believe,
that any person, naming him, has property, money or effects
in his hands, or under his control, belonging to the defendant,
or any or either of the defendants, in such suit, judgment or
decree, or that such person is indebted to such defendant, or
any or either of the defendants, the justice shall issue a. sum
mons against such person requiring him to appear before such
justice at a time and place mentioned in the said summons,
not less than six nor more than twelve days from the date
thereof, and answer, under oath, all questions put to him touch
ing his indebtedness to such defendant, or any or either of the
defendants, naming him or them, and the property, money
and effects of the defendant, or any or either of the defendants,
in his" possession, within his knowledge, or under his control;
which summons shall be served and returned in the same
§ 109.

manner as a summons issued against
108

a defendant

in

other
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cases:
Provided, That any co-partnership or company doing
business in this state, maybe garnisheed under this act if a

personal service on the resident bookkeeper, superintendent,
foreman, or any resident manager of such co-partnership or
The garnishee shall be entitled to the
company is obtained.
same fees as he

would

be

if

he were supoenaed as

a.

witness in

such case.’ ’1
by
1—C. 1... 5 990, as amended
Public Acts, 1901, p. 253.
proceedings
The act to authorize
against garnishees. being in deroga
tion of the common
law. must be
‘Maynards v. (‘orn
strictly construed:
weli, 3 Mich., 309; Ford v. Dry Dock
Co., 50 Mich., 358: 15 N. W.. 609:
Crisp v. Ft. Wayne & E. By. Co., 98
Mich., 648; 57 N. W., 1050.
The pro
ceedings
statutory.
are purely
and
cannot be extended
to cases not pro
vided for by law:
Slevers ct cl. v.
Woodburn Sarven Wheel Co., 43 Mich.,
v.
275: 5 N. W., 811: llanselman
Kegel. 60 Mich., 548; 27 N. W.. 679:
(‘risp v. Ft. Wayne & E. Ry. (70.. 08
They
Mich" 648: 57 N. W., 1050.
are in the nature of an equitable at
iaclimcnt of the debt or assets of the
principal defendant in the hands of
The object is to reach
n third person.
such assets and apply them in dis
charge of the principal debt.
Bethei
v. Judge of Superior Court, 57 Mich.,
379; 24 N. W., 112.
Before gnrnlshec
process can issue the plaintiﬂ must
have a judgment against the princi
have
pal defendant or must
com
suit against him upon con
menced
tract, express or implied. or upon judg
ment:
lron Cliifs Co. v. Lahais, 52
Mich., 396: 18 N. W.. 121.
As to when garnishee process will
not lie. see, Spear v. Rood. 51 Mich..
140; 16 N. W.. 312: Farweil v. Cham
bers. 62 ‘.\iich.. 316: 28 N. W.. 8592
Custer v. White. 49 Mich.. 262; 18
N. W., 588; Anderson v. Odell, 51
Mlch.. 492: 16 N. W., 870: Drake v.
Lake Shore & Michigan Southern Ry.
Co., 09 Mich.. 168: 37 N. W.. 70.
A purchaser of property is not liable
to be garnisheed for the price until
delivery. or part payment of the price.
or n credit has been given therefor:
Case v. Dewey. 55 Mlch.. 116: 20 N.
W., 817; 21 N. W.. 911; Foikerts v.

Standish, 55 Mich.. 463; 21 N. W.,
Nor a debtor after an oral as
signment of the claim against him by
his creditor:
Neumann v. Calumet 6:
Ilecla Mining Co., 57 l\ilch.. 97; 23
N. W., 600.
All the proceedings in garnishment
are special and statutory.
They give
a harsh and peculiar
and
remedy,
ought not to be resorted to when the
sought
redress
may
be
obtained
through common law proceedings.
And
when taken, the statutory
require
ments must be strictly construed and
followed.
The proceedings are mere
ly ancillary
prlnclpul
to the
case.
and if that is defective they go down
with it:
Iron Ciiifs Co. v. Lahals.
52 Mich., 394; 18 N. W., 121; Far
well v. Chambers, 62 Mlch.. 321: 28
N. W., 859; Segar v. Shingle dc L.
Co., 81 l\iich., 34-i: 45 N. W., 982.
An executor or administrator
is not
subject to garnishment
under
this
statute‘for money or property in his
hands for distribution: Basom v. Tay
lor, 39 Mich.. 682.
A register
in
chancery as to funds deposited with
him as such is not to be reached by
this proceeding:
Voorhies v. Sessions,
34 Mich., 91).
An asslgnee for the
benefit of creditors cannot be held as
garnishee of his assignor:
Cook v.
Rogers. 31 Mich., 891.
Nor can a re
ceiver be held as a garnishee:
Trem
per v. Brooks, 40 Mich., 333.
A claim
must be actionable at the suit of the
principal
defendant or it cannot be
subject to garnishment:
v.
Farwell
Chambers. 62 Mlch., 322; 28 N. W..
Wages to be earned under ex
859.
isting contracts are subject to garnish
ment: Kane v. Clough, 36 Mlch., -136.
A garnishee is not justiﬂed in paying
a judgment against him if judgment
in the principal suit is void:
Dutcher
v. Grand Rapids
Fire Ins. Co., 131
Mich., 672; 92 N. W., 345.
891.
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The jurisdiction of a justice df the peace, in garnishee pro
ceedings, does not depend upon the amount due from the
garnishee _to the principal debtor, but upon the sum claimed
to be due from the latter to the plaintiff in the garnishee pro
ceedings?
_

If

a debtor hold a

joint contract against two or more, the

creditor must summon all the parties liable to discharge it.
One of two joint debtors cannot be charged as garnishee in
a suit where the other debtor is not joined; therefore, a judg
ment rendered against one of several joint debtors as garnishee
is void, and no bar to a subsequent suit against ai1.3
ll Bills of exchange and
promissory notes not due, in the
hands of the garnishee at the time of the service of the sum
mons, shall be deemed ‘effects,’ imder the provisions of this
act.’

I4

’4

2—Wetherwax

v.

Paine,

2

Mich.,

555.

Mich.,
3—Wc-therwax v. Paine, 2
A party cannot be held alone
as garnishee upon a debt owing by him
self and another jointly:
Wellover v.
Soule, 30 Mich., 481; Bali v. Young,
52 Mich., 476; 18 N. W., 225.
Nor
can
everai persons be joined as gar
nishees in the same proceeding unless
they are ail jointly liable to the prin
cipal defendant; and this is so_whether
the proceedings relate to the posses
sion of property belonging to the prin
due
cipal defendant or to indebtedness
Bail v. Young, 52 Mich.,
to him:
476; 18 N. W., 225.
Nor can a debt
owing to two persons be garnisheed
in a suit against only one of them:
v.
Markham
Gehan. 42 Mich., 74:
3 N. W., 262: Kennedy v. McLellan,
76 Mich.. 603; 43 N. W., 641: Stone
476; 78 N.
119 Mich..
v. Dowiing,
W., 549.
Nor can a garnishee be held
in a suit against joint
defendants
when he is indebted
to only one of
Wellover v. Soule, 30 Mich.,
them:
481: Ford v. Detroit Dry Dock Co.,
See,
50 Mich., 358: 15 N. W., 509.
Lyon v. Balentine, 63 Mic-h., 97; 29
N. W., 837.
The maker of a
4—(‘.. L., 5 1011.
garnisheed
promissory note may be
if it is
thereon after its maturity.
defendant:
owned by the principal
'
555.

Somers v. Losey, 48 Mich., 29-1: 12
N. W., 188. As to whether the maker
can be garnisheed before its maturity.
under the preent state of the law:
Formerly it was held
Ibid.
Quere.
See, Littleﬂeid v.
that he could not:
Hodge,
6 Mich., 326.
Where, mortgagees
of chattels are in
possession and selling them to satisfy
they can be made lla
their mortgage,
mortgagor
ble as garnishees of the
only to the extent of such of the
mortgaged property or the proceeds
thereof as may remain in their hands
Dag
after the mortgage is satisﬁed:
get Co. v. McClintock,
56 Mich., 51;
22 N. W., 105.
But when the mort
is fraudulent
as to creditors,
gage
see, Cummings v. Fearey, 44 Mich.,
39; 6 N. W., 98.
Personal property exempt from exe
cution while in the hands of the prin
cipal debtor, cannot be reached by gar
nishment against one to whom he has
An
assigned or conveyed the same:
derson v. Odeii, 51 Mich., 402: 16 N.
W., 870; Wilson v. Bartholomew, 45
Mich.. 41; 7 N. W., 227.
Municipal corporations are not sub
ject to process by garnishment. There
fore, a school district cannot be gar
it:
owing
by
nisheed for moneys
Mich.,
School District v. Gage,
39
484.
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The a.ﬁida.vit.5—If the aﬂidavit is made by the agent
or attorney of the party, it is suﬂicient to describe him as agent,
etc., in the body of the aﬁidavit, without swearing positively
'
to the fact that he is such agent or attorney.“
§ 110.

summons issued in pursuance
§111. The summons.—“The
of section 1 of this act may be substantially in the form of the
ordinary justice’s summons, and need not recite either the
commencement of suit by the plaintiﬁ against the principal
defendant, or any of the allegations contained in the aﬂidavit
for garnishment theretofore ﬁled, but shall contain a command
to summon the garnishee to answer in the suit in substantially
the following form: ‘To answer, under oath, all questions put
to him touching his indebtedness to A B, principal defendant
at the suit of C. D, plaintiff herein, and the property, money,
and effects of the said A B in his possession, within his knowl

or under his control, according to the allegations con
tained in the aﬁidavit of said C. D (or E. F., agent of said C
D), duly made and ﬁled in this suit.’ ”"
edge,

5—The aﬂldavit should show upon
Conway
what the action is rounded:
46 Mich"
v. Judge of ionia Circuit,
28; 8 N. W., 588.
If the principal
suit is upon contract, the atiidavit tor
the writ of garnishment should state
whether it was brought upon an ex
press
implied
or
contract:
Wei
meister v. liianville.
4-i Mich., 408;
6 N. W.. 859.
And it should state
definitely the grounds upon which the
writ is applied tor, whether to reach
an indebtedness due to the principal
defendant, or property in the posses
sion of the garnishee belonging to him :
Ibid.
proceedings are
Gnrnishment
it the
founded upon the aﬂfldavlt.
no
aﬂidavlt is insudicient there
is
Voluntary
appearance
Jurisdiction.
Ettel
will not confer jurisdiction:
sohn v. Insurance Co., 64 Mich., 334:
31 N. W., 201.
As to amendment
of
the aﬂidavit. see, Wattles v. Judge of
Wayne Circuit, 117 Mich., 662: 76 N.
W.. 115: Union Nat‘l Bank v. Judge
of Muskegon Circuit, 117 Mich., 678:
76 N. W., 116: Millard v. Judge of
Lenawee Circuit. 107 Mich., 134: 64
N. W., 1046.
An action on a foreign
judgment
is an
action on contract

within the meaning of the garnish
ment statute and an aﬂidnvit alleging
that it so arises is suﬂicicnt:
Wattles
v. Judge oi.’ Wayne Circuit, and Union
Nat‘i Bank v. Judge oi Muskegon Cir
cuit, supra.
The statute authorize
the issuing
oi! the writ upon two grounds:
1. The
possession
ot property. money, goods,
chattels, credits and eitects belonging
to the principal defendant. 2. An in
debtedness
to the principal defendant.
These grounds are distinct, and the
garnishee cannot be held on one when
the aiﬂdavlt and process is confined to
the other, so held under C. I.., 510600,
which is similar in terms, in this re
spect, to § 990, as amended
by Pub.
Acts, 1901, p. 253: Botsiord v. Sim
mons, 32 liiich., 352.
Paine, 2 Mich.,
6—Wetherwax
v.
555.

'

7—C. L., Q 1015.
The "section 1,
or this. act,"
referred to, is C. L.,
§ 990, as amended by Pub. Acts, 1901,
p. 253.
A mere clerical error as to the month
in the return day of the summons, is
waived by an appearance and answer
on the
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Service and return.—-The summons is to be made re
in
not less than six nor more than twelve days from
turnable
the date thereof; and shall be served and returned in the same
manner as a summons issued against a defendant in other
§

112.

cases.“

“The personal service of

a summons upon such garnishee
of a suit in the name of
the
cominenceinent
shakli
the plaintiff against such garnishee, which summons may be
served in the same or adjoining county of this state, and re
quire the appearance of such garnishee before such justice at
his oﬁice in the same or any adjoining counties of this state, and
be deemed

constable or sheriff of either county may serve the same:
Provided, The lawful fees for travel and attendance shall be
a.

paid or tendered to such garnishee at the time of such service,
and such suit may be entered on the docket as suits in other
cases.

’ ’°

might be amended after answer, or the
mistake be disregarded:
Weliover v.
Souie, 30 Mich., 481.
8-—C. L., Q 960, as amended by Pub.
Acts, 1901, p. 253.
As to the manner
of serving and returning a summons,
see. ante, 55 39-47.
9—C. L., Q 994.
For fees to be paid
or tendered, see, post, Q 493, and notes.

Amazon Ins. Co., 38 Mich., 400,
is not applicable to suits against for
eig corporations, but that service in
such
cases is controlled
by (‘. L., 5
1014, in which there is no provision
for service beyond the county in which
v.

process

Docket Entrj/.—The following form
of entitling ii garnishee suit upon the
Justice's docket has been held suﬁiclent.

viz.:
STATE OF MICHIGAN.
. . . . . .COLm'rr.

M.

. . .8.

W. . . QB. M. . . .,
D. . . .J'. K. . . ;,
P. . . .F‘. D. . . .,
Proceedings in
H. . . . ii. G. . . .,
B.

. . .8:

u‘

G. . . ., Plaintiff,

L.

v.

Defendant.
Gamishee Defendant.
Piaintiii"s Attorney.
Garnishmcnt.
Principal Defendant's
Attorney.
. ., Attorneys for Garnishee.

language of the statute that
suits may be entered
in the
docket as suits in other cases." is not
mandatory, but permissive:
i-‘asquelle
v. Kennedy, 55 Mich., 305; 21 N. W.,
The
"such

347.

It

that this section providing
the same or adjoining
counties," upon the authority of Hebe!
seems

for service “in

issues.

There must be jurisdiction over the
principal defendant through service or
appearance or the garnishment pro
ceedings
will avail nothing:
Kraft v.
Raths, -15 Mich., 20: 7 N. W., 232.
Service of the summons should be
made by an oﬂicer authorized to serve
process:
35
Johnson v. Delbridge.
Mich., 436.
And for service upon a
corporation, see C. L., 1 1016.
In
order to reach a joint debt owing by
two or more, in garnishment, all of
the debtors must be served:
Wether
wax v. Paine, 2 Mich., 555: Hirth
v. Pfeife, 42 Mich., 31: 3 N. W.. 239.
Process, although duly served upon
the garnishee. will be of no avail, un
less by due service upon, or appear
ance by, the principal
defendant. the
of him in
court obtains jurisdiction
the principal suit:
Kraft v. Raths. 45
And so the
Mich.. 20; 7 N. W., 232.
gnrnishee proceedings will be nugntory
it the garnlshee summons is taken out
and delivered for service before the
garnishee has become
liable to the
v.
principal
defendant:
Hitchcock
Miller, 48 Mich., 603; 12 N. W., 871;
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Liability of garnishee.——“The person summoned as
§113.
garnishee, from the time of the service of such summons, shall
be deemed liable to the plaintiff in such suit, to the amount
of the property, money and effects in his hands or possession,
or under his control, or due from him, to the defendant in such
suit: Provided, That when the defendant is a householder
having a family, nothing herein contained shall be applicable
of such garnishee to the defendant for the
personal labor of such defendant, or his family, to the amount
of eighty per-centum of such indebtedness, but in no case shall
more than thirty dollars of such indebtedness be exempt from
the operation of this act, and in all cases at least eight dollars
shall be so exempt:
Provided, further, That in case the de
fendant is not a householder, having a family, nothing here
inbefore contained shall be applicable to any indebtedness of
such garnishee to the defendant for the personal labor of
such defendant to the amount of forty per-centum of such in
debtedness, but in no case where the principal defendant is
not a householder shall more than ﬁfteen dollars of such in
debtedness be exempt from the operation of this act, although
in all cases of the description mentioned in this proviso, at least
four dollars shall be so exempt/’"
to any indebtedness

Hopson v. Dinan, 48 Mich., 612; 12
W., 875.
The garnishee cannot waive process
and due service upon himself. and vol
untarily submit himself to the court
in such a way as to bind the prin
cipal defendant, and thereby
protect
himself by such judgment as may he
rendered against him in the garnishee
proceedings:
llebei v. Amazon ins.
Co., 33 Mlch., 400.
Fasquclie v. Ken
10—C. L., 994.
nedy. 55 Mich., 305-7.
1l—C. L., i991. as amended by Pub.
Acts, 1901, p. 235. The garnishee is lia
ble, as such, from the time of the serv
ice of the writ: Maynards v. Cornweli,
3 .\ilch., 811. And his liability depends
upon the state of the claim, as one
gnrnishable or not, at the time of serv
ice:
.\iartz v. Detroit Fire 6: Marine
Ins. Co., 28 Mich., 204; Bethe] v.
Judge. etc., 57 .\iich., 359; 24 N. W.,
11".’.
It is the duty of the garnishee
to regard the exemptions of the prin
N.

s

cipal debtor and he pays the amount
he may owe into court, without dis
closing as to whether the debtor is a.
householder, at his peril:
Crisp v.
Ft. Wayne & Elmwood Ry. Co., 98
l\iich., 6-18; 57 N. W., 1050. The prin
cipal defendant may intervene on his
own motion, in the garnishment pro
ceedings and urge his exemptions: Mc
Dougaii v, Lamb, 113 Mich., 69; 71
N. W., 458.
A garnishee is not liable where the
garnishee process was delivered to the
the
debt
oﬁicer for service before
sought to be reached had accrued to
Hitchcock v.
the principal defendant:
Miller, -18 Mlch.. 603; 12 N. W., 871.
lie cannot be held if he was not in
debted to the principal dcfendant when
the garnishee proceedings were com
menced.
The fact of his becoming in
debted afterwards is of no avail: llop
son v. Dinan, 48 Mich., 612; 12 N,
W., 875; Bethei v. Judge, 57 Mich.,
381; 24 N. W., 112.
As to wages to
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I‘
Garnishee neglecting to a.ppear.- If such garnishee
neglect or refuse to appear at the time and place mentioned
in such summons, and answer as aforesaid, the justice shall
§ 114.

continue the cause to some other day; and without further
showing than the oi’ﬁcer’s return, that the summons had been
personally served upon the garnishee and his fees paid or
tendered, issue a warrant to bring such garnishee before
him.”12
‘5Such warrant shall command the officer forthwith to take
the body of such garnishee, and bring him before such justice,
and shall contain a further command that such officer, after he
shall have arrested the garnishee, notify the plaintiff of such
arrest; and such warrant shall be served and returned in the
same

manner as warrants issued in other cases.”13

§115. Examination of the ga.rnishee.—“On the appearance
of such garnishee before such justice, or on some other day
to which the same may be adjourned, the plaintiff may proceed
to examine the garnishee on oath or otherwise, as the plaintiﬁ
may elect, touching the matters alleged in the affidavit, and the
justice shall take minutes of such examination, and ﬁle the
Upon such examina
same with the other papers in the cause.
tion the garnishee shall not be deemed a witness for the plain

tiff, and his answers or disclosures

upon such examination
may be contradicted and controverted by the plaintiff upon
the trial of the issue hereinafter provided for in section ten.”"
earned.
see. Kane v. Clough. 36
Mlch., 436.
Money earned on labor
contract providing payment in gross
sum
is exempt
under this
statute:
Rikerd v. Lumber Co., -— Mich., —;
98 N. W., 739 (March. 1904).
12—C. L.. 5 992.

he

13—C. L., | 998.
For service and
return of warrant, see, ante, §§ 56-68.
by
14-—C.
L.. 5 995, as amended
Pub. Acts, 1901. p. 235. Section “ten"
referred to in this paragraph is C. L.,
§ 999.

Minutes
of the emamination.—'l‘he
law makes it the duty of the justice
“to take minutes of such examination,
and ﬁle the same with the other papers
in the cause ;” and, while it does not
say that he shall reduce the examina

tion to writing, yet'such is its fair
import. when it is considered that the
disclosure is the evidence, and all the
evidence
that can be produced against
him.
If the justice omits to reduce
material statements or admissions of
the garnishee to writing,
such state
ments or admissions cannot be proved
upon the trial by the justice, or any
other witness, for the purpose of cre
ating a liability not admitted by the
The law docs not
written disclosure.
permit a justice to neglect his duty
to take minutes of the disclosure, and
then to testify to the disclosure made
from his memory; nor does it permit
him to supply any part of the disclos
ure from his recollection:
Isabelle v.
Iron Cllil.'s Co., 57 Mich., 123; 23 N.
W., 613.
As to the suﬂiciency of the
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1901,

it was held

that the garnisliee was to be regarded as a witness for the
plaintiﬁ', and that his disclosure was to be taken as true and
The object of this amendment and
could not be in1peachcd.“"

of

a

the overturning of
of the trial under § 999 to proceed
to the general course of trials of issues between

similar

one

to § 999, was evidently

this rule and the making

according
parties, and permit a judgment even against the disclosure of
the garnishee.
“He is required to disclose, in response to the aﬂidavit upon
which the writ issued, whether he has property of the de
fendant in his possession or under his control, or is indebted
to him.”1°
entry of the disclosure in the Justice's
docket instead oi’ upon a separate paper
and ﬁled with the other papers. etc.,
see. \\'atson v. Kane, 31 Mlch., 61.
15-Maynards v. Cornwell, 3 Mlch.,
312; Isabelle v. iron Clills Co., 57
Mlch., 120; 23 N. W., 613, and caes
cited in the opinion.
16—As to the suﬂiciency of the dis
closure and the garnishee's liability
thereunder. see. Drake v. Lake Shore
8: Michigan Southern Ry. Co., 69 Mlch.,
168; 37 N. W., 70; Hosiey v. Scott,
59 Mlch., 420, 423; 26 N. W., 659;
Kimball v. Macomber, 50 Mlch., 362:
Bali v. Young, 52
15 N. W., 511;
Mlch., 476: 18 N. W., 225: Lyon v.
Kneeland, 58 Mlch., 570: 25 N. W.,
518; Custer v. White, 49 Mlch., 462:
13 N. W., 583; Maynards v. Cornweil,
The statements of the
3 Mlch., 309.
garnishee cannot be controverted; he
Nowell
v.
cannot be contradicted:
Blair, 7 Mlch., 103. The garnlshee's
answers are to be regarded as true,
and this principle extends to assertions
made upon his belief as well as those
upon his own personal knowledge: Sex
Nor can
ton v. Amos. 39 Mlch., 698.
his statements be contradicted, or any
recovery be had against him beyond
Sexton
v.
his admitted liability:
Amos. 39 Mi:-h.. 699. The garaishee is
Whitﬁeld v.
the plaintiffs witness:
Stiles, 57 Mlch., 410; 24 N. W.. 119.
And cannot be contradicted by the
plaintiff:
Isabelle v. Iron Cliifs Co.,
57 Mlch., 123: 23 N. W., 613.
But
a disclosure made by the garnishee be

fore the justice has obtained juris
diction in the principal case, is of no
elect.
And such jurisdiction
subse
quently obtained. will not make the
disclosure of any avail:
iron Clitfs
Co. v. Lahais, 52 Mlch., 394; 1S N.
W., 121; Kraft v. Raths, 45 Mlch.,
20: 7 N. W., 232. The doctrine of the
foregoing cases in this note upon the
conclusive character of the disclosure
would seem to be overturned by the
amendments in 1901 to ii 995 and
999, giving the right to contradict the
disclosure.
1901,
See Pub. Acts,
p.
235.

in garnishee proceedings commenced
in the Circuit Court, where the am
davit only alleged that the garnishee
had pr0p¢r1‘|/, money and effects in his
hands, etc., it was held that the ex
amination of the garnlsiiee could ex~
only to his liability
tend
for such
prop!’-rt)/, money and cﬂcr-ta, and that
be could not be examined as to his
indebtdeness to the principal debtor.
And it is presumed that the same rule
See, Mack
applies in Justice's courts:
v. Brown, 20 Mlch., 335; Botsford v.
Simmpns, 32 Mlch., 352. It is the duty
of the garnishee to state, with entire
accuracy and distinctness, all facts
that may be necessary to enable the
court to decide intelligently the ques
tion of his liability:
Drake on Attach
ment, § 629.
He may correct or ex
plain his disclosure on issue joined:
Barber v. Iiowd. 85 Mlch., 221: 48
N. W., 539.
Defendant in garnishment
may on appeal be permitted to ﬂle a
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Proceedings
following the exa.mina.tion.—“Upon
closing the examination, if the plaintiff shall have recovered
a judgment against the defendant, the garnishee may, after
the expiration of the time limited by law for an appeal, or stay
§ 116.

of execution on said judgment, if no appeal has been made, or
stay of proceedings put in, pay to the justice before whom the
examination was had, all moneys then due and owing by him
to the defendant, or suﬂicient to satisfy said judgment (except
such as is exempt, as provided by section two of this act),
and thereupon such justice shall execute and deliver to the
garnishee a release and discharge for the amount paid, and
enter such discharge upon his docket, or the plaintiff may im
mediately declare against the garnishee, in the manner pro
vided by section ten of this act, and the like proceedings shall
be had as upon a suit brought against the debtor; but if a suit
be pending and undetermined between the plaintiff and the
plea and show his disclosures before
the justice to have been mistaken and
that his indebtedness was to another
Gerow
than the principal defendant:
v. Hyde, 131 Mich., 442; 91 N. W.,
Garnishee defendant may waive
615.
further examination by acknowledging
indebtedness to amount of the judg
Barber
suit:
ment in the principal
it is the duty of the
v. liowd. supra.
garnishee to set forth in his disclosure
ills
the true condition of the liability.
admission of a liability different from
the true one, or one that does not ex
ist, may authorize a judgmentagainst
him, but binds no one else:
ilirth v.
Pfeiife. 42 Mich., 31; 3 N. W., 239.
He should answer every pertinent in
terrogatory so far as he is able, if not
Drake on
in his power to do so fully:
Attachment, 5 630; Shaw v. Bunker,
If he be in doubt wheth
2 Metc., 376.
er under an existing state of facts he
is chargeable, he should state all the
esentlal facts with minuteness and
precision, and leave it for the court
to decide the question of his liability.
And for his own protection, he should
state in his disclosure every fact with
in his knowledge which has destroyed
the relation of debtor and creditor, pre
viously existing between him and the
Drake
on Attachment.
defendant:
But he cannot in his
I5 630, 632.
'

answer be allowed to make allegations
which have the effect of changing the
the terms oi‘ a written contract under
which he appears to be a debtor to the
Ibid., 5 631, citing Field
defendant:
v. Watkins, 5 Ark., 672.
To ascertain
the liability of the garnishee, almost
every variety of question bearing upon
this point may be propounded. and an
answer required; the limit to such ex
amination seems to rest in the discre
tion of the court:
Drake, § 641:
Worthington
Vermont,
v. Jones,
23
546; Knapp v. Levanway, 27 Iiu'd..
298.
But the interrogatories must be
confined tb such matters as the law
contemplates as the ground of the gar
nishee's liability: Lyman v. Parker, 33
Maine, 31: Mack v. Brown, 20 Mich.,
335.
Nor can any attorney, as gar
nishee of his client, protect himself,
on'the ground of privileged communi
cations, from disclosing the eﬂects of
his client in his hands:
Drake, § 648,
citing Comstock v. Pale, 18 La., 479.
it is not permissible to receive and re
tain such parts of a garnish:-e's dis
closure as tend to charge him. and to
exclude and deny such parts oi’ it as
tend in the other direction.
The whole
disclosure must be taken and construed
to!-tether, and the proper result be de
duced therefrom:
Sexton v. Amos. 39
Mich., 699.
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defendant, the cause shall be continued, but it shall not be
necessary to adjourn the same to any day certain; and noth
ing in this amendment shall be construed as to in anywise
interfere with the provisions of section fourteen, of the act
of February twenty-eight, eighteen hundred and forty-nine,
relative to costs in proceedings against garnishees.”1

What

a discontinuance

against garnishee.
the defendant
in the cases
act, or if the
defendant pay the judgment rendered in such case, or stay
the execution thereon within the time, and in the manner pre
scribed by law, it shall in either case be deemed a discon
tinuance of all proceedings against the garnishee.”2
§117.

“If the plaintiff

deemed

fail to recover judgment against
mentioned in section seven of this

The section 2 rc
1—C. I... I 996.
ferred to, is C. L., Q 991: amended,
Pub. Acts. 1901, p. 235: the section
is C. L., § 999; and the
10 named,
section 14, of the Act of February 28,
1849, is C. L., § 1003.
When the gurnlshee proceedings are
dropped after disclosure, and never car
ried to judgment. any payments made
are
by the garnishee to the plaintiff
Hitchcock v. Miller, -18
at his peril:
And pay
Mich.. 608; 12 N. W.. 871.
ment by the garnishce to the justice
of the amount of the judgment ren
dered against him, when the judgment
against the principal
defendant was
void for want of jurisdiction,
cannot
be protected or bar a suit against the
gsrnishee for the money
so paid:
547;
Laidluw
v. Morrow,
44 Mlch.,
7 N. W., 191.
But when a promissory
past due. and
note or other demand
held by or owing to the principal dc
fendant, has been garnisheed,
then
after disclosure made and a valid judg
defendant,
ment aguinst the principal
the garnishee will be protected in pay
ing it to the justice without waiting
for a judgment against himself:
Som
ers v. Losey. 48 .\iich., 294; 12 N.
W., 188.
Money paid by the garnishce to a
justice to be applied on a judgment
against the principal defendant. cannot
of
be applied by him to the payment
any other judgment against the same
party: .\icDonald v. Lewis. 42 i\iich..
135: 3 .\‘. W., 300: Dane v. ilolmes,
41 Mlch., 061; 3 N. W., 169.

See, Barber v. Howd, 85 Mlch., 223;
48 N. W., 539.
2-(‘. L., Q 1000. The section 7 here
referred to is C. L., 5 996: see. Iss
belie v. Iron Ciiils Co., 57 l\ilch., 123;
23 N. W, 613.
The failure of the garnlshee plaintiff
to appear on the return day of the
summons to show cause. will also op
crate as a discontinuance of the pro
cecdings:
See C. L.. § 836.
And no
subsequent
appearance oi’ the plain
titi' and garnishee, either voluntarily or
in obedience to _a second summons.
to

show

cause.
cause
so

will re-instate

or

revive

any prior
as to affect
rights acquired by third persons: John
son v. Dexter, 38 Mlch., 695.
But s.
the

voluntary appearance of both the par
ties after such a discontinuance would.
probably, as between themselves,
be a
waiver of the statutory nonsuit:
Ibm.
And if the garnishee's disclosure shows
that he has no effects of the principal
defendant. and is not indebted to him,
May
thc proceedings are at an end:
nurds v. Cornwell, 3 Mlch., 312: Lor
man v. Phoenix
ins. Co.. 33 Mlch., 65.
iiaekley
Kanitz,
Mlch., 398:
v.
30
Spears v. Chapman, 43 Mlch., 541;
5 N. W., 1038: Weirich v. Scribner.
44 Mlch., 73; 6 N. W., 91.
A
judgment
failure
to
recover
against the principal defendant oper
ates as a discontinuance of the gar
nishec proceedings:
Bethel v. Judge,
etc.. 57 .\iich., 379; 24 N. W.,'112.
The garnishce defendant is not re
leased, however,
where the plsintitl sp
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Second summons against garnishee.—“After the ﬁnal
determination of the suit against the defendant, in the case
mentioned in the preceding section, and at any time within
thirty days after such ﬁnal determination of the suit, and in
§ 118.

of garnishee proceedings commenced after the rendition
judgment against the defendant therein, within thirty
days after the closing of the examination in such garnishee
proceedings, the justice shall, at the request of the plaintiff,
his agent or attorney, issue a summons against the garnishee,
commanding him to appear before the justice to show cause
why a judgment should not be rendered against him.”*"
cases

of

a

penis from the judgment in the prin
cipal suit until the appeal is ﬁnally
determined in favor of the appeilee:
Erickson v. Duluth S. S. dz A. Ry. Co.,
105 Mlch., 415; 63 N. \\’., 420.
N0
judgment can be taken against the gar
nishee until judgment has been taken
against the principal defendant:
Iron
Cliifs C0. v. Lahais, 52 Mich., 896;
18 N. W., 121: Laidlaw v. Morrow,
44 Mich., 547: 7 N. W., 191.
Pay
ment into court by the garnishee, with
out regarding the exemptions of the
defendant, is at the gar
principal
Crisp v. Fort Wayne
nishee’s peril:
6; E. Ry. Co., 98 Mich., 651; 57 N. W.,
1050.

3—C. L., Q 997.
The preceding sec
tion in this section referred to, is C. L.,
5 996.

A valid judgment against the prin
cipal defendant is necessary in order to
pro
authorize and upport subsequent
ceedings under this 5 997, or any judg
ment against the garnishee:
McCios
key v. Judge
of Wayne Circuit, 26
Mlch., 100; Laldiaw v. Morrow, 44
Mich., 547; 7 N.- W., 191: Arno v.
Wayne Circuit Judge, 42 Mich., 375;
4 N. W., 147.
No judgment can be rendered against
the garnishee until after judgment in
the principal cause; and not then until
to show
after he has been summoned
cause why judgment should not be ren
against him, unless he volun
dered
tarily appears and consents that such
judgment may be taken:
Iron Cliffs
Co. v. Lahals. 52 Mich.. 394: 18 N.
W., 121.
But the garnishee, after his
disclosure, may waive second process
and declaration against himself,
and

also proof of indebtedness of the prin
cipal defendant to the piaintiﬂ‘ in gar
Thus, where about a year
nishment.
after judgment against the principal
defendant, a garnishee process
was
taken out and served upon B. as a
debtor of the principal judgment debt
or, whereupon, on the return day of
the gnrnishee summons.
B., the gar
went with the plaintiff in the
nishee.
garnlshce suit before the justice. and
B. then subscribed before the justice
on the docket, that he (B.), as gar
nishee of the principal defendant, was
indebted to the garnlshee plaintlif, and
authorized the justice to enter judg
ment against himself (B.) as garnishee,
and in favor of the garnishee plain
til‘i', and the justice
Held,
did so:
that B. thus waived second process.
declaration and proof that the prin
cipai defendant owed the plnintitf in
garnishment, and that the judgment
against B. was authorized and valid:
Bigalow v. Barre, 30 Mich., 1.
De
fendant in garnishment is not entitled
to the second summons to show cause
where the judgment in the principal
case has been rendered,
and the time
for staying execution and for appeal
has passed, but the piaintiﬂ may de
clare against him at once:
Eiser v.
Rommel. 98 Mlch.. 77: 56 N. W.,
1107.
A summons to show cause issu
ing seventy-four days after the rendi
tion of judgment in the principal suit.
having been no continuance of
there
will not sustain s. judg
the cause,
ment agninst the gnrnishec though he
and pleaded
appeared
to the merits:
Iierltage v. Armstrong, 101 Mich., 86;
59 N. W., 439.
The period of 30 days
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not less than three
nor more than ten days from the date thereof, and shall be
served at least two days before the time of appearance men
tioned therein.”4

“Such summons shall

be made returnable

§119. Pleadings, trial, appeal, etc.—“In all cases where a
judgment has been rendered against the defendant, and also
after a ﬁnal determination of the suit pending against the
defendant, as mentioned jn section seven of this act, and the
garnishee has been duly summoned to appear and show cause,
the plaintiff may declare against the garnishee for the prop
erty, moneys and effects above mentioned, in trover; or if the
garnishee be indebted to the defendant, for" moneys had and re
ceived, or if the garnishee shall have property, moneys and ef
fects of the defendant in his possession, and shall also be indebt
ed to the defendant, the plaintiff may declare in trover, and add
thereto a count for moneys had and received, and may give
the special matter in evidence; and the garnishee may plead
thereto, and issue may be formed and tried as if the defendant
had brought such suit against the garnishee for the matters set
forth in such declaration, and either party shall be entitled to
an appeal or other process, as in other cases. The answers or
disclosure of the garnishee made as in this act provided shall
not be conclusive of the truth of the matters therein.set forth,
but upon the trial of any issue between the plaintiff and the gar
nishee, the plaintiff may introduce evidence to contradict, or
otherwise controvert, the truth of the said answers or dis
closure.”5
referred to in this statute is to be
reckoned from the entry of judgment
and not from the expiration of the
Kayser v. Farmer's
time for appeal:
& M. Bank. 115 Mich., 688: 74 N.
W., 181.
It is the duty of the justice
to
issue this summons against the
garnlshee upon request of the plain
thirty
days.
tiff made within the
though the plalntitl may not have ap
penred at the time of the disclosure:
Hyde v. Chadwick, 132 Mich., 270;
93 N. W., 616.
4—C. L., Q 998. For service and re
see, ante‘, [5 39-47.
turn nt summons.
5-—C. L.. Q 999. as amended by Pub.
The section 7 re
Acts. 1901, p. 236.

It

ferred to, is C. L., 5 998.
is not
necessary
that plaintiff
should elect
to declare in either trover or assump
slt. lie may do both at the same time:

Peninsular
Judge
Stove Co. v.
oi‘
Wayne Circuit, 85 Mieh.. 400; 48 N.
W., 549.
The principal defendant has
the right. at least in the absence
of
objection by the garnlshee, to inter
vene and urge the exemption of the
property in the hands of the gar
nishee:
Lamb,
v.
113
Mcﬂrougall
Mich., 69: 71 N. W., 458.
The lan
guage of this statute enables
the gar
nishee
to make any defence which he
might make if the action were one
against him by the principal defend
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The declaration against the garnishee, whether for property
in his hands, or upon his indebtedness to the defendant, must
upon his disclosure.“
There may be such a disclosure by the garnishee as will ren
der a. further inquiry necessary, and an adjudication to de
termine his liability, or its extent, as well as to protect him
against subsequent litigation.’ And where the garnishee has
property in his hands, it may sometimes be desirable to prove
its value.
And it seems that upon the trial the garnishee may make
other and further statements for the purpose of" showing that
he is not liable, and may correct any statement made by him in
his disclosure, by mistake or inadvertence, as, that by mis
be predicated

ant—the defenses of recoupment and
See, past, § 131.
set-off are available.
After service of the summons to
show cause and before pleading, the
garnlshee has the right to make a
further and supplemental
disclosure:
Michigan
Drake v. Lake Shore
&
Southern Ry. Co., 69 Mich., 168; 37
N. W., 70.
And before judgment can
him, judgment
against
be rendered
against the
must have been rendered
principal defendant:
Iron Cliffs Co.
v. Lahais, 52 Mlch., 396; 18 N. W.,
121.
And no judgment can be ren
dered against him except upon the lia
bility admitted in his disclosure: Isa
belle v. Iron Cliﬂs Co., 57 .\iich., 123;
Contra,
23 N. W., 613.
ince amend
ment of 1901: Pub. Acts, p. 235. Nor
can judgment be rendered against him
unless it will discharge him to the
extent of such judgment from liability
Hamilton
to the principal defendant:
v. Rogers, 67 Mich., 135; 34 N. W.,
278.

6—Maynards
v. Cornwall, 3 Mich.,
Upon the trial of the issue on
the hearing of cause the burden of
proof is upon the plaintiff to make out
Spears v. Chap
a prima facie case:
man, 43 Mi-:h., 541; 5 N. W., 1038.
If the disclosure is ambiguous, leav
ing it uncertain whether any indebt
edness exists or if so, to whom, and
the case rests substantially upon that,
the plaintiff must fall: Spears v. Chap
man, 43 Mich., 541; 5 N. W., 1038;
Walker v. Detroit, Grand Haven 8:
Milwaukee Ry. Co., 49 Mich., 448;
Therefore the gar
13 N. W., 812.
813.

disclosure admitting possession
of property which he had received from
the principal defendant, but which he
had since been told had been sold to
another, does not show him Jiable:
Sexton v. Amos, 39 Mich., 695: see,
Lyon v. Kneeland, 58 Mich., 570; 25
N. W., 518.
But the liability of a
garnishee who admits an indebtedness
to the principal defendant, is ﬁxed by
his disclosure:
Somers v. Losey, 48
liich., 294; 12 N. W., 188. And what
the disclosure admits, may be
ever
taken by the plaintiff as established:
Allen v. Hazen, 28 Mlch., 142; Sexton
v. Amos, 39 Mich., 697-8.
plaintiff,
Appeal—0crtiorari.——The
as well as the garnishee, may appeal:
The
Newell v. Blair, 7 Mich., 106.
appeal or certtorarl of the garnishee
suit must be separate from an appeal
the
or certiorart in the suit against
principal defendant; an appeal or cer
tiorarl in the latter will not carry up
the garnishee proceedings for review:
Wlthington
28 Mich.,
v. Southworth,
The disclosure taken before the
381.
justice, and reduced to writing, is com
Further
petent evidence on the appeal.
may be taken in the Circuit
evidence
court in corroboration
of the gar
nishee‘s statement before the justice.
The garnlshee may be examined on the
appeal for a fuller disclosure, and he
may there make corrections in his
statements made in the court below:
Newell v. Blair, 7 Mich., 106.
7—'Maynards v. Cornwell, 3 hiich.,

nlshee's

309,

120
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take he had overstated the amount of money in his hands; so,
if in his disclosure he should admit effects in his hands as
belonging to the defendant, yet it would be contrary to the
intent of the law to hold him responsible if he should after
wards ascertain and offer to prove on the trial that the owner
ship was not where he supposed it to be.”
On the trial before the justice, the garnishee may avail him
self of the statute of limitations, the same as he might do if
sued by the defendant for the debt.”
_

Judgment, execution, etc.—“Judgments rendered
§ 120.
against a garnishee under the provisions of this act, shall have
the same force and effect as they would have under existing
laws, if such defendant had been named as plaintiff therein.”1°
“If judgment be rendered against the garnishee, the justice
may issue execution thereon, as in other cases; such execution
may be directed to the sheriff, or any constable of the county
where such justice resides, or to the sheriff or any constable of
any colmty in this state, and may be fully executed in the
county to which it is directed; but if the body of such garnishee

in such execution, he shall be committed to the jail
of the county in which he resides.”11
“Judgments against garnishees may be stayed in the same
manner, and with like effect, as in other cases.”"
“If the garnishee shall, on demand, deliver to the oﬁiccr
having such execution all the property, money and effects in
his possession or under his control, belonging to the defendant,
and pay all moneys found to be due from him to the defendant

be taken

at the time the suit was commenced against him, or so much
of the money, property or effects as may be necessary to satisfy
such execution, then the costs which may have accrued against
such garnishee shall be paid out of the property, moneys and
effects so paid over or delivered to such ofﬁcer.”13
8—Newell v. Blair, 7 Mich., 106-107:
Gerow v. Hyde, 131 Mich., 442; 91 N.
Wlfneiﬁe case of Nowell v Blair it
was held, that on an appeal in the garnishee cause. the plulntllf, on the trial
m the ch-cmt court may examine the
garnishee fully as to his labillty: and
there would seem to be no good resson why such
further
examination
might not be had on the trial before

the

justice: Barber v. Howd.

221;

48

N.

9—Hazen

10_C'

VI

L"

85 Mich.,

W., 539.

Emerson‘ 9 Pick" 144'

5 1008'

11—c- L-- 5 1001see "P0"
ll"
service and return of executions, post,
§§ 52l‘552
12—('~ L-- 5 1002
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The officer having such execution shall endorse all moneys
received from such garnishee, and a description of all property
or effects delivered to him by the garnishee; and such delivery
or payments shall be deemed a delivery or payment to the de
fendant in such suit.”“
“Upon the return of such execution so endorsed, the same
shall be entered on the docket of the justice as fully as such
return appears upon such execution, and such entry or a
transcript thereof shall be prima facie evidence of the facts
therein stated.”1“
“Whenever the garnishee shall pay or deliver to the oﬁicer
having such execution any property which may be sold on an
execution by existing laws, the officer shall proceed to levy
upon and sell the same at public auction or vendue, as in other
cases, and if the garnishee shall deliver to such oﬁicer any
notes, bills, bonds, or other choses in action, the oﬁicer shall
return the same to the justice, to be retained in his hands for
the use of the plaintiff, and the plaintiff may sue and collect the
same, or so much thereof as may be necessary to pay the judg
ment against the defendant, and the costs.
The balance, if
All
any, shall be returned to the garnishee or the defendant.
bills, bonds, notes, accounts and other choses in action received
or delivered under the provisions of this section, shall be taken
subject to all liens, set-offs, rights, liabilities and equities exist
ing between the original parties thereto.”1°
“If the garnishee pay to the ofﬁcer having such execution
any bank note or bill, the same shall be paid over to the plain
tiﬁf at the par value thereof, if he will accept the same; if not,
it shall be sold in the same manner as other personal prop

erty.”"
Suit by defendant against garnishee.—“No suit shall
be maintained or recovery had by such defendant against the
garnishee for the amount of money sworn, proved or admitted
to be due from such garnishee to the defendant, or for the
property, or the value thereof, money or effects in the hands
§ 121.

14—C. L., Q 1004.
15___C ‘

L"

1c-c.

L., 5 1006.

ecutlon, ls also exempt from garnlshee
process
at the election of the debtor;
\Vllson v. Bartholomew, 45 mu-u., 41;

5 1005 '

A debtor's property exempt

7 N_ w__

from ex-

17-C.

22.,‘

L., Q 1007.
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of such garnishee

ing.”"

as aforesaid,

,

§122

while such proceedings is pend
~

“The preceding section shall not
vent
such
such
erty
such

be so construed as to pre
such defendant from prosecuting for and recovering of
garnishee any other or further sum of money due from
garnishee, or the possession, or value of any other prop
or effects in the hands of such garnishee, belonging to
defendant.”19

§122. Demands not due.—-“If it shall appear upon any ex
amination or trial had under the provisions of this act, that any
sum or sums of money is or are owing and payable from the
garnishee to the defendant at some future time or times, it
shall be the duty of such court, after such examination, or the
rendition of the verdict (if a trial by jury is had), and after
the trial (if the cause is tried by the court), to note the time
or times when the sum or sums of money mentioned in this sec
tion shall become due and payable, and shall thereupon con
tinue the cause tmtil after the time or times so noted.”2°
18—C. L.. I 1009. A landlord is not
entitled to suc to recover possession
of leased premises for non-payment of
of garnish
rent during the pendency
proceedlngs against the tenant
ment
O'Conner
by the landlord's creditor:
v. White, 12-t .\iich., 22; 82 N. W.,
The rule requiring the pendency
664.
of another suit to oe pleaded in abate
ment and not in bar, applies as well
where the prior suit is a garnishee
proceeding as in other cases; this §
1009 does not make garnishee proceed
ings an exception to the general rule:
Near v. Mitchell. 23 Mich., 382.
if the garnishee is sued by the prin
cipal defendant after the commence
ment of gnrnishee proceedings against
of
him. he may plead the pendency
such proceedings in abatement of the
suit: Grossiight v. Cresup, 58 Mich.,
531: 25 N. W.. 505.
If a garnishee having notice or
knowledge that the debt or demand
owing by him to the principal defend
ant has been assigned by such defend
ant to a third person before service
of the writ of garnishment. and con
eeais or fails to mention such assign
on his disclosure.
but admits
ment
that he still owes the debt to the prin

cipal defendant, and thereby allows
judgment to be rendered against him
in favor of the garnishec plnlntitf, snch
judgment, or any payment by him of
the debt to the justice, will be no
to an action by the assignee
defense
for the recovery of the assigned debt
or demand:
Tabor v. Van Vranken,
39 Mich., 793.
Nor can such former
recovery by the plaintiff in garnish
ment be shown under the general issue
in a suit by the assignee to recover
the demand:
lbtd.
_
10—C. L., § 1010.
20-C. L., 5 1012. The justice loses
jurisdiction to render judgment against
the garnlshee under this and the fol
lowing sections, being {I 1012 and
1013, if the adjournment provided for
in 1 1012 is not had: Heritage v. Arm
strong, 101 lilch.. 85: 50 N. W., 439.
It seems that in order to hold n
garnishee for a debt or obligation pay
able in the future, there must he a
present valid obligation to pay when
the time arrives. without any contin
gency; for if his obligation to pay
depends only upon a contingency which
may or may not happen. he is ‘not lia
Thus, shippers of ti canto under
ble.
contract with the owner of the ship
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“After the said sum or sums of money
able as mentioned

in the preceding

become
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due and pay
the justice or

court shall, at the request of the plaintiff, issue a summons
against the garnishee as mentioned_ in section eight of this act,
returnable in the same time, and the same proceedings shall be
had thereon, and with the like effect, as if the said "sum or
sums of money had been due and payable at the time of the
service of the summons”.21

When eﬁ'ects or demands garnisheed, are claimed by
§ 123.
a third person.—“When the examination or disclosure of the
garnishee shall disclose that any other person or corporation
than the defendant claims in whole or in part the money, prop
erty, or indebtedness due by him, or in his
name and residence of such claimant, the
liver such money, property or indebtedness
shall cause to be served on such claimant

possession, and the
garnishee may de
to the justice, who

a written notice to
appear in said court and maintain his said claim; such notice
shall contain the name of the parties to the principal and gar
nishee suits, the name and place of residence of the justice, the

return day or adjourned day of the garnishee suit, and the
substance or a copy of the disclosure, and shall be served at
least ten days before the return or adjourned day‘ of the gar
nishment suit; the notice may be served in the same or any ad
joining county; in other respects it shall be served in the
same manner as summonses from justices’ courts; for the pur
pose of giving an opportunity of serving the notice above
provided, it shall be the duty of the justice, on the return day

of the garnishment suit, if requested by the garnishee, to ad
journ such suit not less than ten or more than thirty days.
After the service of such notice, and'the payment or delivery
he should have a share of the
proﬁts arising on the cargo. were
held not liable as garnishees of the
owner until the termination
of the
as it was altogether contin
voyage,
gent whether anything would ever be
due to the owner:
Davis v. Ham, 3
Mass, 33; and see. Thorndike v. De
Wolt, 6 I‘ick.,
122.
123.
And so,
of goods to be sold
where consignees
for the owner received and sold them
for him on credit, and guaranteed the

that
net

payment thereof by the owner, were
held not liable as garnishees oi! the
owner before the credit expired. he
cause the purchasers were the debtors
to the'owner,
and the liability of the
consignee to the owner was contin
gent upon the non-payment by the pur
chasers:
Tucker v. Clisby. 12 Pick.,
25; as to wages
not yet‘ due, see,
Ib|‘d., 105; Kane v. Clough, 36 Mich.,
436.
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to the justice of the money, property, or indebtedness, as above
provided, the garnishee shall be discharged from all liability
to any person in respect to the money or property so paid or
delivered; and the proof of the service of such notice ﬁled in
the suit, and the certiﬁcate

or docket entry

made

by the jus

tice of such payment or delivery, shall be prima facie evidence
of the facts stated therein. The claimant shall appear in the
suit on the return or adjourned day named in the notice served
upon him as aforesaid, and in default thereof judgment shall
be rendered against him in respect to his claim.

The defendant
or defendants so notiﬁed shall be considered as defendants in
the place and stead of the garnishee, and an issue may be
formed between the plaintiff and such defendants in the same
manner as provided in section ten of act number one hundred
and thirty-seven of the session laws of eighteen hundred and

-/1:

forty-nine, being section eight thousand and forty of H0well’s
Annotated Statutes of eighteen hundred and eighty-two; the
issue may be tried by the justice or by a jury, ‘as in other cases,
and such judgment shall be rendered between the parties as
shall be just, and such substituted defendant or claimant shall
have the same right to appeal as the original garnishee: Pro
vided, That this section shall not be operative when the answer
of the garnishee shall disclose that such claimant does not
reside in the county where such disclosure is made, or in any
adjoining county; nor in case such claimant is a corporation
and its principal place of business is not in the same or any
adjoining county.”*2
F-1

3 5"

as ga1'nishees.—“_-\il corporations
Corporations
tsoever nature, whether foreign, domestic, municipal

124.

5

Q

Mich., 346; 61 N .W., 891.
also, Stone v. Dowling,
119
Mich. 476; 78 N. W. 549.
Where a
gnrnishee discloses that another claims
money in his hands, and deposits the
money with the justice, the garnishee
is relieved from liability to such third
person, though the garnishee colluded
with the plalntli! to bring the suit.
and though the
person had
third
brought trover tor the money: Bryant
v. Wilcox, — Mich. —-; 100 N. W.
018 (0ct., 1904).

&

I

?.2—(‘. L.,
1017.
The section 8040
of lIo\\'ell's annotated statutes is C.
L.,
901). The purpose of this statute,
i017. is that the claimant shall be
brought before the court, so that in
whatever judgment may be rendered
against the principal defendant, or in
of the money which
the application
shall be paid into the hands of the
justice to the cxtlnguishment ot the
claim against the principal defendant.
the claimant of the fund thus cited in
Pecard v. Home
shall be concluded:

of
or

125

Co.,

See,
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otherwise, except counties, may be proceeded against as gar
nishees in the same manner and with like effect as individuals
under the provisions of this act, and the rules of law regulat
ing proceedings against corporations, and the summons against
the garnishee in such case may be served on the president,
cashier, secretary, treasurer, comptroller, or other principal
oiﬁcer of such corporation, and it shall be the duty of such
oﬁicer so served, or the proper oﬁicer of such corporation
having knowledge of the facts, to appear before the jus
tice at the return day of the summons and answer thereto,

or to answer at his option in writing, veriﬁed

by his oath,
to administer oaths, and trans
mit the same, by mail or otherwise, to the justice issuing said
summons, on or before.the return day thereof, which shall be
deemed a suﬁicient compliance with such summons; and unless
shall be
he shall so appear or so answer, such corporation
before some person authorized

held to be.indebted to the defendant in the original suit, to
the amount of any judgment that may be made against such
defendant in said original suit, unless within three days after
the return day of such summons such corporation shall, by
such officer, show a suﬁicient reason to the satisfaction of the
justice for non-appearing to answer such summons, and the
justice shall thereupon, on the third secular day, render judg
ment against such corporation, as against other garnishees for
the amount of such debt, and with like effect; but on such
cause shown, such oﬂicer may be examined as other garnishees,

and with like effect, as against the corporation he represents.
Such corporation or the plaintiff in such suit may appeal from
such judgment rendered under this section to the circuit court
of the proper county, in the same manner as appeals may be
taken from any other judgment of a justice of the peace,
where the liability of such corporation may be fully inquired
into: Provided, That when a municipal corporation is pro
ceeded

against,

as

provided for in this act, judgment shall

have been obtained in a court of competent jurisdiction by the

plaintiff against the defendant before garnishment proceed
ings shall be valid against such municipal corporation: Pro
vided, further, That it shall be necessary for the plaintiff in
the action to cause to be served a notice in writing upon the
126
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clerk, treasurer, or comptroller of such municipal corporation,
signed by the justice of the peace before whom an action of
garnishment has been commenced, stating that judgment has
been rendered and is on ﬁle in favor of the plaintiff and against
the defendant; that the plaintiﬁ‘ has ﬁled an aﬁidavit to that
effect, and that he believes or has good reason to believe that
such municipal corporation is indebted to the defendant, and
has money, property or effects in its hands belonging to such
shall hold
corporation
defendant, and that such municipal
such money, property or effects until the ﬁnal disposition of
the action or garnishment then pending before such justice,
Such corporation re
unless sooner released by the justice.
,ceiving the notice, herein provided, shall hold any money,
property or effects in its hands belonging to ‘the defendant
named in such notice until the ﬁnal disposition of the action
against said municipal corporation, unless sooner released by
order of thejustice.
Such money may be released by the
defendant giving a bond in double the amount claimed to be
due by the plaintiff in the action then pending, conditioned
that if the plaintiff recover, the bondsmen will pay into court
for the use of said plaintitf the amoimt of such judgment and
The plaintiff
costs, such bond to be approved by the justice.
in such original action against the defendant shall cause to
be ﬁled with the treasurer of such municipal corporation, at
the time of service of the notice aforesaid, a certiﬁed copy of
the judgment, whereupon such municipal corporation shall be
liable to the judgment creditor for the amount of such judg
ment. The ﬁling of such judgment shall constitute a lien upon
any money, property or effects that such municipal corpora
tion may have in its hands, belonging to the defendant in such
action, and such municipal corporation shall be required to
make disclosure,

the same as in garnishee proceedings,

and

such further action shall be had under the law now provided
for in garnishee proceedings, after the service of a summons,
and any reference hereafter

made relative

to garnishee shall

after
ﬁling of a certiﬁed copy of the judgment as hereinbefore pro
vided:
Provided, further, That when such corporation shall wish

include and be construed to mean municipal corporations,
a
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to appeal, in cases where they have not answered as garnishees,
they shall, in addition to the other requirements of law, ﬁle
with the justice a full and complete answer, in‘ writing, as
such garnishees, veriﬁed by the oath of one of‘the ofﬁcers hav
ing knowledge of the facts; which said oﬂicer shall also answer
under oath all questions put to him by such justice relating to
the matter of such suit, and whereupon the said justice shall,
within the time required for making such return of such ap
peal, at the option of the plaintiﬁ, either make such return or
set aside thegjudgment rendered against such corporation, by
entry thereon upon his docket, and across the face of such judg
ment, in which event said corporation, if they have not al
ready paid all costs in such suit, shall be liable for the same:

Provided, further, That in the Upper

Peninsula garnishee
process under this act may be served on the clerk of all com
panies organized under the general mining laws of the state of
Michigan, as well as on other oﬂicers thereof mentioned in this
section.’ ’23

Z$—C. L.. 5 1014.
As amended by
Public Acts, 1903, p. 97.
School district
are clearly muni
cipal corporations under the laws of
this state, and cannot waive objection
to a Justice's jurisdiction in garnish
School District v. Gage, 39
ment:
Mlch., 484; Seeley v. Board oi’ Educa
tion of Port Huron, 39 Mlch., 486.
The garnishee cannot, by submitting to
a jurisdiction not given by the statute,
waive or prejudice the rights oi.’ the
principal defendant:
Secley v. Board
of Education of Port Huron, 39 Mlch.,
484;
see, Johnson
and
v. Dexter,
It is to be noticed
38 Mlch., 695.
that this section as it now stands
garnishment
proceedings
authorizes
against municipal corporations (except
counties), as against others.
A suit
against an omcer of the municipal cor
poration, who is the proper custodian
of the money or property of the muni
cipality,
is a suit against the cor
Smith v. Woolsey. 22 Ill.
poration:
App., 185; Triebel v. Colburn, 64 Ill.,
making the
dis
The person
376.
therein as the
closure is described
garni
of
the
treasurer"
"assistant
defendant; held, to show
suf
sbce
it: Whit
ﬂcient authority to make

worth v. Detroit L. & N. Ry. Co., 81
Mlch., 98; 45 N. W. 500.
The pro
vision for transmission
of the dis
closure is upheld in Whitworth v. De
troit L. & N. Ry. Co., supra.
Costs
cannot be taxed against a successful
garnishee defendant on appeal: Winne
v. Judge of Wayne Circuit, 74 Mlch.,
329; 42 N. W. 279.
terms,
The
“general
special
or
agent," as used in this § 101-1, in
designating the persons or oﬂlcers upon
whom the garnishee summons may be
served.
are very indeﬁnite;
but em
ployed as they are here in associa
tion with terms designating the prin
cipal oﬁicers of the corporation, they
evidently
intend agents who either
generally or in respect to some par
ticular department of the corporate
business have a controlling authority,
either general or special.
Every serv
ant of the corpany is in a sense an
agent; but these terms do not mean
every man who is entrusted with a
commission or employment. Hence the
return of service of a summons upon
an agent must show that he is such
an agent as is contemplated by the
statute;
otherwise
the justice
will
acquire no jurisdiction over the com
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Service of process on corporations.—“Any process,
§125.
notice, or writing issued by a justice of the peace against any
corporation, may be served in the manner preticribed by law
for serving process on the corporation
against which the
process, notice or writing, is issued.”"‘
§125a.

When garnishee to

be released

from

liability.-“In

all

cases where the defendant takes an appeal from the judg
ment in the justice court, and in all cases where the judgment
in justice court becomes ﬁnal in favor of said defendant, the
justice shall make and deliver an order or orders releasing
the garnishee or garnishees from all liability,” etc.‘-'5

Proceedings
against garnishees in attachment.
“That any person or corporation indebted to the defendant in
any attachment suit, or who has any property or effects be
longing to said defendant, may be summoned as a garnishee of
§ 126.

such defendant in

"such

attachment proceedings.

Therefore a return of service
pany.
of a garnishee summons issued against
merely
company.
which
a
railroad
service upon “I. D., agent of
showed
the within named defendant," without
showing what l. D.'s agency was, was
held invalid:
Lake Shore and Michi
gan
Southern Ry. Co. v. llunt, 39
Mich., 469.
A foreign insurance com
pany may be garnished in Justice's
court: Grinneil v. Niagara Fire ins.
A
(‘o., 127 Mich. 19: 86 N. W. 435.
return of service on an “agent," with
out specifying whether general or spe
cial, gives jurisdiction:
Ibid.
24—C. L., 5 1016.
Service of garnishee process upon
corporations not found within the state
must he made precisely in the way
And where
provided by the statutes.
service purports to be made upon the
agent of a foreign corporation.
it
seems that in order to acquire juris
diction. the court must have competent
evidence
not only that the person
served
is an agent competent to rc
(eive service, but also that the service
is strictly according to law: nor is the
admission of service by one who claims
to be the agent of the company stifli
cient, without competent evidence that
he is such agent:
Iiebel v. Amazon
ins. Co., 33 Mich., 400; see, Hartford
9

The proceed

Fire Ins. Co. v. Owen, 30 Mich., 441.
But see \\'hitworth v. Detroit L. & N.
Ry. Co., 81 Mich., 98; 45 N. W. 500,
holding that a statement in the dis
closure that it is made hy the assist
ant treasurer of the corporation and
on its behalf is suiilcient showing of
authority.
The general agent in this
state of a foreign corporation doing
business here, and authorized to re
ceive
service on its behalf. has au
thority under the statute. when served
with gnrnishee process against the com
pany, to make answer on behalf of the
company; and a foreign corporation
after due service of garnishee process
upon its authorized agent. is not to be
considered in default for want of an
swer, after disclosure ﬁled by such
agent:
Lormnn v. Phoenix Ins. Co.,
33 Mich., 65.
25-0, i.., 5 1018. As amended by
Act 178, Pub. Acts, 1895, p. 547. The
with provisions re
statute proceeds
quiring
proceedings
all garnishment
auxiliary to the principal suit to he
returned with the main action. and for
further appropriate action in the gar
nishment suit in the appellate court.
For a construction of this statute prior
to the amendment of 1895 see: Erick
son v. Duluth S. 8. & A. Ry. Co., 105
Mich., 415; 63 N. W., 420.
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ings against the garnishee shall be conducted in the manner
prescribed in chapter two hundred and two of the Compiled
Laws of eighteen hundred and seventy-one, and the amend
ments thereto, now or hereafter passed. Such garnishee pro
ceedings may be commenced simultaneously with the issuing of
the writ of attachment, or while such attachment suit is pend
ing, and shall be deemed auxiliary to the proceedings in at
tachment, but shall be entered separately upon the justice’s
docket, the same as in other garnishee cases. If the disclosure
shows that the garnishee is indebted to the defendant in attach
ment, or that such garnishee has any money, property, credits,
or effects in his or its hands, or under his or its control, the
be entitled to judgment in such
attachment proceedings the same as in the case of property
attached, and shall also be entitled to judgment against the
garnishee as in other case"s.”2°

plaintiff in attachment shall

In attachment against foreign corporations.—“When
§ 127.
ever an action shall be commenced by attachment against a
foreign corporation, and proceedings by garnishment shall
also be commenced in the same action, if it shall appear on
the return of the writ of attachment that a copy thereof, and
also copies of all garnishee summons issued in said action, have
served on any ofﬁcer, member, clerk, or agent
within this state, the same pro
ceedings may be thereupon had in said action against said
corporation, and in the same manner, as upon the return of a
summons personally served in actions against natural persons;
been personally

of such foreign corporation

and in all cases of proceedings by garnishment against cor
porations, whether foreign or domestic, service of any process
in the manner above provided for in case of foreign corpora
tions shall have the like force and eifect as personal service
upon natural persons.

”'~"‘

Chapter 202, C.
26-—C. L., 5 7-i5.
For
L., '71, is chapter 35, C. L., '97.
a construction of this statute prior to
the amendment of 1895 see: Erickson
105
v. Duluth
S. S. & A. Ry. Co.,
Mlch., 415; 63 N. W.. 420.
As to the liability of corporations as
garnishees prior to the enactment of
this section (in 1883), in its present
Iorm, see, Hewitt v. Wager Lumber

Co., 38 Mlch., 701.
As to the showing
necessary to the liability or a corpora

tion:

Ibtd_
27——C. L.,

Prior to the
5 746.
amendment oi’ 1879 a Justice had no
jurisdiction
in attachment against tor
eign corporations:
Brigham v. Egiin
ton, 7 Mlch., 291; Hartford Fire Ins.
v. Owen, 30 Mlch.,
Co.
441.
This
statute is limited to suits in garnish

1 30
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The rights and liabilities of garnishees in such cases, and
the proceedings against them, shall be the same in all respects
as is provided by law in other cases of garnishment.”23

Public Omcers as garnishees.—No person claiming his
§ 128.
authority from the law, and obliged to execute it according to
the rules of law, can be holden by process of this kind?” A
public oﬂicer who has money in his hands to satisfy a demand,
which one has upon him merely as a public oﬂicer, cannot, for
that cause, be his trustee.“ Thus, a county treasurer is not
liable to be proceeded against as garnishee, for money in his
hands as treasurer, for the payment of a demand due from
the county to the defendant.“
Nor a sheriif or constable,
for money received by him on an execution in favor of the
defendant in the writ. The money, in such cases, is in the
custody of the law, and it is not liable to be arrested in the
hands of the ofﬁcer." It is not the money of the defendant
until paid over to him. But when an oﬁicer has seized, upon
an execution, a greater sum than the execution required, the
surplus is the money of the defendant, and may be levied upon
by the oﬁicer, and he is liable as garnishee for such surplus.“
tnent where the original suit was be
Kirby Carpenter
gun by attachment:
(‘o. v. Tromhiey. 101 Mich., -H7: 59
N. W., 809.

28—C. L., 5 7-i7.

Mass.

20—Brooks

v. Cook,

30-Sheaiy

v.

Brewer, 7 Muss., IO=1
P

v.

Brewer, 7 Mass., 259.

8

246.

261.

31—Sheaiy

32—Winder v. Bailey. 3 Mass., 289;
Dubois v. Dubois, 6 C0w., 494; Light
ner v. Steinagei. 33 1ii., 510; see
itobinson v. iloward,
7 Cush., 257;
and see Voorhees v. Sessions, 34 Mlch.,
iii).

Public oﬂicers are not liable as gar
nishees for money in their possession
in their oﬂiciai
and held by them
capacity as such oﬂicers, as, in ease ot
funds held by a register in chance-ry:
Vnorhees v. Sessions. 34 Mich., 09. Or,
by receivers appointed by order of the
court: Tremper v. Brooks. 40 Mich.,
Nor can school district oiiicers
333.
be garnisheed for money in their hands
School
or due from them oﬂieially:
Pre
District v. Gauze. 30 .\ilch._ 484.
vious to the amendment of this statute

in
1899,
and ﬂnaiiy
1903,
in
a
municipal
corporation
could not be
reached
with garnishment proceedings.
These amendments enable
parties to
against
proceed
municipal
corpora
tions,
counties,
except
as against
others.
It is essential. however, that
the principal suit shall have gone to
judgment before such proceedings shaii
be valid.
Nor will garnishment process
reach property
transferred
in good
faith by a public oilicer to a surety
on his oﬂlciai bond, to enable the latter
to secure his own and his principal‘!
liability:
Spear v. Rood, 51 Mich.,
140; 16 N. \\'., 312.
An osslgnee for the beneﬁt of credit
orn is not iisbie as garnishee of the
assignor.
Cook v. Rogers, 31 Mieh.,
391.
But where an assignment or eon
veyance
of personal property is frau
dulent as against creditors of the per
son assigning or conveying._ the gar
nishee process is the proper mode to
reach
it: Buriingame v. Beii., 16
17
Mass.. 320; Hastings v. Baldwin,

Ibid.,

658.

v.
11
Smith.
Barb..
345; Watson v. Todd, 5 Msss., 271-319.
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A justice of

the peace is not liable to be proceeded against
of money paid to him by an oﬁicer, on
an execution in favor of the defendant in the attachment suit.
It does not belong to the debtor in attachment until it is paid
,
over to him.“
as garnishee on account

etc.—Guard
Guardians, executors, administrators,
§129.
ians, executors and administrators, like officers whose duties
are prescribed and regulated by law, cannot be summoned
and charged as garnishees; certainly not until there had been
a settlement, a decree of the probate court, a demand of the
balance and a refusal of payment.“
An attorney at law having money in his hands collected by
him in the course of his profession, is liable as garnishee, when
the money was received for the defendant.“
Demands in suit.—A debt due from A. to B. for the
recovery of which an action has been commenced and referred
by a rule of court, in which rule it was agreed that judgment
§ 130.

should
hands
before
ing a

be entered up, etc.,

is not liable to attachment

in the

of A., at the suit of B.’s creditors."
“In this case,
the attachment, a writ to compel payment was pend
rule of reference had been entered into in which the
parties had agreed that judgment should be entered according
to the report, and the referees had agreed on their report.
In
this state of the action, no day for pleading remained for the
trustee, and the law furnished him_ with no legal defense
34—I'iooks v. York, 4 Porter, 1nd.,
A judgment rendered by one jus
by garnishee
tice cannot be reached
process from another justice: Sievers
at al. v. Woodburn & Sarven Wheel
But
Co., 43 Mich., 275; 5 N. W. 311.
a justice before whom a judgment has
been obtained, and to whom the same
has been paid pending garnishee pro
ceedings before him to reach the avails
of that judgment, may, upon judgment
being rendcrcd in the garnlshee pro
against the judgment debtor,
ceedings
and after the time for appealing from
the garnishee proceedings has expired,
apply the money so paid into court in
payment of the gsrnishee judgment:
Griﬂin v. Potter, 27 Mich.. 166.
v. Treat, 7 Mass, 271;
3§-—Wiider
636.

Brooks

v. Cook, 8 Mass., 2-16: Waite
v. Osborne,
11 Maine, 185: Gassett v.
Grout, 4 Metc., 486.
Executors and

administrators
are not liable to gar
nishment in justice's courts for moneys
in their hands due to creditors of the
deceased under f‘. L., Q 9399:
Basom
v. Taylor, 39 Mich., 682.
36—Thayer
v. Sherman, 12 Mesa,
441: Staples v. Staples, 4 Maine. 532:
Woodbridge v. Morse, 6 N. B., 519.
37—Iioweii v. Freeman, 3 Mass,
121.
A demand in suit pending before
one justice cannot be garnisheed by a
creditor of the plaintiff
in a suit
brought against him before another
justice: Noyes v'. Foster, 48 Z\Iich..
2'73: 12 N. W., 221; Custer v. White,
49 Mich., 262; 13 N. W., 583.
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The principal
against the principal’s demand of judgment.
being entitled to judgment, his execution was properly ruled
out and satisﬁed. The debt, consequently, due him from the
trustee, was, at the time of H0well’s attachment, so situated,
he could not defend himself against paying it to Freeman; it is
not, therefore, a credit in the hands of the trustee, subject to

this attachment.”
Nor would the debtor be liable as gar
nishee, after issue was joined in the cause, for the same rea
son." In Massachusetts it has been decided that a judgment
debtor could not be held as garnishee;-"° but the contrary has
been

held in Indiana.“

A

covenant to pay rent at a particular time does not create
debt until the time stipulated for payment ar-*
rives."
Sailors’ wages are not liable to garnishee process
unless the voyage in which they are earned is ﬁrst completed.“
But a debt owing at present, though payable hereafter, is
subject to garnishee process."

a garnishable

When an entire contract is made for labor, on a large number
of articles in the process of manufacture, to be paid for when
ﬁnished, the owner cannot be held as garnishee of the laborer
until the work is performed on all the articles.“ A promise
to perform labor for another to a certain amount is not a credit
subject to this process, "'.til this promise is broken.“
Charging oneas garnishee, does not vary his liability under
a contract with the principal defendant; as, if he be bound to
38—Kldd v. Shepherd, 4 Msss., 238.
39—Sharp v. Clark, 2 Mass, 91, 93.
Sievers v. Wood
So also in Michigan:
hurn Sarven Wheel Co., 43 l\llch., 275;
5 N. W.. 311.
40—lIalbert v. Stinson. 6 Blackford,
This, however. was a foreign at
398.
tachment.
But see Griffin v. Potter,
166, and Sievers v. The
21 hllch.,
Woodburn Sarven Wheel Co., 43 Mlch.,
275: 5 N. W., 311.
4l—Wood Y. Partridge, 11 Mass.,
488, 493: Thorp v. Preston, 42 Mlch.,
511: 4 N. W., 227.
105;
v. Nye, 12 Pick.,
~i2—Taber
sec. Wyman v. Hichborn, 6 Cush., 264:
As
lladley v. Peabody. 13 Gray, 200.
not yet
wages
for
in garnishment
earned under an existing contract of
employment. see. Kane v. Clough, 86

Mlch., 436: Webber v. Bolte, 51 Mlch.,
113, 115; 16 N. W., 257.
43—Wood v. Partridge,
11 Mass.,
488; Tucker v. Clisby, 12 Pick., 22,
25; Thorndike v. De Wolf, 6 Pick,
120, 122.
The debt must he owing
absolutely and without
contingency:
Thorp v. Preston, 42 Mlch., 511; 4
N. W., 227.
44—Robinson v. Hall, 3 Meta, 301;
Dally v. Jordan, 2 Cush., 390.
Gar
nishment process cannot reach sums
payable upon a contract, but which
will not become due until the perform
ance
thereof at some future
time:
Webber v. Bolte, 51 Mlch., 113; 16 N.
W., 257; Hopson v. Dinan, 48 Mlch.,
612: 12 N. W., 875; Kiely v. Bertrand,
67 Mich., 332; 34 N. W. 674.
45—Wright v. Geyer, 4 Mass., 1_02.
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deliver merchandise at a particular time and place, and by the
default of his creditor he be discharged from such contract, he
is also discharged as garnishee. He cannot be held by a de
mand made for their delivery, on an execution against the
goods and chattels of the defendant in his hands, at any other
time and place than that stipulated for in the contract."

Right of set-oﬂ', etc.—The ‘garnishee has a right to
§131.
set off against the debt which he owes the principal, any de
mand which he might set off in any of the modes allowed,
either by statute or common law, or in any course of proceed
ing." But this does not include any claims for unliquidated
damages for mere torts.“ He may set up any defense which
he might if sued by the principal defendant."
46—-Jewett

v.

Bacon,

6

Mass,

60

47——Smith v. Stearns, 19 I’lck., 22;
Boston Type & S. Foundry Co. v. Mor
timer, 7 Ibid., 186; Brewer v. Pitkin,
11 Ibid., 298.
v. Russell, 16 Mass.,
48-——Hathaway
'
474,

Emerson, 9 Pick., 144.
But ‘a gar
who has goods in his possession
belonging to the principal
defendant
cannot retain them merely because the
principal defendant owes him a debt,
for he has no legal lien on them until
he attaches or levies on them the same
as any other creditor, there being no
pledge of them:
Allen v. Meguire. 15
l\!nss., 490; see Brewer v. Pitkln, 11
Plck., 298; Allen v. Hall, 5 Metc., 267.
nishee

61.

476.

49--Allen

v.
Hall. 5 Metc., 263:
Green v. Nelson. 12 Ib|'d., 567; and
the statute ot limitations: Hazen v.
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Deputlng persons to serve.
Oﬂicer protected by.
irregularities,
and waiver of.
Security for costs.
§ 141. Security in suits for labor.

5132. Form oi’ process.
5133. Proceedings on Sunday.
Q13-i. Proceedings on holidays.
5135. Seventh day observers.
£136. Proceedings to be in English.

5137.
5138.
5139.
5140.

Form of process.-“Ali process issued

iiy

llrLx'1"r1~:ss

a

justice of
the peace should be signed by him, and may be under seal or
It shall not be necessary in any process to
without seal.
of
recite any
the contents or conditions of any bond or affi
davit required to be made or ﬁled before the issue of such
process, but in any case the statement in such process that such
affidavit or bond has been made or ﬁled shall be suﬁicient.”1
§ 132.

a

a

A general authority by justice to a constable to ﬁll up or
alter process issued by the justice, would be void; such author
ity as to
particular process would be valid, but indiscreet
and imprudent.”

it

it

§133. Proceedings on Sunday.—-“No court shall be opened
or transact any business on the ﬁrst day of the week, unless
be for the purpose of instructing or discharging a jury, or of
receiving a verdict; but this section shall not prevent the exer
shall
cise of the jurisdiction of any single magistrate, when

served

beyond

the

balliwick:

Ilart

ford Fire Ins. (‘o. v. Owen, 30 Mich.,
Except certain process in gar
441.
See, ante, if 112, 120.
nishment:
Hubbard, 10 Johns.,
2—l‘lerce
v.
405.

The ﬁling up or alteration

of process

another person,
by the direction
and in the presence
of the justice,
where no discretion is given to the
person thus acting as a mere clerk or
nmanuensis. may be treated as the oth
ciai nct of the justice, and as admis
sible.
justice
But any authority by
to another to ﬂii up or alter process
at his discretion, or any such ﬁlling
up or alteration done by another not
in the presence of the justice, and by
his express direction, would render the
process void.
Garrison v. lioyt, 25
Mich., 509; see, C. L.,
2589.
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a

by

5

5

As amended by
1.—C. L.,
952.
This section
Pub. Acts, 1883, p. 202.
refers to process issued under the pro
visions of this chapter 34. Under our
Justice's Act, process from a justice
court in civil cases is not authorized
to run into another county, or to be

§134

1\iA'i"l‘l:IRS

be necessary,

in criminal
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to preserve the peace,

cases,

or to

3

arrest offenders.”
_
I
While the statute does not in speciﬁc terms prohibit the
issuing of process on Sunday, and though formerly it was,
and in some jurisdictions it still is, held that it might be done,‘
yet now it is held that even if it was not prohibited by the
common law, it is under statutes like ours.5
“No person shall serve or execute any civil process from

midnight preceding, to midnight following the said ﬁrst day of
the week; but such service shall be void, and the person serv
ing or executing such process, shall be liable in damages to
the party aggrieved, in like manner as if he had not had any
such process/’°
This section makes the service absolutely
void, and renders the service of a summons or any other civil
process on Sunday of no effect; so, the service of a certiorari
on that day would be void.’
§134. Proceedings on ho1ida.ys.—“The following days, viz.:
The ﬁrst day of January, commonly called New Year’s Day;
the twenty-second day of February, commonly called Wash
ington’s Birthday; the thirtieth day of May, commonly called
Decoration Day; the fourth day of July; the ﬁrst Monday of
September, commonly called Labor Day; the twenty-ﬁfth day
of December, commonly called Christmas Day; every Saturday
from twelve o’clock noon until twelve o’clock at night, which
is hereby designated a half holiday; election days, embracing
national, state, county and city elections; and any day, ap
pointed or recommended by the governor of this state, or the
president of the United States as a day of fasting and prayer
or thanksgiving, shall, for all purposes whatever as regards the
presenting for payment or acceptance, and of the protesting
and giving notice of the dishonor of bills of exchange, bank
checks and promissory notes, made after this act shall take
eifect, also for the holding of courts, except as hereinafter
3—C. L., 5 1114.
Coke,
4~McI\'ally‘s
9
Cnse.
68:
Havens v. Stiles, 8 Idaho, 250; 87
Pac., 919; 56 L. R. A., 736.
Paddock,
12
Vechten
v.
5—Van
Johns, 178; 7 Am. Dec., 303.
Service of a writ
6—C. L., I 5916.
of cerﬂorari on Sunday is void: An

deron

v. Birce, 3 Mic-h., 280.
And so
is the return of an execution on that
day: Peck v. Cavell, 16 ;\iich., 9.
7—Anderson ct al. v. Birce. 3 Mlch..
280.
Like any other defective service
a general appearance will waive the
See, Pierce v. Rehtuss, 35
defect:
Mich., 53.
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provided, be treated and considered as the ﬁrst day of the
week, commonly called Sunday, and as public holidays or
half holidays; and all such bills, checks and notes otherwise
presentable for acceptance or payment on any of the said
days shall be deemed to be payable and presentable for accept
ance or payment on the secular or business day next succeeding
such holiday or half holiday; I’r0z~idcd, That in construing
this section, every Saturday, unless a whole holiday, as afore
said, shall, for the holding of court and the transaction of
any business authorized by the laws of this state, be deemed
a secular or business day: Provirled, also, That in case the
return or adjourn day in any suit, matter or hearing before
any court, oﬂicer, referee or arbitrators shall come on any
of the days ﬁrst above named, except Sunday, such suit, matter
or proceeding, commenced or adjourned as aforesaid, shall
not, by reason of coming on any of such days except Sunday,
abate, but the same shall stand continued to the next succeed
ing day, at the same time and place unless the next day be
the ﬁrst day of the week, or a holiday, in which case the same
shall stand continued to the next day succeeding said ﬁrst
day of the week or holiday, at the same time and place: Pro
vided, further, That whenever the ﬁrst day of the general
term of any circuit court, as ﬁxed by the order of a circuit
judge shall fall upon either of the days ﬁrst above named,
or whenever any circuit court shall be adjourned to any of the
days ﬁrst above named, such court may be adjourned to the
And provided, further, That
next succeeding secular day:
nothing herein contained shall be construed to prevent or
invalidate the entry, issuance, service or execution of any
writ, summons or confession of judgment or other legal process
whatever, holding courts or the transaction of any lawful
business except banking on any of the Saturday afternoons
herein designated as half holidays, nor to prevent any bank
from keeping its doors open or transacting its business on any
of the said Saturday afternoons, if by a vote of its directors

it elects to do
1-c.

so.”‘_

As amended by
5 4sso.
Pub. Acts" 1903. p. 420.
The issuing of a summons is a mlnisterlal act merely. and may he lawRmith v.
fully issued on a holiday:
1...

Ihling, 41 Mlch., 014; 11 N. w., 40s.
But a judgment rendered by a justice
upon one o! these days is void: Hem
mens v. Bentley. 32 Mich., 89.
A school district cannot make a de
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§135. Seventh day observers.—In regard to the service of
process, and the holding of courts, in the ease of parties who
observe the seventh day of the week as the Sabbath, the law
provides: “That no person who conscientiously believes that
the seventh day of the week ought to be observed as the Sab
bath, and actually refrains from secular business and labor on
that day, shall be compelled to defend any civil suit in the
justiee’s courts of this state on that day.”2
“Whenever any person, as aforesaid, shall be served with
any process returnable on the seventh day of the week, such
person may make aﬁidavit before any person authorized to
administer oaths setting forth the fact that a summons has
been issued, naming the day when the same was issued, when
returnable, by whom issued, and in whose favor, and against
whom the same was issued; and also that the said aﬂiant
believes that the seventh day of the week
conscientiously
ought to be observed as the Sabbath, and that the said afﬁant
actually refrains from secular business and labor on said day,
and may at any time after service of such process, and before
the return day thereof ﬁle such afﬁdavit with justice before
Whom said cause shall be pending.”3

“It

shall be the duty of any justice of the peace before
whom any cause shall be pending, in which such affidavit
shall be ﬁled regularly, to call such cause on the return day
thereof, as in other eases, and upon his own motion to adjourn
the same without pleadings, to such time as he shall see ﬁt:

Provided, the same shall not be adjourned to the seventh or
the ﬁrst day of the week:
And, provided also, that the said
cause
cause

shall not be so adjourned
af0resaid.”4

more than ten days,

for the

Proceedings to be in the English language.-“All
§136.
writs, process, proceedings and records in any court within
this state, shall be in the English language (except that the
proper and known names of process, and technical words, may
be expressed in the language

heretofore and now commonly
used), and shall be made out on paper or parchment, in a fair,
for
ductlon from a teacher's wage
vacations on these public holidays:
School District v. Gage, 39 Mich., 484.
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legible character, in words at length, and not abbreviated;
but such abbreviations as are now commonly used in the
English language may be used, and numbers may be expressed
by Arabic ﬁgures, or Roman numerals, in the customary man

ner.”°
§137. Deputing persons to serve proceas.—“Every justice
who shall issue any process authorized by this chapter, when
ever he shall judge it expedient, on the request of the party,
may, by written authority endorsed on such process, empower
any proper person_ being of lawful age, and not a party or inter
ested in the suit, to execute the same.”°

“The person
a constable

so empowered shall possess all the authority of
in relation to the execution of such process, and

shall be subject to the same obligations, but shall not receive
any fee or reward for his services thereon/"'

It will

that a party cannot be deputed to execute any
process in his own case. A constable cannot serve a summons
be seen

Where a. notice of
5—C. L., 5 1115.
guardians
sale was published in a
newspaper printed for the most part
in German, hut the notice itself was
printed in English, the court. while
holding the publication bad, declined
after 17 years to permit an attack in
Schaalc v.
proceeding:
a collateral
Wasey. 70 Mlch., 419: 38 N. W., 817.
6——C. L., Q 978; Montelth v. Cash,
But a person
1 E. D. Smith, 412.
under twenty-one years of age cannot
Mlin v.
he dcputed to serve process:
Russell, 3 E. D. Smith, 303: Rasch v.
Moore, 57 Mich., 5-i, 56: ‘Z3 N. W.
A deputation of authority to
456.
endorsed thereon,
a summons,
serve
need not state that the person author
ized is oi’ age and not interested in the
suit:
Buel v. Duke. 38 Mich., 167.
The form 0! deputation held suﬂlcient
“By re
in this case. was as follows:
I hereby authorize
quest of plalntiﬂ,
C . . . . .. ll . . . . .. to serve the within
within defendant.
on
the
process
Dated October 28, 1874, F . . . . .. J.
B . . . . .., justice of the peace."
per
The statute
(C. L., 5 716)
mitting a summons to be served by
does not au
any competent person,
service
to be made
such
thorize

a
by
private
person
until
he has
been appointed by the justice for that
purpose:
See, ante. 5 39, note
23.
Contra, as to service of notice under
the drain law when the language is,
as here, that it may he served by “any
competent
person": Walpert v. New

106 Mich., 357; 64 N. W. 326.
because there is no requirement
for particular authorization, as in case
ot process issued by justices.
See (‘.
L., M 978 and 979.
When an execution is duly delivered
to :1 constable to he served, it becomes
his duty to execute it in person; he
has no power to substitute another
comb,

This

constable in his place:
Downs v. Mc
Glynn, 2 Hilt., 14; sec, Foster v.
Wiley, 27 Mich., 244.
But, as to whether a justice can,
under this section 978, dcputize a per
an execution:
Quaere,
son to serve
Harvey v. McAdams, 32 Mich., 472.
If. however. this can be done, the
plaintiff thus selecting the person who
execution,
shall
thereby
serve
the
makes himself responsible for the acts
Ibid.
of the deputy:
7—C. L., § 979; Rnsch v. Moore, 57
Mich., 56: 23 N. W., 456.
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attachment or execution
be executed by a constable who is a party in the suit.
can a warrant,

Process protects the oﬂiicer, when.—A constable is
§138.
protected in the execution of process, although the court had
not in fact jurisdiction in the case, provided that, on face of
the process, it appears that the court had jurisdiction of the
subject matter. But, in no case, where there is in fact a want
of jurisdiction, is the oﬂiccr bound to act. He has a discretion,

is

is

is

a

it, it,

if he chooses to exercise it; if he refuses to act, the party
cannot make him accountable; he is protected‘ by showing that
the process was issued without authority.”
But this rule is
one of protection merely: the oﬁicer may defend under
but he cannot build up
title or right to possession upon
The knowledge of the oﬁicer that
as against third persons."
of no importance.
the court had no jurisdiction
He must
by
protected,
be governed, and
the process, and
not
aﬁected by anything which he has heard or learned out of

24.

C1 "'

1

a

§

5

an appeal has been taken, where the
justice insisted that the appeal had
not been perfected. lie has a right to
rely on his process until he is ofhcially
notified that it has been suspended:
Foster v. \\"iicy, 27 Mk-h.. 244.
Botsford,
10—Beach
Doug.,
v.
Mich., 199; LeRoy v. East Saginaw
City Railway, 18 Mich.. 233; Adams v.
Hubbard, 30 Mich., 10-i: see, Haynes
v. Knowles, 36 Mich., 407.
11——Webber v. Gay, 24 Wend., 485:
People v. Warren,
Hill, 440.
But
if the process shows on its face,
either that it was issued without au
thority, or that the person who issued
it had no jurisdiction
to issue such
process, it will be no protection to the
oﬂicer:
Stroud v. Butler, 18 Barb.,
Wend.,
327: Parker
v. Walrod,
16
1

note

5

39,

iiiil, 35;
Barnes,
Earl v. Camp. 16 Wend.. 67; Beach
Doug., Mich.. 205.
An
v. Botsford,
invalid writ, although fair on its face,
will not protect an oﬂicer in seizing
the property of the wrong person:
Mathews v. Densmorc ct al., 43 Mich.,
And further. as
N. W., 669.
461:
to when a constable will be protected
See, Wall v. Trum
by his process:
bull, 16 Mich., 228; Dunn v. Giliman.
256; Bird v. Perkins. 33
34 Mich.,
Mich., 28; Finn v. I‘eck., 47 Mich.,
208; 10 N. W., 202.
2595, au
Under the statute, C. L.,
thorizing sheriils to serve any process
which constables may execute, no spe
cial direction of the process to the
sherii! is necessary: and
sheriff or
his deputy is not liable in trespass, on
the ground of want of authority, for
ad
levying
justice‘s
a
execution
An
dressed
to any constable, etc.
oilicer does not render himself liable
in trespass for proceeding in good
faith to serve a justice‘s execution
after being told by the defendant that

514.

ministerial
oﬁcer cannot justify
under a process issued by a court or
nﬁicr-r
having no jurisdiction of the
subject matter.
But this rule is based
upon
the ground that every man
is
bound to know the law: and the sub
ject matter in reference to which the

140

A

8—8ee, ante,
v.
9—Cornell

Q

a

it,

going to impeach it." A ministerial oﬁicer executing, in
warrant regular on its
good faith and without oppression,
face, and issued by an ofﬁcer having jurisdiction of the subject
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matter, will be protected by the warrant, and is not required
to look beyond it for his authority to serve it."

8

I-I

Irregularity, waiver, etc.—Any irregularity in the
or service of process, and all defects in its form or
substance, are waived or cured, so far as any question in
regard to them may arise in the particular suit, by the de
fendant’s omitting to take advantage of them at the very ﬁrst
opportunity.‘-°' Thus, if process is void because of some defect
in the manner in which it issued, yet if the defendant appear
at the return day and does not object, but joins issue upon
the merits, the justiee’s jurisdiction over his person will be
complete." And if he plead to the suit, or take any similar
n
5

.

issuing

233.

12—Ortman

v.

Grecnman,

4

Mich..

291; Watkins v. Wallace. 10 Mlch., 57,
74.
13

141

it

a

1

1

2

4

it

a

it

An irregularity
is deﬁned to he
"the want of adherence to some pre
scribed rule or mode of proceeding;
and
consists either in omitting to do
something that is necessary
for the
due and orderly conducting of
suit,
or doing
in an unreasonable man
ner." ln all such cases. if a defendant
will take advantage of the irregularity,
he must do so at the earliest period:
Turril v. Walker,
.\Iich., 177, 183,
Waiver is a voluntary act. and implies
an election by the party to dispense
with something of value. or to forego
some advantage which he might at his
option have demanded or insisted on:
Warren v. Crane, 50 Mlch., 300; 15 N,
W., 465.
14—Malone v. Clark,
Hill, 657:
Crane v. llardy,
Mi;-11,, 55,
61;
(‘ampau v. Fairbanks.
Mlch., 152:
Pierce v. Rehfuss. 35 Mlch., 53; see.
Slatteriy
v. Hilliker, 39 Mlch.,
573.
While an appearance specially for the
speciﬂc purpose of making an objec
tion or of arresting the suit on account
of previous irregularities, waives noth
ing, yet, if the appearance was for
another purpose and with a view to
prolonging the pendency of the action,
and contemplated
step adapted to
a case regularly on foot.
will be a
waiver of prior defects.
Thus, appear
ing and applying for an adjournment
is
step in the cause. and one which
means that the action shall be kept on
foot, and further proceedings shall be
had therein, and, therefore. is awsiver
a

6

question of jurisdiction arises, can gen
erally be decided by reference to the
statute itself. without an inquiry into
the facts which the law does not dis
Thus, if a justice issued a writ
close.
in ejectment, or a war
of possession
rant of commitment to the state prison
on a conviction of murder, such writ
or warrant would be no protection to
the oiﬁcer, however regular on its face,
because he is presumed to know, and
from the law,
can easily ascertain
that the justice had no jurisdiction
of the subject matter, vim: the eject
ment or conviction of murder. No fact
beyond what the law discloses is neces
But the
sary to decide the question.
law makes no presumption, in ordi
nary cases. that the otlicer knows the
matter of fact in the case in which
and Of Whlﬂh the
issued.
the process
law gives no information, and which
are not disclosed by the process which
And where the
he is called to execute.
jurisdiction
of the subject matter de
pends upon matter of fact, the exist
ence or non-existence of which can
not be determined from the law. and
which is not of public notoriety. the
oilicer ought to he pro
ministerial
tected
(if the process is regular on
its face). and ought not to be bound
jurisdiction
the
at his
to ascertain
peril, unless the law has clearly given
him the right to demand the informa
People
tion and determine the fact:
v. Rix.
.\ilch.. 14-ii see. Lelloy v.
l-Inst Saginaw (‘lty Ry. (“n., 18 Mlch.,
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steps, which supposes the process to be valid, he cannot after
wards object to the process itself.“
Unless the party pleads,
asks an adjournment, cross-examines the plaintiff’s witnesses,

or in some other way litigates the cause, the irregularity is
Merely being present to attend the progress of
not cured.
an irregular proceeding, or saying “here” when his name is
called, is not enough." S0 appearing and making the objec
tion is no waiver; for, if this was the case there would be
no such thing as an objection to process."
If there has been an irregularity in the service of the process,
the defendant may apply to the justice to set aside the service.
of prior defects: Lane v. Leech, 44
So, where
Mich., 163; 6 N. W., 228.
a defendant was arrested upon a war
rant for trespass upon lands, issued
upon an insuﬂicient atiidavit, but ap
in the cause, pleaded the gen
peared
eral issue and went to trial on the
merits without having made any objec
tion to the suiﬁelency oi’ the attidnvit,
or validity of the warrant: Held, that
waived;
that
those objections were
while much allowance will be made in
favor ot a party under arrest, and a
waiver of objections will not be hastily
assumed,
yet it would he misleading
for a party to lie by indefinitely and
submit himself without some kind of
protest to. the trial on the merits and
then rely on an objection which he has
Max
a right to waive it he chooses:
well v. Deena, 46 Mich., 35; 8 N. W.,
561.

But. giving bail on arrest by virtue
is no waiver of the right
to object to the sufficiency of the am
warrant
was
on
which
the
davit
Nor will an adjournment
founded.
obtained before pleading, by a. party so
arrested, waive any right to object to
the proceedings on which the arrest
Brown v. Kelley, 20
was founded:
Mich., 27; see, Warren v. Crane, 50
Mich., 301-2; 15 N. W., 465; Stephen
son's Case, 32 Mich., 60.
But a garnlshee cannot waive legal
service oi’ process upon himself in such
a way as to prejudice the rights of the
Ilebel v. Ama
principal
defendant:
zon Ins. Co., 33 Mich., 400.
15-—Bronson v. Earl, 17 Jobns., 63;
All
Swartwout v. Roddis, 5 Hill, 118.
objections to the process or proceedings
oi.’ a warrant,

which a defendant is brought into
court are waived by his pleading to
the
merits:
Gunn liardware
Co.
v.
Dennison, 83 Mich., 40: 46 .\‘. W., 940.
And this though it be after a special
appeal has been overruled: Ovid Town
ship v. Ilaire, 133 Mich., —--~: 94 N.
W., 1060 (May, 1903).
Even it the writ is void, and the de
fendnnt. in ignorance of it, appears
and goes to trial on the merits with
objection,
out
irregularity
the
is
Hill, 1 Mich.,
waived:
Stewart v
by

265-7.

16-—Fanning v. Trowbridge, 5 Hill,
When a party does not appear
suit before a justice he waives
nothing, and may take objection to any
irregularity,
on appeal or ccrtiorarl:
Campau v. Fairbanks,
1 Mich.,
152.
Ea: parte proceedings must conform to
the statute:
Lee v. Mason, 10 Mich..
-105?
But where the justice has by
law no jurisdiction of the subject mat
ter of the suit, no appearance, waiver
or consent will confer jurisdiction; and
this objection may be raised at any
Clark v. Holmes, 1 Doug, 393.
time:
And without jurisdiction,
the proceed
ings are void: Spear v. Carter, 1 Mich..
19, 23; Thompson v. Michigan Mutual
52 Mich., 522; 18
Beneﬁt-Association.
N. W. 247.
;l7—Wheeier v. Lampman, 14 Johns,
481: Wright v. Russell, 19 Mich., 3-16:
Wheeler v. Wilkins. lb'ld., 78. An np
pearance made merely for the purpose
of applying to have proceedings set
waives
aside for want of jurisdiction,
nothing:
McCasiin v. Camp.. 26 Mich.,

428.
in a

390.

142

CH.

VI.

MATTERS

IN RELATION

TO PROCESS.

§140

The defendant may show that a return of personal service
summons, is untrue, as where summons against the father
served on the son, but returned personally served on
father, it was held that the defendant might show that it

of

a

was
the
had

never been served upon him."
In this case the defendant
did not appear, and assigned the want of service as error, and
for that reason the judgment was reversed. But the fact of
want of service cannot be set up in opposition to the return,
and shown to be false, collaterally, in an action upon the
judgment, or in any other action. The remedy, if the return is
false, is to set aside the service, and, if this is denied by the
justice, to appeal and allege the want of service as error, or
prosecute the constable for a false return."

§140. Security for costs.-—“Any justice of the peace may,
either before or after the issuing of any process, in his dis
cretion, require security of the plaintiff for any costs which
may be adjudged against him in any action, and the person
becoming such security shall sign an undertaking, in writing,
to that effect, upon the docket ofsaid justice, and in all eases
plaintiﬁs who are not residents of the county in which uch
suit is brought shall give such security before process shall
issue; and if any plaintiff, after commencing an action in the
county in which he resides, shall remove from said county, the
justice shall require such plaintiff to give security for all costs
which have accrued and may accrue in the action, and if judg
ment be rendered against the plaintiff in any case for costs,
an execution may issue against said plaintiif and the person
becoming security for said costs; and in case the defendant
recover against said plaintiff any sum besides cost, a separate
execution may issue for the collection of the same.”*°
And it is further provided, that where any person shall be
18—Fitch

v. Devlin,

19—.\iew York
18 Barb., 574.

15 Barb.,

k Erie

Co.

47.

v. Purdy,

In case of appeal,
20—(‘. I... 5 713.
the security for costs is liable for the
costs in the appellate court :' Dunn
v. Sutliif.
1 Mlch.,
26: Brabon v.
Pierce, 34 Mlch., 40.
And so when
the cause is removed
by certloruriz
.\i<~i.ean v. isbell, 44 Mlch., 129: 6 N.

W., 210: see, Boat: v. Berg. 51 Mlch.,
8: 16 N. W.. 184.
The obligation of the party who
security for costs, is based
becomes
upon a suiiicient consideration, and a
common
law action may be sustained
thereon,
notwithstanding
the security
may not have been given in strict con
formity to the mode prescribed by the
statute:
Brion v. Kennedy, 47 Mlch.,
499; 11 N. W., 288.
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ecurity for another for costs, in ease the defendant shall
judgment against the plaintiﬁf for costs, thereupon
judgment shall be immediately, and in such suit, entered, as
well against such security as against such plaintiff, and execu
come

recover

tion may issue against such security, in the same manner as
party to such suit?‘

if

he had been himself a

The ﬁling of security in the case of a non-resident plaintiif,
“The
is not essential to confer jurisdiction on the justice.
statute does not make the giving of security a condition, on
compliance with wfhich, only, the process shall issue. Nor does
it provide that the process shall be void, or be quashed, or set

if

such security should not be given. The court having
of the subject matter and of the parties,
jurisdiction
general

aside,

may proceed to ﬁnal judgment, unless the defendant move to
set aside the process for this defect.
Such a motion, when
made, must prevail, unless the plaintiff in the suit furnish the
requisite security. But where no motion is made, the objection
is deemed to be waived and the defect cured. The only object
is to secure the defendant against costs, in case judgment is
ﬁnally rendered in his favor; and this object is secured as
effectually by giving security after the issuing of the process
as before.”22

is

is

is

is,

The discretion which the justice is required to exercise, is a
he is not to require security for costs (except
legal one, that
in case of non-resident plaintiﬂ"s) unless some good cause
shown justifying it. He cannot arbitrarily compel the giving
sometimes done. Also, the application should
of security, as
be made as soon as an opportunity oifers, provided the cause

A

a

defendant should not be permitted, after
cause
to
this
adjourned,
interpose
has been
application, in case he

6

22—Parks
v.
Doug..
Goodwin.
Mich., 56; see, Gray v. Wilcox, 56
Mich., 58: 22 N. W. 109: Brown v.
Pontiac Mining Co., 105 .\Iich.. 653:
63 N. W., 1000; Harris v. Doyle, 130
Mich., 470; 90 N. W. 293.
The right
to insist upon this obligation of the
plaintiff to give the security may be
waived by not insisting upon
at the
ﬁrst opportunity
after knowledge of
non-residence:
Harris v. Doyle, supra.

144

1

Q

-

21-—-C. L.,
10353: see, McLean v.
Isbell, 44 Mich., 129;
N. W. 210.
Sureties are concluded by the judg
ment against their principal,
when lt
has been duly obtained in the course
of regular proceedings; but it seems
not when the judgment is allowed
through collusive and fraudulent agree
ment between the parties to the suit,
Wright
to the prejudice of the surety:
v. Hakes, 30 Mieh., 525.

it

known.

'

CH.

VI.

MATTERS

IN RELATION ro raocass.

was apprised of the facts upon which his application
at the time the cause was adjourned."

§141
is founded,

The undertaking of the surety must be entered in the docket.

Security for costs in suits for personal labor.-“In
§141.
any suit brought to recover for the personal work and labor of
the plaintiif, security for costs shall not be ordered in case
the plaintiff shall make and ﬁle with the court an aﬁidavit that
he has a good and meritorious cause of action and is unable
to procure security for costs.”“
The security given by a. plaintiif extends to the ﬁnal deter
mination of the cause when carried up by appeal; so that the
party is liable for the costs of the appeal, if adjudged against
This is upon the ground that it is the same
the plaintff.“
cause, though carried by appeal to a higher court, and it is
And so
considered but a continuation of the original suit.
when a cause is removed by C67‘t'l'01'd1"i-.26
23—Roblnson

v.

Sinclair,

1

Denio,

628.

24—C.

L.,

Q

11283.

Constitution

ality of this statute upheld:
Jones v.
Judge of Qhiawassee Circuit, 105 .\il:-h.,
This statute is
664: ﬂit N. W., 976.
not applicable in cases of nnn-resident
106
plaintiffs:
Osowlckl v, Ferrick,
.\lich.. 41: 63 N. W.. 981; see, Bur
rows v. Brooks, 113 Mich., 307; 71 N.
W., 460.

10

Nichols, 7 Wend.,
25—Travers
v.
434; I)unn v. Sutliif,
1 Mich.,
24.
But a submission to arbitration oi’ the
Subject matter oi’ the suit is a dis
continuance .ot the suit, and discharges
the security for costs.
Dunn v. Silt
llif. 1 Mich., 24: Brabon v. Pierce, 34
Mich., 40.
26-McLean v. Isbeii, 44 Mich., 129;
6 N. W., 210.
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§142. May appear h0W.—“Every plaintiff of full age, may
appear and conduct his suit or defense, either in person or by
attorney; but the constable who served either the original or
jury process in the cause, shall not appear and advocate for
either party at the trial.”1
Appearance by attorney, authority must be proved.—
“The authority to appear as attorney for any party may be
either written or verbal; and such authority shall be proved
by the attorney or other competent testimony, in all eases
where requested by the opposite party, or where the opposite
party shall not appear.”
§ 143.

1—C. L., 5 761; Westbrook v. Blood,
Mich., 445; 15 N. W., 544.
A
written request by the plaintiff or his
attorney that a case be adjourned or
held open is an appearance by the
plaintiff and gives the justice Juris
diction to act if presented to him
within one hour after the return hour
of the process by which the suit is
Wagner v. Kellogg, 92
commenced:
Mich., 616; 52 N. W., 1017.
2—C. L., 5 762.
The authority of
an attorney who appears in a Justice's
court extends no farther than the pro
ceedings
Berkery
before the justice:
50

.

Circuit Judge, 82 Mich., 160; 46
N. W., 436.
The olﬁce of attorney, in the profes
sionai sense of the term, is not known
in justices’
They are
courts.
not
courts of record, and have no such
control over those
who practice in
them as to render it safe to give such
persons any very liberal power to con
ciude-the rights of those whom they
claim to represent.
Bailey v. Dela
piaine, 1 Sandf., 13. But a party may
appoint an attorney in fact, who will
competent to appear for
be entirely
and represent him in justices‘ court:
v.
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The former law did not require “an attorney of a court of
record of this state” to prove his authority to appear. He is
now on the same footing, in that respect, as other persons.
No good reason, it is conceived, can be given why a defendant
should be shut out from ascertaining the fact that the attorney
has, in fact, the right to recover judgment and receive the
money.
When the authority of an attorney to appear is in writing,
the hand-writing of the client may be established presump
tively. Thus, where letters were directed by the attorney to
the client, at the residence of the latter, in relation to the
subject matter of the suit, and several answers were received
by him in due course of mail, purporting to be signed by the
client, all in the same hand-writing, and dated at his resi
dence, which letters contained a general authority to the attor
ney to take any steps, legal or otherwise, as he might deem
advisable, for the recovery of the debt, it was held the author
ity was suﬁiciently proved. The court said: “An authority
to appear may be by parol or in writing, and the attorney him
self may prove his authority.” If the authority is in writing,
evidence of the hand-writing must be produced.‘ This may be
established, however, presumptively; as, where letters were
directed to a particular person on business, and answers were
received in due course of mail, a fair inference arises, that
The
Hughes v. Muivey, 1 Sandf.. 95.
statute, however, is peremptory in its
requirements that. in Justice's court,
where the defendant does not appear,
the person appearing as the plaintiﬂ's
attorney shall prove his authority; and
his failure to do so is not cured by C.
31
v. Cahoon.
Scoﬁeld
I... 5 950:
Mich., 206. The purpose of the statute
with
for ascertaining
is
to provide
certainty, in all cases, whether any one
assuming to represent another is able
Westbrook v. Blood. 50
to bind him:
Mich., 446; 15 N. W., 544.
And the
fact that the person appearing for the
plaintiff as his attorney did not prove
his authority. is ground for reversing
a judgment for the plaintiﬂ. if neither
and the
he or the defendant appeared.
objection is a proper ground for a spe
Woodhridge v. Robinson,
cial appeal:
But a
49 Mich., 228; 13 N. W. 527.

Justice's judgment cannot be attacked
collaterally on the ground that the per
appearing as attorney failed to
son
prove his authority: Reed v. Gage, 33
Mich., 180; Mnhew v. Snell. 33 .\iich..
182; Fruitport Twp. v. Judge of Mus
kegon Circuit, 90 .\iich., 20: 51 N. W.,
109.

3—Gaul v. Groat, 1 (‘ow., 113.
A
verbal request is a sutﬂcient au
thority for a person
to appear and
manage a cause for another in a jus
tice's court: IbId., .\iurray v. House,
11 John., 461; Tuliock v. Cunningham,
1 Cow., 256.
But a person cannot
prove his authority to appear as at
i01'l1l'S' for a party by producing a let
ter from a third person who is an at
-torney at law, without proving that
the latter is himself attorney for the
party: Westbrook v. Blood, 50 ‘Mich.,
445; 15 N. W. 544,
mere
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the answers were written by the person from whom they pur
port to come.‘
A justice is not bound to require proof of the authority of a
person who claims to appear as attorney for one of the parties,
if the other party does not object to such appearance ;“ by not
requiring proof of the authority of the opposite party to ap

pear by attorney, he will be deemed to have admitted it; if
the defendant does not appear, the authority of the attorney
to appear must be proved.
'I‘he justice cannot‘ act upon information which he has re
ceived out of court in relation to the appointment of an attor
ney, even though the information came from the party for
whom the attorney appears.“ Therefore, when the justice ex
amined the attorney on oath, as to his authority, before the
time mentioned for appearance in thelprocess, or the defendant
had appeared, it was held that the examination was extrajudi

An authority
cial, and in judgment of law proved nothing.’
from the party on the record authorizes the'appearance, al
though he is but a nominal plaintiff, and not the party in
interest.“
The attorney cannot delegate his authority to a third per
In such case the author
son, unless authorized by his power.”
ity of the attorney and the substitute must be proved."
§ 144.

Who may

ried women may
4-Bush
As

will

to

when

v.

be authorized

be authorized

Miller,
an

he presumed,

13 Barb., 481.
attorney's authority
see, Wilcox v. Kas

sick, 2 Mich., 165.
v. Finch.,
15 Wend.,
5—Ackerman
If either party wishes proof of
652.
the authority of the attorney who ap
pears for the opposite party, such
proof must be required when the at
Merritt v.
torney
appears:
ﬁrst
Thompson, 3 E. D. Smith, 596, 599;
see. Underhlii v. Taylor, 2 Barh.. 348;
and, Andrews v. Harrington, 19 Barb.,
It seems that if a party himself
343.
of an
does not appear, the authority
attorney to appear for him should be
proved under oath: Morton v. Crane,
But the right to object
39 Mich., 530.
to an appearance as attorney in jus
tice's court for want of authority, is

to appea.r.—Infants and mar
to appear for either party.“
not waived by having demanded a plea
of him before making the objection:
Westbrook v. Blood, 50 Mich., 445;
15 N. W., 544.
6—Beaver v. Van Every, 2 Cow.,
429.

7—Fanning
v. Trowbridge,
5 Hill,
428; see, Westbrook v. Blood, 50 Mich.,
444; 15 N. W., 544.
8—Cuiver v. Barney. 14 Wend., 161.
9—Bac. Ah.; “Authorlt_v," (D). The
employment of one member of a ﬁrm
is the employment of all and any one
of them may act: Eggieston v. Board
man, 37 Mieh., 14.
10-Fanning v. Trowhridge, 5 Hiii,
428: and see, Spier v. M‘Queen, 1
1\iich.,

252.

11—-Bac.

defendant's
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“But the constable, who served either the original or jury
process in the cause, shall not appear and advocate for either
party at the triai.”1‘~’
When the constable, who served the summons, answered for
the plaintiff, and presented to the justice the note on which the
suit was brought, and stated the plaintiﬁ’s demand, it was held
not to be an appearing and advocating-the
cause within the
meaning of a like statute." But where the constable appeared
on the day of trial for the plaintiff, and proved the note de
clared on, the defendant not appearing, it was held to be with
in the meaning of the statute, appearing and advocating at the
trial." The party by whom the constable was employed could
not object that his appearance was erroneous."
A general authority to collect, implies an authority to ap
pear for the plaintii¥."‘

It

would be irregular to allow the same person to appear for

both parties."
Appearance by townships.-“The supervisor of each
township shall be the agent for his township for the trans
action of all legal business, by whom'suits may be brought
and defended, and upon whom all process against the town
§1-£5.

ship shall be served/’13
OF

TIIE APPEARANCE

OF INFANTS.

§146. Why not allowed to appear personally.-An infant
is regarded in law as incapable of properly caring for, guard
ing and enforcing his rights. It is therefore required that some
to appear for him in a suit
justice, but she may be au
Hughes v. Mulvey.
thorize so to do:
1 Sandi'., 92.
Nor is the law partner
of one who is the oﬂiclal attorney for
municipal corporation
entitled. on
proof of that tact, to appear as at
torney for the corporation in Justice's
court: Wilcox v. Clement, 4 Denio.

and cannot act as counsel on the trial:
Wilkinson v. Vorce. 41 Barb., 370.
13—I'inney v. Earl, 9 Johns., 352,

160.

17—Sherwood
v. The Saratoga
&
Washington Ry. Co., 15 Ba:-b., 650.
18-‘—C. I... I 2336.
An action by
the treasurer in the name of the town
ship is improperly brought:
Laketon
Twp. v. Akeley, 74 Mich., 695; 42 N.
W., 165.

thorized

before

a

I

One serving a
12—C. L., § 761.
summons issued by a justice, under a
special authority
given him by the
justice for that
purpose. is to be
deemed a constable as to that action.

354.
14—l<‘ord

15—Smith

v. Smith, 11 Wend., 73.
Johns.,
v. Goodrich,
5

354.

16—M<-Minn v.

Richtmeyer,

8

Hill,

236.
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one shall be appointed to represent him, to stand for him
whenever he comes into court as a party, either plaintiff or de
fendant. The pcrson so appointed to represent him, if plaintiﬂ’,
is called a “next friend,” and if defendant, a “guardian ad

litem.”

.

Infant p1a.intiﬂ's.—“No process shall be issued for an
§ 147.
infant plaintiff, nor shall any issue joined by such plaintiff
without process be heard, until a. next friend for such plaintiff
shall be appointed.”1°

“Whenever requested, the justice shall appoint some suit
able person to be named by such plaintiff, who will consent
thereto in writing, to act as his next friend in such suit, who
shall be responsible for the costs thcrein.”2°
The consent must be in writing, and be ﬁled with the jus
tice.21

The

full

age

of man or woman is twenty-one years; every
‘

person under that age is an infant.
If process issue in favor of an infant plaintiff before the
appointment of a next friend, it may be set aside on motion
as

irregular.”

If

the appointment

is to be made

in

a.

suit instituted

by

joining issue without process, the consent should be entitled
'
in the cause.
After making the appointment, it should be noted in the
docket.
The next friend must be a responsible person,” as he is
responsible for the costs. In what manner the costs are to be
collected of him, is difficult to say, unless an agreement to pay
Fellows v. Niver, Ibid., 563; Haines
v. Oatman, 2 Doug., Mich., 430.
As
to when an appointment will be pre
sumed
to be regular, see, Kearney v.
Doyle, 22 Mich., 294.
But the infant, and not the next
friend, is the party to the suit. and is
not bound by any reiinquishments of
its rights by the next friend, nor can
the next friend admit away its rights:
20——C. L., § 757.
Burt v. McBain, 29 Mlch., 260. 265.
21-—C. L.. Q 760.
23—Peopie v. N. Y. Com. Pleas, 11
Ember, 12 Wend.,
Wend., 164; Haines v. Oatman, 2
v.
22—Wiider
191; Fitch v. Fitch., 18 Wend., 513; . Doug., Mich., 430.

Where suit is
19—C. L., § 756.
prosecuted by next friend, the uit be
ing appealed,
the appellate court will
regular:
appointment
presume
the
Kearney v. Doyle, 22 Mich., 294; Dil
lon v. Howe, 98 Mk-h., 168; 57 N. W.,
The proper practice where an
102.
in
brings
suit is indicated
infant
Haines v. Oatman, 2 Doug., Mich., 429.
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them is contained in the consent of the person who proposes
to become next friend, which may be done?‘
The rule that an infant shall appear by next friend, and not
by attorney, relates to the appearance upon the record, but it is
not intended to deprive the infant of the professional aid of an
attorney.“ The next friend may, after his appointment, au
thorize another person to appear and prosecute the suit. It
would be the same in respect of a guardian for the defendant.
If an infant plaintiff appear and prosecute a suit in person
or by attorney, the defendant can take advantage of it only by
moving to set aside the proceedings for irregularity, or by
pleading it in an abatement?‘-"

Infant defendants.—“After the service of process
§148.
against an infant defendant, the suit shall not be any further
prosecuted until a guardian for such defendant be appointed;
and the justice, upon the request of such defendant, shall
appoint some person who will consent thereto in writing, to
he guardian of the defendant, in the defense of the suit.”2"
“If such defendant shall not appear on the return day of the
process, or if he neglect or refuse to nominate such guardian,
the justice may, on motion of the plaintiff, appoint any dis
creet person to be such guardian.”'*’3
“The consent of every such next friend or guardian shall
he ﬁled with the justice; and the guardian for the defendant
shall not be liable for any costs in the suit.”2°
24—1 Cow. '1‘reat., 2d ed.. 542-3. The
responsibility
for costs is to the de
fendant.
Sick v. Michigan Aid Assn.,
As be
49 Mich., 50; 12 N. W. 905.
tween the infant and the next friend
the infant is responsible for costs un
less by reason of some misconduct or
failure to exercise ordinary prudence
the next friend has caused the infant
litigation.
See
to carry on fruitless
Waring v. Crane, 2 Paige Ch., 79; 21
Am. Dec. 70.
The language of the
statute "who shall be responsible for
the costs therein,“ does not mean that
the next friend must be ﬁnancially able
to pay the costs, but rather that he
shall be liable for the costs: Rabidou v.
Muskegon Circuit Judge, 110 Mich.,
297; 68 N. W., 147.
25—People v. N. Y. Com. Pleas, 11
Wend.. 164.

26—Schcmerhorn
Jenkins,
v.
7
Johns., 373.
And if no objection is
made until after issue joined on the
merits, all objection and irregularity
is waived:
Treadwell v. Bruder. 3 E.
D. Smith, 597; Schemerhorn v. Jen
kins, 7 Johns., 373.
27—C. L., Q 758.
No person should
he appointed guardian who has any in
terest in the suit adverse to the in
fant.
Damouth v. I\'lock. 29 Mich.,
289,

296.

28—C. L., 1 7.19.
29-0. L., § 760.
If a guardian is not appointed for
an infant defendant, and judgment is
against him, he may reverse
rendered
the judgment because of the error:
Hockey v. Gray. 2 Johns., 192; Alder
man v. Tirrell, 8 Jobns.. 418.
But if
there are several defendants, and they
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The consent of the guardian must be in writing, and the
appointment noted in the docket, as in the case of a next

friend.”
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Effect of failure to appear at time ﬁxed.—-“Judg
§149.
ment of nonsuit with costs shall be rendered against a plaintiff
prosecuting an action before a. justice of the peace in the
following cases: “ " "

' ' '

If

fail to appear on the return of any process within
after the same was returnable;
If after an adjournment he fail to appear within one
2.
hour after the time to which the adjournment shall have been
1.

one

he

hour

madewai

0

0

as

av

0

o

are sued as joint debtors, and Judg
against all, it is no
ment rendered
cause for reversing the judgment that
one of them
was an infant and no
guardian
i'or
him:
was appointed
Wend.,
612;
11
Mason v. Denlson,
Mason v. Denison, 15 Ib¢'d., 64
30—A judgment is not void. but
voidahle merely, because no guardian
Schimpt v.
ad Iifem was appointed:
Wayne Circuit Judge, 129 Mich., 103;
Neither is an admin
88 N. W., 384.
istrator's sale invalid for the reason
that no guardian ad Iiicm was appoint
ed for an infant heir already repre
Wheel
sented hy a general guardian:
ock v. Lake. 117 liiich.. 11; 75 N. W.,
140.
Such guardian ad litem may be
appointed in the circuit court after
appeal:
In re Sanborn's Estate, 109
Mich.. 191; 67 N. W., 128.
31-—.C. L., I 836; Morris v. Bleak
ley, 1 Hilt., 90; Redman v. White, 25
Mlch., 523.
And the justice’s docket
must show that the appearance was
Ihid.,'
Mudge v.
within
the hour:
Yaples, 58 Mlch., 307: 25 N. W., 297;
Post v. Harper, 61 Mich., 434; 28 N.
W.. 161; Stolte D. & F. Co. v. Coch
ran. 111 Mlch., 193; 69 N. W., 247.
The failure of the plaintitl to appear
within an hour of the time to which
a cause has been adjourned, operates
as a discontinuance, and deprives the
justice of jurisdiction except to render
Brady v. Taber.
judgment of nonsuit:
29 Mich., 199; Cagney v. Wattles, 121

.\iich., 469; 80 N. W. 245.
And the
failure of the plaintiff to appear with
in one honr of the time for the return
of a. garnishee summons to show cause,
etc.,
works a discontinuance of the
garnishee
proceedings:
Johnson
v.
Dexter. 38 Mich., 695.
To constitute
an appearance, the party must do some
act or take ome step in the action:
if, when the cause is called, a party
refuses to answer, or merely answers
"here," hut refuses to put in any plead
ing or take any other step in the cause,
there is no legal appearance on his
part: Fanning v. Trowbridge, 5 Hill.
428. 430; People v. Wllgus, 5 Denio.
58, G2. A written request by the plain
tiff or his attorney that the case he
held open, or adjourned. constitutes an
appearance:
Wagner v. Kellogg, 92
Mich., 616; 52 N. W. 1017.
Au ap
pearance may be general or special. it
is general, when the party appears
for the purpose oi‘ litigating the cause
upon its merits, and upon all questions
that may ar-ise: it is special, when he
appears merely for the purpose of mak
ing some motion or objection. raising
some question or pleading some special
matter which does not relate to the
merits of the case: See Wright v. Rus
sell, 19 Mich., 346. 350.
An appear
ance will not be deemed to be special
unless the party states that it is spe~
cial, and he ought to state distinctly
the purpose for which he appears. And
the justice should state in his minutes
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In practice, the justice gives one hour for the parties to
appear, and unless both appear, he ought not, within that time
to proceed in the cause.“ In this case it was decided, that,
as a. general rule, a justice should wait one hour for the ap
pearance of the parties, and no longer unless a reasonable
The preceding
excuse was shown for further indulgence.
provision of the statute was not intended to change this rule.
“Many circumstances may exist rendering it necessary to de
lay beyond the hour to call the cause, such as being engaged in
other oﬂicial duties, and the like.”33
and docket whether the appearance is
general or special; and it the latter,
the grounds or purpose of the appear
ance.

Shufelt v. Cranmer, 20 Johns.,
309: Sherwood v. Saratoga & Washing
ton Ry. Co., 15 Bari», 650.
Our statute does not require the
justice to wait an hour for the de
fendant. still it is reasonable and
proper that he should wait that length
of time:
Smith v. Brown, 3-i Mich.,
455, 458: Talbot v. Kuhn, 89 l\iich..
30; 50 N. W., 791.
The justice ought
to wait an hour for the defendant to
appear in the same cases in which by the
terms of the statute such time is given
There is no good
plaintiff.
to the
reason for giving an additional hour
to the plaintiff and withholding it from
the defendant.
Jusltice requires that
both parties shall have equal chances,
and the justice ought to wait n reas
onable time for the defendant. and
that, by analogy to the time allowed
for the plaintiff, may ever be regarded
Bossence v. Jones, 46
as an hour:
As to wait
Mic-h., 492: 9 NT W., 531.
ing an hour for the defendant, see,
Chair Co. v. Runnels. 77 Mich.. 104:
43‘N. W., 1006: Talbot v. Kuhn. 89
Mich.. 30: 50 N. W.. 791: Hodge V.
Bagg, 81 Mich.. 243; 45 N. W., 841.
in Talbot v. Kuhn. supra, it is held
that while the statute does not require
the Justice to wait one hour, if de
fondant fails to appear. before render
ing judgment, yet by judicial construc
tion it is the right of the defendant
that he should wait the hour and that
if he fails to do so the error may be
corrected by application to the proper
it the plaintiff fails to appear
court.
within the hour the justice loses juris

diction to do anything but render a
judgment
of nonsuit.
and this by
virtue of the express language of the
statute.
On the other hand, if the
defendant fail to appear and judg
ment is rendered before the expiration
of the hour, the judgment is good un
less reversed
in a proceeding taken to
that end.
No appeal lies from a judg
ment
of nonsuit against a plaintii!
who fails to appear within the hour
after the time fixed.
Such judgment
is regarded as a voluntary
nonsuit
from which no appeal
lies,
notwith
standing C. L.. § 902.
33-The absence of the justice for a
few minutes beyond the hour to which
the cause was adjourned. for the pur
pose of holding a coroner's inquest,
was held not to work a discontinuance
of the case.
The court says the jus
tice was absent on ofiiciai duty, and
both duties could not be performed at
the same instant, and the absence
of
the justice for a few minutes more
than the hour to which the cause was
adjourned, could not he allowed to
operate as a discontinuance, though the
defendant might have remained at the
oﬂice till the expiration
of the hour
and then left.
But in such case. if
the defendant had gone away ignorant
of the cause of the Justice's absence,
the justice should have notiﬁed him of
his return at the earliest opportunity.
and should have required proof that
he had received such notice before rak
ing any other step in the cause; and
if the defendant had in good faith dis
missed his witnesses. he would, on
showing cause, be entitled to the neces
snry time to procure their attendance:
Stadier v. Morse, 9 Mich.. 264-6.
. .
But where upon the adjourned day
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“If

no reasonable excuse exists or appears, the cause should
within the time designated by the statute, and the
refusal would be error.
of this construction,
Independently
be called

the justice was right in this ease, as the defendant wilfully
abandoned the defense when the suit was about to be called.”34
The defendant at the expiration of the hour, the plaintiff not
appearing, requested the justice to call the case, who told him

it a rule to wait ﬁve minutes on account of varia
tion of time;pieces, and should wait that time, and if the plain
tiff did not appear he would dismiss the cause, but if he did
appear he should go on with it. The defendant left, and soon
after, within ﬁve minutes, the plaintiff appeared, and the jus
tice proceeded to try the cause. This was, on certiorari, alleged
as error.
The court say: “The ﬁrst question is, whether the
defendant was bound to wait ﬁve minutes after an ‘hour had
elapsed from the time appointed for his appearance. I think
not. The words of the statute are, ‘Judgment of nonsuit, with
costs, shall be rendered against a plaintiff, if he fail to appear
on the return of any process, within one hour after the-same
If the plaintiff had appeared before the de
was returnable.’
fendant left, or if he had been in sight and approaching, and
the justice had told the defendant, then, it seems, the defend
ant would have gone away at his peril.“ But here the plaintiff
had neither arrived, nor was there anything to show that he
he had made

the justice was absent in the perform

Hathaway,

ance of duties as superintendent of the
poor, and returned to his oiﬂce about

thirty minutes after the expiration of
an hour from the time to which the
cause had been adjourned, and the de
fendant not being then present. the
justice found him near by and in
formed him that he was ready to pro
ceed with the trial, but the defendant
refused to appear, whereupon the jus
tice adjourned the case and caused
notice thereof to be served upon the
defendant, and then upon the ad
journed day, the defendant not appear
ing, the cause was tried and judgment
Held, that as
rendered against him:
the justice was not absent in the per
formance of any onicial duty as a jus
tice, but in the performance of the
duties of another oﬂice, the judgment
v.
reversed:
Rubert
be
should

42 Mlch., 592; 4 N. W.,
See. Woempener v. Ketchum. 110
Mlch., 34; 67 N. W., 1106. holding that
a justice may hold open a cause from
day to day for performance of other
307.

ofﬂciai duties without losing jurisdic
tion.
Attention is called to sections
799 and 800. being Act 114. Pub. Acts
of 1885.
This act provides for the
transfer of causes to another justice
in cases of vacancy occurring in the
oflicc
of justice
before whom such
actions are pending;
also for such
transfer in cases where the justice is
sick or “unable for any cause, tem
porarily or negligently, to perform the
duties of his oince."
34—Barber v. Parker, 11 Wend.. 51:
and see, Cornell v. Bennett, 11 Barh.,
(357.

35—Baldwln
v. Carter.
15 J’ohns.,
496; Barber v. Parker, 11 Wend., 51.
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intended to appear; and the justice was not engaged in any
other oﬂicial business. If, under such circumstances, the de
fendant must, at his peril, wait beyond the hour, the statute
is, in eifect, repealed. When the law says that the plaintiﬁ
shall have but one hour, the justice has no right to say that
'

'
minutes/’“$‘
If the defendant fails to appearin proper season, there may
be a ﬁnal judgment against him, which will be a bar to any
further litigation of the same matter, and it may also deprive
him of the advantage of a set-off. And it has been held, that
if the defendant appears on the return day of the process, and
the justice and plaintiff are still present in the court, the de
fendant may interpose his defense as a matter of right, even if
the plaintiff has put in his declaration, and the cause has been
adjourned to a subsequent day for trial, and for the purpose
of allowing the plaintiff an opportunity of getting his wit
The plaintiff does not lose any rights in such a case,
nesses."
and to deprive a. defendant of his defense under such circum

he shall have sixty-ﬁve

But if the defendant does
stances would seem to be unjust.
not appear on the return day of the process nor on the ad
journed day, until after a witness has been called and examined
on the part of the plaintiﬁ, it seems that he will be too late,
even if the justice is disposed to admit the defense."
36—Wiicox v. Clement. 4 Denio, 160.
Dexter, 12 Wend.,
31—Pickert
v.
150; ilowther v. Crummie, 8 Cow., 87.
And it is said that if the defendant
appears on the return day, though not
at the time mentioned in the process,
nor within an hour of It, yet he may
still interpose his defense if the plain
tiff is proceeding with the trial on that
day, and the trial is then in progress:
Sweet v. Coon, 15 Johns., 86; Atwood
v. Austin. 16 Johns., 180; Lowther v.
Crummle. 8 Cow., 87; Pickert v. Dex
if the defendant
ter. i2 Wend., 150.
does not appear on the return day. but
does appear on the day to which the

may have been adjourned for the
convenience of the plaintiff. the jus
tice may, in his discretion, then permit
the defendant to interpose his defense:
Sammis v. Brice, 4 Denio, 576: Jenkins
v. Brown,
21 Wend., 454;
Mead v.
But it is said
Darragh, 1 Hilt., 396.
that he cannot at this time claim to
put in his defense
as a matter of
right: Samrnis v, Brice, 4 Denio, 576;
Jenkins v. Brown, 21 Wend.. 454:
Bnell v. Louclrs, 11 Johns., 69.
iiughes, 3 E. D.
38—Monfort
v.
Smith, 591, 598-9; Mead v. Darragh, 1
cause

Hilt.,
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§150. In suits commenced by warrant.—Provision is made
for taking a defendant arrested on a warrant before some
other justice, in case the justice who issued it shall be absent,
or unable to hear or try the case, or if it shall appear by the
affidavit of the defendant that such justice
in his behalf on the trial of the case.‘

is a material

wit

ness

In

suits commenced by other process.—“If, before
cause, the defendant, or his agent or
attorney, shall make and ﬁle with the said justice an affidavit,
stating that the justice, before whom the same is pending, is
§151.

joining issue in any

witness for such defendant, without whose testi
mony he cannot safely proceed to the trial thereof, and shall
state in said affidavit the facts he expects to prove by said
justice, or shall make and ﬁle as aforesaid an aﬂidavit that the
said justice has advised or counseled with the plaintiff in
respect to the subject matter of said cause, the justice shall
forthwith make in his docket an entry of the ﬁling of such
affidavit, and an order that the suit and all papers relating
a material

thereto, be transferred to one of the nearest justices of the
peace in the same county, who is not of kin to either party,
sick, absent from town, or interested in the event of said suit,
either as 001111861 or otherwise, which justice shall be named
in said order, and such transfer shall forthwith be made by
such justice,
1-0.

and the justice to whom such transfer shall be

L., 5 726.

See,

ante, 55 64, 68.
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made, shall thereupon proceed to hear, try and determine the
cause in the same manner as if the suit had been originally
commenced before him, and with like eifect, or the said justice
may in the order aforesaid, in his discretion, postpone the
hearing of said cause to such time as he shall see ﬁt, not
exceeding ﬁve days, at which time the justice to whom the
cause is transferred, shall attend and proceed to hear, try and
determine said cause as aforesaid: Provided, that the defend
ant shall pay to the justice making such order of transfer,
the costs which have so far accrued and as taxed by said
justice, together with ﬁfty cents for such transcript, and the
sum so paid shall be recovered by the said defendant against
the plaintiff in addition to his other costs, if he ﬁnally prevail
in said cause.”’
The proper time to make this affidavit would be after the
plaintiff had declared, and before plea. The justice would
have no right to interpose his private knowledge or recollec
tion, as an answer to the aﬁidavit.- The facts sworn to, how
ever, must be material to the issue.“
§152. In case of absence of justice on the day of trial.
“If any justice of the peace shall be absent when there shall
be pending before him any matter or suit undetermined, he
This statute is
2—C. L., Q 835.
applicable only to suits at law, not to
People v. Brigh
special proceedings:
ton, 20 Mich., 70.
If parties appear
before the justice to whom the trans
fer is made without objection and go
to trial. if such justice has jurisdiction
of the subject matter the question of
the regularity of the transfer is fore
Smith v. St. Joseph Circuit
closed:
Judge. 46 Mich.. 33-S: 9 N. W. 440. As
to when n justice will be deemed to be
of in
disqualiﬁed to act by reason
terest. see West v. Wheeler, 49 Mich.,
505: 13 N. W., 836: Moon v. Stevens,
53 Mich., 144: 18 N. W., 600; Taggart
v. Waters. 115 Mich., 638; 13 N. W.,
There can be no removal until all
885.
statutory prerequisites have been com
plied with: Oakley v. Dunn, 63 .\iich..
494; 30 N. W., 90.
Counter aﬂidavits
to aﬂidavits
for removal. not receiv
able:
Ibid.
Where. in a suit before a justice, it

was necessary for the phintlﬂ to prove
the execution of a paper to which the
justice was the only subscribing wit
ness:
Held, that the disability of the
justice to be sworn did not authorize
him to admit other proof of the execu
tion of the instrument:
Jones
v.
Phelps, 5 Mlch., 21s.'
3—Hopkins
Cabrey, 24 Wend.,
v.
260.
The justice has a right to judge
of the suﬂiclency of the affidavit: but
he cannot refuse to transfer the cause
on the ground that he does not recoi
iect the fact which the defendant ex
pects
to prove by him:
Young v.
Scott, 3 Hill, 32; see, Murtha v. Wal
ters,
2 Sandf., 517.
When such an
aﬂidavit is drawn and presented to the
justice, he is bound
to
swear the
defendant to the truth of it. whether the
aiiidavit is suﬂicient or not; and his
refusal to do so would be a misde
meanor: People v. Brooks, 1 Denio, 45].
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may deliver over all the papers relating to such matter Or suit,
with a. minute of his proceedings therein, to some neighbor

ing justice of the
proceed to hear,
same manner as

same

city or township, who may thereupon

try and determine such matter or suit, in the

if

such matter or suit had been commenced
before him, and with like eifect; but the parties to such mat
ter or suit, their agents or attorneys, shall be notiﬁed of
such transfer previous to any hearing or trial of such matter
or suit.”4

In case of vacancy in the oﬂice of any justice.
§153.
“\Vheneve1' the office of any justice shall become vacant by
resignation, removal or otherwise, and there shall be pending
before him any matter or suit undetermined, and the books
and papers of such justice shall be delivered over to any other
justice of the city or township, pursuant to the -foregoing pro
visions, the justice to whom such books and papers shall be
so delivered, shall proceed to hear, try, and'determine such
matter or suit, and to issue execution thereon, in the same
manner and with the like eﬂ"ect as he might have done if
such matter or suit had been originally commenced before

him.”“
Further, in case of vacancy, absence of justice, etc.
§ 154.
Further provisions for the transfer of causes have been en
acted as follows:
“In case a vacancy from any cause shall occur in the office
of a justice of the peace, all causes and matters pending before

him at the time such vacancy shall occur shall stand trans
ferred to the justice of the same township or city Whose term
of oﬁice shall soonest expire: Provided, that the hearing or
trial of the same shall not be had within ten days after such
vacancy shall occur.”“
“I'n case of the sickness of any justice, or of his absence
from the township or city in which he was elected, or his inabil
ity from any cause, temporarily or negligently, to perform
the duties of his oﬂice, any such matter or cause pending
before him shall stand continued before him two weeks, at
4—C. L., 5 964.
5-C. L.. § 971. The "foregoing provisions" referred to in this section,

will
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be found in C. L..
L., 5 799.
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the end of which time, unless said justice shall be able to
attend the same, such cause or matter shall stand transferred
to the justice of the same township or city whose term of
ofﬁce shall soonest expire, and be heard or tried before him
in the same manner and time as in case of a vacancy: Provided,
that this act shall not be construed to prevent the transfer of
causes by justices under the existing provisions of law.”'
7—C.

L.,

I
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IN GENERAL.

§155. By statute.-“At the time of the ﬁrst appearance of
the parties before the justice, either upon the return of process
or their Voluntary appearance to join issue, the pleadings of
the parties shall be made, unless the justice shall allow, fur
ther time upon cause shown, and when both parties have ap
peared, an issue shall be joined before an adjournment shall
be had, except as aforesaid; and when the defendant shall
have appeared upon a warrant, the pleadings shall be made
within such reasonable time as the justice shall allow for that
purpose/’1

Discretionary power of justice as to time of receiv
upon the return of a summons, after
ing‘ pleadings.-When
waiting an hour and twenty minutes, the plaintiff declared,
and proceeded to the proof of his demand by examining two
witnesses; and then (an hour and a. half after the time speci
§156.

When a party is
1—C. L., 5 766.
brought before a justice upon a war
rant, he should be allowed reasonable
time to procure counsel and to plead:
Brown v. Kelley, 20 Mich., 32; Med
daugh v. Williams, 48 Mich., 172; 12
In the latter case, when
N. W., 34.
the defendant was brought before the
justice upon a warrant, he was re
quired to plead immediately, which he

did by putting in the general issue,
and the suit was then adjourned. Held,
that having been compelled
to plead
immediately, it was his privilege. as a
matter of right, on the adjourned day
to amend his pleading by adding there
to a notice of special defense under the
general
issue. but this privilege having
by the justice, the judg
been denied
ment was reversed.
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ﬁed in the summons for appearance) the defendant appeared
and asked leave to plead, offering to pay all costs, and the
justice refused to give such leave, and only permitted the
defendant to cross-examine the plaintiff ’s witnesses, the court
held that the defendant should have been allowed to put in
his plea and go into his defense.’ In a. former case,3 the court
decided that the defendant may plead if he appears and
offers to make his defense before the co1u"t has entered upon
the trial of the merits. In the above case, in 12 Wendell, the
judge observes: “I would approve of the qualiﬁcation to the
general rule, contained in Sweet v. Coon, and allow the de
fendant to plead, if he appeared on the return of the sum
mons before the cause is adjourned, or even after, if the plain
tiff was still present, or before the plaintiff had closed his
case, if he went to a hearing on a. return day. The latter indul
should grant, because, if the plaintiff came prepared
gence
for a hearing on the return day, he must have prepared under
the expectation that the defendant would appear, and there
fore there would be no great inconvenience in permitting the
defense.”
But, to allow a defendant to come in on an adjourned day
and go into his defense, although upon payment of costs and
consenting to an adjournment, would tend to encourage negli
gence on the part of the defendant, and to promote delay and
The defendant not appear
embarrassment of the plaintiff.
ing on the return of the summons, the plaintiff at the ad
journed day is not bound to anticipate and prepare for a eon
tested trial; and to permit the defendant to have the beneﬁt
of a trial under such circumstances, is allowing him to take
advantage of his own negligence, to the prejudice of another.‘
In such a case the defendant would be allowed only to give evi
dence in mitigation of the damages.“
But where the defendant appeared on the adjourned day,
for the ﬁrst time, and made an affidavit excusing his default
in not appearing on the return day, and generally of merits in
the cause, as advised by coimsel, and oifered to pay the costs
of the adjournment and all subsequent proceedings, and to

I

2-—I'lckert v. Dexter. 12 Wend.. 150.
3—Sweet v. Coon. 15 Johns., 86.
11

4.—Plckert v. Dexter, 12 Wend.,153;
Snell v. Loucks, 11 Johns., 69.
5—Snell v. Loucks, 11 Johns, 69.
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a further adjournment if he wished it, and,
circumstances,
asked leave t0 plead and tendered
under the
a plea, the court held that a justice might, on the cause shown,
have given the leave without violating the spirit of any de
cision of the court; that he had the same power in this respect
as a court of record, which is to let in a defendant to plead
at any stage of the cause, on such terms as shall save all reason

allow the plaintiff

able chance of preparation to the plaintiff, while it subserves
the purposes of justice by promoting a trial upon the merits,
without dispensing. with the exercise of proper diligence on
the side of the defendant.“
But as this is matter of discretion
merely in ‘the justice, his decision upon the question is con

For that reason the justice should not be too rigid
clusive.
If the justice is satisﬁed by the aili
upon the defendant.
davits, or otherwise, that the defendant has a good excuse for
not appearing on the return day, that he has a good defense,
and that the application is made in good faith, he should
allow the party to plead. He may also require the defendant
to pay the costs of the plaintiif in preparing for trial, in case
an adjournment should be wished by the plaintiff; he may
require the defendant to consent to an adjournment, and to
admit the aﬁidavit of a witness for the plaintiff, in case of his
absence on the day of trial.
§157. Nature and essentials of.—Pleading is the statement
in a logical and legal form of the facts which constitute the
plaintiﬂ"’s cause of action, or the defendant's ground of de
fense; it is the formal mode of alleging on the record that

which would

or the defense of the party in

be the support

evidence.

And in general, whatever circumstances are necessary to
constitute the cause of action on the ground of defense, must
be stated in the pleadings, and all beyond is surplusage.
But
facts only are to be stated; and not arguments or inferences,
or matters of law."
6—Jenkins v. Brown, 21 Wend., 464.
Justices‘ courts have all such powers
for the purposes of jurisdiction as are
usual in courts of record. except the
power of setting aside a verdict and
judgments
thereon:
Van
nrresting
Sickle v. Kellogg, 19 Mich., 49.
-

7—1 Chitty's Pieadings, 10 Am. cd.,
214: Picard v. McCormick.
11
Mich., 69. The real object of pleading in
any court is, to apprise the opposite par
ty of the nature and grounds of the
action, or the defense, as the case may
be. so that there shall be neither mis
213-
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Construction of pleading‘s.4Pleadings in justices’
§158.
courts have always been liberally construed, and great latitude
has been allowed in them.“
But, notwithstanding the liberal
ity with which courts have regarded them, they are still
subject to the same rules as the pleadings in courts of record;
and it is only when they have passed without objection from
the opposite party that they have been regarded with favor
by the courts.”
§159. May be written or 0ral.—“The pleadings in a suit
before a justice of the peace may be either written or verbal,
at the discretion of the party making the same, except in
case of notice of title to land; when written, they shall be
ﬁled with the justice; when verbal, the justice shall enter in his
docket the substance thereof; the declaration shall be sufficient
on general demurrer, if conformable at the time, to the rules
of pleading applicable to the circuit court; the plea of the
general issue shall be in the same form as in those courts, and
notice of any defense not admissible under the general issue,
shall be given with such plea; no special demurrer shall be
allowed; pleas in abatement must be pleaded under oath, and
the execution of a written instrument, ﬁled with the justice,
apprehension nor surprise on the trial
as to what matters are to be litigated:
iiurtford v. liolmes, 3 i\iich., 463.
justices‘
8—Pieadings
courts
in
should be viewed with llberaiity. Tech
nicailties in such pleadings should be
discountenanced, and substance instead
Hurtford v. Holmes,
of form required:
3 hiich.. 460.
Technicalities and form
nor required _in
are neither expected
proceedings of justices‘ courts:
the
Kinyon v. Fowler, 10 Mlch., 16: see.
Wilcox v. Toledo, etc., R. R. 00., 43
Mich., 584: 5 N. \\'.. 1003; Snyder v.
Wlnsor, 44 Mich., 140: 6 N. W.. 197.
But. while the rules of pleadings ap
plied to justices‘ courts are extremely
liberal. a cause of action must be as
fully proved in those courts as in any
other:
Clcotte v. Morse, 8 Mich., 424.
lnsuﬂiciency of a pleading,
9—'l‘i1e
either for want of substance or suffi
cient speciﬁcation, may be waived by
the party to be affected by it: and ii.’
the declaration is not sufficient in this

respect,
and the defendant pleads is
suably, and goes to trial on the. merits,
he is estopped
from objecting after
wards to the pleading for insufficiency:
Hartford v. Holmes, 3 .‘\iich., 460, 464.
Thus, pleading to the merits and going
to trial thereon before a justice, pre
eludes the defendant from objecting to
evidence on the ground that particular
facts essential to its introduction were
not set forth in the declaration, if it
so states the pialntlﬂ‘s cause of action
that it may be fully understood, and
so as not to mislead the defendant:
Chancey v. Skeels, 43 1liich., 347; 5
And, though a declara
N. W., 380.
tion be informai, if it fairly apprises
the defendant of the
claim
made
against him, it will be held sufficient
if not demurred to: 43 Mich., 584,
supra; see. Wheipley v. Nash, 46 Mich.,
25: 8 N. W., 570. Pieadlngs are always
understood to date, as to their aile
gatlons, from their actual filing: Alien
v. Carpenter, 15 Mich., 41.
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THE DECLARATION.

Requlsltes of.—The declaration is a speciﬁcation, in
of the circumstances which constitute the plain
tiif’s cause of action. The general requisites of a declaration
are: 1st, that it correspond with the process; 2d, that it con
tain a statement of all the facts necessary in point of law to
§160.

a legal form,

sustain the action, and no more; and 3rd, that these facts be set
forth with certainty and truth."
The declaration must agree with the process in the number
of the plaintiffs, and the character in which they sue.

Mistake in name of p1a.intiﬁ.—The name of the plain
If the name of the plaintiff
must
be stated in the process.
tiff
is mistaken in the process, the same name may and must be in
the declaration; unless the process is amended as it may be,
by inserting the true name." If, however, the correct name
is not used, the defendant may plead the misnomer in abate
§ 161.

ment.13

\

Mistake in name of defendant
The same rule, as to
§ 162.
“No process shall contain the
number, applies to defendants.
names of the defendants in more than one action.”“
“When in actions for tort, a summons is returned not found
or served by copy, as to part of the defendants who shall not
10—C. L., 5 767; Crouse v. Derby
Pieadings in jus
shire, 10 Mich., 481.
tices‘ courts are to be viewed with
iiberallty and to be liberally construed:
Bank v. Carson, 60 Mich., 432; 27 N.
are not fav
W., 589.
Technlcalities
ored;
Soper v. Mills, 50 Mich., 752
14 N. W., 704; Whittle v. Bailes. 65
Mich., 6-10; 32 N. W., 874: Nugent v.
Tcachout, 67 Mich., 571; 35 N. W.,
254; Lynch v, Craney, 95 Mich., 199;
54 N. W., 879.
Still they must be suﬂieient to fairly
show a cause of action, and with sulﬁ
cient certainty to obviate surprise on
the part of the other side and to enable
him to prepare to meet the proofs:
Watkins v. Ford, 69 Mich., 457; 37 N.
W., 300.

11-1

Chitty’s Pl., 10 Am. ed.. 240.
the declaration is in writing
it must conform in substance to the
rules of the (‘ircuit Court: Benalieck
v. 1'eople, 31 Mich., 201.
Declarations
in justices‘ courts are to be liberally
construed, and, though informal, when
they fairly apprise the defendant of
the claim against him may be held suf
ﬂcient: Costello v. TenEyck, 86 Mich.,
348; 49 N. W., 152; see cases cited in
preceding note.
12—Willard v. Missani, 1 Cow., 37:
Waterbury V. Mather, 16 Wend., 611:
but see, 1 Chitty's PL, 10 Am. ed.,
241."
13—Waterbury v. Mather, 16 Wend.,
244.

If

611.
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appear, the plaintiff may dismiss the cause as to such defend
ants, and proceed against the defendants personally served or

"5

appearing.’
If the defendant be sued by a wrong name, and does not ap
pear, the process having been personally served, the plaintiff
will declare against him, and proceed to judgment, in the name
in the process. The defendant may either plead the misnomer
in abatement, or move to set aside the process," unless a ﬁcti
tious name is used." When a suit is commenced for or against
and the names of all the several parties are
the
known,
not
suit may be commenced in the partnership
name of said plaintiﬁs or defendants, and the plaintiffs or de
fendants have the right, at any time- before the pleadings are
closed, to amend the same by inserting the names of the parties
In actions upon instruments in
composing the partnership."
writing, any of the parties to which are designated by the
initial letter or letters, or contraction of the christian or ﬁrst
name or names, it is suﬁicient to describe them in the same
a copartnership,

manner in the declaration.“
’._
If a person enter into a bond or deed by a wrong name, he
should be sued by such name; and a declaration against him
by his right name, stating that he by the wrong name executed

19--C. L.,

165.

;

c 1

d
9

u

3

2

165

it

5

Q

4

I

764; ante,
24: see.
1R—C. L.,
liuhbardston Lumber Co. v. Covert. 35
.\ilch., 261.
This section can only
apply where there is a partnership, and
not to a case where a single person
uses a name’ indicating n partnership
Sterling
v.
which does not exist:
N. W.,
Heintzrnan. 42 Mich., 449:

Shaw v. Fortine, 98 Mich., 254; 57
N. W., 128; Fisher v. Northrup, 79
Mich., 287; 44 N. W., 610.
20-1 Chitty‘s Pi., 245: Gould v.
Taunt., 504; see, Meredith v.
Barnes.
Hinsdale,
Caines, 362.
The mis
spelling of a name is not material, if
the two names be of the same sound:
Chitty‘s PL. 245.
The name is the
same when the pronunciation
is the
same:
Doug., Mich., 69; Finnegan
v. .\ia_vworm,
Mich., 146.
But when
"the Board
ot Supervisors
of the
County of St. Joseph." brought suit on
a bond, alleging that
was given to
“the Board of Supervisors of the Coun
ty of St. Joseph ;” but the bond proved.
was given to “the Supervisors of the
County of St. Joseph," the court held
1

We-nd., 611.

'

seems

1

it

"s

Hm
mm
761
that a plalntlif cannot avail
himself of the tatute allowing process
to be issued against a defendant by a
ﬁctitious name, on the ground that his
name was not known to the plaintiff,
unless an averment to that etfect is
contained in the declaration, or is al
leged by way of replication to a plea
ot misnomer: Waterbury v. Mather, 16
:_1_(_

5 763; ante, 5 30: see,
v. Abbott, 28 Mich., 210: Bar
ber v. Smith, 41 Mich., 138:
N. W.,
002- Ba ms
V .Eat on .12 Mi 11., H7
I-‘owiass

“8_

'09

_

°':

, 4 C

_y

‘";“

15__C' [M5
6__M
_

nil
@541
.,.

the bond, is bad, and the defendant may avail himself of this
objection under the general issue.” -

§ 163

PLEADINGS IN

csussan

AND DECLARATION.

Cu.

IX

A

variance between the summons and declaration, as to the
plea, is a. matter of form, merely, and not to be regarded."
Requirement as to allegations of fact in the declara
ti0n.—If the defendant does not appear, or appearing, does
not object to the declaration, technical nicety or form in it will
§163.

not be required.
In such cases, pleadings having no claim
to form, and very little to substance, have been held good.”
It is no objection that there is no venue; nor in an action for
goods sold, that there is no averment that the goods were sold

and delivered by the plaintiff to the defendant; and that no
promise or undertaking by the defendant is stated.“ When
the declaration was “for moneys due on contract (lost by
ﬁre), damages for non-performance of contract, services ren
dered, money paid, goods sold and delivered,” it was held
that there was a variance, and that
the plaintiffs should have averred in
that the bond was
the declaration
made to them by the name mentioned
Supervisors of St. Joseph
in the bond:
v. Coifenbury, 1 Mich., 355.
21——See, ante, 5 30.
22—Groi! v. Griswold, 1 Denio, 432;
Klnyon v. Fowler, 10 Mich., 16; see
Soper v. Mills, 50 Mich., 75; 14 N.

But the declaration must
W. 704.
contain a substantial statement of a
Therefore, where a
cause of action.
plaintiff, in declaring against the in
dorser oi’ a note, merely presented the
note indorsed by the defendant, and
stated that he declared against the de
iendant as lndorser, without making
any statement or averment as to the
presentation of the note for payment,
and notice ot non-payment to the de
fendant, the declaration was held bad,
as those latter allegations were neces
sary to show the liability ot the de
fondant:
Barber v. Taylor, 1 Mich.,
352.
But when a declaration con
tains in substance a cause of action,
and to which the general issue is
pleaded, it will, after Judgment be pre
sumed that all inaccuracies and defects
in the plaintiff's statement of his case
were supplied by proof on the trial:
Stange v. Clement, 17 Micb.,
402.
Pleading and going to trial precludes
parties from setting up merely tech

nical detects.
where the declaration
contains a good case otherwise: Grand
Rapids & Indiana Ry. Co. v. South
wick, 30 Mlch., 446.
But the objec
tion that the declaration tails to state
any cause of action is not waived by
pleading tovthe merits; the point may
be made by an objection to the intro
duction oi.’ any evidence:
Stoﬂet v.
Marker, 34 Mich., 313; Jennlson v.
Ilaire, 29 Mich., 207.
Where the
statute has Ozpressly required the ex
istence of any tact, in order to give a
cause
of action, such fact must be
avcrrcd in the declaration:
Beaubien
v. Cicotte, 8 Mich., 12.
in declaring on a. statute, where
there is an exception in the enact
ing clause, the pleader must negative
the exception; but where there/-is no
exception in the enacting clause. but
an exemption in o. proviso to the enact
ing clause, or in a subsequent
sect on
oi! the act, it is a mutter oi’ defense,
and must be shown by the defendant:
Myers v. Carr, 12 Mlch., 71; Lynch
v. The People, 16 Mich., 472.
in construing statutes adopted from
the laws of other states, our courts
will apply the same construction as
given by the courts of the state from
which they were adopted:
Harrison
v. Sager, 27 Mich., 476.
23—Staii.'ord
183.
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“We have repeatedly held that pleadings in justices’
courts, as brief and imperfect as those in the present case,
were suﬁicient to let in the evidence, unless the party was
called on at the time of joining issue, to state his cause of
action or defense more at large.”‘15
When the defendant does
not demur, but goes to trial, and is fairly beaten on the merits,
the court above will overlook all defects of form, and of sub
stance too, in the pleadings.
But if the declaration does not
set forth a cause of action, if one is not made out by proof,
the judgment will be reversed. Thus, where the declaration al
leged that the defendant, or his family, set his dog on certain
swine of plaintilf, and proved that the daughter of defendant,
good.“

v. Rummeli, 5 Hill. 60;
Thus, where the plaintiff
declared verbally “on common counts
in assumpsit. and also on a hreach
of a written contract, now on ﬁle in
court, in all for three hundred dollars
or under," and the defendant pleaded
issue,
the general
it was held that.
under the liberal rules of pleading ap
plicable to justices’ courts. the declara
tion was sufficient. and that the con
tract referred to was admissible in evi
Bradshaw v. Mc
dence thereunder:
Laughlin. 39 Mlch., 480; see, Soper v.
Mills, 50 Mlch., 75; 14 N. W., 704.
by an aycnf—
Contract executed
When a contract purporting to be ex
respective
ecuted
the
lvy agents of
parties was set forth at length in the
declaration, and alleged to be the con
tract of the parties, the declaration
showing
was held sutllcient without
Re
how the agency was constituted:
gents. etc., v. The Detroit Y. M.‘s. S.,
12 Mlch., 138.
Consideration, how allc_r1cd—ln
de
clnring upon simple contracts. except
in those cases where the contracts
import a consideration. the
themselves
rules of pleading require the considera
tion to be set out. When the mode in
which the consideration is stated is
defective, informal or uncertain. the
declaration will be had on demurrer.
The consideration is required to be set
forth. that the court may sec that it
is of the kind and nature to sustain
and should he distinctly
the premises.
set out that the court may judge of it:
should state the
and the declaration
expressly
and
whole
consideration

24—Young

7

ilill.

503.

formally, correspondent with the facts
in the case, and co-extensive
with the
contract.
If the plaintiff may, in gen
eral terms. allege that there was a
consideration,
specifying
without
in
what it consists, it will be impossible
for the court, upon demurrer, to say,
from the declaration,
whether that
which the plaintiff considers a valid
consideration, is, in fact, one which
will support the action.
Therefore,
where the declaration
simply avers
that the promise was made for a good
and valuable consideration,
without
stating in what the consideration con
But, if
sists. it is clearly defective.
to such a declaration the defendant
should plead
the general
issue,
he
would be deemed to have waived his
right to a more speciﬁc statement of
consideration,
the
and the plaintiff
might prove a suﬂlcient consideration
under it. and the judgment would be
sustained:
Kean v. Mitchell. 13 Mlch.,
207; see Tillman v. Fuller. 13 Mlch.,
113; Comstock v. ilowd, 15 Mlch., 237.
But in a declaration on the common
counts in assumpsit, it is not neces
sary to set out the consideration, nor
to explain what it consisted of: Crane
v. Grassman. 27 Mlch., 443.
‘Vixen a
party claims pay for his services rend
cred under a special contract which he
has performed on his part, and noth
ing remains hut to receive payment in
money, he may declare upon the com
mon counts only, and need not set out
the special agreement: Crane v. Grass
man. 27 Mlch., 444.
25-—Young v. Rummell, 5 ilill, 60.
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not by his direction, set the dog on the hog, the judgment
was reversed, because the father was not answerable for the
act of his daughter, done without his authority or approval;
but the daughter, whether an infant or not, was answerable
for her own trespass.“ So, where the plaintiff declared for
the breach of a “verbal contract” in a case where the statute
of frauds required the contract to be in writing, and the de
fendant pleaded to the declaration, and on the trial, upon proof
of the parol contract, the defendant for that reason objected
that the contract was invalid, which objection was overruled,
the judgment rendered for the plaintiif was reversed?"
The

of Barber v. Taylor” may seem, at the ﬁrst view, to con
ﬂict with the above cases, but such is not the case. In a recent
case, the supreme court held that pleadings in a justice ’s court
should be viewed with liberality.
That technicalities in plead
ings in their courts should be discountenanced, and substance
instead of form required.
That the object of a pleading in
any court is to apprise the opposite party of the nature and
grounds of action or defense, as the case may be, so that there
should be neither misapprehension nor surprise on the trial as
to what matters are to be litigated.
That if a party is not
he
or
may
demur
sufficiently apprised,
demand a more full
and particular statement before joining an issue upon the
merits.
But if he pleads issuably, and goes to trial on the
case

merits without objection, he shall be, upon principle, estopped
from raising any objection afterwards to a pleading of the case
on _the ground of its suﬁiciency, either for want of substance
or sufficient speciﬁcation.”

But

may require the declaration to
contain all which is required by law to be set forth in it; that
The declaration will be
is, it must be correct in substance.
a party,

by demurring,

26—Tl!‘l't v. Tiﬂt, 4 Denio, 175.
1 Denio,
v. Armstrong,
550.
Where a thing is originally au
thorized by statute, which could not
be done at common law, then, in plead
ing, everything must he averted, which
the statute requires, to bring the act
Thus, in the case of a
done within it.
will of lands, it must be averred to be
in writing.
But where a statute makes
a writing necessary in a case where it
27-—Green

was not so at the common law, then
in pleading, it is not necessary to aver
that the writing was made; that the
writing was made is a matter of evi
dence to be shown upon the trial: Day
ton v. Williams, 2 Doug., Mich., 32.
28—1 Mich., 352.
29—Hurtford v. Holmes, 3 Mich.,
460.
And see cases ante, 55 159, 160,
notes 10 and 11.
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suﬂicient on general demurrer, if conformable, at the time, to
the rules of pleading applicable to the circuit court. A special
demurrer is not allowed.3°
§ 164.

Declarations

in actions by or against corporations.

In the pleadings “in actions by or against any corporation
created by or under any law of this state, it shall not be neces
sary to recite the act or acts of incorporation, or the proceed
ings by which such corporation was created, or to set forth the
substance thereof, but the same may be pleaded by reciting
the title of such act, and the date of its approval.”31
Declarations on judgments.-“In pleading a judg
§165.
ment or decision of a court or oﬁicer of special jurisdiction,
it shall be suﬁicicut to allege generally, that judgment or dc
cision was duly given or made.”32
§166. Pleading performance of condition and on open ac
c0unts.—“In pleading the performance of a condition prece
dent in a contract, it will be suﬂicient to allege generally, that
the party performed all the conditions on his part; if the
allegation be denied, the facts showing the performance must
be proved on the trial.”33
“Plaintiffs, in actions founded on open accounts, shall em
brace all claims then due on account, not exceeding twenty-ﬁve
dollars, or failing so to do, shall not recover costs in any subse
quent suit on claims not so embraced.”34
“A
30—-(‘. L., § 767: ante, 5 159.
general demurred to a declaration is
simply an objection to it on the ground
It can
that it is insuihcient in law.
not be doubted that in whatever form
it be put any objection in Justice's
court, by the defendant that the plain
tiff's declaration is insufficient in law,
would be held suﬂicient to constitute a
Stevens v. Harris,
general demurrer":
A
99 Mlch., 230, 233: 58 N. W., 230.
general demurrer is a waiver of objec
tions to jurisdiction over the person:
Thompson v. Michigan M. B. Assn.,
52 llilch.. 522: 18 N. W., 247; Norberg
v. iieineman, 59 Mlch., 210; 26 N. W.,
481.
31
C. L3, Q 10472; see, Wilson Sew
ing Machine (*0. v. Spears, 50 Mlch.,
534: 15 N. W., 804.
3i2—\"..

L.,

5 770.

In declaring on a Judgment rendered
by a Justice of the peace, the‘ usual
form applicable to judgments in courts
of record, without stating the particu
lar facts whereby the justice obtained
Jurisdiction,
Thus, on a
is suﬂicient.
judgment in assumpsit, a statement of
the amount of the judgment, and its
character as a judgment in assumpsit,
show aflirmatively that it was within
the general jurisdiction
of the justice
who rendered it, and no more in this
respect is required:
Goodsell v. Loon
ard, 23 Mlch., 374.
83—-C. L., 5 771.
L., Q 768; see. Town V.
34-—C.
Smith, 14 Mlch., 348; Dutton v. -“haw.
35 Mlch., 431; Morehouse v. Baker, 48
Mlch., 338; 12 N. W. 170; Minnaugh
v. Partlin, 67 Mlch., 391: 3-4 N. W.,
717.
This statute docs not make it
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Form of declaration.

§ 167.

m. JUSTICE 's comer.

v.

James Jackson.
Lenawee County, ss.

J

Before C . . . . . .B.
. . . . . ., a Justice of
in
the Peace
and for the County of
Lenawee.

James Stiles

35

James Stiles,“ plaintiﬂ’ in this suit, by C . . . . . . D . . . . . ., his
attorney (or, in his own proper person), complains of James

Jackson," the defendant herein, who has
answer

the said plaintiﬁ

in

a.

been summoned to
plea of trespass on the case

upon promises."
For that whereas heretofore to wit:. . . . . . (allege a time when
the cause of action arose), at to wit:. . . . . .(allege a place where
the cause of action arose, then state the cause of action and
conclude thus:3”) to the damage of the plaintiff of three hun
dred dollars,*°' and therefore he brings suit.
in case-s‘oi' an account made
of several items, to bring u single
action to recover all on penalty of hav
lug a. former judgment for u part suc
cessfully pleaded in bar of an action
its effect is simply
for another part.
to defeat a recovery for costs in the
Phelps v. Abbott, 116
second action:
Mich., 624; 74 N. W., 1010.
is
no local description
35—When
it is not essential to allege
necessary,
that the act took place in any particu
lar township or place named within
the county; it is suiﬁcient to aver that
But
it took place in the county only.
if the township or place be stated as
matter of description. as in the situa
tion ot premises, then a variance would
When a. transitory mutter
be fatal.
occurred out of "the county, it may, in
some cases, for the purpose of explain~
ing a fact, be necessary to state that
it occurred abroad. It the exact place
abroad be stated, it should be shown
under a videllcit (l. "e., to-wit): That
it happened in the county where the
In the town
suit is brought, thus:
ship of . . . . . ., in the county of Mon
In the township of
to-wit:
roe.
1
. . . . . ., in the county of Lenawee:
Chltty‘s PL, 10 Am. ed., 275.
30—See, ante, § 27.

See,

ante, § 28-31.

necessary,

37

up

38—See, ante, Q 36.

39—ln stating the cause of action,
it is not necessary to allege more than
will constitute a prima facle or suin
Atty. Gen'l v. Michigan
cient cause:
State Bank, 2 Doug., 361.
Under a
general allegation of damage, a party
is entitled to recover those damages
only which the law presumes to have
accrued from the act complained of:
Burrei v. The N. Y. 8: S. S. Co., 14
But where the party has
Mich.. 34.
sustained a special injury or damage,
such as the law would not ordinarily
presume to result from the wrong com
plained oi’, such special damages must
be alleged and set forth in the declara
tion. otherwise the plaintii! would not
be allowed to recover for them: Fuller
v. Bowker, 11 Mich., 204; Gilbert v.
Kennedy. 22 ‘Mich.
40—’I‘his sum ls, in general. the
amount to which the court has Juris
diction in the particular action.
The
sum must not exceed the jurisdiction
of a Justice in the particular action.
or the whole proceeding would be void:
Rockwell v. Perine, 5 Barb., 574: see,
ante, § 37.
So, where the justice had
jurisdiction
to ﬁfty dollars, and the
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declaration
contained
three
counts
claiming fifty dollars, and had no con
clusion stating the amount claimed,
it was held, on appeal, that the suit
must be dismissed for want of juris
diction: Swlft v. Woods, 5 Blacki'.,
97, 357.
But when, in such a case,
the parties are in court before the Jus
tice, the declaration may be amended:
\\'ooley v. Wilber. 4 Denio, 570: 16
Mlch., 326; ante, § 37.
But ii’, at the close oi’ his declara
tion, he claims a speciﬁed
sum
for
damages.
which is intended to include
all his damages under the declaration,
he cannot have judgment
for more
Kenyon v. Woodward,
than that sum:
16 Mich., 326.
Where a declaration
contains two counts, the ﬁrst of which
closes without any all damnum clause.
and the second states a cause of action
not within the jurisdiction of the jus
tice,
but
closes
with a general
ad
damnum. inserted at the end of the
declaration, this clause will be deemed

§ 167

to apply to the ﬁrst count as well as
to the second: Sheldon v. Sullivan, 45
it does not
Mich., 32-i; 7 N. W., 900.
seem
necessary,
in a declaration in

Justice's court, to state the amount oi’
damages
claimed: and that it no spe
ciﬁed sum is claimed, it will be intended
that the plaintiff claimed damages to
the amount of the Justice's jurisdiction.
Therefore, where s plaintiff declared on
counts, claiming damages
the common
thereunder to the amount of $100, and
in the same declaration declared on
c(rtain promissory notes, but did not
specify the amount of damages claimed
under the counts on the notes, it was
held that he was not limited in his re
covery 10 the sum of $100. as the $100
damages
mentioned in the declaration
referred only to his claim under the
common
count:
Pew v. Yoare, 12
.\iicli., 18. But there must be an alle
gation of damages,
since it does not
necessarily follow that plaintiff is in
jured in the particular case.
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§173. in abatement of
§17~i To the action of
5171

5183:
§184.

of plaintlﬁ.
of defendant.
the proces.

§ 185.
$5186.
£5187.

the process.

AND IN ABATEMENT.
Strict construction of.
Must be veriﬁed.
Form of judgment.
The plea of coverture.
plaintiffs.
Of nonjolndcr—of
Of nonjolndel'—of defendants.
Of evidence to sustain plea.
Of misjoinder of parties.
Of misnomer.
Of pendency of another action.
Of joinder of causes of action.
Of misjolnder of counts.
Of dividing causes of action.

IN GENERAL.
§168. Kinds of pleas and order of pleading them.—Pieas
of two sorts: dilatory pleas, and pleas to the action. Dila
tory plea-s are such as tend merely to delay or put off the suit,
by questioning the propriety of the remedy, or the correctness
of the procedure as taken, rather than by denying the injury.
Pleas to the action are such as to dispute the very cause of
suit}
The order always to be observed in pleading, is:

are

a.—To the jurisdiction
b.—To the disability of the person.
1.—Of the plaintiff.
2.—Of the defendant.
the process.
1.—To the form of the process.
2.—To the action of the process.
d.—To the action itself in bar of it.

c.—T0

By this order of pleading,
1-——3Black.

C0m.,

301.

each subsequent plea admits that
/
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there is. no foundation for the former, and the defendant is
precluded from pleading any matter prior in point of order to
that upon which judgment to answer over has been given
against him; and after a plea. in bar to the action, the defend

ant cannot plead in abatement, unless for matter arising after
the commencement of the suit? ‘Nor can a plea in bar and a
plea in abatement be pleaded at the same time.” In uch a
case, if the plea in bar is ﬁrst, the plea in abatement may be
disregarded.‘
Where, after having pleaded in abatement, the
defendant pleads in bar, he waives his ﬁrst plea.“ By pleading
according to the above arrangement, the defendant may go
through the whole series.
OF‘

PLEAS TO THE JURISDICTION.

§169. Jurisdiction-—what it is.—The justice must have au
thority to determine the particular question presented and to
command the particular persons interested in that determina
Authority in the justices’
tion, to enforce the determination.
courts to decide particular classes of cases comes from the
statutes deﬁning the jurisdiction of these courts, and within
the limits of this authority these courts are said to have “juris
diction of the subject matter.” Authority to command the
persons interested comes from the statutes prescribing what
classes of persons (usually determined by residence) may be
so commanded by the justice, and through their voluntarily
2—1 Chit. PL, 10 Am. ed., 441;
Cook v. Ferrsl, 13 Wend., 285; Palmer
v. Evcrtson. 2 Cow., 417.
3—Palmer v. Evertson, 2 Cow., 417;
Smith v. Elder, 3 .lohns., 105; Burn
Oontm
hum v. Webster, 5 Mass., 266.
in the circuit
court in Michigan by

virtue of circuit court rule number 8:
Fraternity v. Wayne Cir.
National
Judge, 127 Mich., 186; 86 N. W., 240.
Pepoon, 2 Johns.
4-—Jcnkins
v.
Cases, 313.
5-—-Burnham
v. Webster, 5 Mass,
266-268.
Matter which is merely in
denial of the piaintiifs right of action
but
is never pleadablc in abatement,
Morgan v.
must be pleaded in bar:
Butterileld, 3 Mich. 625.
Under cir
cuit court rule No. 6. a defendant may.

in circuit courts, plead in abatement
and at same time plead the general
issue and not lose the beneﬁt of his
plea in abatement.
This rule is con
strued to include pleas to the juris
diction as weii as the plea in abate
ment:
National Fraternity v Wayne
Circui; Judge, 127 Mich., 186; 86 N.
Grant, J., uses the follow
W., 540.
ing language in the opinion in the last
named case: “Chitty and other writers
upon pleading recognize a distinction
pleas to the jurisdiction
between
and
pleas in abatement.
We think, how
ever, under the practice and decisions
in the courts of this state, a plea to
the jurisdiction is included in the term
‘plea in abatement‘
used in the rule."
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themselves to this authority (as in the case of
plaintiﬁs, and defendants who waive the service of process)
or through their being brought under this authority through
the service of compulsory process, as is the case usually with
submitting

When this authority exists as to a particular
is said to have “jurisdiction of the person.”
the
court
person
defendants.

Parties cannot confer, by consent or otherwise, jurisdiction
of the subject matter!’ Speciﬁc provisions of the statutes de
termine whether the justice has authority to determine a case
like that presented, and questions of whether the court has
authority of this sort are determined by the application of
these statutes.

As to jurisdiction of the person, while it is true that in
all cases the court must have this jurisdiction before it can
pass a. judgment aifecting the person, yet it is not essential
that this shall be gained through the service of compulsory
process for appearance. Any conduct which in effect acknowl
edges this authority of the court is as effective as the service
of compulsory process.

A justice may sometimes be shorn of jurisdiction, which
otherwise he might possess, by reason of some speciﬁc rule of
law, either common or statutory, as in the case of interest in
the controversy to be submitted to him or relationship to the
parties or one of them.
Objections to jurisdiction and effect of absence of
§170.
jurisdiction.—Objections to the jurisdiction of the justice may
be made at any stage of the proceedings, in case he has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit, or he has not
In all
obtained jurisdiction of the person of the defendant.

such cases, the whole proceedings would be void.
Thus, if
a warrant or attachment issues without the requisite proof by
affidavit, the proceedings would be void._ If, however, the de
fendant should, in such a case, appear and join issue, the ob
jection would be thereby waived, and the subsequent proceed
ings would be valid."

If

a justice,

6—Farrand v. Bentley, G Ml¢h., 281;
Moore V. Ellls, 18 Mlch., 77 ; Attorney

without consent of parties,

444;
General v. Mollter.
26
Mlcl:|..
Stephenson's Case, 32 Mlch., 60.
7——Swartout
v. Roddls, 5 Hill, 118.
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try a cause which he is prohibited from trying by reason of
aﬁinity or consanguinity to either of the parties, the judg
ment would be void.“
In all such cases, the defendant may
plead to the jurisdiction of the court, or he may object at any
time, whenever the objection is not waived by pleading.”
OF PLEAS

IN ABATEMENT.

is

-,1‘

§171. Pleas m the asthma? of the plaintiff are, that he is
not in existence, being only a ﬁctitious person or d.ead,‘° that
he died since the commencement of the suit, but if there are
more than one plaintiif or defendant, and any die, and the
that the
cause of action survives, the suit does not abate
an infant, and has declared in person or by attorney,
plaintiff

Saund. Pi.

6; Schermerhorn

Ev.,

Am. ed.,
Johns.,
N. H.. 345:
i‘lck., 552; C.
5

12-1

2. and (‘lnrk v. Mlkeseli,
-15 N. W., 377.

v. Jenkins,

7

45;

&

8-Anic.
81 Mlch..

5

a

is

a

it
it is

a

it

is

a married wo
and not by next friend ;‘2 that the plaintiff
man," or married after the commencement of suit." If she
may be pleaded puis dar. cont."
marry after imue joined,
When married woman has no interest whatever in the subject
defense
matter of the action, and improperly sues alone,
or
issue,"
defendant
may
in
general
plead
the
abate
under
good pica that plaintiﬁs suing as husband and wife
ment. It
are not married ;" and this objection will not avail under the
general issue."

373; Young v. Young.
Blood v. liarrington,
10455-10465.
L»
13—Mllner v. Miines,

ment.

14—Morgan
v. Painter,
'i‘erm.,
Vt., 545:
265: Bates v. Stevens,
205;
Swan v. Wilkinson.
14 .\iass..
Rlackf., ‘.‘.\i\‘.
Templeton v. Clary.

'I‘erm..

627.

4

15—Le Bret v., Paplllon.
East.
But as to suits by and against
married women, under present Michi
gan statutes, see, post.
178 nnd notes.
502.

Q

1

5

Am. ed.,
16-1 Saund. Pi.
I-Iv..
Term R., 361.
7: Caudeil v. Shaw,
Ev., 7;
Bac. Ab.,
17-Saund. Pi.
“Abate," (G).

Strange.
1&—i)ickenson v. Davis,
480; Ricket and Wife v. Stanley,
Blackt., 169; Coombs and Wile v. Wil

175

6

1

a

Q

11——(‘. L..
10121: Newberry v.
This rule
Trowhridize. 13 Mich.. 275.
is applied in case where the action is
joined with the
against
principal
On the death of
suretles on his bond.
in
the action proceeds
the principal
it is
of the survivors.
names
the
erroneous to bring in the personal
lieaiy
representative of the deceased:
v. Newton, 96 Mich., 228; 55 N. W.,
So in the case ot the death ot
666.
Van Kleeck v. McCabe,
one partner:
87 Mich.. 599; 49 N. W.. 872.

1

John., 308;

4 G:

19

&

io—Doe v. Penﬂeid,
Archl)old's I‘i.. 304.

4

6

3

N

8

3

9—in Clark v. Mikeseli, 81 Mich.,
45; 45 N. W., 377, the question of
disqualiﬁcation of the justice by reason
or interest was raised by plea in abate

I
or

§ 172

PLEAS IN ABATEMENT.

CH. X.

in_

When a domestic corporation sues, and the defendant wishes
to deny the existence of such corporation, he may either plead
in abatement, or give notice under his plea of the general
issue, that the plaintiffs are not a corporation,
and annex
thereto an aﬁidavit of .the truth of such plea or notice."
“In suits or proceedings by or against any corporation, a
the naming of such corporation shall be pleaded in
mistake
abatement; and if not so pleaded, shall be deemed to have
been wa.ived.””°

a

5

2

4

5

1

3

5

it

a

_

5

2

1

&

4

1

1

5

Supervisors, 38 liich., 532.
Formerly
the existence of plaintii! as a corpora
tion could only be tested by plea in
abatement:
Boston Type Foundry v.
Spooner,
Vermont, 93; Proprietors of
Kennebeck v. Call,
M888.,
485;
Conard v. Atlantic Ins. Co.,
Peters,
450: Society for the Propagation &c.
v. Town of Pawiet,
ID1'd., 501.
21—'1‘l1e
Merchants‘
Farmers’
Bank v. Dakin, 24 Wend., 411; Bur
gess v. Abbott,
Hill. 476; Hawks v.
Hill, 200; Mitchell v. Cham
Munger,
bers, 43 Mich., 150;
N. W.. 57; see.
Mcintosh v. Mcintosh, 79 Mich., 198;
44 N. W., 592.
22-—Arch. Pi., 289, 291.
It
cor
poration, when detendant is misnamed,
advantage oi‘
can only he taken by
plea in abatement:
C. L.,
10473.
23-Mllner v. Miines,
Term. R.,
627;
Chitty's Pi., 10 Am. ed.. 449.
24—1 Chitty's Pi., 449: Crockett v.
Ross and Wife,
Greenlt. R., 445;
Durgin v. Leighton, 10 Mass, 58.
25—(‘ooper V. Hunchin,
East., 521.
26-—Marshaii v. Rutton,
Term. R..
545.
As to suits against married wo
men under Michigan statutes, see, post,
178 and notes.
8

1

&

a

5

1

§

liams, 15 Mass.. 243. As to the rights
or married women in the courts of the
178 and notes.
state, see. poet,
Insanity of the plaintii! when suit
is said to be n good
was commenced,
Chitty’s PL, 10
plea in abatement:
Am. ed., -449, n. 1.
A plea of the
L.,
10471.
19—(?.
general issue with no notice to the con
in
trary admits corporate existence
Gar
case of a domestic corporation.
ton v. Nat’i Bank, 34 Mich., 279; Wil
son S. M. Co. v. Spears. 50 Mich., 534;
15 N. W., 894; Manhard Hardware Co.
121 Mich., 6-37; 80 N.
v. Rothschild,
W., 707.
This statute in terms is applicable to
As to
only.
domestic corporations
whether a like result would follow at
the common law in cases of corpora
tions generally is not clear upon au
thority.
It is held in Michigan, how
ever, that a plea of the general issue
puts piaintii! to his proof of corporate
foreign corporation:
character, if
Mechanics B. oi’ M. v. Troy
Farmers
Doug., Mich., 457; Owen
City Bank,
Bani: of Sandstone,
v.
Farmers
Doug., Mich., 138.
10473; Johr v. St. Clair
20—C. L.,

5

is

it

is

is

To the disability of the defendant.—Nonjoinder or
§172.
misjoinder of parties as defendants,
cause for plea in abate
ment;2‘ and so, that the defendant
or, that the
I'iiiSI13.Il1€d;22
defendant was a. married woman at the time of action
brought.“ If the defendant marry after the commencement
cannot be pleaded even in abatement;24 and
of the suit,
plaintiﬁ may in that case proceed to judgment against her.”
The coverture of the defendant, when the supposed contract
defense in bar of the suit.“
was entered into,
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Pleas in abatement of the process are, that a war
§173.
rant or attachment issued without the requisite affidavit; privi
lege from arrest upon a warrant; or, from the service of other
process.”

The

defendant

may also

make these

objections

without pleading." So he may show that a return of personal
service of the summons is untrue; as, where a summons against
the father was served on the son, but returned personally
served on the father, it was held
show that it had not been served
the defendant did not appear, and
ice as error, and for that cause the

that the defendant might
In this case
upon him.”
assigned the want of serv
judgment was reversed.

§174. Pleas to the'action of the process are, that another
action is pending for the same cause in another court in this
state.-"0
To an action on a judgment, a writ of certiorari pend
ing may be pleaded; but it must appear by the plea that the
writ was brought prior to the commencement of the action,
and that the requisite steps were taken to render it a super
sedeas to the execution.“
An appeal would have the same
effect on a justiee’s judgment.
A plea in abatement personal to one of two defendants can
not be pleaded by both.“
_

Plea in abatement strictly construed.-Great accuracy
in the form of all pleas in abatement, as well in
commencement as in the conclusion, for it is said they make
plea."

§ 175.

is necessary
the
the

2T-King v. Colt, 4 Day, 129; Hub
bard v. Sanborn, 2 N. IL, 468: Van
586;
Alstine v. Dearborn, 2 Wend.,
iialsey v. Steward, 1 Southard, 366:
Gilbert v. Vanderpooi, 15 Johns., 242.
While according to the rules of the
lay a plea in abatement was
common
the proper method of raising questions
of this sort, under the practice as now
recognized it is proper to raise them
by motion to dismiss for the defect:
Stringer v. Dean. 61 Mich., 196; 27 N.
W., 886.
28—!laisey v. Steward, 1 Southard.
Defective service can be objected
366.
to only hy motion or plea in abate
it is too late after pleading to
ment.
4
Dwight,
v.
Pollard
the merits:
U. S., 3
Cranch., 421: Fnrrnr
v.
19

Peters, 459; Tiiton v. Parker. 4 N. 11.,
142: Morse v. Caiiey, 5 N. H., 223.
It is otherwise with void process:

3; see
v. l-‘igglns.
1 Breese.
v. Huckins, 6 Mas:-1., 309.
29——Fitch v.‘ Devlin, 15 Barb., 47.

Coleen

Hart

30—llowne V. Joy, 9 Johns.. 221.
The defense of a former suit pending
can only be raised by a plea in abate
Ryan v. Mills. 129 Mlch.. 170;
ment:
88 .\'. W., R92.
But an action pending
in the court of another state cannot be
Ibid.; Neweli v. Newton,
so pleaded:
10 I’ick., 470.
Pepoon, 2 Johns.
31—Jenklns
v.
Cases,

312.

32—Shannon
456.
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The plea must have the highest degree of certainty and pre
cision. Every allegation necessary to make out the case cov
ered by
and every fact which
alleged by the other side
would defeat the plea, must be distinctly and not inferentially
forth. Such a plea must be certain to every intent, and be
It must not state different
pleaded without any repugnancy.
facts having no relation to each other!“
set

must be veriﬁed.—“No plea in abatement, or
plea, which does not involve the merits of the
received by any court, unless the party offering
prove the truth i thereof by aﬂidavit, or by some
other evidence/’35

Plea
§176.
other dilatory
action, shall be
such plea shall

it

is

is

This aﬂidavit or evidence must be positive as to the truth of
every fact contained in the plea, leaving nothing to be col
Belief will not answer; the party must
lected by inference.
swear without qualiﬁcation, that the plea
true in substance
and matter of fact.“
It not necessary that the affidavit should be by the party
himself;
may be by his attorney, or even by a stranger."

is

If the truth of the plea appear to the court upon an inspection
of its own records or proceedings, an affidavit or other evi
not necessary."
dence

again. The judgment for the defendant,
the suit abate.”

in all cases,

is

is,

i_t

is

The form of judgment on plea in abatement.—If an
§177.
issue of fact, joined on a plea in abatement, be found for the
ﬁnal that he recover; but on de
plaintiff, the judgment
that the defendant answer over; that is, plead
murrer,
that

§178. Consideration of the special defense of c0verture.—
The defendant’s coverture, when the supposed contract was
10070.

v.

Cowman,

Hill,

608.

17s

39-1

it

v. Sidneﬂ'.

Chitty's

Pi., 466.

B.

&

38—Gray

Pl., 463. But
must
before the declaration
must be properly and
in the cause:
Ibld.
3

37—1 Chitty‘s
not be sworn to
is filed.
And
exactly entitled

it

1

-

36-—i\'lngslnnd

5

3.'>—C. L., §§ 767.

1 8

Mlcb., 500:
34—Belden v. Laing.
Findley v. The People.
Mich.. 234;
Mlch., 254; lleyman
Wales v. Jones,
157; Dubois v.
v. Coveil, 36 Mich.,
And gener
Henderson, 40 Mlch., 262.
ally it must set up matters not ap
parent on the face of the declaration.
The few exceptions are where certain
defects or defenses are waived it not
specially pleaded: ilinman v. Eaklns,
26 Mich., 82.

P., 397.
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entered into, is available as a defense under the general issue."
If the parties are sued as husband and wife when they were
not, the fact that they were not is a defense under the general
issue.“

This plea will not avail, if the husband be imprisoned in the
prison for life,"'2, or divorced a vinculo matr-im0nii,*3 or
from bed and board,“ or if the wife shall have come from any
other state or country into this state, without her husband,
he having never lived with her in this state“ or where she
made the contract under authority from the court of probate ;‘°
all which may be replied to the plea. But it is no answer to
the plea that the husband and wife have separated, and that
the wife has a separate maintenance secured to her by deed."
But in this state, the rules, as they were at the common law,
in relation to the joinder of husband and wife, are very much
changed by the statute in respect to the rights of married
women. The following provisions have been enacted:
state

“The real and personal estate of every female, acquired be
fore marriage, and all property, real and personal, to which she
may afterwards become entitled, by gift, grant, inheritance,
devise, or in any other manner, shall be and remain the estate
and property of such fegnale, and shall not be liable for the
debts, obligations and engagements of her husband, and may
be contracted, sold, transferred, mortgaged, conveyed, devised
or bequeathed by her, in the same manner and with the like
effect as if she were unmarried/’43
-l0—Marshaii

v. Rutton,

8 Term.

545.

-ll—8inciair

Rep.,

842.

v.

Iiervey,

2

R..

Chitty's

42—C. L., i 8620.
43—Lewis v. Lee. 3 B. & C., 291.
-H—(‘, L., 5 8682.
45-0. L.. 5 8678. A married wo
man residing in another state cannot,
to
con
pleading disqualiﬁcation
by
tract, evade payment of notes given
by her for goods purchased in Michi
gan.,
without showing that the laws
of that state do so disqualify her. Notes
authorized by Michigan laws are not
to be void, nor is it
to he presumed
conceded that such notes made in this
state would be void, notwithstanding
to contract in
the woman's inability

the state of her residence:
Wheeler
v. Constantine, 39 Mlch., 62.
46—C. L., 5 8670.
47—Marshall
v. Rutton, 8 Term R.,
545.

48—C. L., 5 8690.
She
has the
same power over her property, in all
respects.
that she had while unmar

ried: Starkweathpr v. Smith. 6 Mich.,
377; Farr v. Sherman, 11 Mich., 33.
She may contract in relation to her
sole property the same as it she were
unmarried, and her contracts of sale
and purchase of property, and her obli
zations incurred in relation to her sole
property, are to be treated the same.
and she may be sued thereon the same
as if she were unmarried:
Durfee v.
McCiarg.
232; Burdeno v.
8 Mich..
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Actions may be brought by and against a married woman
in relation to her sole property, in the same manner as if she
were unmarried, and inlcases where the property of the hus
Amperse, 14 Mlch., 95; Starkweather
v. Smith, 6 Mlch., 377; Tong v. Mar
vin, 15 Mlch., 60; People v. llorton,
67; Moore v. Foote, 34
4 Mlch.,
Mlch., 443.
And she may mortgage
her own property to secure a debt
Watson
owing by her husband alone:
Wife's
457.
11 Mlch.,
v. Thurber,
power to make contracts is not gen
eral, but statutory, and cannot be ex
and
the constitutional
tended
beyond
Kenton Ins. Co. v.
statutory limits:
McClellan, 43 Mlch., 565; 6 N. W., 88.
She has no power to make contracts
except concerning her separate estate,
which must be either by making agree
ments concerning property already pos
sessed, and referring to it, or else con
cerning property acquired by the con
tract, or in consideration ot it: John
son v. Sutherland, 39 Mlch., 579; West
28 Mlch., 464; Jenne v.
v. Laraway,
There must be
Marble, 37 Mlch., 319.
the contract
a direct relation between
Reed v. Bays. 44
and the property:
She cannot
Mlch., 82; '6 N. W., 111.
incur a mere personal obligation uncon
nected with property and not charging
it: Jenne v. Marble. 37 Mlch., 121.
The test of the validity oi’ a married
woman's contract ls, does it or does it
estate:
not deal with her individual
Russell v. People's Savings Bank, 39
Mlch., 671.
A married woman whose
to her the
husband has transferred
and the personal property
homestead
about the house and agreed to pay her
$100 per year during life in considera
tion or her release of dower and all
claims present and future to his prop
erty is competent to contract for a
Barber v. Eberle's
nurse for herself:
Estate, 131 Mlch., 317; 91 N. W., 123.
an action
A wife cannot maintain
against her husband for n personal
tort committed upon her while living
Bandiield v.
as husband and wife:
Bandﬂeid. 117 Mlch., 80; 75 N. W.,
A wife is not liable on a note
287.
given by her jointly with her husband
purchased by
for personal property
Caldwell v. Jones. 115
them jointly:
A wife
Mlch., 129; 73 N. W., 129.
may convey her property to pay hus

band's debts:
Kleldsen v. Blodgett,
113 Mlch., 655; 72 N. W., 9: see Citi
zen's Savings Bank v. Darling,
110
Mlch., 227; 68 N. W., 132.
So she
may give her note to pay husband's
debt and to prevent an attack upon a
conveyance
by her husband to her:
Mlch.,
Whelpley
Stoughton,
v.
112
594; 70 N. W., 1098.
She is not liable
for servants in the house and on the
farm owned by her husband, though
hired by her:
Kirt v. Kropili 110
Mlch., 51; G1 N. W., 1080.
A mere
incidental beneﬁt to her property will
Detroit C.
not support her contract:
ot C. v. Goodman, 110 Mlch., 498: 68
N. W., 295.
Nor will her undertak
ings bind her, unless it is made ai‘iirma
tiveiy to appear that it is within her
powers, and relates to or concerns her
Russell
separate property or estate:
v. I'eopie‘s Savings Bank, supra; Pow
ers v. Rnssell, 28 Mlch., 179; 28 Mit-h..
supra; West v. Laraway, 28
466-7,
Mlch., 465.
There is no presumption
of the validity ot a married woman's
contract, whether negotiable or not.
hence proof must always he given it
such a consideration will bind her:
Kenton ins. Co. v. Mt-Ciellan, 43 Mlch.,
565; 6 N. W., 88; Buhler v. Jennings,
And the
49 Mlch., 538; 14 N. W., 488.
burden of proof is on the plaintiif to
show that the contract is within her
powers: 28 Mlch., 466-7, supra. A wire
may contract with her husband, and en
torce such contracts, in relation to her
separate estate: Randall v. Randall, 37
Mlch., 563.
A husband cannot make
a valid agreement with the wife to
pay her for her services as keeper of
Such contract is without
his house.
against
public
and
consideration
policy: Michigan Trust Co. v. Chapin,
106 Mlch., 384; 64 N. W., 334.
may
A married -woman
carry on
business in her own name. and for
that purpose may make herself liable
She
for purchases _made on credit.
may also employ her husband to art
on such
as her agent in carrying
business: and the fact that her hus
band, by reason ot ﬁnancial embarrass
ment,
is unable to carry on business
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cannot be sold, mortgaged or otherwise encumbered,
without the consent of his wife, to be given in the manner
prescribed by law, or when his property is exempted by law
from sale on execution or other ﬁnal process issued from any
court against him, his wife may bring an action in her own
name, with the like effect as in cases in actions in relation to
her sole property as aforesaid.”1
band

in his own name for the support of
his family. is no impediment to the
wife's engaging in business for that
Nor would a business thus
purpose.
carried on by the wife for the purpose
of keeping property purchased by her
from the reach of her husband's credit
ors, be a fraud on his creditors, unless
result were to hinder,
the necessary
delay or defraud such creditors in the
A purchase
collection of their debts.
by the wife of property which would
of
never have come to the possession
either husband or wife. except in pur
of an understanding that she
suance
should be the purchaser and carry on
by means of it, cannot wrong
business
Where one
the husband's creditors.
refuses to sell to the husband, not be
ing willing to trust him, but is willing
to trust the wife on credit, and sells
to her In good faith, the title of the
property will not pass, contrary'to
the intent of both parties, to the hus
baud for the beneﬁt of his creditors,
who could not be wronged by n sale
to her. and have no right to insist on
Rankin v.
a sale to the husband:
West, 25 Mich., 195. As to the rights
0! the wife in personal property pur
chased by her and her husband joint
ly: See Wait v. Bovee, 35 Mich., 425.
She may sue and
1—C. L., i 8692.
be sued alone and in her own name,
her own contracts and obliga
upon
Thus, where n married woman
tions.
purchased goods and furniture on her
own credit, to be used in a boarding
was
house,
business of which
the
carried on and managed solely by her
self. she was sued alone and held
15
$l1lI(‘k|@!0l1Tillman
V.
liable:
Mich., 447; Gilliam v. Boynton. 36
Mich., 236.
And so, where a woman,
having an estate of her own, and liv
ing with her husband. purchased goods
used in the husband's family, such as
but solely on her
family necessaries,

own credit and agreement
to pay:
Campbell v. White. 22 .\iici1., 178. iiut
a woman purchasing goods suitable for
ordinary family use, of one who knows
that she is n married woman and liv
ing with her husband,
but does not
claim to be buying upon her o\vn indi
viduai account, the inference would be
that she was buying upon her hus
band's account and for the use of his
family, and in the absence of any ex
press agreement she would not thereby
render herself liable to pay for them:
Powers v. Russell, 26 Mich., 17!); see
also Kirt v. Kropp, 110 Mich., iii: I57
N. W., 10.80.
She cannot bind henseif
to pay the board of her sister, the
contract having no reference
to her
separate property:
June v. Lnbadie,
132 Mich., 135: 92 N. W., 937.
A married woman may sue alone in
respect
to her separate interests and
estate:
Wilson v. Coolidge, 42 Mich.,
112: 3 N. W., 285; Glover v. Alcott,
11 Mich., 489.
And so, for her per
sonal service rendered for another:
Mason v. Dunbar, 43 Mich., 407; 5 N.
W., 432.
And she can hire out, with
her husband's consent, and can sue for,
and recover,
and keep her earnings,
even where the hiring is to n firm in
which her husband is n partner: and
in such case, a settlement by the hus
band with the ﬂrm for her wages,
without her authority, the ﬂrm having
knowledge of her claims at the time,
will not dcbar her from suing and re
covering against
firm for the
the
and if the husband is jointly
wages,
liable with the other members of the
firm, he must be made a defendant in
Benson
v. Mor
the suit with them:
gan and others, 50 Mich., 77; 14 N.
W., T05.
Nor is it any defense to a
suit by a wife on a claim against a
firm of which her husband was a mem
ber, that other partners have been in
jured by his frauds to which she was
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be liable to

be sued upon any contract made by such married woman in
relation to her sole property, and the wife shall be liable to
be sued upon any contract or engagement made by her in
not a party: .\ioore v. Foote, 34 Mlch.,
Nor will a wife's suit upon a
443.
chose in action, of which she is the
by her hus
sole owner, be defeated
Black
band's former recovery on it:
wood v. Brown, 32 Mlch., 104.
But it seems that she is liable only
upon her contracts and obligations
respect or in relation to
made with
her sole property:
Glover v, Alcott,
Therefore, where a
11 Mlch., 470.
woman joined with her husband in
making a promissory note, to secure
a debt owing by him alone, she was
was
held not liable, as the engagement
not made with reference to her own
property, and she received no consid
De Vrles v.
eration for signing it:
Conkling, 22 Mlch., 255; Emery v.
Lord, 26 Mlch., 431; Ross v. Walker.
31 Mlch., 120; Barnes v. Brown, 32
Mlch., 146.
A wife's note, given for property
Gillam v.
purchased by her, ls valid:
But. giving
Boynton, 36 Mlch., 236.
her note, or making a contract merely
for the payment of money, creates no
West v. Laraway,
lien on her estate:
28 Mlch., 464.
But the note of a married woman
will not be valid, unless made upon a
consideration running to herself, and
such consideration must be shown be
fore any recovery can be had upon it
against her:
Buhler v. Jennings, 49
And if she
Mlch., 538; 14 N. W., 488.
is in fact not liable, her oral admission
of liability upon it will not bind her:
Ibid.
She must be connected
with the
consideration, or she will not be bound.
Where a. wife signed a note with her
husband merely because he requested
her to, but without any knowledge as
to what the note was to be used for,
the fact that it was afterwards, with
out her knowledge, used to pay a judg
ment against her husband and herself,
will not make the note binding on her,
she never having given it or authorized
it to be given for that purpose: Schlat
terer v. Nickodemus, 51 Mlch., 627: 17
N. W.. 210.
She may, however, give
her note to pay her husband's debt if,

in consideration of her so doing, a
contemplated attack upon a convey
ance from her husband to her ls to be
abandoned:
Whelpley v. Stoughton.
112 Mlch., 594; 70 N. W., 1093.
She may transfer a note belonging
to herself by her own lndorsement. and
thereby make herself liable, if it is
done for the beneﬁt of her own estate.
But the statute does not enable her
to bind herself by an indorsement made
merely for the beneﬁt of another.
She
cannot pledge her personal responsi
bility merely as surety for another.
She cannot even indorse the note of a
corporation of which she is a stock
holder, and thereby pledge her personal
liability for its beneﬁt, the corpora
tion being a distinct person, in the
law, from herself:
Russell v. People's
Savings Bank, 39 Mlch., 671.
A marrledwoman cannot bind her
self by a contract oi’ suretyship; such
a contract
is not within the words
or spirit of the statute:
Russell v.
People's Savings Bank, 39 Mlch., 671:
Kitchell v. Mudgett, 37 Mlch., 81;
Gantz v. Toies, 40 Mlch., 725.
She
cannot make herself personally liable
for the debt or obligation of another
where no consideration passes to her
for that purpose:
De Vries v. Conk
ling, 22 Mlch., 255; Reed v. Buys, 44
Mlch., 80.
Nor be personally bound
with her husband or any other person
as surety, by mere personal promise:
Jenne v. Marble, 37 Mlch., 321: Emery
Mlch.,
431;
Lord,
Ross v.
v.
26
Walker, 31 Mich.. 120; West v. Lara
way, 28 Mlch., 465.
And so, she was held not liable on
her covenant of warranty contained in
a deed made by her husband and her
self to convey
lands owned by him
alone:
Hovey v. Smith, 22 Mlch., 170.
While a married woman is not liable
upon her promissory note given for
the purpose of securing the debt of her
husband, yet if there was any_ equitable
obligation on her part to pay the debt
for which the note was given. as, if
it were for materials furnished and
used in improving her property with
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Of nonjoinder-of plaintiﬂ's.—When

joint

tractor, tcnant in common, or a party who has received

objection, or verbally consenting there
to: Holman v. Giliett, 24 Mlch., 414.
A wife may sustain an action in her
own name for damages for an assault
and battery upon her without joining
Berger v. Jacobs, 21
her husband:
Mich" 215; Hyatt v. Adams, 16 Mich.,

183

3

without the writen consent of his wife,
she knowing of the sale and making no

1

A

sale of property by the husband.
though exempt from execution, is valid

4

1

98.

con

joint

198.
And for defamation of her char
acter:
Leonard v. Pope, 27_ Mich..
145. But
not against her husband:
Wagner v. Wayne Circuit Judge: no
opinion was ﬂied in this case, but the
conclusion of the court is stated in the
opinion ﬂied in Bandﬂeid v. Bandiield.
117 Mlch., 80: 75 N. W., 287.
A wife
may maintain an action for the aliena
tion of her husband's affections:
War
ren
v.
Warren,
89
Mich.,
123:
50 N. W., 842.
Such actions should
be bmllglll
by the Wife
alone,
and
not jointly with her husband:
Mich
igan Central
Ry. Co.
v.
(bleman,
28 Mlch., 440; Burt v. Mcilain.
29
Mich., 262.
And the husband also
can sue alone for his damages
result
ing from an assault. such as loss of
services and society of the wife, and
his expenses in caring for and pro
viding medical treatment for her: Ber
ger v. Jacobs, 21 Mich., 215, 221.
1—C. L.,
8693; Tong v. Marvin.
15 Mich., 71.
Nor is a husband liable
for money loaned to his wife upon her
credit only; nor for money loaned to
her for her use and without the knowi
cdge of her husband, where the lender
conceals the fact of such lending from
him: Franklin v. Foster, 20 Mich.. 75.
2—Leader v. Barry,
Esp., 354;
Doe v. Fleming.
Bing., 266.
Mar
riage is provable in all civil cases in
volving property rights by evidence of
conduct and reputation, but not in
criminal cases or in actions for crim
inal conversation or’ divorce:
Perry v.
Lovejoy, 49 Mich., 529; 14 N. W.. 485.
But unless the parties live together,
some proof of an actual marriage seems
necessary:
Camp.,
Odell v. Wake,
394; Horn v. Noel,
Ibld., 61.
5

it

a

a

out her having paid or become bound
to pay the husband or anyone clse for
them,
or if the husband as between
him and his wife was acting as her
agent,
then whether the note was
given in
payment or as
security
merely, and notwithstanding the credit
may have been originally given to the
husband,
there would be
good and
valuable consideration for the note,
and she would be bound; this would
substantially
be in effect
debt in
curred on account of her separate prop
erty: Emery v. Lord, 26 Mich., 432;
see Whelpiey v. Stoughton, 112 Mich.,
594; 70 N. W., 1098. And she may sue
alone to recover exempt property of
her husband which has been taken on
King v. Moore, 10 Mich..
execution:
And so, in any case
where
538.
property of her husband is
exempt
seized
in adverse proceedings,
as in
attachment, or where a poundmaster
improperly seizes
without process.
The remedy is not coniined to final
lngersoli v. Gage, 47 1iiich.,
process:
121: 10 N. W., 135. But the right of
the wife to ue alone in her own name
for exempt property does not preclude
the husband from joining with her in
the suit: Shepherd v. Cross., 33 Mich.,

a
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cases where her husband
not in law liable, or where he re
fuses to perform such contract or engagement, and in any case
herein authorized, the cause of action shall be deemed to have
accrued from and after the passage of this act.”1
Upon a replication denying the coverture,
will be suiﬁcient
to prove cohabitation under marriage by repute, which may be
established by general reputation, the acknowledgment of the
parties, and reception by their friends as man and wife, etc.’

or
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injury,
not joined as
plaintiff, the nonjoinder may be
pleaded in abatement.
In actions upon contracts (or on judg
co-contractor as plaintiif may
ments) the nonjoinder of
be taken advantage of at the trial under the general issue,“
or
appears on the pleadings, the defendant may demurﬁ
the plaintiff sue as executor, administrator, etc., on a
contract, the nonjoinder must be pleaded in abatement.‘ In
actions for torts, if one of several who should be plaintiﬁs sue
alone, the nonjoinder of the others must be pleaded in abate
ment, and the defendant cannot take advantage of
in any
other manner, except to prevent the plaintilf on the trial from
recovering more than his aliquot share or interest.“ It
no
objection that the defect appears on the pleadings.7
If the
defendant do not plead the nonjoinder in abatement, the others
may afterwards sue alone for the injury to their lmdivided
shares, and the defendant cannot plead in abatement of such
action the nonjoinderﬁ
is

it

But

Of defenda.nts.—The nonjoinder of
person as de
in
an action upon contract must be pleaded in abate
fendant
ment,9 unless upon the declaration or other pleading of the
a

§180.

4

should have been made co-plaintiffs,
will not enlarge the personal right of
recovery of the person bringing the
suit: Ives V. Williams, 53 Mich., 636;
19 N. W., 562.
7—Ouaere, People v. Dennis,
Mich.,
Ev.. 10;

see Achey

Hill v.
Hull,

v.

7

Mich., 423.
in actions on contract, whether
the judgment be against one or all the
joint debtors, as well as where the
suit is instituted against part only oi’
jointly liable, and no plea in
those
abatement is interposed on that ac
count, such judgment is a bar to the
action upon the original claim against
the defendants not served
in the one
cae, and against the debtors not pro
ceeded agalnst in the other: Brooks v.
McIntyre,
Mich., 319.
Mich., 316.
9—Brooks v. Mclntyre,
318. And cannot otherwise be taken ad
vantage of unless the defect appear on
the face of the declaration:
People V.
Dennis,
Mich., 609, 615: Baliou v.
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Hill, 56;

5

8-1

Gibb,
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815.

4

4

But

4

4 3

7

8

&

1

2

1

k

5

4

it

1

5

&

Ev.,
Am. ed.,
3-1 Saund. Pl.
10; Burgess v. Abott,
Hill, 476;
Mich.,
132
Blackburn
v. Blackburn,
\\“l1en the hus
525: 94 N. W., 24.
hand
sues alone for the property of
the wife held in her own right, or in
is not necessary to
that of another,
plead the nonjolnder in abatement; it
may be taken advantage of under the
general issue:
"Brown v. Fiﬂeid,
Hill, 56.
.\iich., 322; Hill v. Gibbs,
Ev., 10; Burgess
4—1 Saund. Pl.
Hill, 476.
v. Abott,
5—Brassing'ton
Bing.,
v.
Ault.
177;
Ev., 10.
Saund. P1.
Johns,
6-—Bradish v. Schenck,
177.
The nonjoinder
of the other
owner or party who might be joined
as plaintiff, only goes to apportion the
damages:
Achey v. Hull,
Mich.,
423.
And the principle
that non
joinder of plaintiiifs in tort must be
pleaded
in abatement,
applies in re~
plevin:
Wright v. Bennett,
Barb.,
Mich.,
451: see Brown v. Fiﬁeld,
A failure to plead in abatement
327.
tor the nonjoinder
of persons who

CH.

X.

AB;\'I'Eli|IENT.

or rnnas m

§180

plaintiﬁ, the nonjoinder appear and that the person is living;
in which case the defendant may demur, but cannot avail
In actions for torts,
himself of the objection on the trial."
in general, be
cannot,
defendants
as
nonjoinder of others
pleaded in abatement, or otherwise taken advantage of." But
where the tort consists in the omission by .scveral joint owners

of land of some act to be done by them respecting the land,
the nonjoinder of the other owners may be pleaded in abate
meat."
The defendant in his plea must name all the joint con
tractors; he will fail, if it appear on the trial thatthe contract
was made with others also not named in the plea." The plea
25 Mlch., 204: lllnman v. Eaklns.
26 .\iich., 80; Bowen v. Cuip, 36 Mic-h..

Hill,
224.

l0—Burgess v. Abbott, 1 llill, 476:
Morrison v. Trenchard, 4 M. & G.,
But unless the declaration ex
709.
pressly shows that the other joint con
tractor is all:-0, the defendant cannot
1 lllil, 476.
demur:
dcbtor»—
joint
and
(‘nportncrs
or
other joint
Where a copartner
debtor has compromised and paid to
the creditor his share and proportion
of the debt, and has received from the
creditor a discharge from the copart

ncrship or other joint liability, it will
not be necessary thereafter, in a suit
by the creditor against the other co
partner or other joint debtor to re
cover the balance of the debt, to join
the party so released as a codefendant.
Nor in tact could he be properly
See, C. L., 5; 10449-10453.
joined:
v. Syl
Beelrman
quoted, post, § 205.
183; 66 N. W.,
vester,
109 Mic-h.,
1093.

Where
8: Ev., 11.
tort is committed by several indi
viduals, the plaintii! may sue all joint
Liv
ly, or one or more separately:
ingston v. Bishop, 1 Johns., 290; Rose
v. Oliver, 2 IMd., 365: Marsh v. Berry,
v.
7 Cow., 344; 8 Ib'ld., 43; Creed
Hartmnnn. 29 N. Y., 591. it an action
obtained
and judgment
is brought
against one of the joint wrong-doers,
the payment oi‘ that judgment will bar
an action against the others: Dexter v.
Broat, 16 Barb., 337; Osterhout v.

11-1 Saund. Pl.

a

But until pay
Roberts., 8 C0w., 43.
ment or tender of the amount of the
judgment, the plaintii! may sue each
defendant separately, and then elect
He may
which judgment to collect.
collect the costs in each case. but the
Livingston v.
only in one:
damages
Bishop, 1 Johns., 290: Osterhout v.
Roberts, 8 Cow., 43.
it less than all
the wrong-doers are sued, the plaintii!
recover against those who are
may
liable, and judgment will be rendered
in favor of those not guilty: Dominick
v. Eaclrer, 3 Barb., 18; Fox v. Jackson.
8 Ibid., 355: Montfort v. llughcs. 3 E.
D. Smith, 591: iiiclntosh v. Ensign, 28
N. Y., 169., Where the animals of dif
terent owners do mischief when to
gether, the several owners cannot be
joined as defendants for the trespass.
Thus, where the cows of several own
ers are found together trespassing in
a garden, each owner is liable only for
the damages done by his own cow; but
in the absence of proof to the contrary.
it will be presumed that each cow did
an equal amount oi! the mischief: Bud
dington v. Shearer, 20 I’lck., 479.
So.
it several dogs worry sheep, a joint
action will not lie against all the own
ers: Van Steenburgh v. Tobias. 17
Ham, 1
Wend., 562; Auchmuty
v.
Denio, 495.
5 Term.
v. Tarbutt,
12—Mitcheil
R., 651; Low v. Mumford, 14 Johns.
426.
13——Mechanlcs'
& Farmers‘ Bank v.
Dakln, 24 \\'end., 411; Godson v. Good,
6 Taunt., 587: Creelin v. Calvert, 14

M. 8: W., 11.
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or less
mentions."
number of persons made the contract than the plea
Nor, if the contract was joint and several." Nor, if the per
son omitted is a dormant partner of a ﬁrm, imless the plaintiff
knew it." Nor, if he is an infant." Nor, if the action as to
the person not joined is barred by the statute of limitations."
This section, 9743, authorizes the plaintiff to avail himself of
the fact by replication of it to the plea; probably the plaintiff
must by replication avail himself of the fact that the person
not joined was an infant."
is not sustained

a greater

Of evidence, to sustain the plea.-Proof of some one
§181.
item of the plaintiff ‘s claim being the debt of the person named
in the plea, will sustain the plea.'~"’
Upon a replication denying a plea of the nonjoinder of a
co-defendant, plaintiff may, besides giving evidence to disprove
a joint liability of all or any of the parties named in the plea,
prove that another or others not named in the plea are also
liable F1 or that the claim as against the persons named in the
Or that the de
plea is barred by the statute of limitations.”
fendant, in making the contract, represented or otherwise in
duced the plaintiff to believe that he was dealing

with him

alone.“
The plea admits the plaintiff ’s claim, but not the amount of
it. If the defendant fail in sustaining his plea, he may contest
the whole or any part of the claim, which the plaintiff gives in
evidence, the same as if the general issue had been pleaded.“

Of misjoinder of pa.rties.—The joinder of persons

§182.

plaintiffs or defendants who should not
14-—lIawks
.\iecl1anics'
24 \\'end..
15~—Van

v.

Munger, 2 Hill, 200;
Bank v. Dakin,

& Farmers‘
411.

Tine

v.

Crane,

1

Wend.,

524.

16-—New York Dry Dock
Treadwell, 19 Wend., 525.
17—~Glossop

Co.

v.

v. Colman, 1 Starkle R.,

be joined,

as

in actions

20—Vansllke v. Gilmore,
511; Colson v. Selby. 1 Esp.
21—(‘rellin v. Calvert, 14
11; -Mechanics‘ & Farmers’
Dakin, 24 Wend., 411.
22—C. L., 5 9743.
23—Bonfleld v. Smith, 12

Blacki'.,
R., 452.
M. k W.,
Bank v.

6

'

M. & W.,

405.

19—Burgess v. Merrill, 4 Taunt. R..
468. "The doctrine of this case is de
nied in Slocum v. ilookcr, 13 Ba:-h..

24—Mechanlcs’ and Farmers’ Bank
Dakin, 24 Wend.,- 411, 416: France
v. White,
1 M. & G., 731; Hill v.
White, 6 Bln;.'., N. C., 23, 26. And de
fendants
must
to nominal
suhmlt
damages at all events:
24 Wend., 411,

536.

416.

25.

18—C. L., § 9743.

v.
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upon contract, had the effect at the common law of defeating
the plaintiif on the trial. The misjoinder could be pleaded in
abatement, but it was not advisable. The same effect was pro
duced in actions for torts, if there was a misjoinder of plain
tiffs, but it was not so in respect to defendants, as those not
guilty could be acquitted.“ By C. L., §837, as amended by
Pub. Acts, 1901, p. 78, it is now provided that in case of

misjoinder of defendants the plaintiff may discontinue

as to

such as he pleases at any time before ﬁnal submission, or he
may go to the ﬁnding of the court or jury as to which of the
defendants are liable and have judgment entered against such
This statute does not affect the
only as are found liable.
common law rule as to misjoinder of plaintiffs.

Of misn0m.er.—There seems to be confusion in the
§183.
books upon the cﬁect of the misnomer of the plaintiff, and
when, if ever, it must be pleaded in abatement. But it is well
settled that where a written contract is sued upon, a variance
in name can be taken advantage of under the general issue,
and the misnomer need not be pleaded in abatement.'*’°
§184. Of pendency of another action.-—The pendency of a
former action for the same cause may be pleaded in abate
ment,” but not in bar.”-‘* Where two suits are commenced at
the same time, their pendency may, it seems, be pleaded re
Saund. Pl. 8: Ev., 11; see,
Buttertleld, 29 i\lich., 254.
13 Mich.,
26—Gilhert. v. Iinnford,
40, 43.
A pialntiif cannot proceed in
a suit wherein he is wrongly named,
or by the initials oi’ his christian or
79
Fisher v. Northrup,
ﬁrst name:
Mich. LZHT: -i-I N. W.. 610. Under C.
L., 5 763, in actions upon instruments
in writing. it is competent to use the
name as used in making the contract,
though only initials or contractions of
a Christian name are used.
_
The eitect of a motion to dismiss a
in Justice's
cause
court. because the
piaintiii."s Christian name is not given
in the writ. i in eifect a plea in abate
ment, which is admitted by the state
ment of the party who appears for the
piaintii! that he cannot amend because
of n want or knowledge 0! the plain
Fisher v. Northrup,
tiii"s tuil name:
supra.

25-1

Larkln

v.

27—I'ercival
v. Hickey,
18 Johns.,
257; iiaight v. Holley, 3 Wend., 258:
Wales v. Jones, 1 Mich., 254.
And ii‘
defense
thi
is relied on, it must be
pleaded
in abatement: Sullings v. The
Goodyear D. V. Co., 36 Mlch., 313. But
a pending and undetermined chancery
proceeding is no bar in itself to a legal
action, whatever may be the force of
a final decree:
Kinney v. Roblson, 52
Mic-h.. 393; 18 N. W., 120.
A prior suit pending, in which there
can be no recovery because it was pre
maturely brought, is no bar to a re
covery in a new suit brought for the
same cause of action:
Blackwood v.
Brown, 34 1iiich., 4.
The rule requiring the pendency of
another suit to be pleaded in abate
ment and not in bar, applies as well
where the prior suit is a garnishee
suit, as in other cases.
The pendency
ot such proceedings cannot be proved
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other.” But the commencement of
a second suit, after bringing the ﬁrst, cannot be pleaded in
abatement of the ﬁrst; but, if a judgment is rendered in the
second suit in favor of the plaintiff, it may be pleaded in bar
of the ﬁrst suit.” In an action against one of several joint
ciprocally the

one to the

contractors, the defendant cannot plead in abatement the pen
dency of another action for the same cause against another
contractor; but he should plead in abatement the nonjoinder
of the joint contractor, and if a. second action be brought
against all, the pendency of the prior action against the other
joint contractor may be pleaded.31
§185. Joinder of causes of a.ction.—When a plaintiff has
two or more causes of action of the same kind, and the actions
are in the same form, they may and ought to be joined in the
same suit; and this should be done by setting them out in
Thus, in actions arising
separate counts in the declaration.
on contract, several causes of action in assumpsit may be
issue:
under the plea of the general
Near v. Mitchell, 22 Mich., 382; Ryan
v. Mills, 129 Mich., 170; 88 N. W..
392.

28—Hurley
v. Greenwood, 5 B. &
101; Percival
18
ilickey,
Ald.,
v.
Johns., 257.
Nor can the pendency oi
another suit in another state for the
in
of action be pleaded
same cause
Bowne v.
abatement in this state:
Joy, 9 Johns., 221; Walsh v. Durkin,
99; Newell v. Newton, 10
12 Ibid.,
I'ick., 470.
Nor in bar; it good at all,
it could only be pleaded in abatement:
Wilcox v. Cassick, 2 Mich., 166, 178.

29--Iiaight v. Holley, 3 Wend., 258.
But not unless they are commenced at
lbid.
But a plea of
the same time:
the pendency of a former suit will not
avail unless it is averred in the plea
Where
that the suit is still pending.
in good
a second
suit is commenced
faith, and the former suit discontinued
before the defendant was called upon
to plead in the second, the latter can
of the
not be abated by the pendency
prior suit when it was commenced:
Wales v. Jones, 1 Mich., 254. And the
plea will be bad unless it aver that
Pew
the former suit is still pending:
v. Yoarc, 12 liiich., 16.

30
339.

Nichols

v.

Mason,

21

Wand,

31—FIenry v. Goidney, 15 M. & W.,
49-i; see, rmic, § 150, note 10.
The
highest degree oi’ certainty is required
Therefore,
in a plea in abatement.
where a plea in abatement averred that
another suit was commenced
at the
same time, upon and for not perform
ing the very same identical promises
and undertakings,
without adding, tn
the said declaration in this present
suit mentioned, or other equivalent
words, it was held bad on that sc
count: Wales v. Jones, 1 Mich., 254.
So where in replevin a plea in abate
ment was interpnsed, setting up the
pendency
of a prior suit in replevin,
by virtue ot the writ in which the
property in controvery
was taken by
one of the defendants, the plea was
held bad because it did not allege that
any aﬂidavit was attached to the writ
in the ﬁrst suit, nor that the writ
commanded
the
sheriif to take the
property in controversy.
A plea in
abatement must contain every ‘allega
tion necessary to make out the case
covered
Belden v. Laing, S
by it:
Mich., 500.
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joined;

so also in debt and covenant."
But assumpsit, cove
nant and debt cannot be joined." So, in actions in tort, sev
eral distinct trespasses may be joined in the same suit.-'“ And
an action on the case may be joined with trove!-.~"5 But actions
arising on contract cannot be joined with actions in tort.-'*°
Therefore, assumpsit cannot be joined with ease," nor with
trover," nor debt with trespass.”
But the several causes of
action must all exist in the same right or they cannot be joined.
Thus, an executor suing for a demand due to the estate of the
deceased, cannot join a demand due to himself.“
If several
causes of action are improperly joined, the defendant may

demur.“
Misjoinder of c0\1ntl.—Joinder of repugnant counts
§186.
in a declaration does not preclude recovery on one or the other.
They do not destroy each other." The objection of misjoinder
of counts should be disposed of in the beginning of the trial
by compelling an election and thus limit the range of the
testimony." A person who has been compelled to elect be
tween counts, may upon a new trial proceed upon another
count.“
Dividing causes of action.—-Where a person has sev
§ 187.
eral demands or existing causes of action growing out of the
32—Burrili's Prac., 74; Union Cot
ton Manutactory v. Lobdell. 13 Johns.,
482.
Plaintiil may Join all the causes
of action he has when recovery may be
hnd in each in the same form of action
Tre
if separate suits were brought:
gent v. Maybee, 54 Mich., 226; 19 N.
\\'.. 962.
.'i3—i'eli v. Lovett. 19 Wendell. 546.
But a count on a judgment may be
joined with a count for use and occu
pation, and with the common counts:
Hogsett v. Ellis, 17 Mich., 351.
34-1 (‘hitty's PL, 200.
35—Jennings
v. Webb., 1 Term. R.,
277; Ayer v. Bartlett, 9 Plck., 156,
161.

36-Martin v. The Mayor. etc., 1
Hill, 545: ii.-iii v. i-‘islier, 20 Barb.,

By C. L.. 5 10421, it is pro
442.
vided that assumpsit may be brought
for fraudulent representations or con
duct.
The eiiect of this is held to per
mit the joinder of the common counts

i;

with n special count for false repre
sentation:
i<‘irst
National
Bank
v.
Steel, — Mic-h.,
99 N. W., 786
(May, 190-1).
37—Church v. Mumford, 11 Johns.,
479.

38—Howe v. Cook, 21 Wend., 29.
39—(‘.oryton v. Lithebye, 2 Saunders
Rep., 117; Dalson v. Tyson, 3 Saik.,
204.

40—1 Chitty‘s PL, 204; Lucas v.
New York Central R. R. Co., 21 Barb.,
245.

41—1 Chitty's Pl., 205: Cooper v.
Bisseil, 16 Johns., 146; Hall v. Fisher.
Lucas v. New York
20 Barb., 442;
Central R. R. Co., 21 Ibid., 245.
42—Be!-ringer v. Cobb., 58 Mich.,
557; 25 N. W., 491.
43—Ives v. Williams, 53 l\iieh., 636;
19 N. W., 582.
44—Gott v. Superior Court
42 Mich., 625; 4 N. W., 520.
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in matters of account which may he
joined; and if the cause of action, although there may be many
items of
be split up, and a. suit
brought for part only, and
a
second
suit
for
the residue, the ﬁrst action may
subsequently
be pleaded in abatement of the second, or in bar." The same
is

it,

same contract, or resting

rule applies to several actions against the same person

wrong.“

3

3
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a
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1

6

2

rich., 21 Barb., 317.
It there are sov
eral items of account for goods sold,
or work performed at different times,
there must be an express contract, or
the circumstances must be such
to
raise one implied contract embracing
all the items. in order to make them a
Secor v.
single or entire demand:
Sturgis. 16 N. Y. Rep., 548, 558. Sepa
rate suits may be brought upon claims
in an open account, subject.
embraced
768, to the penalty of
under C. L.,
loss of costs in subsequent suits where
the whole of the claim upon such an
account is not included in one action:
Phelps v. Abbott, 116 Mich., 624; 74
N. W., 1010.
Where defendant gave
notice of set-oi! of $150, and then
withdrew $50 of the item,
was held
that he could not afterward have his
action for that portion withdrawn.
though the justice could not have given
him more than $100:
Andreas v.
Frac., — Mich.,
School Dist. No.
—-: 100 N. W., 1021 (0ct., 1904).
46—Farrington
v. Payne, 15 Johns..
432; and see, Bendernagle v. Cocks, 19
Ilill, 54;
Wend., 201'; Fish v. Folley,
Allison v. Connor, 36 Mich., 283.
6

v. Cocks,

4

19 Wend..
Carver,
Wend.,
Smith v. Jones, 15 Johns., 22!);
Phillips v. Berick, 16 Johus.. 136; Cog
E. D. Smith, 434;
gins v. Bulwinkle,
Bancroft v. Winspear, 44 Barb., 209;
Hill, 54; Stevens v.
Fish v. Folley,
Lockwood, 13 Wencl., 644; Dutton v.
Shaw, 35 Mich., 431.
See the same
principle as applied to counter claims
-—set-oils, recoupment, etc.: See, More
house v. Baker, 48 Mich., 335: 12 N.
W., 170; Dutton v. Shaw, 35 Mich.,
434; Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Daven
port, 37 Mich., 614; Iron Cilils Co. v.
N. W., 238:
Giugrass, 42 Mich., 30;
Chandler v. Childs, 42 Mich., 128:
N.‘ W., 297; Hazen v. Reed, 30 Mich.,
331; Huntoon v. Russell, 41 Mich.,
N. W., 38.
316:
But the causes of action must arise
out of a single contract or transaction;
therefore, where two bills of goods
were purchased, one on
credit of
six months and the other without any,
the causes of action were held to arise
on separate _contracts,
and that a re
covery for one bill was not a bar to a
Staples v. Good
suit upon the other:
45——Bendernagle
Gurnscy v.

207;
492;

5

same

for the
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| 188. Character or pleas in bar.
5 iso. A failure or want of considera
tion.
5190. illegality of consideration.
instruments, execution
§ 191. Written
how denied.
in as
Q 192. Eifect of general issue
sumpit.

5193. Elect oi general issue in debt.
Eifect of general issue in cove
nant.

§19~i.

5105. Etfect of general issue in trover
and case.
5196.

Effect

of general

issue

in tres

pass.

§197. Pleas of several defendants.

Oharacter of pleas in bar.-These pleas either deny
§188.
that the plaintiif ever had the cause of action complained of,
or they admit that he once had the cause of action, but insist
that it no longer exists.‘

“No special plea in bar shall be pleaded in any civil action
hereafter to be commenced; but all matters of defense to any
such action, may be given in evidence under the general
issue.
((

’

”

In all civil actions hereafter to

be commenced, the general

issue shall consist of a demand by the defendant, of a trial of
the matters set forth in the plaintiif’s declaration.”3
“
The plea of the general issue shall be in the same
form as in those courts [circuit courts] and notice of any de
fense not admissible under the general issue, shall be given

' ' '

' ' ' '

with such plea.
1-2

Saund.

Pl.

&

Ev.,

Part

”4

1., p.

6-17.

The statute abol
2—C. L.. Q 10071.
special pleadings does not make
special pleading void when the parties
it, joined
adopted
voluntarily
have
to trial and judg
issue. and proceeded
Wales v. Lyon, 2 Mlch., 276.
ment:
3—C. L., i 10072.
4-The general issue, in all civil
actions. denies every material aver
declaration
ment in the plaintii!‘s
which much be proved, whatever the
inhlmz

nature or form of the action may be:
Kinnie v. Owen, 1 Mich., 249.
It de
nies every fact necessary to enable the
plaintiﬂ to recover: Young v. Stephens.
502; Ingals v. Eaton, 25
9 Mich.,
Mich., 34-5.
Thus, in assumpsit, as a
general rule, it puts in issue, without
further notice, every fact and combina
tion oi' facts, necessary to constitute
It de
the plaintiif‘s
cause of action.
nies the existence of any such state
oi’ facts as could constitute or estab
lish the promise declared upon, or
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“To entitle a defendant to avail himself of any matter of
defense, which, according to the practice as it has heretofore
existed, was required to be pleaded specially, or of which a
which would entitle the plaintiff to
recover upon the cause of action ai
ieged:
Winslow v. Wager, 26 Mich.,
455; see, Hill v. Callaghan, 31 Mich.,
424 ; Child v. Detroit Mfg. Co., 72 Mich.,
623; 40 N. W., 918; Denver v. Booming
lt
Co., 51 Mich., 472; 16 N. W., 817.
denies that the promise relied upon has
Snyder v.
any validity or legal force:
The de
Willey, 33 Mlch., 483. 489.
fendant's ownership of a note sued
upon may be contested under this plea:
Reynolds v. Kent, 38 Mich., 246. When
contract is declared upon,
a written
a variance in names may be taken ad
vantage of under the general issue:
Gilbert v. Ilanford. 13 Mich., 40. And
so. in actions upon contracts, the non
joinder of a co-contractor as plaintiff
may be taken advantage of at the trial
1 Saund. Pl. & Ev.,
under this plea:
5 Am. ed., 10: Burgess v. Abbott, 1
lliil, 476. And evidence may be given
under this plea to show that the in
strument declared upon was void, for
the reason that it was given in con
sideration of an illegal sale, as in case
of ‘sales made in violation of law:
Myers v. Carr. 12 Mich., 63; Dean v.
Chapin, 22 Mich., 275; and see, Hill
Payment
v. Callaghan, 31 Mlch., 424.
may be shown under the general issuer
Olcott v. Hanson, 12 Mlch., 454; Burt
v. Olcott, 33 Mich., 179; Brennan v.
Tietsort, 49 Mich., 398: 13 N. W..
agreement
790.
So may a subsequent
destroying or modifying the old: Cank
iing v. Tattle, 52 li[ich.. 630: 18 N.
So may non-compliance with
W.. 391.
conditions:
Morley v. Insurance Co.,
85 Mich., 217; 48 N. W.. 502.
So may
a rescission of the contract for cause:
1
Staheiin v. Sowle, 87 Mich., 124; 49
N. W.. 529.
In an action on a sealed
instrument, by virtue of C. L., $5
the defense of want of con
10185-6.
sideration cannot be made under the
general issue:
Boyer v. Sowies, 109
Micb.. 481: 67 N. W.. 530: Robson v.
Dayton, 111 l\iich., 440; 69 N. W., 834.
And in an action of tort, everything
which may properly be considered by
the jury in mitigation of damages may
under this plea:
be given in evidence

Delevan v. Bates, 1 Mich., 97; Osborn
Lovell, 36 !\iich., 2-l6.
Thus, in un
action for treble damages for trespass
in cutting timber. the defendant may
show under the general issue without
notice, that the trespass was involun
tary and under a bona ﬂdc claim of
right: Ibid.
So in slander:
Iluson
Dale, 19 _Mich.,
v.
17.
In trover
defendant may show property in a
Stephenson v. Little,
third person:
10 Mir-,h., 433.
The general issue ad
mits the jurisdiction ot the court over
the person of the defendant:
Webb v.
Mann, 3 .\[ich., 140: Gott v. Brigham,
41 Mich., 227: 2 N. W., 5; Grand
Rapids, Newaygo & Lake Shore Ry.
Co. v. Gray. 38 Mlch.. 461.
it ad
mits
that
a
defendant
by
sued
corporate name
a
is sued by the
right name:
Lake Superior Building
Co. v. Thompson, 32 Mlch.. 293; see,
C. L., 5 10473: Grand Rapids & Ind.
R. R. C0. V. Southwick, 30 Mich., 446;
Johr v. St. Clair Supervisors, 38 Mich.,
532, 535-6.
And o, in a suit brought
by a corporation organized under the
laws of this state, the general issue
admits its corporate name and exist
ence: Wilson Sewing Machine Co. v.
Spears. 50 l\i'ich., 534: 15 N. W., 894:
see, C. L., §§ 10471, 10473: Garton v.
City Bank. 34_ Mich., 279;
Union
Grand Rapids & I. Ry. Co. v. South
wick, 30 Mich., 444.
Unless a notice
is given under the plea, and duly veri
ﬁed, denying the existence
of the cor
And in a
poration:
§ 10471, supra.
suit by an executor or administrator
wlio has made profert of his letters,
the general issue admits his oﬁiclal
Vlckery v. Bier, 16 Mlch.,
character:
v.

50.

The general issue also waives objec
tions to process and service thereof:
Campau v. Fairbanks, 1 Mich., 151;
Crane v. Hardy. 1 Mich., 56; Pardee
v. Smith. 27 Mich., 33, 388; Hart v.
Blake, 31 Mich., 278: Manhard v.
Schott, 37 Mich., 234: Grand Rapids.
N. 8: L. S. R. R. (.‘o. v. Gray. 38 Mich.,
461; Gott v. Brigham, 41 Mich., 227:
2 N. W., 5: Gunn Hardware
Co. v.
Denlson, 83 Mich.. 40: 46 N. W., 940:
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special notice was required to be given \mder- the general issue
or other general plea, such defendant shall annex to his plea.
of the general issue a notice to the plaintiff, brieﬂy stating the
H5
precise nature of such matter of defense.

6

a

1

193

13
0

it

5

8

Q

a

1:1»
1-IQ
4:!-I

prise the plaintiff ot the nature of the
defense
relied upon, so that he may
be prepared to meet it, and so that he
may not be taken by surprise on the
trial by a defense which he could not,
with reasonable certainty. anticipate:
Rosenbury v. Angeli,
Mlch., 508, 514.
The oiﬂce of the notice is to present
tangible issues, and not to introduce
matters which form no part of the
issue.
it cannot make such matters
relevant
or
material:
i‘roctor
v.
iioughtaling, 37 .\ilch., 45. And as to
the general requisites of the notice, no
distinction is made between one kind
(‘resinger v.
of action and another:
Reed,
25 Mlch., 455: see, Bailey
v.
Kalamazoo Publishing
(‘o.. 40 Mlch.,
254: Brown v. Moore. 32 Mlch., 257;
ilaie Mfg. Co. v. Amer. Saw Co., 43
N. W.. 300.
The notice
Micb.. 251:
pleading. nor is
is not properly
to be tested by the same rules appli
cable to a plea.
N0 issue of fact or law
can he founded upon it: the only issue
The
in the case is the general issue.
notice is of matters of defense intended
to be introduced in evidence under that
issue: Ibld.,' and Mclinrdy v. Wads
Mlch., 3-iii, 351: and see.
worth,
.\ilch., 239. 2-ii:
Porter v. Kimball.
Myers v. Carr, 12 Mlch., T0. To such
notice there can be no replication.
nor any new assignment, but the plain
tiff goes to trial on the declaration,
v. Ray
McFarlane
plea and notice:
ct al., 14 Mlch., 460.
Although special pleas are not al
lowed (C. L..
10073). yet where one
is put in it is customary to allow it
notice of defense; nor is
to stand as
there any valid objection to this course.
Special pleas were abolished to avoid
technicality and prolixlty, but notices
containing
the substance of special
pleas are required where such pleas
were formerly essential. and if one is
put in where the other should have
been. the dlﬂerence being in matter of
form only, may be disregarded. and the
general purpose of the statute will be
equally advanced by that course: Ben

a

v. Soutlcr, 82 Mlch., 648; 48
N. W., 1027; Dailey v. Kennedy, 64
Mlch., 208; 31 N. W., 125: Taylor v.
Adams. 58 Mlch., 187: 2-1 N. W., 864.
The general rule being. that a party
who pleads the general issue and goes
to trial on the merits, waives objec
tions to the process unless be makes
.\iaxwell v.
them known in some way:
Deena,
-16 Mlch., 37; 8 N. W., 561.
issue
Iiut the plea of the general
defects
waives only such jurisdictional
as appear on the {ace of the declara
St-gar v. Shingle and Lumber
tion:
Co., 81 .\iich., 3-H: 45 N. W., 982.
And so. the plea of the general issue,
and going to trial on the merits,
waives formal and technical defects to
liurtford v. Holmes,
the declaration:
3 Mlch., -160: Grand Rapids J: 1. Ry.
Co. v. Southwick. 30 Mlch., 466; and
see, Grand Rapids. N. 8: L. S. R. R.
: Jackson v.
Co. v. Gray. 88 Mlch.,
v.
Reeder
ox
39
.‘\iicb..
Collins.
Moore, 95 Mlch., 594: so N. W., 436:
Campbell v. Kalamazoo, 80 Mlch., 655:
45 N. W.. 652: Fuller v. Jackson. 82
Mlch., 480: 46 N. W., 7212 Clark v.
North Muskeizon, 88 Mlch., 308; 50 N.
But it does not waive an
W.. 254.
objection that the declaration fails to
allegations
the essential
set
forth
necessary to show a cause of action:
Btoﬂiet v. Marker. 34 Mlch., 313: and
see. Jennlson v. flaire, 20 Mlch., 207;
Stange v. Clements. 17 Mlch., 402.
Pleadlngs in justices‘ courts are to be
viewed with iiberality, and are to be
liberally construed. and technicalities
First National Bank
are not favored:
v. Carson. 60 Mlch., 432: 27 N. W.,
5%; Whittle v. Bailes. 65 Mlch., 640:
Rtiil they must be sut
32 N, W., 874.
tlcient to fairly show a cause of action
and with sutiicient certainty to obviate
surprise on the part of the other side
and to enable him to prepare to meet
the proofs: Watkins v. Ford, 69 Mlch.,
3.’-7: 37 N. W.. 300.
5—C. L.. 55 10073. 767.
The notice umlcr the general issue.
--The object of t-his notice ls, to ap

Jacklin
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§189. “A failure or want of consideration in whole or in
part, may be shown in defense, to any action or set-oif, upon
or arising out of any bond or promissory note or other instru
ment in writing, except negotiable notes, negotiated before
falling due, to any person not having at the time it was nego
tiated, knowledge of such defense/’1
A total. failure, or want of consideration, was, in actions
edict v. Smith, 48 Mich., 593; 12 N.
W., 860.
Notice of defense under the general
issue,
v.
suﬂicient:
Whittle
when
Bailes, 65 Mich., 6-10: 32 N. W. 874;
see. Watkins v. Ford, 69 ii/ilch.. 357:
37 N. W., 300: Waldo v. Waldo, 52
Mich., 94; 17 N. W., 710.
The sole test of the sutilclency of a
notice of special matter of defense is
that it shall apprise the plaintlﬂ of the
nature of the defense relied on, so that
he may be prepared to meet it and to
avoid surprise on the trial. See cases
last cited and Briesenmeister v. Su
preme Lodge K. of P., 81 Mich.,
52%;

W.. 977.
Among the defenses of which notice
is required to be given, is discharge in
Goodwin,
1
Parks
v.
bankruptcy:
Mich., 25. in trespass for taking away
that
an-J chattels, the defense
goods
they were taken in attachment against
a third person alleged to be the owner.
Rosenbury v. Angeli,
requires notice:
And so, in trover.
6 Mich., 508, 513.
that the goods were taken in attach
Fry v. Soper, 39 Mich., 727.
ment:
Bateman v. Blake. 81
So in replevln:
Mich., 227: 45 N. W., 831.. And in
that the prop
trover by an assignee,
erty was seized on process in favor ot
the assignor‘s creditors, notice is re
quired:
Frankel v. Coots. 41 Mich.,
75; 1 N. W., 940.
In an action for
trespass on lands, license can be shown
only under notice:
Senecal v. Labadie,
42 Mich., 127: 3 N. W., 296: Vander
karr v. Thompson, 19 Mich., 87:
Waldo v. Waldo, 52 Mich., 94; 17 N.
W., 710.
Defenses arising out of mis
repreentation
and fraud, require a
special notice:
Miller v. Finley, 26
Mich., 249: Wait v. Kellogg, 63 Mich.,
144; 30 N. W., R0. And so, proof of
the worthlessness of a patent right for
which the note sued upon was given:
The defense of a former recov
_Ibid.
45 N.

ery is not admissible without notice:
Achey v. Hull, 7 Mich., 430; Tabor v.
Van Vranken, 39 Mich., 794.
And in
assumpslt, on a policy of insurance, a
defense
that the insurance was pro
cured by fraud, requires notice:
Fire
Insurance Co. v. Hannowald, 37 Mich.,
So, the statute of limitations:
106.
111 Mich., 642; 70 N. W., 140: Whit
worth v. Pelton, 81 Mich., 101; 45 N.
W., 500.
So, the release
of a surety
through
of
unauthorized
extension
Rawlings
v. Cole,
67 .\ilch.,
time:
431; 35 N. W., 66. So, failure of con
Boyer
sideration in action on bond:
v. Sowles, 109 Mich., 481; 67 N. W.,
530; Robson v. Dayton, 111 Mich.,
440; 60 N. W., 834: Hollenbeck v.
Breakey, 127 Mich., 555: 86 N. W.,
1055. So, notice of non-tenantable con
dition.of premises leased in action for
rent: Holmes v. Wood, 88 Mich., 436;
50 N. W., 323.
These, C. L., if 10071, 10072. 10073,
do not apply to pleas puts don-eh: con
tinuance, nor to any matter which, if
pleaded
specially. would destroy the
Johnson v.
plea of the general issue:
Klbbee, 36 Mich., 270.
Amendments to the notice attached
to the plea, is in the discretion of the
court: Brown v. Moore, 32 Mich., 254.
Amendment of notice may be allowed
Hopkins v. Briggs, 41
after appeal:
Mich.,
Such
175: 2 N. .W., 199.
amendments are in the discretion of
the court:
Randall v. Baird. 66 Mich.,
312: 33 N. W., 506: Deline v. Michi
gan F. 8: M. In. Co., 70 Mich., 485;
38 N. W., 298; Mlnnock v. Eureka F.
& M. Ins. Co., 90 Mich., 236: 51 N. W.,
387.

1—C. L., § 769.
Parole evidence is
competent to show a bill or note with
So held where it
out conslderation.
was permitted to show an agreement
that the note be used by the payee as
collateral and he, the payee, to take
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required no notice.” This section
failure, or want of consideration.
is applied by the statutes to any
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§190

as between the parties

and
allows a defense of partial
The defense, in this section,
sealed instrument.
“In any action upon a sealed instrument, and where a set-oﬁ
is founded on any sealed instrument, the seal thereof shall
only be presumptive evidence of a suﬂicient consideration,
which may be rcbutted in the same manner, and to the same
extent, as if such instruments were not sealed.” 3
“The defense allowed by the last section shall not be made,
unless the defendant shall have given notice thereof with his
plea of the general issue.”4
Notice must also be given in actions upon contracts, though
not under seal, where there is only a partial failure or want of
If, however, the bond or other contract is
consideration.“
offered as a set-off, notice is not necessary.
§190. Illegality of consideration.-—In assumpsit, illegality
of consideration, between the original parties to a promissory
note, may be given in evidence under the general issue.“
§191. Written instruments, denial of execution of.—The
general issue does not always operate as a denial of the execu
tion of a written instrument.
“When any written instrument, purporting to be executed
by one of the parties, is declared upon or set off, it may be used
in evidence on the trial of the cause against such party, with
out proving its execution, unless its execution be denied by
oath at the time of declaring, or pleading, or giving notice of
care of it so that the maker should not
Brown v. Smedley, —
have to pay it:
; 98 N._ W., 856 (March.
Mlch.,
1904); see C. L., 9 828.
2-—lllli v. Callaghan. 31 Mlch., 423.
3—C. L., 5 10185; Case v. Bough
ton, 11 Wend., 106.
A seal is pre
sumptive evidence of consideration, and
in the absence of any statute to the
contrary, is conclusive: Lee v. Wisner.
Seal is but presumptive
38 Mlch., 85.
v.
Green
evidence
of consideration:
llangrlon. 28 Mlch., 221; ﬂollenbeck v.
Breakey, 127 Mlch., 555: 86 N. W.,
l0:'-5; Boyer v. Sowles. 100 ‘.\lich.. 481:
67 N. W.. 530.
This statute applies to
all sealed instruments between party

and party: Hobbs v. Brush E. L. Co.,
75 Mlch., 550; 42 N. W., 965.
4——-C. L., § 10186.
See cases cited
in note, p. 193.
5—C. L., I 828.
Total failure of
consideration may be shown under the
general issue without notice:
Hub
; 94
bard v. Frelburger, — Mlch.,
N. W., 727 iMay,
See cases
1903).
cited in note. § 192.
6—!liyers v. (‘arr, 12 Mlch., 63, 70;
see, lllll v. Callaghan, 31 Mlch., 423.
So it may be shown that money sued
for was furnished to enable defendant
to conduct a bawdy house:
McDonald
; 97 N. W.,
v. Born, — Mlch.,
693 (Dec, 1903).
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if such instrument shall

be produced and ﬁled
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LI.

with the

’ "‘

Unless the parties seeking to recover on the written instru
ment produce the instrument, so that the opposite party shall
Thus, where a
7—C. L., 5 826.
promissory note sued upon was ﬂied
with the Justice at the time of de
claring: Ilcld, that the plaintiﬂ was
entitled to read the note in evidence
on the trial, without proving its execu
tion, unless the defendant denied its
execution on oath, at the time of plead
ing: Burson v. Huntington, 21 Mich.,
'i‘he execution of a bond sued
427.
upon need ‘not be proved unless denied
by affidavit:
‘Lee v. Wisner. 38 Micb.,
In an action upon a promissory
87.
against makers and indorsers.
note,
unaccompanied by
the general issue,
an atﬂdavit denying the execution of
the note, is an admission by each de
fendant that he signed the instrument
also,
declaration;
as alleged in the
by the parties
that it was executed
declared against; and is also an ad
mission that the defendants executed
the instrument by the name and de
alleged in the declaration,
scription
and obviates the necessity of proving
partnership between persons signing in
a firm name and charged as partners:
Lobdell v. Merchants’ & Manufacturers
Bank. 33 Mich., 408; see, also, Howry
v. Eppinger, 34 Mich., 29: Anderson v.
Walter. Ib4d., 113: Jennison v. ilalre,
29 Mlch., 207: Mills v. Bunce, Ib£d.,
364; Curran v. Rogers, 35 Mich., 221:
Towle v. Dunham. 76 Mich., 251: 42
Iiaight v. Arnold, 48
N. W., 1117;
Mich.. 512: 12 N. W., 680.
A denial under oath appended to the
plea. merely puts the plaintiff to proof
of the execution of the written instru
Hunter v. Par
ment declared upon:
sons, 22 Mich., 103: see. Polhemus v.
Ann Arbor Savings Bank. 27 Mich., 44.
But proof of the execution of a written
instrument will not be dispensed with
unless the paper is ﬂied with the jus
tice at or before the time when the
opposite party is required to plead or
give notice of his defense thereto: Col
bath v. Jones. 28 Mich..2.<i0:Newton v.
82 Mk-h.. 271: 46 N. W..
l"rinc_lpaal_
234: People v. Cotteral. 115 Mic-h.. 43:
73 N. W., 9: 74 N. W., 183: Ryerson v.

Tourcotte,

Mich., 78; T9 N. W..
ﬁled at any time
previous thereto, and if it is on ﬁle
with the justice at that time it will
be sufﬁcient:
Smoke
v. Jones.,
35
Mlch., 409.
A failure to deny, etc., only admits
the
execution of the instrument de
clared upon:
Montross v. Roger Wil
liams ins. Co., 49 Mich.. 477; 13 N.
W., S23.
An indorsement or assign
ment
of the instrument by another
person not a party to the suit l.-_v
whlch the plaintiff claims title to the
paper, is not thereby admitted.
Such
indorsement or assigment must still
be proved in order to show the plain
Spicer
tiff's title to the instrument:
v. Smith, 23 Mich.,
96: Newton v.
Principaal.
82 liiich.. 271; 46 N. W..
234.
It admits the execution and de
livery of the instrument, but does not
preclude the defendant from makinz
any other defense to the paper on the
merits which does not contradict its
execution, such as, that it was pro
cured of the defendant by fraud. or
without consideration, etc.:
Freeman
v. Ellison,
37 Mk-h.. 459; Ada Dairy
Assn. v. liiears. 123 Mich.. 470: 82 N.
W., 25-S. Or that the defendant had
no legal capacity to make the instru
ment:
Kenton Ins. Co. v. McClellan.
48 Mlch., 564; 6 N. W., 88.
"The
correct rule, we think. is. that the ad
mission of the execution of the instru
ment. contemplated by the statute. is
an admission that it was executed by
the defendants by the name and de
scription alleged in the declaration":
Pegg v. Bideiman, 5 Mich.. 26: Naptz
ker v. Lantz, — l\iich.,
100 N.
W., 601 (July, 1904).
A denial of delivery, merely. is not
a denial of the execution of the instru
ment: Burson v. Huntington. 21 Mich.,
415
The signature is admitted if de
livery only is denied by the aﬂidavit:
Mc("ormick v. McKee. 51 Mich.. 426:
16 N. W.. 796.
So. in cae of a part
nership note. an aﬂldavit by two out of
three of the partners, denying, “each
933.
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§ 191

have an opportunity of inspecting it before pleading to the
declaration; or, if set oil‘, to ascertain its genuineness, when
the notice of set-oif is given, the party of whom the amount
due upon it is sought to be obtained is not bound to deny the
execution under oath, and the plea of the general issue would
not, in such case, excuse from proof of the execution. A fail

is

it,

ure to make a denial of the execution under oath only oper
ates as an admission of the execution of the instrument, leav
ing the party at liberty to set up any defense other than that
which
he did not execute
admissible under his plea of the

is

it

general issue or notice.
The aﬁidavit of one of several defendants, denying the exe
necessary, as to
cution of the instrument sued on, renders
of
or
the handwriting should be
him, that proof of partnership
made. The implied admission, created by the statute, still ex
not entitled to any beneﬁt
ists as to the other defendant, who
codefendant,
except the incidental beneﬁt
from the oath of his
which would result from the plaintiﬂ’ failing to maintain the
issue as to one of the joint defendants.8

a

&

purports
instrument
to
have
been
signed:
Inglisb v. Aycr, 92 Mich.,
But see Dewey
370: 52 N. W., 030.
v. Toledo, A. A.
N. M. Ry. Co., 91
Mich., 351; 51 N. W., 1063.
The
applies
only
statute
to
(Q
1355)
written instruments purporting to be
by one of the parties to the
executed
suit, and not to instruments made by
third person, not parties in the case.
Thus, where
contract was assigned
by writing indorsed upon the instru
ment, and the assignee sued the maker,
who failed to deny the execution of
Held, that the
the contract on oath:
maker did not thereby admit the mak
ing of the assignment nor the genuine
ness ot the signature to the assign
lllnekley
v. Weatherwax,
35
ment:
Mich., 510; Spicer v. Smith, 23 Mich.,
96.

1

197

5

Mich., 26;
S—Pt-gg v. Bidelman,
17 Ill.. 202: see
Davis v. Scarritt,
When
Mills v. Bunce, 29 Mich., 364.
several persons are sued jointly as
promissory note, an aili
makers ot
davit by one of them that he has
neither executed the note nor author
for him. is
i1ed any one to execute
sutiiclent to put the execution and
it

a

a

it

A

a

a

it

for himself, that he ever executed or
denial that
delivered." etc., is not
is
valid ﬂrm note, duly executed and
delivered by the third partner as the
Mills v. Buace, 29
note ot the tirm:
Mich., 364.
plea of the general issue. without
an aﬂidavlt of denial, would not admit
obliga
the execution of an unsealed
tion when an instrument under seal
The aiildnvlt
had been declared on.
tiled with the plea of the ileneral issue
denying the execution, should not be
is suiti
If
technically construed.
clent to show that the defendant
in good faith to contest the
means
execution or delivery of the instru
ment sued on, he should be permitted
it was not in
to make his defense.
tended,
ln requiring such an uﬂldavit,
full statement of the tat-ts
to compel
hut only to indicate the defense, or to
denial.
Nor will the
make
a plain
admission resulting from a want of
an aifldavit of denial dispense with the
production of the instrument in court:
McCormick v. Bay (‘ity. 23 Mich., 4572
Height v. Arnold, 48 Mich., 512: 12
N. W.. 680.
A failure to deny admits
the authority of an agent by whom the
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If the written instrument declared on, or set off, is ﬁled at
the time of declaring or pleading, and giving notice of set-oifs,
its execution must be denied on oath at the time of such ﬁling,
and not afterwards, in order to put the party relying on it
upon proof of its execution.”
§192. Effect of general issue in assumpsit.—In assumpsit,
the general issue denies the making of the promise. Under this
plea, any matter which shows that the plaintiff never had a
cause of action, and also most matters in discharge of the
action, are admissible.
So, under this plea, evidence of the
defendant's incapacity to contract, as that at the time the
supposed contract was entered into the defendant was an
infant, a lunatic, or a fame-covert, would be admissible. And
so a release, arbitration, former recovery for the same cause,
payment, alteration in the terms of the contract, and some
others. Of some defenses in this action notice must be given
with the general issue, as a tender, set-off, or the statute of

limitations."
validity of the note at issue, so far as
even though his co
lie is concerned,
defendants do not join in the aﬂidavlt:
Wren v. McLaren, 48 Mich., 197; 12
And so. where such an aili
N. W., 41.
davit was made when the defendants
lialglit v. Arnold, 48
were partners:
Mlch., 512; 12 N. W., 680.
9—F‘ish v. Hall, 4 Mlch., 506; see,
ante, § 191, note 7.
10—1 Chltty‘s Pl., 515: 1 Saund. Pl.
& Ev., 226; Young v. Rnmmell, 2 Hill,
478.

Under the general issue the defend
ant may give in evidence nearly every
which shows that there was
defense
not a subsisting cause of action at the
Young v.
time the suit was brought:
Rummell. 2 Hill. 478; Boyd v. Weeks,
Darby v. Bou
5 Ibid., 393: Infancy,
cnei-,' 1 Salk., 279; 1 Tidd's Pr.. 646:
Duress, Ibid., 646; Payment, Drake v.
Drake, 11 Johns. R., 531: Sheets v.
Baldwin, 12 Ohio. 120; Fulton Bank
v. Stafford, 2 Wend., 486; or its equiva
lent, Clark v. Yale, 12 Wend., 470;
Performance of the Contract, Wilt v.
Ogden,
13 Johns.,
56: Accord and
Barker,
2
satisfaction,
Cheriot
v.

Johns, 346; Fulton

Bank v. Stafford,
Arbitrament and award.
Martin v. Thornton, 4 Esp. B., 181;
Ibid.;
1 Chitty's Pi., 478: a release,
Fulton Bank v. Stafford, 2 Wend.. -186:
a former recovery for the same cause,
Iiughes, 3 East, 378;
M'Danlel
v.
Young v. Rummell, 2 Hill. 478; Miller
v. Manice, 6 Ibid.,
124: Prescott v.
Hull, 17 Johns., 284; \\'ood v. Jackson,
8 Wend., 1: total failure of considera
tion of 0. note, People on rel. of Flem
ing v. Niagara C. P., 12 Wend., 246:
Payne v. Cutler, 13 Ibi‘d.,.605; C. L.,
§ 769; or, that the note was obtained
by fraud or given without
considera
tion. Sill v. Rood, 15 Johns., 230: Hills
v. Bannister, 8 (‘ow., 31.
The rule be
ing that where the defense goes to de
stroy the plaintiE’s right of action en
tirely. it may be given in evidence
under the general issue without notice;
but if it goes merely to reduce or miti
gate
the damages,
notice must be
given:
Gleason v. Clark, 9 Cow.. 59;
People on rel. 0! Fleming v. Niagara
See, ante, p.
C. P., 12 Wend., 246.
193, note 1.
2 Wend., 486;
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In dob.t.—In debt on a record, the general issue merely
in
issue the existence of the record as stated; of any mat
puts
ter in discharge of the action, notice must be given; as, pay
ment or release; levy by execution, etc. In debt on a justicels
§ 193.

judgment, the general issue would only put in issue the fact
that such judgment was rendered. In debt on bond, it would
be only a denial of the execution of it.

In covenant.—In covenant,
§194.
the execution of the deed."

this plea only puts in

issue

In trover and actions on the case.—In trover and
§195.
actions on the case, the general issue allows any defense except
the statute of limitations."*’
§ 196.

In trespass.—In trespass to real or personal property,

or to the person, the general issue would not authorize the giv
ing in evidence anything but what directly controverts the
truth of any matter which the plaintiff would be bO11I]d to
Of any justiﬁcation or matter in discharge of the
prove.
cause of action, notice must be given with the general issue."
Pleas by several defendants.-—-Several defendants
§197.
may join in the same plea, or each may plead separately; one
may plead in abatement, another in bar, and a third may de
mur, except in actions against husband and wife, when the
husband must join in the plea with his wife. But personal de
fenses, as coverture, infancy, ete., should be pleaded separately;

and one of several defendants may justify by command of
another defendant, who pleads the general issue, or confesses
the action, for one defendant cannot, by pleading, take away
11—But under the general issue in
covenant, the defendant may show that
the deed is not his, by proving a lack
of power in the agent who executed it
Agent, ete., v. Lathrop,
on his behalf:
1 Mich., 438.
12—D<-iavan
v. Bates. 1 Mich., 97.
As to when an oﬂicer who has levied
on property must, in his defense in
trover for taking, ete., give notice of
the judgment under which the execu
See, (‘omstock v. Hollon,
tion issued:
2 Mich., 355: Thomas v. Watt. 104
Mich., 201; 62 N. W., 345.
But see,
Hine v. Commercial Bank, ete., 119

Mich., 448; 78 N. W., 471, where it is
held that the general issue in trover
will not permit the showing that the
property for which suit is brought is
held by virtue of an attachment, foi
lowing Eureka I. & S. Works v. Bresna
han, 66 Mich., 489; 33 N. W., 834, and
cases cited.
trespass for taking goods,
13—In
ete., the defense
that the goods were
taken under an attachment against a
third person alleged to be the owner,
is not admissible under the general
Rosenburg v.
issue without notice:
Angeli, 6 Mich., 508.
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two defendants join
for the other, the
plea is bad as to both, for the court cannot sever it and say
that one is guilty and the other is not, when they all put them
selves on the same terms." But this rule would not apply to a
joint plea of the general issue, as neither defendant could give
in evidence a justiﬁcation under that plea in any case.
in

a plea

which

14—1 Chltty's

PL,

is sufficient

for

10 Am. ed.,

365-6-7.

one but not

\
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What it i8.—Acc0rd is an agreement between two
§198.
parties to give and accept something in satisfaction of a claim
made by the one against the other,1 which when performed, is
'
satisfaction, and a bar to all actions upon that account.’
Ac
cord and satisfaction
reeords.3

is a defense

in all actions except upon

§199. How pleaded.—The best and safest way of pleading
an accord is to plead it by way of satisfaction; for, if it is
pleaded by way of accord, a precise execution of it in every
part must be pleaded; and if there be a failure in any part,
the plea is insuiﬁcient;

if

but

it is pleaded by way of satisfac

tion, the defendant need plead no more, but that he paid the
plaintiﬂ’, or delivered to him, the money or article in full sat
The acceptance in satisfaction
isfaction, which he received.‘
is the essence and gist of the plea.“ A plea of accord merely,

without satisfaction, will

it

is,

must be expressly
bad; that
was
in satis
or
accepted
that the money
property
faction and discharge; and an averment that the money or the
property was given in payment and satisfaction would be
be

averred

The plea must show that the satisfaction pro
total
be executed by
for,
not
stranger, the defendant cannot avail himself of it.’ It
necessary, in general, to allege the satisfaction to be-reason
insuﬁicient.°

from the defendant;

is

a

it

if

ceeded

3

410,

6—Drake v. Mitchell,
see, Russell v. Lytle,

6

408,

it
2

6

5

Hawiey v. Foote, 19 lbid., 516; Brook
lyn Bank v. DeGrauw. 23 Ibid., 342;
Tilton v. Alcott, 16 Barb., 598: Brown
N. W.,
ing v. Crouse, 43 Mic-h., 489;
664; Harrison
v. Gamble, 69 Mich.,
'
96; 36 N. W., 682.
37;
Johns.,
7-—Clow v. Borst.
Daniels v. Hallenbeck, 19 Wend., 408;
Kemp v. Balls, 10 Exch., 607.
v.
Cruikshank.
8—Heathcote
Term., 26.
9——3 Chltty's "L, 924, note o.
C.,
10—Bartlett v. Pentlund, 10 B.
&

&

1

1—Bacon‘s Abr., “Accord and Satis
faction,“ C.
The next
2—3 Bis. Com., 15, 16.
friend of an infant cannot bind the in
fant by an accord and satisfaction:
Burt v. McBain, 29 Mich., 260.
Saund.
3-1 Chitty’s Pi., 485-6;
Ev., 25.
Pl.
4—Bacon’s Abr., “Accord and Satis
faction," C.: Daniels v. liallcnbeck, 19
Wend., 410.
5—Danieis v. Hallenbeck, 19 Wend.,

is

it

it

is

able,‘ or the value of it.° Where accord and satisfaction
must appear that the
admissible under the general issue,
accord was executed before the commencement of the suit,“
no objection that
but when specially pleaded, puis, etc.,

East, 251:

Wend.,

390;

776.
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was executed after the commencement of the action, and it
may be pleaded in bar of the further maintenance of the suit."
If the accord and satisfaction took place after action brought,
the notice must aver, and it must be proved, that it was a
satisfaction of the costs and damages sustained by the breach

of contract.“

But where, to an action upon a note, the de
pleaded payment by the maker, after the suit was
brought, of a sum about two dollars less than the note, and
interest, “in full satisfaction and discharge of the note,” the
plea was held to be good, on the ground that interest ought
fendant

not to be considered as part of the debt within the purview
the rule that payment of a lcss sum, in satisfaction of a debt
due, is not good, and as to the costs, when parties settled

of

be borne by each party."
There is an exception to the rule that a smaller sum is not a.
satisfaction of a greater, namely, where creditors agree to take
a composition from their debtor.

without noticing them, they are to

To establish

this

defense, the defendant must prove the
agreement between him and the plaintiff to accept the satis
faction, and that the satisfaction agreed upon was reasonable,
perfect, certain and executed," and proceeded from the de

fendant."
§200. What will amoimt to satisfaction.—The satisfaction
must be a reasonable and complete satisfaction of the thing
demanded, and operates as an extinguishinent of the original
Therefore, acceptance of a. less sum is not a
cause of action.
satisfaction of a greater." So, an agreement with one of two
l1—Corbell
Ell., 673.

v.

Swinburne,

8

Ad.

&

v. Aywell, 5 B. It Ald.,
12—I<‘rancia
886: 1 Saund. Pl. & Ev., 37.
v. Brauuan, 5 Johns.,
13—Johnston
3 Johns.,
271; Tiiotson
v. Preston,
229.

14—ileathcote
Term R.. 26.

v.

Cruikshank.

2

Borst., 6 Johns.. 37;
Daniels v. Hallenbeck. 19 Weud., 408.
if such n satisfaction is ad
But
by a stranger and is accepted
vanced
by the defendant, it is a good satis
10
Simpson v. Eglnston,
faction:
And if payment is made
Exch., 845.

i5—Clow

v.

by a stranger and subsequently ratiﬁed
by the defendant. it is a good bar:
Belshaw v. Bush, 11 C. B., 191, 207;
and see. Booth v. Smith, 3 Wend., 66.

16—~Fitch
v. Sutton, 5 East, 230.
That is, where the greater sum is actu
aiiy and justly due, and there is no
Seymour v.
dispute to its amount:

Mlnturn, 17 Johns., 160; Dederick v.
Leman, 9 Ibld., 333; Harrison v. Gam
ble, 69 Mich., 98; 38 N. W., 682;
Leeson v. Anderson, 99 Mich., 247; 58
N. W., 72.
This doctrine is applic
able to debts liquidated by agreement
or otherwise; and s claim any portion
of which is in dispute cannot be said

203
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joint makers of

a note to accept part of it from him and to
the other for the residue and the payment of the
money accordingly, is not a good accord and satisfaction, nor
will it prevent a suit against both for that debt." But pay
ment and acceptance of a part of a debt in satisfaction of the

look

to

before the time it became due," or at a place where it
was not payable," or if a third person guarantee or secure
the payment of a less sum,2° or there be a release, or some

whole,

for the relinquishing his further claim, would
satisfaction.” But payment and acceptance in
satisfaction of an amoimt exceeding the principal of the debt,
but not covering the whole interest, nor the costs of suit, is
suﬁicient." If a debtor give a chose in possession for a chose
in action, as a horse,'or other property in specie, it is suﬁ“1
cient.“ The property assigned or delivered may amount to
the sum in demand, and more, or it may amount to less-not
evcn the twentieth part of it-—yet it is good enough, because
But the
the plaintiff has accepted it as a full satisfaction.“
property given, or the thing done, must appear to be of some
consideration

be a suﬁicient

value or advantage to the plaintiff.*’-5
to be liquidated within the meaning of
Merrill, 108
the
rule:
Tanner
v.
Mic-h., 58; 05 N. W., 664.
Johns.,
Close,
v.
2
17—Harrison
448; see. post, 5 205.
Separate com
promise by Joint debtors.
18—Johnston
v. Brannan, 5 Johns.,
17 Ihld.,
269: Seymour v. Minturn,
169.

19—Co. Lit., 212.
20—Steinrnan v. Magnus, 11 East.
390; Kellogg v. Richards, 14 Wend.,
116; Page v. McCrea, 1 Wend., 164;
Boyd v.‘ Hitchcock, 20 J'ohns.. 76.
21—i<“it<-ii v. Sutton.
5 East R.,
230; King v. Brewer, 121 Mich., 839;
80 N. W., 238.
Compromise
settlemente.—But
the
rule that a part payment is no bar to
an action for the residue of the debt,
applies only in those cases where the
is undisputed. and is liqui
demand
dated; for if the sum is disputed or
the amount unliquidated, a payment of
a part and the acceptance of it in
satisfaction by the creditor will bar an
action for any further sum than that
paid and accepted:
Lougrldge v. Dor

ville, 5 B. It Ald., 117: Wilkinson v.
Byers, 1 Ad. G: E., 106; Atlee v. Back
house, 3 M. & W., 651; Paimerton v.
lluxford. 4 Denio. 166; Pierce v.
Pierce, 25 Barb., 343.
Where parties
have compromised claims apparently
made in good faith by one against the
other, the courts will not go back of
into the
their
action
and inquire
merits of the controversy or reason
ableness
of the settlement:
Hull v.
Swartout, 29 Mich.. 250; Prichard v.
Sharp, 51 Hich., 432; 16 N. W.. 798:
Hart v. Gould, 62 Mich., 262: 28 N.
W., 831; Freeman v. Freeman. 68
Mich., 28; 35 N. W., 897: Brown v.
Kriser, 129 Mich.. 448: 89 N. W.. 51;
Kern Brewing Co. v. Royal Ins. Co..
127 Mich., 39: 86 N. W., 388: Lamb
v. Rathburn,- 118 Mich., 666; 77 N.
W., 268.
v. Brannan. 5 .Tohns.,
22—Johnston
269.
v.
23-—Heathcote
Crookshanks. _2
Term. R., 24, 26.
24—Watkinson v. lnglesby. 5 Johns.,
386. 392.
25——Preston
86.
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In case of a specialty security.—Sueh, where c0-ex
§201.
tensive, operates as a satisfaction of a simple contract debt or
security; and is a satisfaction, as the simple contract is merged
in the specialty,“ but not if the specialty be void, or be taken
merely as a collateral or additional security," and a judg
meilz having been obtained on the collateral security, will not,
unless it has produced satisfaction, be an extinguishment of
the original demand.“

a

is,

But one bond is not satisﬁed by the
giving of another,“ nor is a judgment satisﬁed by merely
obtaining another judgment upon it.3° The general principle
of law in such cases
security of a higher nature ex
that
tinguishes inferior securities, but not securities of equal do
greeﬁ"

a

it

is

A bill of exchange or promissory note, etc., will sometimes
If the debt satisﬁed
operate as an accord and satisfaction.
bar
bill
forms
to
an
action for the debt."
note,
or
by a
Where A. and B. have suits for false imprisonment pending
Mich., 3.18: Breitung v. Llndaucr, 37
Mich., 217; Brown
v.
Dunckel. 46
(_‘., Mich.. 29:
B.
27—Twopenny v. Young,
N. W., 537; Tabor v.
Michigan M. L. ins. Co., 44 Mich..
210; Sterling v. Rogers, 2
Wend..
N. W., 830;
Riverside iron
324:
658.
East., 259.
Works v. ilali, 64 Mlch., 165; 31 N.
28—Drake v. Mitchell,
Johns., 55;
W., 152: Mcitiorran
20—I‘helps v. Johnson.
v. Murphy,
68
Mir-h., 246: 36 N. W., 60; Beecher
Jackson v. i=hnil‘cr. 11 Johna., 513, 517.
v.
Cow.,
Dacey.
45 Mich., 92;
30-—Mumtord v. Stocker,
N. W., 689.
ITS; Andrews v. Smith,
may
Wend., 53.
But
bo presumed,
from the
Wend., 53.
circumstances attending the transac
31-Andrews v. Smith.
tion, and the subsequent
Taking Judgment on a note coi
acts of the
F-4.
lateral to a chattel mortgage, does not parties, that the note was given and
in satisfaction ot the tormer
accepted
destroy the lien of the mortgage:
Mlch., 295.
debt:
llotchln v.
Thurber v. Jewett,
note or antecedent
Mich., 494; Sears v. Smith,
32—Wittersby
v. Mann. 11 Johns..
Secor.
Ibid., 310:
12
576: Johnson v. Weed.
i\llch.. 243; Sage v. Walker.
Mlch., 425. Thus, where a debtor gave
The
Sage v. Walker. 12 Mich.. 425.
giving of a promissory note for goods
a new note tor the accrued interest
sold. or for an antecedent debt, or due on a bond and mortgage, with
higher
ls
no
other valuable consideration.
than
that
rate of interest
satisfaction or payment, unless it is
named in the bond, the giving of such
specially agreed to be so taken; and in
new note was held to operate as pay
difference
makes
no
ment upon the bond and mortgage of
this respect
precedent
the interet for which the new note was
whether it be given for
contempo
given:
Burchard v. Fraser, 23 .\ilch..
debt or tor a debt created
And therefore it is not neces
rnneously with the making oi’ the note,
224.
or whether it he the note of the debtor sary to prove that it was expressly
agreed that
Gardner v. Gor
or ot a third person:
should be taken in satis
I)oug.. Mich., 50. 510.
As to
ham,
faction:
Fiotchin v. Secor,
Mich..
404.
The taking of a bill or note for
bill or note will be construed
when
present or former simple contract
cases:
as payment, see the following
36
debt, is prime facie a satistaction, and
Au Sable B. B. Co. v. Sanborn,
'
v.

Foster,

Blng..

2

26-Winton

N.

8

It

a

it

a

2

9

8

3

9 9

it

7

,1

8 3

6

L!

I

8

3

&

692.

n

a 1

(‘..

205

§ 202

against

ACCORD

CH.

XII.

to discontinue

the

AND SATISFACTION.

each other, a mutual.

agreement

suits, which are accordingly discontinued, is good as an accord
Destroying certain documents upon plain
and satisfaction."
in
tit'f’s undertaking,
consideration thereof, not to bring an
action for slander, is a sufﬁcient accord and satisfaction.“
§202. An accord must be certain.—An accord that the de
fendant should employ a workman three or four days about
repairing the house is bad,” and performance of an uncertain
accord will not aid the ﬁrst uncertaintly.“

it remains ex
§203. An accord must be executed.—While
on
the part of the de
eeutory, although without any default
fendant, it is no bar to the action; even payment or delivery
of part of the money or goods agreed to be received in satis
faction, and a tender of the residue, is insuﬁicient.-°"
Satisfaction must proceed from the defendant-If it
by a total stranger, it will not avail the de
fendant.” Accord and satisfaction to one of several co-plain
tifts will operate as a discharge to all,” and by one of several
copartners, or co-obligors,4° or joint wrong-doers,“ will avail
as to all, although it is agreed that it shall not operate as a
satisfaction for the others.“
§204.

executed

be

Separate compromises by joint debtors.—Pi-ovision is
made by statute enabling copartners, and other joint
debtors, separately to compromise and settle their respective
shares and proportions of the joint liabilities, and thereby
§ 205.

now

protect

themselves

from payment

amounts to an agreement to glve the
person dellverlng It credit for the time
It has to run: 1 Saund. Pl. & Ev.. 29;
Yale v. Coddlngton, 21 Wend., 175.
33—Foster v. Trull, 12 Johns.. 456.
3-1—Lane v. Applegate, 1 Starkle,
97.
35——Adams
B8.
36-—-Russel
1 Saund.

Pl.

v.

Tapllng,

v. Russel,
& Ev., 32.

4
3

Mod.
Lev.,

B.,
189;

37—Fltcl1 v. Sutton, 5 East, 230;
Russell v. Lytle. 6 Wend.. 391: Haw
ley v. Foote. 19 Wend.. 516; Brooklyn
Bank v. DeGrauw. 23 Wend., 342; 'I‘ll
ton v. Alcott, 46 Barb., 598.

and

actions

v. Borst,
38—Clow
Danlels v. Hallenbeck,

for the
6
19

re

37;
Wend., 408.

Johns.

516.

39—Plnnel's

5 Coke B., 117.

Case,

12
East.
40—_Jacaud v. French,
317; Strang v. Holmes, 7 Cow., 214.

41-Dufresne
v.
8
Ylutchlnson.
Taunt.. 117; Strang v. Holmes, 7 Cow..
And a partial satlsfactlon by one
224.
ot several wrong-doers ls, so far as lt
Merch B.
goes, satlsfactlon as to all:
v. Curtis. 37 Barb., 317.
42-Ellls v. Bltzer. 2 Ham.. Ohlo.
S9; Mt-Bride v. Scott, 132 Mlch., 176;
1— N. W., —,
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joint debts and liabilities, the provisions
are
V

as

“That whenever any ﬁrm or copartnership shall be dis
solved, by mutual consent or otherwise, it shall and may be
lawful for any one or more of the individuals composing such
ﬁrm or copartnership, to make a separate settlement or com
promise with any one or all of the creditors of such ﬁrm or
copartnership; and such settlement or compromise shall be a
full and complete discharge, both in law and in equity, to the
debtor or debtors making such settlement or compromise, and
to such debtor or debtors only, of and from all and every lia
bility to the creditor or creditors with whom the same is made
or incurred, by reason of his or their connection with such
ﬁrm or copartnership; Provided, however, That in case of such

or compromise, the copartner

or copartners who
are not parties to the same, shall be discharged from all liabil
ity to the creditor or creditors except for their joint, ratable
portion of such copartnership debt."
“Every such debtor or debtors making such settlement or
compromise, shall take from the creditor or creditors, or their
attorney, with whom he may make the same, a receipt or mem
orandum, in writing, exonerating and discharging him or them,
from all and every individual liability, incurred by reason of
such connection with such ﬁrm or copartnership, whether such
liability was incurred as endorsee, acceptors, or otherwise,
which receipt or memorandum shall refer to-the instrument as
evidence of the indebtedness, and may be given in evidence
by such debtor or debtors, under the general issue in bar of
any creditor’s right of recovery against him or them, or any
indebtedness or liability so settled or compromised; and if
such liability sha-ll be, by judgment in any court in this state,
then on production to, and ﬁling in such court a receipt or
memorandum, signed by such creditor, agent or attorney, en
titled in such cause, describing suchjudgment, then the jus
tice before whom such judgment may remain, or if in a court
settlement

43--C. L., § 10448: see, Southworth
41 Mich., 198: 1 N. W.,
v. Parker,
it has been held in New York,
944.
under a similar statute, that a release
to one of several joint debtors.

authority of the statute, should refer
Bank of Poughkeepsie
to the statute:
v. Ibbatson, 5 Hill, 462; Holman v.
Dunlap, 1 Bsrb., 185.

under
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of record, then the clerk of such court shall discharge such
judgment of record, so far as such debtor or debtors, so settling
or compromising, shall be concerned.”“
“Such settlement or compromise with the individual mem
bers of a ﬁrm or copartnership, shall not be so construed as
to discharge the other copartners, except as provided in the
ﬁrst section of this act; nor shall it impair the right of the cred
itors to proceed in law or in equity, against the members of
such ﬁrm or copartnership as have not been discharged, and
it shall not be necessary to make such person or persons as
have been discharged, by such settlement or compromise, par
ties to any suit with the other copartners who have not been
discharged; and the member or members of such ﬁrm or co
partnership, so proceeded against, shall be entitled to set off
any demand against said creditor or creditors, which could
have been set oﬂ’ had such suit been brought against all the
individuals comprising such ﬁrm or copartnership; nor shall
such settlement, compromise or discharge of an individual of
the other members of such
ﬁrm or copartnership from availing themselves of any defense
at law or equity that would have been available had not this
act been passed, except that they shall not set up the discharge
of one or more partners, as the discharge of the other copart
a ﬁrm or copartnership

prevent

ners, unless it shall expressly appear in the receipt or mem
orandum that all were intended to be discharged/"“"
“Such settlement or compromise of one or more members of
such ﬁrm or copartnership, with a creditor of such ﬁrm or co
partnership, shall in nowise aifect the right of the other part
ners to demand and recover from their copartners making such
settlement or compromise, their ratable portions of such ﬁrm
debt, in the same manner, and to the same
extent, as if this act had not been passed/’4°
“The provisions of this act shall extend to joint deb-tors in
the same manner as it now extends to copartners; and such

or copartnership

joint debtors are hereby authorized, individually, to settle or
compromise, and be discharged from their joint indebtedness
44—C. L., Q 10450.

tial that

the

as a condition

release

It

is not essencourt

be ﬁled in

of its validity:

Beek-

man v. Sylvester, 109
N. W., 1093.
45—C. L., § 10451.
46-0. L., § 10452.
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in the

same manner as is herein provided by the Settlement and
compromise of copartners. ”‘"
DURESS.
§ 206.

What it is.-—Durcss is of two kinds; by imprisonment

and by t.hrca.t.s.1
A bond or contract procured by means of unlawful impris
A judgment
47—C. L.. l 10453.
cannot be enforced against one of three
joint judgment debtors.
where the
other two show a discharge from the
judgment. and there has been no dis
continuance as to them. such judgment
in such case must be against all: Beek
man v. Sylvester, 109 Mich., 183; 66
N. W.. 1093.
1—Duress exists when one, by the
unlawful
act of another, is induced
to make a contract or perform some
act under circumstances which deprive
It
him of the exercise of free will.
may be either of the person or of the
goods
of the party.
Duress of the
is either by imprisonment, or
person
or by the exhibition of
by threats.
force which apparently cannot be re
sisted.
Duress of goods may exist
when one is compelled to submit to
an illegal exactlon in order to obtain
them from one who has them in posses
sion. but refuses to surrender them
unless the exaction is submitted to.
Thus. where the plaintiff pledged goods
for £20. and when he offered to redeem
them the pawnbrokcr refused to sur
render the property unless he was paid
the exorbitant exaction of £10 for in
terest. This was held to be duress of
the goods: and. although the plaintiff
submitted to the exaction. he was held
entitled to recover back all that had
and taken.
been unlawfully
demanded
This. say the court. was a payment by
compulsion.
it is duress of goods
when a common carrier refuses. until
charges.
to de
payment of excessive
liver the property for the carriage of
And
which the charges were made.
so. where one having securities in his
hands which he refuses to surrender
until illegal commissions are paid. R0,
if illegal tolls are demanded for pass
ing a raft of lumber, and the owner
pays them to liberate his raft, he may
14

recover back what he has been illegally
So, one may recover
compelled
to pay.
hack money which he pays to release
his goods from an attachment which is
sued out with knowledge on the part
of the plaintiﬂ that he has no cause
of action.
Nor is the principal con
to payments made
ﬁned
to recover
goods; it applies equally well when
i
money
extorted as a condition to
the exercise by the party of any other
right: for example. when a cor
legal
p
ration refuses to suh'er a lawful
transfer of stock till an illegal exac
tion is submitted to.
And the mere
threat to employ
colorable legal au
thority to compel payment of an un
founded claim. is such duress as will
support an action to recover back what
is paid under it.
But when a party threatens nothing
except what he has a legal right to do
or perform, there is no duress.
When.
judgment
a
creditor
therefore.
threatens to levy his execution on the
debtor's goods. and under fear of the
levy the debtor executes and delivers
a note for the amount, with snreties
the note cannot be avoided for duress
And it is said. that a refusal to pay on
demand
a debt
that is due. thereby
forcing the creditor, while in great
financial embarrassment. to receipt in
full for only a partial payment. is not
duress if the debtor has done nothing
unlawful to cause the embarrassment.
which compelled
the creditor to sub
mit to the
extortion:
v.
Hackley
lieadley. 45 Mich.. 569; 8 N. W. 511.
The foregoing discussion found in the
opinion in this case just referred to
is supported by many authorities cited
therein.
See also Mayhew v. Phoenix
Ins. Co.,
23
Mich..
105: Peter v.
Thickstun. 51 Mich., 590; 17 N. W.,
68: Prichard v. Sharp. 51 Mich.. 432;
16 N. W., 798.
As to effect of threats
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is

thus arrested

to obtain his deliverance,
avoided by duress of impris0nment.”3

such deed

may be

210

6

2

it

2

&

a

1

to him from others, is duress, and
cannot be sustained:
Vyne v. Glenn,
41 Mich., 112;
N. W., 997.
A plea
of duress is not good as against
bona tide holder of negotiable paper:
Farmers
M.
Bank
v.
Butler. 48
Mich., 192: 12 N. W., 36.
It must
appear that the action in question was
inﬂuenced by the unlawful
restraint.
It is not suﬂicient to show unlawful
restraint alone:
Feller v. Green, 26
Mich., 70.
2—Thompson
Lockwood,
v.
15
Johns.,
Begieys,
Evans
v.
256:
Wend., 243: Strong v. Grannis. 26
Barb., 122, 126. But lawful imprison
ment constitutes no duress to avoid a
deed or contract.
To constitute
in
case, there must be undue
such
and
illegal force used, or the party made
to endure unlawful
and unnecessary
privation, and be induced to execute
deed, or make
the
the
contract. to
avoid such illegal hardship or priva
Doug. Mich..
tion: Rood v. Winslow.
68,
under
71.
Securities
obtained
pressure of a criminal prosecution re
sorted to to enforce civil liability can
not be enforced by one guilty of such
conduct:
Seiber v. Price, 26 Mich.,
518; Briggs v. Withey, 24 Mich., 136.
8—Watkins
v. Baird,
Mass.. 506.
511; Holbrook v. Cooper,
44 Mich.,
N. W., 850.
The rule seems to
373:
be that where there is an arrest for
just
improper
purposes,
without
a
cause; or, where there is an arrest for
a just cause
under lawful authority.
may
but for an unlawful purpose,
Strong
be construed to he a duress:
Barb., 162; Severance
v. Grannis,-26
N. H., 386; Richard
v. Kimball,
son v. Duncan,
N. H., 508: and see,
Hackct v. King,
Alien. 58: Hacket
Allen, 144.
recognizance
v. King,
prisoner
illegally
extorted
from

A

a

8

6

3

8

it

6

to

it

to furnish
to prosecuting oilicers in
formation upon which criminal prosc
cution might be instituted, see Berger
V. Farnham, 131 Mich., 487; 90 N. W.,
Durcss to he available must be
281.
by the plaintiff or his authority: Boy
dan v. Iiaberstumpf, 129 Mich., 1371
The execution of a
88 N. W., 386.
mortgage by a wife, upon the state
ment by the husband. who is in cus
to
tody, that she would have to do
save
him from jail, is voidable for
duress, though those having him in
custody made no statement to her;
the agent of the insurance company,
which hud been defrauded through the
forgery of the husband, had however
suggested
the husband that he pro
cure his wlte to make the mortgage:
Bentley v. Robson, 117 Mich., 691; 76
N. W., 146: Benedict v. Roome, 106
Mich., 378; 64 N. W., 193.
Such a
conveyance is not void but voidable:
Miller v. Lumber Co., 98 Mich., 163;
57 N. W., 101: Meech v. Lee, 82 Mich.,
274; 46 N. W., 383; Cribbs v. Sowle,
As to
87 Mich., 340: 49 N. W., 587.
recognition oi.’
the eﬂect of subsequent
the instrument procured by duress, see
Meech
v. Lee, 82 Mich., 274: 46 N.
W., 383, where a second mortgage is
original
by
the
held to be effected
and Bentley v. Robson,
transaction:
117 Mich., 691; 76 N. W., 146: where
payments on the security obtained were
subequently made, they were held not
A
to eﬂect a waiver of the illegality.
mother who releases a claim for dam
ages then in suit in order to save her
prosecution is
from a criminal
son
Weiser v. Weicb, 112
under duress:
Mich., 134: 70 N. W., 438.
But a
settlement and deductions compelled
by taking advantage oi’ a creditor’s
ﬁnancial embarrassments, and threat
ening ruin by stopping payments due

a

a.

a

a

is

is

it,

onment of the person making
void? So, although the
imprisonment
under legal process, the bond or contract may
be avoided.
“It a sound and correct principle of law that
when
man shall falsely, maliciously and without probable
cause sue out
process, in form regular and legal, to arrest
and imprison another, and shall obtain
deed from
party

\
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Modern doctrine of duress-“The true doctrine of
§207.
duress at the present day, both in this country and England,
is that a. contract obtained by so oppressing a person by
threats regarding his personal safety or liberty, or that of
his property, or of a member of his family, as to deprive him
of the free ‘exercise of his will and prevent the meeting of
minds necessary to a valid contract, may be avoided on the
ground of duress. " " " " The law no longer allows a.
person to enjoy without disturbance, the fruits of his iniquity,
because his victim was not a person of ordinary courage: and
no longer gauges the acts that shall be held legally suﬁicient
to produce duress by any arbitrary standard, but holds him
who, by putting another in fear, shall have produced in him
a state of mental incompetency to contract, and then takes
advantage of such condition, no matter by what means such
fear be caused, liable at the option of such other to make

restitution to him of everything

of value thereby taken from

him. ”4

In an action on a bond executed by two,

one cannot plead
this rule does not

that the other executed it by duress.“ But
apply to a bond taken by an oﬂicer by virtue of his oﬁice.°

I
while under arrest, and in violation of
his right to an examination, before
being required to give such security,
has been held to have been obtained
Champlain v. People, 2 N.
by duress:
Y., R2.
And where a person arrested
another on the pretense that he had a
warrant, when in fact he had none,
and the prisoner gave property to ob
tain hls release, it was held that the
transaction:
the
duress
avoided
Fnshny v. Ferguson. 5 Hill, 154: see,
Lyon v. Waldo. 36 Mlch., 345.
Where n timid and ignorant man
was induced, by threats of prosecution
for slander. to assign a mortgage to
another, the assignment was held to
on account
be without consideration,
of the duress: Tate v. Whitney. Har.
Ch. (liiich.). 145; see, Gates v. Shntts,
7 Mich., 127.
Nor is it necessary that the party
executing the contract should be under
fear of personal injury to himself to
void.
Thus.
render the transaction

where a wife, terriﬁed by threats made
in her presence to arrest her husband
was in
for an alleged embezzlement,
duced to transfer suﬂlclent of her sep
arate property to secure the amount
alleged to have been embezzled. it was
held to he under duress, and void:
Eddie v. Slimmon, 26 N. Y., 1). And,
where a ballee of perishable merchan
disc exacts more than is due to him
as a condition of delivering it to the
owner, the money so paid wrongfully
as the necessary means of obtaining
delivery, may be recovered back as
liarmony v.
money paid under duress:
Bingham, 1 Duer, 210; Harmony v.
Bingham, 12 N. Y.. 99: Atlee v. Back
honse, 3' Mees. & W., 633.
4—Galusha
v. Sherman, 105 Wis,
263; 81 N. W., 495; 47 L. R. A., 417:
Cribbs v. Sowle, 87 Mich., 340; 49 N.
W., 587.
Lockwood,
16
v.
6—'1‘hompson
Johns., 256.
6—Ibid.
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Eﬁect of.-—The effect of infancy

agreement

is,

INFANCY.
that any contract

made by the infant, except its object be necessaries,

is

may be avoided. Such contract or agreement
not void for
the infancy but voidable only, and cannot be avoided by him
during the continuance of his infancy.’ The only exception to
is

this general rule
the case of contracts which could by
possibility beneﬁt the infants

no

is

is

When contract
for necessa.ries.—The word neces
§209.
saries
not conﬁned, in its strict sense, to such articles as are
necessary to the support of life, but extends to articles ﬁt
to maintain the particular person in the state, station and

if

if

it

is

degree in life in which he is.” Meat, drink, apparel, medicine,
An infant
schooling and instruction, are necessaries.”
liable
for money borrowed to purchase necessaries,
be actually
the lender either lays out
applied to that purpose; at least,
is

it

So,
laid out for necessaries."
the money himself, or sees
liable for money paid to procure his liberation
an infant
from arrest on execution; and also on mesne process, where
Necessaries supplied to the
the arrest was for necessaries."

wife and children (if an infant are necessaries to him." The
rank or fortune of the defendant may make some articles
necessaries which in the case of another person must be deemed
articles of mere comfort and convenience; but articles which,
in the particular case, are matters of comfort and convenience
&

5

9-—Wharton v. McKenzie,
Ad.
N. S., 606; Peters v. Flemming,
W., 42; Ford v. Fothergiii,
M.
Esp., 211.
A
10——Bac. Abr., “Infancy,"
3.
school
education would
good common
Middle
be necessary for every one:
bury Col. v. Chandler, 16 Vt., 683;
and see, Harris v. Roofs Executors, 10
Mich.,
Barb., 489: Squier v. Hydiiﬂ,
A horse held not to be: Wood
274.
v. Losey, 50 Mich., 475;_15 N. W.,
9

1,

1

&

6

Eli.,

557.

212

1

1

2

1

11-—Randali v. Sweet,
Denio. 460;
Sandf., 306.
Smith v. Oiiphant.
Denio, 460.
12—Randail v. Sweet,
Strange,
13—'I‘urner v. Trisby,
Denio, 518.
168; People v. Moores,
4

6

9

3

7'--Dunton v. Brown, 31 Mich., 182:
Armitage v. Widoe, 36 Mich., 124; Os
N. W..
born v. Farr, 42 Mich., 134;
299; Lansing v. Michigan C. Ry. Co.,
A
126 Mich., 663; 86 N. W.. 147.
minor may bind himself by contract
and such contract,
for necessaries,
when executed, if reasonable under all
the circumstances, or not so unreason
of fraud or
able as to be evidence
undue advantage, cannot be repudiated
Mich.,
by him: Squier v. Hydiiif,
An adult contracting with
274, 277.
an infant cannot avoid his contract
for the infancy: Wldrig v. Taggart,
51 Mich., 103: 16 N. W.. 251.
8—Dunton v. Brown, 31 Mich., 182:
Mich., 217.
Chandler v. McKinney,

'
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merely, can never be included

§ 210

under the term necessaries."

An infant widow is bound by her contract for the providing of
the funeral of her husband, who has left no property to be
.
administered."
the
articles
furnished
are
such
as
are
generally
_Although
classed as necessaries, an infant is not liable if he live at home
with his father, and is maintained by his father."
Nor, if
he live away from the father, but is furnished by the father
with all that is necessary for him." If the infant is supplied
with necessaries from any quarter, as if he purchase sutﬁcient
from one tradesman, although upon credit, any others he may
purchase about the same time from other tradesmen cannot
be deemed necessaries."
Where the plaintiff, an infant, contracted to labor for a cer

tain time, and left the defendant before the time without
cause, it was held, in an action for his work and labor, that the
plaintiif’s violation of his agreement was neither a defense nor
a ground for reducing the amount of the recovery."
Infant ’s contracts voidable.—The general rule is, that
the contracts of infants are voidable, and not absolutely void.”
§ 210.

14—Wharton

Eii.,

N.

S.,

606.

v.

McKenzie,

5 Ad.

&.

,

15—Chsppell
v. Cooper, 13 M. 8:
W., 252.
16—Walllng v. Toll, 0 Johns., 141;
Bainbridge v. Pickering, 2 W. Bia.,
1825: 3 C. & P., 111.
17-Story v. Perry, 4 C. 8: P., 526.
18—1 Esp., 211; Baiubridge v. Pick
ering, 2 W. Bia., 1.125; see, Wood v.
Losey, 50 Mich., 475; 15 N. W.. 557.
Denlo,
3
v. Hull,
1D—\\'hitmarsh
2
375-6; but see. Moses v. Stevens.
Plck., 332.
in such ease the infant is
by
not compeliable to pay damages,
way of recoupment or otherwise, for
en
contract
withdrawing
from his
Persons who contract with
gagement.
The
minors do so at their own risk.
adult binds himself. but the infant
51
not: Widrig v. Taggart,
does
Mich.. 163: 18 N. W., 251.
But it seems that where an infant
has made a contract to render ser
vices and labor for another, and has
performed it, that he will be bound
if it
by the terms of the aizreement.
was reasonable under all the circum

stances,

or not so unreasonable as to

be evidence
of fraud or undue advan
tage on the part of the employer:
Squlcr v. llydliif, 9 Mich., 27-1.

if

contract for services is apparently
fair and reasonable under the circum
stances. the infant who has performed
it should be held to its terms, and
should not he allowed to repudiate it
unless an unfair advantage has been
So long as the em
taken of him.
ployer acts in good faith, and is not
notiﬁed of any dissent on the part
of the infant, he has n right to under
stand that his responsibility is meas
On the other
ured by his agreement.
hsnd, the infant may abandon the
service when he pleases, or stipulate
for such new terms as he can obtain.
He is bound by the terms of the con
tract so fnr as he executes it without
dissent, but no further:
Spicer v.
Earl, 41 Mich., 191: 1 N. W., 923.
20—2 Kent's Com., 9 ed., 234. An
infants contracts are not void. but
voidahle. The law, in declaring such
contracts voidable, docs so for the
infant's protection; and it is for the
a
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And there are but few, if any, exeeutory contracts of an in
fant, except perhaps for necessaries, which are not voidable
at his election.”
Infant must do equity.—The infant, if he would re
must restore what he has received by virtue of the
contract, if it is possible for him to do so. 'l‘he right to re
pudiate, however, is based upon the incapacity of the infant.
This same incapacity excuses him from returning or answering
for, the consideration received by him
through his im
providenee or otherwise,
spent or lost during minority.“
not permitted to protect fraudulent acts; and,
Infancy
an infant takes an estate, and agrees to pay rent,
therefore,
he cannot protect himself from the rent by pretense of infancy,
after enjoying the estate, when of age. If he receives rents, he
cannot demand them again when of age, according to the doc
trine now understood.
The note of an infant, though negotiable,
voidable, and
is

is

if is

it

if,

§211.
pudiate,

void."

2

7

336.

It is only such agreements as are
not possibly to be regarded as bene
ﬁcial to the infant, which are null
from the beginning: Dunton v. Brown,
31 5iich., 182.
An infant cannot aﬁirm or disaﬂirm
Armitage
his voidahle contract:
v.
Widoe, 36 Mich., 124. 130.
That is
a matter for hi
decision when he
arrives at mature age:
Dunton v.
Brown, 31 Mlch., 182.
Nor can his
guardian aﬂirm or annul it during his
infancy:
Iirid.
An infant's partnership contract ls’
not void, but only voidabie; therefore,
where an infant entered into a part
agreement
nership
and
advanced
money and performed services in the

business of the ﬁrm: Held, that he
could not afterward, during his mi
nority, repudiate the agreement and
sue his partner upon implied contract.
for his services and money advanced:
Dunton v. Brown, 31 Mlch., 182; Os
burn v. Farr, 42 Mic_h., 134;
N. W.,
299.
An assignment for the beneﬁt
of creditors, made by a ﬁrm one of
whom
is an infant,
is not therefore
void, but at most is only voidable:
Soper v. Fry, 37 Mich., 236.
22—(‘orey v. Burton. 32 Mich., 30:
Chandler v. Simmons, 97 Mass, 508;
93 Am. Dec., 117; see, note covering
the whole subject of infants‘ contracts
in 18 Am. St. Rep., 573-724.
For
other cases on character of the con
tracts of infants, see, ante, §§ 208
210, and notes.
23-Goodseii v. Myers,
Wend.,
3

infant to avoid the contract or ratify
it. A stranger, or wrong-doer, cannot
set up the infant's incapacity to con
tract,
as a protection to himself.
Though voldahle at the option of the
infant, his contract is valid as to
third persons who are strangers to
both the parties to the contract. and
who do not claim under either of
them: Holmes v. Rice, 45 Mich., 142;
N. W., 772.
Plck., 335,
21—Moses v. Stevens,

8

not

479.

The mercantile paper of a minor is
voidable at his election, and not ab
solutely void, but it has no binding
force until conﬁrmed.
If a minor purchases goods and
gives his note therefor, and sells a
part of the goods before his majority
and the remainder after that time,
still, he will not be liable upon the
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'Generally, whatsoever

an

infant

§ 212

is bound to do by law, the

same shall bind him, albeit he doeth

it without suit of law.“

A bond executed by an infant, the reputed father of
child, is valid.”

a bastard

Infant's liability for t0I'i'.5.—A party, notwithstanding
will be liable for torts in the same manner as
adults." As a. general rule, where a.n action against an infant
is founded on a contract, it cannot be converted into a tort,
so as to charge the infant."
An infant would not be liable
on his contract for a‘ fraudulent representation that he was of
full age, whereby the olaintiﬁ was induced to contract with
§ 212.

his infancy,

him."
But there are exceptions to this rule. Where goods were
delivered to an infant, who was master of a ship, under an
agreement to carry themi to a particular place, and they were
wrongfully shipped by him to a different place, he was liable in
trover for them.” So, if an infant hire a horse to go to one
place, and go to another, it is a. conversion of the horse.” So,
if goods are sold to a.n infant, he falsely aﬁirming that he was
of age, the vendor may recover them in tr0ver;31 so, it would
seem, if with an intention not to pay for them, he fraudulently
conceal the fact of his being an infant." If an infant wilfully
and intentionally injure an animal hired by him, an action of
note if he disaﬂirms it after his ma
jority, but he will be liable upon an
implied assumpsit. as for goods sold
and delivered. for the value not ex
ceeding the purchase price. of so many
of the goods as remained and were
of by him after he
sold or disposed
came to age:
Minnock v. Shortridge,
21 Ml('h., 304.
An infant cannot appoint an agent
or attorney, or empower them to act
for him; nor can he afﬂrm what one
has assumed to do for him. or as his
agent or in his name: Armitsge v.
Widoe, 36 Mich., 129.
24—Bnker v. Lovett, 6 Mass, 80.
25—l‘eopie v. Moores, 4 Denio, 518.
26—~Buliock
391.

v.

Bubcock,

3

Wend.,

27—Jennings
8 '1‘erm.,
v. Randall,
335.
v.
2-°—-(‘nnroe
Illrdsali. 1 Johns.
127; Burley v. Russell, 10 N.
Cases,

15 Mass,
l'l.. 184; Badger v.‘Phinney.
359; Brown v. Mc(‘une, 5 Sandf., 224.
But where an infant fraudulently
obtains goods on credit. by falsely
representing himself to be of age. with
intent not to pay for them, he will
be liable in tort for the fraud. even
though he may defeat a collection of
the price of the goods on the ground
of infancy:
Wallace v. Morse, 5 Hill,
391: Eckstein v. Frank, 1 Daly, 384.
And the vendor may claim the goods:
Badger v. Phlnney, 15 Mass., 359;
Fitts v. Hall, 9 N. H., 441: Eckstein
v. Frank. 1 Duly, 334; see, Campbell
v. Perkins, 4 Selden, 440.
2l)—Vasse v. Smith. 6 Cranch., 228.
30—lIomer v. Thwing, 3 Pick., 492;
Fish v. Ferris, 5 Duer, 49.
31-Bndger v. Phlnney, 15 Mass.,
359.
32—~Wa1lace
391.
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Morse, 5 Hill, 389,
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trespass may be sustained against him for the tort.” And
though the action be assumpsit, yet if in point of substance it
be of the description of a tort, infancy will be no defense; as
in assumrpsit for money embezzled by him.“

Infant's liability for negligence.-An infant is liable
His contributory negligence will
defeat his recovery in an action founded in negligence.“
Age is to be considered in determining questions of negligence
of infant."
§213.

for his negligent conduct.“

Burden of proof and evide'nce.—The burden of proof
§ 214.
on the plea of infancy is on the defendant.-"3
The burden of
proof is upon the infant defendant to show that articles within
a class generally considered as necessary, are not such in the
particular case.” But, scmble, contra, in case where the prop
erty not of this class." The plaintiff either denies the infancy
of the defendant, or proves, either that the goods, ctc., were
necessaries,“ or that the defendant ratiﬁed the contract after
In case the infancy is denied, the proof of
he became of age.
his non-age is cast upon the defendant. A new promise ratify
ing the contract must be proved to have been made before the
33—Campbeil v. Stokes, 2 Wend.,
137; Conklln v. Thompson, 29 Barb.,
But where an infant hires a
218.
horse and injures it through want of
skill, knowledge or discretion,
then
to an
the infancy may he a defense
violent
action of trespass, alleging
Camp
driving and cruel treatment:
bell v. Stokes, 2 Wend., 137.
Esp.,
34—Brlstow
v. Eastman,
1
172.

35-Chaddock v. Tabor, 115 Mich.,
27; 72 N. W., 1093.
The infant is
not liable however on the doctrine of
imputed negligence
as
this doctrine
Ham
rests on the theory of agency:
pel v. Detroit G. R. In W. Ry. Co.,
Mich.,
(Oct.,
100 N. W., 1002
1904); overruling Apsey v. Ry. Co.,
83 Mich., 432; 47 N. W., 319.
See,
also,
Mullen v. Owosso,
100 Mich.,
103: 58 N. W., 663: 23 L. R. A.
693; 43 Am. St, 436, and Fye v.
(‘hapin, 121 Mich., 679; 80 N. W.,

-

-;

797.
30

‘Hassenyer

i‘o.. -18 Mich.,

v.

205:

Michigan C. Ry.
12 N. W., 155:

Baker v. Flint & P. M. Ry. Co., 68
Mich., 90; 35 N. W., 836; Strudgeon
v. Sand Beach, 107 Mich., 497; 65
N. W., 616; Borck v. Michigan Bolt
8: W. Wks., 111 Mich., 129; 69 N. W.,
254: Lehman v. Eureka I. & S. \Vks..
114 Mich., 260: 72 N. W., 183: Hen
derson v. Detroit Citizens‘ S. Ry. Co.,
116 Mich., 368; 74 N. W., 525.
37
See cases in last note.
3B—Simmons v. Simmons, 8 Mich.,
318; Stewart v. Ashley, 34 Mich.,
183; Lynch v. Johnson,
109 Mich.,
640; 67 N. W., 908.
39—Lynch
v. Johnson,
109 Mich.,
,
640; 67 N. W., 908.
40-Wood v. Losey, 50 Mich., 475;
15 N. W., 557.
41—1n a suit agalnt an infant for
the price of goods or property sold
to him, the burden is on the plnintiﬂ
to show, before he can recover,
that
the articles sold were necessaries
for
the infant in the circumstances in
which he was at the time of the sale:
Wood v. Losey, 50 Mich., 475; 15
N. W., 557.
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commencement of the suit. For a promise after action will
not be sufficient."
Upon this issue it is sufficient to entitle
the plaintiff prima. facie to recover, to prove a new promise,
without showing that the defendant was of age at the time of

making it; it is for the defendant to prove, if he can, that he
was under age at the time, the fact being more particularly
within his knowledge.“

account

for

it,

A promise which will ratify a contract made during infancy
must be voluntary and express, and given with knowledge that
the party’s infancy discharged him from all legal liability.“
A bare acknowledgment of the debt, even by paying a sum on
will not

sufficient.“

If

it

is

it

were a conditional
promise to pay when he should be able, the plaintiff must prove
his ability; but
sufficient to give evidence of ability
be

is

from ostensible circumstances and appearances-in the world.“
the
The promise must be made to the plaintiff, or, what
same thing, to his attorney or agent; a promise to a stranger
will not answer."
PAYMENT.

_

a

9

9

2

3

5

2

1

4

8:

1

Cnruihers,
v.
43—Barthwick
Term., 668: llartley v. Wharton, 11
i-3., 934; Bigelow v. Grannis,
Ad.
Denio. 108.
liill. 206; Bay v. Gunn,
Esp., 628;
4-i—Thrupp v. Fielder.
lb|'d., 103; Good
llarmer v. Killing,
Wend., 479; Bige
seli v. Meyers.
liiil, 120: Smith
low v. Grannis,
Mass., 62; Whitney v.
v. Mayo.
Dutch, 14 Mass., 4.17.
Mass., 62.
45-Smith v. Mayo,
There must be an aiiirmative act to
mere
ac
amount to ratiﬁcation; a
for a time is not enough:
quiescence
Jackson v. Carpenter, 11 Johns., 530;
124;
Burchin,
14 Ilu'd.,
Jackson
v.
Voorhies v. Voorhies, 24 Barb., 150.
Where on coming of age the infant
makes
distinct acknowledgment of
the contract and indicates an inten
tion to be bound by it, there is ratiﬁ
Lynch v. Johnson, 109 Mlch.,
cation.
640: 67 N. W., 908.
Here silence will not amount to

Lynch v. Johnson. supra.
ratification:
The infant has the time prescribed
after
by
the
statute of limitations
coming of age in which to bring his
action, upon the theory that there
has been no ratiﬁcation:
Donovan
v. Ward, 100 .\iich., 601; 59 N. W.,
254, and cases cited in the opinion.
Esp. R.,
46-Clarke v. Bradshaw.
iiill, 120;
156; Bigelow v. Grannis,
Wend.,
479;
Goodseli v. Myers,
Hodges v. Hunt, 22 Barb., 150; Taft
v. Sergeant, 18 Barb., 320.
47—2 Cow. Treat.. 2d ed., 691 to
696.
On simple contracts, payments
may be proved under the general issue
without notice: Olcott v. Hanson, 12
Mich., 452; Burt v. Olcott, 33 Mich.,
178; Brennan v. Tietsort, 49 Mich.,
397; 13 N. W. 700.
Payment implies
a voluntary act of the debtor with the
satisfying
intention
of
a demand
against him. either in whole or in part:
Detroit, iiiilsdale
Southwestern Ry.
Co. v. Smith, 50 Mich., 112; 13 N. W.,
3

B.

2

Iilingworth,

v.

824.

8

(‘..

&

&

42—'1‘hornton

2

How the defense made.-—In assumpsit, or debt on
§215.
simple contract, payment may be given in evidence under

39.
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the general issue; in covenant or debt, on a specialty, notice
It must be pleaded in all cases of payment
must be given."

after action brought, if the whole demand
ment must have been made to the plaintiﬂ'
by him to receive it.
Payment to one of
or by one of several defendants, is suﬁicient,

paid.“

was

or

Pay

one authorized

several plaintiffs,
or by an agent.“
A common mode of proving payment is by a. receipt. It is
A payment may be
not, however, necessary to produce it.
proved by other evidence than the receipt, even if one has been

If
taken, and without accounting for its not being produced}
produced, the circumstances under which is was given may be
shown, as that it was obtained by fraud or misapprehension.’
48-—Boyd v. Weeks,
393.
5 Hill,
is,
under our statute, notice
puts riarre|'n continuance would have
to be given.
4l')—King v. Smith, 4 C. & P., 108.
Proof that a person is clerk for an
other docs not establish his right to
for his employer payment of
receive
demands
not shown to have any con
nection with the business:
Brown v.
36 Mich.,
1-19.
School District,
50—Waiters v. Smith, 2 B. & Ad.,
889.
To constitute a payment, the
or other valuable thing deliv
money
ered to the creditor must be accepted
by him as payment, otherwise the debt
Kingston
will not be extinguished:
Pay
Bunk v. Gay, 19 Barb., 459.
ment made on behalf of a debtor by
by
some other person may be adopted
him: Glover v. Parish of Dowagiac,
48 Mich., 595; 12 N. W., 887.
Payment may be effected by an ar
rangement
to accept the
debtor's
debtor, in satisfaction of the demand
against the former, if all the parties
agree to it; and such an agreement
need not be in writing.
Such a pay
is a
by way of substitution,
ment.
re
matter of defense, and may be
the creditor
buttcd:
Ibld.
Unless
agrees
to the substitution, he is not
bound by it: Blanchard v. Boom Co.,
40 Mich., 566.
But it seems that the assent of the
thing
or
creditor that the money
shall be received as payment may be
acts and
proved by his subsequent
conduct, as well as by proof of an ex
agreement:
Hotchln v. Secor.
press
8 Mich., 494.

That

1—Southwick

Hayden,

v.

7

Cow.,

334.
The burden of proof of payment
is on the debtor, and where there is
conﬂict in the testimony on the sub
ject, the question must be determined
by the probabilities and circumstances
corroborating
the one or the other:
Adams v. Field, 25 Mich., 16; see,
Smith‘s Appeal, 52 Mich., 415: 18 N.

W., 195.

The payment or delivery of
without
qualify
or explain the meaning of the act.
imports the payment of a debt, and
not a loan: 'Downey v. Andrus, 43
Mich., 65; 4 N. W., 628.
Where a creditor received payment
of his claim in money, ﬁfty dollars
of which he afterwards found to'be
spurious, and brought suit for that
part of the debt claimed as unpaid by
reason of the worthiessness of the
fifty dollars, and on trial the defend
ant admitting the debt and the pay
ment of it, but denying that any of
Held,
the money paid was spurious.
that the burden of proof was upon
the plaintiff
to show that the ﬁfty
dollars
was spurious, and he must
prove that before he could recover:
Atwood v. Cornwall, 25 Mich., 142.
2—Strstton v. Rastaii, 2 Term., 366;
Shaw v. Picton, 4 B. & C., 715; John
son v. Ward, 9 Johns., 310.
A mere
receipt may be contradicted
or ex
plained by the party: 2 Cow. Treat,
954; 1 Greenleafs Ev., § 305.
A re
ceipt or acknowledgment of payment
is not conclusive evidence of the fact
of payment:
McAllister v. Engle, 52
Mich., 56; 17 N. W., 694.
Indorse
another,
to
money
by
one
some
other circumstance to
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§216. What will operate as payment.—If a person received
in payment counterfeit bank notes, it does not operate as a
payment?
So, a payment in genuine bills of a bank which
had broken before the payment was made, of which both
parties were ignorant.‘ But, in such cases, the party receiving
the bills must oﬁer to return them within a reasonable time
after discovering that they are worthless, or he must bear
the loss.“
Payment may be proved by the delivery and ac
ceptance of any particular article; thus, where a party agreed
to accept a speciﬁc article in payment of a judgment, its
acceptance was deemed a satisfaction of the judgment.“
The note, either of the party or a third person, is not pay
ment, whether given for a precedent debt or one contracted at
the time, unless there be an agreement to receive it as such.’
ments upon notes. unexplained. prove
payment, and, whether explained or
not. prove an extinguishment and re
lease of liability to the amount of the
indorsement, as between
the parties,
unless it.be shown that they were not
Morris v.
intended so to operate:
But lu
Morris. 5 Mlch., 171. 180.
sut
dorsements are not of themselves
ilcient evidence of payment as against
the case out of
the debtor to take
the operation of the statute of limi
and see, Michigan
tations:
§ 0744;
ins. Co. v. Brown. 11 Mlch., 26.1. 273.
3—Mnrkie v. iinttield, 2 Johns., 454
5; Thomas v. Todd, 6 ilill, 340.
11
v. Ontario
Bk..
4-—-Lighthody
Wend., 9; Ontario Bank v. Lightbody,
6
13 Wend., 101; Young v. Adams,
Mass,
182: Gloucester Bank v. Sa
42, 43.
lem,
17 Ibid.,
5—Thomas v. Todd, 6 Hlil., 340:
Camidge v. Allenby, 6 B. & C., 373;
6—Brown v. Feeter, 7 Wend.. 301;
New York State Bk. v. Fletcher, 5
!bid., 85. And it a chattel is accepted
in payment of a debt. it is a good
payment and discharge, although the
chattel may not be of hali’ the value
Sibree v. TrilJl>. 15 M.
oi’ the debt:
& W., 35; Brooks v. White, 2 l\ietc..
285, 286.
But an attorney, without
special instruction. has no authority to
anything but money in pay
receive
ment of his client's debt: Jackson v.
361; Kellogg v.
Bartlett,
8 Johns.,
Gilbert,
Johns., 220.
And an
10

agent

who is authorized to receive
cnnnot bind his principal by
receiving goods in payment instead:
iloward v. Chapman, -1 C. & P., 508.
Nor has a shcriﬂ or constable power
anything
to receive
but legal
eur
rency on an execution in his hands
Bennet,
for collection:
Heald v.
1
Doug., Mlch., 513.
And the same rule
applies to
Justices
of the
Peace:
Welch v. Frost, 1 Mlch., 30 Delivery
and acceptance
of a land contract is
payment where there was an agree
ment to take certain lands in exchange
tor stock of groceries at a price ﬁxed.
Van Wert v. Olney & J. G. Co., 100
Mlch., 328: 59 N. W., 139.
7-—l‘orter v. Talcot, 1 Cow., 359;
Muldon v. Whitcock, 1 Ibid.,
290:
Frisbe v. Larned, 21 Wend., 450. The
note oi’ the debtor, given to and ac
cepted by the creditor tor the amount
of the debt, is not a payment of the
unless it is so understood or
demand
agreed
between
Brown
them:
v.
Dunckle, 46 Mlch., 29; 8 N. W., 537;
Breitung v. Lindauer, 37 Mlch., 217:
92; 7
Beecher
v. Dacey, 45 Mlch.,
And the date oi! the note
N. W., 689.
does not therefore necessarily ﬂx the
date oi.’ the indebtedness:
Ibid.
Nor
given
will the debtor's acceptances,
operate as payment
for the demand,
unless they were given upon the agree
ment that they shouid be received
as
payment:
Au Sable. etc., Co. v. San
horn, 30 Mlch., 358; see, Burrows v.
money
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is believed that no principle of law is better established at

I the present day than the giving a promissory note for goods
sold, or for any other valuable consideration, is no payment
unless it is specially agreed to be so taken; and in this respect
it makes no difference whether the note be given for a. preced
ing debt, or for a debt contemporaneously with the agreement;
or whether it be the note of a third person, or of the party to
the agreement.’

’8

But if the ac
Bangs, 34 Mich., 304.
oi a third person, given by
the debtor ‘to the creditor for the
is not paid
amount of the demand,
when due, and the creditor holds it
thereafter without notice to the debt
or of the non-payment until the ac
ceptor fails, the creditor will thereby
acceptance his own, and
make
the
Blanch
it will operate as payment:
ard v. Boom Co., 40 Mich., 566. The
giving of a new note for the amount
of an old one past due. will not op
erate as a payment of the latter un
less it was so understood or agreed
but as an addi
the parties:
between
But if the
tional security, rather.
old note was given up when the new
one was delivered, it will be prtmu
facie, but not conclusive, evidence of
payment; the real intention of the
parties will be open to explanation:
Sage v. Walker, 12 Mich., 425; Brown
v. Dunckle, 46 Mich., 29; 8 ‘N. W., 537.
Renewals of notes at a bank, in the
to the contrary,
absence
of evidence
ought always to be regarded as pay
ment,
because
the banks so regard
Chllds v. Pellett, 102 Mich.,
them:
And it seems
559: 61 N. W., 54.
that even where a note is given for a
yet, if it is not paid
prior demand,
when due, the creditor may sue upon
otherwise, if the
the original demand,
creditor accepts the note of a third
Cole v. Sacket.
person in payment:
And it is said that the
1 Hill, 516.
giving of a note by one of several
partners or joint debtors for a demand
antecedently due from all, will not
extinguish their liability, though the
creditor expressly accept the note in
Luer,
Waydeil
v.
5
satisfaction:
Hill, 448: but see, contra, I-‘lotchin v.
Secor, 8 Mich., 494.
Gotham,
Doug.,
1
v.
8—Gardner
Mich., 510; see, Sorreli v. Brewster,
ceptance

1 Mich.,

But

a note received for
is payment of that de
if such is the understanding
and assent of the parties: and that
such was their understanding and as
sent,
may be proved by their subse
quent acts and conduct, as 'well as by
direct proof of an express agreement:
Iiutchln v. Secor, 8 Mich., 494; see,
also, Burchard
v. Fraser,
23 Mich.,
224, and rmtc, 5 201, note 32.
Accept
ance of the note of two of the part
ners, in payment of a partnership debt
due from them and other partners, will
extinguish the original debt and re
lease those other partners:
Hotchin
v.
8 Mich., 494.
And where
Secor,
the vendor of land takes from the pur
chaser the note of a third person for
purchase price, the presumption
the
is that he takes it in payment, and not
merely as security:
Sears v. Smith, 2
Mich., 243: but see, Noel v. Murray. 3
Kernan 167.
If the owner of land
purchased subject to a mortgage there
on, pays the mortgage and takes "up
therewith,
the note collateral
after
maturity, the note will
be
deemed
paid, and no recovery can be had on
Appledorn v. Streeter,
it thereafter:
20 Mich., 9; and, see, Mich. Ins. Co. v.
Kibbee, 6 Mich., 410.
Where a note
accompanying a mortgage is not pro
duced
or accounted for, it must be
presumed paid, as against the party
claiming on the mortgage:
Basset v.
Mich., 28.
Hathaway,
9
Where a
mortgagor who is personally
liable
redeems,
for the debt
it should be
but'otherwise,
deemed a payment;
if
a person who is not liable for the
debt purchases
the property and re
deems,
if there is a prior outstand
ing mortgage:
Johnson
v. Johnson.
Wal. Chy. (Mich.), 331.
if the hold
er ot notes
ecured
by chattel mort
Kﬂge
appropriates
suiﬁcient
of the
a prior
mand,
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Subsequent events may charge the creditor with the amoimt
of the note, as where he neglects to make demand and give
notice, by which the security of some of the parties is lost, or
where, without the assent of the debtor from whom it was re
ceived, the bill or note is cancelled on receiving other security
in its stead.” If, where a note has been taken as payment, the
plaintiff was induced to take it by the fraudulent representa
tions of the other party as to the solvency of the maker, the
note will not be considered a payment."
Whether a note was taken absolutely'as payment or not, is
‘
a question of fact for the jury."
Presumptions oi’ payment.-Payment may be pre
§217.
thus
sumed, from lapse of time or other circumstances,-and
A
bond
in
of
the
notice."
is
evidence
support
pre
furnish
upon a bank where the drawer has
mortgaged property to pay the debt,
it will operate as n payment of the 1 funds, but delays presentment for pay
ment for an unreasonable time, during
Place v. Grant, 9 Mlch., 42.
notes.
9-1 Hays v. Stone, 7 llill, 128; which the bank falls, the holder of
the check must hear the loss: Little
and see, Sage v. Walker, 12 Mlch.,
Phoenix Bank, 7 llili. 359.
V. The
425.
But mere delay in presentment will
l0—I‘lerce v. Drake, 15 Johns., 475.
not affect the rights of a bona fldc
11—Johnson v. Weed, 9 John., 310;
holder of u check,
as against
the
Gardner v. Gorhnm, 1 Dou|z., Mlch.,
drawer, it the drawer has not sus
507; llotchin v. Secor, 8 Mlch., 494;
of
talned any damage in consequence
Miller v. Ross B. it C. Co., 107 Mlch.,
538; 65 N. W., 562..
non-presentment:
v.
the
ilarheck
Payment by chcck.—-The giving of
Croft. 4 Duer, 122, 129. If the draw
a payment,
er has no funds in the hank, a pre
a cheek is presumptively
Fitch v.
sentment ls not necessary:
rather than a loan: Bernard v. i-‘ee‘s
Redding, 4 Sandi.'., 130; Reddlngton
Estate. 129 Mlch., 429; 88 N. W.,
The mere mailing of a check,
V. Gllman, 1 Bosw., 235; Franklin v.
1052.
Delivering
Vanderpool, 1 ilall, 78.
that pay
pursuant to an agreement
a cheek to the payee does not trans
ment may be made by check. does not.
fer the title to the money mentioned
irrespective of the questions of re
ceipt by the payee and payment by the
in it and in the hands or a bank, even
though the money is on deposit there
Baum
operate as payment:
hank.
gnrdner v. Henry, 131 Mlch., 240; 91
Butter
to the credit of the drawer:
A check which is not worth v. Peek, 5 Bosw., 341; Marine
N. W., 169.
3 Sandi,
paid on presentment is not regarded
dz F. 1. Bank v. Jauncey,
The taking of an acceptance
as a payment ct the drawers debt to 257.
Olcot v. Rathbone, 5 for the price oi’ goods is not pay
his creditors:
Wend., 490; Genin v. Lockwood.
speciﬁc
12
absence
of
ment
in
the
agreement:
Kirkpatrick v. Bessais,
Bar-b., 265: Strong v. Stevens, 4 Dner,
A check payable on demand
116 .\ilch., 657; 74 N. W., 1042; Same
668.
ought to be presented
for payment
v. Costo, 116 Mlch., 662; 74 N. W.,
1117.
on the same or the next day after it
12—But presumption of payment can
was drawn: Binnie v. Brown. 4 Bing.,
N. C.. 268: Mohawk Bank v. Broder
never arise from lapse of time alone,
ick, 10 Wend., 304: Broderick Bank
short of the period of limitations ﬁxed
Ihid.,
13
133 ;
by law: Adair v. Adair, 5 Mlch., 304.
v.
Broderick.
Stephens v. Mc.\'eill. 26 Barb., 651.
note will
So. payment of a demand
receives a check
Where a creditor
not be presumed from the neglect to
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sumed to be paid after twenty years."
So, 9, judgment of
a. court of record
is presumed to have been paid after ten
years." The presumption of payment by lapse of time may

proof of facts and circumstances repelling such
an ii1f0!‘8IlC8.15 Payment may also be presumed from the usual
course of dealings between the parties; thus, where it was
proved that the plaintiff and other workmen came regularly to
receive their wages from the defendant, whose practice it was
to pay every Saturday night." A receipt for rent due on a
certain day is strong evidence of payment of former rents."
be repelled by

Application of payments.-A debtor, upon paying
§218.
money to a creditor to whom he is indebted upon different de
mands, has the right to direct upon which of the several de
mands the payment shall be applied."-‘ And in the absence of
express directions, the intent of the debtor will sometimes be
presumed, and the presumption will govern. Thus, a general
payment will always be presumed to be intended to apply upon
a debt that is due, in preference
present
elapsed

until
suihcient time has
bar it under the statute:
Appeal, 52 Mlch., 415; 18 N.

it

to

Smith's
W., 195.
13—.Tackson v. Tiotchkiss, 6 Cow.,
401; see, C. L., 5 9734.
actions
And
14—C. L., 5 9751.
thereon are barred after that time:

Ibid.

Wend.,
7
v. Sacket,
15—Jackson
94: Morris v. Wadsworth, 17 Wend.,
103; as, by showing that the defend
ant has admitted the debt by paying
interest within six years; or, that he
has resided out of the state during
the above time: Newman v. Newman,
1 Stark., 101: C. L., 55 9744, 9740.
1 Esp.,
16—Lucas v. Novosiieski,
196.

17—2 Saund. Pl. & Ev., 470, 642.
And a settlement of accounts between
parties is prima facie evidence of set
tlement of all accounts between them,
but still the parties may show what
was settled and what omitted: Bourke
v. Kneeland, 4 Mich., 336.
18—'I‘hayer v. Denton, 4 Mich., 192,
196; Hall v. Marston, 17 Mass., 575;
Bonaffe v. Wnodberry, 12 Pick.. 463;
A
Reed v. Boardman, 20 Pick., 441.

to one that is

not."

And

debtor, when making a payment, has
the right to direct its application, and
the creditor receiving it cannot refuse
he cannot
it accordingly:
to apply
credit it on some other account with
Mich. Air
debtor‘s assent:
out the
Line Ry. v. Meiien, 44 Mich., 321; 6
N. W.. 845.
to
When a debtor delivers money
his creditor, not for the purpose oi’
payment, but for some other purpose,
the creditor's control and use of the
money
is limited to the purpose for
which it was delivered to him; he
apply
cannot
it to the .payment
can
A creditor
of his demand.
the
pay himself with
not lawfully
debtor's money, without the debtor's
implied:
consent, either express
or
Detroit, Hillsdale & Southwestern Ry.
(‘o.. v. Smith, 50 Mich., 112; 15 N.
W., 39.
It the debtor pays with one intent
as to its application, and the creditor
receives it with another, the intent
Alien v.
of the debtor shall govern:
Culver, 3 Denio, 284: Hail v. Con
stant, 2 Hall's B.. 185, 189.
Cow.,
9
19—Baker
v. Stackpole,
420; Stone v. Seymour, 15 Wend., 19,
24.
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where the payment is equal to one debt, but differs in amount
from others, this shows an intention to apply it to the debt

in amount with the payment.”
When the
corresponding
debtor has once made the application, he cannot change it
without the consent of the creditor; and where he has made
the application upon a joint debt, it extinguishes so much of
the debt, and the paying debtor and creditor cannot, even by
their concurrent aid, afterwards change the application and
thus revive the debt, without the consent of the co-creditor.“
Unless there is an express or implied application by the
debtor, at or before the time of payment, his right to make the

application is gone, and that right thereafter belongs to the
And it is held that he may make the application
creditor."
at the time of payment, or at any time before verdict on the
demand.2,3
The appropriation by the creditor may be evi
denced, either by a verbal declaration, or by the terms of a
receipt given, or by rendering an account in which it is cred
ited, or by any other act which shows that a particular ap
plication was made.“
20—Robert v. Cs_rnie, 3 Caines, 14;
Stone v. Seymour. 5 Wend., 19.
21—Thayer v. Denton, 4 Mich., 192.
22—Smlth v. Applegate, 1 Deiy, 91:
Wood v. Genett, 120 Mich., 222: 79
Payments by a debtor
N. W., 199.
discharge in
who has received his
bankruptcy, made from time to time,
upon a running
without application,
account for goods sold at diii'erent
times,
partly before and partly after
the discharge, where the creditor had
proceed
no notice of the bankruptcy
ings, and was not named as a creditor
in the bankrupt's schedules, and where
the dis
the payments made after
charge exceeded the purchases made
after that time, may be applied by
the creditor to the items ﬁrst due
on the account:
Hill v. Robbins, 22
Mich., 475.
23—Ailen v. Culver, 3 Denio, 284:
Pattison v. Hull, 7 Cow., 749; Phill
pott v. Jones, 2 Ad. & Ell.. 41.
But
a creditor cannot apply a payment so
as to revive an outlawed note which
he holds against the debtor,
and re
move the bur of the statute of limita
tions, when it was not intended or

supposed
by the parties, when made,
that he should apply it for that pur
pose: Krone v. Krone, 38 .\iich., 661.
That the creditor may apply u pay
ment to a claim barred by the statute

of limitations seems true; but if it is
to have the eifect of removing the
bar of the statute the debtor must
make the application:
Blake v. Saw
yer, 83 Me. 129; 21 Atl. 834; 23 Am.
A debtor and creditor
St. Rep. 762.
cannot agree on Sunday for a particu
lar application of a credit
to
be
earned on Monday:
Piiien v. Erick
son, 125 Mich., 68; 83 N. W., 1023.
An indorsement of payment made by
the owner of a note, not in the pres
ence of the maker, is not suﬂicient
evidence
of payment to interrupt the
running of the statute of limitations:
C. L., I 9744; Michigan
ins. Co. v.
Brown, 11 Mich., 265; Rogers v. An
derson, 40 Mich., 290; Ocohock
v.
Myers‘ Estate, 127 Mich., 181: 86 N.
W., 534; Fowles v. Joslyn, 130 Mich.,
272; 89 N. W., 946.

24-Allen
291.
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So, the intent of the creditor to make a particular application
of a payment by crediting it upon an open account, implies
an intention to apply it to the items in the order of time, even
though the creditor has security for the earlier items, but not
for the others." And where some debts are secured and
others not, the creditor may make the application to the latter
and retain his rights to the secured debts."
But when he
has once made the application

he

will not

it."

be allowed to change

Where no application is made by the parties, the law will so
apply a general payment as to extinguish those debts ﬁrst
due ,2“ and in case of a running account, to the items in the
order of time ;2° and to those debts which are secured, in order
to relieve the surety, ra-ther than to demands not secured.”
Thus, where one has given an agreement that if the person to
whom it is given will sell another goods on credit, he will
see the amount paid, and the goods are delivered

accordingly,
the ﬁrst moneys received by the creditor on the debtor’s gen
eral account, must be applied on the purchase under this

guaranty.“
§ 219.

'

Essentials of the notice of payment under the general

issue.-A notice of payment need not specify any sum; it is
suﬂicient to allege that “the defendant paid the plaintiff the
several sums of money mentioned in the plaintiﬂ"’s declara
tion.”32

If

the plaintiif proves as much as covers the demand

25—Truscot v. King, 2 Selden, 147;
Webb v. Dickinson, 11 Wend., 62.
26—Ciark v. Burdett, 2 Hall, 197,
200; Van Rensselaer v. Roberts, 5
Denio, 470; Wood v. Callaghan, 61
402; 28 N. W., 162.
Mlcl1.,
A creditor cannot apply a payment
to a debt not due it others are due:
Richardson v. Coddington, 49 Mich.,
1; 12 N. W., 886.
27—Simpson v. Ingham, 2 B. & C.,
65; Mayor, &c., of Alexandria v. Pat
ten, 4 Cranch., 317; Van Rensselaer
v. Roberts, 5 Denio, 470; Thayer v.
Denton, 4 Mlch., 192; see, Mcliaster
41 Mich., 505; 2 N. W.,
v. Merrick,
895.

28—Hunter v. Osterhondt, 11 Barb.,
38; Phillips v. Preston. 5 How., 288;

Grasser 8: B. B. Co. v. Rogers, 112
Mich., 112; 70 N. W., 445: People
v. Sheehan,
118 l\1ich., 539; 77 N. W.,
88.

Where the parties do not make any
speciﬁc application
moneys
of the
paid, the law will apply it usually
as the justice and equity of the case
may require:
Youmans v. Heartt, 34
Mich., 397.
29—Down v. Morewood, 10 Barb..
183; Allen v. Culver, 8 Denio, 284;
Webb v. Dickinson, 11 Wend., 62.
30—Pattison
v. Hull, 8 Cow.. 7472
Dows v. Morewood. 10 Barb., 183.
31—Gard v. Stevens, 12 Mlch., 292.
32—Chew v. Wooiey, 7 J'ohns., 399:
New York Dry Dock Co. v. M‘Intosh,
5
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established on the part of the plaintiff, it will be sufﬁcient,
although he may have given notice of a larger sum."
RELEASE.

What it is and eﬂect of.—In an action by several on
§ 220.
joint contract, or any personal action, a release by one joint
So, in an action against
plaintiff is a bar to the action.“

a

several, a release to one is a release to all.-°'~'> A receipt in full
to one joint obligor, on his paying his proportion of the debt,
is not a discharge of the others.-3°
A covenant not to sue is construed a release, to prevent cir
cuity of action," but a covenant not to sue one of several
cocontractors, does not operate as a release, but is a covenant
The covenant must be with all, to be construed a re
An agreement not to sue for a limited time only is not
lease.
a release. It extinguishes the right of the creditor to enforce,

only.“

and the obligation of the debtor to make
limited time expires." An agreement not
tract for a. limited time, or until certain acts
to an action brought in violation of it. It is

payment, until the
to sue upon a con
done, is a good bar

not an independent
or collateral undertaking, but a mere modiﬁcation of the right
But such an agree
and obligation of the original contract.

ment is not' pleadable in abatement."
A release without consideration, and not under seal, is void,"
‘Where a release contains introductory matter, explaining the
facts, the release, though in general terms, must be controlled
33—Falcon
N. 8., 314.

v.

34-Austin

v.

Benn,

2

Ad.

& Ell.

son.

iiall,

18 Johus.,

286.

Hill,
1
v. Fltzhugh,
35—Bro!lson
So, in case hoth of_ wrong-doers
185.
lbid.
and joint contractors:

36-C.

L..

5!

10440-10452.

This

statute is a modification of the com
of one
mon iaw rule that a release
of several joint debtors releases all.
Therefore, a release under this statute
should in some manner refer to it,
and be so drawn with reference to it
as to show an intention to discharge
the party only to whom it is given;
otherwise, it may he a release to all:
Sec, flolfman v. Dunlap, 1 Burb., 185.
15

Poughkeepsle v. 1bbot
461.
37—-Tackson v. Stackhnuse. 1 (‘ow.,
122; Morgan v. Butterﬁeid, 3 Mich.,
620.
38—Rowiey v. $t0(ldBi'(l,
1 Johns:
and

Bank
5

or

Hill,

207; Couch v. Mills, 21 Wend., 424;
Bank of Chenango v. Osgood. 4 Wend.,
607; Harrison
2 J0hns.,
v. Wilcox,
4-18;
(‘atsklll Bank v. Messenger.
9
(T‘ow., 37: see, Morgan v. Butterﬂeld,
3 Mich..
615.
39—iloblnson
v. Godfrey, 2 Mich.,
-408,

410.
40'—~Morgan

v.

Butterﬁeld,

3

Mich.,

615.

41—Juckson
R., 122.
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Where a release acknowledged the
receipt of one dollar, in full of a judgment described in
and
also in full of all debts, demands, etc., whatsoever,
was held,
was conﬁned by the particular words to the judgment
that
only." The piaintiif may prove to this notice that the release
not by deed, or that
was obtained by fraud. If suit
brought in the name of one who has no interest in the demand,

is

it

is

it

it

it,

by the previous recital."

is

a

as by the payee of
note not negotiable, which has been
assigned, and the nominal plaintiif release the suit after notice
of the assignment, which release
set up, the plaintiff may
show the assignment and notice.“

A fair

settlement of conﬂicting

is

binding upon the
parties, though they may have yielded legal rights.“
claims

FORMER RECOVERY.

When former judgment a. ba1'.—To render
former
bar in a subsequent suit for the same matter, there
judgment
should be
trial and judgment upon the merits ;‘°
subsequent suit," unless
of nonsuit would not be a bar to
a

a

a

a

a

§221.

trial

such a judgment was rendered after the cause had been sub
mitted to the justice, and he had taken time to make up his

1

6

5

&

1

45—Converse v. Blumricb, 14 Mich.,
settle
Courts cannot disturb

109.

ments between partles, unless on sat
isfactory evidence
of mistake. fraud
or unconscionable advantage:
l‘rich
ard v. Sharp. 51 Mich.. 432: 16 N.
W.. 1'98: Hart v. Gould, 62 Mich.,
262; 28 N. W., 831; Lewless v. De
troit, G. H.
M. Ry. Co., 65 Mici1..
292; 32 N. W., 790; Calkins v. Green,
130 Mich., 57; S9 N. W., 587.
Barb.,
v. Ehle,
46-Quackenbush
469; Tucker v. Rohrback, 13 Mich..
A judgment for the defendant
73.
for costs, on the ground that the suit
was commenced
before the clnim was
due, is not a judgment on the merits.
and is no bar to a new suit for the
same
demand:
Franks v. Fechimer,
177;
N. W., 215; see,
44 Mich.,
Hart v. Lindley, 50 .\Iicl1., 20: 14 N.
W.. 682.
Dong.
47—-Bowne v. Johnson,
(Mlcl1.), 185: Yale v. Brotherton. 10
John.. 363: Willis v. Green. 10 Wend..
519; Tattersall v. Ilass,
Flllt., 56;
Ibld., 52; Dexter
Seaman
v. Ward,
v. clerk, 35 Barb., 271.

226

1

854.

& 1

9

1 3

6

3

1

1

8

&

4

2

& &

322;
18 Pick.,
42—Rich
v. Lord,
B., 38;
Brod.
Solly v. Forbes.
S., 423:
Payler v. llomersham,
M.
B.
Simons v. Johnson,
Ad.. 175;
Cow., 126.
Jackson v. Stackhouse.
Cow.,
48-Jackson v. Stackhousc.
A general release of all claims
122.
or
demands
will operate as a dis
charge ot all existing causes of ac
tion, and. as well, demands not due
Tynan
due:
v.
as those actually
Bridges, Cro-Jac..
300: see, Leggett
v. Bank oi’ Sing Sing, 25 Barb., 326:
Selden, 476, 480.
Allen v. Patterson,
Hill, 237.
44—Timan
v. Leland,
is general in its
Where a release
terms, paroi evidence is not admissible
to show that certain claims were ex
cepted
by parol from its operation:
See, Van Brunt v. Van Brunt,
Edw.
Ch., 14; Hoes v. Van Uoesen.
Barb.
lllll,
Ch., 379; Bronson v. F'it1.hugh,
Ell.,
185; Brooks v. Stuart,
Ad.
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judgment."
“The question whether a verdict and judgment
for the defendant in a former suit is a bar to a second suit
for the same cause or matter, does not depend upon the fact
that the proof in the former suit was sufficient to sustain that
48—Shali

Willis

v.

v. Lathrop,
8 Hill, 237;
Green,
A
10 \Vend.. 519.

former judgment of the same court or
of concurrent Jurisdiction, di
rectly upon the point in issue, is, as a
conclusive be
plea in bar, or evidence,
tween the same parties, or others claim
ing under them, upon the same matter
in a subsequent suit or proceeding, not
only as to the matter actually deter
mined,
but as to every other matter
which the parties might have litigated
and have had decided as incident to
the subject mnttcr of the suit, or com
lug within the legitimate range of the
original action, both as to matters of
Ernbury v. (‘on
claim and defense:
nor, 3 N. Y., 511; Wales v. Lyon.
Francis,
2 .\llch., 276: Love v.
63
.‘\iicl1.. 181; 20 N, W., 843: Gardner
120;
Cow.,
v. Buckbee,
Wood
3
9;
Jackson,
Wend.,
v.
8
Eth
IMIL, 399;
cridge v.
Osborn,
12
Peltier v. Sewell, Ibid., 389; Burt v.
Sternburgh, 4 Cow., 559: iiarrls v.
liar:-is. 36 Barb., 88; Hayes v. Reese,
84 Ibicl, 156;
Ehle v. Bingham, 7
lMd., 494; Haire v. Baker, 1 Seldon,
357; Davis v. Tallcot, 2 Kern.. 184;
Demsrest v. Darg, 5 Tiii'., N. Y., 281;
Yonkers & N. Y. Fire ins. Co. v. Bish
But it is not compe
op. 1 Daly, 449.
tent. under the general issue to rely
on n former judgment:
it must be
pleaded:
Briggs
specially
v.
Mil
Mich.,
514;
40
Porter
v.
lvurn.
41;
22
N. W.,
Leache. 56 .\iich.,
104.
To constitute a judgment in
one case a bar to another action, it
is not essential that the object of the
two suits should be the same; nor
that the parties should stand in the
same relation or position to each oth
er, if the point in controversy were
the same
in both cases.
Nor is it
important that one suit was brought
to enforce one stipulation
in a con
tract. while the other suit involved
stipulation
a different
of the same
contract.
The validity or invalidity
of the contract being adjudged in the
one case, it is settled for the other
a court

also.
Nor is it material whether the
litigated
point was actually
in the
ﬁrst suit or not, if its determination
was necessarily included in the Judg
ment.
Barker v. Cleveland, 19 Mich.,
236; Jacobson v. Miller,
Mich.,
41
90; 1 N. W., 1013.
A Judgment by
confession for part of a claim arising
out of the same contract or trans
action. as, for part of the amount
due on a note, is a bar to a suit for
the balance of the demand:
Town
Smith, 14 Mich., 348.
v
But n. re
covery in covenant for an installment
due on a bond will be no bar to a
subsequently
suit
on
installments
falling due: C. L., 5 709. And where
separate
judgments
are
rendered
against joint irespassers, an execu
tion upon one of the judgments is n.
bar to an action upon the judgment
against
the others:
Boardman
v.
Acer, 13 Mich., 77: Kasson v. People,
44 Barb., 347.
But it seems to be
otherwise in case of separate judg
ments against diiferent parties for the
against
same debt: as, for example,
makers and
indorsers
of
a
note:
Acer,
Mic-h.,
Boardman
v.
13
80.
At the common law a judgment ren
against one
joint
dered
of several
debtors extinguished the original de
mand, and was a bar to a suit against
the others.
See Candee
v. Clark,
2
Mlch., 255, and Bonesteel
v. Todd,
9 .'\ilch., 375.
But where, under the
statute, C. L., I5 10371, 840, service
of process
is obtained upon part of
the debtors only, and the judgment
is rendered
in form against all, the
original cause of action
is not ex
tinguished, and the judgment is not
a bar to a subsequent
suit against
all the joint debtors upon the original
demand: Bonesteel v. Todd. 9 Mlch.,
375.
If a defendant fraudulently con
ceals n part of his liability,
which
for that reason is not included in the
judgment against him, the judgment
will not bar a suit to recover that part
of the demand
which
was so con
cealed: Johnson v. Provincial
insur
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For where the same matter was in issue and submitted
to the jury in the former suit without sufficient proof, the de
cision of the jury upon the matter in issue, and thus submitted
action.

to them, followed by the judgment of the court upon their ver
dict, will be a bar to another action for the same cause or

I

2‘)

where there are several
but each arising out of
separate and
distinct
a
contracts.
judgment for one will not bar a suit
Staples v. Goodrich, 21
for another:
Barb., 317.
See, Phelps
v. Abbott,
116 Mich., 624; 74 N. W.. 1010.
Be
cause many itcms are found in a gen
eral account it does not follow that
they must all he included in ti single
cause of action.
It is when the sev
eral items result from a single con
tract: Stickei v. Steel, 41 Mich., 350:
1 N. W., 1046.
And the same general
rules as to splitting up causes of ac
tion prevail in cases of tort as in ac
Farrlngton
v.
tions
on
contract:
Paine, 15 Johns., 432.
So, n fraud
cannot be separated into two causes
of action, and one settled or sued for
and the other left open; it is and must
he an entirety:
Allison v. Connor; 36
Mich., 283.
And it is a general prin
ciple in
against wrong-doers.
suits
that the plaintiff may recover, by way
of damages,
all that he has lost
through the wrongful act for which
suit is brought, up to the commence
ment of the suit.
And it is also a
general rule that damages
resulting
from one and the same cause of action
must be assessed and recovered
once
for all, and that actions cannot be
from day to day, as the daily
repeated
eﬂects of the one original wrong hap
pen
to mature.
When the tortious
of damage has been done and
cause
the effects have not fully accrued. but
must accrue, and are already reson
ably and fairly capable of safe estima
tioh, the injured party is entitled to
have them considered by the jury:
Mich.,
Thompson v. Ellsworth,
39
719; see, 5 188, ante. But where the
injury is a continuing one, a judgment
for damages
will not bar an action
for injuries accruing after the time
of commencing the ﬁrst suit: Beck
with v. Griswold, 29 Barb., 294; see,
ante, 5 188.
it seems that where
judgment is taken for a part only of
seems

demands

that

due,

(1)

Co.,
12 Mich., 216, 223.
And
when s judgment is pleaded in bar, it
may he shown not to have been on
Franks v. Fecheimer, 44
the merits:
Mlch., 177; 6 N. W., 215.
And that
the merits of the plaintiff's claim were
not litigated or passed upon in the
former suit, and this may be shown
by the testimony of the justice: Wood
55 Mich.,
v. Faut,
185: 20 N. W.
897; Lyman v. Becannon, 20 Mich.,
466;
Sheldon,
Jennings
v.
see,
And by
44 liilch., 92; 6. N. W. 96.
parol evidence: Munro v. Me-ech., 94
Mich., 596; 54 N. W., 290.
Where a
party sued a sheriff for taking per
sonal property, and failed, and after
brought
wards
suit to recover the
same property from the person who
purchased it at the sheriffs sale, the
suit against the sheriff was held to
be a bar, he and the purchasers being
privles: Prentiss v. Hoibrook, 2 Mich.,
A note is not merged in and
372.
barred by a judgment thereon in at
tachment where there was no person
al service and no part of the judg
Smith v.
ment
has been satisﬁed:
Curtiss, 38 Mich., 393.
An adjudication is conclusive in re
spect to, (1) the subject matter of the
litigation: (2) the point of fact or
law or both necessarily settled in de
subject
termining the issue on the
Jacobson v. Miller, 41 Mich.,
matter:
'
00: 1 N. W., 1013.
Splitting
judgment
dcmands.—If
is taken for only u part of an entire
claim, or demand, all of which is due
and coliectnble at the time suit is
brought, it will bar a recovery for the
balance of the claim.
All demands
contract,
actually
due
same
by the
make
but an entire contract within
this rule: Miller v. Covert, 1 Wend.,
487; Smith v. Jones, 15 Johns. 229;
Phillips v. Borick_ 16 1bid., 136: Will
ard v. Sperry, Illirl., 121; Bendernagle
v. Cocks,
19 Wend., 207; (‘nggins V.
Bulwlnkie, 1 E. D. Smith, 434; Dut
ton v. Shaw, 35 Mlch., 431.
But it
nnce

—<—WI'I~l
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matter where the same evidence which is necessary to sustain
the second suit, if it had been given in the former action,
would have authorized a recovery therein. Where a general
declaration embraces several causes of action, the plaintiff in
a second suit may show that he offered no evidence as to one
or more of those causes of action, and that the cause went to
the jury upon a different part of his claim from that for which
the second suit is brought. And then the judgment in the ﬁrst
action will be no bar to the second.
But where he attempts to
give evidence as to all the causes of action, and submits the

question to the jury without withdrawing any part of his claim,
and he fails as to the whole, or a part, for want of sufficient
proof, the defendant may insist upon the ﬁrst judgment as a
bar, if the same evidence which is sufficient to sustain the
second suit would have authorized a recovery in the ﬁrst action,
in case it had been produced on the trial thereof.” It is no
answer to the defense that the form of action in both suits is
not the same, or that all the plaintiffs or defendants in both
suits are not the same. For if the same question was submitted
to the jury in the ﬁrst action, and the evidence in the last suit,
if it had been given in the ﬁrst action, would have been equally
available as in the last, to entitle the plaintiff to recover under
the state of pleadings in both, then the verdict and judgment
in the ﬁrst action is an absolute bar to any recovery therein.
But where the form of the ﬁrst action was such that the proof
necessary to a recovery could only be brought forward in a dif
ferent form of action, or where, from the number of the plain
tiffs or defendants in the ﬁrst suit, the testimony relied on in
the second is suﬁicient to authorize a recovery in the second
action, but could not have produced a different result in the
suit,

upon nn agree
parties at the
judgment
time in court, that such
shall not operate as an estoppel or har
to a new suit for the balance of the
will he
demand,
that such agreement
hindiniz. and may be shown in evidence
in the new suit: Merchants’ Bank v.
Schuienberg, 48 Mich.-, 102; 11 N. W.,
the demand

ment

made

in

between

the

S26.

As to set-offs, when the demands of
parties are distinct and separate in
their nature or origin, it is in general

party
at the option
of
the
sued
whether' he will make use of his de
mands against the piaintiﬂ as coun
ter clnims in that suit—when the case
is such as to admit of it—-or make
them
the subject of an independent
action.
And when a demand is such
that it is available by way of recoup
ment. the rule is the same; there is
imperative
requirement that it
no
claim:
shall be used as a counter
liiorehouse v. Baker, 48 .\Iich., 835.
338; 12 N. W., 170.
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ﬁrst, the failure of the plaintitf in the ﬁrst suit is no bar to his
recovery in the other, although it is for the same cause of action
for which he attempted to recover in the ﬁrst suit.”°
The defendant may also show that the demand on which
the suit is brought was set off or submitted
or jury in a former suit.‘

to

the justice

The plaintiff, in answier to the notice, may show that the
court in which the former action was had, had no jurisdiction
of the case,’ or, that the proceedings were void for any eause.3

A

recovery upon a justice’s judgment does not bar
action on the same judgment, unless upon the
ﬁrst suit on the judgment a defense is set up upon which a
judgment is rendered against the plaintiﬁ, or, the plaintiﬁ fail
in such suit to recover the whole of the judgment, or, it be used
as a set-oﬁ, passed upon and allowed or disallowedﬁ
former

a subsequent

0—Miller v. Manice, 6 Hill, 114,
in general, the cause ot action

121.

is the same where the same evidence
Rice v.
will support both actions:
King, 7 Johns., 20; Cairns v. Smith,
8

IMd.,

338.

When the detense ot a former re
covery is set up, and the record ot the
former suit does not clearly show the
matters then in dispute, and where
whole
record it remains
upon the
the same subject
doubtful whether
matter was actually passed upon, and
in cases where several distinct mat
ters were in issue, and the judgment
does not clearly and necessarily cover
and embrace ail, parol evidence is ad
missible to show what matters were
Thus,
it
proved and passed upon.
may be shown that the plaintili! with
part
of his
a
drew or abandoned
claim, or that the defendant aban
matter he had
doned some particular
as set oft or re
set up in defense,
preferring to bring an in
coupment,
such
In
action thereon.
dependent
case it would thus be made to appear
that upon such matters no evidence
had been given, and that no adjudi
Mer
cation had been had thereon:
chants‘ Bank v. Schulenberg, -19 .\ilch.,
102. 105; 11 N. W., S20.
The question as to whether a former
recovery is a bar or not, does not
question as to
the
depend
upon
whether the form of {iﬂlnn in the

former and present suit is the same.
The question is, as to whether the
point or demand
same
was passed
upon and adjudicated in the former
suit.
It the question has been de
termined between the partles, the tact
that the former suit was in assump
sit, when legally it should have been
in tort, will not deteat the bar: Jen
nings v. Sheldon, 44 Mich., 92; 6 N.
W., 96.
But a former judgment, to
be a bar, must be upon the same issue
and between the same parties.
Evi
dence that the question in issue was
decided in another suit, in which only
one of the present litigants
was a
party, is not admissible:
Phillips v.
Jamieson, 51 Mich., 153; 16 N. W.,
318.

1—-Hatch v. Benton, 6 Barb., 28:
Rogers v. Rogers, 1 Daiy, 194; Mc
Johns.,
184;
Lean v. Hugarin,
13
Skelding v. Whitney, 3 Wend., 154:
see, Wilder
v. Case.
16 Wend., 583.
see, punt. “Set-oﬁ," Chap. xiii.
Recoupmcnt of a demand in a former
suit is a bar:
Ward v. Feilers, 3
Mich., 281.
-41
2—-Schoonmaker v. Clearwater,
Barl.>.. 200; Gage v. Hill, 43 Barh..
44; Blin v. Campbell, 14 Johns. 432:
Wilcox v. Kassick, 2 Mich., 165.
Stephens, 17 Mich.,
3—Wlxon
v.
522.

~i~]\iillard v. Whitaker, 5 Hill, 408.
fact that an
I?I)'vcf of appeat.——The
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LIMITATIONS.

Nature of the defense.—Statutes of limitations were
formerly regarded as statutes of presumption and looked upon
with disfavor, but are now regarded as statutes of repose as
§222.

well, and are looked

upon favorably

by the courts.“

Statutes

of limitations may be retroactive, but a deﬁnite time must be
ﬁxed in the statute within which suits, where the cause of
action has already accrued at the time of the enactment of the
statute, may be brought, and such time must be reasonable.“
The bar of the statute cannot be escaped by amendment of
An amendment adding notice of the statute is
pleadings.’
within the discretion of the court.“
§223. The sta.tutes.—“'l‘he following actions shall be com
menced within six years next after the cause of action shall
accrue, and not afterwards, that is to say :9 1. All actions of debt, founded upon any contract or liability,
not lmder seal, except such as are brought upon the judgment

or decree of some court of record of the United States, or of
this, or of some other of the United States;
2. All actions upon judgments rendered in any court, other
than those above excepted ;‘°
appeal has been taken. is said not to
affect
the conclusiveuess of the judg
ment as a bar, while it remains un
Tyler v. \\'illis, 35 Barb.,
reversed:
213; Willard v. Fox, 18 Johns, 497.
But a reversal of the judgment would
destroy its effect as a bar: Wood v.
Jackson, 8 Wend., 9; Onderdonk v.
Ranlett, 3 Hill, 323.
If :1 Justice's
judgment is for costs only, and not
upon the merits, and does not give
the defendant any substantial rights.
the plaintiff, after appealing from it,
may discontinue his suit and begin
anew: Franks v. Fecheimer, 44 Mich.,
177: 6 N. W., 215.
5—Jewitt v. Petit, 4 Mich., 508;
Greene
v. Anglemlre, 77 Mich., 168;
48 N. W., 772; Mt-Klsson v. Daven
port. 83 Mich., 211; 47 N. W., 100.
6—Ludwig v. Stewart, 32 Mich.,
28; Krone v. Krone, 37 Mich., 307;
Price v. Hopkin, 13 Mich., 318.
Newaygo
7—Gorman
v.
Circuit

231

Judge, 27 Mich.,
Wingert
v.
138:
Wayne Circuit Judge, 101 Mich., 395;
59 N. W., 662.
Where the amendment
does not introduce a new cause of ac
tion the running of the statutc is ar
rested at the institution
of the suit:
Prutt v. Montcalm Circuit Judge, 105
Mich., 499; 63 N. W., 506; Belden Y.
Blackman, 124 Mich., 667: 83 N. W.,
616.

8—Pratt
v.
Montcalm
Circuit
Judge,
Mich.,
499;
105
63
N.
W., 506: Shank v. Woodworth, 111
Mich., 642; 70 N. W., 140, citing Rip
'
ley v. Davis, 15 Mich., 75.
9—C. L., 5 9728.
_
10—Issuing execution upon a judg
ment does not prevent the running of
the statute: therefore. to save a claim
in judgment, the judgment must be
renewed by suit commenced
before the
expiration of six years from the ren
dition of judgment in _iustice’s courts.
and within ten years on judgments in

srxrurn or
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All actions for arrears of rent;

4. All actions of assumpsit, or upon the case, founded upon
any contract or liability, express or in1plied;11
5. All actions for waste;
6. All actions of replevin and trover, and all other actions
for taking, detaining, or injuring goods or chattels;
7. All other actions on the case, except actions for slander
ous words, or for libels.”

“All

actions for trespass upon land, or for assault and bat
tery, or for false imprisonment, and all actions for slanderous
words, and for libels, shall be commenced within two years
next after the .cause
wards. ’ ’1 2
lI

of action shall accrue, and not after

All actions against sheriffs, for the misconduct or neglect of

their deputies, shall be commenced within three years next
after the cause of action shall accrue, and not afterwards.”“"
circuit court, otherwise the judg
ment will be barred:
Ten Eyck v.
Wing, 1 Mlch., 55.
A judgment in
Justice's court is barred in six years:
Jerome v. Williams, \13 Mlch., 526;
and in the circuit court (see C. L..
Q 9751) in ten years atter its rendi
dition.
But when a Justice's judg
ment is removed by transcript to the
be
circuit court. and there docketed
fore it is barred, it becomes of the
same force and elect as a judgment
rendered in the circuit court. and suit
may be maintained on it at any time,
it was ren
within
ten years after
dered: Arnold v. Thompson, 19 Mlch.,
333.
in determining the question of
whether action on the judgment, so
to the
circuit
from the
transferred
justice‘s court, is barred by the stat
ute, time is to he computed
from the
jus
rendition of judgment
in the
tice's court and not from the time
of the tiling ot the transcript in the
circuit court:
Wilcox v. Lantz, 107
Mlch., 2; 6-i N. W., 735.
11-—Aii actions of assumpsit, on
sealed as well as other contracts, are
required to be brought
six
within
Slgier v. Platt. 16 Mlch., 206.
years:
C. L., § 10417 permits assump
While
sit to be brought where convenant
might be maintained, yet, if assumpsit
is brought, that form of action will
the

be barred
in six years under this
The statute does not ﬂx the
5 9728.
bar by the cause of action, but by
the form of the action; Christy v. Far
lin, 49 Mlch., 319; 13 N. W., 607. Not
so in case of assumpsit on judgment

court. It is the fact that it
in on a judgment, rather than that it
is an assumpsit, that determines the
period of limitation: Snyder v. Hitch
cock, 94 Mlch., 313: 54 N. W.. 43.
On
in circuit

the other hand again, an action of
on a lease
under seal, may be
brought at any time within ten years
after the action accrues, but if ac
tion is brought in assumpsit instead,
it must be brought within six years:
the form and not the cause ot action
determining the period:
Stewart v.
Sprague, 71 Mlch., 50: 38 N. W., 673.
Where a party has an election oi! rem
edies,
they will be governed by the
limitation appropriate to each.
Good
rich v. Leland, 18 Mlch., 110.
Delay
in bringing an action on the case for
fraud. while it may have some bear
ing on the fraud as affecting the plain
tiiT’s conduct, cannot bar the suit un
less coming within the statute of limi
Day
tations applicable to the case:
ton v. Monroe, 47 Mlch., 193: 10 N.
W.. 196.
12—C. L., 5 9729.
13-C. L., 5 9730.
\\"here a dep
debt
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actions on any contract, not limited by the
foregoing sections, or by any law of this state, shall be brought
within ten years after the accruing of the cause of action, and
not afterwards/’“
personal

“The limitations hereinbefore prescribed for the commence
ment of actions, shall apply to the same actions when brought
in the name of the people of this state, or in the name of any
officer or otherwise, for the beneﬁt of the state, in the same
manner as to actions brought by individuals/’1°
“All actions and suits for any penalty or forfeiture on any
penal statute, brought in the name of the people of this state,
shall be commenced within two years next after the offense was
committed, and not afterwards, except in the cases mentioned
in the next section.”1°
“The preceding section shall not apply to any suit which is
or shall be limited by any statute, to be brought within a
shorter or longer time than is prescribed in said section; but
such suit shall be brought w'ithin.the
’
by such statute. ’"

time that may be limited

“None of the provisions of this chapter shall apply to any
action brought upon any bills, notes, or other evidences of debt
issued by any bank/"3
§

When the statute begins to run.-The statute begins
from the time there is a complete cause of action."

224.

to run

uty sherllf neglected to pay over mon
collected on an execution, it was
held, under n similar statute. that the
to
commenced
statute of limitations
run from the return day ot the execu
tion. and not from the day the money
was demanded of him. The President,
etc., v. Balch, 9 Greenieafs
11.. 7-4;
see, Elliot v. Cronks's Administrators,
40; Peck v. liurlburt, 46
13 Wend.,
Barb., 559.
An action ot
14-C. L., 5 9734.
debt: upon a sealed instrument is not
Good
barred until atter ten years:
rich v. Leland, 18 Mich., 118.
Cove
nant must be brought in ten years:
Post v. Campau, 42 Mich., 94; 3 N.
W.. 272.
ey

15-c. L.
1s—c.
17-1*.

1s_e

5 0741.

L., 5 0143.
t... 5 9749.
L., 5 0131.

Upon

certiﬁ

of deposit, and obligations pay
demand,
when
not excepted
by this statute, the time runs from
Tripp v. Curtenlus,
the beginning:
36 Mich., 494; see, Palmer v. Palmer,
487; Kimball
36 Mich.,
v. Kimball,
16 Mich.. 211.
19—Whcn statute begins to run—
in ease of infants and other persons,
to "sue, see pout,
undcr‘tlIsabilit1/
§
233, and notes.
On mutual accounts,
232,
post,
see
and notes.
In
§
case
of principal
and agent, when
there is a demand by the principal:
Kimball
v. Kimball,
16 Mich.,
211.
219; Ewers v. White's Estate, 114
Mich., 266; 72 N. W., 184.
Upon a
judgment, the day following its ren
dition, the day of its rendition being
excluded:
Warren v. Slade, 23 Mich.,
judgment
in case of justice-‘s
1.
transferred
to the circuit
court by

233
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§225. Eﬁect of disability to sue.—-When the statute once
begins to run, no subsequent disability to sue will prevent

from running?" A disability that will prevent the statute from
running must exist when the right of action ﬁrst accrues; and
several disabilities exist together, the statute does not begin
to run until the whole are removed.“
But in case of several
disabilities, the party can only avail himself of such of them
as existed when the right of action ﬁrst accrued.
If new
arising from time to time could be added
disabilities
to disabilities existing when the right of action accrued, claims

if

N. W., 151.
On
from the day or its de
livery: Palmer v. Palmer, 36 Mlch.,
487.
So with a bank certiﬁcate of
deposit:
Tripp v. Curtenius, 36 Mlch.,
494.
The same principle governs when
the paper is payable a certain period
Palmer,
after
demand:
Palmer
v.
supra.
Where payment is to be made
in installments, from the date or each
Gray v. Pin
installment respectively:
dar,
I‘ul., 427.
Upon paper
Bos.
payable at sight, from the time or
presentation:
Holmes v. Kerrison,
Taunt., 323.
In case of a surety com
pelled to pay, from the time of such
Heddln,
payment:
10
Rodman v.
Wend., 498.
Upon warranty of qual
ity ot goods, from time they turn out
Battley v.
not to be as warranted:
A., 288.
Faulkner,
Upon
B.
guaranty, from the time of the prin
clpul's default:
Holl v. Hadley,
lti., 315.
superscdeas
Upon
Nev.
10485, upon
bond given under C, L.,
the rendition ot Judgment or aﬂirm
ance, or at the latest at the earliest
date on which costs could be taxed:
Busch v. Wilcox, 106 Mici1., 515; 64
N. W., 485.
in computing time for
the period of the statute, the day on
which the action accrued is excluded:
Warren v. Slade, 23 Mlch., 1.
It the statute has run against
judgment
is 0! no avail to take ex
ecution upon it
Ludeman v. ilirth,
96 Mlch., 17; 55 N. W., 449.
Johns., 165;
20—Peck v. Randall,
Mlch., 45; Dem
Ten Eyck v. Wing,
arest v. Wynkoop,
John Ch. R., 129.
Cow.,
Johnson,
21—Jackson
v.
68

a

260;

note,

4

a

&

3

2

2

demand

&

Mlch.,

5

3

1

1

it

a

5 a

&

transcript when the judgment is en
tered
in the Justice's
court rather
than when transcript tiled in the cir
Wilcox v. Ilantz,
cuit court:
107
Mlch., 2; 64 N. W., 735.
Upon an
agreement
to pay at death, when death
Mlch.,
occurs.
Sword v. Keith,
31
247; Davis v. ’i‘eachout's
Estate, 126
Mlch., 136; 85 N. W., 475.
In case
of continuous service under contract
for indeﬁnite period, when service
Carter,
36
terminates:
Carter
v.
Mlch.,
Upon covenants, from
207.
Vaughan,
v.
Mattison
the
breach:
373,
or when substantial
38 Mlch.,
Cam
Post
v.
damage
is suffered:
90;
N. W.. 272.
42 Mlch.,
pau,
Upon a warranty in a contract for
machinery to be put in running order
tested,
and
aIter_ a reasonable time
Felt v. Rey
to do so has elapsed:
nolds R. F. E. Co., 52 Mlch., 602;
Against an action for
18 N. W., 378.
conversion of personal property of an
is
intestate, not until administrator
101
appointed:
Parks v. Norris,
Mlch., 71; 59 N. W., 428.
In case of
an express trust, when notice ot the
repudiation of the trust is brought
Frank v.
to the ccstut que trust:
Estate of Morley, 106 Mlch., 635:
Where the cause of
64 N. W., 577.
action has been fraudulently concealed,
when the tact of its existence is dis
Tompkins v. Holllster,
60
covered:
Mlch., 470; 27 N. W., 651; Stebhins
108 Mlch., 537; 66 N.
v. Patterson,
due
on
W‘.
484.
On installments
contracts with laborers and material
men, as against oﬂicers failing to re
quire the statutory
bond
tor their
protection, when payment is due from
the contractor:
Station v. Lyon, 110
3

‘V"I-"'7:~
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§226

to an indeﬁnite extent

of time, and to the

STATUTE

great injury and oppression of parties."
Notice of this defense must be given under the plea of the
general issue."

How the defense of the statute of limitations may be
overcome.-By proving that the original cause of action in
fact accrued within six years before the commencement of
the suit. This is done by proving the time the cause of action
accrued, and that it was within six years previous to the
of the suit by issuing the ﬁrst process, or
commencement
‘
otherwise.“
§226.

A

annexed, performance of it, or a readiness to perform

2

5

'

9

235

‘

1

_A

23-—Notice of the statute of limita
tions must be added to the plea of the
general issue to enable the defendant
to avail himself of such defense: Whit
wortb v. Peiton. 81 Mich., 98; 45 N.
Butler,
W.,
500;
v.
127
Bellows
100; 86 N. W., 533.
de
1\llch.,
in
from
fondant may be estopped
siting upon the bar of the statute
where he has by his conduct deceived
pialntiif into believing that a suit
Renackowsky
v.
unnecessary:
is
hoard of W. Com'rs. 122 Mlch., 613:
81 N. W., 581; Kiass v. (‘ity of De
troit, 129 Mich., 35; 88 N. W., 204.
The defense of the statute of Limita
tions cannot he raised by demurrer:
First Nat‘l Bank v. Steel, — Mich.,
1904);
-——; 99 N. W., 786
(May,
Itenackowsky v. Board of W. Com'rs,
122 Mlch., 613: 81 N. W., 581.
A notice of the defense of the stat
ute of limitations. "That the plaintiff's
cause of action did not accrue within
six years next before the ﬁling of the
plaintiff's
is
amended
declaration."
bad.
It does not show the cause of
action barred before the
commence

of suit:
Wilcox v. Kasslck,
l\lich., 165.
Amendment.-—After
issue joined, It
is in the discretion of the court to
allow the defendant to interpose the
defense
of the statute of limitations
by amendment to his notice, or by
adding such notice under the general
issue by way of amendment:
Ripley
v. Davis. 15 Mlch.. 75, 79.
The de
fense
of the statute of limitations
should not be allowed to be interposed
by way of amendment during the trial
of the cause:
Marx V. Hiisendezen.
46 Micb., 336;
N. W., 439; Shank
v. Woodworth, 111 Micb., 642; 70 N.
W., 140.
Nor can a new cause of
action be introduced by amendment
after the statute has run:
Gorman
Judge, 27 Mlch.,
v. Newaygo Circuit
138: Wingert v. Wayne Circuit Judge,
101 .\n¢n., 395; 59 N. W., 662; Prim
v. Montcalm Circuit Judge, 105 Mich.,
499; 63 N. W., 506.
2~i—Beardmore
B.
v. Rattenbury,
A., 452.
Richardson,
25—Stnfi'ord
v.
15
Wend., 302; Alien v. Webster, Ib£d.,
28-1; Bell v. Morrison,
Peters, 360,
Where
new promise is set
363. 372.
ment

a

Mlch., 40,

8:

1

—'l‘en Eyck v. Wing,

45.

a

must

shown.”

ID
I-7

be

it,

new promise defeats the bar of the statute.-Prov
ing a new promise of the defendant within six years relieves
from the bar of the statute. The promise that will revive a
debt must be proved in an explicit manner, and be, in its
terms, unequivocal and determinate; and if any condition is
§ 227.

\
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And the statute provides that,
actions founded upon
contract express or implied, no acknowledgment or promise
shall be evidence of a continuing contract, whereby to take a
case out of the provisions of this chapter, or to deprive any
party of the beneﬁt thereof, unless such acknowledgment or
promise be made or contained by ‘or in some writing, signed by
the party to be charged thereby I’ $26
The writing containing the promise, although in the hand
writing of the party, would not be sufﬁcient unless signed by
him?"
It must be signed by the party himself, or by soIne one
authorized to act for him.23 The promise must not be condi
up

to take a case

out of the statute,

it must be proved in a clear and
plicit manner. either expressly or

ex
by

unqualiﬁed acknowledgment
and the
its implication;
acknowledgment should contain an un
qualilied and direct admission of a
which
the
present subsisting debt,
party is liable and willing to pay, and
must not be accompanied by any cir
cumstance or declaration which repels
the presumption of a promise or in
Ten Iiyck v. Wing,
tention to pay:
v. Petit, 4
1 Mich., 40; see. Jewett
Mich., 508.
A letter of the debtor
asking a creditor i£ he would take a
new note for the amount of several
held by the creditor against the debtor,
and If not how much cash he would
take to balance all debtor owed. Held,
to keep the cause of action alive as
Rumsey v. Settle's Estate, 120
to all.
See, Hal
.\iich._ 372; Til N. W., 579.
laday v. Weeks,
127 .\iieh.. 363; R6
1\'_ \\'_, 79:), where it is held that a
promise to “pay when able“ was not
In i\'ln;;‘s Estate. 94 .\iich.,
sufiicient.
411; 54 N. W.. 178. an indorsement
reading “the within note shall not be
outlawed" is held sufiicient.
The payment
26--(‘. I... § 9'Hil.
and indorsemcnt in his own hand. by
the maker of a promissory note, of a
is a suiti
payment thereon.
partial
cient acknowledgment. and competent
evidence
of such pa_\'me11t to take tire
(‘handler
out of the statui-er
cause
v. Lawrence, 3 Mich., 261.
A verbal contract or promise is not
suﬂlcient: it must be in writin_t:: .To_v
l iroug.. f~lT.'i'. Hille
v. Tllﬁfil]l.\'1\il_
brtilnds \'. l\'ihelink. -ill Mir-l1.. (H6.
such

an

as authorizes

Where, to save a note from out
lawing. the maker and endorser made
and signed an intlorsement on the back
of it as follows: "For value received,
we admit our liability on the within
note, and hereby
promise to pay the
amount due thereon, principal and in
terest, on demand,
less any payment
which should be applied
thereon:"
Held. that this was a sufficient prom
ise. and upon a sufficient consideration
to prevent the bar of the
statute:
Parsons v. Frost, 55 Mich., 230; 21
N. W., 303; see, Minor v. Lorman.
.\Iieh., 212;
56
22
N. W.. 265-6.
After an open account has been barred,
an accounting elumging it into an ac
count stated. will not revive it unless
by agreement
in writing:
Sperry v.
Moore's Estate, 42 Mich., 3602 4 N.
A written reply to a demand
W.. 13.
for payment. that it was impossible
to pay at present, is not suﬁicient to
constitute a new promise:
Cromer v.
Platt. 37 Mich., 1312. A new promise
to pay a debt barred by the statute,
cannot be inferred from
the
mere
recognition of the existence of a just
Mohr,
Mainzinger
demand:
v.
41
Mich., 686; 3 N, W., 183; see. Chand
ler v. Lawrence, 3 Mich., 261; Jewett
v. Petit, 4 Mich., 508.
Ashton, 12 Ad. &
v.
2T—Ba_vle_v

Eil..

493.

2S—See,

Ilyde v. Johnson, 2 BlD_2'..
Rut it seems that the in
(7., 776.
strument need not be literally signed
by subscribing the name oi.’ the promis
or at the end of the writing. but that
it will be sufficient if it is found any
where in the writing, provided it was
N.

put there

for the

purpose of creating

‘lflii
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“as soon
suﬂicient.”

to pay

able, and is not

as

I

can” is

§ 228

a promise to

In case of joint contractors.—“If there be two or
§228.
more joint contractors, or joint executors or administrators
of any contractor, no such joint executor or administrator shall
lose the beneﬁt of the provisions of this chapter, so as to be
chargeable, by reason of any acknowledgment or promise,
made or signed by any other or others of them.”3°
“In actions commenced against two or more joint contrac
tors, or joint executors or administrators of any contractor, if
it shall appear on the trial or otherwise, that the plaintiff is
barred by the provisions of this chapter, as to one or more of
the defendants, but entitled to recover against any other or
others of them, by virtue of a new acknowledgment or promise
or otherwise, judgment shall be given for the plaintiff as to any
of the defendants against whom he was entitled to recover,
and for the other defendant or defendants against the plain
titf/'31
“If, in any action on contract, the defendant shall plead in
abatement that any other person ought to have been jointly
sued, it shall be a good replication to such plea, if true in fact,
that the action was, by the provisions of this chapter, barred
against the person so named in the plea, but not so barred by
reason of such acknowledgment or promise, as against such
defendant.

’ ’3'-’

§229. To whom and when promise to be made.-It is not
necessary that the acknowledgment or promise be made to the
plaintiff.-*3 It must be made before the action is brought.-"*4
\

liability

on the part of the promlsor:
Davis v. Shields, 26 Wend., 341; James
iiolmes
v.
v. Patten, 2 Seldon, 0:
Mackrei, 3 J. Scott. N. S., 789; Lobh

0.

v. Stanley. 5 Q. B., 574.
29—~Ilalladay v. Weeks. 127 Mich.,
363; 86 N. W., 799, and cases cited

in the opinion.
30—C. L., Q 9741.
31—C.
L.. Q 9742: Reading v.
Beardsley, 41 1\lich., 123: 1 N. W.,
065; Borden v. Fletcher's Estate, 131
The fact
Mleh.. 220; 91 N. W., 145.
that the joint debtors were partners
will not atlfect the rule it the partner

ship hns been dissolved:
Borden v.
‘
Fletcher's Estate, supra.
32—(‘. L., 5 9743.
33—Pinkerton
v. Bailey,
8 Wend.,
600; Dean v. Hewet, 5 Ibid., 257. But
the promise must be made to the cred
itor or to some one in his behalf, or his
agent or attorney; if to a. stranger,
it would not be suﬂiclent. Ibld., and
85;
Wakemnn v. Sherman, 5 Seld.,
Bioodgood v. Bruen, 4 IMd., 362.
34—Bateman v. Pindar, 3 Ad. & Ell.,
N. S., 574: Tanner v. Smart, 6 B. 6:
C.,

603.
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A promise by the defendant

to pay as soon as he is able, un
of
his liability, will not authorize
by
proof
accompanied
\any
a recovery of the plaintiff, although made within six years after
the cause of action had accrued, and before the cause of action
was barred by the statute.“

§230. When promise may be inferred.—The defense of the
statute of limitations may also be overcome, by proving an
acknowledgment or admission that the debt is unpaid, from
which a promise may be inferred. The acknowledgment must
be an unqualiﬁed and direct admission of a previous, subsisting
debt, which the party is liable and willing to pay. If there
be accompanying
circumstances that repel the presumption
of a promise or intention to pay; if the expression be equivocal,
vague and indeterminate, leading to no certain conclusion, but
at best to probable inferences, which may affect different minds
in different ways, the proof will be insuﬁicient.”
This acknowledgment must be in writing, and must be signed

by the party to be charged thereby, and not by an agent for

him.“
§ 231. By proof of payment.—“Nothing contained in the four
preceding sections shall altar, take away, or lessen the elfect of
a payment of any principal or interest, made by any person;
but no indorsement or memorandum of any such payment.
written or made upon any promissory note, bill of exchange
or other writing, by or on behalf of the party to whom such
payment shall be made, or purport to be made, shall be deemed
sufficient proof of the payment, so as to take the case out of

the operation

of the provisions

35—‘Hsyden v. Williams,
7 Bing.,
163; Tanner v. Smart, 6 B. & C., 603:
(‘ncks v. Weeks, 7 iiill, 45; Wakemen
v. Sherman. 5 Seid., 85.
A promise to
pay when able requires proof of ability
before there can be a recovery:
Wait
6 Wend., 39-1; Scouton v.
V. Morris,
Eislord, 7 Johns., 36.
promise
Such
held insufﬁcient in Halladay v. Weeks,
127 Mich., 363: 86 N. W., 799.
Wend.,
36—Allen
v. Webster, 15
284, 289; Ten Eyck v. Wing., 1 Mich.,
40: Bell v. Morrison, 1 Peters, 362.
if the acknowledgment of a debt
barred by the statute is accompanied
by declarations or circumstances which

of this

chapter.-"*8

rebut the implication of a promise, or
obligation to pay, the claim is not re
vived:
Jewett v. Petit, 4 Mich., 508.
37—See. l11if('. § 227.
The four preced
38—C. L., § 9744.
ing sections referred to are C. L.,

~r
§§

97-10-9743.

Payment upon the demand.
effect
Chandler v. Lawrence. 3 .\Iich.,
of:
When accompanied by declara
266-7.
v.
Jewett
tions denying liability:
Petit. -1 Mich., 508; Ten Eyck v. Wing.
Payments on an open
1 Mlch.. 40.
Payne v. Walker. 26 .\ilch.. 60.
account:
The running of the statute is not
arrested by a payment made by one a

238
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§ 231

It is immaterial whether the payment is made in money or
in some other manner. The giving of a note for the interest
accrued on the demand in question is sufficient." So, a debt
or’s account stated with his creditor, in which credit is given
for interest, is the same as if the money had been paid.“ If
payment be made by a note, it operates as a payment from the
time of giving the note, and not from the time it is paid.“ If
there are two debts, one barred by the statute and the other
not, and a debtor pay a sum generally, without appropriating
it to either debt, the creditor cannot, by applying it to the
oldest debt, take it out of the statute," nor if there are two

If it be agreed between the
clear and undisputed debts."
debtor and creditor that the latter shall receive goods to be
sold, and the proceeds to be applied toward the payment of

the debt or note, if the sale is made, and the avails indorsed
upon the note within a reasonable time, it will be deemed a
payment made by the makcr’s order. But if the holder, with
out any assent on the part of the maker, or any notice to him,
time has
makes the sale and indorsement after a reasonable
elapsed,

it will not take the

case out

by mortgage will not prevent the bar
Westinghouse Co. v.
of the statute:
Boyle, 126 Mich., 677: 86 N. W., 136.
39—Wenman v. Mohawk Ins. Co.. 13
Wend., 267; Commonwealth Ins. Co.
1 Metc. R., 21.
V. Whitney,
And a
delivery of goods and chattels in part
payment
Hooper
is sufficient:
v.
Stephens, 4 Ad. & l-]ii., 71: llart v.
Nash, 2 Cr. M. & it., 337.

year and a half after authority was
given him to make the payment: Sweet
v. Ellis, 109 Mlch., 460: 67 N. W.,
L!Q4
$1

The statute does not prescribe what
part payment of a demand shall
but it operates as an acknowl
edgment
of the continued existence of
and as a waiver of any
the demand,
right to take advantage. by plea of the
of any such
statute of limitations,
lapse of time as may have occurred
previous to the payment having been
made.
The payment is not a contract;
it is not in itself even a promise.
But
it furnishes ground for implying a
promise, in renewal from its date, of
any right of action which before may
have existed:
Miner v. Lorman. 58
Wherever
Mlch.. 212; 22 N. W.. 265.
therefore the circumstances are such
as to negative
the idea of a new
acknowledgment of the obligation pay
ment will not arrest the running of the
statute:
Borden v. Fletcher's Estate,
131 Mich., 220; 91 N. W., 145.
So the
application of the proceeds of a chat
tel mortgage sale upon the debt secured

of the statute.“

effect
have,

40—Smith

41-Irving
90.

'

v. Ll.l(ll0W,
v.

Veitch,

6 Johns..

M.

3

267.

& W..

42—Mills

v. Fawkes. 5 Bing., N. C..
see,
Bancroft
v.
Dumas. 21
455:
Vt., 456; Ayer v. linwklns,
19 Ibld.,
26.
A payment of money not intended
or supposed by the parties to be made
upon a note. cannot be applied to it
by the creditor so as to save the note
from the bar of the statute:
Krone
v. Krone, 38 Mich., 661.

43—Burn
S.,

476.

44—l‘orter
Pond v.

see,

635,

23 9

v.
,

Boulton,

Blood.
Williams,

v.

2
I
5
1

M.

G.

&

Pick., 54;
Gray, 630,

0

A

.
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is

is

a

The indorsement of
partial payment upon a promissory
note, written by the party sought to be charged thereby,
competent evidence of such payment, to take the case out of
The admission of the defendant, as
the statute of limitations.
admissible under
well as any other competent parol evidence,
demand,
the statute to prove the fact of part payment on
to take the case out of the statute of limitations.“

is

if

is

a

If the acknciwledgment of debt barred by the statute of
accompanied by
a partial payment of it,
limitations, or
declarations, or circumstances, which rebut the implication of
a. promise of payment, or that the debtor, by the partial pay
ment, admitted his obligation to pay the residue, the claim
not revived.“
But, “if there are two or more joint contI‘&Ct0I'S,
executors or administrators of any contractor, no one
shall lose the benefit of the provisions of this chapter,
be chargeable by reason only of any payment made

A

R

4

§

by any

a

A

a

other who was not privy to it or in
any way participating in it:
Probate
Judge v. Stevenson, 55 Mich.. 320; 21
joint maker or
One
.\’_ W., 348-9.
debtor should not lose the beneﬁt of
the statute by reason
of
payments
Rogers v. Ander
made by the other:
son, 40 Mich., ‘290.
Nor will payment
on
note by the estate of one of the
joint makers bind the other, or deprive
him of the benefit of the statute: Hol
comb v. Sloan. 39 Mich..
173-4.
joint contract
partnership note is
within the meaning of this'§ 9745, and
a payment made by one of the part
ners on such a note, after dissolution.
knowledge of the
to a payee having:
dissolution,
will not bind the other
partner:
Gates v. Fisk. 45 Mich..
522:
N. W.. 558; see. Malnzinger
v. Mohr. 41 I\ilch., 685-7:
N. W.,
193.
Even though a husband is au
thorized to act for his wife generally
still
payment made by a husband on
a joint mortgage of himself and wife.
given for the husband's debt. will not
prevent the running of the statute as
to the wife:
(‘urtiss v. I-‘erry. 126
.\’. W.. 1131.
Mich.. 600:
Although a note may be harred as
arrainst a joint maker, who has signed
3

8

4

6

9

3

Mich..
45-—(‘handler v. Lawrence.
.\Ietc.. 482.
261: \\'illiams v. (iridley.
But lndorscments unexplained. and not
shown to be in the handwriting of the
debtor. have no weight under the stat
of payment to take
ute as evidence
the case out of the statute:' Mich.
Ins. (To. v. Brown. 11 Mich.. 265, 273.
See, Snyder v. Winsor. 4-I Mich.. 140;
Nor is an indorsement
N. W.. 197.
of
made in the presence
of payment
the maker by the owner suﬂicient evi
dence of payment to interrupt the run
ning of the statute:
Fowles v. Jos
lin. 130 .\iich., ‘.372: H9 N. \\'.. 946.
-lf‘>—~.Tewett V, l'etlt.
l\Il('ll.. 508,
ﬁlo; \\'estln;.:liouse v. Hoyle. 1136 Mlch.,
677: R6 .\'. W., 136: Borden v. Fletch
er's Estate. 131 .\Iich., ‘.320: 91 N. \\'..
145; Sweet v. Ellis. 109 Mir,-h.. 460;
67 N. W., 535: Lester v. 'l‘_hompson.
91 1\iich., 2-if»: 51 N. W.. R93,
9745; see. Shoemaker
47—(‘. I...
v. Benedict. 11 N. Y.. 176: iialdeu v.
(‘rat't"s.
E. I). Smith. N. Y., 56¢);
.\iich..
and see, Pennoyer v. David.
407: Sl;:ler v. i‘latt. 16 ‘.\iieh.. ‘Z07:
Smith v. Sheldon. 35'» f\ilch.. 42.
or new promise by one joint
paytnent
or co-surety. will not operate
debtor,
to keep the obligation alive as to an
‘.240
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When statute begins to run in case of mutual ac
00unts.—“In all actions of debt or assumpsit, brought to_re
§232.

covcr the balance due upon a mutual and open account current,
the cause of action shall be deemed to have accrued at the time

of the last item proved in such account.”“
If the items in an account are all on one side, as between a.
tradesman and customer, and some of them are within six
years, and the others beyond that time, the former will not
The
entitle the plaintiif to give evidence of the latter."
An item of the account
statute applies to mutual accounts.5°
on either side, within six years before the bringing of the suit,
draws after it the account on both sides, and takes the account
of the other party out of the statute.“ The foregoing section
it as surety tor the other maker. yet
the surety may take it up and enforce
it against the principal debtor if the
latter. by partial payments or other
wise, has kept it alive as against him
Durham,
44
McClatchie
v.
self:
Mich. 435: 7 N. W., 76.
48—C. L.. 5 9732.
In order to prevent the statute from
accrued
cuttlm: oi‘! an account‘which
before
suit
years
six
more
than
brought. it must appear that there
was n mutual account current between
the parties during s. period within six
of suit.
years prior to commencement
That is. that at least the last item
of such account. on one side or the
other, was within the six years.
To
there
constitute a mutual account,
credit
must be a mutual credit——a
founded on one side upon a subsisting
debt upon the other. or an express or
implied agreement for a set-off of mu
if no charges were made
tuai debts.
for
hy the defendant. it is not enough
merely to
prove
the plaintiff
the
This would not
on his side.
charm-s
make a mutual account. but only a
credit on one side.
There must he a
and
credits
mutual alternate deal.
given. either expressly or impliedly,
upon both sides. of some items of deal.
it is not necessary that the defendant
should put his credits or charges on
a book. nor that he should claim them
on the trial.
It will be suﬂiclent if
the plaintiff has given him the credits
to which he is entitled. it it was under
stood between the parties at the time
16

that he was to have such credits on
account, to apply against the charges
of the other party:
Kimball v. Kim
And further,
ball. 16 l\iich.. 211. 217.
as to what are mutual accounts. see,
Campbell v. White, 22 Mich., 178:
White v. Campbell, 25 iiilch.. 463. And
as to what is not, see, Mandigo v.
The statute
Msndirzo. 26 Mlcb.. 349.
Sperry v.
runs from the last item:
Moore's Estate, 42 Mich., '357; 4 N.
W.. 13.
Payments on an account are sui‘l1
cient to render it an open mutual ac
count, so as to prevent its being cut
oft‘ by the statute of limitations: Payne
v. Walker, 28 Mlch., 60.
49——Buller's
N. P., 149; 2 Saund.
Pl. 8: Ev.. 312.
50—C0ster v. Murry. 5 John. Ch. R.,
522: s. c.. 20 Johns., 576.
Sickles v. Mather, 20 Wend.. 72.
That is, where there are mutual ac
counts.
See. aio, Davis v. ﬁmith. 4
Greenif.. 337: Cogswell v. Doliver, 2
Mass. 217: Chamberlln v. Cuyler. 9
3
Wend.. 126; Pennlman v. Rotch,
But in the last case it
Metc.. 216.
is said that where there is but one
item of credit on one side, that item
must have been given or paid to apply
generally on the account on the other
side,
for. if it was applied to the
speciﬁc payment of some one item on
the other side, or to apply only on
some one item. it does not make such
a mutual account as will take both
accounts out of the statute. Ibid.
51——lf there is an account only on
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apply exclusively to such actions as are
in which debits and credits are stated, and
balance struck, but extends also to cases in which the plain
tiff seeks to recover the balance due to him, though he de
clares only on the debit side of the account. And in the latter
the defendant does not ﬁle an account in oﬂ'set, nor
case,
prove items on his side of the account by way of payment,
but relies on the statute, the plaintiff may avoid the statute
by Sh0Wlil1g that there was a. mutual and open account current,
and proving an item on either side within six years."
The account, to come within the above section, must be “an
stated between
open account current.” When the account
the parties, or when anything shall have been done by them
equivalent to a settle
which, by their implied admission,
has then become an ascertained debt. “All intricacy
ment,
of account, or doubt as to which side the balance may fall,
at an end,” and thus the case
neither within the letter nor
In
when there
a. settled
short,
of
the spirit
the exception.
account, that becomes the cause of action, and not the original
account." “The mere rendering an account does not make
stated one; but,
the other party receives the account,
admits the correctness of the items, claims the balance, or
then
may be in his favor or against
offers to pay it, as
does not

it,

if

it

a.

it

is

is

is

it

is

is

if

a

brought on accounts

it

The balance due on such
becomes a stated account.”54
settlement may be the commencement of and constitute an item

3

Kimball

V.

Kimball,

16

Mich.,

217.

53-3

Ev., 311; Wat
Saund. Pl.
Lelgh.. 240;
Lylcs‘ Adm‘r,
Toland v. Sprague, 12 Peters, 333;
Howes v. Woodruff, 21 Wend.. 640;
Plck.,
see. Union Bank v. Knalilh
son

v.

3

If there is an interval of six years
or more, in which no accounts occur
on either side, all items prior to that
Thus, where a
interval are cut oh’.
plaintiff sued upon a claim arising in
186$), the defendant was
allo\\‘e<l to
prove set~oﬁ's arising: in 1865, they he
lm: within six years. but he was not
allowed to go back from 1865 to 1858
(there being no dealingzs lvetween those
of
two dates) and have the beneﬁt
an item of account of that early dale.
because there was an interval of more
than six years from
1958 in 1&6.“-:
Liandlgo v. Mandizzo. 26 .\iieh.. 340.
52—Pennln.1an
v. Iioteh,
Ilicte.

211.

4

1

7

it

220.

216;

8:

an item within six years will
any Items beyond
not draw after
Kimball
v. Brown,
that period:
Sandf.,
\\'end., 322; Hollock v. Losee,
one side,

96.

54-Toland v. Sprague, 12 Peters.
But in action for goods sold
333.
and delivered. where the beneﬁt of the
statute of limitations
is claimed as
a defense to a portion of the demand
sued for. on the ground that it has
been converted into an account stated.
by assent oi’ the defendant to the ac
count as rendered to him. it is not
sutﬁeient to sustain such defense, that
upon and after the exhibition
of the
m-count

passive:

to him he remained entirely
he must show some word or
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in a new account. In such case, however, the statute would be
a bar to the items of the account which were settled, but would
not affect the balance found du 5° clG1
'

What disability will a.ﬁ'ect the running of the statute.
person entitled to bring any of the‘actions mentioned
in this chapter shall, at the time when the cause of action ac
crues, be within the age of twenty-one years, insane, or im
prisoned in the state prison, or absent from the United States
and from the British provinces of North America, such person
may bring the action within the times in this chapter respec
tively limited, after the disability shall be removed: Provided,
if any person not already barred by the provisions of law here
tofore existing, from maintaining any of said actions, shall be
barred according to the foregoing provisions of this enactment
therefrom. then such person may bring such action within one
year after this act shall take effect and not afterwards.”1
\\'hen the statute once begins to run, it continues to run,
notwithstanding any subsequent disability?
The disability
which entitles a party to the beneﬁt of the above section, must
exist when the right. of action ﬁrst accrued; and if several
disabilities exist at that time, the statute docs not begin to run
until the whole are removed. Cumulative or successive dis
§ 233.

—“If any

to the
act irnplyin: that he assented
account: White v. Fampbell, 2-'3 Mich-,
463: Payne v. Walker, 26 .\iich., 63.
55—Uniou Bank v. Knapp, 3 I‘ick.,
96.
An account stated. may be ef
fected without any written acknowl
whom
edgment
by the party agxainst
the balance is ascertained. and it may
But
be proved by unsigned writings.
when an account has become barred
by the statute, the fact that the par
ties come together and examine and
adjust the same, and orally agree upon
will not hinder the
a balance due,
statute from continuing to run against
matters of the account
the original
and save the balance so ascertained
from the bar of the statute. unless
account stated be supported by
the
evidence of someuvriting signed by
Sperry v.
the party to be charged:
Moore's Estate. 42 1\iieh.. 360: 4 N.
W.. 13: see (‘. L., § 9740: (‘hase v.

Traiford.
1—C.

_i18 Mass. 529.
L.. § 9733. as amended

15, 1871. Laws of 1871. p. 226.
As
to the construction of this section prior
to the amendment thereto, April 15,
1871,
Messicar,
Erskine
v.
see.
27
1\iich., 84.
And since the amendment:

Krone v. Krone. 37 i\iich., 308.
It an
heir of an intestate resides in Germany
at the time of the death and dies there
the asslgnee and administrator of those
who inherit from such heir can bring
h‘s action to recover a death beneﬁt
from a mutual beneﬁt association at
any time within ten years from the
death of the non-resident:
Wolf v.
District Grand Lodge N0. 6. I. O. B.
B.. 102 Mich.. 23: 60 N. W., 44.1.
“"here the circumstances are such that
the action
must be brought in the
name of the person seduced.
and not
by another the statute will not begin
to run till her majority:
Watson v.
Watson, 53 I\iich.. 168: 18 N.
605.

April

2—I'ack

v.

Randall.

1 Johns.,

165.
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do not prevent the statute from running; the party
claiming the beneﬁt of the exception can avail himself only of
the disability existing when the right of action ﬁrst accrued."
If all of several plaintiffs are not under a disability, this sec
abilities

tion will not prevent the statute from barring the action, not
withstanding some of them may be."
“When any person shall be disabled to prosecute an action
in the courts of this state, by reason of his being an alien,
subject or citizen of any country at war with the United States,
a

the time of the continuance of such war shall not be deemed
part of the respective periods hcrcin limited for the com
mcncemcnt of any of the actions before mcntioned.”1°
§

Effect of absence of the defendant from the state.
at the time when any cause of action mentioned in this
chapter, shall accrue against any person, he shall be out of the
state, the action may be coiiimenced within the time herein
limited therefor, after such person shall come into this state,
after any cause'of action shall have accrued, the person
and
shall have accrued shall be absent from and
against whom
reside. out of the state, the time of his absence shall not be
taken as any part of the time limited for the commencement of
234.

it

if,

“If,

Johnson,

Cow.,

§

§

‘

1 4

'l‘crm., 516;
14—I’ci'ry v. Jackson,
lienio, 445.
see, Brown v. Dclaiicld,
1.",~~c. L.,
mar».
The condition
1("»——(“.L.,
(i736.
upon which the suspension of thc stat
ute, as provided in the latter clause
requires ihc
depends,
of this section.
fncts—rcsidcnce
of two
('onci1rrcncc
out oi‘ the state. and absence from it:
and without the conjunction of these
two cicmcnis the condition will he in

Aliscncc. lo pI'c\'cnt thc op
eration of the statute, must. he actual.
licturns of
not mcrcly constructive.
the (lcliior to set the statute running
again, must be sufllcicntly opcn to en
able the creditor, with rcnsonnhlc dili
;:cncc_ to scrvc proccss upon him;
sccrci return, ilcsiirlicfl
must not liQ
to iit‘("i‘i\'(‘ and inislcnd The crcciiior.
he
(lpcn visits. which niight
W"ii
known to all persons. are to be cred
:1

if

complete.

ited to the debtor, while on the other
may be ac
absences
hand. successive
Campbell v.
cnmulatcd against him:
The provisions
White. I32 Mich., 178.
of
of this statute apply to causes
action which accrue without the state
v.
Bclden
non-residents:
ii(‘i\\'(‘Pl]
Iilackman. 118 Mich., 448; 76 N. W.,
This statute held to apply where
979.
note re
both
maker and payee of
for a time and take up their
movc
residence
in another state——certainly
the action is not barred by the
Black
statutes of the latter state:
burn v. Blnc-klmrn’s Estate, 124 Mich.,
190: H2 N. W., S35.
of bringing his action
'i‘he burden
within the exception is on him whose
cnusc
of action is otherwise barred:
l-‘.<-ldcn v. Blackman, 124 Mich., 667;
st-1 N. \\'.. 616.
The exception of this
statute applies by analogy to the ten
9751, as to
ycar limitation of C. L..
Newlove v.
actions upon judgments:
a

v.

§

Jackson

74.

if

13

5

’1°

the action.’
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In order to avail himself of the provision in the former part
of this section, the defendant must show that the creditor
knew of his coming into the state, so as to have had the oppor
tunity to prosecute him, or that his coming was so public as to
amount to constructive
notice or knowledge, and to raise the
if
that,
the
creditor had used ordinary diligence
presumption
and due means, the defendant might have been prosecuted."
This provision appl-ies to persons who have never been within
the state, as well as to citizens who have been absent for a
time," and to a new promise made out of the state, whether
the promise was made before or after the original promise
In assumpsit against several
had been barred by the statute."
123 Mlch., 260; 82 N. W.,
Pennock,
54.
claims the bene
Where a defendant
tit of the statute of limitations, and
it appears that he had removed his
residence
to a foreign country, and
had afterwards returned to this state,
the burden of proving that the sum of
the times of his presence within this
to six years, and was
state amounted
suillclent to satisfy the statute, is upon
him; he is the party who substan
tially asserts the aﬂirmative of the
25
lbld., White v. Campbell.
issue:
L.,
Mlch., 463.
C.
This statute,
I 9736, providing for a deduction from
the period of limitations, of the time
the debtor is absent from and resides
out of the state, applies to every cause
in the chapter
of action mentioned
includes
(C. L., chap. 268) which
Judgment recovered
in
by
debtors
courts of record, as well as in those
Conrad v. Nail, 24
not of record:
Mlch., 275.
i7——\\'hite v. Bailey, 3 Mass.. 271;
Little v. Blunt, 16 Pick., 359: Fowler
v. Iiunt, 10 Johus., 464; and see, Ran
dall v. Wilkins, 4 Denlo, 577. And it

is held that a temporary absence from
with
state by a resident
thereof.
out a change of residence, will not
the running of the statute
prevent
during
such
absence:
Hickok
v.
Bliss, 34 Barb., 321; and see, Camp
bell v. White, 22 Mlch., 178.
18—Llttle v. Blunt, 16 I‘ick., 359;
Ford v. Babcock. 2 Sandf., 518; Car
Where
penter v. Wells, 21 Barb., 593.
of nor
the debtor was not a resident
the

the state when
the cause of
accrued,
the statute does not
begin to run until he comes into the
state, and the statup does not bar the
action until he has been in the state
six full years after deducting
all the
time of his residence abroad; and it is
immaterial whether the absence is con
tinuous or made up of several dis
tlnct absences:
Berrien v. Wright, 26
Barb., 208; Gans v. Frank, 36 Barb.,
320; Power v. Hathaway, 43 Barb.,
214; and see, Campbell v. White, 22
Mlch., 178. If the defendant has not.
after deducting the aggregate of all
absences,
resided
or remained
within
the state for a time equal to six years
after the cause of action accrued and
before commencement
of suit, the stat
ute is no bar:
Ford v. Babcock, 2
Sandf., 518; (‘ole v. Jessup, 10 N.
Y.. 96; Berrien v. Wright. 28 Barh..
208: Harden v. Palmer, 2 E. D. Smith.
172; see, Burrows v. Bloomer, 5 Denio,
532-5.
On a suit brought in this
state upon a cause of action which
accrued
in another state, the defend
ant cannot avail himself of the limita
tion laws of the latter state, nor of
the fact that the cause of action is
barred by the laws of that state.
Limi
tations affect only the remedy, and
the defense
is available only when
the action is barred
by the laws of
the state where suit is brought: Rug
gles v. Keeler, 3 Johns. 263; Gans v.
Frank, 36 Burb., 320; Power v. Hatha
way, 43 Barb..
21-i: see, Lincoln v.
Battelle, 6 \\'end., -175.
l9—Little v. Blunt, 18 Pick., 359.
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defendants, it is no answer to a plea of the statute, that one
of them, within six years from the accruing of the cause of
action, departed from the state and continued absent tmtil
the commencement of the suit. All the persons liable upon a

joint contract must depart from the state in order to arrest
the running of the statute against the demand.
The rule is
different in actions for torts. A resident defendant who is liable
in such a cause of action may be sued alone, though another
person who is out of the state might be bound with him in the
action.
return.2°
same

Such absent person may also be sued on his

§235. Death of claimant or debtor—Extension of time by
reason 0f.—“If any erson entitled to bring any of the actions
before mentioned in this chapter, or liable to any such actions,
shall die before the expiration of the time herein limited, or

within thirty days after the expiration of the said time, and if
the cause of action does by law survive, the action may be
commenced by or against the executor or administrator of the
person, or the claim may be proved as a debt against
the estate of the deceased person, as the case may be, at any
time within two years after granting letters testamentary or of
deceased

administration,

and not afterwards,

if

barred by the provisions

of this chapter.”21
Extension of time by reason of. fa.i1iu'e to serve proc
ess, ei'-0.—“If, in any action, duly commenced within the time
limited in this chapter, and allowed therefor, the Writ or
declaration shall fail of a sufﬁcient service or return, by any
§

236.

20—Brown

v.

Delaﬁeld,

1

Denio,

445.

The statute does not run in favor
of a maker of a joint and several con
tract to pay money, during the time of
his residence out of the state, although
it may at the same time run and be
a bar to the other joint contractor
who is and has remained in the state:
Bogart v. Vermilya,
10 N. Y., 447.
And where defendants are joint debt
ors, the absence oi! one of them from
the running
the state will suspend
of the
tatute as to him, notwith
standing his co-dehior has remained
Denny v. Smith, 1 N.
in the state:

246

Y., 567; Fannin v. Anderson, 10 Q.
B., 811.
21—C. L., § 9737; see, Post v.
Campau, 42 Mich., 94: 3 N. W., 272;
Sperry v. Moore's Estate, 42 Mich..
353-7; 4 N. W., 13.
In case of the
debtor's death within thirty days after
the expiration of the time, etc.: Sword
247,
v. Keith,
31 Mich.,
263.
The
failure to ﬁle an inventory will not
delay the running of the stat-ute: First
1\‘at’l Bank v. Estate of Sherman, 117
Mich., 605: 76 N. W., 97.
The lapse
of 12 years without
administration
will not defeat the application of this
Estate,
statute:
Baker v. iialieck’s
128 Mich., 180; 87 N. W., 100.
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§237. By reason of fraudulent concealment of causes of
action.-—“If any person who
liable to any of the actions
fraudulently
in
this
shall
chapter,
mentioned
conceal the cause
of such action from the knowledge of the person entitled there
to, the action may be commenced at any time within two years
entitled to bring the same shall dis
after the person who
of action, although such action
cause
cover that he has such
be otherwise barred by the provisions of this chapter/’2‘
would

247

a

5

3

-

1

3

:A

dismissed
for matter oi’ form, it was
held that the year within which
new
suit might be brought, commenced at
the time of dismissal in the circuit
Partridge v. Lott. 15 Mlch.,
court:
\\'hcre, for want of personal
251.
service of the summons. a second sum
mons is taken out in 'continuatlon.ot
the suit, the suit will be deemed com
menced at the time when
the ﬁrst
summons
was delivered to the oﬂicer:
Denio,
Cornell v. Moultou,
12.
As
to when a suit will be deemed to be
commenced, etc.:
iioweli v. Shepard,
48 Mlch., 472; 12 N. W.. 661.
23-—Barker v. billiard,
16 Wend.,
572: Berrien v. Wright. 26 Barh., 208.
But as to this, see, C. L..
9754.
2-i—(,‘. i..,
9739: Johnson v. Pro
vincial Ins. Co., 12 Mlch., 216, 233;
Tompkins v. Hollister, 60 Mlch., 470;
Q

I

ii’ suit is abated
22—C. L.,
9738.
through failure 0! oﬂicer to make re
turn of a summons in due season, the
plaintii! may commence anew at any
time within
the stat
year, though
ute of limitations has in the meantime
Ricaby v.
run against his claim:
Gentle,
122 Mlch., 336; B0 N. W.,
1093.
This section applies to reversals
Mc0mber
on writ of ccrtiorari also:
42 Mlch., 117:
N. W.,
v. Chapman,
See, Spicer v. McQueen,
288.
Mlch..
252.
This section is applicable where
the action is defeated because of mis
McMillan
choice ol' remedies
taken
v. Resume, —- Mlch., -—; 100 N. W.,
166 (June, 1904).
Where a suit was commenced before
a justice on the last day under the
statute of limitations, and afterwards
appealed to the circuit court, and there
u

1—*44—444—?

a

if

if

if

it

unavoidable accident, or by any default or neglect of the oﬂi
cer to whom
was committed, or
the writ be abated, or the
action otherwise avoided or defeated, by the death of any party
thereto, or for any matte:-'of form, or
after a verdict for
the plaintiff, the judgment shall be arrested, or
judgment
for the plaintitf shall be reversed on a writ of error, the plain
tiif may commence
new action for the same cause, at any
time within one year after the abatement or other determina
tion of the original suit, or after the reversal of the judgment
therein; and
the cause of action does by law survive, his
executor or administrator may, in case of his death, commence
such new action within the said one year.“
Where the holder of note was stayed by an injunction from
chancery from prosecuting the same,
was held that
did
not suspend the running of the statute. The remedy of the
party stayed
by application to ehancery to prevent the de
fendant from setting up the statute as a bar.”
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§238. Set-oﬂ‘s, when barred.-—“A1l the provisions of this
chapter shall apply to the case of any debt or contract alleged
by way of set-off on the part of a defendant; and the time of
the limitation of such debt shall beconiputed in like manner
as if an action had been commenced therefor, at the time when
the plaintiﬂ"s action was commenced, provided such debt or
contract would have been barred according to law, before the
accruing of the claim or demand upon which such defendant is
sued.”2°
As an action of assumpsit cannot be maintained for a de
mand after the time limited by the statute has elapsed, so a
demand which has been barred by the statute cannot be set
off. If the defendant, under a plea and notice, give it in evi
dence, it may be objected to at the trial."
Where joint debtors are sued, some of whom are not served
with process, and judgment is obtained against all under the
statute, such judgment does not prevent the running of the
statute in respect tothe defendants on whom service was not
made?"
Computation of time, etc.-—In determining whether
of limitations has run against a note, the day on
which the action accrued is excluded from the computation.
Therefore, where a note payable on demand was made on the
14th day of February, 1839, a suit commenced on the 14th day
of February, 1845, is in time.”
§239.

the statute

27 N. W., 651; Stebbins v, Patterson,
108 Mich., 537; 66 N. W., 484; Wol
kins v..Knight, — Mich., —~; 96 N.
W., 445 (Sept, 1903); Wells v. Win
sor. 3 Pick., 73; First Massachusetts
Turnpike Cor. v. Field. 3 1\iass., 201.
the
So, if plaintiff
did not discover

is barred if the period of limitation
had run against it before the accru
ing of the cause of action upon which
the plaintiff brings suit and not other
wlse:"
Busch v. Wilcox, 106 Mich.,
514; 64 N. W., 485.
.‘Iobns.,
26—Ruggles v. Keeler, 3

fraud until after
v. Fish, 1 Plck.,

263.

six

years:
The
in this

435.

Homer

conceal
section,

contemplated
ments
9739, are those of the person sought
to be charged
with the debt or lla
hillty, and not those of his clerk,
servant or agent, without his fault:
Stevenson
v. Robinson, 39 Mic-h., 160:
see, Robert v. Morin, 27 Mich., 807;
Allen v. Conkiin, 112 Mich., 74; 70
N. W., 339.
25—C. L., § 9746. “Under the terms
of this statute the claim of defendant

27—Bruen v. Bokee, 4 Denio, 56.
28—Cornell v. Moulton, 3 Denio, 12:
Warren v. Slade, 23 Mich., 1. Where
a receipt was given for money. to he
accounted
for on demand with inter
est, lt was held to be the same as a
note payable on demand, and the stat
ute commenced
to run from its date.
But where a receipt was given for
property, to be sold and accounted for
hy the receiptor, the statute would not
commence to run against him until he
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Subsequent acimowledgment in case of breach of con
the cause of an action arising from the breach
of a.
contract to do an act at a speciﬁc time, is once barred by the
statute, a subsequent acknowledgment
by the party that he
broke the contract will not take the case out of the statute.
§

240.

tract.-If

The defendant promised to invest plaintiff's money on good
security; the security was bad; it was proved that the de
fendant acknowledged that the security was bad, and prom
ised to pay' the plaintiff:
Held, that the plaintiﬁ could not
recover. “The subsequent promise must agree with the origi
nal promise stated in the declaration.” “Contracts of this
sort are not capable of being revived by any subsequent prom
ise.”2°

A distinction

seems to have been taken

in England,

between

a promise to pay a sum of money, and a contract for the per
formance of a particular act.3° If a man acknowledge the ex
istence of a debt barred by the statute, the common law has
been supposed to raise a new promise to pay it, and thus the
remedy is revived; but no such effect can be given to an ac
knowledgment, where the cause of action arises from the doing,

or omitting to do, some act at a particular moment in breach
of a contract!"
But where the promise declared on was to
invest plaintiiT’s money on good security, and that the de
fendant invested it on bad security, to which defendant pleaded
the statute, and plaintiif replied a new promise, on the trial
of -which it was proved that defendant acknowledged the se
curity to be bad, and promised that plaintiff should be paid,
“Contracts of this sort are not capable of
the court said:
being revived by any subsequent promise.”-"'*’
bad sold the property, or until it was
And where A. rc
demanded
ot him.
ceived certain notes of B., and gave
him a receipt therefor. as having re
ceived them for collection, agreeing to
apply the proceeds to the payment of
I1 certain note given by B. to a third
party, and to pay over or account to
Held, that the
B. tor the balance:
statute would not commence
to run
against such n. receipt until A. had
been called on for an accounting;
that
the receipt established the relation of
principal and agent in respect to the
collection and disbursement
of
the

249
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which could only be changed
the relation of debtor and creditor
by a demand:
Kimball
v. Kimball.
16 Mich., 221.
moneys,
to

2 Brod.
29—Whitehead
v. Howard,
3
Bing., 372; Short v. McCarthy.
B. & Aid.. 626.
v. Bussard,
30—Wetzeil
Wheat.

&

ll

309.

31—Boydell v. Drummond. 2 (‘amp..
160; but see. Gibbons v. McCasland,
1 B. & Aid-. 690.
.'i2—Whltehead v. Howard, 2 Brod.
&

Bing,

372.

_

Q

§
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Subsequent acknowledgment in case of torts.—Evi
denee of an admission within six years of
trespass com
mitted more than six years before, and for which the action
was brought, and to which the statute was pleaded, was held
sufficient to take the case out of the statute.”
a

§24l.

TENDER.

servant, or
§243. By whom made.--A tender made by
as
stranger, on the behalf and at the desire of the party,
had been made by the party hi1nself.3“
Where an
good as
agent tendered a greater sum than he was authorized to do
by the defendant, the tender was holden good for the larger

a

amountf"

a

it

is said

1

672.

A creditor cannot lawfully refuse
tender by an agent duly authorized,
if he has reasonable opportunity to
learn his authority: Ilslow v. Mitchell,
‘.36 Mich., 500.
S.,
37-Reed v. Goidring,
M.

4

8;

I

Q

86.

38—Bacon’s

Ab.,

“Tender

&

2

a

E."

U1
D

-1

200.

10406.

v._ Ham!-leton.

a

l

2

10405,

Cro. Eliz.,
that any person
may make a good tender for an idiot.
And so
relative. though not the
guardian. may make a good tender for
Dysinger.
an infant.
Brown v.
But a tender by one with
llawle. 408.
no authority
is of no avail:
Sinclair
v. Learned. 51 ‘Mich., 335; 16 N. W.,
36—(‘ropp
48.
And

¢~
3

it

33'»-—-(.‘.L.. §§

&

B.
33—Gihbons v. McCasiand,
Chitty.
Ald.. 92: ilurst v. Parker,
‘.349. But sec. llolthnm v. Detroit, —
l\iich., —-; 98 N. W., 754 (.\Iarch.
1904), holding that
cause of action
for tort barred by the statute of limi
tations cannot be revived by agreement,
either express or implied. in an action
for torts, the statute begins to run
from the time when the wrongful act
was done. Thus, in trnver. from the
time of the conversion: Kelsey v. Gris
wold,
Barh., 436; lienys v. Shack
And for
YOil!lfJ,' & (".. -ill.
hui‘;.:li,
wrongful taking of goods on execution.
Read
v.
from the time of taking:
'
Johns.. 523.
Markle.
M.,
N.
34
Searle v. Barrett.
G

,.

§244. To whom made.—A tender may be made to any per
party or privy, the right to the thing
son in whom, either as
tendered is.3~‘-* A tender to an agent or servant authorized to

a

__?_._.‘@135?
Q-4-iii; ll ~iIi,‘
‘>0
I I‘Q1:i
_;__I
ié: >I
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it

if

is

'i

a

.'1
>l

,1
ll

is

it

is a

tender may
§242. When can be made.-At common law,
be made in any case wherein the debt or duty
certain; but
cannot be in any action for unliquidated damages, as by
a landlord against a tenant for not repairing.“
By statute,
made of a casual or involuntarily trespass or
an exception
injury. This statute will be considered hereafter.35
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receive payment, is a tender to the creditor himself.” A tender
to one of two joint creditors is a tender to both.“
Where a
creditor told his clerk, who was previously authorized to re
the_money, not to receive a sum if offered on a par
ticular debt, as he had put it into the hand of his attorney,
and the clerk, on tender made, refused to receive the money,
it was held a good tender to the principal.“
ceive

Of what to be made.—Where

a party is entitled to
which is made current
by the laws of the United States. But a tender of bank notes,
if not objected to on thatground, will be good." So, if the
party agree before the day of payment to receive them, and
when tendered refused them, provided they are current." All
gold, silver and minor coins stricken and issued at the mint
of the United States, except trade dollars, are a legal tender.
The American gold coins are double eagles, eagles, half eagles,
three dollar pieces, quarter eagles and dollar pieces, and are
legal tender for any amount."
Of silver coins there are dol
lars, which are also legal tender for any sums ;‘5 half dollars,
quarter dollars, dimes and half dimes, which are legal tender
the tender must be in money

by the debtor
there
to any one in
charge of the oﬂice. in the attorney's
valid:
Kiston
v.
absence. will he
Braithwaite, 1 M. & W., 310; Wiimot
v. Smith, 3 C. & P., 453.
And where
money was coming due on a contract
which speciﬁed no place of payment,
but the creditor told the debtor that
she would be at home to receive it on
it was held that
the day oi’ payment,
tender at the house to her son, who
lived with her, was good. she having
absented
herself at the time:
Smith
405; Smith v.
v. Smith. 25 Wend..
Smith, 2 lliii, 351; and see, Judd v.
Ensign, 6 Barb., 258.

39—Goodland v. Biewitte. 1 Camp.,
But a tender must be made to
477.
the creditor or some one authorized
to act for him. It is insuﬂicient ii’ made
to a mere servant of the creditor:
Thurber v. Jewett, 3 Miche, 29.1.
40—Dougias v. Patrick. 3 Term R.,
But it must be pleaded as a ten
683.
Ibid.
Where two per
der to both:
a tender to
sons are both interested.
it both
especially
either is sutlicient,
are present: Beebe v. Knapp, 28 Mich.,
53.

251

Richards

3

5

ii

v. Vanﬁusan, 21 Mich.,
v. White, 44 Mich.,
N. \\‘.. 233: Waidron v. Mur
phy, 40 Mich., 668; Koehier v. Buhi,
94 Mich., 496: 54 N. W., 157.
43-Wright v. Reed.
Term R., 554;
Johns., 476.
Warren v. Mains,
4-4—Rev. Stat, U. S., 2d ed..
3585.
45—Act of Congress
of Feb. 28,
1878: the silver trade dollar excepted.
42-—Fosdicit

567;
622:

7

41--Moffat
v. Parsons. 5
Taunt..
307; Muifntt v. Parsons, 1 Marsh., 55.
A tender to a merchant's clerk at the
store tor goods previously bought there
the
claim
is good. notwithstanding
had been left with an attorney for
Maine,
lioyt v. Byrdes,
coiiection:
And tender to an attorney with
475.
whom the claim is left for collection
is good: Mciniile v. Wheeiock. 1 Gray,
600: Jackson v. Crofts, 18 Johns.,
100.
And if the attorney by letter
demands payment at his oﬂice, a tender

'4'

§245.

money
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for all sums not exceeding ﬁve dollarsﬁf The minor coins of
the United States are a ﬁve cent piece, a three cent piece and
a one cent picce;‘" and are a legal tender for any amount not
United
exceeding twenty-ﬁve cents in- any one payment.“
currency,

States notes, commonly termed greenback
legal tender for sums to any amount."

are also

Where -the plaintiﬂ’ presented for payment, at one time, at
the banking house of defendants, thirty-ﬁve dollar notes of the
defendants, the defendants, to redeem them, tendered three
himdred half-dollar pieces of the recent coinage of the United
States, which the plaintiff refused: ,Held, that each bill was to
be considered a separate debt, and, therefore, the tender was

good.”
§246. How to be made.-—'I‘he law requires to constitute a
valid tender, whether of money or chattels, that they be ac
tually produced and oﬂiercd in sufficient quantity, at the time
and place agreed upon, unless such production and oﬁer is
dispensed with by the declarations, or equivalent conduct of
Gen
the person to whom tender is made, waiving the same}
erally speaking, an objection to the tender upon a particular

5f)—Strong v. Farmers‘ & Mechanics‘
Sec.
Bank of Michigan. 4 l\lich., 35!).
Johnson v. Cranage, 45 1\ilch.. 14: 7
N. W., 188.
the creditor that
and a refusal to ae
anythln: excuses production of
ccpt
24 l\ilch..
money:
Lm-_v v. Wilson.
A tender oi a gross sum in dis
479.
It is
charge of several liens is good.
not necessary to make a separate ten
Johnson \'. (‘rﬂiiilﬂfh
der for each:
lt is
‘T N. \\'.. IRS.
45 l\iich..
not essential. in the tender of money.
over in
that it lie actually counted
1-—A

anything

denial
is

due

ii:

hy

A

8

2d od.. 5 3598.

A tender made in gwenliacks and ﬁfty
iinited States currency
cent fractional
where no objection was
is suﬂlclcnt
tn the tender on this ground
made
28
v. Knapp,
Beebe
at the time:
Mlch., 53.

7

3515.
3587.

5

2d ed.,

§

2d ed.,

§

48—Rev. Stat, IT.
49—Rev. Slat. fl‘

717*.’-O

47—Rev. Stat, C1

of the person to whom
presence
It is enough that op
tender is made.
portunlty is given to count it: Wade's
Case,
tender ot an
115.
Coke,
insutiieient amount ls 01' no avail:
Montaigne
v. Dougan, 68 Mich., 98; 35
N. W., 840.
A tender of too much
Hubbard v. Che
will not vltiate:
An oifer to
nango Bank.
Cow.. 88.
pay what may be found to be due is
Chase v. Welsh,
good tender:
not
One
N. W., 895.
45 Mich., 345;
who would be entitled to subrogation
a
mortgngoi-‘s rights under
to
the
chattel mortgage must tender amount
so
due on the mortgage and expenses
Shutes
far incurred in foreclosure:
v. Woodard, 57 Mich., 213; 23 N. W..
than
A tender made ot less
775.
amount due upon condition that it
shall he in full, ii’ accepted discharges
debt,
it amount is in dispute:
the
Rosema
v. Porter, 112 Mlch., 13; T0
ot de
See illustration
N. W., 316.
fectlve tender in. Niederhauser v. De
troit C. S. Ry. Co., 131 lHich., 550;
91 N. W., 1028.
the

:1

46—Rev. Stat, U. 3.. 2d ed., §§ 3513
3586.

i
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ground, is a waiver of all other objection to the form in which
it is made? When, however, no particular objection is urged
against the tender, it seems that the tender must be good
against any objection which might be made.“
The imposition of conditions not justiﬁed

-

will vitiate the

tender.‘
§247. Eﬁect of tender.—The tender of money, in payment
of a money debt, only discharges the debtor from payment of
interest thereafter, from liability to costs, and discharges any
security the creditor may hold for the debt. The debt still
remains.“ And if, after having made a. tender, the debtor re

482.

5—Raymond

v.

v.
.\lanu_v
Jackson v. Law,
27-1:

Bernard.

llarris,

i2 Johns.,

2-4;
2 Ibid..
Cow.. ‘.248; Porter
Mich., 10: Esiow v.

1'»

Hodenpuyl.
A tender is
Mitchell. 26 Mlch., 500.
liability to the
of
an admission
amount tendered. but not oi’ any larger
amount claimed by the plaintilfz Ken
153; 17 N.
v. Nims. 52 i\ilch..
nedy
W.. 735.
tender. to be effectual
as such. must be of the whole amount
part only will
due.
tender of
not he operative unless accepted by the
39
(‘oots
v.
Mc(‘onneil.
creditor:
a

A

A

a

9

v.

a

it

a
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liili.

a

4-Wilson v. Wagar. 26 ‘.\ilch., 452.
A tender is not defeated because made
upon a condition the creditor has a
Allen v. At
right to insist upon:
v.
Brink
kinson,
21
.\Ilch.. 351;
Freoif. 40 Mieh., 610: s. c.. 4-i Mich.,
60; 6 N. W.. 94. See. further. Moyna
ban v. Moore. 9 Mlch.. 9; Potts v.
Piaisted. so .\n¢n.. 149; Sager v."1‘up
That the note
134.
35 Mich.,
per.
shall be surrendered may be insisted
Wilder v. Seeiye.
on as a condition:
Smith v. Rockwell, 2
8 Barb., 408;

7

339.

hiieh., 742.
A tender of amount due
land contract deprives the vendor
of right to declare a forfeiture tor
non-payment in analogy to the rule
that a tender of amount due on a
mortgage discharges the lien:
Iiiil v.
Carter, 101 1\ilch.. 158; 59 N. W., 413.
is claimed that certain serv
Where
ices rendered were to discharge amount
due it will not defeat the right to
show such agreement that
tender
liill
has been made of amount due:
A valid tender once
v. Carter. supra.
made
is effective to discharge a lien
though not thereafter kept good: Ca
12 l\iich., 270;
ruthers v. llumphrey.
Sears v. VanI)usen. 25 Mich.. 351 (a
48
guarantor); Stewart v. Brown,
The evi
Mich.. 383; 12 N. W., 499.
dence in support of a tender to dis
charge
lien should be clear and satis
factory: Engie v. Ilali, 45 Mich.. 57;
N. W., 239; Proctor v. Robinson.
Mich., 284; Selby v. ilurd. 51
35
Stops in
Mich., 1; 16 N. W.. 180.
(‘owles v. Marble, 37 Mich.,
terest:
158; Jones v. Shaw, 56 .\Iich.. 332;
A tender made and
23 N. \\'.. 33.
payment into court cannot be with
though
is
no debt:
there
drawn
Thompson v. Townsend. 41 Mich.. 346;
But the holder of _thc
N. W., 1042.
security must in every case have a
reasonable opportunity to look over the
papers, to calculate and ascertain the
amount due. and if such papers are
not present he must have a reasonable
time to get them and make the calcu
latlon:
Potts v. Piaisted. 30 .\iich..
149, supra.
A tender of the amount
mortgage made at an un
due upon
reasonable time and place, in' the ab
on

1

2—Fosdi<-k v. Vanilusan, 21 Mich.,
Moore, 9 1\ilch.,
v.
567; Moynahan
Chamberlain,
24
914; F'iandcr.< v.
l\ilch., 305; illii v. Carter, 101 Mich.,
158; 59 N. W., 413.
As to whether, where no objection
to the tender is made at the time. all
objections to the form of making are
v. Crouse, 40
waived. see Browning
Mlcb., 339; Siesinger v. Bresler, 110
Mich.. 198; 68 N. W., 128.
v. Crouse, 40 l\ilch.,
3-—Bl'0Wnin'.:
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is

fuses to pay the debt upon any subsequent demand, he loses
the beneﬁt of his tender, except that security for the debt
discharged.‘-i

A

a

9

5O
CI

a

672.

a

a

a

a

A

A

7

7

4

-.1 .

ii

yet the security is destroyed at
And the holder of a security
upon which a party is authorized to
make a tender is not concerned where,
or on what terms the person tender
ing the money obtained it, so long as
he could have got payment by accept
ing the tender:
Eslow v. Mitchell, 26
Mich., 500.
A lien for rent under a.
clause in a lease is discharged by
tender in full:
Gordon v. Construc
tive Ii. Co., 117 Mich., 621; 76 N. W.,
142.
tender by a junior incum
brancer accompanied with a demand
for an assignment from his senior, of
the amount of a prior lien does not
operate
discharge
to
lien:
that
Schmittdiel v. Moore, 120 Mich.. 199;
79 N. W., 195.
v. Trow.
168.
6—Town
24 Pick.,
If, after tender and refusal to accept,
with a
the debtor deposit the money
third person with notice to the cred
itor, he is not obliged to call on the
depositor for the money. and if after
such a deposit the creditor calls on
the debtor for the money, and he does
not pay or tender the sum due, the
tender is unavailing.
Ibid.
If a ten
der is refused and the money is re
ceived back by the debtor,
the tender
Browning
will be of no avail:
v.
(‘rouse, 40 Mich.. 339.
And the ten
der to
mechanic of the amount due
him, and for which he has a lien on
discharges
property in his pos.-ession,
the lien. and the property is forever
after freed from the lien. And in re
plevin by the owner for the property
is not necessary to bring the ten
der into court or show that it has been
kept good:
Hodenpuyl,
v.
Porter
Mlch., 9.
Lamb v. Lathrop. 13 Wend..
.
Where the party to whom tender is
delivery of the
made is non-resident
speciﬁc goods to
warehouseman sub
ject to the order of the non-resident.
with notice to him of such action is a
good
Angeli v. Loomis, 97
tender:
ment.
once.

it

if

sence of the mortgage. may be properly
can have
declined until the mortgagee
a reasonable time to examine the mort
gage and make the necessary compu
the refusal to accept
And
tations.
is not absolute and un
tender
the
reasonable,
it will not discharge the
Waidron v. Murphy, 40 Mich.,
lien.
668; see, Parks 4 Allen, 42 Mich.,
482;
Chase v. Welsh,
N. W.,
N. W., 895.
45 i\iich., 345;
\\'here the discharge of a mortgage
is claimed on the ground of a ten
in support of the
der,
the evidence
tender should be very clear and satis
factory, and ought to place the defend
Eagle v.
ant distinctly in the wrong:
Hall, 45 Mich.. 57:
N. W.. 239.
in his ordinary
engaged
mortgagee.
occupation. is not bound at his peril
to know at. all times the exact amount
owing to him on his security, and to
be ready to determine forthwith, with
for examination and
out opportunity
computation, whether he will accept
any particular sum that is tendered to
lie
him in satisfaction of his claim.
must have a reasonable opportunity to
satisfy himself as to the amount he
Root v. Brad
is entitled to receive:
lay. 49 Mich.. ‘.17: lib N. \\'.. 896.
tender of the amount due upon
in order to be effectual
as
mortgage,
of the lien, must be open,
release
fair and reasonable, and be made
at a proper time and place and to the
proper person; and the refusal of such
tender must be without justifiable
excuse to warrant a forfeiture oi’ the
security:
l'ost v. Springstcd. 49 Mich..
And it seems that
90: 13 N. W., 370.
a valid tender cannot be made by or
on behalf of one who is neither liable
for the debt nor has any interest in
the mortgaged property:
Sinclair v.
Learned. 51 Mir-h..
333: 16 N. XV"

7

is

a

is

\

But the tender of speciﬁc articles on the day and at the place
payable in spe
speciﬁed for performance, as, where a note
In such case,
satisfaction of the contract.‘
ciﬁc articles,

a

A

tender regularly and lawfully made
lion. and whilc the debt
discharszcs
is not thereby discharged without pay
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after tender and refusal to accept, the relation of the parties
is changed to that of bailor and baileeﬁ

Eﬁect of notice of tender under general issue.—A
§2-18.
notice of tender must contain a profert in court of the money
tendered.” It admits a cause of action to the amoimt of the
money tendered, which sum must be paid into court."
The plaintiﬁ’ either denies the tender or shows that suit was
commenced before tender, or that on a subsequent demand of
the money it was not paid.
A person making a tender must hold himself in readiness, at
all reasonable times and places, to meet a demand for_the

money tendered, and if he fail to pay it on request, he loses
the beneﬁt of the tender," and a. new right to damages ac
crues fr0m_ the non-payment upon the subsequent demand."
Mich., 5: 55 N. W., 1008.
if property
on a sale is of any appre
received
in
ciable value it must be tendered
John
order to a valid rescission:
son v. Flynn, 97 Mich., 581; 56 N.
W., 939.
8——Lamb v. Lathrop, 13 Wend., 95.
And the party making the tender will
thereafter hold the articles as baiior,
but at the rlslt and expense of the
4
v.
Sheldon
creditor:
Skinner.
Wend, 525: see, Brooklyn Bank v. De
Grauw, 23 Weud.. 344.
9—Ayt-es v. Pease. 12 Wend., 393.
10—liathaway
v. O'Hara, 14 Wend.,
221: Sherlden v. Smith, 2 Hill, 538.
And if the notice is not accompanied
by payment of the money into court,
the tender will not avail: Ibir1., and
Wilder v. Scelye. 8 Barh., 408; Liv
ingston v. Harrison. 2 E. D. Smith,
197: Roosevelt v. New York & ii. R.
R. Co., 45 Barb., 554; Porter v. linden
puyl, 9 Mich., 10. And the notice of
tender should show, not only that the
money was properly tendered.
but that
it has been kept good. that the debtor
was not only ready and willing to puy
but that he
at the time of tender.
always has heen and now is ready and
willing to pay: Kortrlght v. Cady, 23
Barh.. 490; Wilder v. iiieelye, 8 Barb..
408: Roosevelt v. Bull's Head Bank.
Money paid into court
45 Ilarlx. 579.
belongs to the plaintiff, without refer
Logue
ence to the result of the suit:
v. Gilllck,
1 E. D. Smith. 398: Wood
v. Perry, 1 Barb., 114: Slack v. Brown.

I3

it

operates as a pay
goes, and the plain
tiff has the right to take it out of
court. but the defendant has not:
Murray v. Bethune. 1 Wend., 191.
it
the declaration is on
the
common
counts. notice or tender with payment
of money into court is an admission
that the defendant is indebted to that
amount upon some contract. but not
that he is liable upon any particular
contract upon which the plaintil! may
Kingham v. Robins,
choose
to rely:
5 M. G: W., 94: Stapleton v. Nowell,
6 Ibid., 9; Charles v. Branker. 12 Ibirl.,
743 Archer v. English, 1 M. & G.. 873.
But if the declaration is upon a special
contract. notice of tender with pay
ment,
etc.,
is an admission of the
cnuse of action as therein set forth,
but not of the amount of damages al
Wend.,

390.

as far as it

ment

leged:

Johnston
v. Columbian
ins.
Johns.. 315: Spalding v. Van
dercook. 2 Wend., 431; Ynte v. Willan.
2 East, 134: Stoveld v. Brewln. 2 B. &
Ald.. 116: Wright v. Goddard. 8 Ad. k
E.. 144: Bulwer v. iiorne, 4 B. & Ad.,
Co.,

7

182.

11—Town v. Trow, 24 l"lck., 168:
Porter v. Hodenpuyl, 9 Mich., 9. And
it has been held that if after a tender.
which was refused, the ‘debtor use the
money in his business or mingle it with
his other funds. the tender will not be
good:
Roosevelt v. B. ll. Bank, 45
Barh., 57!); see, Brooklyn Bank V. De
Grauw, 23 Ibld.. 345.
12——Manny v. Harris, 2 .Tohns., 31.
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The demand must be by some one authorized to receive the
debt and give the debtor a discharge." A letter demanding
payment is not, it seems suﬁicient; the demand should be
personal, that the defendant may have an opportunity at the
time of paying the money demanded.“
But where, to a letter
demanding payment, an answer was returned that the demand
should be settled, it was deemed suﬁicient evidence to go to
the jury of a subsequent demand.“ The demand must be of
the exact sum speciﬁed as having been before tendered and

refused." If the demand be made ‘upon
liable jointly, it is sufficient."

one

of two parties

Tender under the statute a.fter- suit is brought.
§249.
“Wl1en any action at law shall be commenced, "for the re
covery of a sum certain, or w‘hich may be be reduced to a
certainty by calculation, or for a casual or involuntary tres
pass or injury, the defendant, in any stage of the proceedings
before trial in such causes, or before such damages shall have
been assessed, or before judgment rendered in an action of
debt, may tender to the plaintiff, or his attorney, any sum of
money which such defendant shall conceive suﬁicient amends
for the injury done, for which such action or proceeding was
instituted, or suiﬁcient to pay the plaintiif’s demand, together
with the costs of such action or proceeding, to the time of
making

such tender.”18

“If

it shall appear upon the trial of the cause, or upon the
of damages, that the amount so tendered was suffi
to
cient
pay the plaintii’f ’s demand, or was suﬂicient amends for
the injury done, and the costs of the suit or proceeding up to
tlm time of such tender, the plaintiff shall not be entitled to
recover or collect any interest on such demand from the time of
such tender, or any costs incurred subsequent to that time, but
shall be liable to the defendant for the costs inc1u'red by him
assessment

subsequent to such timc.”1°
13—Cole v. Bell, 1 (‘amp.. 478. n. 1;
Anderson v. Cleland. 1 ]']s1').. 47.
1-i—I~Zdwnr<l v. Yates, Ii. & M.. 360.
13'-—lla_vs\-arri v. ilague, 4 Rsp.. 93.
lﬁ-—Sp_vhe_v v. iI_vde. 1 (‘nmp.. 181;
Town v. Trow, 2-i I‘ick.. ITO; Rivers
v. Griihtlis. 5 B. & A.. 630.

_

17—Pierce

v.

Bowles,

1

Stark

B.,

323.

1S—C. L., § 10405.
19-C. L., § 10406. These section
of the statute authorize a tender only
after action commenced, and therefore
be
before suit must
a tender made
I
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to accept the sum tendered,

the amount

tendered must be included in the amount of his recovery. The
he refused the sum tendered, may at any
time thereafter, even on the trial, accept the sum tendered,
and the defendant must pay
(allowing him reasonable time
to procure the money), or his refusal to pay will render the
tender unavailing.
If the plaintiff recover an amount exceeding the sum ten
dered, he will recover full costs, unless the tender was ac
cepted, when the costs will depend upon the excess.
The statute only applies to action ll for the recovery of
sum certain, or which may be reduced to a certainty by calcula
tion, or for
casuallor involuntary trespass or injury.” In
these cases,
incumbent on the defendant to bring his case
within the terms of the statute. Therefore, in an action of
trespass, the jury or the court should ﬁnd that the trespass was
“casual or voluntary.”2°
is

it

a

a

a

it

plaintiff, although

USURY.

a

§

The sta.tute.—“No bond, bill, note, contract or assur
consideration or contract,
ance, made or given for or upon
250.

by payment of the amount
will not
into court, or the tender
Brown v. Fergu
avail as a defence:
Denio, 196; see, Johnson v.
son,
iiiil, 10.
Comstock,
A claim for unliquidated damages
for refusing to deliver property on
proper case
contract of sale is not
for a tender
under these 55 10405,
But where, in
suit for such
10408.
justice. the defendant
damages before
made
tender which was refused and
then paid over to and left with the
justice, and after judgment and appeal
taken,
took
the money
the plaintiif
Held, that the re
from the justice:
ception of this money by plaintii! did
not bar him in the circuit court from
recovering such further amount as he
or she appeared to be entitled to; but
that the justice should not have paid
appeal
the money to plaintii! after
without
consent:
Mc
defendant's
Kircher v. Curtis. 35 Micb.. 478.
A tender after suit brought can only
be made under the statute. 55 10405,
10406.
This doe not allow such a

tender to bar the further prosecution
of the suit, but only to stop interest
and costs, and to subject the piaintifl
to subsequent
costs
if the tender is
suﬂicient.
Section 10406 contemplates
that such tender may be shown on the
Snyder v. Quarton, 47 Mich.,
trial:
if a full tender
211: 10 N. W., 204.
is made, subsequent
costs must go to
the defendant:
Wilcox v. L.
R.
Powder Co., 44 Mich., 35;
N. W.,

a

5

a

&

a

a

6

2

accompanied

'*"_‘“"¢'\:

a

1091.

+4

4

W

17

F74

l

has been duly made
paid into court, the
money
amount of the tender should not be
included in the verdict or judgment
for plaintiff:
Wetherbee
v. Kusterer,
N. W., 45.
41 Mich., 359:
As to
costs where tender has been made. See,
\Vhere a tender
the

2

and

1

Mich.,
393;
Smith v. Curtiss, 38
Thompson v. Townsend, 41 Mich., 346;
N. W., 1042.
20—Slack v. Brown, 13 Wend., 390;
see, Holiister v. Brown, 19 Mich., 163.
is made
Where tender
after
suit
brought, but before service of process
on defendant and before he knows that

257

__.-l

§ 250

'

USURY.

CH.

XII.

whereby or whereon a greater rate of interest has been, di
rectly or indirectly, reserved, taken or received, than is al
lowed by law, shall be thereby rendered void; but in any action
brought by any person on such usurious contract or assurance,
except as is provided in the following section, if it shall appear
that a greater rate of interest has been, directly or indirectly,
reserved, taken or received than is allowed by law, the de
fendant shall not be compelled to pay any interest thereon/’”-1
The “following section” referred to in the above is as fol
lows:
“Whenever it shall satisfactorily appear by the ad
mission of the defendant, or by proof that any bond, bill, note,
assurance, pledge, conveyance, contract, security, or any evi
dence of debt has been taken or received in violation of this
act, the court shall declare the interest thereon to be v0id.”‘“
“In any action brought on any bill of exchange, or promis
sory note payable in money, and to order or bearer, originally
given or made for, or upon any usurious consideration or con
tract, if it shall appear that the plaintiﬂ’ became, in good faith,
the indorsee or holder of such bill of exchange or promissory
costs have been incurred, it is sum
cient to tender the debt alone, without
offering to pny costs:
Hull v. Peters,
7 Barb., 331.

21—C. L.. Q 4857.
This section is a
part of Act 156 of the Public Acts
of 1891, and by virtue of a clause in
section one of that act it does not
apply to existing contracts, “whether
the same be either due or not due or
part due."
Section one of this act
ﬁxed the rate of interest at six per
cent with a permissible rate of eight
per cent. This section one was amend
ed by Act 207 of the Public Acts of
1899. changing the rate to ﬁve per cent
with a. permissible maximum rate of
Nothing is usury in
seven per cent.
this state that does not exceed the
maximum rate allowed by the statute:
Havens v. Jones, 45 Mlch., 253: 7
Any agreement for a rate
N. W., 818.
in excess of the statutory rate and
within the maximum rate allowed, to
be valid, must be in writing:
C. L.,
§ 4856; Nelson v. Dutton, 51 Mich..
416; 16 N. W., 791.
Interest contin
ues to run at the same rate after
due:
Warner v. Juif, 38
as before

Mlch., 662. Prior to the amendment of
the statute of 1891 the penalty attach
ing to a usurious contract was the
forfeiture of the interest in excess of
the highest permissible rate.
Under
the law as it now stands all interest
L., § 4857.
is forfeited:
The
C
defense of usury is a personal defense
which can only be interposed by a
party to the contract:
Farmers‘ &
M. Bank v. Kimmel, 1 Mlch., S4; Sel
lers v. Botsford, 11 Mlch., 59. A pur
premises cannot
chaser of mortgaged
insist upon a reduction of the amount
of a mortgage
on the lands, by the
amount of usurious interest paid by his
grantor for the defense is a personal
Gray v. H. M. Loud & Sons
one:
L. Co., 128 Mlch., 427: 87 N, W., 376.
Thi principle was applied in Barney
v. Tontine Surety 00.. 131 Mlch., 192;
A general payment by
91 N. W., 140.
the maker on a promissory note the
interest on which is usurious, must be
applied to reduce the principal:
Pretz
v. Murray, 118 Mlch., 302; 76 N. W.,
495.

22—C. L., § 4858.
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a valuable consideration,

due, then and in such case, unless

before the same became

it shall further appear that

at the time of becoming such indorsee or holder,
had actual notice that such bill or note was given for or upon
a usurious consideration or contract, he shall be entitled to re
cover thereon, in the same manner, and to the same extent, as
if such usury had not been alleged and proved.”23
the plaintiif,

Interest upon installments of interest permitted.—
“When any installment of interest upon any note, bond, mort
gage, or other written contract, shall have become due, and the
same shall remain unpaid, interest may be computed and col
lected on any such installment so due and unpaid, from the
time at which it became due, at the same rate as speciﬁed in any
such note, bond, mortgage, or other written contract, not ex
ceeding ten per cent; and if no rate of interest be speciﬁed
in such instrument, then at the rate ‘of seven per centum per
’
annum. '24
§251.

23—C. L., I 4864.
this section will now
bills or notes made or
taking ei‘l!ect of Act

As to whether
apply to any
given
156,

since

the
ot
See,
ections 2 and 3
Query.
1891:
Prior to the
or that act above quoted.
passage of that act the following de
Coats
cisions in this note were made:
worth v. Barr, 11 Mich., 199.
Where a person loaning $300 was by
for
a mortgage
agreement
to have
$412 therefor, drawing interest at ten
per cent, and to avoid the appearance
of usury, the lender required the bor
rower to execute the mortgage to a
third person, who was to and did sell
and assign the mortgage to the lender
for $300, which he received for the
it was held that
use of the borrower.
was usurious, and that
the mortgage
only the $300 and interest could he
thereon by the lender of the
collected
mortgage:
borrower who made the
Caruthers v. Humphrey. 12 Mich., 270.
The purchase of a mortgage from the
mortgagee,
the purchaser has
where
knowledge
that the mortgagee in mak
ing the sale ls acting as the agent of
the mnrtgagors,
is in eﬂect but a loan
to the mortzagors upon the mortgage,
of the amount actually paid therefor
by the purchasers.
And the surplus,

Laws

it the mortgage is given for more than
this, is usurious and void:
Smith
ers v. Heather,
25 Mich., 447.
see,
L.,
24—C. L., Q 4859:
C.
A mortgage given before the
Q 4856.
time when this section,
5 4859, took

eifect (July 5, 1869), remains
subject
to the law regulating interest as in
force at the time it was given.
And
the tact that a part of the_money
se
cured by the mortgage
was not paid
over to the mortgagor
until after that
act took etfect, does not subject that
part of the money to the payment oi’
compound interest:
Huxiord v. Eslow,
53 Mich., 179; 18 N. W., 630; see,
Iioyie v. Page, 41 Mich., 533: 2 N.
Beller, 56
W., 665; and Voigt
v.
Mich., 140: 22 N. W., 270: Clapp v.
Galloway. 56 Mich., 272; 22 N. W.,
869; Jones v. Shaw, Ibt'd., 332: 23 N.
W., 33: Rix v. Strauts, 59 Mich., 364;
26 N. W., 638.
Interest collected on unpaid interest
tailing due upon a note or mortgage
executed prior to this act is usurious,
and may be collected hack, or set oil’
in an action brought to enforce pay
ment oi’ the note or mortgage:
Hav
ens v. Jones, 45 Mich., 253: 7 N. W.,
818.
interest can be collected
Compound
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§252. Interest on contracts payable in other states, etc.
shall be lawful for any person or corporation, borrowing
money in this state, to make notes, bills, bonds, drafts, ac
ceptances, mortgages, or other securities, for the payment of
principal or interest, at the rates authorized by the laws of

“It

this state, payable at the place where the parties may agree,
although the legal rate of interest in such place may be less
than in this state; and such notes, bonds, bills, drafts, or other
securities, shall not be regarded or held to be usurious, nor
shall any securities taken for the same, or ‘upon such loans,
of the rate of interest of the
be invalidated in consequence
state, kingdom or country, where the paper is made payable,
being less than in this state, nor of any usury or penal law
therein.’ '2‘
under the statute (C. L., § 4859) only
in those cases where payments or in
by
stallments of interest fall due
ep
and may be demanded
themselves
Where the
arntely from the principal.
principal and interest become due and
all at one time. they consti
payable
tute but one debt, and any demand or
suit for this debt must embrace the
In
whole, both principal and interest.
such case there
is no installment or
payment of interest falling due by
itself and separately from the princi
pal, therefore such interest cannot be
under the statute. Thus.
compounded
payable
a mortgage
made
“one year
after date with annual interest at ten
per cent,” means
that the interest
shall be computed at ten per cent per
annum, and does not provide for suc
cessive installments of interest. and in
that case the interest cannot be com
pounded:
Hoyle v. Page, 41 Mlch.,
533; 2 N. W.. 665.
Compound
interest
is coliectabie only by virtue of this
Voigt v. Belier, 56 Mlch.,
statute:
141; 22 N. W., 270.
Where no inter
est is payable until the principal
is
due, interest cannot be computed
on
interest:
Rix v. Strauts, 59 Mlch.,
Computation of
364: 26 N. W.. 638.
interest upon interest may be made
up to the time when the obligation
Beyond
matures.
that simple interest
only is allowed. McVicar v. Denison,
81 Mlch., 348; 45 N. W., 659; Wallace
v. Glaser, 82 Mlch., 191; 46 N. W..

When a note is payable "with annual
interest," it means with interest pay
able at the end of each year:
Leonard
182; Cook v.
v. l‘hl1lps, 39 Mlch.,
Wiles, 42 Mlch., 439; 4 N. W., 169.
But if the paper is to mature in less
“with
than two years, the expression.
interest annually.“ does not .call for
the payment of any interest until the
note is due: Leonard v. Philips, supra.
25-—-C. L., § 4360.
Where a contract is made in another
state for the payment of money to be
paid there, the validity of the con
tract will be determined by the laws
of that state; and though the contract
be usurious, but is not rendered
void
on that account by the laws of that
state, yet if suit is brought here, our
courts will enforce the contract. and
cannot give any of the remedies pro
vided by the laws of the other state
for usurious payments.
Our courts
can give no other remedies than those
provided by our laws.
Therefore. if
on such a contract the laws of the
other state provide for the recovery
of the usury paid, or for its appro
priation to reduce the balance of the
debt, those
provisions form no part
of the contract, but relate solely to
the remedy which will be aﬂorded by
her courts to the party from whom the
usury is taken.
Our courts cannot
enforce those remedies in a suit here:
(‘oilins iron Co. v. Burkmsn, 10 Mlch.,
283.

227.
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No plea of usiu-y, nor defense founded upon an allegation
of usury, shall be sustained in any court in this state, nor shall
any security be held invalid on an allegation of usury, where
the rate of interest reserved, discounted or taken, does not ex
ceed that allowcd by the laws of this state, in consequence of
such security being payable in a state, kingdom or coimtry
where such rate of interest is not allowed.”2°
“It shall be lawful for all parties loaning money in this state,
to take, reserve, or discount interest upon any note, bond, bill

draft, acceptance, or other commercial

paper, mortgage, or
other security, at any rate authorized by the laws of this state,
whether such paper or securities, for principal or interest, be
payable in this state, or in any other state, kingdom, or coun
try, without regard to the laws of any other state, kingdom or
country; and all such notes, bonds, bills, drafts, or acceptances,

or other commercial paper, mortgages or other security, shall
be held valid in this state, whether the parties to the same re
side in this state or elsewhere.”2"
“When any contract or loan shall be made in this state, or
between citizens of this state and any other state or country,
bearing interest at any rate which was or shall be lawful ac
cording to any laws of the. state of Michigan, it shall and may
be lawful to make the amount of principal and interest of such
contract or loan payable in any other state or territory of the
United States, or in England; and in all such cases, such con
tract or loan shall be deemed and considered as governed by the
laws of the state of Michigan, and shall not be affected by the
laws of the state or country where the same shall be made
payable; and no contract or loan which may have heretofore
been made or entered into, in this state, or between citizens
of this state and of any other country, bearing interest at a
rate which was legal according to the laws of this state at
the time when the same was made or entered into, shall be
invalidated or in anywise impaired or affected by reason of
the same having been

made payable

in any other state or

coimtry.”"
26-—-(‘. L..

27—C.

28—C. L., Q 4883.

Q 4861.

L.. Q 4862.
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a
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a.

is

253. Under what circumstances
defense.—Intoxication
deed or to
good defense upon plea of the general issue to
not an incompetent person in the law,
promise.” A drunkard
as
an idiot, or one generally insane. He
simply incom
petent upon proof, that at the time of the act his understand

is

is

a‘

is

ing was clouded or his reason dethroned by actual intoxica
A contract entered into by
so drunk
tion.3°
person who
as not to know what he
voidable only, and not
doing
void, and therefore may be ratiﬁed by him wlhen he becomes
sober.“
deceived
signed,

as to the identity of the paper
void, and any defense

it is not

a

2

to it must be on the ground of fraud,
Such
and not on absolute incapacity.
a note would be valid in the hands of
an honest
holder for value:
Miller
v. Finley, 26 ‘Mich., 2-ii).
30~\\'right v. Fisher, 65 Mich., 275;
32 N. W., 605.
31—Carpenter v. Rodgers, 61 Mich.,
384: 28 N. W., 156.
But drunken persons are held for
their tortious acts. even though they
have no actual intention to do wrong,
and even ii’ they do not know the not
done to be illegal and wrong:
Pren
Paige. 30, 31. And.
tice v. Achorn,
as to
criminal act, see, People v.
Garbutt, 17 Mich., 19.

My __
,,.-,, llriﬂﬁl-'
."‘ I "
".q|—n—-0

' .n.-4|.-in-ills“

2

n

2

8: 3

2

1

1 3

Camp.,
29—Pitt v. Smith,
33-4:
Stark., 126.
Fenton v. Holloway,
The ground of invalidity seems to be,
has no
that an intoxicated person
agreeing mind; and see. Cook v. Clay
worth, 18 Ves., 15; Barrett v. Buxton,
Ark., 167; Burroughs v. Richmond,
Green N. J., 233; Prentice v. Achorn,
30; Harrison v. Lemon,
Paige,
Blackt. 21: Gore v. Gibson, 13 M.
W., 623.
Partial intoxication may not
intoxication,
be sutllcient;
to avoid
man to
an agreement,
must disable
know the consequences
of his con
Vt., 97;
tract: Foot v. Tewksbury,
and see, Cook v. Clayworth,
18 Ves.,
16, 17.
Where a note is signed by a
who,
if intoxicated, was yet
person
aware oi’ what he was doing, and not
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5

269
270.
271.
272.

case of trust relations.
case of actions against prin
cipal und surety.
Judgments in case of.
Judgments in case of, against
executors.
Neglect
to set oil’ a demand,
eifect of.
Notice oi’, when may be given.
Form and substance
of notice
ot.
Effect of plea puts darreln con

273.

tlnuance.
Discontinuance

l
5

I I

267
268.

Q

Must arise on Judgment or con
tract.
257. Must be in defendant's
own
right.
5258 Must be demand tor property.
etc., or it must be liquidated.
I259. Demand must be due.
£260. l‘lalntli!‘s demand must be such
as could be subject of set-01!.
must be
5261. it several defendants,
due to ail.
5262. Against whom must be due.
of non
5263. In case of assignment

Q

I256.

l

negotinble
claims.
case of assignment of nego

Q

in

274
275.

When

set-oi!

barred

of llmitationst

In genera.l.—Set-oif

allowed.

Claim sounding in tort.

tiabie claims.

§254.

not

when.
by

statute

the compensation of one debt

is

I264.

in
In

265
266.

I

5254. In general.
I255 Notice of. required.

Nonca Tnaasor.

§

GIVING

I

Or Sm-Oars mo

a

or demand for another,_by virtue of which damages are re
covered by the party in whose favor a balance‘ shall be found.
Set-offs are allowed for the purpose of avoiding
multiplicity
enable parties who have mutual cross de
of actions,
and\to

mands, unconnected with each other, and arising upon con
tract, express or implied, which are liquidated or capable of
being ascertained by ‘calculation, and not resting in opinion
only, to have the whole adjudicated in one action}

._

it

_._.-._.-,_,_.*

5

2

215; Hunton v. Russell, 41 Mich., 316;
N. W., 38: Mitchell v. Wells, 54
Mich., 130; 19 N. W., 777.
But see,
781, providing that where it
C. L..
not used by way of set-oi! when it
might be. that no costs can be recov
ered ln an action upon it: see. also,
The Seventh
Day A. Puh. Assn. v.
Fisher, 95 Mlch., 274: 54 N. W., 759.
In an action by an administrator. de
fendant cannot set oll‘ a claim which
he has tailed to present
to the com
missioners on claims:
Quinn v. Mc

l

3

Mich., 285-8.
1—Ward v. Feliers,
The right of set-oi! at law is given
The common
and limited by statute.
law never recognized it. Unless a case
is positively embraced within the speci
ﬁcations of the statute, the remedy
is denied and the claim will remain
as though
to be separately enforced
Woods
there was no such statute:
Where a claim
v. Ayres. 39 Mich., 348.
may be
is a proper ubject ot set-oil.’
so used or it may be sued upon sepa
rately:
McEwen v. Bigelow, 40 Mich..
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3-..'.‘

a

a

is

required.-“To
§255. Notice under the general issue
entitle
defendant to
set-off he must give notice of the same,
specifying the nature of his claim, with reasonable certainty
at the time of joining issue on a question of fact upon the
merits of the cause.”
2

-*-="‘i§f:=-3.. 4

if

it
is

is

a

A

it

:1

:1

:1

if
it

a

1.

a

§256. Must arise on judgment or contract.—“In the fol
defend
lowing cases, and under the following circumstances,
ant may set. off demands which he has against the plaintiff:
It must he (lt’lll2lll(.l arising upon judgincnt or upon con‘
tmct, express or implied, wlicthcr such contract be Written or
he founded upon
uiiwriticii, scaled or without seal; and
condition, the sum equit
bond or other instrument linving
ably due by virtue of its condition only, shall be set off;”3
immaterial
If the demand to he set oil‘ be _judginent,
was recovered, whether contract
upon what cause of action
jiulgineiit rendered before
or tort, or for costs nn»rciy.4
the subject of set-off as much as a judg
justice of the peace

under

.5

ll

3352 l'_' .\'. \\'..
liqiiidatcd
be
amount.

or

1T0.
\\'lli'Tl

some

claim is srihl to
some

speciﬁc

speciﬁc

data

A

A

it

4

iho

from

§

2

sot-oﬂ'

it

of

iou.

(‘ow.,

8

siibjoct

30-i.
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~

tho

statute which is not ll1'|lllil3i'F*(l.
[__'€'lil’l‘2'il
Mb-li., l-;'»'_': liol
Smith v, Warner.
land v. lien, 48 Mich. '._‘l.~1;12 .\'. \\',,
167; .\lni'¢*ll(iiit<o \'. li.'ll\'i'i‘, -is \ii<-h..
A

D Q->7-I
l
._-_-_‘-- t‘-~.-:.~:‘-""
-'>"___
I
-~
L‘,7“'_:,'~.:~‘:'l-4;‘
.

be

which such amount can be calculated
an ordinary mathematical process,
shall have been arrived at:
Smith V.
\\'nrncr. 14 Mich., 157.
'.2—(‘. l...
T77.
Where a plea is
{i(‘(‘ulll[)illlll‘(,l by u sworn statement
of
sot-oil
cannot be objected that there
is no notice of it:
Kinney v. Robison.
-7'-I -\ii<'h., 3-*9: IS N. W., 120.
no
live of set-oil‘ m:i_v be as broad as a
(lo:-larniion on the common
counts:
I-‘eruuson
v. Miiiikcn,
42 Mich., 441;
.\'. W., 185.
plea
puis darrcin
<-onfinimru-(" siipcrsodes
a previous plea
of iliv gt-norlll issue and notice of set
oiY:
Wliittonioro
v.
Stephens,
48
Mi:-h., 575%; 12 N. \V., S58.
The no
llI'i* of sot-oil‘ may be amended in the
ill§i'l'(‘il()ll of the cntlrti
Rawiings v.
l*‘ish<-r. llo .\iich.. 19; 67 N. W.. 977.
4‘. I...
776.
It does not neces
sarily follow lu'CllilS9 assumpsit might
lie upon a claim that
is proper
matter for set-oii:
Wood v. Ayres,
.".!‘i Mich., 345'».
-1- -llldw.
Treatise,
59;
Cow.
'i‘ro:it.. Qd cd.. 735'»; Barbour-'5 Law of
»\‘~-i-off. RR: and see, Sherman v. Bai
by

Benjamin

fl

97 Mich., 114; 56 N. W., 226;
v.
i~Jnri_v. 123 Mich., 93;
This is not true
W.,
973.
S1 N.
where there has never lit‘t‘l] nppoinii-(l
iioiiwood v.
on claims:
:1 commission
Miller, 112 Mich., t‘».'iT; Tl N. W., 506.
The object of the Finiutc is to save
('l‘H:~‘S
of liilgiiiiiill ill
{ho ox|)¢_~11;\‘(actions. and docs not exist in cases
not brinir
Wh€'i‘c the (lPfl'llll2lili could
an nciion at law to l‘l‘('H\'l_‘l' the (iv
to be set ofi', from the
mand sought
Gardiner v. i-‘araro. SH‘ .\ii<-h..
plaintiff:
71.’; ‘.2-i N. W.. i‘».'>.'>~'i'.
The purpose of
set-ol'i’ is, to sot up by woy of counter
claim. and to oi-rain allowance in one
causes
action for. such imlcpemle-iii
of ncilon as would be cnpnblc of being
the plain
sued upon (lll’i‘('il_\‘ nminst
tiil‘:
lironnan v. 'l‘ii'ir~ul‘i. -iii P\iich.,
391'; lit .\'. \\'.. Tfllii,
A rltllm cannot
Govern.

,

|,*
-

_

_

_

__
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is

a

a.

it,

ment of a court of record,“ unless it be a judgment rendered by
a justice in a suit commenced by attachment, in which the de
fendant was not personally served with the process, and did
not appear.“
If the defendant in execution escape, the judg
ment may be set off.’
The right of set-off, founded upon a bond, is not conﬁned to
cases where the _condition is for the payment of money only.
In an action of debt brought for the penalty of a bond condi
tioned for the performance of the award of arbitrators, one of
the breaches assigned was, that the defendant did not pay a
certain sum awarded to the plaintiff.
It was held that a set-off
was admissible.“ So, where the bond was conditioned for the
performance of a certain work within a certain time, and on
for the payment of weekly sum there
failiue to perform
after, until the work was ﬁnished. The work not being com
pleted within the stipulated time, a certain sum became for
feited, according to the provisions of the bond, which sum was
allowed to be a good set-oﬂ’.° So,
set-off may be made to an
of
for the payment of
action on bond, the
which
condition
'
annuity."
an

It
§257. Must be due defendant in his own right.-“2.
must be due to him in his own right, either as being the orig
inal ereditor or payee, or as being the assignee or owner of the
” 11
bond
Wend.,
v. Herrick,
defendant escape,
the
plaintlﬂ'
is
remitted to his former
rights. the imprisonment is no longer
a satisfaction:
lblrl.
It
defendant
is taken on execution
on s.
issued
judgment against him, this will bar a
set-oil.’ of the judgment so long as the
imprisonment
continues:
Bank
of
Beloit v. Beagle. 20 How., 331; Coop
Cow., 56.
er v. Bigaiow,
8—Burgess v. Tucker,
Johns., 105.
a

v.

Dyche,

2 2

9-Fletcher

'l‘erm.,

32.

265

a

10—(‘oiiins v. Collins,
Bur.. 820.
The sum due on
bond may be set oi!
against any demand recoverable under
or for which tn
the common counts,
will lie: Downer
debttntus
asnumpnit
v. Eggieston, 15 Wand, 51: Tuttle v.
Johns., 153.
Behee,
11—C. I...
778.
M1-Graw v. Petti
hone, 10 Mich., 537.
debt due to
A

Q

it

5

ll

a

the

1

6

a

it

it

5

8

7—McGuinty

240.

8

Cow., 126. But
v. Terry,
Justices judgment from which an
appeals has been taken. and which is
then pending and undetermined,
can
not bc used by way of set-oil’.
But
the appeal will not of itself he a bar
to
new action on the Judgment:
Willard v. Fox, 18 Johns., 497.
etc.,
6-—Peopie
v. The Judges.
Cow., 598.
This was on the ground
judgment was merely
that such
prime Incle, and not conclusive.
evi
dence of the debt.
judgment rendered
Where
on a
suit commenced by attachment is ot
tered as a set-01!,
will not be ai
lowed it
appear that property was
taken on the attachment,
and is then
in the custody of the oﬂicer, since the
presumption will be that the judg
ment was satisﬁed by the zoods taken:
Miller v. Starks, 13 Johns., 517.
5-—Ewen

a

\
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Therefore, in an action against a man for his own debt, he
cannot set off a demand due to him in right of his wife."
A debt due to the defendant as a surviving partner, or sur
viving joint creditor, may be set oﬁ against a demand on him
in his own right."
The defendant may set oif, not only a demand, which is a
proper matter of set-oif, originally due to him from the plain
tiff, but also any such demand, whether negotiable or not,
originally due from the plaintiﬁ to a third person, and by that
person assigned to the defendant."
It is not competent for a defendant to purchase a judgment
conditionally for the purpose of setting it off. He must be
come the absolute proprietor for that purpose." But it is not
necessary that the consideration of the assignment should
have been actually paid to render it a legal set-oﬂ".1°
The assignment may be by writing, without seal; and it
would seem that a verbal assignment is suﬁicient."

Must be demand for property sold, etc., or it must
liquidated.—“3. It must be a demand for real estate sold,
or for personal property sold, or for money paid, or services
done 7 or if it be not such a demand, the amount must be
§258.

be

capacity
person
in his individual
cannot be set oi! against a debt due
First N.
from him as a trustee:
Bank oi.’ Detroit v. E. T. Barnum, etc.,
58 .\iich., 124; 24 N. W., 543.
12—Buli., N. P., 179.
13—Newberry
Trowbridge,
v.
13
Mich., 275, 276.
But a joint debt
cannot be set oil! against a separate
demand,
nor a separate debt against
Barb. on Set-oﬂ,
56
a joint one:
Grant v. Royal Exch. Assur. Co., 5
Maui & S., 439: Detroit, H. & S. W.
Ry. Co. v. Smith. 50 Mich., 113: 15 N.
W.. 39; Keystone liifg. Co. v. For
syth, 115 Mich., 51: 72 N. W., 1109.
the
Unless it be so agreed between
parties:
Kinnerly
v.
2
Ilossack.
Taunt., 170. A debt from the plaintiff
may
as surviving debtor to defendant.
be set oi‘! against a debt due from the
defendant to the plaintiff in his own
right: French v. Andrade, 6 Term.,
a

tltt:

Tuttle v. Bebee. 8 Johns., 152;
Ford v. Stuart. 19
or a judgment:
Johns., 342: or an account against
him: Martin v. Williams, 17 Johns.,
330: which has been duly assigned to
But
the defendant in his own right.
there can be no set-oi! between claims
where
the debtor on one side is not
the creditor on the other side. nomi
nally or really:
Hendricks v. Toole,
29 Mich., 340.
The defendant must
be the real owner oi.’ the counter-claim
with the right to control it: McGraw
v. Pettlbone, 10 Mich., 537; Dunlap v.
J’. P. Donaldson Co., 74 Mich., 290:
41 N. W., 927.
15—Milier v. Gilman. 7 Cow., 469;
Satterlee v. Ten Eyck. 7 Ibid., 480. p

~"
582.

14—Edw. T1'eat.. 59:

set

oﬂ! a bond

executed

Thus. he may
by the plain

16—Everet v. Strong, 5 Hill, 163:
Everlt v. Strong. 7 Hill. 585.

17—Prescott
v.
Hull.
284; Ford v. Stuart, 19
Runyan v. Merserean. 11
Littleﬂeld v. Storey, 3 Ibld.,
son, v. Coies, 16 lMd., 51.

17

Johns...

Ibid., 3-12:
Ibid., 538;
425: Daw
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ascertained

§259
by

calcula

15

a

Under the ﬁrst clause of this subdivision,
demand to be set
off must be for real estate sold, or for personal property sold,
or for money paid, or services done. The demand under this
clause, in order to be set off, must be such for which an action

of

a

a

a

a

if

if

is,

is

indebitatius asaumpsit may be sustained at common law; and
such demand may be set oﬂ’, although the amount thereof
unliquidated or not ascertained by the parties, but depends
upon proof." Any other demand arising on contract may be
set oif,
the amount be liquidated, that
ascertained by the
agreement or settlement of the parties, or
the amount be
of
capable
being ascertained by calculation merely, as
bill
of exchange, or
promissory note for the payment of money,
or a written contract for
sum certain, though payable in
speciﬁc articles, or a written contract for speciﬁc articles, at
value or price stipulated in the contract.”

i
l

§259.
the time

Demand must be due.—“4.

of

of

the commencement

It

must have existed at

the suit, and must then have

belonged to the defendant;”"
5

A defendant may
of set-oil for moneys
previously paid’ by him to the plain
tii! for liquors. and which moneys,
according to the law then in force,
consideration:
paid
without
were
Webber
v. Howe,
36 Mich., 150:
Mich., 340.
Cow.
19—Edw. 'l‘reat., 2d ed.. 59;
'l‘reat., 2d ed., 736, 737: and see, Ve
iie v. Myers, 14 Johns., 165; Shephard
v. Little,
14 Johns., 210; Bowen v.
'
Bell, 20 lbid., 338.
Cow. Tr.,
20—Barb. Set-oil’, 78:
736. 737; Smith v. Warner, 1-4 Mich.,
156: and as to what are liquidated
1;
see, ante,
69, note
demands.
Smith v. Warner, 14 Mich., 157; Butts
139, 156, 157:
v. Collins. 13 Wend.,
Downer v. Eggieston. 15 Wend., 51
That the set-oif under the second
63.
liquidated de:
provision must be
Mich.,
mand:
See, Ward v. Feliers,
285; Smith v. Warner, 14 l\ilch., 152:
IMd., 16 i\ilch., 390; Mitchell v. Shu
A claim which is
ert. 18 Mich.. 444.
neither liquidated nor capable of be
but
ing ascertained by calculation,
776.

way

_*

1

3

--

a

-7‘-~

2

2

3

by

the amount of which would have to
conﬂicting
be determined
from the
is not a proper
opinion of witnesses.
subject of set-oi! unless
within the
description found in the ﬁrst clause
of this section:
Carter v. Jaseph. 48
Micb., 615; 12 N. W., 876.
Unilqui
sounding in tort can
dated damages
not be applied by way of set-oil: Bra
zee v. Bryant, 15 N. W., 49: 50 Mich.,
136.
Nor is set-oi‘! admissible iii an
action brought for the recovery of un
liquidated damages for the breach of a
agreement:
Holland v. _Rea,
special
48 Mich., 218: 12 N. W., 167; More
house v. Baker, 48 Mich., 330: 12 N.
W., 170; see, Howell v. Medier, 41
Mich., 641.
had and received
Money
iiail v. Kinner. 61
may he set-oil‘:
Mlch., 269; 28 N. W., 96. So
claim
Dustin v. Rndford, 57
for services:
Mich., 163; 23 N. W.. 715; so a
claim for money paid without con
sideration: Webber v. Howe. 36 Micb..
156; Bronson v. Herbert, 95 Mich.,
479; 55 N. W.. 359.
21--C. L., 776.
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the demand must be due at the time

of the suit,” and must at that time
of the defendant."
§

mencement

260.

CH.

Plaintiff's demand must
,

of

be the

XIII.

the com

property

be such as could be subject

date prior to the commencement
of suit. that is prima facie evidence
of an assignment before suit:
Bell
Barb., 210.
v. Davis,
if the demand
belonged
to all the defendants jointly
at the
time of commencement
of
suit, it is no objection to it as a set
oif that one of the defendants derived
his title by l!SSi,‘.,'l1lI1(*flt from his co
Bell v. Davis,
defendant:
Barb..
210.
To make a set-off available, it
must be due, and defendant's right to
sue for it must be complete
at the
time when plalntiﬂ“s action was com
menced.
Therefore. if any demand of
payment
was
before
de
necessary
fendant could sue on the claim offered
an a Bet-oil’. such demand
must have
been made before plaintii'f’s suit was
commenced,
otherwise the setmif can
Kingston
Bank v.
not be aliowed:
Dry
Gay, 19 Barb., 459: Bouten v.
Dock Co.,
E. D. Smith, 420.
debtor of an insolvent bank cannot,
the
after the insolvency and before
buy
up
appointment of a receiver,
claims and set them oif in 'sn action
by the receiver:
Stone v. Dodge, 96
Mich., 514; 56 N. W., 75.
24—(‘. L.,
776.
The statute per
only where the claim
mits set-offs
sued upon would itself be the proper
subject of a set-off: Smith v. Warner,
14 Mich., 156; Bradley v. Thompson
mith's Sons, 98 Mich., 455: 57 N.
W., 576.
Nothing can be set oif un
less it could he sued upon. and on the
any claim cominl: within
other hand,
the statute can be set-off if it could be
Wallace v. Finnigan, 14 Mich.,
sued:

A

8

8

bears

§

171.

25—Hepburn v. Hoag.
Cow.. 613.
Thus, where an action is brought for
6

7

a

&

4

IJ
IO

Nev.
v. Colman,
—Braithwaite
Strlcly
speaking.
Man.
654.
until
set-off
there is no right
of
suit is begun in which it may be
right
accrues with
The
pleaded.
of
action:
the commencement
the
Kinney v. Taylor, 62 Mich., 571: 29
A demand note is
N. W., 86, 512.
demand
as be
due at once without
tween the bank and its depositor and
Citizens’
a proper matter of set-off:
Savings Bank v. Vaughan, 115 Mich.,
156; 73 N. W., 143.
As to the rule
in equity where the cross demands
are a part of the same general trans
action, as between a bank and its de
positor who is also a borrower of the
see, Thompson v. Union Trust
bank.
Co., 130 Mich., 508; 90 N. W., 294,
The
and cases cited in the opinion.
holding here is that the deposits may
be set off against the notes of the de
positor held by the bank though not
due at time insolvency of bank oc
curs.
23—See, Smith V. Warner, 16 Mich.,
390, 398:
Jefferson County Bank v.
If a de
Chapman, 19 Johns., 322.
mand is purchased by defendant on
condition that it is to be his if allowed
set-oil‘, but otherwise not, there
as
is no such change of title as to render
it available as a set-off: Miller v. Gil
Cow., 469: Smith v. Warner.
man.
Where the defendant
16 Mich., 398.
offers to set-oil’ a demand that has
to him, he must prove
been assigned
affirmatively that it was assigned be
Heidenheimer
fore suit commenced:
v. Wilson. 31 Barb., 636; see, Jeffer
Chapman,
19
v.
son County Bank
.'iohns., 322.
But it seems that where
writing,
and
the assignment is in

4

5.

It can be allov» ed only in actions founded on
demands which could themselves be the subject of set-oif
according to 1aw;”2‘*
A demand for uncertain or unliquidated damages cannot be
set oﬁ’ and by this subdivision, in an action for the recovery of
such a demand, no set-oﬁ of any demand can be made.“
of set-oif.-

at
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§261

If

several defendants, demand must be due to ai1.—
“6. If there be several defendants, the demand set oif must
be due to all of them jointly, unless the defendant shall prove
an agreement of the plaintiff or plaintiifs that the demand
proposed to be set oif should apply as payment upon his or
§261.

their claim;”2°
might be set oif would be
within this section.” When the plaintiff owes a debt to several
persons jointly, one of whom owes him, the latter may acquire
the right of set-off against the plaintiff by taking an assign
ment to himself alone, of the debt due from the plaintiﬂ’, before
the commencement of p1aintiiT’s suit."

An agreement that such

a demand

the recovery of uniiquidated damages
for the breach of a special contract,
as for a breach of warranty in the
sale of goods, no set-off is allowable:
The
Wend., 584.
\\'ilmot v. iiurd,
right of set-oil‘ does not depend on the
form of piaintii!’s action, provided it
is in form ea contmctu but on the
upon.
sued
nature of the demand
might
Therefore,
where the plaintiff
recover under the common counts. he
cannot. by declaring specially, deprive
the defendant of his right of set-oil’:
15 Wend.. 58:
Downer v. Etzgleston,
Burgess v. Tucker,
5
Johns.. 105;
Nor
Smith v. Warner, 16 Mich.. 396.
it seems can a plaintiff deprive a de
fendant of the right of set-oil‘ by
bringing
his action in tort, as in
trovcr for money not returned after
Pierce v. Underwood, 103
demand:
But see.
5iich.. 62; 61 N. W.. 344.
.\iich., 204:
108
Pinch
v.
Willard.
66 N. W., 42. where. in a replevin
action. the gencrni doctrine is stated
the
of
that "set-off is a creature
au
statute. and it has never been
thorized
in
actions of tort."
And
a
in a special count upon
where.
breach of contract. the plaintiff claims
uniiquidated damages. and in the same
counts
declaration adds the common
upon demands which might themsr-im--4
be the subject of set-oﬂ. the defenrlnnt
may avail himself of a set-oi! to those
demands declared upon in the common
counts.
And where the plaintiff. by
s special count. joins, an unfounded
damn;-ze.<_ in
claim for uniiquidated
the same suit with other claims that

ll

*

.
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are the subject of set-oil. the legal
inference is, that the pialntii.'f's action
is founded, not on the baseless demand
that was asserted, but rather upon the
others that were not only asserted.
but proved:
Smith v. Warner,
16
Mich., 390.
26—C. L., 5 776.
Joint defendants
can set-oﬂ only such demands as are
of them:
Robbins
due to all
v.
Brooks. 42 Mlch., 62; 8 N. W., 256;
v.
Van
MiddIes
Van Middiesworth
worth, 32 1\Iich., 183.
And so with
Sager v. Tupper. 38 Mich..
partners:
258; Randall v. Baird, 66 Mich., 312:
33 N. W., 506; Kinney v. Robison. 52
Mich., 380: 18 N. W., 120.
A joint
and scvernl note may be set-off against
a claim by one of the makers:
Fer
441; 4
guson
v. Miiiikin, 42 Mic-h..
N. W., 185. See. post, Q 262. note 30.
v. iiossack, 2 'I‘aunt.,
2?—Kinnersiy
170.
17 Johns.,
28—.\iartin
v. Williams,
330; sec, Wolf v. Washburn, 6 Cow.,
A
261: Bell v. Davis. 8 Barh.. 210.
debt due to one of two joint makers
of a note, cannot be set-oﬂ against
the note:
Mott v. Burnett, 2 E. D.
And in an action by an
Smith. 50.
individual azainst a ﬁrm. a debt due
from the plaintiif to one of the firm
cannot be set-oﬂ against the plain
tiff's debt which is due from the mem
Pinckney v. Kuyier,
bers of the ﬁrm:
4 E’. D. Rmlth, 469: Warner v. Bar
ker. 3 Wend., 400. Nor can a debt due
to the defendant Jointly with another
be set-oif. for a joint debt cannot be
set-oi! against
an
individual
one

;~
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It must be a
§262. Against whom must be due.—“7.
demand existing against the plaintiff in the action, unless the
suit be brought in the name of a plaintiff who has no real
interest in the contract upon which the suit is foimded; in
which case, no set-oif of a demand against the plaintiff shall
be allowed, unless as hereinafter speciﬁed;” 2°
In general,

a debt owing by one of several partners cannot
against a partnership demand.”
But it seems that
demands against individual partners may be set off against
demands of the ﬁrm, if the course of dealing of the ﬁrm, in
receiving such demands in payment, is uniform and so noto
rious, that persons dealing with the ﬁrm must be supposed to
have had reference to it in their transactions with them.“
A debt due to a defendant, as a surviving partner, may be
set off against a demand on him by the plaintiff in his own
be set oﬂ'

right."

So, a debt due from one who was the only apparent
trader may be set off in an action by himself and partners.”

§263. In case of assignment of claims other than nego
tiable instruments.-—“8. If the action be founded upon con
tract (othcr than a negotiable promissory note or bill of ex
change) which has been assigned by the plaintiff, a demand
existing against such plaintiff, or any assignee of such con
tract, at the time of theassignment thereof, and belonging to
the defendant in good faith before notice of such assignment,
Campbell v. Grant, 2 Hilt., 291: Wolf
v. Jasspon, 126 Mich., 11; 85 N. W.,
260; Rumney v. Detroit 8: M. C. Co.,
The
129 Mich., 644: 89 N. W.. 573.
general rule is, that to authorize a
set-off the debts must be mutual and
in
due to and from the same persons
Dudley v. Gris
the same capacity:
wold. 2 Blackf., 2-1; and see, Ladue
v. Hart,
4 Wend., 583;
Wasson v.
Gould, 3 Binckf., 18.
20—C. L., § 776.
30——Ladue v. Hart, 4 Wend.,
583:
see, Beebe v. Bull, 12 Wend., 604. Nor s
partnership debt against an individual

ngainst all the partners jointly: Sager
258,
A
v. Tupper, 38 Mich.,
265.
claim against only one
of
several
plaintiffs cannot be set of! against a
demand sued on by all . Flﬂeld v. Ed
wards, 39 Mich., 264.
A joint in
debtedness
cannot be set oil’ in a suit
brought by only one nf the debtors:
Detroit Ii. & S. W. Ry. (‘o. v. Smith,
50 Mich., 112: 15 N. W., 39.
Ensworth,
81—Everingham
v.
7

debt due to one of the members of the
ﬂrm, although the notes and accounts of
the iirm have been transferred to such
partner, and he has undertaken to pay

’

the ﬁrm debts:
Sears v. Patrick, 23
\'»'t~nd.,528. A demand due to one part
be set-off against a claim
lief‘ cannot

Wend.,

226.

32—Slipper v. Stidstnne. 5 Term. R..
493.
And conversely, a debt due from
the piaintiﬂ as surviving partner. may
be set off against a debt due from the
plalntilf to the defendant in his own
right: French v. Androde, 6 Term.
R.. 52: Meader v. Scott, 4 Vt., 26.
3.‘-l—Stracey
v. Deey.
7 Term. IL,
361: Lord v. Baldwin, 6 I"icl-1., 348.
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to the amount of the plaintiff's

be such as might have been set

tiff or such

assignee

debt,

if

the

against such plain

while the contract belonged

to

him;”

34

The section authorizes a defendant in an action foimded
upon a contract other than negotiable paper, which has been
assigned to a third person, to set oif a demand belonging to
him in good faith, before notice of the assignment; but it must
be a demand which was in ea:istencc against the plaintiﬂ at the
A debt accruing subsequently is
time he made the assigmrwnt.
impliedly excluded; the legislature undoubtedly believing, in
such case, that the equity of the assignee was the strongest,
The distinction
even in the absence of notice to the defendant.
is new, and the reason for it not obvious, where the defendant
has purchased the demand with the view to apply it in satis
faction of a demand held against him; the time when it
accrued does not seem at all important in balancing the equities
The fault lies rather with the assigncc, in not
of the parties.
giving previous notice of the assignment, thereby leaving the
defendant to believe the plaintiff to be still the owner of the
demand. The language of the statute, however, is explicit,
and the rule imperative upon the courts.

l

i
l
l
V

34-C. L.. I 776. An assigned dc
mand cannot be off-set by a demand
not yet due at the time of the assign
ment:
Kuil v. Thompson. 38 Mlch.,
685.
\\'here a debtor contracts with
his creditor to perform certain labor,
and before entering upon the work, as
signs the contract to persons who have
guaranteed
the cred
its performance,
itor cannot set on‘, in a suit by the
against
assignces.
his demand
the
was
debtor due when the assignment
assigned
the
made.
This because
claim while owned by the asslgnor
was itself not the subject of set-oil’,
not being due.
See. 5 776, subdivision

l

l

I

i

5;

Thompson
Smith's
Bradley
v.
Sons. 98 Mlch., 449; 57 N. W., 576.
in an action on an account by one
holding a naked
assignment
of it,
existing against the assignor
charges
at the time of the assignment
are
to
the
available to the defendant
amount of the debt assigned only, and
judgment agninst the plaintiff for the
Pabst Brew
excess is unauthorized:

ing (‘o. v. Lueders,
107 Mlch., 41; 64
N. W., 872.
Where
the plaintiff has purchased
a claim which was due at the time of
and assignment
the purchase
thereof
to him, and brings suit thereon.
the
defendant may set oil’ any claim which
is a proper
subject
of set-off under
the statute.
which he ‘held against
the original creditor at the time of
the assignment
to plaintiif, and also
against the original cred
an_v~cialm
pur
itor which the defendant
had
chased and became the owner of, in
good faith. before he had notice
of
the assignment
to plaintiff:
and the
defendant
may do this even though
he purchased
such claim against the
original creditor after the assignment
to plaintiff, provided the defendant pur
chased
in good faith,-and without
notice of the assignment
to the plain

The statute makes the demands
till’.
a proper
set-off if they belonged
to
in good faith before no
the defendant
tice of the assignment.
And it is no

27 1
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of a note not negotiable, made to the
would preclude him from setting oﬁ
demand against the payee, which arose before the giving of
the note, for
to be presumed from his giving the note, and
his promise to pay
that such set-off had been paid or satis
ﬁed, especially in the absence of all explanation.‘
Where suit
brought on a demand by the assignee of the
larger demand
original creditor, and the defendant has
of character to entitle
to be
against the assignor, which
set off against the demand sued on, such set-oif can only be
made to the amount of the plaintiff's debt, but no judgment
for a balance canbe rendered against the plaintiif. The jus
tice in such a case may render judgment generally for the
defendant for the costs of his defense; but what remedy the
defendant has under such circumstances to recover the balance
due to him over the plaintiif’s claim,
not very apparent.
None
provided by statute.’

a

it,

a maker

to pay

it

is

is

a

is

a

is

it,

is

of it

it

assignee

a

a

it

§264. In case of assignment of negotiable instruments.
“9. If the action be upon a negotiable promissory note or
bill of exchange which has been assigned to the plaintiif after
became due,
set-off to the amount of the plaintiif’s debt
demand existing against any person or
may be made of

if,

a

a

is

a

it

3

it

if

persons who shall have assigned or transferred such note or
bill after
became due,
the amount be such as might have
been set off against the assignor while the note or bill belonged
>
to him.”
note be transferred after
becomes due, the maker
Though
not entitled to set oﬂ’
demand against the payee,
at the
time of the transfer, the payee has other demands against the
maker to an amount sufficient to exhaust the demands sought
demand
to be set oil‘!
Where the maker of two notes has
pur
that
the
defendant
the demands
for the purpose
of using them as a set-off, and at
great discount, or for
mere nominal
sum.
All that the statute requires is,

off

chased

debtor

shnil be actually.
the demands
and
not merely colorably. owned by
the defendant.
The amount paid for
them is immaterial:
Smith v. Warner.
16 Mich., 390, 397, 398; and see. C‘. Ii..
10054.
judgment
An assignee of
takes it subject to any matters of set

1—Gould v. Chase, 16 Johns.. 226.
Denio,
344.
2—Kost v. Cathern,
See, Pabst Brewing
Lueders.
Co. v.
107 Mich., 41; 64 N, W., 872.

a

Q

3

that

existing in favor of the judgment
against the assignor up to such
time as such debtor has notice of the
assignment:
Finn
v.
36
Corbitt.
Mich., 318.

3-c.

L.,

4-Collins

5

a

a

objection

fro.
v.

Alien,

12 Wend,

356.
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against the payee suﬁicient to extinguish one of them, and the
of them after its maturity, the other being
sufficient to meet the demand of the maker, and subsequently
the second note
transferred also after its maturity, the hold
cr of the note ﬁrst transferred would be entitled to recover the
whole amoimt of it; as the one to whom the ﬁrst note was
transferred would have the greater equity.“
\Vhere a note
transferred bona ﬁde for
valuable consider
becomes due, no set-oﬂ’ can be allowed of de
ation before
mands against any but the plaintiff.
Such
case
not within
the statute.“ Where the plaintiff buys
negotiable note after
becomes due, he should give immediate notice of the transfer
to the maker, as the maker would be entitled to set off any
demands he might acquire thereafter against the payee with
out notice of the transfer.’
is

it

a

a

it

a.

is

is

payee transfers one

i
i
i

is

a

l

a

it

ill-it

'18

273

2

a

8—C. L.,
776.
9—Savage v. Davis,

Wend.,

no
N

2

Hill, 140.
assignee
is said that
general
for the beneﬁt of creditors is not such
homz ﬂdc purchaser as to be entitled

nolds.

ii

7

5‘

5

E

to refuse a just-set-oﬁ; he is regarded
as the representative of the assignor,
and any demand available as
set-oi!
against the assignor before
assign
ment. will be equally available against
his assignee:
Mans v. Goodman.
Fiiit., 175: and see. Griiﬂn v. Mar
quardt,
F}. D. Smith, 28; also, Berry
Bosw., 627.
v. Brett.
3

a

5—Coiiins v. Alien, 12 Wend., 356.
6—-Smith v. Van Loan, 16 Wend..
659.
But where
person
purchased
a note after maturity, he takes it sub
ject to any set-oi! which the maker
held against the original payee: Ibid.
7-2 Cow. Treat.. 2d ed.. 742: but
Rey
Co. v.
see. contra, Manhattan

6

i
i

9°

“A

a

is is

is

a

is

if

is

l.

is

i

a

a

if

§265. In case of trust relations.-—“10. If the plaintiff be
trustee for any other, or
the suit be in the name of
plaintiff who has no real interest in the contract upon which
founded, so much of a demand existing against
the suit
those whom the plaintiff represents, or for whose beneﬁt the
brought, may be set off as will satisfy the plaintiff's
action
debt,
the same might have been set oif in action brought by
those beneﬁcially interested;”3
note
transferred for the purpose of depriving the
Where
defendant of his set-off, the case would come within the above
to be deemed, so far as the equit
The plaintiff
provision.
trustee;
of
concerned,
of
maker
the note
the
able defense
void, on the ground of
as to him the transfer or indorsement
to be deemed the property of the payee.”
fraud, and the note
In an action on such note, the maker would be bound to

i

\
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prove the fraudulent transfer, or he will not be allowed to
prove his set-oﬁ. The same rule would apply when the note
is transferred after it becomes due.1°
§266. In case of actions against principal and surety.
“11. In actions upon a note or other contract against several
defendants, any one of whom is principal, and the others
sureties therein, any claim upon contract in favor of the
principal defendant, and against the plaintiff, or any former
holder of the note or other contract, may be allowed as a set
oﬁ by the principal or any other defendant/’"

Judgment in cases of set-oﬂ'.-“If the amount of set
§ 267.
off duly established be equal to the plaintiff ’s debt, judgment
shall be entered for the defendant, with costs; if it be less
than the plaintiﬂ:"s debt, the plaintiff shall have judgment for
the residue only, with costs; if it be more than the plaintiff ’s
debt, and the balance found due to the defendant from the
plaintiff in the action be three hundred dollars or under, judg
ment shall be rendered for the defendant for the amount there
of, with costs; and execution shall be awarded as upon a
judgment in a suit brought by him ; b11t no such judgment shall
be rendered against the plaintiﬂf when the contract which is the
subject of suit shall have been assigned before the commence
ment of such suit, nor for any balance due from any other
person than the plaintiff in the action.”1'*‘
It is not necessary, to entitle a defendant to a judgment for
the amount of his set-off proved on the trial, that there should
be something proved and allowed to the plaintiff."
“If the balance found due to the defendant exceed three
10—l"Iendrlcks

v.

Judah,

1

.iohns..

319.

See, Locke v.
11~C. L.. i 776.
Smith. 10 Johns., 250; Newell v. Sal
mons, 22 Barb., 647.
A joint and sev
eral note may he set-off against the
claim of one of the makers: Fergu
son v. Millikin. 42 Mich., 441; 4 N.
W., 185: see. Detroit, H. & S. W. Ry.
('0. v. Smith, 50 Mlch., 113; 15 N.
W., 39,
12-(‘. L., 5 778. Merchants’ Bank
v. Schulenberg.
54 Mich., 51; 10 N.
W., 741.
A cross action has always
law
been allowed both
at common

and under the statute .n cases where
recoupment
may be proper; and where
and
the defendant refuses to recoup
brings his action, he may do so and
will be allowed his costs if he pre

vails’: Mimnaugh v. Partlin, 67 Mich..
391; 34 N, W.. 717. But if defendant
fails to set-off a claim when he has
an opportunity, he will not thereafter
be allowed costs in suits to recover
Ibdd.
the same:
13-Greenieaf v. Low, 4 Denio. 168.
But it the plaintiff does not appear
at the trial and proceed with it. the
judgment of
a
justice must render
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dollars, the justice shall set oif so much of the de
fendant's demand against the plaintiif’s debt as shall be suﬁi
cient to satisfy
requested to do so by the defendant, and
shall render judgment for the defendant for his costs; but
the defendant shall not require such set-off, the justice shall
render judgment of discontinuance against the plaintiff, with

if

it,

if

hundred

costs to the defendant; and the defendant may thereafter sue
for and recover his demand in any court having cognizance

thereof.”

1‘

Judgment in case of set-oﬂ against executor,
“Whencver a set-off
established in
suit brought by

etc.

a

is

§268.

execu

'

tors or administrators, and the defendant shall be entitled to
judgment, such judgment shall be rendered against‘the plain
tiifs in their representative character, and shall be evidence of
debt established to be'paid in the course of administration,
but no execution shall issue thereon.” "’
a

demand, eﬂ'ect of._“If defend
Neglect to set oﬂ‘
§269.
ant neglect to set off any demand which, according to the
preceding provisions, might have been allowed to him on the
trial of the cause, he shall be forever thereafter precluded
from recovering costs in any action brought to recover such
demand, or any part thereof, which might have been set off;

if

and
the demand which might have been set oif consisted of
a negotiable promissory note or bill of exchange, no person
who shall derive title thereto, after the amount thereof might
have been set oif as aforesaid, shall recover costs in any action

thereon.”"

a

Q

275

n

6

168.

16—C. L.,
781.
Iluntoon v. Rus
41 Mich., 316;
N. W.. 38.
withold his
defendant may. however.
claim of set-off to be litigated in an
other suit:
.\icEwen v. Bigeiow, 40
Mich., 215,
But
tender of the dif
sell,

A

Q

On an appeal
779.
1-i—C. L.,
from a judgment rendered under this
section. the circuit court can render
no other or different judgment than
could have been rendered by the jus
tice: Cross v. Eaton, 48 Mich.. 184:
12 N. W., 35; iiiimnaugh v. Partiin,
87 .\iich.. 391: 34 N. W., 717.
case
7!-10. In such
15—(‘. L.,
the defendant cannot set oi! a note of
the deceased purchased by the defen
dant after the death of the deceased:

2

273.

Root v. Taylor, 20 Johns., 137.
An
executor can maintain a suit in his
own name, or ns executor upon a note
given to him as executor,
for
debt
due to the tcstator at the time of his de
But if the executor bring an
ceuse.
action in his own name. the defendant
cannot set-off a demand which existed
against the testator at the time of his
d€‘('Pt'tiI02 Merritt v. Seaman,
N. Y.,

a

favor of
would in
Green v.
see. post,

Q

|

a

non-suit, and a Judgment in
the defendant, for n set-oi!
case be erroneous:
such
Angeli, 13 Johns., 469.
But

or saw-orrs

§27~0
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Notice of set-oﬂ', when may be give-n.—Notice of set
off must be given at the time of joining issue, and it cannot be
given afterwards."
It can be given only when the plea in
volves “a question of fact upon the merits of the canse;” not
where there is a demurrer or a plea in 8.b3.t€lIl€I1lZ.18
§ 270.

§271.

Form and substance of the notice.—Unless objected
will answer. Where the de

to, a notice in almost any form

fendant stated that he pleaded the general issue, and gave
notice of set-oﬁ', and claimed a balance of ﬁfty dollars, it was
held sufﬁcicnt, unless the plaintiff objected to its form, and
required av speciﬁcation of the nature of the defendant’s claim,
and that the plaintiff could not on the trial object to evidence
of the set-off, on account of the defective notice."
'

If the notice is defective for Want of certainty, the plaintiff,
at the time, must objecti on that account, or require a speciﬁca
tion of the set-off.”
The notice need not claim a balance in favor of the defend
ant." The defendant is not bound to be as formal as in a bill
of particulars, but he may be required to specify the nature of
his claim with reasonable certainty; it must be so speciﬁc that
the plaintiff shall not be surprised upon the trial by any de
mand not embraced in the notice." It is enough if a claim
offered in evidence on the trial as a set-oﬁi, is included within
the notice of set-off given at the joining of issue?“ See bill of
particulars, post, Chapter XVI.
ference

between

the

dei'endant’s

717.

17—Waring v. Lockwood. 10 Johns..
108: Seiiick v. Fox. 12 Ibtd., 205:
see, ante, 5 255.
No formal notice
ot set-on’ is required in cases heard
before commissioners on claims in pro
bate proceeding
or on appeal from
by the
their decision unless ordered
Westra v. Estate of Westra,
court:
101 .\[ich., 526: 60 N. W., 55.
post, “Amending pleas," 5
1S—See,
577.

19—Civil

v, Wright,

13 Wend.,

20—Bell

set

oi! and the plaintiff's claim will bar
the latter of costs subsequent
to the
Smith v. Curtiss, 38 Mich.,
tender:
393: Morehouse v. Baker. 48 l\Iich.,
338-9: 12 N. W., 170; Mimnauzh v.
Pnrtiin. 67 2\iich., 391, 393; 34 N. W..

403.

v.

see, Wiggins
21—~People
Cow.,
21.

Davis, 8 Barb., 210;
v. C‘-ans, 3 Sandi. 38.
v. The Judges, etc., 4

22—lIar1-ington v. Ensign, 11 Wend.,
554.
A
23—Bell v. Davis, 8 Barb., 210.
notice of set-oi! as broad as the com
mon money counts in assumpsit will.
if no hill of particulars is called for,
cover anything that could be proved
Fer
as a demand under such counts:
guson v. Millikin. 42 Mich.. 441; 4 N.
W.. 185. A defense of set-oi‘! must be
clearly proved
before
it can be al
lowed.
It should be substantiated by
the same evidence
that'would be re
quired were the defendant suing on
the demand as plaintlﬂ in the action:
Prentiss v. Sprsgue, 1 Hilt., 428.
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§272. Eﬁect of plea puis darrein continuance.—A plea‘ puis
darrein continuance supersedes a previous plea of the general
issue with notice of set-off and places the issue entirely on
the new plea.“
§273. Discontinuance not allowed where set-oﬁ' pleaded.
By statute it is provided “That in any action hereafter com
menced in this state when the defendant has given notice of
set-oﬁ, the plaintiﬁ‘ shall not be allowed to discontinue his
suit, or submit to a nonsuit without the consent of the defend
ant.“ This statute does not prevent the plaintiff from with
drawing certain items of his claim from the consideration of
the court. The statute gives defendant the right to an adjudi
cation upon his claim pleaded in- set-off, regardless of whether
or not the plaintiﬁ asks an adjudication upon his claim, or
I
any part of it?“
§274. Claims sounding in tort not to be set-off.-Matters
of tort are not properly subjects of set-0ii;27 but if not
objected to, and are actually set off, they can never be ques
tioned again." The consequences would be the same if the
claim was for unliquidated damages.
If a party introduce
an improper set-oif, and goes into an investigation with a
view to make it available, and it passes and is submitted to
the justice or jury, it cannot be heard again." Where a judg
ment is insisted on as a set-off, and submitted to and passed
upon by a jury, whether the same be allowed or not, the judg
ment is extinguished.“
24—Whittemore
v.
Mich., 573: 12 N. W,
L., 5 10081.
25-—C.

Stephens,
858.

This

48

statute

following the
was enacted immediately
in Merchants‘ Bank v. Schn
decision
elenberg,
54 Mich., 49; 19 N. W.,
741.
26-—Buch v. Jones, 94 Mk-h.. 223:
v. Hawk
53 N. W., 1051: Lechmere
ins. 2 Esp., 626; Downer v. Eggieston,
cannot
be
Aan there
15 Wend., 51.
any splitting of a cause of action,
see ante,
55 187 and 221, note 48.

if a party brings an action for only
a part ot his demand, and recovers
subse
judgment thereon, he cannot
quently set-off the residue in an action
So,

against him by the opposite party:
Miller v. Coventry. 1 Wendi, 487.
27—Dean v. Alien, 8 Johns., 390;
Moore v.- Davis, 11 Johns, 144.
28—Wiison v. Lurmouth, 3 Johns.,
433; M‘Lain v. Hagarin. 13 .Tohns.,
184.
And therefore, in an action for
tort, a demand arising on contract
cannot be set-oif, although such de
mand would be a valid set-oi! if of
fered in an action on contract where
a set-oi!
was allowable:
Moore V.
Davis, 11 Johns., 144; Dygert v. Cop
perstoli, 13 Johns., 210.
29-—Wiider

v. Case, 16 Wend., 583.
v. Herrick. 5 Wend.,

30—McGuinty
240.
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v. Wilcox,

106 Mich., 51

a

64 N. W., 485.

==*

31—Bush

U1

is

is

§

§

is

275. When demand pleaded as set-oﬁ‘
barred by statute
of limita.tions.—Under C. L.,
9746,
debt alleged by way
of set-oﬁ'
not barred by the statute of limitations unless the
statutory period had elapsed before the accruing of the claim
brought.“
upon which suit

'

or
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CHAPTER XIV.
OF RECOUPMENT.
5276. What it is and when allowed.
Judgment for def:-mi:m!.
win-n.

$278. Notice of the defense.

{277.

What it is and when a110wed.—Rec0upment, in its
original sense, was a mere right of deduction from the plain
tit1"s demand, arising from payment in whole or in part, or
from recovery, or some analogous fact; but it is now under
stood to embrace all counter claims of the defendant, arising
out of the same transaction, as does the cause of action of the
plaintiff’)
§276.

1—Sedgwick on Damages,
3d ed.,
431.
And will be allowed whenever
an action for damages
can be maln
tained by the defendant for the plain
breach
of the contract sucd
tiif‘s
upon:
iiouston v. Young, 7 Ind., 200.
But it is optional with the defendant
whether he will recoup his damages
in the plaintiff's suit or reserve them
for a separate action of his own:
Morehouse v. Baker, 48 Mich., 335;
12 N. W., 170.
Recoupmcnt adjusts by one action
claims growing out of the
adverse
It is not neces
same subject mutter.
sary that the opposing claims should
In all cuscs
he of the same character.
of both parties
where the demands
spring out of the same contract or
transaction, the defendant may recoup,
although the damages
on both
sides
are unliquidated.
The defense is con
set-oil’,
tradlsfinguishahle
in
from
1st, in he
those essential particulars:
ing conﬁned to matters arising out of.
and
connected
with. the transaction
or contract upon which the suit is
brought: 2d, in having no regard as
to whether or not such matters be
and 3d.
liquidated or uniiquidated:
that the judgment is not the subject
of statutory regulation, but is con

trolled

the rules of the common
v. Feliers, 3 Mich., 281.
C. L., 5 10082 was enacted
in 1861
and regulated the judgment to be ren
dered
in actions where
recoupment
was pleaded
by allowing
a recovery
by the defendant in excess of the claim

law:

by

Ward

of the plaintiff.
At the common law
this defense could be made to the ex
tent only of piaintiﬂ"s claim.
The
right of recoupment is not confined to
damages arising before action brought.
but may include anything for which
u cross actiop could lie at the time of
pleading:
Platt v. Brand, 26 Mich.,
Rccoupmcnt is favored in the
173.
law as avoiding multiplicity of suits:
Morehouse v. Baker, 48 Mlch., 335;
12 N. W., 170.
Recoupment is merely setting oﬂ
one distinct
cause of action against
another, although both of thorn arose
Gillespie v.
out of the same contract:
Torrance, 25 N. Y., 306; and see,
Allen v. Mci\'ibhin. 5 Mich., 449, 456.
And only such damages
can be re
couped as spring out of the contract
upon which suit is brought:
Forrest
v. Johnson, 100 Mich.,
321: 58 N.
W.. 1005; Molby v. Johnson. 17 Mich.,
3922 Thompson v. Richards, 14 Mich..
18-i-5: Holland v.‘ Rea, 48 Mich., 218,
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In actions of assumpsit to recover damages for the breach
of an agreement, the defendant may set up, by way of recoup
ment, that the plaintiff has violated the same agreement, and
thus defeat a recovery for more than the balance?
Thus, it
was held that in an action to recover the rent of demised prem
ises, the tenant might avail himself of a breach of the land
lord ’s agreement to repair by way of rccoupment, though not
as a. set-0/f.3
And, in an action to recover the price of goods
sold with warranty, the defendant may recoup his damages
for a breach of warranty.‘
And so, that work contracted for
was not equal in quality to what the agreement required.“ The
doctrine is equally applicable as well where fraud is not
imputable to the plaintiff in relation to the contract on which
225: 12 N. W., 167; Brazee v. Bryant,
50 Mich., 136; 15 N. W., 49; McKev
itte v. Feige, 57 Mlch., 374; 24 N. W.,
109.
is in substance and ef
Recoupment
fect a cross action, and unless the
to sub
party whom it is attempted
ject to it could be compelled
to re
spond for the damages in an indepen
dent action against him, he cannot be
Hence there
by recoupment.
reached
against infants
can be no recoupment
in actions upon contract brought by
Widrig v. Taggart, 51 Mich.,
them:

103; 16 N. W., 251.
2-Wbitbeck v. Skinner. 7 Hill, 53.
3—ibiri.: and see, Darvln v. Potter.
6 Denio, 306; Nichols v. Dusenbury, 2
Comst., 283.
In a suit by a landlord
for rent, the tenant may recoup dam
ages for a breach of covenant for quiet
lease:
in
the
enjoyment contained
Mayor, etc.. v. Mable. 3 Kern, 151.
And in an action for rent. the tenant
may show that he was induced to en
ter into the lease by fraudulent repre
sentations of the landlord, or that the
comprehended
lands
leased
premises
which were not in fact included, and
may recoup the damages sustained in
Aliaire v. Whitney. 1
consequence:
Hill, 424: Whitney v. Allaire, 1
305; Whitney V. Ailaire, 4
Comst.,
Denio, 554.
Reab,
v.
4 Wend..
4—McAliister
483: Reah v. McAiiister, 8 Wend., 109.
The defendant may show that the
goods sold were, by the terms of the
~

_

m_

,,_

contract, to be delivered in good ship
ping order, or that there was some
other warranty as to their quantity
or quality, and for a breach of such
warranty the defendant
may recoup:
Stewart v. Black, 1 Hilt., 122: Ives
155; Batter
v. Van Epps, 22 Wend.,
man v. Pierce, 3 l-illl, 171.
Where
there is an express warranty as to the
description and quality of the goods.
which is broken, the purchaser need
not return them, but may retain them.
and in an action for the price. recoup
such damages as result from a breach
Warren
Van
of the warranty:
v.
Pelt, 4 E. D. Smith, 202: Norris v.
LaFarge, 3 Ibid., 375: Harris v. Ber
nard, 4 Iln'd., 195; Van Epps v. Har
rison. 5 Iiiil, 63. So. in an action by
an administrator
for purchase price
property sold with war
of personal
ranty. defendant may recoup for breach
of the warranty:
Bottwood v. Miller,
112 Mlch.. 857: 71 N. W., 506.
5-—Ives v. Van Epps, 22 Wend., 155.
In an action for payment for service
under a contract which has
rendered
the defen
not been fully performed.
dant may recoup such damages as he
of the non
has sustained by reason
performance of the residue of the con
tract: Sickles v. Pnttison, 14 Wend.,
257 : Hudson v. Feige, 58 Mich.. 148: 24
And in an action for the
N. W.. 863.
price of building a steamboat, the de
fendant may recoup such sum as will
in supplying de
need to be expended
fects in the vessel, or its machinery,
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And

the defendant may

avail himself of it where there was fraud, although he has not
returned the property, on discovering the fraud.’
Nor is it an objection to this defense that the plaintiff does
not sue upon the original contract of sale of property, but
upon a note given for the purchase money.5
so as to make it conform
to the con
tract for its construction:
Blanchard
v. Ely. 21 \\'end..
And where
342.
plaintiff sued for his pay for building
Held, that the defendant
a house:
might recoup his damages sustained
by the non-completion
of the building
at the time speciﬁed, as in such case
damages
the law will imply
for the
want of the use of it. if he were in
tending to occupy it himself; and the
rule is the same if the defendant lost
the opportunity of renting the prem
ises in consequence
of the plaintiii!‘s
default. But if the building was erect
ed for the purpose of renting. and the
defendant did not. in fact. lose any
opportunity of renting by plaintiff's
delay.

there

would

be no

damages

to

recoup: Wagoner v. Caskili. 40 Barb..
1'75. The consignee of goods also may
recoup
from the price charged
for
freight and transportation. any losses
occurring from the wrongful act or
neglect of duty upon the part of the
Strong,v. Grand Trunk Ry.
carrier:
And where action
Co.. 15 Mlch.. 215.
is brought on quantum meruit, for ia
bor done under
special
a
contract.
which has not been substantially per
by the plaintiff on his part.
formed
if there are damages growing out of
such
enter

non~pe-rformance
which
do not
into the contract price. the de
fendant may recoup them in the suit:
Alien v. McKibbin. 5 Mich.,, 4-I9.
ti—Batterman v. Pierce. 3 lliii. 171.
7—Van Epps v. Harrison. 5 ilili.
63: Burton v. Stewart. 3 Wend.. 236;
Biecitcr v. Vrooman,
13 .Tohns., 302;
Sill v. Rood. 15 John:-1.. 230.
Negligcm'e.—In an action for com
for services.
pcnsation
the
employer
may recoup his damages resulting from
breach of ordc-rs and negligence by the
employee
in. the use of defendant's
property: Still v. Hail. 20 Wend.. 51.
And damages. from want of skill. or
the neglect to use it. may be recouped

l

l

l
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in an action
work generally.
of a particular
lves v.
tract:
155; Grant v.
Where fraud

for- compensation
for
or for the performance
job under special con
Van Epps, 22 Wend..
Butler. 14 Johns.. 377.

has occurred. or where
been a failure of considera
total or partial. or a breach of
has

there

tion.
warranty, fraudulent or otherwise. all
or any of these facts may be relied
on in defense by a party when sued
on such a contract.
and he shall not
be driven to a cross action to recover
damages therefor:
Withers v. Green,
9 Iloward. 214; Van Buren v. Diggs.

11 lbid... 461.
8—-Rcab
v. McAiiister.
8
Wend..
109: Judd v. Dennison, 10 Wend., 512:
Harrington v. Stratton. 22 Pick.. 510:
Perley v. Balch. 23 lbid.. 284; Good
win v. Morse. 9 Metc.. 278.
Thus.
in an action by the payee, on a prom
issory note given for the price of
goods, the defendant
may recoup his
damages
for the non~delivery of the
goods at the time
speciﬁed:
Fabri
And
catti v. Lnunitz. 3 Sa_ndf.. 743.
so. where the goods were not of the
quality contracted
for: Spauiding v.
Vandercook,
2 Wend..
431.
And in
an action on a promissory note, given
by two persons on a contract of pur
chase of property by one of the makers
only. it is competent
to recoup dam
ages growing out of breach
of the
contract or purchase. to the same ex
tent as if the note ‘had been given
only:
Mcﬂardy v.
by the purchaser
Wadsworth. 8 Mich., 349.
In an action for tort. there can be
for damages sustained
no recoupment
for another tort.
by the defendant
Murden
by the plaintiff:
committed
Nor for any
v. Priment. 1 lllit.. 75.
distinct and independent wrong on the
part of the plaintiff: (‘ram v. Dres
Sandf.. 120. So. to. in an ac
ser.
tiou for a tort. there cannot be a re
claim arising
coupment
even for a

i

or
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The defendant has his election whether he will set up his
claim by way of recoupment in answer to plaintiE’s demand,
or resort to a cross action for his damages.”
§277. Judgment for defendant, when.—Foi-merly the rule
was, that whatever might be the amount of the defendant’s
damages, he could, in recoupment, only set them up by way of
abatement, either in whole or in part, of the plaintiif’s demand.
And even where they exceeded the plaintitf’s claim, could not,
as in case of set-oﬂ:', go beyond that and have judgment in his
But now the statutes provide:
“That
favor for balance.1°
in any action, in any court, if the defendant shall claim dam
ages by way of recoupment, by 'plea or otherwise, in pursu
ance of the rules and practice of such court, and on the trial of
the issue formed,

if

jury trying the

the court or

Plser v. Stearns, 1
Cockroft. 4 E. D.
Smith, 34; Pattison v. Richards, 22
Barb., 143.
in actions
But where,
for tort, the defendant has suffered
damages from some wrongful conduct
of the plaintii! in the transaction on
which he founds his action. the de
And. in such
fendant may recoup.
cases, recoupment
is as applicable in
actions of tort as in cases of contract:
(‘handler v. Chllds, 42 Mich., 128; 3
105
N. W., 297; Carey v. Guillow,
Mass., 18.
Who may rcc0up.——'I‘he original par
ties to the contract may. of course. re
upon

contract:

iIilt., 86; Drake

coup

such

v.

damages

as

they

may

have

sustained. And it is said that in case
of the assignment of the right of
either party under the contract, the
assignee
will be entitled to all the
advantages and disadvantages of the
rig-ht
of
the
asslgnor,
and
that
will pass to the as
recoupmeni:
incident
to
the
signee
as
an
contract: And see. also, (‘. L., 510054.
But it an infant sues for his wages
the defendant cannot recoup damages
non-performance of the in
for
the
under which
such
fant's agreement
Whitmarsh v.
labor was performed:
llall. 3 Denio, 375: Widrig v. Taggart,
Nor
51 l\iich.. 103; 16 N. W.. 251.
sued upon
the
a surety. when
can
contract of his principal. for the per
formance of which he is the surety.

set up by way of recoupment,
any
damage sustained by his principal for
the non-performance
plaintiff of
by
his part of the contract.
The claim
which may be recouped is a distinct
cause of action belonging to the prin
cipal, which he may bring an action
upon,
or recoup in his own defense,
and this right. of election belongs ex
clusively to the principal,
and the
surety can do no act to impair that
right: Gillespie v. Torrance. 25 N. Y..
306; LaFarge v. Halsey, 1 Bosw.. 171.
And where A. sold goods to B. with
warranty, and (7., a third party. gave
his note for the purchase price, which
was accepted in payment,
on a suit
against (‘.., on the note. he cannot re
coup damages for a breach of the war
ranty of the goods sold.
The right
of action and to recover for those
damages belonged to B.. the purchaser,
alone: Delnno\ v. Rawson, 10 Bosw..
286.
9—Ward v. Fellers. 3 Mich.. 281,

391: Gillespie v. Torrance, 25 N. Y..
306: Mt-Donald v. Christie. 42 Barb..
36: Barth v. Burt, 43 Ibid., 628; Bat
terman v. Pierce, 3 Hill, 171: More
house v. Baker. 48 Mlch.. R35: 12 N.
W., 170.
The burden of proof is on
defendant to establish his claim which
he seeks to recoup:
Truax v. Heartt.
— Mlch., —; 97 N. W.. 394 (Dec.,
1903).
10—Ward v. Fellers, 3 Mlch.. 281.
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such defendant entitled to an amount of damages, whether
liquidated or not, greater than the amount of the demand of
the plaintiff, the court shall give judgment according to the
true right thereof for the defendant, for the amount of such
excess so f0l111d and costs, and issue execution therefor against
the plaintiff, as in cases of judgment and execution on plea
or notice of set-otfs.”"
If, however, the defendant, in his recoupment, use or procure
the allowance of only a part of his damages in defense of the
plaintiif’s claim, he cannot maintain a cross action for the
remainder.‘ 3
_
§278. Notice of the defense.-To make the defense of re
coupment available, notice of it must be given, under the gen
eral issue," unless the defense goes to the whole cause of
action, in which case, it is said to be admissible under the
general issue."
11—C. L., I 10082.
This statute
entitles the defendant to recover the
balance

when

the

damages

proved

by

in
him exceed the demand established
favor of the plalntiﬂ: Chandler v.
Childs. 42 Mlch., 128: 3 N. W., 297.
12—Batterrnan v. Pierce, 8 Hill.
171; Gillespie v. Torrance. 25 N. Y.,
306, 310; Wilder v. Case. 16 Wend.,
583; Brltton v. Turner. 3 N. IL. 481.
But see the correctness
of this rule
in Ward v. Fellers. 3 Mich..
questioned
This last case was decided be
281.
fore the enactment of the statute (C.
L., Q 10082) above cited. by which the
have
defendant may in recoupment.
his whole damages,
of
the beneﬁt
therefore the reason of the rule. that
the allowance of a part of defendant's
damages
in recoupment
will bar an
action for the balance, ls made much
stronger than before.
13—Eldrldge v. Mather, 2 Comst..
157: Diefendorf v. Gage. 7 Barb.. 18:
Barber v. Rose. 5 Hill. 76: Trowbridgc
Hill, 430;
7
v. Mayor of Albany.
Where a plea was "the general issue
notice of set-oi!’ and recoupment" it
was held not suﬂiciently definite, but
Bacon v.
that it might be amended:
Reich. 121 Mlch.. 480: 80 N. W., 278.
Where the docket showed that “the
the general
issue
defendant pleaded

and gave notice of recoupmcnt,
upon
the trial of the appeal in the circuit
court evidence
was
admitted. over
plaintiff's objection that it was too
indeﬁnite and its admission was held
error in Kerr v. Bennett, 109 Mlch..
546: 67 N. W.. 564. See further upon
Llggett S.
sufficiency
of the notice:
& A. Co. v. Michigan B. Co., 100:
Mich.. 445; 64 N. W., 466; (‘. l...
And the defendant
{Q 10071. 10073.
will he limited to the claims set up
in his notice
of recoupment:
ille
Kevitte v. Feige, 57 Mich., 374: 2-1
N. W.. 109; Taylor v. Salt dz L. Co..
103 Mlch.. 1: 61 N. W.. 5.
If defendant recoups for damages

sustained from plaintiff's breach
contract on which he sues. the
point
of reconpment
should
what respect the contract was

of the

notion
out
in
broken
injury:
to defendant‘:-1
R01-thke
v.
Philip Best Brewing Co., 33 Micli.,
340.
14-Barber v. Rose. 5 Hill, 76:
Pungs v. American Brake-Beam CQAI
128 Mich.. 318: 87 N. W., 364.
But

notwithstanding.

if under our statute.

the defendant
desires
to have judg
ment lfor the balance of his damages
after satisfying the plaintiff's claim,
s. notice
of recoupment
would seem
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OF REPLICATIONS.
'

§

Only proper to pleas in abatement.-The statute hav
ing abolished all pleas in bar, except the general issue, repli
cations in consequence,
except to pleas in abatement, are
279.

abolished, and any matter which might have been replied to
the plea under the old practice, may now be proved in answer
i
to the defense set up in the notice.

is is

it,

is

The former

out.

iii-i'i-<-tire in

olijcciimi

8111).‘?!/IIl('(?,

and

will
the

when the pleading
latter
rwiuisite where the
of pleading.
The special de
sufﬁce

is

pointed

is

<ml_\' in the /'m'm
murrer
not ]‘)(*l'llllil.(*.(l in justice’s courts, by reason of the
express p1'o\'isim1 of the Si2lllllP.1
A (lemu1'rcr may be to the
part
whole or
of the <lccl:1r:1tion.2
In point of form, no precise

is

TNT,
urged:
1- i‘. i...
Stevens v. Ilarris, 99 Mich..
2- -.-\n_v (lli_l(‘('ililn to ille .sufli<-i<~mr_\'‘..’.'l.'l; SS N. W., 230.
declaration
in law of the (l1'1'i.'li‘.'1llnfl will he sufis dcnmrralile for want of any ac
ﬁviont
in _i|1sii<-c‘s court rcgzirilli-ss of
curate showing of the extent of the
the form
in which iiiv (llJjP(‘iiilll
is
pininiiiT's rights, and how they have

A
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§280. What they are, kinds of, and eﬂ'ect of.—A demurrer
an objection made by one party to the pleading of his
opponent, for some defect in
either in substance or form.
l)(,‘llllll‘I't'l‘S are either gcncral or spcci'ul,- grincral, when no par
ticular cause
alleged: special, when the particular defect

§
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words are necessary, the usual form of a general demurrer“
to a declaration, alleges that the declaration‘, and the matters
therein contained, are not sufficient in law to enable the plain
impaired:
Ives v. Williams, 53
Mich., 639: 19 N. W., 562.
If the
demurrer is intended to apply to the
whole
declaration it must cover the
But, when a part only, as, for
whole.
instance,
of the
one of the counts
declaration appears objectionable,
the
demurrer should be contlned expressly
to the
to such part; for s. demurrer
whole
declaration containing several
counts will not be sustained if any one
of the counts is good: Achran v. Scott,
3 Wend.,
229: People v. Bartow, G
Cow., 295.
When
in covenant,
and
been

debt on bond, several breaches are as
signed
in the declaration. some of
which are good and the others bad.
and the whole declaration is demurred
to, the plaintiff will have judgment
on the demurrer: Martin v. Williams.
13 Johns., 264; Glover v. Tuck, 24
Wend., 153; Brum v, Stebbins, 4 iiill,
154.
The defendant.
under such cir
cumstances,
should
plead
to
the
breaches which are well assigned. and
demur to the others: Ibld., Brum v.
Stebhins,
4 Hill, 154: Glover v. Tuck.
assumpsit,
24 Wend.. 153.
in
But
where several breaches are alleged in
the same count, the defendant cnnnnot
demur to a part and plead to the re
mainder: if no breach is well assigned.
he may demur to the whole count; if
one breach is well assigned and others
are not, he may under the general is
sue, object
on the trial against re
ceiving evidence, or assessing damages
on the defective breaches:
Pettibone
v. ﬁtevens, 6 iiiii, 258: see, Root v.
And where de
Woodruﬂf. 6 Hill, 418.
fendant demurs to one count. he must
at the same time plead to the others:
1 Chit. PL, 10 Am._ ed., 664; Arch.
I‘l., 309: 1 Burrill's Prac.. 146. But
he cannot plead and demur to the same
count at the same time:
Hair
v.
Weaver, 1 Riackf.. 77; Rickert v. Sny
der, 5 Wend.,
104.
In the order of
the defense by demurrer is
pleading.
required
pleading
to be taken before
to the merits and going to issue upon
the facts: and where such a plea has
been made. and afterwards it appears
to demur to the same count
desirable

or counts, the
drawn from the
of allowing the
posed.
Whiie a

be with
plea should
record for the purpose
demurrer
to be inter
pies to the
merits
of,
stands upon the record undisposed
it excludes the right to demur: and if
such a plea is put in while a de
murrer to the same count or counts is
of, it over
and undisposed
pending
rules the demurrer.
There cannot be
an issue of fact and an issue of law
standing at the same time in respect
to the same matter; one admits what
the other denies: Cicotte v. County of
Wayne, 44 Mich., 173; 6 N. W., 236.
If there are several defendants, one
may demur and another may plead:
Archlbold PL, 310.
A misjoinder of
counts or causes of action should be
advantage
taken
of by demurrer to
the whole declaration: defendant
can
not, in such case, plead to one count
and demur
to the other:
Smith v.
Merwin, 15 \\'end., 184: Ferriss
v.
North American Fire ins. Co., 1 Hill,
it a declaration tails to state any
‘IO.
cause of action.
the objection is not
waived by pleading
to the merits in
stead of demurring; the objection may
be made to the introduction of any
evidence:
Stoﬂet v. Marker, 34 Mich.,
313.
But the better practice is to
raise the objection to the suﬂiciency of
the declaration by demurrer,
before
any costs of a trial on the merits are
incurred:
Rowland
v.
Kalamazoo
Supts., 49 Mich., 553: 14 N. W., 494.
A defendant cannot withdraw his de
murrer and interpose
another plead
ing without the leave of the court:
Blecker v. Bellinger, 11 Wend., 179.
3—C. L., 5 767. A general demurrer
is a waiver of objections to the juris
diction of the court over the person:
Thompson
v. Michigan M. B. Associa
tion. 52 Mich., 522: 18 N. W., 247. It
operates
appearance
as
an
in
the

cause: Ibid.
A demurrer
nicai grounds

to a declaration on tech
does not attect its suf
ficiency in matters of substance:
En
rilzht v. Hartsig. 46 Mich., 469: 9 N
W.. 496.
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A joinder in demurrer,

asserts that

the pleading is sufficient.“

A demurrer admits the facts pleaded, and refers the question
It will not lie to a bill
of their legal sufﬁciency to the eourt.°
of particulars.’
§281. The judgment on demu1'rer.—If the justice decide in
favor of the party demurring, he should permit the opposite
party to amend his pleading. If, however, the plaintiff de
clines to accept the privilege of amendment of his declaration,
and elects to stand on his demurrer, he cannot then plead to
If the decision is against the party demurring,
the merits?
the court should allow him to withdraw his demurrer and
answer the pleading demurred to.” But, if the defendant with
draw his demurrer and plead to the declaration, he cannot
afterwards question the decision upon the demurrer."
If, however, no application be made to amend or answer the
pleading, the judgment will be ﬁnal; if in favor of the defend
ant, for his costs; if in favor of the plaintiﬁ, the justice will
proceed and ascertain the amount of his demand, and render
judgment for the same with costs, except on a demurrer to a
plea in abatement or to a replication to such plea."
4-1

8-Boyer

(‘hit. I‘l., 10 Am. ed., 666.
5—Ibid., 667.
6—~1 Chit. Pl., 10 Am. ed., 662.
A
demurrer admits the allegation in the
declaration for thepurposes
of that
issue only, and not a right of action
in the plaintiff which the proofs might
fail to, sustain if the demurrer were
overruled
and he was allowed to plead
to the merits:
(Took v. Detroit & Mil
waukee Ry. Co., 45 Mich., 453; 8 N.
W., 74.
But it seems that a demurrer
to special counts does not admit facts

H

-j

u

‘ii.

i

stated in consolidated
common counts
placed at the close of the declaration:
~
Rose v. Jackson. 40 Mich., 29, 34.
It the plaintiff is satisﬁed, on re
ceiving the demurrer,
that it is well
taken. he should ask leave of the court
to amend
his declaration. and thus
cure the
in
his pleading:
defect
Stange
v. Clemens,
17 Mich., 409.
County, 44
7-—Cicotte
v. Wayne
Mich., 173: 6 N. W., 236.

67

N.

W.,

v. Sowies,
530.

109

Mich., 48:

9-—On overruling a demurrer to a
declaration, judgment goes for the
plaintiff, unless leave is given to the
defendant
to plead: Teift v. l\IeNoah,
9 Mich., 206.
If the defendant dc.»
sires to plead anew to the merits, he
apply to the court for leave
should
to withdraw
his demurrer, and to
he
enter such plea, and this should
judgment is entered on
done hetore
Emery v. Whitwell, 6
the demurrer:
Mich., 490.

10—Wale v. Lyon, 2 Mich., 276;
Thompson, 6 Hill, 6212
Jones
v.
Krattz v. Electric Light Co., 82 Mich..
457; 46 N. W., 787; Ashton v. De
troit City Ry. Co., 78 Mich., 587:
44
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Emery
11—See
Mich., 474, 489.

v.

Whitweii,
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What matters may be so plea.ded—in general.—
§282.
Though by rule of court adopted in 1884, being circuit court
rule 9, this plea is to have the effect simply of a notice under
the general issue, and does not have the eifect of waiver of
other defenses, nor require any replication," still it would
seem to possess its common law status when pleaded in jus
tice’s courts." Where a matter of defense has arisen after the
of the suit, it cannot be pleaded in bar of the
commencement
action generally, but must, where it has arisen before suit, be
pleaded as to the further maintenance of the suit, and cannot
be given in evidence otherwise; and when it has arisen after
issue joined, puis dm-rein continuance, as that the plaintiff has
given the defendant a release, payment, etc."
Pleas of this kind are either in abatement or in bar. Either
kind is in general a waiver of all former pleas, and the judg
ment, whether upon demurrer or verdict, if for the plaintiff, is
ﬁnal that he recover.‘-" This rule does not, however, apply where
12--Burt v. Wayne Circuit’ Judges,
90 Mlch., 570; 51 N. W., 482: People
v. Plank Road Co., 125 Mlch., 366; S4
N. W., 290.
13-Johnson V. Kihbee. 40 Mleh..
269; Snyder v. Quarton. 47 Mlch.,
211; 10 N. W.. 204; \\'hitt(-more v.
Stephens,
48 Mlch., 573; 12 N. W..
858.
1~i—1 Chit. PL, 10 Am. ed.. 657;
Boyd v. \\'eeks, 5 Hill, 393; Covel v.
Weston. 20 Johns., 41-4; Rowei v. Hay
den. -10 M. E.. 582: Jackson v. Ram
Facts arising after
sey, 3 (‘ow., 75.
issue joined, can only he pleaded puts
(lnrrcfn continuance,’ and if pleaded
generally. in bar to the further maln
tenancc
oi.’ the suit. without being in
form. puts darrcfn, efc., the plea will
1 Sandf..
he had:
Hart v. Meeker.
023.
A pica or notice of defense
puts, when in bar, may be to the whole

declaration, or to
particular
some
count in it; but it must set up a com
plete defense to the whole declaration.
or to the count to which it npplics:
Morris v. Cook. 19 Wend.. 69!): Smith
v. Ely. 5 McLean, 76; see Johnson v.
Kihbee, 36 Mlch., 269.
Matter which

was n proper subject for a plea puia
at common law, may be so pleaded
under
our practice instead of a no
ﬁnyder v. Quarton, 47 Mlch.,
tice:
211; 10 N. W.. ‘.104.
In a suit hrnught upon an appeal
bond. and issue joined thereon, a dis
charge of the judgment thereafter oi»
talned can he shown only under a plea
pub; rinrrcfn conflnunucc:
Souvals v.
Leavitt, 53 Mlch.. 577: 19 N. W., 261.
But tender
of payment
after
suit
hrought is not a proper matter for
a plea pm’-w: Snyder v.
Quarton. 47
In a suit
1\fich.. 211: 10 N. W., 20-i.
to recover upon a contract, a plea pufw
that the plaintiff had sold and as
signed the demand after suit brought,
presents an immaterial issue, and may
be disregarded:
The purchasers of a
whether before or after suit
demand.
brought thereon, may still pul"sue his
in the name of the original
remedy
contracting party‘.
Moon v. Harder.
38 Mlch., 566.
Huntington,
15—Klmhall
v.
10
Wend., 6752 Culver v. Barney. 14 IbM..
By pleading one of these pleas
161.
the defendant
abandons all other pleas
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a

is

the matter of the plea affects the remedy only and not the
right of action; thus, a plea puis darrcin of a discharge under
the act abolishing imprisonment for debt,
not
waiver of
in
before
bar
pleaded."
plea
plea,

must

be

veriﬁed.-A plea puts darrein, being
veriﬁed by affidavit, or by some other

a.

Plea. must be

§283.

dilatory

evidence."
\\'is., 306.
And confesses everything
except
by
the matter contested
the
plea puts: Raynor v. Dyett,
Wend.,
300; Kimball v. Huntington, 10 Ibid.,
679.
16—Raynor v. Dyett,
Wend., 300.
The waiver applies only where the de
fendant assumes a new ground of de
fense ,and abandons
the defense before
relied on:
lbfd.
And not where the
mutter of the plea affects only the rem
edy: Culver v. Barney, 14 Wend., 161.
Nor where the plea goes only to one
counts,
of several
or to some par
ticular part of an entire claim: Morris
v. (‘ook, 19 Wend., 699.
1'i'—An1e,
168; Wheelock v. Rice,

7

1

7

§

4 1 1

i\ilch., 271; West v. Stanley,
69; but see. Jackson v. Peer.
R., 418; Bancker v. Ash,
Cow.
Johns., 250.
Great strictness and certainty are
required in regard to pleas puts, and
but one of them can be pleaded.
Where two defendants have pleaded
jointly. one of them may abandon that
puts.
The other de
plea and plead
fendant ls not prejudiced thereby, and
as to him, the suit may be prosecuted
issue:
to judgment on the original
Doug. Mich., 271-2.
Wlieelock v. Rice,
Doug.

ilill,

9

699.
At common law, the effect of a
plea puts darrein continuance is to de
stroy the issue previously formed, and
new issue must be formed on the
plea puts, by replication or otherwise:
By
Johnson v. Klhbee, 36 Mlch., 269.
such a plea
the defendant abandons
his former plea and places the issue
of the suit entirely on the new plea;
and all further defense to the notion
is thereby rested upon the point newly
set forth:
Whlttemore v. Stephens,
48 Mich., 573; 12 N. W., 858; Burt
Judges. 90 Mlch..
v. Wayne (‘lrcult
520: 51 N. W., 482; People v. Plank
Road Co., 125 Mich., 366: 84 N. W.,
The plea puts conclusively ad
290.
mits the cause of action as set out in
the declaration:
Adams v. Flier,

1

4

5

2

2

1

him in the cause, and
pleaded
by
places the issue of the suit upon this
single plea: Wheelock v. Rice,
Doug.
i\iich., 272.
It waives the general is
sue: New York Dry Dock Co. v. Mc
Hill, 290. And all notices
Intosh.
of special matter under it: Adler v.
Wise,
Wis., 159; Adams v. Filer,
Wis., 306.
And the case then stands
the same as if the plea puts had been
Burrlll‘s
the plea originally put in:
i‘rac., 424; Morris v. Cook, 19 Wend.,

a

__..__i.__¢_;_—__.
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When may be required.
Demand to be made for.
Not a pleading.

PARTICULARS

§287. Content and elect
$288. Amendment of.

of.

;

if

a

§284. When may be requ.ired.—“In cases before a justice,
where a bill of particulars of the demand of the party may
be required in
court of record, the plaintiff may be required
by the justice to ﬁle such bill of particulars of his demand;
and the defendant,
required by the plaintiff, shall ﬁle a like
bill of particulars, he may claim as a set-off and the evidence
on the trial shall be conﬁned to the items set forth in said
bill.”1

In all actions in which

the plaintiff declares generally, with
out specifying the particulars of his cause of action, the jus
tice, upon application, will order him to give the defendant the
particulars in writing. Thus, in actions for work and labor,
goods sold and delivered, and the like, the defendant may call
for the particulars of the demand. But whenever the par
ticulars of the cause of action are fully speciﬁed in the declara
tion, as in actions on the case, special assumpsit, or on a note,
or the like, any further particulars would, of course, be unnec

essaryF

h

&

5

dz

a

2
-vy_v-v

2
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L

19

774,
bills
of particulars
in
that
actions of tort do not rcst upon any
They rest in the
strict legal right.
ound discretion of the trial court to
according as
be required or refused
justice and fair dealing require.
This
crim con. action.
was
2—Day_ v. Davis,
C.
P.. 340;
P., 267. The
Cowper v. Amos.
C.
bill of particulars is, to in
oiilce of
form ihc opposite party of the cause
or causes of action which the party
giving i[aiIIlt0IJd8 to rely on at the
trial, not speciﬁcally set out in tho
declaration, or notice accompanying
a

5

A bill of particu772.
is not dcmandabie
in an action
damages.
on the case for consequential
Everett v. Marquette Judge, 39 Mich.,
437: Kehrlg v. Peters, 41 Mich., 478;
N. W.. 801.
Nor in garnishee cases
Strong v. Iiolion.
as matter of right:
30 Mich., 411.
A showing that by
reason of
loss of
books he
was unable
to furn péalntiifs
a speciﬁc
hill
of particulars
will excuse him from
doing so: Rossman v. Bock, 07 Mich.,
430;
56
N. W., 777.
it is
But
said
Gary
in
v.
Eaton
Circuit
Judge, 132 Mich., 105; 92 N. W..

n

i—(‘. I...
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Also, when the defendant gives notice of set-off, the plaintiff
may obtain a particular of the set-off, in the same manner a
defendant would be entitled to
the matter so set oﬁ were
declared upon.
285.

Demand to be made for.-—Application

should be made

bill of particulars when the parties ﬁrst appear. It
cannot be ordered on the trial of the cause. The justice may,
imdoubtedly,
necessary, on the ﬁrst appearance of the par
to be ﬁled within a certain number of days before
ties, order
the trial—such time as would give the parties an opportunity,
after
ﬁled, to prepare for trial.
a

is

it

a

it

if

for

a

preparation
for
an intelligent
trial, and to enter upon the investiga
tion before the court or jury with an
understanding of what is really in con
troversy.
It may, and usually does,
restrict the proofs in these causes of
action on grounds of defense speciﬁed
Cicotte v. Wayne County, 44
in it:
Mich., 173:
N. W., 236.
An as
signed demand.
it set forth in plain
tiii"s bill of particulars, may be recov
counts.
in
ered under the common
case it is not necessary
that
such
The
the declaration should be special.
defendant, when sued upon the com
can always be informed
mon counts,
as fully by demanding a bill of par
averments
in
the
ticulars
as by
a

6

make

I

1

290

W

a

a

n

4

P.,
Wend., 200.
The object of
the bili of particulars is, to secure such
speciﬁcation of the nature and items
of the cause of action or ground of
the parties to
defense as will enable

declaration, and that is all that is
needed for his protection:
Snell v.
Gregory, 37 Mich., 500; see. Kelley v.
Waters, 31 Mich., 404; Wilcox v. To
ledo
Ann Arbor Ry. Co., 43 Mich..
584;
N.
1003.
In
case in
which the declaration sounds in tort
and not in nssumpsit, but in which if
recovery
is had it must be for speciﬁc
parties or
amounts paid to speciﬁc
due upon contract, and the allegations
of the declarations were only general.
it is held that a bill of particulars is
demandahle:
Anti-Kaisomine
v.
Co.
Kent Circuit Judge, 119 Mich., 43-i:
78 N. W., 467.
3—When a party has demanded
bill of particulars from his opponent.
it is error for the justice on his own
motion, and
any objection
without
from the party making the demand.
to exclude
the bill because
not ﬂied
within the time allowed by the jus
tice, if the same is offered before trial.
and there is nothing to show that its
reception will be prejudicial
to the
party airing for the bill:
Boats v.
Berg, 51 Mich., 8: 16 N. W., 184.
5 8:

the general issue.
Therefore. if a con
tract is set out in the declaration, it
although
is admissible in evidence,
in the bill of particu
not mentioned
iars: Davis v. Freeman, 10 Mich.,
192; and see, People, etc., v. Monroe
C.

a

it

it

a

it

it

a

Whenever the justice orders either party to ﬁle
bill of par
had been
ticulars, he shall note on his docket the fact that
has been ﬁled.3
ordered, and of the ﬁling, when
Where the plaintiff requires of the defendant
bill of par
in
ticulars, the order is that the defendant deliver
certain
time, or that he shall not be allowed to give evidence of them
justice cannot nonsuit the plaintiﬂ’,
at the trial. As
would

Cu. XVI.
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§286

seem that the order

must be the same when the defendant
requires a bill of particulars of the plaintiﬂ”s demand.‘
§286. Not a pleading.-The bill of particulars is no part
the pleading and cannot be permitted to aﬁect the declara
tion on demurrer. It cannot be construed into an amendment
of the declaration.“ A plea or demurrer will not lie to a bill
of particulars.“

of

§287. Content and eﬂ'ect of a bill of pa.rticu1ars.—The bill
of particulars ﬁled by either party, should contain an account
of the items of the demand, and state, in general, when and
It must be drawn with such
in what manner they arose.’
particularity as to inform the opposite party of the foundation
of the transaction upon which the claim arises; and it will be
sufﬁciently certain and deﬁnite if it apprises the party for
whose beneﬁt it is given, of the evidence which is to be offered,
so that there can be no mistake as to the preparation
made to resist the claim.“

When the bill of particulars

4--When a plaintiff refuses to com
ply with a proper and rightful demand
for n bill of particulars. evidence of
his demand may be properly rejected:
Peterson v. Tllden. 44 Mich., 168; 6
in such case the justice
N. W., 217.
may exclude all testimony on the part
of the plaintiff and dismiss the cause;
such
refusal being a virtual discon
tlnunnce of the suit:
Lovette v.
Essie; 92 Mich., 461: 52 N. W., 750.
And so when a defendant refuses to
of his set-offs:
particulars
the
tile
iinntz v. Borg. 51 .\iich._ 8: 16 N. W.,
IR-I.
When a defendant has duly and
rightfully demanded u hill of particu
lars. his right thereto is not waived
Peter
hy pleading before it is given:
son v. Tilden, 44 Mich., 168; 6 N. W..
217.

5-Clcotte v. County of Wayne, 44
Mich., 173; 6 N. W., 2362 Weston V.
County of Luce, 102 Mich., 528; 61
N. W., 15.
6—Cicotte v. (‘ounty of Wayne, 44
Mich.. 173: 0 N. W.. 236.
7—-Moran v. Mnrrlsscy. 2R llow..
18 Abb.,
100: Moran v. Morrissey,
it should furnish the items
1-'11.
in detail. specifying the dates. prices
and amounts as near as may be done:
Humphrey v. Cottleym. 4 Cow. R., 54.

to be
stated

v. Iiaight,
15 Johns.
8—Ryckt_nan
222.
Neither party is required to do
more than furnish the items which he
claims against the other.
He is not
required to state any credits or set-offs
in favor of the other party:
Williams
209; Ryckman v.
v. Shaw, 4 Ahb.,

iiaight.
15 Johns, 222.
A demand
for money loaned cannot he recovered
under a hill of particulars which mere
ly sets forth a claim for services ren
dered: Judd v. Burton, 51 Mich., 74;
16 .\‘. W.. 237.
A charge in a bill of
particulars tor money loaned to the
defendant, will not authorize proof of
the loan of a Ilnilcd States bond or
other bonds or like obligations for the
payment of money: such a charge can
be uppqrtcd only by proof of the loan
of coin. bank hills or some well-known
circulating
popularly known
medium
and designated
as money:
Waterman
v. Waterman, 34 Mich., 490. A bill of
particulars which furnishes no infor
mation beyond that found in the dec
laration is insuﬂiclcnt. and evidence
should not be received
under it:
Knnp V. National F. Ins. Co., 101
Mich., 359: 59 N. W.. 653.
Unless
plaintiff
the
shows his inability
to
make
it more specific:
Rossman
v.
Bock, 97 Mich., 430; 56 N. W., 777.
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an item of money paid to A., by mistake, instead of B., the
plaintiff was allowed to prove that the item was intended,
and must have been understood, to refer to B., and the defend
ant, to set aside that item, must make aﬂidavit that he had
S0, where the work for which the action was
been misled.”
brought was stated in the particulars to have been done in the
wrong month, the plaintiff was permited to give evidence of
the work having been in another month." An error in the
date, or other inaccuracy, will not preclude the plaintiff from
appear that the defendant has been
proving the item, unless
it." Although
or
misled
by
party
conﬁned
either surprised
in his proof to the items contained in his bill of particulars,
If
and the evidence on the trial shall be conﬁned to the items set
appear from the evidence of one
forth in said bill,”12 yet
entitled to more for items not included
party that the other
in the bill, he may recover for such items."

it

~
n

8

2

1

Q

ﬁed with it, and really needs
fuller
statement,
he
should
demand
it:
Freehling v. Ketchum, 39 Mich., 299.
9-Day v. Bower,
69, n.
Camp.,
10—Miliwood v. Walter,
Taunt..
224.
Where the plaintiff seems to
have a cause of action. but his evi
dence fails to support the demand set
forth in the bill of particulars, the
bill may be amended:
Cummin v. Wil
cox, 47 Mich., 501; 11 N. W., 289.
Wood,
Bing.,
11—Ilarrlson
v.
&

7

371: Lambirth v. Boft, Ibid., 411:
C., 622; Col
Tucker v. Barrow.
B.
lins v. Beecher, 45 Mich., 436, 438;
N. W., 97.
12—Tefl't v. McNoah,
Mlch.. 206.
When a bill of particulars is properly
demandahle,
and is given. no recovery
for any omitted items
can be had
which should have been included there
in: Bennett v. Smith, 40 liiich., 211.
Camp., 68;
13—ilunt v. Watkins,
see, Steel v. Lacy.
'I‘aunt._ 285; Hoi
P., 243; Fiske
B.
land v. Hopkins,
W., 486: “Fil
v. Wainwright,
M.
R., 316.
llams v. Allen,
Cow.
At
the trial the particulars of the plain
are considered
tlﬂ"s demand
as in
corpornted with the declaration, and
on proof of the delivery of the bill.
voluntary and without
even though
the order of the court, the plaintiff
will be conﬁned in his proof to the
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1

& &

3

2

1

7

Where there has been an effort at com
pllance with the demand for a hill of
particulars an objection to evidence on
the irial comes too lnte. a request for
further particulars should be made:
Freehllng v. Ketchum, 39 Mich., 209:
90
Township of Buckeye
v. Clark,
.\Iich., 432; 51 N. W., 528; Strutz v.
Brown, 110 Mlch., 687; 68 N. W., 981.
Not so where the claimed compliance
gives no particulars beyond what may
be found in the allegations of the
Knop v. National F. ins.
declaration:
Co., 101 Mich., 359; 59 N. W., 653.
The oﬂlce of the lllll is to amplify and
explain the allegations of the declara
tion: Knop v. National F. Ins. Co.,
of,
supra.
Further as to sufilciency
103 Mich..
v. Stokes,
see. Duplanty
630: 61 N. W., 1015: Tanner v. Page,
106 l\Ilch., 155; 63 N. W., 993; Strutz
v. Brown. supra.
In case of the sale and delivery of
different bills of goods at different
containing
times,
several
each
bill
articles or items, it will be sufﬁcient
if the bill of particulars gives the
dates and amounts of the several sales
and deliveries, without itemizing the
different articles included in each hill,
is demanded;
unless a. fuller statement
such a bill is usually sufficient to in
defendant
of what he is ex
form
pected to meet; and if he is dissatis

__}
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When the defendant oﬁers evidence of a claim against the
plaintiff, the latter may prove a payment of such claim, al
though such payment does not appear in his bill of particulars;
for it was not a proper item to make out the case of the plain
tiﬂ, in the ﬁrst instance, but to rebut evidence procured by the
defendant."
So, the defendant, in answer to proof of a de
mand of the plaintiif, may, for the same reason, prove payment,
although not included in his bill, for this would be admissible
under the general issue."
Amendment of bill of particula.rs.—“Such bill may be
amended at any time before the trial, to supply any deﬁciency
or omission in the items, when by such amendments, substan
§ 288.

tial justice will be promoted.”1‘*
ll The justice may, in his discretion, require,

as a condition
of an amendment, the payment of costs to the adverse party, to
be ﬁxed by the justice; but such payment cannot be required,
is made necessary
by the amend
unless an adjournment

ment.

’

"7

therein contained:
1 Tidd‘s Pr.,
299; 1 Burrill‘s Pr., -132; Williams v.
Allen, 7 Cow. R.. 316; Tefft v. hic
Noah, 9 i\Iich., 206.
items

14-Brown

v.

Denison,

2

Wend..

593.

15—0lcott v. Hanson, 12 Mich., 452.
books, un
A party‘s private account
are not
supported
by other evidence,
competent proof of the items set forth
Tioga Mfg.
in his bill of particulars:
Co. v. Btimpson,
48 Mich., 213; 12 N.
W., 173.
A party testifying in his own behalf,
knowledge
and havinc personal
of the
items and matters set forth in his bill
of particulars. may use the bill to re
his recollection, notwithstand
fresh
ing that the hill is a mere copy of
entries made
v. Comstock,
N‘. W., 157

16—C.
objection

L.,
to

in his books:
50 i\iich., 596,
§ 773.
evidence

Hudnutt
601: 16

Where the

sole

oﬁered

that

is

it varies from the bill of particulars.
if the variance is merely formal it is
better to permit an amendment
of the
particulars than to reject the evidence.
because the amendment
will generally
be in furtherance of justice, unless
is reason to believe that the
there
defendant
will be prejudiced thereby:
Collins v. Beecher, 45 Mich 436: S
N. W., 97; see, Cummin v. Wilcox, 47
Mich., 501; 11 N. W., 289.
An amendment
of the bill of par
ticulars does not operate as a change
of the issue of the cause:
Cicotte v.
Wayne County. 44 l\iich., 173, 175; 6
N. W.. 236.
An amendment
may be
allowed in the circuit court after
appeal
if it introduces no new cause
of action:
Anderson C. Co. v. Punzs.
See,
127 i\Iich., 5-13; 86 N. W., 1040.
Sogge v.
further as to amendment,
Schwart7, 116 ‘\Iich 635
74 N W,
1000
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of party.
prior adjournment.

_1;‘*_ t .

§‘.’tl1. After
§2!l'.Z. \\'hell not
case
§'..'tl.‘5. In

ﬂllo\\'t‘d.
suit commenced

After
l-‘rum

Must

ttial commenced.
necessity.
be docket entry of.

irregular
$512197.
lay

§2."JS.

adjournments.
Waiver of irregularity.

warrant.

1-t‘.

a

$5

-.1

a

‘V’ 444

is

a

a

Of adjotmunents in general.-“At the time of the
§289.
resitlent of the county, in favor
sunnnons against
return of
resilient, or an attacllmelit personally
of one who
also
served, or of
writ of replevin, or of joining issue without
process,
_iustiee lll2l_\', in his tiisei-etion, anti with or without
the consent. of the parties, ati_jonrn the cause not exceeding
six <la}'s.”1
tiee, will not be heard to complain
that such adjournment was on the
Justice's own motion. and, being for
more than six days. w0rked_a discon
tinuance of the suit:' Patterson v.
Mcitae. ‘.39 Slit-h., 258.
A catlsc in
justice‘s court may be
v. Law,
i‘.l'_‘. The justice
.Tolins..
.'lli_iﬂl1l‘llt'(1 on the written stipulation
cannot of his own illnliﬂil ilti_inlll‘Il a of their counsel, and Without the per
<1-guise
tllliil lii"l(‘l‘.\'S is l'clltt‘iit'~i. tlltul{_'il snnal presence of the parties.
And
very different case from
llarhour
v.
he the return da_\':
this is
verhal
I-Ihireli. INT .\iich._ HT»: <3-iTi. \\'.. 103$.
2l‘..'i‘w‘lli"I1t between parties out
justice has no authority to alijourn
of ('mll‘I. upon which action was had
where
n cause upon his n\\'ll motion
In such
h_v the justice afterwards.
the parties. or either of them. are not
a etlse the justice
assumed
to act
residents of his count_v:
llali \'. upon iilf¢il'lll.‘liiOIl furnished by himself.
Shank. ST .\iicl1.. 326: ‘._'I‘..\'. \\'.. -17%. of what the parties agreed to else
wliere; hut in this case, when be acts.
was
\\'h~-re .<er\"iel- uf an attachm--nt
he has l-efm-e him the written stipu
made on the return d:1_\' of the writ it
was held that the justice trtulhi not
iﬂiinll of the parties. which is just as
day:
on the saine
eil--ctual
for whatever agreements
p|'um-ell in trial
are
12.", .\iich.. l‘.'_’l‘>; Ill.’
v. iii|iier_
therein incorporated as any oral agree
l\'<-_\‘~-.<
N. \\'., (H713. .\s to ali_i~»urnm--nt.< l»_\' tnent then marle in his presence would
consent of parties: see. .\‘ini-in v. Sem
he:
i'almer \-‘. Lewis. 24 Mich.. ‘Z42.
piinl-r‘. S4; \iich.. 1?-.l‘.; 4% .\’_ W.. THO.
Where. after parties have in the pres
tiefentiant
who has t'eqnestt-ti. or
ence of the justice agreed to an ad
nt least consenteli
to. an atljournnient
of the cause to
particu
_inurnmcni
nil .'1c~'~»untof the .<i<,-knessot‘ the ‘lus
lar lime, and afterward. and not in

I...

a

_t\

A

a

a

it

‘.3

a

It

L_
_
;.¢*-@:._~‘————r
._A_E,__JI-—___1Q>I-‘iI‘;I?l'->

ly

7!i.'». 'l‘he ri_i_'ht express
to the justice hy this section.
to adjourn on his n\\'ll motion nil the
return day. cuts nil’ all implications of
to give him the like power
an intent
in an_v other si:l'_'e of the t':lseZ .\'t.-idler
23"-N; see. tlatna*_'e
v. Moors.
.\iich..
given

‘W4
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is,

entitled to an adjourn
the adjourn
ment in such cases is, in
great measure, discretionary with
the justice.
Thus he should adjourn the case on the applica
tion of either party, upon his showing reasonable ground for it,
It
as, the want of testimony, the sickness of his family, etc.
cannot be expected, usually, in
contested suit, that the par
ties would be prepared with their proof at the time of joining
issue.
Under
provision substantially the same as the above
section,
judgment was reversed, because the justice refused
to grant an adjournment to the defendant who was unable to
attend on account of his child being dangerously sick. The
court said, that the discretion given to the justice
not an
ought to be soundly and judiciously exer
arbitrary one;
V
Neither party

under this section,

for it,’ but

it

is

a

a

a

a

ment, of course without showing cause

cised.3

it

a.

party.-“If
§290. Adjoumments on the application of
either party to the suit shall make
appear to the satisfac
tion of the justice, by his own oath, or the oath of any other
person, that he cannot safely proceed to trial for the want of

§

5

8

9

Q

55

&

11

it

both
return day
the
Where on
parties ask for an adjournment. one
for eight days and the other for thirty
days, and the justice adjourns the suit
is
for seven dnys.
£000 l\d.i0\1I'11
ment, upon the theory that it is an
adjournment by consent. both parties
asking an adjournment. though neither
Shaw v. For
to that particular time:
tine, 98 Mich.. 25-i: 57 N. W.. 128.
Adjournment of units rctunmblc on,
pro
or adjourned to. holiday/s.——For
visions relative to the adjournment of
stilts returnable on. or adjourned to,
legal holidays. see (‘. L.,
-I890. as
by Pub. Acts, 1903. p. 420.
amended
134.
and the provision in full, nntc.
by
is also made
the
Provision
statutes, that when any process shall
be made returnable on Saturday. in

.

1'00.

where
the defendant conscien
tiously belicves that the seventh day
of the week should he observed as
the Sabbath,
and shall make and tile
with the justice an aﬂidavit to that
effect, that the justice shall. on the
return day, adjourn the cause on his
own motion
to some other day of the
week:
See, the
C. L.,
796. 798.
provision in full, ante.
134.
Mich., 269;
2- Stadier v. Moors,
Waiter A. Wood. etc., v. Vanderbilt,
109 Mich., 489: 6'7 N. W.. 690.
3—Rose v. Stuyvesant.
.Tohns..
N. Bank, 29
426: Mercer v. The L.
Mich..243.
it is not the practice for parties to
be ready to join Issue and proceed at
once to trial on the return day of the
summons; and the showing for a con
tinuance need not be as complete on
that day as would be required later in
the case, and
would be error for the
justice to refuse an adjournment on
the return day upon a sworn state
ment showing that the defendant
was
too iii to leave his house or to at
tend: Locke v. The Leonard Silk t‘o.,
cases

it

a

the presence of the justice. agree that
the adjournment shall be to the fol
lowing day. and each party informs
of such agree
the justice subsequently
ment. the justice changing his docket
good ad
entry accordingly, it is held
Simon
journment to the later date:
v. Scmpliner, 86 Mich., 136: 48 N. W.,

37 .\iich..
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some material testimony or witness, the justice shall postpone

trial for such reasonable time,4 and

so often as he shall
proper, not exceetling in all three months, unless by
longer time shall be stipu
consent of the parties to such suit
latetl therefor in writing. to be Sl_$_!‘Ilt‘(i by the parties or their
party
Provided, that
attorne_\is anti ilit‘(l with the justice:
claiming an atljournment after
former atljotirnment has been
ililti, shall t'urther make
appear, to the satisfaction of the
justice, that he has used reasonable tliligence to procure such
testimony or witness since the last precetling a.(1journment.”“
The party may show cause for an atljournment by an oral
statement anti examination on oath before the justice.5
The application to ailjourn 1na_v be made on the oath of the
in the discretion of the
party or of any other person. It
justice to l‘et|llii't‘ the oath oi’ the party or not; in general he
wonhi be better actplaintetl with the facts which establish his
cause of action or tletense, ainl the person by whom they can be
not
proveil, than any other person wouhl be. But this
always so.
liiziy be that
thirtl person
as Well, perhaps
better aetplainteti with them than the party himself; and in
sueh anti like eases, there can be no propriety in excluding the
matter which rests in the sound
oath of such person. This
An atijournment upon joining issue
tilS(‘l‘(‘ll()ll of the justice.“
the

is

is

is

it

a

is

a

It

4-(‘.

L.,
party is entitled
701.
matter of
adjmwninent. as
with the
provided he complies
§

the

I'.‘(]\il‘.'liiHﬁ

ot"

the

three

months

W..

1314.

-i\'ilmer v. Crary. 13
.»\litl
would seem that
is entitled. as
matter
nmke the proofs required,
or attorney:
Seers
V.
.Tolms.. Si-4.
In fact. the
a

Johns., 228.
(119 plaintiff

of right,

to

by an agent

Grandy,
statute pro
Yitles that he may make the proofs by
his own oath or the oath of any other

1

&

‘iii:

N.

it

a

Silt-ll
Zrounrl is not
let.’-‘ii <'ﬂll\'f‘ TH!‘
Warner
v.
(‘om
arljournnu-nt:
an
as .\neli..
-3-: .\'. W.. P»-1.
stock.
See, Sr-<_r:1t'v, {\‘liin:le
imlnliet‘
('11..
H1 Y\iieh.. I2-H. .".lT2 -l."» .\'. \\'.. as‘).
The "three months" of the statute be
liateh
in to run on the return (lay:
PM \lit"li.. WY: I13 .\'. \\'..
(‘llristm.'ts.
after
appenranee
.\‘!'.I’..
\"oluntar_\'

6

71

S,

Tl

n

an

A

ﬁxed by the statutes gives the justice
jurisdiction to render judgment:
Gil
riuht,
more v, Lieiitenburg, 129 Mlch., 275;
gt;11|1[({ in $h|i\\‘lIi_‘_f reasonable
_~.:ronn(ls .58 N. \\'.. (129.
5—If an application for an adjourn
.\'ellis v. .\le(‘arn. ."».'»l\ai'b..
therefor:
lint he is not entitled. of rir_:ht. ment is based upon an aﬂldavit made
iii».
and sworn to by the party himself,
to an arljonrnnient. unless by consent
the opposite party Will have the right
of the other party. without showing
to cross-exaniine him upon such aili
some cause reeoqnizeil
l-_\' the statute:
All
tlavitz and a refusal to submit to such
.\'l:l(ilr~l' V. i\l<‘ml'.\',
l\lit'ii.. Qlift.
cross-exainination, is suﬂiclent reason
application for an ntljonrnnient merely
for l‘el'llsiliL' to allow the adjournment:
for the purpose of <'nal»lin'.t the party
T’>o.'lt'/, V. n0l‘_2', 51 1\Iich.,
10; 13
In pl'¢i('llI'+- t'ulill.\‘t"i. tifilllltii lit‘ f_'l‘.'iIlit'ti.
to

.\

‘~_
- .-%""
; ~_.._t-.111
“ 13--=
1~v'i‘_"J-_§
_41-it

47—
_$-»

,_|., _I ‘ Q

;

\' T:

z.._x=

la.

a

a

it
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is so much a matter of course in litigated eases, that a strict
compliance with the letter of the statute in this respect should
The parties,
not, except in extraordinary cases, be required.
joined,
issue
after
usually, make no preparation for trial until
for until that time neither of them can legally know what
will be the claim or defense of his antagonist; and hence, the
statute does not require that either party, in order to obtain
an adjournment, in the ﬁrst instance, should show that he has

Nor can the party
made any effort to procure his witnesses.
the name or
state
to
asking an adjournment be compelled
At least,
of the testimony which is to be obtained.’
nature
it would be in the discretion of the justice to require it or
not.

The length of time for which the cause shall be adjourned,
is in the discretion of the justice; it must be for a reasonable
time, such time as will be reasonable under all the circum
resides,
stances of the case. The distance at which the witness
and many other circumstances, are to be considered.
‘It will be observed that the only cause for an adjournment,

under this provision.” is a want of some material testimony or
witness; no other reason will be sufficient if the opposite party
object.
The justice is authorized to adjourn the case as often as he
shall deem it proper. the time to which the cause may be ad
journed cannot exceed three months, unless by consent of par
ties; except in the Upper Peninsula.

adjournment.—If a party
§291. Adjournment after a prior
ask an adjournment after a former adjournment has been had
on his own motion. he must, in addition to the requirement
already mentioned, “further make it appear to the satisfaction
of the justice, that he has used reasonable dﬂrigerrce to procure
adjourn
such testimony or witness since the last preceding
ment.”° If the party show that he has subpoenaed :1 material
witness who does not attend, and that he cannot safely proceed
being
to trial without him, or other reasonable excuse for not
The party
ready, the justice shall grant the adjournment.”
1-2

Cow.

Treat,

2a

ed..

Eaton v. North. 7 Barh.. 631.
8-C. L., 5 79!.

s4o;' see
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0-c.

1... 5 101.

l0—Beekman v. Wrlght. 11 Johns..
442: llemstreet v. Young. 9 Johns.

or
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is not bound to state what he expects to prove by the absent
witness, unless the conduct of the party is such as fairly to
cast a well-grounded suspicion upon the good faith of the ap
In such ease, if he ret'use to disclose
plication to adjourn.
what he expects to prove, the adjournment may be refused."
If he state what he expects to prove, the adjournment may be
denied in ease the opposite party will admit it." It will not be
sufficient, however, to admit that the witness will swear as
stated; the admission must extend to the existence of the fact
proposed to be proved by the witness, that what the party ex
pects to prove is true.‘-"
It must also be shown that the party expects to be able to
procure the attendance of the witness at the day to which he
desires to have the case adjourned.“
It is not a sutlieient reason for refusing the adjournment,
that the witness lives out of the jurisdiction of the court, for
the party ma_v procure his attendance or his 1estim0ny.15
Nor can the adjournment be refused because the party
refuses to pay costs; a justice has no right to require the pay
ment of costs as a condition of allowing an adjournment.”

When adjournment not allowed.-“No party shall be
_S 292.
entitled to an adjournment. after he shall have seen the account
or demand of the adverse party, unless he shall exhibit his
account or demand, if any he has, to be litigated or passed
upon in the suit, or shall state the nature thereof, as far forth
as may be in his power. to the satisfaction of the justice.”17
This provision has nothing to do with the question of set-off
on the trial.
.-\t the time when the exhibit is required, the
sole <|uestion before the justice is. the propriety of granting an
adjournment; hence. the part_v is to set forth the nature of his
364.
And even where :1 day of trlat
has been ajzreed upon by the parties.
one of them ls not thereby prevented
from asklm: a further adjournment.
on sntlieient
cause shown:
Annln v.
(‘hasr-_ 1?. Johns., 461.’: and see, Smith
v. l~‘euton. 2 Pow. R., -t'_’."».

11---(mderdonk v. Raulett, 3 lllll.
.".‘_’.'§.
l'_’- l'.r-ill v. Lord. 11 .lohns., 341
\'er|uil_\'~-:1, T
I3’. l'~~i[~l¢—‘
\'
1‘o\\'..
Ilﬂio

14---ﬁnderdonk

V.

Raulett,

3

Hill,

329.

15--liaton
v. Coe, 2 Johns, 383.
Rut If it ls n--~--ssary to take the
tr-stir1i~m_\' of :1 foreign or absent wit
ness by commission,
that may be suf
ﬁelent
reason
for an adjournment:
Eaton V. North, 7 l§8.l‘l)., 631.
1ﬁ——llemstreet
v. Young. 9 .Tohns..
11 Ib!d.,
-"ft-1: In-ekman
v. Wright.
4-1;’: People v. Palhoun, 3 Wend., 420.
1'.'»(‘. 1.,. .5 792.
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demand to the satisfaction of the justice, who is to be reason
ably satisﬁed that the party has good grounds for asking for an
adjournment; that the witness stated to be absent, is necessary
to support a bona ﬁde demand which the party has, or at least
supposes he has, and that injustice may be done if he is driven
to a trial instanter, without an opportunity to support his
claim. This is the whole object of the provision; and when the
adjournment is granted the object is attained, and the par
ties upon the trial are thrown upon the issue joined by the

pleadings."
by warrant.-“If
a cause commenced by warrant be adjourned on the applica
tion of the defendant, he shall continue during the time of
adjournment in the custody of the constable, unless he shall
give bond to the plaintiff in the sum of two hundred dollars,
with sufficient surety or surcties, to be approved by the jus
tice, conditioned that the defendant will render himself in
execution in case judgment shall be rendered against him in
the suit, and that no part of his property liable to execution
shall be removed, secreted or assigned, or disposed of, except
for the necessary support of himself and family, until any
judgment the plaintiif may obtain against him shall be satis
ﬁed, or until the expiration of ten days after the plaintiff shall
be entitled to execution thereon.”19
If the plaintiff, being present, make no objection to the
surety, he will be received of course. If any objection is made
to his competency, the justice shall require him to justify
under oath.
“If such cause be adjourned on the application of the plain
tiff, the defendant, if the justice shall think it proper, shall
be discharged from custody, but the cause shall not be dis
continued by such discharge; and at the adjourned day the
same proceedings shall be had as in case of a summons re
turned personally served/"*’°
It is in the discretion of the justice either to discharge the
defendant or detain him in custody. The statute allows three
days in which the justice is required to proceed to hearing and
§293.

Adjournment in suits

18-Harrington
Wend.,

v.

Ensign.

11

554.

299

commenced

19—C. L., Q 793
20-C. L., § 794
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the consent.

of

a

is

if

a.

a

a

a

is

If longer time required, the cause
determine the cause?‘
must be ad jourued.
The justice, in such case, should require
the plaintitf to make a strong case before he allows an ad
journment.
Wliere
day for the trial has been agreed on by the par
ties,‘-"-3 or they are under a stipulation
not to delay the trial
beyond the day tixed, the parties are not, therefore, precluded,
further adjournment.23
upon sutiieient (‘altse__ from asl<iu_Q
An a_<_ri-eement. of the parties, before the justice, to adjourn
a eertain person do not attend at the ad
cause, and that
journed day. the justice mig__ght adjourn for such reasonable
time as he might deem iieeessary, in order to procure the at
tendanee oi" the witness,
valid and binding agreement be
tween the parties, whieh neither has a. riglit to rescind Without
the Olll(’l‘.2’l

Adjournment after trial commenced.—After

294.

the

jury

if

a

it

is

is

it

has been sworn in the e:11lse_
too late to apply for an
'l‘he trial of the cause
adjourninent.
then considered as
ermum-iieed.”"
be
So, also, would
the justice had com
meneed the trial h_v examination of
witness, or the hearing
But, 2lltl10l1_$l'll the justice cannot in
of any other testinion_v.'~"‘
sneh ease, _;'rant an a<ljourinnent, he may hold open his court

for
short time
gralitiiig of this

a

a

part_\' to procure

a

it

is

a

Witness. The
pi'i\'ile<_w- rests in the (lis<fI'€tiOIl of the justice,
abused, the judgment will not be
and. unless that diseretion
reversed. And ‘Yer sueh purpose two hours has been consid
ered not an uin-easonalile time]-'7 But. where the justice allowed
the p;|I't_\' t\vent_v hours to obtain
ivitness twelve miles off,
Se, where he allowed four days,
was held H11l'e:lsull:|l‘>l\'.3“
tlllllﬂlltlll the del'endant had not pleaded, and even had not
to enable

llall.

lirown.

.Tnllns..

'0 *1
Q =1
_. CI

7

2

1

:.’T~Pense V. Gleason,
Johns.. 409.
‘_’-\‘—-Green V. Angel, 13 .Tolins., 469.
Clement,
1.’£>—-’\\’il<i-oxv.
(‘o\v..
Denlo.
160.
\\'heu practicable, it is better
~13-:7: In liuld the cause open for
deﬁnite
4

v.

s

n ." -..»*4:‘."%-vir-‘*5-0!

Ihi¢I_
‘._’l-~lli~-lmrtlsoii
'.37~:'».
‘..’.'»-—l~‘ink v.

1

lneny:

‘I’.-‘_i.

a

w».

is absent.
and
that
lllll,‘.l't‘lll‘%' in .\‘m'lll‘(,'
to obtain his ter~'ti-

)

'_’

witness

ll;l.\‘

ll.\‘l'4l tlllt‘
his attendunee,
or

ll!“

Parinelee v. Thompson,
Hill.
Story v. Fiestell,
E. D. Smith.
Pollock v. Ehle, Ibid., 541; Story V.
Ihid., 423.
l’»i.<l|up_
2t‘»—See, Gale V. Barnes,
C'0W.,
8

Inaterlzil

‘liase.

-I

see, nnfr‘.
GT.
12%.Iehns.. 4412.
t‘n\\'.. -11.’-'».
l"enIen_
p:u't_v sliows that :1

‘_'Z_'—-Annin v.
‘..'.'*Z
-Smith \'.
As. where the

§

‘.11—t‘. l,..

§
- -1
is
-1

>-Q_

appeared.'~"-’

son

_

_____

_____-W

-

_

__

, __

__

_...__-.

_

"~

XVII.

CH.

or anaousnusms.

§295

may
Adjournments from necessity.—Adjournments
Thus, where an attachment is
also be made from necessity.
the
issued against a witness;3° or, a new venirc is issued
when
So,
time.
reasonable
adjourned
may
be
for
cause
witness refuses to be sworn, or to answer any pertinent or
proper question, the cause may be adjourned from time to time
at the request of the party in whose favor such witness at
tended, until such witness shall testify in the cause, or be dead,
a

a

,3‘

§295.

§

a

a

witness."
or otherwise incapable of testifying as
“In case of the sickness of any justice, or of his absence
from the township or city in which be was elected, or his ina
bility from any cause, temporarily or negligently, to perform
the duties of his office, any such matter or cause pending be
fore him shall stand continued before him two weeks, at the
end of which time, unless said justice shall be able to attend
the same, such cause or matter shall stand transferred to the
justice of the same township or city, whose term of office shall
soonest expire, and be heard and tried before him in the same
manner and time as in case of vacancy, etc.”3-"
296.

Must

be docket entry of adjournment.—'I‘he

statute=’-4

I

a

9

a

see,

3

134.

post,

800; see, ante,
33--C. L..
154.
34—(‘. L..
957.
35—So hcid where the docket failed
to show to what place the adjourn
ment was had:
\\‘aldron v. Palmer,
104 Mich., 556; 62 N. W., 731; Fitz~
hugh v. Rivard, 109 Mich., 154; 66 N.
W., 947; Stotte, D.
F. (‘o. v. Coch
ran. 111 l\iIch., 193; 69 N. W., 247.
And n failure of the docket to shnw
to which an adjournment
the place
was taken is not a. "technical defect"
which may be disregarded
on
cer
Hornri:
Mitts v. ilnrvey. 125 Mich.,
354; 84 N. W., 288.
“'here an appli
cation was made to adjourn and the
docket of the justice recited
that “i
overruled said motion and adjourned
said cause untli one o'clock p. m., at

301

&

9

3

§§

986:

5

a

L.,
Aberhail
v.
8032
E. D. Smith. 345; see. post,
justice is en
Bo, where
304-5.
gaged in the trial of another cause, or
in other oiiiciai business. he may ad
cause open until the
journ or hold
is dis
first cause or prior business
posed oi’: iiunt v. Wickwire, 10 Wend..
102; Stadier v. Moors.
Mich.. 26R.
31—C. L.,} 833; Fiero v. Reynolds.
30—C.
Roach,

post,§323;
(‘nines IL,

~

continuance ls not an “adjournment"
Stadler v.
controlled by the statute:
v.
Moors,
Mich.. 268: Woempener
Ketchum, 110 Mich. 34; 67 N. W.,
1106.

20 Barb., 275; see,
see, Day v. Wiiber.
32-—-C. L., 55 984,
304-5.
§ 5

as,

a

ot
certain number
for
an indeﬁnite holding open tor
But
days is improper: Ibtd.
several
the justice may hold the cause open
time. and continue it
reasonable
for
from day to day, in the progress of
the trial. as the ne(‘e~'.<i\‘leBof the case
may require; and such holding open or
time,

hours:

§§

if

is

every adjournment, stating on
requires the justice to enter
whose motion, and to what time and place” on his docket.
fatal to the judgment.”
A failure to do so not waived
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a.

a

is
a

Of irregular adjournments.-An adjournment not
§297.
discontinuance of the 'su_it.3“
authorized by the statute,
As where the justice being absent from the place of holding
note in writing to adjourn the cause; where,
the court, sent
in the absence of the justice, the parties agreed to adjourn,
which was entered by him on his docket,“ where the cause
day certain.“
was adjourned indeﬁnitely, and not to
Waiver of irregu1arities.—If

having the"
appear at the
adjourned day and go to trial on the merits ,3” or cross-examine
a Witness;4° or -apply for an adjournment, or do any other
act treating the cause as existing,“ the irregularity would be
waived. So, where the case was indeﬁnitely adjourned, but
on notice from the justice the parties appeared and proceeded
to trial.“ But mere appearance of the party and answering

4

4

9

1

1

2

3

4

4

4

irregularity would be waived:
Ibid.
38—Allen v. Edwards,
Hill. 499;
Wilcox v. Clement,
Denio, 160.
S0.
also, where the justice held open the
cause for an unreasonable
of
length
time after the trial had commenced:
Green v. Angel, 13 Johns., 469:
E.
D. Smith, 423; Aberhall v. Roach.
Ibid.,
IMd., 345: Redﬂeld v. F_iorence,
So, when the plaintiff does not
339.
on the return day. or on an
appear
adjourned day, the cause cannot be ad
journed: it must be dismissed: Bailey
Sandt., 11: Norris v.
v. Delapiaine,
90;
Bieakley.
Hilt.,
v.
Sprague
Shedd,
Johns., 140; Green v. Angel,
13 Iloid, 469.
Nor can the justice
adjourn
cause
on motion
of the
plaintiff, in the absence ot the defend
ant. without cause shown:
Sbadier v.
Moors,
Mich.. 264.
a

v. Shedd,

9

39—Spra_zue

J'ohns.,

136,

7

3

140; Titft v. Culver,
Hill, 180.
40—Dunham v. Hayden,
Johns._.
381.
See, ante,

v. Trowbrldge.
139, note 15.

5

41—Fnnning
428.

Hill.

5

Hill, 499.
42—Allen v. Edwards,
Any objection to an illegal adjourn
ment by a justice must be made he
fore the trial of the cause is enter:-d
Erie Pre
upon, or it will be waived:
serving Co. v. Wltherspoon, 49 Mich.
3

9

2

my oﬂice in the city of Lapeer," it was
held
that the justice did not lose
jurisdiction;
that the entry indicated
a mere holding open to an hour certain
Loder v. Reed, 129
on the same day:
‘
Mich., 180; 88 N. W., 389.
Johns., 192.
36—Gamage
v. Law.
An adjournment, unless by consent.
without some cause recognized by the
statute, or without
showing cause
when the statute has given it only on
cause shown, or without showing dili
or an
gence when that is required.
adjournment on the justice's own mo
tion, except on the return day, oper
ates as a discontinuance ot the suit:
Mich., 269: see
Stadier v. Moors,
Hall v. Shank, 57 Mich., 36: 23 N.
adjournment for
So, an
478.
W..
more than four days after the trial
for the purpose of ren
is completed,
dering judgment,
the justice
deprives
Brady
of the case:
of jurisdiction
An unau
v. Taber, 29 Mich., 199.
thorized adjournment ousts the jus
Segar v. Shingle
tice of jurisdiction:
and Lumber Co., 81 Mich., 344; 45
N. W., 982; Scullen v. George,
65
Mich., 215: 31 N. W., 841.
v.
37—l'\'lmball
Mack. 10 Wend.,
497: Weeks v. Lyon, 18 Barb., 530;
95;
Denio,
Deland v. Richardson,
Wiest v. Critsinger.
.Tohns.. 117.
But if both parties should subsequent
to trial, the
appear
and proceed

ly

s

I
if

,.

the party

to object to the erroneous adjournment

9

,¢-

§298.

right

.'-K77; 13 N. W.,

781.
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to his name, but declining to take any part in the proceedings,
is no Waiver."
So, if a defendant, after being improperly
refused an adjournment, voluntarily confess judgment, he
waives the irregularity.“
The party upon whose application an erroneous adjourn
ment is made, cannot object to it as irregillar."
Nor can the
other party, unless he objected to it at the time, as by not
doing so he will be considered as consenting to it.“
43—Fannlng
428.

44—IIlll
45-Peck

v.

Trowbrldge,

5

HUI.

v. Downer, 11 Johns., 461.
v. McAlp1ne,
3 Calnes R.,

166.

303

46—Dunham v. Hayden, 7 Johns.,
381; Kllmore v. Sudam,
10 Johns,
529.
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cases Justice may issue.
Subpoena due“ m,um_
before
Compelling
attendance

$302.

Single,

By

witnesses.

Under what circumstances
How attachment "‘3c"l9d~

5304.
5305-

H

how.

committed.

OF

TIIE

\\'RI'I‘.

a

wit
Subpoenas duces tecum.-—If the party desires
ness to produce in evidence, on the trial, any deed, book, paper
or other thing, in his possession, the subpoena must require
called
the witness so to do. Such subpoena
subpoena duces
or
writing
thing desired
tccum.
should
the
other
It
describe
as that
could be
to be produced with such particularity
identiﬁed with reasonable certainty?
a

it

a

appearance before arbitrators.—“Wit
to appear before such arbitrators
to be issued by any justice of the peace, in the

Compelling

by subpoenas,
»

5

1—C. L..
801.
2—lnabiiity
to ﬁnd after diligent
will excuse production under
search
subpoena ducea tccum:
Lamb v. Lip
pincott. 115 Mich., 611; 73 N. W., SST.

-

_|
‘u

documents
are In court their
production may be compelled by order.
without
tccum:
subpoena
duccn
llunton v. Hertz
H. Co., 118 Mich.,
Where

&

1‘

nesses may also be compelled

a

4

is

it
ll
:‘-'!:*¥.~'_'-if

i

‘_r_,?_.._
|

.,._-\~

,

may.

§299. In what cases justices may issue subpoenas for wit
nesseS.—“Any justice of the peace may issue subpoenas to com
pel the attendance of witnesses, to give evidence in any cause
or matter depending before himself or any other justice or
court; and such subpoenas shall be valid to compel the attend
of
witness within the same county where the cause or matter
to be tried, or in another county, and within thirty miles of
the place of trial.”1

§301.

-

I I

-

I

‘-Q

AT

or FAILURE TO .\'r'rn.\1n on rssrxrr.
May be ﬁned for not atwnding
§307. Witness also liable in damages.
§308. Refusing to be sworn may be

§300.

‘n

BY

§3Q6_

or rm: wan.

and

COMPELLING
ATTENDANCE
TACHMENT.

is

I

whom
'

_
ii ,===a;-=_ -_~_‘-._i_.:...
P‘

Hi‘

OF

In what

arbitrators.
for several

or Wrrnsssss.

ATTENDANCE

5299.
§300_
$301.

01-"run snnvics

_.-,.
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same manner and with the like effect, and subject to the same

penalties for disobedience, or for refusing to be sworn or to
testify, as in cases of trials before justices of the peace.”3
§ 302. Single Subpoena may be used for several witnesses.
The subpoena may contain the names of as many witnesses as
the party may wish to have inserted. And there is no impro
priety in the justice inserting the name of one witness, and
permitting the party to insert such others as he may please.‘
In fact, he may insert them without such permission.
OF‘

THE SERVICE OF THE SUBPOENA.

§303. By whom and how served.—“A subpoena may be
served either by the constable or any other person, and it
shall be served by reading the same, or stating the contents
to the witness, and by paying or tendering the fees allowed
by law for traveling, and one-half day's attendance.”
If the witness be a married woman, the subpoena must be
served upon her, and the fees paid or tendered to her, and not
to her husband.“ The subpoena must be served on the witness a
reasonable time before the trial.’ He is entitled to a reasonable
time to travel to court according to the usual modes of public
conveyance, and cannot be required to travel on Sunday.” He
is bound to make extraordinary eitort to obey the subpoena;
nothing but extreme poverty and utter inability to attend, or
sickness of himself or family, conclusively proved, will excuse
'
his non-attendance?
OF COMPELLING

ATTENDANCE BY ATTACHMENT.

§304. Under what circumstances attendance so compelled.
-—“W'henever it shall appear by the affidavit of the party in
3—(‘. L., § 10029.
4—2 Cow. 'i'reat..' 2 ed., 859.
5—(‘. L., 5 802.
6--Goodwin v. West. Cro. Car.. 522.
7—ilamm0nd v. Stewart, 1 Strange.
510: (‘halmers v. Melville. 1 E. D.
Smith. 502. Otherwise he will not be
liable to an attachment for nemat
tendance: Ibid.
v. Chadwick. 13 Wend..
8—Wilkle
49.

9—People
20

v.

Davis. 15 Wend..

602.

But the witness will be under no obli
gation to attend, unless his fees for
travel and attendance were paid: Ilurd
v. Swan. 4 Denlo. 75.
Nor can a wit
ness. though present In court, be com
pelled to be sworn as a witness until
his fees are paid.
Nor is he under
any obligation to remain at court for
any longer time than that for which
his fees have been paid, or tendered to
him; he is not bound to apply for his
fees, or notify the party that he will

305
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the suit, or by other competent testimony, to the satisfaction of
the justice, that any person duly subpoenaed to appear before
him in any cause shall have refused or neglected without just
cause to attend as a witness in conformity to such subpoena,
and that the testimony of sttch witness is material, as the de
ponent verily believes, the justice shall have power to issue
an attaclnnent to compel

the attendance of such witncss.”1°

Unless the subpoena has been served by a constable or
sheritl'. and a return made by him, there must be an atﬁdavit
or other competent evidence of service. And before issuing
the attachment, the justice should satisfy himself, by due
proof, that the witness has neglected or refused to attend with
out just cause, and that. his testimony is material in the case.
The proof for an attachment, it is said,
before the justice.“
If the subpoena was served by a party,
and of the iuateriality of the testimony is
should be annexed to the subpoena.
If the witness be near the place of trial,
be made

returnable forthwith; but if

may be made

orally

proof of service
made by aﬁidavit, it

and

the attachment may

he be at such a distance

fron1 it that the attachment cannot be served and returned in

for continuing

the cause open, the proper
adjourn
to such time as would be suﬂicient
course would be to
for the service and return of the attachment, and make it
a reasonable time

returnable at that time."-'
Attachment, how executed.—“Every. such attachment
(executed) in the same manner as a Warrant,
and the fees of the otlieers for issuinti and serving the same,
§ 305.

shall be issued

l!.'irb.,

if

it

.»‘\

I2-——l‘illW.'ll‘il.\‘ 'l‘reat..
‘Id ed. Til.
his wit
see that
party sin-nid
the
in :ittend:inee
ii.-tore
nesees are

a

4

1'.’

if

to-J‘.

T... § so?..
1I—~I’.riker
v. \\'illlntns.
fF)"V
.|_,|_

3

l‘ms\\'.. t‘>.'».'».

trial is commenced;
they are not.
he should apply for an attachment at
justice might. perhaps.
once.
in
his discretion, issue
an
attachment
on an application made after the trial
has comnienced, but he would not then
he authori'/.ed
to adjourn the cause as
he ml:__'ht have done had the motion
been made at the proper time:
Aber
hall v. Roach.
E. D. Smith. 345:
Story v. Bishop,
Ibid., 423.
But
witness has been regularly
sub
court, and left
[im~iiﬂt‘Il. and attended
after the trial commenced, the jus
A

And
leave if they are not paid: [hit].
lt lms been held. that a party in the
cause, and in court, cannot be required
to be .swoi'n or to testif_\' when called
p:1rt_v_ unless his fees
by the opposite
as :1 witness have been paid or ten
llewlett V. Brown, 1
dered to him:
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shall be paid by the person against whom the same shall be
issued, unless he shall show reasonable cause to the satisfac
tion of the justice for his omission to attend; in which case
the party requiring such attachment shall pay all costs of such
attachment, and the service of the same.”13
The statute contains no provision directing the manner in
which the payment of the fees for issuing and serving the
attachment should be collected. The justice on the return of
should determine whether the witness or the

the attachiiient,

party should pay them; and the one adjudged liable for them
would be accountable in an action by the party if the witness is
to pay, and by the justioc_ and constable if the party is holden.“
OF THE

PENALTY

FOR

NON-ATTENDANCE

OR REFUSAL

TO

TESTIFY.

Witness may be ﬁned for not a.i;t8nding.——“Every
§306.
person duly subpoenaed as a‘ witness, who shall n_ot appear,
or who, appearing, shall refuse to testify, shall forfeit for
every such non-appearance or refusal (unless some reasonable
ca.use or excuse shall be shown on his oath, or the oath of
some other person) a sum not less than one dollar, nor more
than ten dollars.”15
“Such ﬁne may be imposed by the justice, upon the witness
being: before him. or his being brought before him on attach
ment; and the justice shall thereupon make and enter in his
docket, a minute of the conviction and the cause thereof, and
the same shall be deemed a judgment, in all respects, at the
suit of the people of this state.”"‘
in his discretion, hold the
open until the witness can he
attached and l>rou,'.:ht in. if that can
Rapp
be done in a reasonable
time:
leyc v. Prince. 4 Hill, 119.
tlcc may,

cause

13~(‘. L., 5 sot.
l~i—2 (‘ow. Treat. 2d cd., R64.
15-—(‘. L.. § S05.
The procecdinlls
to impose a ﬁne under this and the
next section are of n criminal nature:
Prentiss v. Webster.
2 Doug., 5: see.
Matter of John Morton. 10 .\Ilch., 208;
PREP v. Mitchel. I3 Mlch., 63: Matter
of i-‘redcrlck liall, 10 ‘.\llch., 210.
iﬁ-(X L.. 5 R06: llashrouck v.
linker. 10 Johns. 248: ileermnns v.
Williams, 11 Wend., 636.
It has been

that the neglect of the witness to
appear in obedience to the suhpocnais
a contempt.
and that after termination
of the suit the witness might be pun
therefor, and that the justice
ished
might issue his warrant to bring the
witness before him to receive sentence.
for the pun
And that the proceedings
ishment of a defaulting witness may
as well be had at the close of the
suit as before, and at any time before
the penalty is barred by the statute
of limitations: Robbins v. Gorham. 25
held,

N. Y., 588; but see. Matter of Clark,
320.
The validity oi’ the
12 (‘ush..
pro
complete
conviction
is
when
nounced and the minutes thereof mad B
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case the witness does not appear, the penalty must be col
in an action for its recovery." In such action it must

appear that the witness was material. The witness may show
by the plaiutit’r"s admission that he (witness) knew nothing
about the matter in controversy.
The omission to pay the
witness his legal fees would be a reasonable excuse."
Unless
those fees are paid, an action cannot be sustained. Where less
than the legal amount was paid the witness when he was sub
poenaed, and it did not appear whether he Ol)_]'c<3t8(l‘&t the time

is,

that the amount was insuthcient, it was held, that the party
must pay a witness enough at his peril, and therefore the action
could not be sustained. If necessary that the Witness remain
in court beyond the time for which he has been paid, the party
must pay additional fees, at the peril of losing him; the witness
is not under any legal obligation to ask for them." Whether a
witness, who at the time of service of the subpoena waives the
payment of a part or the whole of his fees, is liable to an
action,
perliaps, questionable.
“lipon the imposition of such ﬁne, and in default of pay
ment thereof, with costs. the justice shall forthwith issue an
execution (llI‘eete(l to any constable of the county, command
ing him to levy such tine, with costs, on the goods and chat
tels of the delinquent. and for want thereof to take and convey
him to the jail of the county. there to remain until he shall
pay such tine and costs; and the keeper of such jail shall keep
such delintpient in close custody in such jail, until the ﬁne and
costs be paid, but such imprisonment shall not exceed thirty
days. "~'°
“\\'hen money shall he eollectetl on such execution, the con
stable shall return the same to the justice. and such~justice
shall pay over the amount of such tine to the county treasurer,
to be 1llSll‘llllll4*(l according to law.”2‘
’

liable in damages,

when.-“Every

as aforesahl. and neglecting or refusing

G

P. I... chap. ‘.371.
v. Baker,
Denlo. ‘IT
IR~t“ourtne_v
19
llurd v, Swan.
Denlo. 75.
‘_’H__(‘. I...
-907.
‘ll
I‘. I...
ROR.
17

3

up, and its \':|lidit_\' is not ¢‘lfTt‘t'l|'tl l»_v
the failure of the _ltt.\'ll1'a~to enter it
in his (locket: Itol-bins
v. ﬁorhain. '_'.'»
.\'. Y.. T-RR: and see, ll.-ill v. 'l‘utIle.
llill. IIH: '\\'.'1lrod v. Sliutter.
Ponist.
lZ”’.~t.

person

to appear

4

Sllr)]i()n‘Iltl1‘ll

R09

.___.

j

—

-7-

\

Witness
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or testify, shall also be liable to the party in whose behalf he
shall have been subpoenaed, for all damages which such party
shall sustain by reason of such non-appearance or refusal; and
in all cases when any fees shall be paid to any person for at
tendance or travel as a witness, and such person shall fail
to attend, he shall refund the amount

paid.””

Witness refusing to be sworn or to testify may be
a witness, attending before any justice
in the cause, shall refuse to be sworn in the form prescribed
by law, or to answer any pertinent or proper question, such
justice may, by warrant, commit such witness to the jail of the
§308.

c0mmitted.——“Wh<*11

county.”23

“Such warrant shall specify the cause for which the same is
and if it be for refusing to answer any question, such

as a witness.”

Before the justice can commit
22——C. L., Q 809.
in an action for damages
occa
sioned by the defendant's non-attend
to B.
ance as a witness in obedience
the plaintiff
is entitled to
subpoena,
recover any damages immediately con
on the non-attendance; as,
sequential
for example,
that occasioned
by the
postponement
of the trial for which
he was subpoenaed.
on account of his
absence.
And it is no answer to such
action. that the court from which the
subpoena
issued
refused
to Impose a
fine upon the defendant for disobeying
the subpoena, but accepted his excuse:

a

person

who

refuses

to be

Mich.,
v. Webster,
2 Doug.,
see, Hasbrouck v. Baker, 10 Johns..
2-18; lieermans v. Williams, 11 Wend..
But, before an action will lie.
636.
it must be made to appear that the
witness was a material one, and that
the failure to try the cause, or the de
feat of the party, arose from the
absence
of such witness:
Hurd v.
Swan, 4 Denio, 75; Courtney v. Baker,
3 Ibid., 27.
23—C. L., 5 984.
24--—(.‘. I... § 985.
10
25—l\/latter of John_ Morton,
Mich., ‘Z08. And the justice would be
Prentiss

5;
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question shall be speciﬁed therein; and such witness shall be
closely conﬁned, pursuant to such warrant, until he submit to
be sworn, or to answer, as the case may be.”“
If, for any reason, the justice has failed to acquire jurisdic
tion of the proceeding or cause, a commitment of a witness for
refusing to testify would be void.”
If the witness refuse to testify, the justice may immediately
require him to show cause why a ﬁne should not be imposed,
and if no sufficient cause be shown, impose a ﬁne. It must be
shown or admitted that the subpoena has been duly served, as
by the language of the previous section (§ 805) a ﬁne can be
has been “duly subpoenaed
imposed only upon a person who
A

I41 -1--_-4

issued,
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a

it

liable to an action for false imprisonment for any detention which the witness might be subjected to, under such
void warrant of commitment: Page v.
Mitchell, 13 Mich., 63, 68.
But

a

986.

witness

210.

."
1‘I

i

;i4

L.,

-1
- -—-_-

...¢-.>---...._-.-.3

26—C.

§

‘

-

cannot be detained in custody for rc
fusing to be sworn or to testify after
the cause or proceeding
in which his
testimony is required is discontinued:
Matter of Frederick Hall, 10 Mich..

in
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Witness,

it
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a

must be proved that he has been duly
subpoenaed, for, unless he has been, he cannot be compelled to
testify. If, however,
person not duly subpoenaed consent to
be sworn, he may be committed
he refuse to answer
perti
nent or proper question. In either case, the party at whose
instance he attended must make oath that the testimony of
so far material that without
such witness
he cannot safely
of
such cause.
proceed to the trial
If the party, after being duly sworn, testify that the testi
mony of the witness
so far material, that without
he can
not safely proceed to the trial of the cause, and the witness
still refuses to be sworn or to answer, the justice must com
mit him.
“The justice shall thereupon adjourn such cause at the re
quest of the party in whose favor such witness attended, from
time to time, until such witness shall testify in the cause, or be
dead, or otherwise incapable of testifying as a witness.”2°
sworn as
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§ 329.
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5 323
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§ 324.

Chailentrrs,

§ 325

Peremptory challenges.

to be summoned.

in general.

(‘haiienges to the array.
(‘halienge to the polls.
328. Service on former juries.

§ 326

§ 327

OF TRIALS BEFORE THE
§ 309.

ON

TH!

TRIAL.

Duty of party having the af
ﬂrmativc.
5 331'. Duty of party opposing.
5 33s. Right to exclude witnesses.
of wit
9 330. Questions of competency
5 336.

5315 Procedure on demand for jury.
5316 Qualiﬁcation of jurors.
5317 Who exempt from serving as
jurors.
5 318. Who may be excused from ser
ving as jurors.
of jurnrs—constnbic
Q 319 Selection
to be sworn.
i 320. Parties may agree upon jurors.
! 321 The venire, how served.
§ 322 Waiver of jury after venire is

i

Further as to when to be made.
How made.
iiow tried.
Number of jurors.
Swearing the jury.
5 335. Jurors refusing to serve.
5 330.
5 331.
5 332.
5 333.
5 33-4.

OF PROCEEDINGS

jury trial.

JURY.

sued.

When challenge
is for cause,
ground to be immediately
as

nesses.
§-340. The oath or aiﬁrmation.
of
§ 341. Order of introduction
deuce.

discretionary
Nonsult.
plaintiff.
Q34-'1. Argument to the jury.
I3-H. Charging the jury.

$342.

01-‘ THE

DELIBERATIONS

OF

evi

with

THE JURY.

procedure
after evidence
§ 345. The
and arguments closed.
§ 3-16. Right to take documentary evi
dence to the jury-room.
Q 347. Misconduct of justice or jury.
§ 348. The verdict.
§ 349. Proceedings not to be taken on
Sunday.
350. Disagreement of jury.

JUSTICE WITHOIIT

A

JURY.

When and where trial to proceed.-—“Whenever

issue

shall have been joined in a suit before a justice, if no jury shall
have been demanded by either party, the justice shall proceed
to try such issue, to hear the proofs and allegations of the
parties, and to determine the same according to law, as the
very right of the case may appeal-.”‘
I

l—C. L.,

Q 811.
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“Whenever a defendant who has been personally served
with a summons, attachment, or writ of replevin, or who shall
have procured an adjournment Without having joined issue,
shall neglect to appear and join issue, the justice shall proceed
to hear the proofs and allegations of the plaintiff, and deter
mine

the same as above

prescribed.“

The trial cannot be had at a place different from the one
mentioned in the summons,“ unless both parties appear at the
place appointed, when it may be adjourned to another place.‘

apppear.-If the defendant
of process, the plaintiff must
prove his demand in the same manner as if he had appeared
and denied it.“
So, if the defendant does not appear after
an adjournment without having joined issue; or if he fails to
appear after issue joined upon a plea which denies the plain
tiff’s demand, as the general issue, or appear and refuses to
§ 310.

In

case defendant fails to

does not appear on the return

2—C. L., 5 812.
.'l—Stewart v. Meigs, 12 Johns., 4.17.
112.
4—l\iorrill
1 Cow.,
V. Near,
But when both parties appear on the
return of process. an adjourned day.
the justice may adjourn the cause to a
more convenient
place of trial. if it is
within reasonable distance and in the
some town.
Unless the parties sooner
appear. the justice must, both on the
rcturn day and on any adjourned day,
with
wait an hour before proceeding
See, (mte_ § 149; and.
the trial:
Shufelt v. Cramer,
20 Johns.,
309:
Staﬂord v. Williams. 4 Denio. 182:
v. Saratoga
8: W. R. R. Co..
650.
So, where a cause is
held open to a particular time. as for
the‘ return of an attachment issued
against a defaulting witness. the jus
tice must, unless both parties shall be
wait one hour before
sooner present,
See, ante,
with the trial:
proceeding
5 149; Clark v. Garrison, 3 Barh.,
Sherwood

l5 Barh.,

372.

Duzor v. Llnderman,
10
5—Van
Johns., 106.
And the evidence must
be suﬁicient to show a cause of action,
for if
to warrant a Judgment.
and
there should be an entire want of evi
dence, or a material defect
in the
the judgment will be reversed
proofs,
Northrop v. Huntley.
on cerﬂorari:

85; Perkins v. Stebhins, 29
523; (‘arter v. Dallimore, 2
Sand.,
222: Swift v. Falconer. Ib|'d.,
640.
But where the defendant
does
not-appear, the plaintiff need not nega
tive any afiirmative defense which the
might have interposed.
had
defendant
no proof need
he appeared: therefore
be made to avoid the statute of limi
tations, or to show that no payment
has been made, or to establish any
other fact which might be used in an
13 Wend..

Barb.,

swer

to

a

defense,

had

one

been

set

llumphrey v. Pearsons, 23 Barb..
313.
The rule is the same where the
has appeared and put in a
defendant
denial, and also set up an aﬂirmative
defense.
If he does not appear at the
trial and prove the affirmative defense.
the plaintlli‘ need only prove what is
put in issue by the general denial. As
to the affirmative defense the burden
of proof is on the defendant. and until
he gives evidence
to prove the truth
of it. the piaintiﬂ need not negative
it: Ibld. Unless the plaintiffs evi
dence shows the aﬂlrmative defense to
the piaintiﬂ
de
as, where
be true,
clares upon a promissory note, which
by
on its face to be barred
appears
in such
the statute of limitations:
sets up that
case. if the defendant
defense at the joining of issue, then
up:

312

Ca.

XIX.

or ramps

WITHOUT

JURY.

§311

plead. In all these cases the justice must hear the proofs and
allegations of the plaintiff, and upon them render his judg
ment.°
§ 311. Proof by witness.-Every person offered as a witness
before any testimony shall be given by him, shall he duly
sworn or aﬂirmcd.'
The oath, to the witness, must be administered by the justice
who tries the cause, and if he be sworn by another justice, it
will be illegal,“ if objected to,” otherwise not, as the parties
may consent that a witness give his evidence without being
sworn at all.1°

When judgment of non-suit may be rendered.
§312.
“Judgment of non-suit, with costs, shall be rendered against a
plaintitf prosecuting an action before a justice of the peace,
in the following cases:
1.
2.

If he discontinue or withdraw his action;
If he fail to appear, on the return of any process,

one hour after the same was returnable

within

;"

3.
If after an adjournment he fail to appear within one
hour after the time to which the adjournment shall have been

made
4.

;

If he

become non-suited on the

A judgment of non-suit

trial.

is a ﬁnal disposition of the particular

though
do not
even
the defendant
appear at the trial. the defense must
he allowed, unless the plaintiff shows
that the demand has been continued
in force. or that it has been revived
legal
manner:
in some
or renewed
Pentleld v. Jacobs. 21 Barh., 335; Wal
rod v. Bennett. 6 lbid., 1-H.
issue does not al
8—'i‘he general
ways deny the plaintiff‘s demand. as.
where the plaintiff claims upon a note
or written instrument made by the de
the justice;
ﬂied with
and
fendant.
Sec, ant:-.. 5 191.
L., §§ 830, 10204,
10205.
7-—C.
10206.
8—Perry v. Wyman. 1 J’0hns._ 520.
9-—Cohb v. Curtis. 8 .Tohns., 470.
10-—Reed v. Gillett, 12 Johns, 396.
While the law docs not permit n jus
tice or judge to be a witness in a cause

on trial before himself, nor to make
any facts within his own knowledge
the basis of his judicial
decisions:
Blanchard v. Richley, 7 Johns. 199;
nor allow his personal
knowledge
of
facts to dispense with proof of them
where such proof would be otherwise
required:
Kermntt v. Ayer, 11 Mlch.,
183; yet it seems that by the consent
of both parties the justice might be
sworn in the case, or make a state
ment wlthout oath, and act upon it:
Cobb v. Curtis, 8 J0hns., 470; see,
Morss v. Morss, 11 Barb., 510.
1l—’I‘he failure of the plaintiff to
appear
within the hour deprives
the
justice of jurisdiction except to render
Brady v.
u judgment of nonsuit:
Taber, 29 Mlch.,
199; Cagney
v.
Wattles, 121 Mlch., 469; 80 N. W.,
245.
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action in which it is entered, but does not necessarily bar a
subsequent action for the same cause."
If the plaintiﬁ be satisﬁed that his proof is insufficient to
maintain his action, he may elect to become non-suit at any
time before the cause is ﬁnally submitted to the justice, but
not after it is so submitted." But if the justice should con
sider the plaintiﬂE"s evidence insuﬁicient to support the action,
he cannot compel the plaintiff to be non-suited.“
Generally, of when judgment to be rendered.—“In
plaintiﬁ shall be non-suited, discontinue or with
draw his action, and where a judgment shall be confessed,
and in all cases where a verdict shall be rendered, or the
defendant shall be in custody at the time of hearing the cause,
the justice shall forthwith render judgment, and enter the
same in his docket; in all other cases he shall render judgment
and enter the same in his docket, within four days after the
cause shall have been submitted to him for his ﬁnal de
’
cision. "5
§313.

cases where a

12—Bowne
Mich.. 186.
be announced

Johnson,
1 Doug.,
a judgment of nonsuit
hy,the justice under the
has
that the plaintii!
v.

It

apprehension
when he has, he may
not appeared,
and proceed
correct the announcement
Hodges v. Bagg, 81
with the trial:
Mich., 247; 45 N. W., S41. A written
request
or plalntii! without personal
by himself or attorney, is
appearance
suiﬁcient to authorize the justice to
hold the case open for a few hours:
Wagner v. Kellogg, 92 Mich., 616; 52
N. W., 1017.
11 .Tohns.,
13--Hess
v. Beekman,
it notice of set-otts has been
457.
ﬂied, he cannot become nonsuited with
out the consent of the defendant: see.
ante, § 273.
14-—Cahill v. K. M. Ins. Co., 2
Doug., Mich., 124, 133.
15—C. L., § 843; see, post, chap. xxvi.
In those cases where the justice
render judg
may, under this section.
ment within four days after the cause
was submitted to him, he may decide
it at any time within the four days.

It

he

determines,

when

the

cause

is

submitted to him. to decide it on some
particular day within that‘ time, this

is In legal eﬂect a continuance of the
cause until that day, and should be so
announced
to the parties, and should
be so entered upon his docket.
Ii.’ he
does not at the time of the submission
of the cause determine on the day
when he will render his judgment, he
may render it at any time within the
four days. when, upon due considera
tion, he becomes satisﬁed what judg
ment should be rendered: and. in such
as
case. the court must be regarded
still open, so far as the particular
case
is concerned,
and the parties
bound to take notice when the judg
ment is rendered,
and what the judg
Draper v. Tooker, 16 Mich..
ment is:
74, 77.
But the decision and judg
ment of the justice must be rendered
within the four days, or the judgment
will be void:
Watson v. Davis, 19
Wend., 371: and see, Bisseil v. Bissell,
11 Barb., 96; Brady v. Taber, 29 Mich..
,

199.

Under C. L., 5 843. where a cause
was tried before a justice without a
jury on the 12th of the month, and
judgment on the 17th,
he rendered
being the ﬁfth day atter the trial:
Held, that the judgment was void,
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During the time which the cause is under advisement, the
justice ought to hold no communication with either of the
parties. They are not in court for any purpose but to receive
judgment."
TRIALS BY JURY.

§314. When may demand jury tria1.—“After an issue of
fact joined, and before the ﬁrst adjournment, and before the
justice shall proceed to an investigation of the merits of the
cause, by an examination of a witness, or the hearing of any
other testimony, either of the parties, or the attorney of either
of them, may demand of the justice that the cause be tried by
a. jury, and pay to the’justice the lawful fees of the jurors.”"’
“Either party who shall not, at the time of joining issue in

457-8.

_

17—C. L., 5 813.
Where a party has demanded
a
jury and paid their fees, he has no
right. it the jury disagree. to insist
on a trial by another jury without ad
vancing an additional jury fee:
Mc
Graw V. Sturgeon, 29 Mich., 426. And
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so on the ground that he has no ju
dicial duty in such a case. and must
act minlstcrially
in recording their
action.
lie cannot set it aside; and.
if his entry of judgment is postponed,
yet the law itself supplies it, whether
entered
or not, and its subsequent
entry, in accordance
with the verdict.
is entirely proper: Alt v. Laione, 54
Mich., 302; 20 N. W., 52; see, Overall
v. Pero, 7 Mich., 315.
But the pro
vision of the statute requiring the jus
tice to enter the judgment in his dock
et, is directory merely.
The entry in
the docket is a ministerial act, and is
evidence of the judgment, but is not
the judgment itself.
The judgment
is complete when pronounced,
and un
til entered in the
docket
may be
proved by the oath of the Justice and
from his minutes: Ilickey v. Hlnsdaie,
8 Mich., 267:'see, also, Hall v. Tut
tic, 6 iiill, 38; Walrod v. Shutter, 2
Comst.,
134.
A judgment entered _in
the justice's minutes
is not void be
cause not forthwith entered upon the
docket: Saunders v. Tioga Mfg. Co.,
27 Mich., 520.
16—Hess v. Bcekman.
11 Johns.,

mio

the 16th day of the
being the fourth day after the
The court say,
trial. was Sunday.
the judgment must be rendered within
four days after the cause is submitted
to the justice. and if the fourth day
is Sunday,
then it must be rendered
within three days after the case is
Sager,
27
submitted:
Harrison
v.
Mich., 476; see, Weaver v. Lummon,
The
62 Mich., 366: 28 N. W.. 905.
same rule obtains in case of legal holi
days: Hemmens v. Bentley, 32 Mich.
88. In cases tried beforeajustice
with
out a jury he has no jurisdiction to ren
day.
der judgment after the fourth
An‘d even where the docket by mistake
showed
the judgment to have
been
rendered
on the ﬁfth instead
of the
fourth day, it was held that the dock
et entry could not be contradicted,
and
the judgment was
held
void:
lbid.,- sec also, Galloway v. Corbett.
52 Mich., 460: 18 N. W., 218; Madge
v. Ynplcs. 58 Mich., 310; 25 N. W.,
297.
in this state, where in an ac
tion for assault. the jury gave a ver
dict for the plaintiff on one day, but
judgment was not rendered
by the
justice until the following day, Held,
that it is enough to say, that where
a cause is tried by jury their verdict
is conclusive, and cannot be invali
dated by any action or non-action of
justice.
the
\Vhen
the
statute re
quires a justice to enter judgment im
medlately
on such a verdict, it does
month,

0-To— -‘-1’

notwithstanding

\
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any cause, and before the same shall be adjourned, require a
trial of such cause by jury, shall be deemed to have waived the
same.”‘8
After issue joined in a cause, the defendant said he would go
on and try the cause, and the justice told the plaintiff to go on
with his account. The plaintiff then asked the defendant if he
would admit any of his account, and he did admit one or two
of the charges. .The plaintiff then called a witness, and after
the justice had begun to administer the oath, the defendant
Held, the de
demanded a venire, which the justice refused:
fendant was too late in his application for a j1u'y. An investi
The justice had told the plaintiff to
gation had commenced.
go on, in consequence of which he proceeded to prove some
items by the admission of the defendant, and a witness was

partly sworn before
OF‘

the call

for

a

venire."

TIIE VENIRE, THE SERVICE AND RETURN THEREOF.

§315. Procedure when demand for jury ma.de.—“Upon
such demand and payment of such fees to the justice, such
constable, or other
justice shall direct some disinterested
proper person of the county, to write down a list of the names
of eighteen inhabitants of the ‘county qualiﬁed to serve as
jurors in courts of record, who shall be in nowise of kin to
the plaintiff or defendant, nor interested in such suit.”2°
are not paid the justice
ifmaysuchtry fees
a jury:
the cause without

from further proceedings there
after does not amount to a waiver of
a jury, and the justice cannot proceed
Boatz ct ai. v.
to try the case alone:
Berg, 51 Mich., 8; 16 N. W.. 184. it
is sufﬁcient, if demand for a jury is
pursuant to the statute. that
made
the jury fee be paid on the day to
which the cause stands adjourned. at
any time before the trial is entered
upon
by the swearing of witnesses:
Plank Road Co. v. ﬂopkinson, 69 Mich.,
10; 36 N. W., 797.
19—Gaie v. Barnes. 1 (‘ow., 235.
But where the justice had merely in
the
the plaintiff's
account
spected
court held that the trial had not com
menced, and that it was not too late
Olney v. Bacus,
to call for a jury:

sence

Roberts v. Tremayne. 61 Mich.. 264:
N. W., 113; McGraw v. Sturgeon,
Mich., 426.
Where a party
18—C. L.. 5 814.
to a suit before a justice oi’ the peace
has tailed to demand
a jury at the
time of joining issue and before ad
journment of the cause. but calls for
day,
adjourned
it
one
on
the
justice,
for
the
competent
is
notwithstanding
the objection of the
opposite party, to order a jury to he
summoned
for the trial of the cause.
The neglect to demand a jury with
the time prescribed by law, is a waiver
only of the right; the justice still
may. in his discretion, order one: Van
But
Sickle v. Kellogg. 19 Mich., 49.
after the defendant has demanded a
jury, and paid the jury fee, his ab
28
29

‘ll?

1

.lohns.,

142.

20—C. L., 5 815. The justice ought
not to designate a constable or other
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§316. Qualiﬁcation of jur0rs.—,Pcrsons having the qualiﬁ
cations of electors are qualiﬁed to serve as jurors.“
“In all
elections, every male inhabitant of this state, being a citizen
of the United States, every male inhabitant residing in this
state on the twenty-fourth
day of June, eighteen hundred
thirty-ﬁve, every male inhabitant residing in the state on the
ﬁrst day of January, eighteen hundred ﬁfty, every male inhabi
tant of foreign birth who, having resided in the state two
years and six months prior to the eighth day of November,
eighteen hundred ninety-four, having declared his intention
to become a citizen of the United States two years and six
months prior to said last named day, and every civilized male
inhabitant of Indian descent, a native of the United States and
not a member of any tribe, shall be an elector and entitled
to vote; but no one shall be an elector or entitled to vote at
any election unless he shall be above the age of twenty-one
years, and has resided in this state six months and in the town
ship or ward in which he offers to vote twenty days next pre
ceeding such election: Provided, that in time of war, insur
rection or rebellion no qualiﬁed elector in the actual military
service of the United States or of this state, or in the army
or navy thereof, shall be deprived of his vote by reason of his
absence from the township, ward or state in which he resides,
and the legislature shall have the power, and shall provide the
manner in which and the time and place at which such absent
electors may vote, and for the canvas and return of their votes
to the township or ward election district in which they re
spectively reside.”22
to w'rite the names and sum
pcrson
mon thc jury. until the parties have
had an opportunity to make all ren
objections to such oﬂlcer or
sonahle
if any such ohjection there
person,
Rice v. Buchanan. 41 Barb.,
may he:
1-i7.
The person selected to choose
the jurors must_he disinterested and
law
impartial:
this is a common
right: People v. Felker, 61 Mich., 1143
The jurors maybe sum
28 N. W.. S3.
at large:
moned
from the county
Faulks v. People. 30 Mich., 20.
21--C. la. § 319. The proper time
inquiries into the qualiﬁca
to~mnke
tions ot the jurors is before trial:

and it not made then, any objections
to the Jurors will he deemed to have
been waived.
The fact that a juror
is an nlien, and
that this was not
discovered
until after judgment. is not.
in civil eases. ground for the reversal
oi’ a judgment:
Johr v. People, 26
It is not a necessary
1\iich.. 427.
juror that he
qualiﬁcation
oi’ the
should he a taxpayer:
Stewart v.
23 Mich..
People.
78-9.
63.
22—Const. of Mich., Art. 7. § 1. if
a man of foreign hirth has declared
his intention to become a citizen in
due form of law. and the other condi
within
the
tions oi’ nge, residence
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jury, the

the statute should be observed:

“In

making such selection, they (the oﬁicers) shall take the names
of such only as are not exempt from serving on juries, who
are in possession of their natural faculties, and not inﬁrm or
decrepit, of good character, of approved integrity, of sound
judgment, and well informed, and conversant with the English
language, and free from all legal exceptions, and who have
not made, and in whose behalf there has not been made, to the
officers mentioned in the preceding section any application to
be selected and returned as jurors/’23
§317. Who exempt from serving on jury.—The following
persons shall be exempt from serving as jurors, to wit: The
governor, lieutenant governor, secretary, treasurer and au
ditor-general of the state, the justices of the supreme court,
all judges of courts of record, acting commissioner of -internal
improvement, commissioner of_the land oﬁice, superintendent
of public instruction, clerks of courts, registers in chaneery,
registers of deeds, sheritfs and their deputies, coroners, con
stables, all officers of the United States, attorneys and coun
selors at law, and solicitors and counselors in chancery, oﬂi
cers of the university, ofﬁcers of colleges, settled ministers of
of incorporated academies,
the gospel, preceptors and
teachers
all superintendents, engineers and collectors of any canal or
railroad authorized by the laws of this state, any portion of
which shall be actually constructed and used, constant ferry
men, all members of any company of ﬁremen organized accord
ing to law; all persons more than sixty years of age, and

~
voting
state
and
proper
length
of

precinct
for the
time are found .to
exist, this provision of the constitution
confers the right of suifrage. and such
person is, in this respect, qualiﬁed to
act as a juror: People v. Scott. 56
.\Iich., 154: 22 N. W., 274: People v.
Rosevear,
158; 22 N. W.,
56 Mic-h.,
Nothing
276.
will be presumed
against the qualiﬁcations of a juror:
People v. Scott, 58 Mir-h., 154: 22 N.
W., 274.
No person is qualiﬁed to be
returned by the supervision as a. juror
whose nnme is not on the assessment
roll and it is a good objection to a

juror that he is not assessed:
Stew
art v. People, 23 Mlch.. 63; Schiacker

Mining Co., 89 Mich.. 253: 50 N.
W., R39; People v. Thncker, 108 Mir-h..
652: 66 N. W.. 562. This is not true
of taiesmen.
The statute does not
require that they be taxpayers: Stew
art v. People, and Schlacker v. Min
ing (‘o.. supra; Reed v. Peacock. 123
liiit-h.. 244; 82 N. W., 53.
23-C. 1'... § 319. And further. as
Sec,
to the qualiﬁcations of jurors:
People v. iiarding.
53 Mich., 48, 51;
18 N. W.. 555.
v.
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all other persons exempted by any other law of this state from
serving on juries.”“
Members of the state troops and of the uniformed volunteer
militia, who have performed military service in the manner and
for the time prescribed by law, and shall have received from
the state military hoard a certiﬁcate showing the performance
of such service, are exempt from serving on juries.”
“Any person who was a. ﬁreman in any incorporated city or
village in this state, on the sixth day of February, one thousand
eight hundred and forty-three, or at any time thereafter, and
who shall have served for the term of seven years from that
time, or from the time of his appointment, if appointed since
that time, and every person who may hereafter be appointed
a ﬁreman in any such city or village, and serve as such ﬁreman,
shall, during the time of such service, be exempted from serv
ing as a juror in any of the courts of this state, etc.”2°
The state salt inspector and his deputies," and keepers of
poor-houses," are'also exempt.
§318. Who may be excused from serving on jury.—“'I‘hc
court to which any person shall be returned as a juror, shall
excuse such juror from serving at such court, whenever it shall
appear,
1.
That he is exempt from serving on juries by the pro
visions of the preceding section; or,
2.
That he is a practicing physician or surgeon, and has
'
patients requiring his attention; or,
That he is a justice of the peace, or executes any other
3.
civil oﬁicc, the duties of which are, at the time, inconsistent
with his attendance as a juror; or,
4.
That he is a teacher of any school, actually employed
and serving as such; or,

Mk-h.. 377: 51 N. W.. 522.
(Overrul
im: a dictum in People v. Baumnn.
52 Mlch., 584: IQ N. W.. 369. to the
contrary.)
a
person
If. however.
within the provisions of this statute

challenged
because of that fact, It
is not reversible error since the op
posing pasty has no right to have such
persons
sit in the cause: especially
challenges
if his peremptory
are not
exhausted:
Mt-Grail
v.
Kalamazoo.
94 Mich
. 53 N. W., 955.
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_ . . ,_,

2~i—(‘. L., 5
The exemption
priv
under this statute ls a personal
ilege and such persons
as are within
the provisions of the statute are com
petent jurors as against objection on
People v.
this ground:
Rawn. 90

5 1607.
5 3472.
5 4944.
5 4520.
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\Vhen, for any other reason, the interests of the public, or
individual juror, will be materially injured by such
attendance, or his own health, or that of any member of his
family requires his absence from such court.”29
the

Selection of jurors, constable to be sworn.—“The eon
stable or other person directed to make such list, shall, before

_._t cw-i ;¢_ _ ._y___

X

§
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of
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making the same, be sworn by the justice to select such per
sons according to his best judgment, and without favor or
partiality to either party.”3°
“From such list each party may strike off six names; and in
case of the absence or refusal of either party to strike out, the
justice shall strike out for him six names from said list; and

a

the justice shall thereupon issue a venire, (lll'€’Ct€'d to any con
stable of the county, requiring him to summon the six persons
whose names shall remain upon the list, to appear at
time

therein,

named

if

a

jury for the trial of
and place to be named therein, to make
the
in
the action between
such venire; and the
parties named
constable shall serve such venire personally on each juror
to be found within his county.”31

Parties may agree upon jurors.—“The parties may
of jurors to try the cause;
and in such ease the justice shall direct in the venire the sum
§320.

agree upon six or any less number

a

moning of the persons so agreed upon, who,"when summoned
and appearing, shall compose the jury; and the justice shall
make
minute of such agreement in his doeket.”32

jury
the trial of
cause by
though not made until after
the return of the venire, and when the jury
drawn.
a

a

good,

Q

is

of. less than six persons,

is

An agreement by the parties for

court.

a

I.

against

either of the parties.
Where
is serious doubt even of his
fairness he Should not be selected to
choose jurors.
'l‘his right of parties is
common
law right and is not de
People v. Fel
pendent upon statute:
ker. 61 Mieh., 114; 28 N.
83.
31—(‘.. L..
S17.
32—C‘. L..
81.8.
there

I.

<>-Qf—
0l 1 ' __
*3

30—(‘. L.,
816.
The ofﬁcer chosen
to write down the list of names from
which the jury is to be chosen should
he free
from prejudices or hostility
§

§

336.

9

the

§ 5

It

is in the disbefore
juror
has been sworn in a cause, to excuse
him
for any reason personal to the
juror. which seems to the court suf
from
even without
ficient.
eliallemze
either party: People v. Carrier, 46
.\iich.. 4-H:
N. W.. -192; Atlas Min
ing (‘o. v. Johnston.
23 Mieh.,- 36:
67
ﬁ'.\'eli v. Lake Superior
(‘o..
And this
.\iieh.. 560; 25 N. W., 162.
though
their
parties have exhausted
challenges:
O'Neil
v.
peremptory
Lake Superior
Co" supra.
I...

of

a

29-0
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§321

The venire, how served.—The constable must serve
on each juror named therein, if to be
found within his county.”
The manner of service may be
§321.

the venire personally

(as is the usual practice) by reading or stating the substance
the venire to each person named therein, care being had to
state the name of the justice issuing the venire, and the names
of the parties, together with the time and place of trial. The
jurors should have a reasonable time to attend, after notice,
as in case of witnesses.

of

the
§322. Waiver of jury after venire issued.—Though
party demanding a trial by jury has undoubtedly a right to
waive such trial after a venire has been issued, yet, if the
venire has been served and returned, the other party would
have the right to insist that the cause should be tried by the
jury thus returned, notwithstanding the party originally de
manding such trial should waive it; or, if a jury should not
that venire, he might
venire should be issued at his instance,

be obtained

on

require that a new
if he had required a

jury.“
In

joint debtors,

venire mentioning only
the defendant brought into court, without taking notice of the
other, is sufficient.“
The party at whose instance the venire is issued, cannot
allege error in it.“
an action against

CALLING THE

a
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§323. When talesmen to be summoned.-On the return of
the venire, the justice will proceed to call the jurors.
“If any of the jurors named in the venire shall not be found,
or shall fail to appear according to the summons, or if there
shall be any legal objection to any one who shall appear, it
shall be the duty of the constable, on being thereunto directed
v. Neweli. 1 Denio, 25;
33—Carm|1n
Keeier v. Delavun, 4 Bnrb.. 317.
In case of loss of the
C. L., Q 817.
ﬁrst venire a second may be issued by
Day v. Wilber, 2 Caines,
the justices:
134.

137.

34-—Edward's
21

Ti-eat.,

1st

ed..

90.

by
Absence
from further proceedings
a party after demanding a jury cannot
be construed as a waiver of his right;
to the jury trial: Boatz v. Berg.. 51
Mich., 8; 16 N. W., 184.
35—Hutchins v. Cary, 4'Johns., 222.
36—Day v. Wiiber, 2 Caines, 134.
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:1

is
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if

of

it

is

a

is

a

a
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is,
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a

by the justice, to summon
sufficient number of talesmen to
supply the deticiency."37
That
the justice may require the constable to summon a
suﬁicient number of the b_vstanders to complete the number
required of those who are absent or set aside as incompetent.
deficiency, the justice may issue
Should there still be
pre
jurors
cept, requiring the constable to summon the number of
wanted. This
to be done under
precept in the nature of a
writ of tales at the connuon law, and
in the same form as the
vcnire, with this ilitl'crencc, that instead of naming the persons,
('()lllliliillilS the (f()ll.\‘lill)l(‘ to summon “three (or other number
wanted) z'2zlml»{tu)zts o/' the .\-aid (.-ount_z/ qurlliﬁed to serve as
jurors in cum-t.>~ of recon], who are in nozrise of kin to either
the plninti,/I’ or the rhfrimlunf, nor inlcre.~'tc(_l in sa-id suit, to
appear, (etc., to rmlkc so nmngy
jury/, etc.” The justice
issue
this
may,
from time to time, till
process
ncccssar_\'.
full jury.39 i'nh»ss one of the jurors named in the
there be
venirc appear. there cannot he lilli'SIl1C‘ll.39
If no jin-ors ;l[>}Hi‘;ll‘_ or none are found competent, or if the
venirc
quaslie<l_ or not return<~d_ or the array challenged for
new venire must he issued from time to
good cause_ (‘l(‘..
time, until
jury
Ol)lIllllt"'l qualiﬁed to try the cause.4°
\\'ln*-re the

parti<f~s

ﬂ}_'i‘i‘O

upon, when sunnnoned

so agreed

the persons

jury.“

obtaineil in the other mode,
constitutes
lc;_ral objection to any one who
the jury, unless there shall be
shall appear.

it

the jnr_\'

.

.

the

jury
of

sworn,

is

Challenges, in general.—Before
4

§324.

a party has any ol»_]~-ction for any eaiise to any
win-tlier Hi’l$_"lll2lll_\' .\‘llillllltJll(’tl as .\ll(‘ll or called

the

if

a

w-hen

is

And

aljury,

upon

and :1ppe:irin_:. shall compose the

.

jurors,

as talesmen,

his ohjet-tion to the jiistiee, which
called
l';ll\'(‘lJ
no
be
But
(‘till
jury
until
full
('ll.'illi*iif__'P.
('li2lllPllQ’(‘
have appeared; and.
the ('lilZllli’ll,!_"(‘S
are taken previously,
ii'

a

a

is

he must state

8 7

‘._’

2d

'i‘reat.,

l'_'

l~Lin:.: v. Edmonds.

ed..

Johns..
.Tohns..

885:
198:
460;

Johns., 385.
B.

&

~11)-Pow.

i!l:im-linrd v. Richly,
Set-rin: v. \\'h-~t-don,
'l‘:iiim:in v. Woodworth,
-ti
(‘. L., S18.

2

\i'.'.
1...
.'l-'<-(‘o\\'.
'l‘rv:it. '_‘~l f-~i., MK-'-Z see.
ti;
.Tolins.,
also.
!~'inirh v. .\utt.<.
7.~-oh-_vv. Yzinsi-n. I'M/._ .".\.'»_
.".‘.l-- l>enl»:i\'.'<lV. \\'m'uil¢-,)‘_ iii i'oki~'.<
li~"'p.. lii'._’.
§

:27--P.

ina¢le.‘12

ll'l'i‘f__"lllZll'l.\'

4

they are

Ald.,

§.-,€.4 ¥'-
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§325

Challenges are of two kinds: ﬁrst, peremptory; second, for
cause, which last includes under our practice what was known
at the common law as challenges for principal cause and to
the favor, this distinction not now being regarded.
All are
challenges for cause and tried in the same manner."
are such as are made
§325. Peremptory challenges.-—These
without assigning any reason, and which the courts are com

“In all civil

'5.

pelled to allow.“
cases before justices of the peace, each party

may challenge peremptorily two talesmen, and in all prosecu
tions in the name of the people of this state, the attorney ap
pearing for the people may challenge peremptorily two tales
men, and the defendant may challenge peremptorily four tales
men.

”“‘

As to when objections to a juror
should be made. etc.: Sleight v. lien
ning. 12 Mich., 376: Bourke v. James
A party going
ct nl., 4 Mich., 337.
to trial without objection, knowing of
a juror’s want of qualification. waives
Owners of Ship Mil~
the objection:
waukee, v. ilale. 1 Doug.. 306: Bush
v. Dunham, 4 Mich., 339; Sleight v.
llennlng, 12 1\!ich.. 376: Johr v. Peo
pie, 26 Mich., 427; Bronson v. People.
32 Mich., 3-i; Clark v. Drain Commis
sioner, 50 Mich., 618: 16 N. W.. 167;
People v. Scott, 56 Mich., 154: 22 N.
W., 274; Walker v. City of Ann Ar
hor. 111 Mich., 1: 69 N. W., 87.
4-'l—ilolt v. People, 13 l\Ilch.. 226;
Stephens
v. People,
38 Mich., 739.
44-0. L., § 819. Prior to the
Act of 1885. above quoted. the only
provision under our law allowing per
in
challenges
matters not
emptory
criminal, is found in the chapter of
Laws relating to the
the Compiled
"Trial of issues of Fact," and allows
a challenge
of jurors in “civil cases"
as well as in prosecutions.
This does
not apply to special proceedings
not
in the ordinary course
of law. and
entirely by par
which are regulated
ticular statutes. Challenges
for cause
in all inquiries by jury.
are necessary
challenges in other than
hut peremptory
criminal proceedings.
are conﬁned
to
cases where
the statute has directly
provided for them:
Convers v. The
-171.

Grand Rapids and Indiana Ry. Co.,
18 Mich., 468.
45—C. L., § 820. The provisions of
this statute are conﬁned to talesmen.
Peremptory challenges
must
be nu
thorlzcd by statute: Matter of Con
vers, 18 Mich., 459.
In justice's court
the trial must be had before the jury
struck by the parties, unless
there
be challenge
for cnuse, since there is
authorizing
no
staute
peremptory
chalienze to the original panel: Eid
ridze v. Hubbell, 119 Mich., 61: 77 N.
W., 631; Reed v. Peacock,
123 Mich.,
Perernptory clini
244: 82 N. W., 53.
lennes may be made at any time be
fore the jury is sworn.
The question
of the order of challenge
is one of
practlcli and discretionary with the
Peremptory challenge
court.
is a
right secured
by statute, of which
neither party can be deprived
until
the jury are sworn: Hamper‘s Appeal.
51 Mich., 72; 16 N. W., 236; see.
Mich.,
liunter v. Parsons. 22
96:
Right
Jhons v. People. 25 Mich., 499.
challenge
to peremptory
is lost when
Thorp v. Deming,
the jury is sworn:
78 Mich., 12-l; 43 N. W., 1097; Ayers
v. iluhhard, S8 Mich., 155; 50 N. W.,
111.
Each defendant who pleads sep
arately by different counsel, has the
right to all the peremptory
separate
challenges
allowed by law.
Stroh v.
But where
llinchmnn. 37 Mlch.. 490.
by the
parties sued together
appear
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Challenges for cause and ﬁrst, to the a.rra.y.—Chal
cause are of two kinds, ﬁrst, to the array; second, to

the polls.

the

is

is

is

A challenge to the array
an objection to the whole panel in
which the jury
arrayed, and
founded on some partiality
or default in the oﬁicer or person who summoned or arrayed
panel."

is

if

is

a

is

is

is

is

if

is

is

if

is

The causes of challenge to the array are such as the fol
lowing, viz.: that the oﬁicer
of kindred or aﬁinity to the
the affinity continue; that one or more
plaintiff or defendant,
of the jury are returned at the nomination of the plaintilf '01
defendant; that an action of battery
pending at the suit of
the officer against the plaintiﬁ or defendant; that an action of
debt
pending at the suit of the plaintiﬁ or defendant, against
by the oﬁicer against the plaintiff or de
the officer, but not
fendant, that the sheriff
counsel, attorney, officer, servant or
gossip of either party; or
arbitrator in the same matter, and
tenant
has treated thereof; that the plaintiff or defendant
of the officer, or that the son of the oﬂicer has married the
daughter of the plaintiﬂ’ or defendant, or the like}
It at least doubtful whether, under any circumstances, the
justice’s court. [The constable
array can be challenged in
to be “disinterested,” and
no objection
who makes the list
will
to
him
be
presumed
be
so,
made to
and the party
he
precluded from questioning the fact of his being disinterested.
If, however, the fact that he was interested was known at the
time to the party, his consent will do away with all objections.’
S0, when the parties agreed upon the jurors,“ there could be no
'
challenge to the array.
is

an exception to one or
§327. Second, to the po11s.—This
of the jurors who have appeared, individually; and
for some defect or disqualiﬁcation of the juror; or on account

is

more

array

must be In writing:

269;

v.

1

People

_

_

2—“'*1"<"1=
107

Ryder

3—C. L.,

v-

“'@*""-

818, ante,

_

_

V‘

'

'

'
'

M35831 123% " C;m"4,_g594'36P:g$e
'
"

§

to

38 Mlch.,'
v. People,
Doe,
Mlch., 453.

§

A

3

a

same counsel, and after that right of
if
ls exhausted,
challenge
peremptory
other counsel take charge of the case
part of them, the latter have no
for
Fraser v.
further rlght of challenge:
Jcnnlson, 42 Mlch., 200:
N. w.. ssz.
challenge
46-3 Bla. Com., 359.

1°

-T<>l11=§-

320.

Ina -*~-

.-q -.
-Q».-A

.i
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is
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a

is

is
a

if

it,

of some supposed bias or partiality; or on account of some
crime or misdemeanor which affects the juror»’s credit and
renders him infamous.
Among the causes of challenge arc, that the juror is not
qualiﬁed as required by law; that he is not an clector, that he
is an alien, or within the age of twenty-one, or is an idiot, or
lunatic.‘
Such were known, under the common
law, as
grounds for principal challenge for defect. Among the grounds
for principal challenge for bias or impartiality, as it was
known as the common law, are the following: That the juror
is of kin to either party, within the ninth degree,‘ or, accord
ing to Lord Coke, however remote the kindred, that there is
affinity or alliance by marriage between the juror and one of
the parties, if such aﬂinity continue, or there be issue of. the
marriage alive; that the juror has an interest in the action,
direct or collateral; that the juror has before given a verdict
in the same cause,“ or upon the same title or matter, though
between other parties; that he was chosen arbitrator in the
same cause by one of the parties, and he had entered upon
an examination of
but otherwise
he were chosen indiffer
ently by both parties; that he
counselor, or servant, of
either party; that he
tenant of either party
that he
he
information
of
the
case
before
sworn;
that he
taken
has
has declared his opinion of the case beforehand
that since he
has been- returned, he has eaten or drank at the expense of
one of the parties; that one of the parties has labored the

it

Heimer,

v.

25

Barb.,

29.

1

8—it is n good ground of challenge
that the juror has expressed an opin
ion belorehand on the question
in con
troversy:
Miiispauirh,
Blake
v.
Denio,
Johns., 346; Lord v. Brown.
345.
And
Juror who has formed
an opinion upon
statement made to
him by one of the parties, is not com
Rogers v. Rogers, 14 Wcnd.,
petent:
131.

325

See, post,

329,

note

17.

Hi
{I
-~ ,'iT

7—Hathaway

ii

Mich.,

~1-.

Kneeinnd,

5

of his own motion.
of a party. to exclude an in
objection
person
toxicated
from acting as a
juror.
it is the duty of the court
guard and protect the
to carefully
rights of parties in the selection
of
jurymen, and see to
that no person
who is incompetent
is allowed to sit
in the case: Torrent v. Yaszer, 52
l\1lci1.. 506, 509: 18 N. W., 239.
5—3 Bin. Com., 363.
The nephew
oi’ a party would he an incompetent

v,

4

for the court
and against the

236.

a

is competent

218.

6—Bourke

§

It

216,

a

430.

juror in the case, as the law presumes
that he would be biased by the rela
tionship: Ilnsceig v. Tripp, 20 Mich.,

'

2

L., §§ 815, 319.
4—-C.,
iiiii v.
Mich., 361.
16
It a por
People,
appearing as a juror is lu
son
toxlcated,
the justice may, of his own
motion,
set him aside and refuse
to
Cow.,
swear him: Billiard v. Spear,
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juror, and given him money or other things for giving his
verdict; but if the party only labor the jury to appear and
act conscientiously, it is no matter of challenge whatever; that
an action, implying malice or displeasure, is pending between
the juror and one of the parties.
The principal challenges for crime or misdemeanor, as known
to the common law, were, that the juror had been convicted
for treason, felony, perjury, conspiracy, forgery, or other
infamous crime, of which he had not obtained a pardon.”
These objections must be proved by the record. The foregoing
were known as principal challenges because the fact appear
'
ing the juror was prima facie disqualiﬁed.

a

“In
be

penal actions, for the recovery of any sum,

it

is

is

a

a

it

it

it,

is

it

if

is

is,

The challenge for favor, of the common law, is of the same
nature with the principal challenge, but of an inferior degree.
The general rule of law
that the juror shall be indiifer
not so, this may be
appear probable that he
ent;1° and
made the subject of "challenge, either principal or to the favor,
according to the degree of probability of his being biased. The
such
cause of aprincipal challenge to the polls, we have seen,
matter as carries with
prima facie, evident marks of sus
picion, either of malice or favor.
But when, from circum
stances,
appears probable that a juror may be biased in favor
of or against either party, and yet such circumstances do not
amount to matter for
principal challenge,
may then be
made
challenge to the favor. The eﬁect of these two species
of challenge
the same, and as previously indicated, the dis
tinction between them
not now recognized in our practice."
shall not

jurors summoned, or to any
that such juror or officer is liable to

good cause of challenge to the

Bla. (‘om.. 363.
v. Stoddard,
324.

Johns..

10226.
12—(‘. L.,
13—C. L.,
2468.
Smith v. Ger
man Ins. Co.. 107 Mlch., 270: 65 N.
W., 238. holding the act constitutional.

i ~’
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§

10-—Wood
194.

5 5
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2

officer summoning them,
pay taxes in any county, city, village, township or district,
which may be beneﬁted by such recovery.”12
“On the trial of every action in which a county shall be
interested, the electors and inhabitants of such county shall
be competent witnesses and jurors/"3

Z
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§328. Service on former juries.—By statute it is provided,
that “it shall be a good cause for challenge to any juror, in
any justice or police court in any city, township, or village in
this state, in addition to the other causes of challenge allowed
by law, that such person has served as a juror in such court
more than three times in one year, previous to such chal

lenge.”“
.\Iattcr which merely exempts a man from serving on a jury,
and does not disqualify him, cannot be a cause of challenge."
§329. When challenge is for cause, ground to be immedi
ately assigned.-In this state, it is now provided by law, that
“in all cases of challenge for cause, such cause shall be imme
diately assigned, and the truth thereof shall be determined by
the court."’1°

of this provision, the supreme court say: “By
this statute, the distinction between challenges for principal
Of

the effect

abolished. All are classed
under the same general head of challenges for cause, and all
* " "‘ But the court,
are tried in the same manner.
in its decision, only declares that a suﬁicient cause for chal
lenge does or does not exist, and is not required to classify
it according to any previous distinctions. The suﬁiciency of
the cause will still be determined by common law rules; but
neither the party, in making his challenge, nor the court, in
has any regard to the former classiﬁcation/’"
passing upon
cause and to the favor is practically

it,

"

5

a

L.,
348.
The fact of
having previously served‘ on
three panels within a year. can scarce
be said to render him incompetent
(except in the county of Wayne, where
347, positively
the statute. C. L.,
disqualiﬂes him if he has served more
The object of the
than three times.)
statute seems to be, to provide an
easy mode of ridding courts of pro
jurors: see, Williams
v.
fcaslonrll
Grand Rapids. 53 Mlch., 271: 18 N.
W.. 811.
15-—linwkins. I’. (7.. chap. 43.
Pringle v. lluse,
(‘ow., 436.
14—-C.

qi
°w
~==.=

§

ly

juror’s

3

1

ante,

317,

5

§

note 24.
10238.
16—(‘.. L..
17-Iloit v. People.
ante,
226-7.
See.

Prejudice

13

H

Mich.
324,

disquallﬁes for jury

224.
327.
service

any reasonable
examination tend
ing to develop whether it exists or not
is permissible.
So
held
where
the
question
to the juror was, “Suppose
in this case, after the evidence is all
introduced,
you should believe that it
balanced,
was
evenly
so that there
was as much for the plaintiff as for
which way would you
the defendant.
be inclined to lean—against or in fa
vor of the Company?" Monaghnn v.
Agricultural
F‘. ins.
Co., 53 Mich.,
238: 18 N. W., 797; Township of Ot
aego Lake v. Kirsten,
72 Mlch., 1;
But, see. People v.
40 N. W., 26.
Caldwell, 107 Mlch.. 374: 65 N. W.,
that counsel
213. where a requirement
eliminate from the examination of the
witness language which assumed that
under such circumstances the juror
and
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Further, as to when to be made.--No challenge can
until
full jury hav appeared.1"~*
Nor can either
party ciiallcnge a juror after he has been sworn.”
Either
§330.

0

a

cithrr way
has a prejudice.
against the ent'uri-enient
of the law.
involved in the vzlso or against one
rcjt-cted
of the parties
slmuld
he
clialle-ngi-ti
when
for such
reason:
Theisen v. .ini|l1.\', 7;! .\ii<'h.. ‘.185; -ill
So, where the {1('ii()Il in
N. W., 727.
illvy/111 sale of in
volves
an :1ll<=;_'-t-ti
tuxlcating li<;uor.~=.one who says he is
prvjl1|iit'ed
against the sale of liquor:
'l‘iu~isvll \-'. .iuhn:~'. all/i/'11.’ \\'ilf'l‘P
one
testifies on his roir (ling that he “hail
talked with fllilil_\' liiiTi'I'i'iit per.<on.<
about the afiairi had not (list-ttsseti the
merits of the ¢':1.<e; tiiv ]iul'2~;nliS with
whotn he itlikvti et\'prr-.<.<mian opinion
to him; he had also ertprt-s.<t-ti an
opinion hased up-in what he had heard:
had
formed
sort oi’ an npillinll
if
what he had heard \v:\:~' true; that
would take sotne 4~\'i¢len('e to retnove
that opinion: lint that
was not so
fixed that he would not he _L'O\'.t‘i‘li“(,i
by the evi<lvnr'e"; and un t-ro.\'s~ex:ln1i

parties il(‘iO[]§.{S. So held where one of
the parties and the juror belonged
to
the Odd Fellows but not to the same
lod;_'e:
Reed
V. l'<-acock, 123 Mich.,
53; Free Masons;
‘.344: 52 N. W..
l'urple v. iinrtoll,
13 \Vend., 9; 27
167;
Church;
Am.
Lutheran
lie:-.,
Barton V. i-Irit-kson, 14 Ne-b., 164: 15
person has
N. \\'., 20¢». That
gen
eral social acquaintance with one of
the parties is not suﬁicient to support
Cil{liit'il‘,_'f‘ for
cause:
Brennan
v.
O'Brien. l'_’l I\ii<-h., 491; 80 N. \\'..
'l'hv trial court has a reasonable
249.
discretion to control the examination
of jurors on this voir dire:
Ford V.
(‘lim-wr. 1121 Mich., 440; 71 N. W.,
M337. The [)(‘l‘t'lllDi0I‘_V challenge of a
juror. aft:-r
<-hallenge for cause to
the Sﬂﬂll‘ juror has been erroneously
will not cure the error if
ovt-rruled.
the p:ll‘t_\' so challenging thereby
ex
his peremptory challenges:
hﬂll.<iP(i
'i‘hei.<vn V. .lohns.,
72 Mich., 285: 40
N. W.. 727.
Not so it his peremptory
nation
that
he
“did
not
know cliallenucs are not exhausted when the
jury is sworn:
I\‘uiiings v. Shakes
as he had ftli'ilH‘li any opinion on the
merits; Illi‘_{il[ iiavo furuwd smite im
peare. -iii .\ii<-h.. 408;
N. W.. 451.
It will not vitiate a verdict that the
pression: po.<t~‘ilil_Vcould not try the
impartially as if ('ut1l‘t t‘.\'4'liSt'!~l juror when it would
(‘Ilse as i'airl_v and
hadn't heard of it. and turinwl thr
he _iii;<tit‘u-ti in refusing to sustain
itiipressiuiist that
he
he
(‘il3iit'YlL'P for cause
prcsuim-d
to the juror.
it
this is done itt‘('.'lllS8 the court is in
vulliti
not." he is not h_v .'~‘ll1'iltesti
doubt as to the impartiality
mony shown to iw in:-urniu-tent.
in
of the
juror: Atlas Mining Co. V. Johnston,
civil ('.'l.<t* the ili.<qualilication
oi‘
juror must <-learl_\' appe-at‘:
‘JP. i\ii('il..
ltice V
36: Pomrnercial Bank v.
ltlr-i-, lttl .\iir~h.. ?.Tlt (‘>2 N. \\',. R1122. l.‘hattit-l¢l_ l‘_'1 l\iich.. 6412 SO N. W1.
i'nri¢-r
in the opinion.
7l‘_’. and <-:t.<t-scited
Itirii of the Slilillin of limita
l-‘or
tions. ('Hlllli~‘t‘i have the rij_'ht tn ex
\'t'i‘_\' full dis-(-ussion of the sub
jvvt of the liias and prejudice as at’
amine _illi‘Hl‘f\‘ tu rii.<<-over \\'ill‘iilt‘i' they
have ]lI"’_iiiiiit't'§ a-.'ainst
that
lli~i't-rise. ft'('iiil‘_' tlw qtl.'lil'ii1‘Rfi0I\8 of jurors, see.
of ii--t<-ruiinin-_' \\'ilPiilt‘i'
llllit‘ to ("nnl. \‘. T‘-i-own. 147 151888..585.
as a nu-ans
as 1'0-l‘t'[it)I‘iP(i in
Am. St. Rep.. pp.
he will I-.\'1'r¢'i<e his ri-.'ht to perenip

would he inclined. to lean

a

who

a

One

a

upheld.

a a

a

a

9

it

it

a

was

rtlnl)

or church

to

\\'iiit'ii one

of

the

-171.
10

v.

lfdmunds,

B.

&

74.‘!-760.
19 -eI\'inr:

Ald.,

-Pow.

'l‘reat..
2d ed.. 890; see.
.Qmiley_ 17 .Tohns._. 133.
trial. after all the case
was put in, the plaintiff was informed
that one of the jurors was incompe
tent by reason of atﬁnlty to defendant.
but ilu ni'l_it‘(‘ii(ln was taken. the court,
in reftlsing a new trial for this reason.

Paris-sttiti
\\'livre ln

v.

a

fol'_V ¢'h.'iii1'l1<_'a-'_'i‘H\\'i¢* V. i‘-l':Hii¢'_\'. WW
My-li_, -tint; tit? N. \\'.. I117.
I-‘urther.
of jurors for sun
upon 1-.\':nninntiun
see. i't't>pi4‘
purt of 1-halh-n~.r~'For 1-aun~'1-.
V. li.'t¢ile_\'_ l‘_’T \ii<'h.. ti‘-'_’TI 93 .\'. \\'-.
iw(‘t1llt~‘t‘
](l‘..’ft. ﬁilv is not <ii!<qil:ilitl<~<i
.QIll‘l" '_'<‘neral tra
l>elon2in'._' to the
ternal. sot-lal or roli:i~»u\' or'_'anl'/.atlon
as (inns one of the ]»at'ti~-<. it he lions
lodge.
not helon<: in that particular
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§331

party may challenge ﬁrst-, but whichever begins ﬁrst must
ﬁnish his challenges before the other begins, otherwise he is
precluded from making any further challenges. If a juror be
challenged and the challenge is overruled, or if upon the trial
he is found indiﬁerent, he may still be challenged by the oppo
site side.”
§331. How made.-The challenge to the array must be in
writing, setting forth the matter of the challenge with cer
tainty and precision?‘
Challenges to the polls are made orally. When the challenge
is for cause, the cause must be stated immediately, and all the
objections to the juror must be made at the same time; if one
It
has been overruled, another will not be allowed to be made.
is irregular to question a juror without first interposing a chal
lenge, and it is not error for the court to allow the juror thus
questioned, but not challenged, to be sworn to try the cause.“
§332. How tried.-If the facts alleged in the challenge are
admitted, the question of their sufficiency is determined at
once by the court,'*’3 who excludes the juror, or overrules the
If the facts alleged in the challenge are denied,
challenge.“
the truth thereof shall be tried by the court. The juror may
be examined upon his own oath as to his competency to sit in
the cause,“ but he cannot be interrogated as to such circum
said that it was the duty of the party
to make his objection as soon as he
was informed of the juror‘s disqualiﬁ
Slelght v. ilenning. 12 Mlch.,
cation:
376-7.
And in a similar case. it was
held that it was the duty of the coun
interposition of the
sel to ask the
court as soon as the objection to the
juror was ascertained by him.
By
neglecting to do this, and electing to
risk a verdict. the party was bound
by it: Bourke v. James, ct 01.. 4 Mich..
330.
These cases seem to imply. that
when
the fact of the juror’s incom
petency
ﬁrst comes to the knowledge
of the party after the jury is sworn.
he may still take the objection at any
time before
And, see, Peo
verdict:
ple v. Damon.
13 Wend.,
351.
a party neglects to appear at the
trial. he waives all objection to the
competency of the jurors. and an omis

If

sion to challenge is like a waiver:
(‘iark v. Vanifrancken, 20 Barb., 278.
And by going to trial without objec
tion. a party waives all objections on
ground of the want of proper
the
qualiﬁcations of the jurors: at least.
if he was aware of such want of quali
ﬁcation:
Owners of Ship Milwaukee
v. liale, 1 Doug. i\iich.. 306.
See. ante,
5 324.
20-—Cow.

Treat.. 2d ed., 890.
21—People V. Doe, 1 Mich., 451;
Ryder v. People, '38 Mich.. 269.
22—(‘rlppen v. People. 8 Mlch., 117.
23—i‘eopie v. Vermiiyea_
6
Cow..
555: People v. Vermilyea. 7 ("ow.. 108.
Ostrander,
24—Ciark
v.
1 Cow.,
441,

note.

25—i'ringle v. Fluse, 1 (‘ow.. 432:
People v. Vermilyea. 7 (.‘ow., 108;
People v. ‘Mather, 4 Wend., 230.

329

_

-~-

CALLING

§333

I

>III~-~'-.-a-¢-.1.-_.-4...,
4
"'

_g

JURY——CHALLENGES,

_
_,

ETC.

I

......-:.':;

CH.

»—-4—
.

XIX.

stances as may tend to his own disgrace or discredit, as whether

crime."
juror is presumed

he has been convicted of

.

A person called as a
to be impartial and
qualiﬁed, and the party challenging him assumes the burden of
proving to the contrary." A juror, to be competent, must not
only be indifferent as to the issue he is to determine, but im
,
partial between the parties.
When, upon a challenge to the polls, a juror is set aside for
cause, his place must be ﬁlled by a talesman before the party
can proceed with his challenges to the other jurors.
Number of jur0rs.—The jury impaneled and sworn
a cause before a justice of the peace must
consist of six persons; unless the parties agree upon a less
§333.

for

the

trial of

nun1bcr.25

-

§334. Swearing the jury.—To each juror the justice is re
quircd to administer :1n oath or aﬁirniation for the trial of the
cause?"

i
|

§335. Jurors refusing to appear or serve.-“Every person
who shall be duly summoned as a juror, and shall not appear,
nor render a reasonable excuse for his default, or appearing,
shall refuse to serve, shall be subject to the same ﬁne, to be
imposed and collected with costs, in the same manner, and paid
over for the same use, as hereinbefore provided in respect to
a person subpoenaed as-a witness, and not appearing, or ap
pearing, and refusing to testi fy Hao
A juror may be ﬁned for non-attendance, after the close of
the case as well as beforeﬁl
26—l\iechanics' & Farmers’ Bank v.
Smith, 19 Johns., 115.

27—llolt

v.

People.

13

Mic-h..

224.

By the act \
28—C. L.. §§ S17, 818.
of 1861, How Stat. 5 7622, the legis
to give authority to
lature attempted
the courts to continue a trial to ver~
dict when. after a full panel had been
sworn for the trial. a juror or more
became incapacitated for further serv~
ice and so the panel was reduced below
the constitutional
number.
This act
in Mc
was declared
unconstitutional
Rae v. Grand Rapids L. &. D. Ry. Co..
93 l\iich.. 399: 53 N. W.. 561.
The
principle controlling in this decision

would make it impossible to compel
a trial by a jury
of less than six
any circumstances except
under
by
consent.
29-C. L., 5 821.
This oath or
aﬂirmntion is rcquircd to be in the

following form: that lie is “well and
truly to try the matter in difference be<
, plaintiff,
tween
and
defendant, and unless discharged by
the justice a true verdict to give ac
cording to law nnd evidence."
30-0. L.. § 834.
31—Robbins v. Gorham, 25 N. Y.
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§336

OF '1‘IlE PROCEEDINGS ON TRIAL.

Duty of party having the aﬁirmative.-“After the
be duly sworn, they shall sit together and hear the
proofs and allegations of the parties, which shall be delivered
publicly, in their presence.”“
The party who holds the aﬂirmative of the issue to be tried,
has the right to open the case; to introduce his evidence ﬁrst;
to give evidence in reply to the proofs of the opposite party,
and to make the closing argument to the jury. And, gener
ally, it is desirable that the party opening the case should make
a brief statement to the jury as to the nature of the action,
the issues to be tried, and then of the substance of the evidence
to be given in proving the case. By this means, the justice and
jury will be better prepared to see the relevancy and applica
tion of the evidence as the witnesses proceed with their testi
mony. But it is only a general view of the case that should
If, however, a party in opening omits to make a
be given.
full statement of his case, this will not prevent him from intro
ducing evidence as to all material points, even though some
of those points were not mentioned in his statement.-"3
It
should not set forth the evidence in detail.“ It should not be
unfair and calculated to prejudice the jury unfairly.“
After
opening the case, the party holding the affirmative proceeds
to introduce his evidence and the testimony of his witnesses.
§336.

jury shall

Duty 01’ party 0pp0sing.—After the party holding
§337.
affirmative has closed his evidence, the opposite party
may open his side of the case to the jury, by a statement of
the grounds of his defense, and the nature of the evidence
It is a common practice in
by which it is to be upported.
some courts that the defendant follows the opening state
the

ment of the plaintiﬁ immediately with his own. There seems
to be no objection to this practice and in some cases would
seem to be advantageous.
He will then introduce the testi
mony of his witnesses in the same manner that the other did.
Each party should exhaust his testimony upon his aﬂirmative
32~—C. L.,
33-—Neai-ing

34—Scripps

|

823.
v. Bell. 5 Hill, 291.
v. Reilly, 35 Mich., 371.
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35—Porter v. Throop, 47 Mlch., 313:
W., 174.

11 N.
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for that purpose. It will be only
by favor of the court that he will be permitted to introduce
When the opposing party has
evidence out of its order.“
case, when he has the case

rested, the party holding the aﬁlrmative may, by way of reply,
introduce evidence rebutting to the defense.
Testimony in
strictly
in
answer
to
the
must
however,
defense, and
be
reply,
the witnesses called in support of it; the party holding the
aﬂirmative will not be allowed to go beyond that and give
Rebutting
evidence in further support of his original case."
evidence means not merely evidence which contradicts the
witnesses of the opposite side.
Evidence in denial of some
or
which
fact,
case,
the
opposite party has sought
affirmative
to prove, is rebutting.-‘"3
Thus, where a defendant has at
tempted to prove a set-oﬁ', or release, the plaintiﬂ’, in rebutting,
may prove that the alleged set-off had been paid, or that the
release was obtained by fraud.
§338. Right to exclude witnesses from the court room.
When the cause is called on, or at any time during its prog
ress, the justice, at the request of either party, may order such
of the witnesses of the opposite party as have not yet been
examined, or who are not under examination, to leave the
court until they shall be called for in their order, so that each
witness may be examined out of the hearing of other witnesses
The
on the same side, who are to be examined after him.39
of
within
the
rule.4°
respective
are
not
parties
the
attorneys

With respect to ordering the witness out of court, although
this is clearly within the power of the judge or justice, and
he may ﬁne a witness for disobeying the order, the better
opinion seems to be that his power is limited to the inﬂiction
of a ﬁne, and that he cannot lawfully refuse to permit the
At least unless it is made to ap
examination of the witness.“
pear that the party calling such witness is shown in some
way to be responsible for the violation of the court’s order.
This order may be general, applying to all witnesses of one
party or to particular witnesses.
36—See, post, 5 341. note 4.
37—Archbold's Nisi Prlus, 41.
v. Foreman, 3 E. D.
38—Silve1-man
Smith, 322.
' 39—Southey v. Nash, 7 Car. & P.,
B32.

40-—Everett v. Lowdham, 5 C. & I‘..
91: Pomeroy v. Budderiy, Ry. & LL.
430.

1 Ell.
41—Cobbett v. Iludson.
11; see, 6 C. & P., 741.

B1ackb.,

&

\

Cu.

XIX.

or run

PROCEEDINGS on

§ 339

TR1.-'\IJ.

it,

The court has no right to exclude the parties to
being present at the trial, although they are to
as witnesses; but if they remain in court after
ordered to leave
the court may direct the jury
credit due to their testimony.“

a cause from
be examined

having been
to weigh the

if

a

a

§339.
Questions of competency of witnesses.—Where
witness appears for the purpose of being sworn, any objection
to his competency that may exclude him from testifying,
should be then made.
“If witness, on being produced, sha_ll be objected to as
incompetent, such objection shall be tried and determined by
the justice; and evidence may be given in support of, and
against, such objection, as in other cases, or the proposed wit
ness may be examined on oath by the party objecting; and
so examined, no other testimony shall be received from either
party, as to the competency of such witness.”43

is

§

The oath or aﬁirmation, how administered.—'I‘he oath
to be administered to the wit
prescribed by the statute,“
ness by the justice who tries the cause.
“The usual mode of administering oaths now practiced in
340.

this state, by the person who swears holding up the right hand,‘
shall be observed in all eases in which an oath may be admin
istered by law, except in the cases herein otherwise pro

vided.”"

is,

is

“Wl1en the court, magistrate, or other oﬂicer before whom
to be sworn, shall be satisﬁed that such person
any person
in his opinion,
has any particular mode of swearing, which
more solemn or obligatory than holding up the hand, such
court or oﬂicer may adopt that mode of administering the
oath.”4°

“Every person conscientiously opposed to taking an oath,
shall, when called on to take an oath, be permitted, instead of

.

Q

Q29.
43—(". L.,
The provisions
oi‘ this section are now of but little
importance.
Since its en
practical
actment the legislature has, by subse
quent laws. removed nearly all of those

333

xxlv. "0! Evidence," and C. L.,
10213.

44-C.

L.,

46-C.

L.,

5 5

443.

830.
10204.
10205.

45~—C. L.,

§§

causes which formerly rendered
See,
post.
ness incompetent:

l

note;
Eq.,

In

5

42-1 Greenleafs Ev.,
432.
Constance v. Brain, 38 E. L.

a wit
chap.
10210,
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swearing, solemnly and sincerely to affirm, under the pains and
penalties of perjury. ”47
The subject of evidence, and the rules relating to the exami
nation of witnesses, will be treated of more at large in a subse
quent part of this work.“-3

Order of introduction of evidence.-“Regularly, the
§341.
party entitled to begin must exhaust all his testimony in sup
port of the issue on his side, before the opposite testimony has
been heard.
He can afterwards introduce evidence in reply
The judge often, for some particular reason, satisfac
only.
tory to himself; departs from this strictness; but the party
can never claim that he should do so, as a mater of right. He
may grant or withhold the required indulgence, in his dis
cretion.”1
The plaintiif has a right to reply to the defendant ’s evidence,
by evidence to contradict, cut down, modify, explain, or in any
way vary it; but beyond this he cannot go without the permis
sion of the court, not even to supply a defect in his own evi
A simple declaration of the plaintiﬂ"s counsel that he
dence.
rests his case, cuts him oﬁ from all further evidence, except
be strictly proper by way of reply.”
It would be so,
also, on the part of the defendant.
If it appear that evidence has been inadvertently omitted, it

what shall

is usual to admit it, even after the parties have gone through
with the case, even at any time before the jury retire.“ But,
when such evidence is admitted, the opposite party would have
the right to introduce evidence to controvert it.‘
47—C. L., § 10206.
48—See, post, chapter xx-xxlv.
1—Ford v. Niles, 1 Hill, 300; Shep
nrd v. Potter, 4 Ibi(l., 202; Ratings
v. Palmer, 20 Wend., 225.
2—Leland v. Bennett, 5 Hill, 286.
3—Clarlr v. Vorce, 15 Wend., 193;
People v. Mather, 4 Wend., 231.
except
4—'I‘echnically,
no evidence,
in reply to the evidence of the oppo
site side, will be admissible after a
While the
party has rested his case.
Justice may refuse in such case to ad
mit further evidence except in reply:
Shepard v. Potter, 4 Hill, 202; yet
this is a matter entirely within his
discretion, and he may receive
it:

White v. Bailey, JO Mich.,155; Detroit
k Milwaukee R. R. Co. v. Van Stein
burg,
Mich.,
17
Hoillster v.
99:
Brown, 19 Mich., 163. A witness may
be recalled after the summing up of
the cause has commenced,
ii’ the jus
tice think it proper under the circum
stances; and when thcrc is a dispute
as to what the testimony of a witness
was, it is in the discretion of the
court to allow him to be recalled to
show how he testified:
Dunckle v.
Parties some
Kocker. 11 Barb., 389.
times omit, by accident, to introduce
all their evidence before the close of
the trial.
And they sometimes
dis
over the existence oi important testi
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with pla.i.ntiﬁ'.-If, after the
§342. Non-suit—discretiona.ry
testimony in the case is given, the plaintiif thinks his evidence
insufficient, he may submit to a non-suit, and this he may do at
any time before the jury render their verdict.-'> A justice cannot,
however, compel the plaintiff to be non-suited. He has always
a right, if he chooses, to go to the jury with his case.“
§343. Argument to the ju1'y.—When the evidence is closed,
the parties, or their counsel, if they see ﬁt, address the jury
upon the case; the party holding the affirmative of the issue,
having the right to open and to make the closing argument.

In

questionsof law, whether before the court or
each party is entitled to see and examine the
authorities cited by the other. And before making his closing
argument, the party having the affirmative is bound to furnish
his authorities to the other party, so that he may examine
and discuss their relevancy or weight before the jury.
discussing

before a

jury,

§344. Charging the juI‘y.—-The justice may, if he deem it
necessary, instruct the jury as to the principles of law ap
plicable to the case, the manner in which they must be applied,
and their effect upon it. As this is designed merely as an
assistance to the jury, the justice, in his discretion, will omit
any part of it he may think unnecessary, while it is optional

with him to omit it altogether.’ The justice cannot control the
jury with instructions as to the law.“ If he assumes to instruct
them it is advisory only. In practice he seldom does instruct
them?
mony after the close of the evidence,
but before the cause has been ﬁnally
In
submitted to the justice or jury.
such cases the justice may permit the
introduction
of the testimony even
after the parties have declared the
case closed: Burger v. White, 2 Bosw..
And it has been held that the Jus
92.
tice may,
in his discretion,
receive
further evidence on an adjourned day
to which the cause was postponed for
argument. the trial having taken place
on a former day:
Heidenheimer v.
Wilson, 31 Barb., 637.
But n party
cannot claim such a privilege as a
matter of right; and it is conceived
that the justice ought not to allow
it where the witnesses oi’ the oppo
site party have iett the court and can

not he recalled, or where the proposed
evidence
would operate as n surprise
upon him at a time when he cannot
meet
it by evidence which he may
but which at the time is not
have,
within his reach.
346;
5-——Platt v. Stever, 5 Johns.,
Eiweii. v. McQueen. 10 Wend.. 522.
But he cannot submit to a nonsuit if
the defendant has given notice ot set
oﬂ: See, ante, 5 273.
6-—Cahiil v. K. & M. Ins. Co., 2
Doug. Mich., 124.
7-—-Delaney
v. Nagie, 16 Barb., 96.
8-—McNell v. Scoﬂeld, 3 Johns.. 436:
Chamberlain v. Brown. 2 Doug. Mich.,

335

120.

9—Chamberiain
Mlch., 120.

v.

Brown.

2
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OF THE JURY—-THE VERDICT, ETC.

The procedure after evidence and arguments c1osed.—
After hearing the proofs and allegations, the jury must be
kept together in some convenient place, under the charge of an
oﬁicer, until they shall agree upon their verdict.”
The jury may, however, if they see ﬁt, give their verdict
without retiring, and in that case an oﬂicer ~need not be
sworn to attend them." But if they leave the court to make
up their verdict, the oath or aihrmation prescribed by the
statute must be administered to the constable."
By consent of parties, the jury may retire without any per
son to attend them; and, in such case, neither party can after
§ 345.

wards object to the verdict, on cert-iorari, because the
drink, or admit other persons to their room."

jury

eat,

Right to take documentary evidence to jury room.—
When the jury withdraw, they may take with them letters
patent, deeds under seal, and exempliﬁcations of depositions
in equity, if the witness, be dead; and, with the assent of the
parties, they may take with them books or writings not under
seal.“ But they cannot take with them evidence which has not
§

346.

L., 5 831.
is not permissible for the oﬂlcer
in charge ot the jury to he present in
the jury room during the delibera
People v. Knapp, 42 Mich.,
tions:
267; 3 N. W., 927.
And after the
jury has retired to deliberate, it is
highly improper for the justice to en
ter their room to advise or consult
with them, whether requested
by the
jury to do so or not. without the con
sent of the parties or their attorneys:
Galloway v. Corbitt, 52 Mich., 460;
18 N. W., 218.
But it seems that the
justice may, with the consent of the
parties, and by request of the jury,
visit their room and answer questions
which they may desire to ask of him,
relating to the matters upon which
they are deliberating: Smoke v. Jones.
85 Mich., 409; see, also. Hart v. Lind
iey, 50 Mich., 20: 14 N. W., 682, and
Galloway v. Corbitt, LIIO Mich., 460;
18 N. W., 218.
10—-C.

It

11-Fink

v.

llall,

8 .7ohns.,

437.

It

is never necessary to require the jurv

to withdraw
unless they desire it:
Bottemly v. Goldsmith, 36 Mich., 27-8:
The Milwaukee v. Hale, 1 Doug. Mich.,
306.

12—(‘.. L., § 831.
If the jury are
left alone in the room where the trial
was had, still an oflicer must be
Douglas v.
sworn as in other cases:
Blackman, 14 Barh., 361.
Johns.,
13——Tower
v. Hewett,
11
134.

justice
may permit
14—The
the
jury, on retiring. to take with them
any deposition or written instrument
which has been properly proved and
introduced in evidence:
Howland v.
It is some
Wiiletts. 5 Selden, 171.
times proper to allow the jury to take
to the jury room documents which
have been admitted in evidence: but
it should only be allowed where the
propriety of it is obvious, and in gen
eral not without consent of parties:
Kalamazoo N. M. Co. v. McAliister, 36
Mich., 327; Hewitt v. Flint .2 P. M.
Ry. Co., 67 Mich., 61: 34 N. W., 659:
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court; and if the party for whom the ver
given deliver such evidence to the jury, it

dict is afterwards
will avoid the verdict, unless the jury do not look at it; but if
delivered by the opposite party, or produced by one of the
jurors, without having received it from the parties, it will not.
In courts of record, the court will not permit the jury, after
they have retired, to see a treatise on the law of the subject,
even with the consent of the parties."
This is because, in
courts, the jury is to receive the law from the judge;
but in justice’s courts, the jury being judges of the law,
whether this rulc is applicable to juries in those courts,
those

quacre.
347.
Misconduct of justice or jury which will defeat a.
verdict.-—-If the jury, after they have left the court, examine
witnesses,*even to the same points to which the same wit
nesses were before examined in court, it will avoid the ver
dict;‘° unless by consent of parties ;" but they may return
into court, on leave being granted by the justice, on application
for that purpose, to hear evidence as to any matter of which
they are in doubt ;'5 or to ask any question of the court; in

which
tice."

case the parties must be present, or at least have no

Nor can the justice go to the jury room while they
are deliberating and give them instructions, without the
It is not enough that they
express consent of the parties.
know he is going and do not object.” But when, in such a
Chicago & W. M. Ry. Co.,
208; 35 N. W., 914 (memo
randa ot counsel), overruling Miller
v. Cuddy, 43 Mich., 274; 5 N. W., 316.
A failure to object to the taking of
documentary evidence by the jury will
operate
as a waiver:
Chadwick v.
Chadwick, 52 Mich., 545: 18 N. W.,
For other cases upon the taking
350.
of documentary evidence by the jury,
Newton, 130 Mich.,
see, Walker
v.
576: 90 N. W., 328, by consent ;—
Wonderly v. Holmes Lumber Co., 56
‘Mich.,
412: 23 N. W.. 79; Foster's
Will. 34 Mich., 21: Bulen v. Granger,
63 Mich., 311; 29 N. W., 718: Bethe!
v. Linn, 63 Mich., 464: 30 N. W.. 84.
The justice has no right to send his
minutes of the evidence to the jury,
par
request,
at their
unless
the
ties consent, and If he does so, the
ilnrronn

GR Mich.,

22

v.

judgment will be reversed:
Nell v.
Abel, 24 Wend., 185; kalamazoo N. M.
Co. v. McAlister, 36 Mich., 827.
15—Burrows
3 Car. &
v. Unwln,
P., 310.
16—\'icary v. Farthing, Cro. Elia,
411,

412.

17—Iirown v. Cowell, 12 Johns., 384.
18—Blackley v. Sheldon, 7 Johns,
32.
For this purpose the witness who
testlﬁed may be recalled. or the justice
may read the evidence from his minu
tes: lhid.
19—Bunn v. (‘roul, 10 Johns., 239;
Blackley v. Sheldon, 7 Ibtd., 32; see,
Henlow v. Leonard. 7 Johns., 200.
20—Moody v. Pomeroy, 4 Denio,
115: Taylor v. Betstord, 18 Johns.,
487: Smoke v. Jones, 35 Mich., 409;
Galloway v. Corbitt. 52 Mich., 461;
18 N. W., 218. If, however, the parties
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case, the jury merely asked the justice if they could add any
thing to the plaintiif’s demand, who answered no, it was not
deemed suﬁicient to set aside the judgment.“
After the jury have retired, it is their duty to continue to
gethcr until they return into court, without having any com
munication with any pcrson, either on the subject of the case
or any other. As a general rule, the mere separation of a jury
after they have agreed on their verdict, unless there be some
suspicion, and the slightest is sufﬁcient, will not prejudice the
verdict}? but if they eat or drink at the expense of the party
for whom they ﬁnd a verdict, it avoids the verdict,“ Where
a juror, after the cause was committed to the jury, drank
brandy, though in a triﬂing quantity, and as he stated, to cure
the diarrhoea, the court set aside the verdict.“
But where
the jury, during the trial of a civil case, were allowed to sepa
rate, and one of them drank spirituous liquors, it was held not
to be a ground for setting aside the verdict, it not appearing
that in so doing he violated any express direction of the court,
and there being no proof that he drank to excess, or upon the
invitation or at the expense of either of the parties. It was also
held, that an irregularity of the juror which would subject him
to censure, whether in drinking spirituous liquors, separating
from his fellows, or the like, should not overturn the verdict,
unless there be some reason to suspect that the irregularity
may have had an inﬂuence on the ﬁnal result of the cause." It
is irregular for a jury, each to put down a sum which they ﬁnd
for the party, add the" sums together, divide by the number of
it would not avoid the verdict:
Snyder v. Wilson, 65 Mich., 340; 32
N. W.. 642.
.
21-Thayer v. Van Vleet, 5 Johns.,
111.
But this is doubted:
Sec, Bunn
v. Croul, 10 Johns., 239. note.
It is
error if the ofiicer having charge of
the jury remain in the jury room dur
ing
their
deliberations:
People v.
Knapp, 42 l\Iich., 267; 3 N. W., 927.
22—Horton v. Horton, 2 (‘ow., 589;
People v. Douglass. 4 lbid., 26.
23—Co. l,it.. 277: Everitt v. Youells,
4 B. 8: Ad., 681: Graham's Prac.. 314.
24-—Brant v. Fowler, 7 Cow., 562.
But, see, Wilson v, Abrahams, 1 Hill.
consent

207.
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V. Abrahams,
1 Hill,
"The only safe rule must be to
treat the jury as disqualiﬁed to settle
the rights ot litigants as soon as they
cease to be guarded against unlawful
contact with the outside world" after
having retired to consider of their
verdict.
So said in a case where the
jury at a hotel were permitted to con
verse and drink with other-s: Church
hlll v. Alpena Circuit Judge. 56 Mich.,
536; 23 N. W., 211.
It will not be
permitted that the verdict in such a
case can be defended
by showing that
the jury were unlnﬂuenced by such cir
cumstanccs:
Ibid.
A verdict is in
curably vitiated
ii.’ evidence oi’ the

25-Wilson

207.
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jurors, and adopt the quotient as their verdict.“ But if the
course be adopted merely for the sake of arriving at a reason
able measure of damages, the jurors not agreeing to abide by
the result, it is no objection to the verdict?" So, where the
jury left it to lot whether the verdict should be for the plaintiif
or the defendant, and the lot eventuated in favor of the de
fondant, and the jury found accordingly, the verdict was set
aside.”
§348. The verdict.-“When the jurors have agreed upon
their verdict, they shall deliver the same to the justice_pub
licly, and thereupon the justice shall enter the same in his
docket, and render judgment thereon/’”

When the jury return to the court, the justice should call
over their names to ascertain if they are all present.
The
plaintiff also should be called, and, if not present, the jury
may be discharged, and judgment of non-suit entered.“ If

plaintiff is present the justice should then ask the jury if they
have agreed upon their verdict, and whether they ﬁnd for
the plaintiff or defendant.
The foreman of the jury then
delivers the verdict, and it is recorded.
After noting the
verdict, the justice says: "‘Listen to your verdict as the
public sentiment as to the case is
allowed to reach the jury after they
have tnken the case:
Ibld.
26-Roberts v. Fnllis, 1 Cow., 238:
Johns., 87:
Harvey v. Rl(.‘i(('H'.
15
Thomas v. Dickinson,
2 Kern.,
364.
“The law contemplates that the jurors
shall, by their discussions, harmonize
their views it possible, but not that
they shall compromie, divide and yield
for the mere purpose of an agreement."
"Jurors should agree if they can do
so without sacriﬁcing what any one
of them believes are the just rights
but not otherwise":
of the parties:
Cooley, J.. in Goodscll v, Secley, 46
Mlch., 623: 10 N. W., 44.
See, also,
Benedict v. Beet & ‘Prov. Co., 115
Mlch., 527: 73 N. W., 802.
27—Dann v. Tucker, 4 Johns., 487.
28—Mitchell v. Ehle. 10 Wend.. 595.
29—C. L., 5 832.
The verdict of
the jury is conclusive and cannot be
invalidated by any action or non-ac
tlon of the justice.
The statute re
quires the justice to enter judgment
immediately on the verdict
on
the

ground that he has no judicial duty
in the matter and must act minis
terially in recording the action of the
jury.
He cannot set the verdict aside
or grant a new trial.
And it his entry
of judgment is postponed the law itself
supplies it whether entered
or not,
and its subsequent entry in accordance
with the verdict is proper:
Alt v. La
lone, 54 Mlch., 302: 20 N. W., 52.
30—i1' the plaintiit is not present
when the verdict is rendered, any
judgment entered upon it may be set
aside: Douglass v. Biackman, 14 Barb.,
381; Shove v. Raynor, 3 Denio, 77.
But it the plalntitli were actually pres
ent, an omission to call his name will
not be a sufﬂclent error to reverse the
judgment: Mcilachron
v. Randles, 34
Barb., 301; Oakley v. Van Horn, 21
Wend., 305. A judgment rendered upon
a verdict receivedlin the absence of the
though not absolutely void,
plnintiif,
cannot be questioned collaterally, still
it is erroneous. and reversible on ap
peal: Relyea v. Ramsay, 2 Wend., 6_02;
Lamoure v. Caryl, 4 Denio, 370, 373.
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You say you ﬁnd, etc. (as the verdict is)
and so say you all.” The verdict must be general for plaintiﬂ?
or defendant; it cannot be special.“ As to the verdict in tres
court has recorded it.

pass on lands under the statute, see, post, ch.

xxxvii."

Until then the
The verdict is not ﬁnal until it is recorded.
jury may correct it; they may be polled by either party,”
although a sealed verdict,“ and any of the jurors may dis
agree to the verdict; and the justice may, of his own accord,
is is,

verdict

however, unusual; and
most manifestly wrong.

is

jury back to reconsider their verdict.“
it

the
course
send

The latter

adopted only when the

a

§

Proceedings in trial not to be taken on Sunday, except
that verdict may be received.—A trial must be closed and
jury on a week day, and not on Sunday.”
submitted to
349.

“No court shall

or transact any business on the
be for the purpose of instructing
ﬁrst day of the week, unless
or discharging
jury, or of receiving a verdict.”*"
a

it

be opened

3

6

7

1

36—When
trial was commenced
on Saturday and continued until two
o'clock on Sunday morning, when it
was submitted to the jury and they
rendered their verdict at about three
the same morning, it was held irregu
lar and the judgment was reversed:
Pulling v. People.
mu-b., ssl; Butler
v. Kelsey, 15 Johns., 177.
37—(‘. L.,
1114: see, ante,
138:
Malcolmson v. Scott, 56 Mich., 465:
23 N. W., 166.
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5

3

4

32.

s

571.

Cow., 23: La
33—Fox v. Smith.
Comst., 547.
har v. Kosslin,
The
jurors
must be unanimous in their
verdict; and to ascertain whether they
are all agreed, either party has the
right to poll the jury at any time be
fore the verdict is recorded.
To poll
a jury is to examine each juror sep
arateiy as to his concurrence in the
verdict, and at the request of either
party the Justice is bound to do it,
which he does by calling each juror
by name and asking him, “Is this your
verdict?"

a

Damages,

Johns., 255:
34—-Bunn v. Hoyt,
Root v. Sherwood,
If the
Ibl'(l._. 68.
verdict as rendered is informal, yet if
it sudiciently
indicated
for
which
party the jury have found the issue.
it will be the duty of the justice to
enter the verdict in the proper form,
according to the substantial ﬁnding:
Doug. Mich.,
Lamberton v. Foote,
102.
And if the verdict as given is
uncertain or indefinite, the justice may
inquire of the Jurors to obtain an ex
press expianatlon
as to what their
Sleight v. Henning, 12
verdict is:
Mich., 371. 377.
And then he should
enter it in due form:
Ibld.
The jus
tice must construe and apply the ver
dict reasonably, in the light of all
the proceedings:
W1lson v. Mc(‘rli
lies, 50 Mich., 347; 15 N. W., 504.
Johns.,
35-Blackley v. Sheldon,

5

1

it

31—\\'ylie v. Hyde, 13 Johns., 249.
32—When
the declaration
claims
double or treble damages under some
statute, the verdict ought to be gen
eral, but should state whether
is
found for single damages, or for the
whole amount of the double or treble
for, in the absence of such
damages,
statement, the legal intehdment will
be that it was found for the whole,
Livingston
double or treble amount:
Cow., 175.
The better
v. Platner,
practice is for the jury to tind single
damages,
and for the court to double
them;
although it would
or treble
probably be equally good for the jury
to assess
the augmented damages,
if
the verdict
hows that such assess
Sedgwick on
ment was in fact made:
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may be received on Sunday, but judgment should
until Monday.38 In the case of a trial com

be entered

menced on Saturday, and not

completed by midnight, the
proper course would be to adjourn the cause to a suitable time
on Monday, and then go on with the trial the same as on an

adjournment from necessity, from

one day to the

next.”

and discharge of jury.——“Whenever
that a jury sworn in any cause be
satisﬁed
be
fore him cannot agree on their verdict, after having been out
a reasonable time, he may discharge them; and thereupon a
new jury shall be selected and summoned as hereinbefore di
§350.

a

Disagreement

justice shall

rected, within forty-eight hours, unless the parties agree upon
a longer time, or consent that the justice may render judg
ment on the evidence ah-eady before him, which, in such case,
he may do.”4°

The question as to the time of discharging a jury, is one
which rests in the sound discretion of the court.
“Juries
should not,” says Chief Justice Savage, “be discharged be
cause upon the ﬁrst comparing of opinions there happens to be
Temperate discussion may produce unanimity,
and time should be allowed for that purpose; but when such
time has been allowed, and the court becomes satisﬁed that
there is no reasonable prospect of an agreement by further
a disagrement.

discussion,

it then becomes their duty to discharge.”“

Osborn,
38-fioughtaiing
15
v.
Johns., 119.
39-—Edw. 'I‘reat., 1st ed., 97.
40—C. L., Q 833.
Where a jury
verdict, but which
gave an informal
suiﬂciently indicated for which party
they found the issue, it was held that
it was the duty of the justice to enter
up the verdict
in proper form. and
enter judgment thereon, and that he
could not refuse to do so, and issue a
new venlre for another jury:
Lam
berton v. Fonte, 1 Doug., Mich., 102:
Roberts v. Tremayne, 61 Mich., 265:
28 N. W., 113: Boatz ct al. v. Berg, 51
Mich., 8; 16 N. W., 184.
4l—People v. Green, 13 Wend., 55.
if the jury cannot agree, and are
discharged, and either party wants a
new Jury, he must advance the fees
therefor, or he will not be entitled to

have a second jury called:
See, ante,
Where, after having been
5 350, n. 41.
out one day, a jury announced they

could not agree, the court would not
discharge them and said to them that
he \vas going away to be gone over
Sunday and they had better agree that
night.
Held, that the verdict, which
rendered, was
was soon
thereafter
coerced and invalid:
Pierce v. Pierce,
So, where the jury an
38 Mich., 412.
nounced that they were $200 apart, and
the court told them, “if that is the only
diiference it would be better for the
county and the parties on both sides
that one or both sides yield so as to
come together.
It would be unfortu
nate for all to have a disagreement
when the diﬂerence is so small."
Held
to he error:
Goodsell v. Seeley, 46
Mich., 623; 10 N. W., 44.
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MATTERS NOTICED JUDICIALLY.

Of what courts take judicial notice.—There are cer
§351.
tain facts Which, by reason of their nature, the courts are
Courts are
assumed to know, and such need not be proven.
They
bound to take notice judicially of what the law is.
will take notice not only of the printed statute books, but also

of the journals of the legislature, in order to determine whether
all the constitutional requisites to the validity of the statutes
have been complied with in their enactment. No plea is nec
essary to bring to the notice of the court facts which the judges
must judicially know, and in respect to which no proof could
They will take judicial notice of the public stat
be given!
utes, and disregard all allegations in pleadings which are in
consistent with them.“
Mich.,
Mahanny,
4—People
13
v.
Callaghan v. Chipman, 59 Mich.,
610; 26 N. W., 806: Atty. Genl. v. Rice,
64 Mich.. 385: 31 N. W., 203; see,
ilanck's Case, 70 Mlch., 396: 38 N. W.,
But not of foreign law: Phelps
269.
v. American S. & L. Assn., 121 Mich..
344: 80 N. W., 120. But courts cannot
take judicial notice of the by-laws of a
Such by-laws must be
corporation.
Portage Lake M.
averred and proved:
8: B. B. Society v. Phillips, 36 Mich.,
481.

22.

5—l‘eopie

Erie By.

Co.,

River
v. Raisin
12 Mich.. 389;

&

Lnke

v. Brittain, 2 Doug., -Mlcb., 191: see.
also, Groesbeck v. Seeley,
13 Mich.,
329, 340.
But our_courts cannot know
judicially what are the provisions ot
the statutes of a foreign country:
G.
W. R. Co. v. Miller, 19 Mich., 314. Nor
Phelps
of the laws oi! a sister state:
Sav., etc.,
v. American
121
Assn..
Mich., 343; 80 N. W., 120: Chapman
v. Colby, 47 Mich., 46; 10 N. W., 74.
The courts will take judicial notice
of the law under which a contract may
be made with the state. but not that
such a contract has in tact been made:
Houghton Co. v. Commissioners, etc.,

llurlburt
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of the political divisions of the
state generally, and of the division of the state by govern
ment survey into townships numbered in ranges.“ And that
the state, counties and towtnships are separate political organi
zations and corporations.’
And of the relative positions of the
towns and counties, but not of their precise boundaries, further
than they may be described in public statutes.8
But they will
take notice that parts of the rivers and lakes surrounding the
be taken

state are beyond its boundaries.” Judicial notice will also be
taken of acts organizing the several townships.1° A court will
also take notice of its own ofﬁcers, but not of the oﬁicers of
another court."
23 Mich., 272.
Courts are bound to
laws of
take judicial notice of the
nature and of the human mind, at
least such of them as are obvious to

the common apprehension of mankind,
as well as the more obvious dictates of
common sense, and principles of human
action. which are assumed as truths
in any process
of reasoning by the
These constitute
mass of sans minds.
ti part of the law of the land, and

courts are bound judicially to know
and apply them:
Lake Shore Ry. Co.
v. Miller, 25 Mich., 274.
Foreign
courts
Lau~.—\\'hile
our
cannot assume to know what any for
eign law is. there is no principle which
will justify them in holding anything
void under a foreign law which is
here,
until
the
variance is
lawful
shown. To that extent our courts may
conformity
between
our
a
presume
And in order
laws and foreign laws.
to sustain the presumptive validity of
our courts, in
foreign transactions,
the absence of proof to the contrary.
hold them valid when conforming to
thacommon law. But we can make no
valid
presumption
that a contract
under our law is not valid elsewhere:
Worthington v. Hanna. 23 Mich., 534;
see, O'Rourke v. O'Rourke, 43 Mich.,
58: 4 N. W., 531.
But the courts of this state will
take judicial
notice that the supreme
court of Massachusetts is a court of
Harrison,
22
Shotwell
V.
record:
So, judicial notice willbe
Mich., 410.
taken that county clerks in the state
of New York are clerks of the supreme

343

court of that state, and that that
court is a court of record:
Morse v.
iiewett. 28 Mich., 481.
6—Wrlght v. Dunham, 13 Mich.,
414; People v. Maynard, 15 Mich.,
-163;
Dexter v. Cranston, 41 Mich.,
448: 2 N. W., 674; People v. Telford,
56 Mich., 541; 23 N. W., 213; People
v. Waller, 70 Mich.. 237; 38 N. W.,
261.
But not the location of objects
with reference
to the boundaries oi!
political
such
divisions:
Pine Saw
Log Co. v. Sias, 43 Mich., 356; 5 N.
W., 414; Schaale v. Wosey, 70 Mich.,
414; 38 N. W., 317; Cicotte v. An
ciaux. 53 Mich., 227, 18 N. W., 793.
7—'i‘own of Lagrange v. Chapman,
11 Mich., 499.
8-1 Green]. Ev., 5 6.
9—Cummings v. Stone, 13 Mich., 70.
10—Ives v. Kimball. 1 Mich.. 308.
11—!\’orvell v. Mcﬂenry,
1 Mich.,
227,
233.
And a tax collector is
bound to take notice of a general
corporations
statute
which exempts
Leroy
from any except speciﬁc taxes:
v East Saginaw City Ry. Co.. 18
Mich., 233. A court will take judicial
notice of the signatures of its officers
and attorneys in proceedings pending
in court.
But they cannot take judi
cial notice of the genulneness
of signa
tures ot private persons and parties
appended
to acknowledgments of ser
vice of process:
Johnson v. Delbrldge,
35 Mich., 436.
The deputy auditor general being an
oﬂicer known to the law, judicial no
tice will be taken of him. and of his
oﬂlcial acts, and that a certiﬁcate pur
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A judge ’s

personal knowledge of facts will not dispense with
proof of them, where such proof would be otherwise required."
GENERAL RULES-——WHAT

TO BE PROVED.

What evidence is and object of.--Evidence is the
§352.
means by which any alleged fact is established or disproved."
It is that which ascertains the truth of the fact or point in
issue.“ In all testimony, the object of the law is to enable
the court or

jury to know all that the witness knows, which is

pertinent to the issue; and every rulc of evidence is designed
to secure this end." “A jury should be allowed to have placed
before them all the means of knowledge which can be had;

without involving the danger of leading them to form con
clusions not based on solid truth, and not reliable as reason
ably

certain.’

’1°

porting

to be made by him, was so
and is of the same force as if
made by the auditor general himself:
People v. John, 22 Mich., 461. A court
will not take judicial notice on de
murrer. of the identity of attorney and
complainant of the same name: Belden
v. Biackman, 118 Mich., 445, 76 N. W.,
made,

979.

12--Kermott

see, Clark

v. Ayer, 11 Mich., 183:
v. Babcock. 23 Mlcb., 164.

Courtwvill

take judicial notice of
general duties and character of
professional empioyments in those oc
cupatlons which are classed as profes
sion by popular usage or law: Pennock
v. Fuller. 41 Mich., 153; 2 N. W., 176.
Judicial notice must be taken of the
ordinary rules and necessities of bank
ing business:
American National Bank
v Bushey, 45 Mich.. 135; 7 N. W.,
Courts will take notice of the
725.
methods of conducting and carrying on
business at the present day; and ap
plying well settled principles of the
common
law, will enforce new classes
of agreements arising therefrom, unless
they violate some rule of public policy:
Gregory v. Wendell, 39 Mich., 337;
see, Cameron v. Biackman, 39 Mich.,
the

108.

The courts will also take judicial
notice of the meaning of current
phrases which everybody else under
Baiiey v. Kalamazoo Publish
stands:

344

Mich., 251.
So of the
Dages
abbreviations:
v.
Brake. 125 Mic-h., 64; 83 N. W., 1034.
Ne{;ligencc.—Courts
will take ju
dicial notice that no care is not due
or reasonable care; and that, when no
care has been used in approaching a
known or threatened danger, and no
lffort has been made to ascertain or
..".oid it, that reasonable care has not
been exercised,
and that the party has
been guilty of negligence:
Lake Shore
& M. S. Ry. Co. v. Miller,
25 Mich.,
ing Co.,
common

40

274, 294.
13——1 Greoni. Ev., 5 1.
14-3 Bla. Com., 367.

15—Beaubien
490.
. 16-Evans

v.

Cicotte,

12

Mic‘h.,

v, People, 12 Mich.. 36.
The proper test for the admissibility of
evidence ought to be, whether it has a
tendency to affect belle: in the mind
of a reasonably cautious person. who
should receive and weigh it with ju
dicial fairness:
Stewart v. People, 23
Micb., 75.
But everything tending to inﬂuence a
jury, if inadmissible in evidence. should
be kept from the knowledge of the jury.
All incompetent testimony should be
excluded. Its admission will be cause
for reversal of the judgment. This rule
could be but light protection if coun
sel were permitted, by way of oiferlmz
the incompetent testimony. to make a

XX.
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Must be relevant to the issue.—A primary rule in the
of evidence
that the evidence offered must cor
respond with the allegations, and be conﬁned to the point in
issue.
This rule supposes the allegations to be material and
is,

§ 353.

production

The
necessary.
Surplusagc, therefore, need not be proved.
term, surplusage, comprehends whatever may be stricken from
the record, without destroying the plaintiif’s right of action."
It is not necessary, however, that the evidence should bear

if

is

it is

a

if

is

is

it it

it it

a

it

directly upon the issue. It
admissible
tends to prove
the issue, or constitutes
link in the chain of proof; although,
might not justify
verdict in accordance with it.“
alone,
seems that testimony should not always be excluded
And,
because its relevancy to the issue
not apparent at the time
the party offering
oifered,
willaindertake to connect
with the issue by further evidence to be introduced in the
course of the trial. But, unless the offer
coupled with such

is

is

if

undertaking, the testimony should not be received, and not
likely to be seriously
then
its introduction out of its order
prejudicial, nor when from the circumstances there
any

if

real question about the ability of the party to produce the
evidence essential to the admission of that offered. And,

this
Rhodes,

or to state

does

argument or otherwise.
Where the
oiier would tend to prejudice the jury.
it in writing.
the articles or evidence.
should be presented to the court and
counsel for examination, without stat
ing the purport or substance of it:
Scripps v. Reilly, 38 Mich., 15, 16.
5

51.
17--1 Greenleafs Ev..
18—State v. i\icAlister, 24 Me., 139.
All evidence is required to be pertinent.
to the issue, and must either hear di
rectly upon it, or form a link in a
chain of facts which may authorize a
jury to infer it.
In determining the
admissibility of any evidence, it must
When a
he decided by this tendency.
witness is asked a question, the imme
diate inquiry is, what part of the issue

tend
to prove?
Mich., 402.

Niles

v.

Evidence which tends to prove any
part ot the issue is admissible, even
though standing alone
does not go
far enough to make out
cause of
action or defense.
No single item of
evidence
can be rejected on the’ sole
ground that it tails short of making
It it contributes to that end
case.
must be received, and its suiiiciency in
connection with
the other evidence
must be determined on a review of the
whole when the case is closed: Collins
v. Beecher,
45 Mich., 436-8:
N. W..
97.
But nil evidence should have some
legitimate tendency to establish or dis
prove the fact in controversy.
and
whatever has no such tendency should
be rejected:
Stroh v. Hinchman, 37
Mich., 497.
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it a

to the jury,

fully to the jury in their

8

same

7

the

jury when

it

statement of

it

the trial, the evidence should be excluded from the

a

it

is

the proper testimony to connect-such evidence with the issue,
relevant,
and to make
noﬁintroduced before the close of

\
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The relevancy of evidence depends
upon the issue to be tried ;2° and in determining the admissi
bility of evidence, it is indispensable to consider the object
the case is given to

for which it is introduced, and the point intended to

be estab

lished by it; and though evidence offered may have a ten
dency to prove a fact inadmissible or irrelevant under the
issue, it cannot be excluded for that reason, if its tendency be
also to prove a fact which is within the issue, or has been made
by the courseof the examination.“
This rule excludes all evidence of collateral facts, or those
which do not afford any reasonable presumption or inference

relevant

as to the principal fact or matter in dispute; and the reason is,
that such evidence tends to draw away the minds of the jurors
from the point in issue, and to prejudice and mislead them.“
But attendant circumstances, so far as they show the nature
of the transaction, and give character to the principal fact in
question, and tend to raise a presumption of the truth of the

matters alleged in the issue, are relevant, and may be proved.
49; 24 N. W., 672; Devereuux v.
19—Diilin v. People, 8 Mich., 369:
Phillips‘ Estate, 97 Mich., 104; 56 N.
People v. Pitcher, 15 Mich., 399. 406.
W., 228.
To make a question, apparently irrele
When evidenqe is otiered in
vant, proper to be put as a link in the
proper
its
order
it
is
not
in
evidence,
the discretion of the court to reject it:
of
it
must
be accom
chain
panied by a proposition to follow it up
Brown v. People, 17 Mich., 429.
The
at the proper time by proof of other
rule is somewhat more strict in crimi
facts, which, it true, would make the
nal cases: People v, Hall, 48 Mich.,
482; 12 N. W., 665; People v. Millard,
operative:
question put legitimately
Wyngert v. Norton, 4 Mich., 286-9: see 53 .\ii<-h.. 63; 18 N. W., 562.
But it
also, Shaw v. Davis, 7 Mich., 318, 321.
is no error to admit testimony which
If the evidence is objected to, the court was irrelevant at the time ot its ad
may require the counsel oifering it to mission. if it is afterwards made rele
show how it will become material, by vant and pertinent by other testimony
stating what other facts are proposed
subsequently introduced: Black v. Cam
to be proved in connection with the
den & Amboy Ry. 8: T. Co., 45 Barb.,
oifered evidence; and unless. when so
40.
required, he does show how the evi
20—White v. Bailey, 10 Mich., 155.
dence is material, it may be properly
21—I‘eopie v. Doyle, 21 Mich., 221;
rejected: Roy v. Targee, 7 Wend., 359:
Dalton v. Dregge, 99 Mich., 250: 58
People v. Millard, 53 Mich., 63; 18 N.
N. W., 57: Cook v. Perry, 43 Mich.,
W., 562; Roberts v. Pepple, 55 Mich.,
623: 5 N. W., 1054.
0n_ the other
367; 21 N. W., 319; lloltman v. Har ‘hand an omnibus proposition involving
rington, 44 Mich., 183; 6 N. W.. 225:
competent and incompetent matter is
The order of proof is within the dis
Angeli v. Loomis,
properly rejected:
cretion of the trial court which is not
97 Mich., 5: 55 N. W., 1008.
subject to review except for abuse:
22-1 Green], Ev., 5 52. It is the
360;
Dubois v. Campau, 2-1 Mich.,
duty of the court to exclude with care
any irrelevant testimony:
Hntchins v. Kimmel, 31 Mich., 126:
Strange v.
Brown v. Marshall. 47 .\iich.. 576: 11
People. 24 Mich., 9.
N. W., 392: Fells v. l"i'irl\our. 59 .\Iich..

I
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Facts do not occur singly, but always in connection with others.
Every transaction owes its occurrence to some preceding cir
cumstance, and in its turn becomes the cause of others. These
surrounding circumstances, when so connected with the fact
under investigation as to affect and explain its character, con
stituate parts of the res gestac, and are essential to be known in
order to a right understanding of its nature, and may always
be shown to the jury along with the principal fact.“
And in any ease where a witness has testiﬁed to a fact or
transaction which, standing alone and entirely unconnected
with anything which led to or brought it about, would appear
in any degree unnatural or improbable in itself, without refer
ence to the facts preceding and inducing the principal trans
action, and which, if proved, would render it more natural and
probable, such previous facts are not only admissible, but they
23~—i‘eople v. Jeuness, 5 Mich., 324.
Thus, in cases where fraud is the sub
ject of the investigation,
the state
ments of the parties charged with it
are permissible in evidence, if made be
fore or at the time of the commission
oi the alleged fraudulent act.
Other
wise,
in a great majority
of cases,
fraud as a fact could not be shown.
Such statements are admissible to show
the
intent and purpose of the act:
Wyckoif v. Carr, 8 Mich., 47; and see,
8 .\iich.. 55, 61.
And where an assign
ment
was attacked as fraudulent. it
was held,
that the acts and declara
tions of the assignor, his circumstances
and situation, the terms and provisions
of the instrument, and any and all
which convince the
means of evidence
mind of the existence of a fraudulent
intent, were relevant.
And even the
subsequent
acts and declarations of the
parties to a transaction, are admissible
for the purpose of showing its fraudu
lent character:
Baldwin v. Buckland.
11 Mich., 389.
But statements made
by a party subsequent to a transaction.
as to his motives and intentions, are
not receivable in evidence to uifect the
right of others.
It is only the inten
tion declared at the time which, as a
part of the res qeetae, can hind or af
fect others: Dawson v. Hall. 2 Mich.,
390.
In personal "injury case it is
competent
to show the entire surround
ings of the place where the injury Was
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Le Beau v. Telephone & T.
302; 67 N. W., 339.
Where plaintii! was injured by a ham
mer he was using, what was said im
mediately utter the injury, about the
hammer or about the work, by a tel
iow workman to whom the hammer
belonged
was not part of the res ges
iac: Dompier v. Lewis, 131 Mlch., 144;
91 N. W., 152.
Evidence that defen
dant on leaving the house with the
money
stated that he was going to
pay his mother, was not
res gcstae
upon the question of payment:
Schulz
v. Schulz. 113 l\iich., 502; 71 N. W.,
854.
In an action for wrongful dis
charge plaintiﬂ’s
letter in answer to
the letter ot discharge contradicting
charges of misconduct and inquiring as
to scope of the discharge in res gcstae:
Schaub
v.
Welded-Barrel
125
Co..
Mich.. 591: 84 N. W., 1095.
What is
spoken concerning the transaction not
at the time or immediately after is
not admissible: Edwards v. Foote, 129
Mlch., 121; 88 N. W., 404.
Other
cases involving the question of res ges
Mich.,
tae are Rutter v. Collins,
96
510: 56 N. W., 93: People v. iiughes.
116 Mich.. 80: 74 N. W., 309; Havi
land v. Chase. 116 Mich., 214; 74 N.
W., 477: Holman v. Union St. Ry. Co.,
114 Mich., 208; 72 N. W., 202; Webber
v. Hayes, 117 Mich., 256: 75 N. W.,
622: People v. McArron, 121 Mich., 1;
79 N. W., 944.
received:
C. Co.,

109 Mich.,

or
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constitute a necessary part of the principal transaction, a link
in the chain of testimony without which it would be impos
sible for the jury properly to appreciate the testimony in refer

And such previous facts
by the examination of the party
producing the witness. Any other rule in such a case, or to
permit the evidence of an isolated transaction, which could
only be made to appear probable by exhibiting the antecedent
ence to such

principal transaction.

should therefore

be elicited

it,

and yet to exclude all those antecedent
facts which induced
would
be
unfair
to the witness, and tend to suppress
facts,
rather than elicit the truth.“
is

a

is

a

Evidence to impeach the character of
witness called by the
evidence to sustain the
always relevant; so
opposite party
witness thus attacked, and on cross-examination
character of
the opposite
hostility.”-"
twb defend

it

is

hostile to
may be shown that the witness
party, and has made statements indicating such
Evidence may be admissible as against one of
ants, but not against the other; in such case

vant to the issue cannot be excluded

ferred to by counsel in opening the

because

it

is

it
it is

it

must be re
to be limited in its effect to the defendant,
ceived, but
admissible.“ Evidence clearly irrelevant
against whom
may be excluded by the court on its own motion, even where
neither party makes any objection to it.” But evidence rele
was not re

case or defense.”

is

a

is,

§354. The substance of the issue only need be proved.-A
second rule
that the substance only of the issue n_eed be
If a party prove that, he has proved substantial
proved.
entitled to his remedy. He will not be
ground of action, and
required to prove immaterial averments. The principle is, that
all the material facts alleged in the declaration, which are put
in issue, must be established by legal proof.”

Mic-h.,

v.

Corning.
Robbins, 24

Y.,
Wend.,
N.

05 .

1

41.

348

;

5

28 —Nearing v. Bell,
Hill. 291 see,
Sawyer v. Chambers, 44 Barb., 42;
Sawyer v. ('hambers. 43 Ibld., 622.
2i)—i"hiliips on Ev.,
Am. ed., 824.
it is suﬂieient it the proofs correspond
with and support the allegations as to
those facts and circumstances which
4

8

5

34

v.

6

27—Corning
97; Stockholm

6 5

24—Peopie v. Jenness,
Mich., 305.’
25-—Newton v. Harris,
N. Y., 345;
Denio, 108.
Starks v. People,
Barb., 355;
26—i<‘ox
v.
Stone,
Black v. Foster, 28 lMll.. 887.
So.
evidence
which is admissible for one
purpose cannot be rejected because it
cannot be used for another: John Han
Life Ins. Co. v. Moore.
cock Mutual

CH.
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NOTICE.

is

is,

But there is a diiference between allegations of matter of
alle
substance, and allegations of matter of description, that
essential to
gations descriptive of the identity of that which

it

is

it

is

a

if

is

if

the former
sufficient
support the claim or charge made. It
be substantially
latter
must
be
proved; but the
proved with
the allegation be that the
strictness and precision.
Thus,
defendant made
promissory note on a certain day, the sub
stance of the allegation
the making of the note, and the time
when
was made
0n the
immaterial, and proof of making

is

it

a

a

it

a.

a

is

is

a

it

is

if

not necessary; but
precise day mentioned
alleged that
certain day mentioned,
the note was made, bearing date on
then the allegation as to the date
descriptive of the note, and
essential to its identity, and must be strictly proved.“
A material averment
one that sets forth facts or circum
right of
stances which are necessary in point of law to give
If an averment can be stricken
action or to sustain
defense.
out without taking away the allegation of any fact necessary to
need not be proved.
Thus, where
sustain the action,
declaration alleged
warranty of soundness and breach, and
further stated that the defendant knew of the unsoundness at
was held that proof of the
the time of making the warranty,
warranty and of the uusoundness was suﬁicient to maintain the
action; for if the whole averment as to defendant’s knowledge
were stricken out, the declaration would still be sufﬁcient to
to recover upon the breach of the warranty
entitle the plaintiff

2

2

proving them; for the court must give
judgment according to the allegations
and proofs:
Field v. The Mayor, etc..
Selden.
179: Kelsey v. Western,
506; New York Central Ins.
Comst.,
Co. v. National Protection Ins. Co., 20
A cause of action must
Barb.. 473.
be as fully proved in a justiee’s court
A court has no right
as in any other.
to assume a fact without evidence le
gally tending to prove it, or to dispense
with the proof of any distinctive condi
Cicotte
tion aﬂixed to an agreement:
.\lich., 424.
In suits
ct r1l., v. Morse,
the
hy service of process.
commenced
defendant's oral admission, on the trial
8

i

¢

L},-—
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a

before the justice, of plaintlifs cause
of action, will authorize
judgment
against him: (‘rouse v. Ilerhyshire, 10
Mich., 479.
But if the defendant does
not appear, the piuintiif
must prove
his cause of action in the same manner
as if the defendant had appeared: Gil
bert v. Hanford, 13 Mich., -if).
30-—1 Greenl. Ev., Q5 56, 61; Har
rington v. Worden,
Mich., 489: Loth
rop v. Southworth,
Mich., 436.
But
a. variance
between
the
declaration
and the proof in the date of a written
instrument should he disregarded at the
trial when the instrument is other
wise sufficiently described in the dec
laration, so that the defendant cannot
be mislead or surprised
by the evi
dence: Ibid.
5 1

4

are. in point of law, essential to the
Stark Ev., 1526.
charge
or claim:
But facts proved, but not pleaded, are
not in general of any avail to the party

1
I

or
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So, in tort, for removing earth from plaintiff ’s land,
whereby the foundations of his house were injured, the allega
tion of bad intent in the defendant is not necessary to be
proved, for the cause of action is perfect, independent of the

proved."

intention.“

In

proving the substance of the issue, the allegations of time,
place, quantity, quality, and value, when not descriptive of the
identity of the subject of the action, will, in general, be found
and need not be strictly proved as laid. Thus, in
trespass to the person, the material fact is the assault and bat
tery; the time and place where committed not being material
immaterial,

unless made so by the nature of the defense, and the manner of
So, in assumpsit, an allegation that a bill of ex
pleading.
change was made on a certain day is not descriptive, and there
fore strict proof, according to the precise day laid, is not
necessary.
So, also, in trespass, proof of cutting the precise
of
number
trees alleged to have been cut, or the precise value

of the goods taken in trespass or trover, is not necessary.”
N‘or is it always necessary that the proofs should go to the
same extent as the allegations in the declaration, provided they
show a complete right of action to the extent to which they
go. Thus, in assumpsit for debt on simple contract, the plain

tiff may prove and recover a less sum than

he alleges to be
is general, for goods sold,
work done, money paid, etc., and in all cases in which a general
form of declaring is good, the plaintiff may prove and recover
a part only of his declaration or count, either in kind, quality

and where

due;

the declaration

And in actions of tort, the general rule is, that
if part only of the allegations stated in
the declaration be proved, provided what is proved aﬂ’ords a
ground for maintaining the action, supposing it to have been
correctly stated and proved; that
enough
the same
ground of action
as
laid
in
the
declaration, al
proved
though not to the extent there stated. But where the plaintiff
declares specially upon a contract, the rule
diiferent. For
or value.“

if

is

is

is

is

it

be sufficient

is,

it will

92.

350

Q

33—Greenl. Ev.,
61.
34—2 Cow. Treat.. 2d ed.. 917. 923:
H. Bla., 249.
McQulIlin v. Cox,
1

9

2

2

East,
31—Williamson
v. Allison,
446;
Cow. Treat, 2d ed., 918; and
Conn., 292.
see. Twiss v. Baldwin,
32—l"attou v. Holland, 17 Johns.,
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unless the whole contract is proved, as stated in the declara
tion, the evidence will show a different contract and ground
of action from that alleged, and the plaintiff will not be en

titled to recover."

Variance.-It being necessary

§ 355.

to prove the substance
is,
a

of the issue, any departure from the substance in the evidence
will be fatal, constituting what is called a -variance; that

a

is

if

a

is

is

disagreement between the allegations and the proof, in some
essential in order to maintain
matter which in point of law
defense.“
or
to
sustain
the
action,
the
brought upon
Where the action
contract, the contract
ought to be stated correctly, and proved_ as stated; and
any
materially
from that stated
part of the contractproved varies
in the pleadings, the action must fail on account of the vari
entire and indivisible.
contract
It will not, how
ance, for
ever, be necessary for the plaintiﬁ
parts of the contract, which consists
provisions, but only so much of the
entire considerationfor the act, and

to state all the several
of distinct and collateral

&

1
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a

a

a

4

a

a

5

1

it

4

36—Stephen on Pleading, 107, 108.
37—1 Phil. on Ev.,
Am. ed., 845,
851.
Rut
is sufticlent. in general, if
agree.
the contract given in evidence
in substance
and legal eﬂect, with that
stated in the declaration: and though
the proof disclose circumstances and
provisions beyond
what is contained
in the declaration. the variance will
provided the matter
not he regarded.
omitted do not quality or alter in any
respect those which are alleged as the
lbid.,
foundation of the action:
Com, Hill and Edwards’ note, p. 846:
Pick., 232,
and see, Alvord v. Smith,
235: Henry v. Cleiland, 14 Johns. 400.
But the legal eiicct and identity of the
contract must always be kept in view,
and any variance in this respect, as to
the promise or undertaking upon which
the action is based or the consideration
thereof, will be fatal:
C. H.
Ed
wards’ notes. 848: see, Underwood v.
Thus, an al
Wsidron, 12 Mich., 73.

legation of
promise to pay absolutely
on the death of A. cannot be sustained
promise to pay at that
by proof of
time if A. should leave the promisor
sutilcient funds to pay with: Roberts
Burr., 325.
So, a declara
v. Peake,
tion on
sealed bond will not permit
evidence
of one without seal, and an
amendment would be necessary to avoid
the eﬂect of the variance:
McCormick
v. Bay City, 23 Mich., 457.
And a
proviso or
declaration on
note with
-condition, should set forth the condi
tion or the variance will be fatal:
Pick., 83.
Whitaker v. Smith,
A
declaration or notice alleging a joint
contract with two. will not, in general,
be supported by proof of
contract
with one alone, but where the declara
promissory note made
tion was upon
by two, and the notice of defense was
that the note was given for the price
of cattle sold by plaintiff to the de
fendants with warranty
which
has
been broken. and claiming to recoup
the damages, and the evidence
was of
a

Am. ed., 836,

1

on Ev.,

837.

a

35-1 Phil.

4

contract as contains the
the entire act to be done
for such consideration, including the time, manner, and other
circumstances of its performance." If the allegation be of an

§ 355
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absolute contract, and the proof be of a contract in the alterna
tive, at the option of the defendant; or a promise be stated to
deliver merchantable goods, and the proof be of a promise to
deliver goods of a second quality; or the contract stated be to
pay or perform in a reasonable time, and the proof be to pay
on a day certain, or on the happening of a certain event; or if
the consideration be stated to be one horse, and the proof be

of two horses; in these and the like cases the variance will be
fatal.‘ And in an action of tort, where a contract is necessary
to be stated in order to maintain the action as alleged, the
contract must be correctly stated, and proved as stated? When
deeds, records, and other writings are declared upon, every
part stated in the pleadings as dcsci'iptive of the instrument,
must be exactly proved or it will be a variance, and this
whether the parts set out at length were necessary to be stated
the sale of the cattle to one of the de
and that the other
fendants alone,
signed the note as surety:
Held, that
the
was immaterial:
variance
Mc
Hardy v. Wadsworth, 8 Mlch., 349.
The allegation and proofs as to the
names of the promlsees must also cor
respond: thus, an allegation that the
acknowledged
defendants
themselves
indebted unto the “board of super
visors of the county of St. Joseph," is
not sustained by a bond to “the su
pervisors of the county of St._.‘Ioseph :"
the declaration not alleging ‘that the
bond
was made to the plaintiﬁs by
the
name
mentioned in the bond:
Board of Supervisors of St. Joseph
v. Coﬂlnbury, 1 Mlch., 855.
The consideration for the promise
must also be set out accurately.
If
there be a material variance between
the consideration averred
and
that
proved, it will be fatal:
1 Chit. Pl..
Thus, where
10 Am. ed., 298. 299.
the consideration for a promise was
stated as consisting of two parts, each
of which was material and pertinent,
but only one of which was proved:
Held, that the variance was fatal to
plaintiff's
recovery,
notwithstanding
either would have been suilicient by
itself to sustain the promise if it alone
had been alleged as the consideration:
Tillman v. Fuller. 13 Mich.. 113.
If
there is any error in the description
of the consideration, the whole contract

352

Thus, in an action
misdescrlbed.
a warranty,
the declaration stated
the consideration to be a yoke of oxen
of the value of $80 and a note for
$20, but the proof was that the note
was for $10 only, the variance was
held to be fatal; that the particular
statement of the amount of the note
was matter of description. going to
Harrington
the identity Of the note:
v. Worden, 1 Mlch., 488, 489.
In this
case it was held, however, that had the
consideration been set forth with less
particularity. or under a vldellcet (to
wit), as, that the sale or warranty was
for a valuable consideration, to-wit.
for one yoke of oxen and a note for
$20, it would not have been necessary
to prove the precise amount of the
note:
Ihid.
The oﬂlce of a videltcet
is to mark that the party does not
undertake to prove the precise circum
stance allcged, or, precisely as alleged;
and in such case he is not ordinarily
held to the precise proof: whereas, if
the allegation were made without- the
vldellect, he might be held to the pre
cise proof of it: See, 1 Chitty on Pl.,
10 Am. ed., 317, 318: 1 Greenl. Ev.,
§ 60; Lothrop v. Southworth, 5 Mlch.,
is

on

446.

1—Gr.

Ev.,

5 68.

2—Phil, on Ev.. 849; Weal v. King,
East, 452: Perry v. Aaron. 1
12
.Tohns.. 129;
l-L, 160.

Silver

v.

Kendrick.

2 N.

I
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or

not.“ Where, however, a pleading does not undertake to set
out a writing by its tenor, or in the words of the instrument,
but by its substance only, a variance between the allegations
and the writings will not be material, provided they sub
stantially correspond. Therefore a party should set out barely
so much of a record, writing or contract, as will make out his

action or defense according to its legal effect, and not verbatim,
as in the papers themselves, for fear of a misdescription;
as it
is always suﬁicient to state the contract or writing according to
its sense or legal eﬂ’ect without adopting its very words. But
the substance should be truly stated, and proved as alleged, or
the party will fail for the varianceﬁ
§ 356.

in

When variance may be disregarded.-But, to obviate
arising from a variance between plead

a measure objections

ings and proofs, the statute provides, in those cases where the
variance is not such as to surprise or mislead a party at the

trial, that:

“Every variance between process, pleadings, or any instru
ment in writing, recited or referred to in any other process,
pleading or record, and every mistake in the name of any
oﬂicer or other person, or in stating any day, month or year,
or in the description of any property, in any pleading or
record, shall be disregarded upon the trial oi such cause, and
after a verdict therein, unless such variance or mistake be
calculated to surprise or mislead the adverse party, and to
prevent his making due preparation for a full answer on the
merits, to. the matter concerning
take shall have been made.”-'>
3-—-4 stark. Ev., 1587: Seeiy v. Man
devllle, 7 Cranch. 208, 217: Ferguson
lbld., 408, 413.
An in
v. llarwood,
strument used upon the trial. is either
set forth in the pleadings by its tenor,
that is. in the words and language of
the writing itself, or, it is described
according to its substance and legal
effect. or, it is simply brought forward
in evidence to sustain allegations which
do not expressly refer to it in any
manner. If the instrument ls set forth
by its tenor. that is, verbatim, the al
legations and instrument when proved
But where
must correspond strictly.
23

_-_

which such variance

or mis

a pleading does not purport to set out
an instrument in its precle words, but
merely by its substance and legal ef
fect. the rule is more liberal, and there
will be no variance if the instrument
proved and the one alleged correspond
in all essential particulars:
1 Cow.,
Hill and Edwards’ notes to Phil. on
Ev., note 247.
4-2 Cow. Treat, 2d ed., 918.
See, Slater v.
5—C. L., 5 10187.
Breese,
36 Mich., 77.
Where the ob
jection of variance is ﬁrst raised when
both sides have closed and the whole
transaction
has been gone over on.
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a mistake in the date

o F1

V1

of the instrument

de

clared on may be disregarded,“ and so a variance where rent
was alleged payable at the end of the year, and the evidence
was that it was payable half yearly."
And in all cases, where the justice is satisﬁed that the vari
ance was not calculated to mislead or surprise the party to his
prejudice, he should disregard it.”
The statute would include all writings of every kind, “re
cited or referred to,” in the pleadings, and which are necessary
to be proved on the trial. By the term “property,” it was
probably

to cover by it misdescriptions of personal
Although the
as in trover and trespass of goods.”

intended

property,
statute only extends to mistakes in setting out process, plead
ings, and instruments in ~wr1'tz'»ng, the same rule is applied in
relation to contracts by par0l.1°
In all cases where the justice decides to disregard the vari
ance, it would be advisable, probably necessary, to amend the
pleadings so that they should correspond with the proof.‘ 1'
Objections for variance must be made when the evidence is
offered, or they will be held to be waived where the evidence is
received and submitted to the jury without the objection being

taken."
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is

is,
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that the point in issue
tion of testimony
to be proved by
And upon him
the party who asserts the aﬁirmative.
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Mlch., 457.
Wadsworth,
12-1/lei’-Iardy
v.
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Co.
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Timber

for ascertaining

defendant could not have been sur
prised or misled by the variance. it
should he disregarded:
Rorahaeker v.
Lee. 16 Mlch., 189; see, also, Lothrop
Mlch., 446; Mcilardy
v. Southworth,
Mlch., 349.
v. Wadsworth,
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7-East Boston
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lmtb sides so that no injury could arise
the objection will not be sustained:
Stone v. Covel],
29 Mlch., 359: Mc
Mlch., 349.
llardy v. Wadsworth,
See, further. upon the subject of vari
ance: Angeli v. Loomis, 97 Mlch., 5;
55 N. W., 1008: Hubbard v. Long, 105
Mlch., 442; 63 N. W., 644.
6—Morris v. Wadsworth, 17 Wend.,
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which side the affirmative lies, is to consider which party would
be entitled to a verdict if no evidence were given; for it is
considered suﬁicient merely to deny an affirmative allegation
until it is established by evidence." As a consequence of the
rule, the party who has the aﬁirmative holds the right to begin
the evidence and to reply; and, having begun, he will, in gen
eral, be required to introduce all his evidence to establish his
side of the case, and will not be permitted to use a part and
reserve the remainder until his reply. But he will not usually
in the opening to introduce evidence to rebut any
anticipated defense; that may be reserved until the defendant
has closed his proofs.“
There are some exceptions, however, to the rule that the bur
den of proof is upon the party holding the afﬁrmative; or, in
be required

other words, it is sometimes necessary to prove a. negative alle
gation to enable a party to maintain his cause; as, where a con
stable is sued for not taking goods on execution; or, for not
arresting a man on a warrant; or, any oﬂicer for not doing his
duty, whereby the party is injured; or, where the declaration
alleged that the defendant did not attend a trial as a witness in
obedience to a subpoena. So, where a party was charged with
having shipped combustible articles on board plaintiﬂ:"s ship,
without giving notice of their nature, whereby the ship was
burned; in these and the like cases, a party alleging the nega
tive is obliged to prove it."

But if the subject matter of the negative allegation is
peculiarly within the knowledge of the other party, it will be
taken as true, unless disproved by that party; as, where a
13-1

Ii.

& Edwards‘
notes to
810.
14—1 Greenlf. Ev.. § 74. The bur
den of proof in n will contest upon

C..

Phil. on Ev.,

the issue of mental capacity is upon
the proponents throughout the trial:
Prentls v. Bates. 93 Mich., 234; 53
N. W.. 153.
The burden of proof on
an issue of fraud is on the person al
leging it: Hyde v. Shank, 93 Mich.,
Where a con
535: 53 N. W., 787.
veyance is shown to be fraudulent, the
grantee to
burden
is upon a second
show that he purchased in good faith
and for
a
valuable
consideration:
Schaible v. Ardncr, 98 liiich., 70; 56

355
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N. W., 1105: Berry v. Whitney, 40
Mich., 65; Letson v. Reed, 45 Mich.,
27; 7 N. 'W., 231; Stevens v. McLach
lln, 120 Mich., 285: 79 N. W., 627;
Whelpley v. Stoughton, 119 Mich., 314:
78 N. W., 137.
Defense of payment to
prior indorsee in an action by a sub
sequent
indorsee, the note being pro
duced with proof of protest. is inad
missihie unless accompanied by proof
that plaintiff is not a bona ﬁde holder,
and upon this issue the defendant has
the burden:
Little v. Mills, 98 Mich.,
423$ 57 N. W., 266.
15—2 Cow. 'l'.‘reat., 2d ed., 917.
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party is charged with selling liquors, or exercising a trade or
occupation, or the like, which the statutes do not permit, except
Here the party licensed can show
by those licensed therefor.
it in his defense without inconvenience; whereas, if proof of
the negative were required, the inconvenience might be great!“
The best evidence rule.-A fourth rule of evidence is,
§ 358.
that only the best evidence which the nature of the case will
admit of, is admissible." Evidence of this character is termed
primary evidence, and is that kind of proof which aifords the
greatest certainty of the fact in question, and bears upon its
face no indication that evidence of a higher quality remains
behind.
All evidence falling short of this in its degree, is

is,

termed secondary, and cannot be substituted for evidence of
a higher nature which the case admits of."
The reason of the rule
that an attempt to substitute the
inferior for the higher evidence raises the presumption that the

a

a

is

a

higher would give a different and unfavorable aspect to the
case of the party introducing the lesser; that the higher evi
dence would make against the party neglecting to produce it."
The ground of the rule
suspicion of fraud where
party
higher
seeks to introduce inferior evidence when that of

hearsay evidence

is

is

it

a

a

a

is

atta-inable.2°
character
Therefore, as
general rule, the contents of
written instru
ment can only be proved by the production of the instrument
itself, parol evidence of such contents being of
secondary or
in accordance with this rule that
inferior nature. And

excluded."
20—U.

&

5

5

1

16—Smith v. Village of Adrian,
Mich., 495. 409.
Mich., 360.
17—Peopie v. Lambert,
18——1 Greenlf. Ev.,
84.
The term
"best evldence." is conﬁned to cases
where the law has divided testimony
into primary
and secondary classes.
And there are no degrees of evidence
except where some document or other
exists,
of
instrument
the contents
which should be proved by an original
rather than by other testimony which
is liable to the danger of inaccuracy:
Elliott v. Van Buren, 33 Mich., 53.
Edwards‘
19-1 Phil. Ev.. C. H.
notes, _568: Platt v. Stewart, 10 Mich.,
265.

S. v. Wood, 14 Peters. 431.

21-This

rule docs not prevent the
evidence in arriving nt the
intention of parties where they have
equivocal
used
words:
Borden v.
Fletcher's Estate, 131 Mich., 220: 91
N. W., 145.
Where there is a hill of
lading it is not permissible to show
by parol where the goods were billed
from: People v. O'Neill. 107 Mich.,
An error in the
556: 65 N. W., 540.
introduction of econdary evidence is
cured by the subsequent introduction
of the primary evidence:
Emlaw v.
Traveler's
In. Co., 108 Mich., 554:
See, also. Meade v.
66 N. Wt, 489.
Bowies, 123 Mich., 698; 82 N. W., 658.
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This rule is satisﬁed, however, by the production of the best
Therefore, if an original paper is-shown
attainable evidence.”
of
hands
the
adverse party, who refuses to produce
be
in
the
to
it after receiving a proper notice for that purpose; or, if a
party shows that the original has been lost or destroyed with
out fault on his part, then the contents may be proved by a
copy, or, if there is no copy, by oral testimony, because in such
case the copy, or oral testimony, then becomes the best evi
dence that can be adduced.“
Exceptions to the rule requiring the best evidence are per
So,
mitted in some cases; as in the instances above. stated.
also, the records of the proceedings in courts, and all records,
papers and entries of a public nature, required by law to be
kept,_ may be proved by examined copies.“ So, public oﬂicers
may be shown to'be such by evidence of their acting in that
character, without producing written evidence of an election or
appointment.” So, also, inscriptions on walls or monuments
and surveyors’ marks on boundary trees, etc., may be proved
by secondary evidence, because of the inconvenience of pro
ducing them in court."
§359. The parol evidence rule.-A ﬁfth rule of evidence is
that where parties have deliberately put their engagements
into writing, in such terms as import a legal obligation, with
out any uncertainty as to the object or extent of such engage
ment, it is conclusively

presumed that their engagement,

2'.’.—'I‘his would not be true in the
sense that the best attainable evidence
will always be received. as if it be
by the opposing
hearsay or evidence
survivor of a deceased person.

23—1 Phil. Ev., 4 Am. ed., 569;
New York Car Oii Co. v. Richmond, 6
Still, the law does not
Bosw.. 213.
permit the tenor of the instrument in
such cases to be made out by anything
of all
less than satistactory_ evidence
Mouiton v. Mason,
that is essential:
Mlch.,
But
there
are
21
364.
secondary
grades
evidence.
no
of
Hence, in case of the loss of a private
writing or paper. and no counterpart
is legally presumed or required to exist,
its contents may be proved as well by
oral testimony as by a copy: Esiow v.
Mitchell, 26 Mich., 500.

If

and

secondary evidence
is received
better is attainable, and no ob
jection is made before the proofs are
closed, no advantage can be taken of it
afterwards:
Burke v. Wiiber, 42 Mich..
327: 3 N. W., 861.
But the general rule is, that a party
is only required to produce the best
evidence
in his power.
it a
Hence.
party cannot obtain record evidence,
may resort to such other evidence
_he
as may be within his reach:
Scott v.
Methodist Episcopal Church of Jack
son, 50 Mic.-h., 534; 15 N. W., 891.
24—C. L., | 10169.
People v. Lam
bert. 5 Mich., 260.
25—Scott
v. Detroit Y. M. S., 1
Doug, liIich., 110, 152.
26—1 Greenleat Ev., § 94.
when
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the extent and manner of their undertaking, were reduced to
writing; and no evidence
of other cotemporaneous facts
is permitted tending to vary or contradict
its terms, or
to substitute a new ‘or diiferent contract for it?"
Nor
such evidence be used to add to the terms of
the instrument.‘
The rule excludes from the consideration of
the court and jury every question except “what is the meaning
of the words which the parties used.” Not broadly what was
can

their intention.

by the words used
must be taken to have been the intention? Or, as otherwise
expressed, the rule is that “parol contemporaneous evidence
The meaning

indicated

is inadmissible to contradict or vary the terms of a valid
written instrument.”3
Thus, where a written contract to do
27—Adair
v. Adair.
5 Mich., 205,
210; McF}wan v. Ortman, 34 Mich.,
325; Spencer v. Bowen, 41 Mich., 149;
1 N. W.. 959; Baker v. Morehouse, 48
Mich., 334; 12 N. W., 170: Seckier V.
Fox, 51 Mich., 92; 16 N. VV,, 246;
Carney v. Hotchklss, 48 Mich., 276;
12 N. W., 182; Skeeis v. Starrett. 57
Mich., 350; 24 N. W., 98; Norris v.
Clark, 33 Minn., 476; 24 N. W., 128.
An unambiguous contract cannot be
varied in its legal eiilect by the under
standing of the parties at or before
its execution: and when the only ques
tion is as to its legal meaning, its con
struction cannot be aided by oral evi
dence of conversation between the par
ties: Johnson v. Crnnage, 45 Mich., 14;
7 N. W., 188.
Thus, where a promissory note ex
pressed upon its face a speciﬁc consid
eration as the consideration for which
it was given, it was held, that the con
sideration named wasa part of the con
tract itself, and could not be so varied
as to show that a
by parol evidence
in fact
was
different consideration
Sutherland, 39
given:
Johnson
v.
Mich., 579.
Nor will it make any difference that
the party never read the contract,
where it does not appear that he was
or misled as to its contents,
deceived
or that he objected to its terms:
Mc
Ewan v. Ortman, 34 Mich., 325.
v.
‘i%€utherland
Crane. Walker's
R.,
Fh.
523.
Parol evidence may
sometimes be used in chancery to show
fraud or mistake in drawing up the
instrument:
Chambers v. Llvermore.

15 Mich., 381.
And where there are
circumstances and appearances render
ing an alteration in a written instru
ment suspicious, the party relying on
the document as altered is bound to
explain it before he can recover: Shel
don v. llawes, 15 Mich., 519.
The writing of a word over an
erasure may or may not be suspicious.
The presumption commonly is, where
nothing suspicious on the face of the
deed beyond
the tact that an erasure
is manifest, that the alteration was
made before the deed was executed:
Munroe v. Eastman, 31 Mich., 283;
Sirrine v. Briggs, 31 Mich., 443.
The
mere fact that an alteration or inter
llneation has been made in the record
oi’ the deed or other public record must,
in the absence of evidence showing the
contrary, be presumed to have been
done in a proper and legitimate man
ner: Hommel v. Devinney, 39 Mich.,
522,

525.

2-1

,

Eq. Juris.,
1
658:
Greeni. Ev., § 305; Ed. 16.
3-1 Greenl. Ev., 5 275: Fuller v.
Parrish, 3 Mich., 211, 214.
“The le
gal effect of,a written instrument, per
tect in itself, and unambiguous in its
terms, cannot be changed by parol evi
dencez" Jones v. Phelps, 5 Mich., 222.
that at the time of ex
So, evidence,
ecuting a promissory note, the parties
made a contemporaneous verbal agree
ment,
the
eﬂect of
which was to
change the note from an absolute and
speciﬁc undertaking. according to its
terms and legal import. to a defensible
or conditional engagement is inadmissi
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a piece of work omitted to state any time of performance, parol
evidence of an agreement contemporaneous with the making
of the writing, that the work should be completed within a.
speciﬁed time, was rejected as varying the terms of the writ
Neither can prior verbal agreements, which result in a
ing.‘
written contract, be proved for the purpose of varying or modi

fying such contract, the presumption
ble: llyde v. Tenwinkel, 26 Mich., 93,
So, an indorser will not be allowed
95.
to how an oral agreement
made at the
time oi indorslng, to change its legal
import and change it into an under
taking subject to outside conditions:
Ortmon v. Canadian Bank, 39 Mich.,
And in the absence of fraud, evi
518.
not in writ
dence of a parol agreement
ing. alleged to have been made at the
time of the delivery of a deed, by
which upon certain conditions the deed
should be redelivered to the grantor
and be of no eifect. is inadmissible:
Beers v. Beers, 22 Mich., 42; Cline V.
Mich.,
31
237.
Cannot
Hubbard,
change terms of payment of notes by
paroi: liutchinson v. Hutchinson, 102
Mich., 6352 61 N. W., 60; Citizens Sav.
Bk. v. Vaughan, 115 Mich., 156: 73 N.
W., 143.
It there is a real ambiguity
in the words used, parol evidence of
the surrounding circumstances is coni
petent to develop
the real meaning,
meaning of onc
but not a secret
Dunham v. Packing 8:
of the parties:
P. Co., 100 Mich., 75: 58 N. W., 627.
Conveyance
property as
described
“part of Block B. :" it is incompetent
to show that it was not a part of
Thompson v. Smith, 96
the block:
Mich., 258: 55 N. W., 886.
It cannot
be shown by parol that it was agreed
that an advertisement contracted for
in writing, might be discontinued it not
satisfactory:
Cohen v. Jackoboice, 101
Mich., 409; 59 N. W., 665.
It is not
permissible to show by parol that it
was agreed that the permission to sub
let in a written lease was qualiﬁed by
agreement
that there should not he a.
sublease
for a saloon:
Harrison v.
Howe, 109 Mich., 476; 67 N. W., 527.
Cannot inject a warranty into written
McCray Rep. & C. S.
contract of sale:
Co. v. Woods & Zent, 99 Mich., 269:
58 N. W., 320.
Where part only of
the contract has been put in writing,

being that the parties

portion which is oral may be
shown by parol but not ii’ contradic
tory of the writing: Biackwood
v.
Brown, 34 Mich., 4; Hutchinson Mfg.
Mich.,
12;
Co.
v.
Pinch.,
107
W.,
729;
64
N.
W.,
66
N.
340.
Where there is no ambiguity
in a will it is not permissible to show
by the scrivener, conversations
with
testator at the time it was made as
bearing upon its construction:
De
frees v. Lake, 109 Mich., 415: 67 N.
W., 505.
So, as to sale
contract:
Hailett v. Gordon, 122 Mich., 501; 81
N. W., 556.
For illustrative
cases
of admission of paroi evidence though
there was a writing, see. Cutler v.
Steele, 93 Mich., 204; 53 N. W., 521:
Liggett Spring 8: A. Co. v. Michigan B.
Co., 106 Mich., 445: 64 N. W., 466;
Rawlings v. Fisher, 110 Mich., 19; 67
N. W., 977: Buhl v. Mechanics‘ Bank,
123 Mich., 591; 82 N. W., 282; Ada
Dairy Assn. v. Mears, 123 Mich., 470:
82 N. W., 258; Borden v. Fletcher's
Estate, 131 Mich., 220; 91 N. W.. 145.
This rule excluding paroi evidence
when the eitect of it is to vary the
writing, does not apply to subsequent
agreements
it law does not require
writing;
contract
in
Seamon
v.
O'Hara. 29 Mich., 66.
4—Stange v, Wilson, 17 Mich., 342:
Kelsey v. Chamberlain, 47 Mich., 241;
10 N. W.,
355.
Where a written
agreement
to furnish merchandise does
not state when it is to be furnished,
evidence
ot a contemporaneous oral
ﬁxing the time, is inadmis
agreement
sible: Coon v. Spalding, 47 Mich., 162;
10 N. W.. 183.
And where a contract
ﬁxes,
expressly, the time oi’ per
formance, it binds the parties, and no
inquiry can be made as to what would
have been a reasonable time for such
Manson,
performance:
Abeii
v.
18
Mich., 306.
It is not competent
to
show that notes were delivered on an
the

359

or

§ 359

included

EVIDENCE-—GENERAL

I

auras.

C11.

XX.

in the writing all that they were ﬁnally willing to
all previous agreements and understandings

agree to, and that

were merged in that contract.-"

But a simple bill of sale, which is designed merely to show a
transfer of title, does not embody the essential terms of the
contract of sale so as to exclude parol evidence of what the
contract was.“ And it may be shown by parol evidence that
the property mentioned in a receipted bill of parcels was not
to be delivered until paid for in the manner verbally agreed
on at the time of sale.’ And that a bill of sale, absolute on its
Also, that a deed of lands,
face, was given as a mortgages
absolute in form,‘ was given and intended between the parties
as a mortgage?
And that a negotiable promissory note was
given for growing crops, with a verbal agreement‘ that if the
land, on measurement, fell short of a certain quantity, a cor
And
responding deduction should be made from the note."
have
intended
to
their
put
where
the
not
generally,
parties
entire contract in writing, and have not done so, that portion
not put in writing may be shown by parol.“
agreement that if the maker of another
note, assigned in consideration of the
giving of the ﬁrst named ones, should
become bankrupt, the ﬁrst named notes
were to become void:
(‘entral Sav.
Bank V. O'Connor, 132 Mk-11., -—, 94
N. W., 11.
Micii.,
5—Savacool v. Farwell,
27
Thus, where there was a written
308.
contract for the sale of land, evidence
of n contemporaneous verbal agreement
for the reservation of the crops grow
ing on it, but not mentioned in the
writing. is inadmissible:
Vanderkar v.
Thompson, 19 Mich., 82.
and where
previous to the conveyance
of land,
for a part of the price of which a
mortgage was given, it was verbally
agreed that the purchaser should have
the land surveyed, and ii’ it fell short
of the amount agreed to be sold, that
a corresponding deduction
from
the
price should be indorsed on the mort
gage; and the land tailing short. held,
that evidence oi! the verbal agreement
was inadmissible. as it would contra
dict and vary the terms of the mort
gage:
Martin v. Hamlin,
18 Mich.,

6-Picard

11

Mieh.,

8—Fuller v. Parrish, 3 Mich., 211.
And that an assignment of a payment
in a mortgage. absolute in form, was
made as a security for money borrowed.
and not as an unqualiﬁed transfer:
Hyler v. Nolan. 45 Mich., 357: 7 N. W..
v. Loranger,
Harr.
910: Wadsworth
Ch. R., 113.
9——Emerson v. Atwater. 7 Mich., 12:
see, Bowker v. Johnson, 17 Mlch., 42.

10—Bennett v. Bidler, 16 Mich., 150.
And for principles somewhat analogous
to those in the foregoing cases. see,
Bishop v. Felch, 7 Ibid., 371: Harvey
v. Cady, 8 lbldf, 432; Batty v. Snooll.
5 Ibid., 231; Bowker v. Johnson,
17
Ibid., 42.
11—Locke
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McCormick,

7—Rowe v. Wright, 12 Mlch., 289.
And a receipt or written acknowledg
ment of payment is not conclusive; it
may be explained or set aside by paroi
evidence: MeAlllster v. Engle, 52 Mlch..
56; 17 N. W., 69-i: Vyne v. Glenn, 41
Mich., 112; 1 N, W., 997.

98 N. \V., 400

354.
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68.
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Wilson. — Mich.,
(Feb., 1904).
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But parol evidence of general custom in regard to the per
of any particular kind of work or labor, or of any
rule or usage adopted by a particular class of persons, cannot
be given to vary the terms of a special written contract for
such services, when the terms of such contract are explicit and
clear," although such proof of custom may be resorted to for
the purpose of ascertaining the meaning with which a term
And so
of doubtful signiﬁcation was used in a contract."
where it cannot be ascertained from a deed which of two per
sons was intended as the grantee, parol evidence is admis
formance

sible.‘

4

v. Cady, 3 Mich., 431-2;
v. Clark. 13 Mlch., 10;
Greenstein v. Borchard, 50 Mic-h., 434;
15 N. W., 540.
Peters, 4 Mich.,
13-Bancroft
v.
619.
Evidence of the sense in which
equivocal words in a written contract
were used for the purpose of explaining

12—Harvey

see, also,

Ervin

the contract is admissible only when
words have been
which
employed
are ambiguous or equivocal in mean
ing: North Amer. Fire Ins. Co. v.
Throop, 22 Mlch., 146.
14—Stockton v. Williams, Walk. (‘h.,
120; and Stockton v. Williams, 1 Doug.,
546; Campau v. Dewey. 9 Mlch., 381.
Parol evidence may sometimes be given
to identify the land intended to be
conveyed: see, Johnson v. Scott, 11
Mich., 232; Ives v. Kimball, 1 Mich.,

A latent ambiguity in a deed
308.
or writing may be removed by paroi
Sheridan,
evidence: Vaughan v.
50
Mich., 155; 15 N. W., 62.
But puroi
evidence
of marked trees and monu
ments not mentioned in the survey of
a road is inadmissible to establish a
line of road variant from that called
for by the courses and distances in
such survey: Moore v. People, 2 Doug.
Mich., 420; and see, to the same
effect, Brut-kner's Lessee v. Lawrence, 1
Doug. Mlch., 19.
Where there is a
want of certainty in an instrument,
parol evidence of the circumstances at
tending the making of it has been ad
mitted, not to contradict the written
instrument, but to aid the court in
giving a true construction:
Facey v.
Otis, 11 Mich., 213.
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5 361.
5 302.
5 363.
5 304.
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§ 366.
Q 367
§ 308.
Q 369
5 370.

tan.
§ 372.
5 373
§ 374
5 375.
5 376
§ 377.
5 378.
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5 380
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RECORDS, ETC.

Statutes of this state.
Statutes of other states, etc.
Statutes of foreign countries.
Common law of other states, etc.
Ordinances, municipal.
Public documents, records, etc.
Record must be proved as a
wholc.
Aﬂidavits made out of the state.
Records of foreign courts.
Copies of records of foreign
courts.
Records of courts of other states
—rule of the federal statute.
Records of courts of this state.
Probate records.
Judgments
and proceedings in
justices’ courts in this state.
Proceedings before justices
of
other states.
Copies of records and documents
in this state.
How certiﬂed.
Certiﬁcates of conviction.
Certiﬁcates of marriage.
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5 384
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§ 387.
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§ 390
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5 392.
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recorded.

when
ac
Other
instruments
knowledged.
Proof of execution, subscribing
witnesses.
Subscribing witnesses, when dis
pensed with.
Handwriting.
Wills.
Books of account.
Proof preliminary to the intro
duction of books of account.
Books, other than books of ac
count.
Proof of demands by aﬂidavit.
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WRITINGS.
Records not made evidence by
law.
§ 395. Non-existence of records, when
5 394

presumed.
Q 396
§ 397
§ 398.
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.5400
§ 401

Lost records and papers.
Lost records, restoring.
Lost records. proof of.
Papers in possession
of oppo
site party.
Proof of corporate charters.
Proof of partnerships.

IN GENERAL.
Cases in which the law requires the written evidence.
§ 360.
—Written evidence being considered of a higher nature than
oral testimony, it is a general rule that when written evidence
of a. fact exists, all parol evidence of it is excluded. In general,
whenever a written instrument is made between parties, and is
intended by them to contain the evidence and terms of their
362
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consent or agreement, or wherever there exists a written docu
ment, which by the policy of the law is considered to contain
the evidence of certain facts, the instrument or document is
regarded

it

of the agreement or facts which
and unless it is in the possession of the opposite

as the best evidence

records;

a

is

it

it,

or
be proved
party, and notice has been given to produce
to be lost or destroyed, secondary evidence of its contents
not admissible} And the fact that paper or entry belongs to
is

a public office, and cannot be removed,
not allowed to open
the door to parol evidence. The reason of the law requires the
best evidence to be given that the nature of the case will

admit of.”
The cases in which the law prohibits the substitution of oral
in place of written evidence, are:
Where the law requires any instrument to be in writing,
1.

testimony

such as records, public documents, oiﬁcial examinations, deeds
of conveyance of land, wills, when required to be in writing,
promises to pay the debt or answer for the default of another,
etc., and all other writings required by the statute of frauds.
is

2.

Where the parties have put their contracts and agree
tacitly agreed
ments in writing; as, in such cases the writing
upon by the parties themselves as the only repository and

is

is

is

3.

proper evidence of their agreement.
And thirdly, oral evidence cannot be substituted for any
mate
writing the existence of which
disputed, and which
rial either to the issue between the parties or to the credit of a
not merely the memorandum of some other
witness, and
fact.“

it

3-1 Greenleaf's Ev., §§ 86, 87, 88.
As to some of those contracts and mat
ters which the law requires to be in
writing, see, C. L., chap. 258.
Even
the admission of a party will not be
competent to prove the contents of a
record. or of an instrument which the
law requires to be in writing, unless
made in open court for the purpose of
obviating the production of the written
evidence: Welland C. Co. v. Hathaway.
Wend., 480, 486; Jenner v. Joliife,
.Tohns.. 9; Hasbrouck v. Baker, 10
Ibid., 248.
Nor can n party be com
pelled to accept his adversnr_v‘s
ad
missions in lieu of record evidence:

6 8

&

1

5 5

Mich., 360.
1-People v. Lambert,
Mich., 360.
2--People v. Lambert,
if a witness be asked to testify re
specting a transaction, before the ques
tion is answered it is competent for
the other party to inquire and know
whether the transaction be in writing;
and if it ls, the witness cannot be per
mitted to give parol evidence on the
subject:
Rice v. Blxier,
Watts
Serg.,
445.
And where the deed or
writing to be proved is only collateral
to the issue, the rule is the same as if
were directly in issue; parol evidence
Angel v. Rosenbury,
is not admissible:
12 Mich., 258.
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a

is

it,

But when the writing does not come within any of these
classes, it is said there is no ground for excluding oral evi
dence.
As, where a written communication is accompanied
by a. verbal one to the same effect, the latter may be received
as independent evidence, though not to prove the contents of
the writing, nor as a substitute for it. Thus payment of money
may be proved by oral testimony, though a receipt was taken;
and in trover, a verbal demand of the goods may be proved,
though a demand in writing was made at the same time. And
where the action is in tort for the conversion or detention of a
note or document, its existence and contents may be proved
without giving notice to the defendant to produce
as in such
case the pleadings give notice to the party that he
charged
with the possession of the paper.‘
notice to quit
So, also,
may be proved orally, without calling upon the defendant on
whom
was served to produce the original."
PUBLIC

LAVVS,

DOCUMENTS,

RECORDS,

ETC.

thereof in all courts, and in all proceedings within this state.”

°

a

Statutes of this state.-“The printed copies of all
§361.
statutes, acts, and resolves of this state, whether of
public or
private nature, which shall be published under the authority
of the government, shall be admitted as suﬁicient evidence

if

Statutes of other states and territories.-—“Printed
§362.
copies of the statute laws, and resolves of any other of the
United States, or of any territory thereof or of any foreign
state,
purporting to be published under the authority of the
respective governments, or if commonly admitted and used as
evidence in their courts shall be admitted in all courts, and in

all proceedings within the state,
such laws and resolves.”"

364

prima facie evidence of

3

§

cross-examine the witness concerning
them:
DeWitt v. Precott, 51 Mich.,
298; 16 N. W.. 656.
6—C. L.,
10172.
Where there is a
discrepancy between
an original
law
on ﬂle and the printed copies thereof,
the former must prevail:
Huiburt v.
Mich., 144.
Merriam,
7—C. L.,
10173.
As amended by
Laws of 1885, page 79, Act 82: Laws
5

2

;

&

John Hancock Mnt. Life Ins. Co. ‘v.
Moore, 34 Mich., 41; Kimball
Austen
Mfg. Co. v. Vroman, 35 .\1ich., 321.
4—1 Greenieafs Em, §§ 89, 90 Rose
V. Lewis, 10 Mich., 483.
Doug. Mich.,
5—Falkner v. Beers,
Documents cannot be considered
117.
as proven by the testimony of a witness
unless the adverse party is given the
opportunity
to inspect them, and to

as
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The acts of the legislatures of the several states may also
by having the seal of their respective states
aﬁixed thereto.” Where it is provided, as 1111d61‘ the laws of
be authenticated

is

a

;11

this state, that proof of the statutes of other states may be
made by a printed copy, in addition to the mode pointed out
by the act of congress, no reason which has been allowed to
apply to proof of private documents by parol can be said to
exist. Proof of such statutes must be made by a copy, either
exempliﬁed or otherwise, veriﬁed by oath, or by some method
regarded in law as of equal validity.
The reported decisions of the courts of the several states are
the only authorized exponents of their local statutes.” And if
farther explanation of them is needed, the true method is to
call in the testimony of experts to make the exposition, but not
to prove the contents of the law by them; and such experts
shall be learned in the law.1°
It is held that the common law,
as in force in this state, will be presumed to prevail in other
and that the laws of
sister state arc
states and countries
shown ;12 but not
the same as our own, until the contrary
But in
that our local statutes have been adopted elsewhere."

1

_.

365

F.

a

4

5

2

See, post,

364,

notes.

a

1

1

Mlch., 62;
12—Crane v. Hardy,
Mlch., 379.
Doug.
Jones v. Palmer,
13—Kermott v. Ayer, 11 Mlch., 184.
And courts, therefore, cannot presume
foreign
that the rate of interest in
country is the ame as that established
by the laws of this state: Ibld.
If
any presumption exists as to the laws
is that they con
of another state,
form in substance to the general pro
law; and in
visions of the common
the absence of proof it cannot be pre
sumed that another state has enacted

it

a

A

8

a

5

l

Mlch., p. 360.
Statutes of
states should be proved in the
same manner as provided in the state
law or in the Act of Congress. rather
lawyer
than by the testimony of
who has practiced within the state
Kopke v.
where they are in force:
People, 43 Mlch., 41:
N. W., 551.
9—People v. McQuaid,
Mlch.,
85
123; 48 N. W., 161.
Mlch., 349;
10-—People
v. Lambert,
see, also,
Greenl. Ev., §§ -187, 488.
11—IIlgh’s Case,
Doug. Mlch., 515;
see, Ellis v. Maxson, 19 Mlch.,
186.
bert,
other

§

may

5

Pennsylvania

Brightly's Purden's

1

proved by
be
Digest,
non-of
ﬂclal compilation of the statutes, ad
mitted in the courts of that state as
prima Incie evidence of the statute law
of the state, and the construction of
such statutes may be shown by its pub
llshed reports: People v. l\icQuaid, 85
Mlch., 123; 48 N. W., 161; Rice v.
Rankans, 101 Mlch., 378; 59 N. W.,
660.
if volume of law contains on
its title page the words “By author
ity." it thereby purports to have been
published by the authority of the state:
Gray. 150; see,
Merrlﬂeld v. Robbins,
also, Shotwell v. Harrison, 22 Mlch.,
410: Morse v. Hewett, 28 Mlch., 481;
Worthington v. Hanna, 23 Mlch., 534;
People v. Calder, 30 Mlch., 85: and.
ante,
358, notes.
printed volume
of the laws of another state which
purported on its title page
to be
“Printed by order of the governor,”
was held to be thereby suﬂiiciently au
thenticated, and admissible in evidence:
Wilt v. Oitler, 38 Mlch., 189.
8—Act of Congress of 1790: see,
C. L., 1897,
p. 49; People v. Lam
of
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for bigamy, where the validity of the ﬁrst mar
riage depended upon its conformity with the laws of another
state, which were shown to be in a statutory form, but were
a prosecution

not produced, it was held that, as against the innocence of
the accused, those laws could not be presumed to be the same
as our own; and that in such case the rule applied, that no
presumption could be made against the innocence of a party
charged with crime.“

of foreign countries.--The statute laws of
a foreign country may, aside from the provisions of the amend
ment of 1885 above quoted, be proved by an exempliﬁcation
under the seal of the state, or by a sworn copy." If our own
government has in any case promulgated a foreign law or
ordinance as authentic, that promulgation is sufficient proof!“
The evidence of an attorney from a foreign country cannot
properly be received to show the terms of a statute of that
Foreign statutes cannot be proved by parol without
coimtry.
some showing why secondary evidence becomes necessary."
§363.

Statutes

The common law, as in force in this state, will be presumed
to prevail in a foreign country, until the contrary is shown."

It

is necessary to prove foreign laws as facts."

Common law of other states and countries.—“The
unwritten or common law of any other of the United States,
§364.

or of any territory thereof, or of any foreign state or country,
may be proved as facts by parol evidence; and the books of
any of the statutes of this state. And,
as a parol contract to sell lands was
good at common law, and is only made
void by statute, therefore the courts
of this state will not presume such a
contract made in another state to be
void without proof that the statutes
of that state make it so: Ellis v. Max
son.

19

M-ich.,

186.

14—People v. Lambert, 5 Mich., 349,
364.

15-1
liill,

Greenl. Ev., 5 448; Packard
2 Wend.. 411; Lincoln v. But
tell, 6 \\'end., 475.
The proof may
be made by some copy of the law which
the witness can swear was recognized
V.

as authoritative
try, and which
I

in the foreign coun
was in force at the

366

time:

Spaulding

501.
16—i"'eoplc

v.

Vincent,

24

Vt.,

v. Lambert, 5 Mich., 361.
17—Kermott v. Ayer, 11 Mich., 184.
Where a foreign law is in question.
nothing can be known of its purport
until it is proved: Chapman v. Colby.
47 Mich., 46. 51: 10 N. W., 74.
1S———l~ilgh'scase, 2 Doug. Mich., 515;
Doug.
and see, Jones v. Palmer,
1
Mich., 380; Crane v. Hardy, 1 Mich.,
63; Ellis v. Maxson, 19 Mich., 186:
see observations as to these cases with
prosecutions:
reference to criminal
People v. Lambert, 5 Mich., 383. 364.
19—Morrissey
v. People, 11 Mich.,
340: Rice v. Rankans, 101 Mich., 378:
59 N. W., 660.
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reports of cases adjudged in their courts may also be admitted
as evidence of such law.”2°

The unwritten law must, from the nature of things, be
And the foreign common law
proved by parol evidence.”
The usual course is to
must be proved by living witnesses.”
make such proof by the testimony of competent witnesses in
structed in the laws, customs and usages, under oath.”
Ordinances of cities and villages.--“All laws, by
§365.
laws, regulations, resolutions and ordinances of the common
council, or of the board of trustees of any incorporated city or
village in this state, may be read in evidence in all courts of
justice, and in all proceedings before any ofﬁcer, body or board,
in which it shall be necessary to refer thereto, either from a
record thereof, kept by the clerk or recorder of such city or
village, or from a printed copy thereof, purporting to have
been published by authority of the common council or board

of trustees, in a newspaper published in such city or village,
or from any volume of ordinances, purporting to have been
printed by authority of the common council or board of trus
tees of such city or village; and such record, certiﬁed copy, or
volume shall be prima facic evidence of the existence and
validity of such laws, regulations, resolutions and ordinances,
without proof of the enactment, publishing, or any other thing
concerning

the

same.”'~’4

Public documents--records, etc.—Books and records
§366.
kept by persons in public oﬁices, in which they are required
by statute to write down particular transactions, occurring in
the

course of their public duties, and under their personal
and all papers and documents required by law

observation,

20—C. L., I 10174; Barger v. Fara
130 Mlch., 487: 00 N. W., 281.
21—People v. Lambert. 5 Mlch., 361.
22—Morrissey
v. People, 11 Mlch.,

ham,

340, 341.

It

is not
23—Greenl. Ev., 5 488.
that the witness should be
necessary
of the legal profession:
R. v. Dent,
1 Car. & Kirw., 97.
it may be proved
by any person who is or has been in
a position to render it probable that
he would make himself acquainted with
it; but there must be some special

367

ground for believing that the person
who is offered is more than ordinarily
capable of speaking on the subject:
Van der Donck v. Thelluson, 8 M. G.
& Scott. 812.
2-i—C. L., § 10193.
This section
places city and village ordinances upon
the same footing with the statutes. so
far as relates to the method of proving
their contents: Napman v. People, 19
Mlch., 352; see, Slielden v. Hill. 33
Mlch., 172: Van Aistine v. People, 37
Mlch., 524-5.
.

§367

or

EVIDENCE-—PUBLIC

LAWS, arc.

CH.

XXI.

to be ﬁled by any pubiic'oﬂ'icer in his office, or to be entered
and recorded therein, and duly ﬁled, entered or recorded there
in, are admissible in evidence.”
Such records and documents, however, on account of the in
convenience of removing them from the repositories provided
for them by law, may be proved by certiﬁed copies, as will be

noticed."
selves introduced in
proof of their oﬂicial
proper repository?"
hereafter

When such books and records are them
evidence, they must be accompanied by
character, and that they come from the
But a book of record, though kept by a

public oﬁicer, is not evidence where there is no law requiring
it to be kept, or declaring it to be evidence."
§367. Record must be proved as a whole.-—When a record
or document is offered in evidence, the whole thereof, or so
much as is material to the point in issue, must be admitted

if

r’equired. Thus, the record of a. survey of a road’ being an
entire thing, a part of the record of a survey cannot be ad
mitted without allowing the whole survey to go to the jury.”
25-1

Greenif. Ev., § 483.
26—See, also, C. L.. 5 10169.
This
section held not to apply where the
originals would not prove themselves:
Shelden v. Merrill. 69 Mich., 156; 37
N. W.. 66; Nor when the question of the
forgery of the original instrument is in
issue: People v. Swetiand. 77 l\ilch.. 53 :
43 N. W.. 779. It is sufficient it the cer
tiﬁcate conforms in substance to the
requirements of the statute:
Bills v.
Keesler, 36 Mich.,
69;
I-luntoon v.
O'Brien. 79 Mich., 227; 44 N. W.. 601.
‘The certiﬁed copy must be accurate and
entire: Doyle v. Mizner. 42 Mich., 338:
See, further, Tessman v.
3 N. W.. 968.
United Friends of Michigan, 103 Mich..
185; 61 N. W., 261; Iloﬂman v. Pack.
W. & Co., 114 Mich., 1; 71 N. W..
1095.
But copies of maps in the oﬁice
of the commissioner of the state land
are not admissible in evidence
oﬂice
unless accompanied by the field notes
of tha survey of the lands: Wilson v.
Hoffman. 54 Mich., 246; 20 N. W., 37.
And the commissioner's certiﬁcate must
show that they are copies of maps or
papers in his ofiice: Ibid.
As to maps
from the oﬂice of the commissioner of
the state land oﬁce, see, C. L., 5 1305.

v. Blckford. 9 Fos
27——Wl:|itehouse
ter, 471; Hall v. People. 21 Mich., 456.
Thus. where the original records of the
proceedings of a township board were
Held, that they
oifered in evidence:
were not admissible without proof of
the otlicial character of the board or
of its members. and that the writings
were the oﬂiclai records of the pro
ceedings of the board; and that the
recitals in the record stating the oﬂicial
character of the persons composing the
board, and that the writing was a rec
ord ot their proceedings, and was not
suﬂicient evidence
for that purpose:

Ibid.

28—Smith

v.

Lawrence,

12

Mich.

431.

29—Moore v. People, 2 Doug. Mich.,
420; and see. Piatt v. Stewart.
10
Mich., 260; Emery V. Whitwell,
6
Mich., 475.
So, the enrolled decree
and proceedings in a suit in chancery,
collected and attached together. as pro
vided by the statute, constitute the
record of the cause.
When any part of
it is read in evidence by one party.
every other part of it is also evidence.
and may be read by the opposite party:
Thayer v. McGee. 20 Mich., 195.

368
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by law the affidavit
the United States,
may be received in
the same

First.

LAWS,

src.

made out Of this state.—-“In

§368
cases where

of any person residing in another state of
or in any foreign country, is required, or
judicial proceedings in this state, to entitle
to be read, it must be authenticated as follows:
It must be certiﬁed by some judge of a court having

a seal, to have been taken and subscribed before him, specify
ing the time and place where taken;
Second.
The genuineness of the signature of such judge,
the existence of the court, and the fact that such judge is a
member thereof, must be certiﬁed by the clerk of the court,
under the seal thereof; or,
Third. If such aﬂidavit be taken in any other of the United
States, or any territory thereof, it may be taken before a com

duly appointed and commissioned by the governor
of this state to take afﬁdavits therein, or before any notary
public or justice of the peace authorized by the laws of such
state to administer oaths therein.
The signature of such
notary public or justice of the peace, and the fact that at the
time of the taking of such afﬁdavit the person before whom the
same was taken was such notary public or justice of the peace,
shall be certiﬁed by the clerk of any court of record in the
missioner

county where such affidavits
of such courts.”3°

shall be taken, under

the seal

Records of foreign courts.—“'I‘he records and judi
§369.
cial proceedings of any court in the several states and terri
tories of the United States, in any foreign country shall be
admitted in evidence in the courts of this state, upon being
authenticated by the attestation of the clerk of such court,
with the seal of such court annexed, or of the officer in whose
custody such records are legally kept, with the seal of his
ofﬁce annexed/’31
In the absence
.'30—C. L., Q 10144.
of the certiﬁcate required by this stat
that a
ute there is no presumption
notary has authority
to administer
Berkery v. Judge of Wayne
oaths:
Circuit, 82 Mich., 160; 46 N. W., 436.
81—C. L., 5 10145.
17 Mich., 535.

man.

24_

Cnpiing v, Her

The constitution of the United States
requires full faith and credit to be
given in every state to the records and
judicial proceedings of other states;
but this requirement does not extend
to the giving of validity to those pro
ceedings
which in themselves are mere
nuiiiiies.
it ls implied in judicial pro
ceedings
that the courts assuming to

369
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Copies of records of foreign courts.—“Copies of such
§370.
records and proceedings in the courts of a foreign country,
may also be admitted in evidence upon due proof:

That the copy offered has been compared by the witness
with the original, and is an exact copy of the whole of such
original;
1.

2. That such original was in the custody of the clerk of
the court, or other officer legally having charge of the same;

and,
3.

duly attested by a seal, which shall be
the seal of the court in which such record or pro

That such copy

is

proved to be
ceeding shall be.”-"2

“The preceding sections“ shall not prevent the proof of any
or judiciai proceeding of the courts of any foreign
country, according to the rules of the common law, in any
other manner than that herein directed, nor shall they be
construed as declaring the eﬁect of any record or judicial
record

proceeding, authenticated

as therein prescribed/’34

Records of courts of other states, rule of the federal
etc.—By virtue of federal statute the records and
judicial proceedings of courts of other states and territories
of the United States may be proved by exempliﬁed copies, at
tested by the clerk of the court, with the‘ seal of the court
annexed, if there be a seal, together with the certiﬁcate of the
§ 371.

statutes,

and to render judgment
should
have had competent authority to do so
in the particular case; and when this
authority is wanting, whatever is done
It cannot, therefore,
is not judicial.
be within the protection of the federal
And if the record by its
constitution.
recitals makes a prime facle case of
Jurisdiction,
no one In another state
or country is concluded thereby, but
may show what the real fact was, and
thus disprove the authority for making
such a record: Reed v. Reed, 52 Mieh.,
121: 17 N. W., 720.
32—C. L., 10146.
33—’1‘he preceding sections are C. L.,
at-t

IQ

10144,

10145,

10146.

See, act of
34—C. L., 5 101-47.
Congress of May 26. 1790, and March
27, 1804, 1 C. L., 1897, p. 40.
The

exempiitication of a judgment of a
foreign court which is admitted to have
had common
law jurisdiction
of the
subject matter, and which is authenti
cated by the seal of the court and the
signature of the clerk. is suﬂicient both
at common law and under our statute.
The statute (C. L., 5 10147) authorizes
the proof of foreign judgments accord
ing to the rules of the common law:
Capiing v. Herman, 17 Mich., 524. I535.
A judgment rendered in a United
States court, authenticated in the com
mon law mode, and in the manner pro~
vided by the laws of this state, is ad
notwithstanding
missible in evidence,
the form of the authentication is not
such as the acts of Congress require
to make it evidence in all places: Dean
v. Chapln, 22 Mich., 275.

370
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judge, chief justice or presiding magistrate,
be, that the said attestation is in due form.“

§372

as the case may

Records of courts of this sta.te.—A common law
§372.
record of a judgment in the circuit court not being necessary,“
the ﬁles and journal entries in the case are deemed a substitute
for such judgment record, and to constitute the record itself."
And a judgment of the circuit court is to be proved by such
original ﬁles and journal entries.“ Such original ﬁles, entries
and records of the court may always be used in the same court
without further’ailthenticationﬁ" ‘If the ﬁles have been lost,
the calendar entries may be given in evidence to “show the
steps taken in the cause before judgment."
And where an
indictment was lost or destroyed, parol evidence of its con
Journal entries of interlocutory
tents was held admissible.“
orders and decrees in chancery are to be considered as originals,
and are admissible in evidence without producing the enroll

ment.“

of Congress of

26,
May
L., 1897, p. 49.
The rec
ord of a judgment of a court of record
in another state cannot be impeached
in this state by showing in opposi
tlon to its recitals that process was
not served on the defendant, nor can
any
proof be received to contradict
material fact appearing by such rec
ord. unless such proof would be re
ceived in the court in which the judg
ment was rendered: Wilcox v. Cassick,
2 Mich., 165; see, Weeks v. Downing,
30 Mich., 4.
36—Kenyon v. Baker, 16 Mich., 373.
1 Mich.,
v. Mcllenry,
37—Norvcll
227, 232: Emery v. Whitwell, 6 Mich.,
The setting aside of a default,
474.
and the proceedings based thereon, by
the circuit court, forms no part of a
Final
law judgment record:
common
v, Backus, 18 Mich., 218.
The enrolled
decree and the proceedings in a suit in
chancery, collected and attached to
gether as provided by the statute, con
stitute the record of the cause: Thayer
v. McGee, 20 Mich., 195.
v. Holbrook, 2 Mich.,
38—Prentiss
372, 374; Crane v. Hardy, 1 Mich., 56,
and Norvell v. Mcilenry. 1 Mich., 227;
Kenyon v. Baker, 16 Mich., 373. Proof
of the ﬂrml entry of judgment is not

35—Act

1790,

1 C.

sumcient evidence of a valid judgment.
The ﬂies and previous entries should
be shown, so that it may appear that
acquired Jurisdiction,
the court
and
that the regular steps were taken to
warrant a judgment.
No presumption
can arise in favor of a. ﬁnal entry of
Judgment that has no previous steps
to explain or warrant it: Ib|'d., Ken
yon v. Baker, 16 Mich., 375: see Ken
yon v. Woodward, 16 Mich., 326.
Where a judgment in one case is in
troduced in evidence in another cause,
parol evidence
to
is not admissible
defects; the rec
supply jurisdictional
rod must be complete in itself: Mont
gomery v. Merrill, 36 Mich., 97.
39—Crane v. Hardy, 1 Mich., 56;
When
Norvell v. Mcllenry, Ibid., 227.
of a. cause, its
a court has Jurisdiction
col
proceedings cannot be impeached
laterally; nor, when of record, can
there be any proof given in opposition
Holmes, 1
Clark
v.
to the record:
Doug. Mich., 390, 398.
40—Norvell

v.

liiclienry,

1

Mich.,

227.

41—I’eople

v. Dennis,

4 Mich.,

609,

617.

42-—Lothrop v. Southworth,
436,

371

448.

5 Mich.,
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Probate recordS.—“Every probate court shall be a
§373.
court of record, and have a seal; and each judge of probate
shall keep a true and fair record of each order, sentence and
decree of the court, and of all wills proved therein, with the
probate thereof, of all letters testamentary and of administra
tion, and of all other things proper to be recorded; and, on
the legal fecs being paid, shall give true copies of the ﬁles,
records and proceedings of the court, certiﬁed by him under
the seal of such court.”43
“All copies so attested shall be legal evidence in all the
courts of law and equity in this state; and certiﬁcates of pro

or of guardianship, attested by the
bate, of administration,
judge of probate, may be given in evidence, and have the same
effect as any probate, letter of administration, or letter testa
mentary, or of guardianship, made out in due form of law.”“
Justices’ courts, judgments, proceedings, etc., in this
state.-“A transcript from the docket of any justice of the
peace, of any judgment had before him; of the proceedings in
the cause previous to such judgment; of the execution issued
thereon, if any, and of the return to such execution, if any,
when certiﬁed by the justice having control of such docket,
shall be evidence to prove the facts stated in such transcript.”4-"
The transcript would be insufficient if it be a transcript of
§ 374.

Haire, 29 Mich., 207; Holcomb v. Tift,
Farrand v. Caton,
43—C. L., 1 647.
I" 54 Mich., 647; 20 N. W., 627.
69 Mich., 235; 37 N. W., 203.
A transcript which is not certiﬁed
When an administrator sues, his let
as a transcript may be proved by the
are competent
tcrs of administration
of the capacity in which he
acts: John Hancock liiut. IA. ins. Co.
And icttcrs
v. Moore, 34 Mich., 41.
of guardianship,
of the appointment
Bur
and authority of the guardian:
rows v. Bailey, 34 Mich., 64.
4-i—(‘,. L., 5 648.
Probate registers
appointed under (‘. L., Q 2354, are com
petent to make such copies: C. L., §
evidence

2555.

4.’-—Where a justice. in pursuance
of the statute (C. L.. § 960), certiﬁes
of a judgment from the
a transcript
docket of a former justice, which he
certlilcs is in his control, full credit
will be given to such certiﬁcate. and
it will be presumed that the docket is
Fncey v.
legally in his possession:
Fuller, 13 Mich., 527; see, Jamison v.

oath of the justice: but where neither
certiﬁed nor otherwise proved, it is not
admissible in evidence to prove a judg
ment:
Wilbur v. Goodrich, 34 Mich..
84.
As to supplementing a judgment
record of a justice with other evidence
of essential facts omitted, see, Smalley
v. Lighthall. 37 Mich., 348.
But oral
proof cannot be given of matters which
requires
tho
law
to be
docketed:
Mudge v, Taples, 58 Mich., 307; 25
N. W., 297; Weaver v. Lammon, 62
Mich., 366: 28 N.‘ W., 905: Stoll v.
Padley, 98 Mich., 13; 56 N. W., 1042.
The docket
itself. veriﬁed by the
justlce, would equally be evidence
of
the facts stated in the docket:
Good
rich v. Burdlck. 26 Mich., 41: Schlat
terer v, Nickodemus, 50 Mich., 315;

‘Y
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the judgment merely. 'It must appear by it that the justice
had jurisdiction of the person and the subject matter.“ Such
transcript duly certiﬁed is evidence in all cases, even in actions
The juatice's return
N. W., 489.
be taken as true as to matters not
required to be entered on the docket;
Weaver v. Lammon, 62 Mich., 366; 28
N. W., 905.
15

will

in Goodseii v. Leonard, it was ob
jected that a certiﬁed transcript of a.
justice‘s judgment was improperly ad
mittcd in evidence. for the alleged de
fect that it did not show that it had
with the original, and
been compared
was a correct transcript therefrom and
But the
the whole oi’ such original.
court say. this certiﬁcate declares the
transcript to be a "transcript from the
docket of B . . . . . . late a justice of the
peace of G . . . . . . in said county, of the
judgment rendered by him in the above
entitled cause, and ol all the procrcd
had by and before him in the
inga
cnusc, so far as they appear upon his
docket. u:hi('h is in my possession, and
of which docket and of mid judgment
I have control,” and we think it fully
complies with the law. C. I... § 960.
This section is complete in itself, and
the provisions ot the general chapter
on evidence do not have any applica
tion to qualify its provisions: Goodseli
v. Leonard, 23 Mich., 374.
46—Ben v. Borst, 9 Wend.. 292:
A
Alien v. Carpenter, 15 Mich., 33.
justlce's docket showing a judgment in
an attachment case, but no aﬂidavlt or
bond. and showing also an execution
issued. but not its return. is not com
petent evidence in support of an ex
ecution sale, without proof of the ﬁles
in the case, or of a proper search for
them: liogsett v. Ellis, 17 Mich., 351:
363.
see, Gordon v. Ward. 10 lii'lch.,
in proving a judgment rendered against
a defendant who did not appear, a
transcript of the docket entry of the
which
judgment
was
introduced.
showed that the summons was issued
May 18. and was personally served
May 22. and that judgment was rend
did
dered May 29: but the transcript
not show when the summons was made
returnable or whether the suit had
from
been kept alive by adjournment
the return day to the day of rendering
judgment: Held, that it was competent

to introduce the summons in evidence to
show that it was returnable on the 29th
of May, the day when judgment was
rendered.
But when the summons was
introduced, it was tound that the con
stable's
return
of service indorsed
thereon left it in doubt as to whether
the service was personal or by copy:
Held, tnrther that it was competent
to prove by the constable as to whether
service was in fact personal, or by
copy:
Smaliey v. Lighthali, 37 Mich.,
348.

Mere irregularities or errors will not
the rejection of a collateral
judgment oﬂered in evidence; to war
rant such rejection, the defects must
be such as to render the judgment
jurlsdictlonally
Bigelow v.
invalid:
Barre,
Mich., 1; see, Hunt v.
30
Strew, 38 Mich., 85.
The record’ot a court of a justice
of the peace consists of the entries
upon his docket, every item of which is
enumerated in the statutes.
C. L., 5
By the next section the Justice
957.
though he is not
may, it he chooses,
bound to, state any other matters than
those enumerated in and required by
the previous section. By C. L., 55 960,
a transcript, duly certiﬁed, is made evi
dence, not only of the judgment. but
of the proceedings previous
to the
judgment, “to prorc the facts stated
in the trrm.vcript,” but of nothing tur
ther; and though the statute does not
expressly so declare, we sec no reason
to doubt that the docket itself. veriﬁed
by the justice, would eqhally be evi
dence “of the facts stated in H."
The
facts which the statute requires to be
thus stated would, in all ordinary
cases. be suﬁlcient to show the juris
diction of the justice.
But a proceed
ing by attachment, which seizes a de
fendant’s property before judgment or
trial, is exceptional, and no jurisdic
tion exists to issue
an atmchment
without an afiidavit ﬁrst made by the
plaintiff,
or some person in his be
half, and ﬁled with the justice, show
ing the facts required by the statute:
and this aiﬂdavit is made the basis of
the suit, and a condition precedent to

justify

373

or EVIDENCE—PUBLlC

§374

against the justice."
less a judgment

It

LAWS, ETC.

would not, however,

had been rendered.“

It

CH.

XXI.

be evidence, un

must appear from the

transcript that the process was properly served, or that the
defendant appeared, or it will not be evidence that the justice
had jurisdiction." But where the entry on a justice’s docket
does not show the time when the summons was served, and the

ﬁles are lost, the time of service may be proved by the justice,
the statute 5° not requiring the time of service to be entered on
If the justice enters upon his docket in regard
the docket.-'>‘

all that the statute requires, the ordi
nary presumption in favor of oﬁicial action must support the
‘
proceedings."
The docket of a justice, or a transcript of the proceedings
in a suit in which the jurisdiction of a cause and of the person
of the defendant appears, is conclusive in evidence." But the
record of an inferior court may be contradicted to the extent of
showing the want of jurisdiction of the person or of the subject
matter.“
IC
Whenever it shall become necessary, in any action or other
proceeding before a justice of the peace, to give evidence of a
to his own proceedings

While,
the exercise of the jurisdiction.
therefore, in an attachment suit, the
docket is evidence that a judgment has,
in fact, been rendered in the suit, and
of the proceedings entered
the
upon
docket, it does not show nny jurisdic
tion of the justice to render it.
And
in these special proceedings, jurisdic
tion is not to be presumed.
Proof.
therefore, of the justit-e's docket (which
would be good as far as it goes),
would not, without such atiidnvit. show
a valid judgment:
Goodseli v. Bur
dick. 26 Mich., 41.
47—Maynard v. Thompson. 8 Wend.,
393; Cornell v. Cook. 7 Cow., 313.
48——'I‘ownsend v. Chase, 1 Cow., 115.
49—l\ianning
v. Johnson.
7 Barb.,
457; see. Smaiiey v. Lighthail, 37
Mich., 348.
.
50-—C. L.. § 957.
51-—Van Kieek v. Eggleston, 7 Mlch.,
.

511.

62—Peck v. Cavell. 16 Mich., 9, 11.
As to what a transcript to ﬁle in the
circuit court should show, see same
case,

pp.

53—Hard v. Shipman, 6 Barb., 621;
Clark v. Iiolmcs, 1 Doug. Mlch., 390;
see, Van Kieei: v. Eggieston, 7 Mlch.,
511.
As to how far a judgment
against the principal
on a secured
debt is evidence of liability against the
surety; see, Lee v. Wlsner, 38 Mich.,
88.

54-—Clark v. llolmes, 1 Doug. Mich.,
But, in a suit upon a judgment
rendered by a justice of the peace, the
docket entry of the justice that the
defendant appeared and pleaded
in
uch action,
cannot be disprovedi
Facey v. Fuller, 13 Mich., 5-7.
Where
a justice mistook a promissory note
ﬂied with him for a confession of judg
ment, and entered up a judgment as by
Held, that in n
confession thereon:
suit upon the judgment, it was com
petent to introduce the ﬂies in the
ﬁrst case containing the note. for the
purpose of showing the mistake. and
that no valid judgment by confession
had been entered: Dodge v. Bird, 19
Lfich., 518.
390.

11, 12.

374

CH.

XXI.

or

EVIDENCE—PUBLIC

LAWS, ETC.

§375

judgment or other proceeding had before him, the original
entry of such judgment or other proceeding, or a transcript
thereof certiﬁed by him, shall be good evidence thereof before
such justice.”" The docket of a justice is evidence of itself,
when the cause in which it is introduced is before himself, in
the same manner as an original record would be in a court to
which it belongs.“ In such case no evidence is necessary that
he was a justice at the time, and that the docket produced by
him is his docket.“
“The proceedings in any cause or matter, had before a jus
tice, may also be proved by the oath of the justice; and in case
of the death or absence of the justice, they may be proved by
producing the original minutes of such proceedings, entered in
a book kept by such justice, accompanied by proof of his hand
writing, or they may be proved by producing copies of such
minutes, sworn to by a competent witness, as having been com
pared by him with the original entries, with proof that such
entries were in the handwriting of the justice/’58
The justice cannot give parol evidence of the contents of his
docket; the docket must be proved and veriﬁed by the oath of
the justice.‘
After judgment is pronounced by the justice,
and before the proceedings are entered on his docket, the
minutes or memorandum of the justice, made at the time of
giving judgment, and ﬁled with the papers in the cause when
proved by the justice, is competent evidence of the judgment?
Proceedings before justices of other sta.tes.—“The
§375.
otlicial certificate of any justice of the peace within any other
state of the United States, of the proceedings and judgment
in any case before him as such justice, with the certiﬁcate of
the clerk of any court of record in the county or district in
which such justice has executed his oﬂice, attested by his offi
cial seal, setting forth that the signature to the certiﬁcate of
the justice is genuine, and that he was such justice at the date
See, Schiatterer
55—C. L., I 959.
Nickodemus, 50 Mich., 315; 15 N.
W., 489.
56—Smith v. Frost, 5 Hill, 431.
57—(‘-roff v. Griswold, 1 Denio, 432.
58—(‘. I... § 961.
1—Boomer v. Iiaine, 10 Wend., 525:
v.

Hickey v. Hinsdaie, 8 Mich., 267, 273.
2——Hickey v. Hinsdaie, 8 Mich., 267,
273.
The entry in the docket is evi
dence of the judgment, but is not the
judgment itself; one is a judicial and
the other a ministerial or clerical act:
Ibid.
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be suﬂicient evidence

The remarks above as to the suﬁiciency of the transcript of
tate, are equally
a judgment rendered by a justice in this
applicable to a certiﬁcate of a judgment rendered in another
state. The statute giving authority to the justice to act, must
be produced and proved; for, unless it appear that the subject
matter of the suit was within his jurisdiction, and the proceed
ings in the cause conformable
would be illegal.“

to the statute, the proceedings

Copies of records and documents in this state.-When
§ 376.
the records or proceedings of one court are to be used in an
other court or proceeding in this state; and when any public
records, documents and papers in this state are to be proved,
they may be proved by copies or transcripts duly certiﬁed by
the clerk or oﬁicer having the custody thereof. And for that
purpose the statute provides, that: “Copies of all papers, rec
ords, entries and documents, required by law to be ﬁled by any
public oﬁicer in his oﬁice, or to be entered or recorded therein,
and duly ﬁled, entered or recorded according to law, certiﬁed
by such officer to be a true transcript, compared by him with
the original in his oﬂice, shall be evidence in all courts and
proceedings, in like manner as the original would if pro
duced.”'*

3-C. L., 5 10171. A properly cer
tiﬁed transcript of a judgment rendered
in another state. on personal service
and personal appearance,
is competent
evidence of the Judgment, in this state,
and of the jurisdiction of the justice:
Campbell v. Wallace, 46 Micl1., 320; 9
N. W., 432.
It will not be presumed
that a "county clerk" i a clerk of
a court of record and a certiﬁed trans
cript authenticated by such an oﬁilcer
is not admissible:
Howard v. Coon,
93 Mlch., 442; 53 N. W., 513.
As to
what is essential by way of seal, see,
C. L., 5 10175.
4—'l‘homas v. Robinson, 3 Wend.,
267.

5-(‘.

Ante, 5 366, note
L., ii 10169.
See, Bradley v. Silshee. 33 Mich.,
A copy of a record will not he
Wholly rejected because the certiﬁcate

26.
328.

attached is conﬁned to a portion of the
document only; the copy will be evi
deuce so far as it is properly certiﬁed:
Glllmun v. Rlopcile, 18 Mich., 145.
It is the duty of an oﬁicer certifying
to a paper or instrument, to give an
accurate copy of the entire document.
He calmot certify to a legal conclusion.
Thus in certifying to an instrument
having a certiﬁcate of acknowledgment
appended.
he cannot certify that the
paper is ackowledgcd in the usual form,
as that would be certifying merely to
a legal conclusion in respect to the
acknowledgment. He must give an sc
curate copy of the certiﬁcate of ac
knowledgment: Doyle v. Misner. 42
Mich., 332, 338; 3 N. W., 968.
Not
only certiﬁed copies, but sworn copies.
also,
of original instruments on ﬁle
in public oﬁiccs, are admissible in evi
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How records, documents, etc., certiﬁed.—“Whenever
copy of any affidavit, record, document or paper,
is declared by law to be evidence, such copy shall be certiﬁed
by the clerk or officer in whose custody the same is by law
‘required to be, to have been compared by him with the original,
and to be a correct transcript therefrom, and of the whole of
such original; and if such ofﬁcer have any official seal by law,
§377.

a certiﬁed

such certiﬁcate shall be attested by such seal; and if such
certiﬁcate be given by the clerk of any county, in his official
character as such clerk, it shall be attested by the seal of the

court of which

he is

clerk.”°

“But the preceding section shall not

be construed to require

the aﬁixing of the seal of any court to any certiﬁed copy of any
rule or order made by such court, or of any paper ﬁled therein,
when such copy is used in the same court, or before any oﬁicer
thereof; nor to require the seal of the supreme court to be
of any rule or order of that court,
aﬁixed to a
certiﬁed copy
when used in any circuit court.”"
Certiﬁcates of conviction.--The certiﬁcate of a justice
conviction for a criminal oﬁense made and ﬁled in the
oﬁice of the county clerk, as required by law, or a'duly certiﬁed
copy thereof, is evidence in all courts and places of the facts
§ 378.

of

a

therein contained
Such certiﬁcate

.3

is competent evidence of the facts therein

deuce: Pierce v. Rehfuss. 35 Mich., 53;
see, Sheiden v. Merrill, 69 Mich., 156;
37 N. W., 66.
A copy oi a chattel mortgage, certi
ﬂed by the township clerk to be a true
and compared copy oi‘ the original on
iile in his oiilce. and oi’ the whole ot
is sufﬂcient to entitlc
snch original,
in
the copy so certiﬁed to be received
evidence: Bills v. Keesier, 36 Mich.,
69; see, C. L., I 9528.
It is not neces
6—C. L., 5 10166.
sary that the certiﬁcate shall be in
with
the
verbal conformity
exact
statute: it will he suﬂlcient it it con
tains in substance what the statute
requires: Bills v. Keesier, 36 Mich., 69.
thc
But the mode of authenticating
documents, records and proceedings of
any of the departments or courts of the
United States, is governed by the laws

of the United States, and by the prac
tice of such departments and courts,
and not by the statutes of the state:
Gillman v. Riopeile, 18 Mich., 158;
Lacey v. Davis, 4 Mich., 140.
The
statutes of the United States make
certified copies, etc., equal in evidence
Stat.,
to the originals: U. S. Rev.
§ 886; Lee v. Wisner, 38 Mich., 87.
This section, C. L., 5 10106, does not
apply to certiﬁcates to transcripts of
justices’ judgments:
Goodseil v. Leon
ard. 23 Mich., 374.
7—C. L., 5 10167.
8-C. L., 55 1044, 1045, 1046. The
certiﬁcate of conviction, if filed or duly
certiiled, is the proper evidence
of
conviction;
such
it it has not been
may be
ﬂied. then secondary evidence
received: People v. Benjamin, 2 Parker
C. R., 201,
212.
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it does not contain evidence that the court had
obtained jurisdiction over the personiof the prisoner, and it

stated, although

by parol evidence, showing that there
Yet it seems that a certiﬁcate of
conviction by a court of inferior jurisdiction may be so far
contradicted as to prove that the colu-t had no jurisdiction of
cannot be contradicted
was no

the

trial or conviction.

ol'I"ense

or of the person of the prisoner.”

is now
Certiﬁcates of marriage.-It
provided
§ 379.
or of any
that, “The record of any license to marry,
marriage certiﬁcate, in any county clerk’s otﬁce, or a eer
tiﬁed copy thereof, shall be pr-ima facie evidence in any court
or proceedings in this state, with the same force and eifect as
if the original were produced, both as to the facts therein con
tained and as to the genuineness of the signatures ethereto.”‘°
On a trial for bigamy, where it was sought to prove the ﬁrst
marriage by a marriage certiﬁcate, it was held that neither the
certiﬁcate nor the record thereof was competent evidence on
a criminal trial, where the defendant was entitled to confront
the witnesses."
Certiﬁcates of the registry of deeds and mortgages,
§380.
etc.—-The register [of deeds] shall certify upon every instru
ment recorded by him the time when it was received, and
a reference to the book and page Where

it

is

recorded."

Notary certiﬁca.tee.—“The certiﬁcate of a notary
§381.
public under his hand and seal of oﬂice, of oﬁieial acts done
by him as such notary, shall be received as presumptive evi
dence of the facts contained in such certiﬁcate; but such certiﬁ
cate shall not be evidence of notice of non-acceptance or non
payment in any case in which a defendant shall annex~to his
9—'Peopie v. Powers. 7 Bar-b.. 462;
v. Holmes, 1 Doug. Mlch., 390.

Clark

10-—C.

L., I

8611.

11—Peopie v. Lambert. 5 Mlch., 349,
To constitute marriage, an ac
365.
or marriage is not es
tuai ceremony
sential to the establishment of the re
It is
lation of husband and wife.
suﬂicient that a man and woman of
and in respect to
due competency,

whom no impediment exists, consent
to take each other as husband and wife
and actually cohabit as such:
Peet
v. Peet, 52 Mlch., 467; 18 N. W., 220;
v. Kimmeii, 31 Mlch.,
see. Hutchlns
126.

12—C. L., 5 8986.
The certiﬁcate
required by this section, lndorsed upon
the instrument,
is evidence
of such
record: Jakway v. Jennison, 46 Mlch.,
521; 9 N. W., 836.
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§ 382

received ‘such

notice.”‘3
Various other public records, documents, certiﬁcates,
etc-—Certiﬁcates of the purchase of public lands, signed by the
receiver, shall be evidence in any court in this territory, that
the possession of the lands described in said certiﬁcate or cer
tiﬁcates is in the person or persons, his, her, or their heirs or
assigns, holding said certiﬁcate or certiﬁcates, as against any
person or persons, not having a better title to such land than
§ 382.

actual possession.“

“Certificates of purchase of university and school lands,
issued pursuant to the provisions of law, shall entitle the pur
chaser to the possession of the lands therein described, and
shall be suﬂicient evidence of title to enable the purchaser,
his heirs or assigns, to maintain actions of trespass for injuries
done to the same, or ejectment, or any other proper action or
proceeding to recover possession thereof, unless such certiﬁ
cate shall have become void by forfeiture; and all certiﬁcates
of purchase in force may be recorded in the same manner
that deeds of conveyance are authorized to be recorded.”"‘
Patents for lands.—When
United States patents for land
law," the record thereof, or a
as
recorded,
by
are
provided
certiﬁed transcript of such record, may be read in evidence."
If the patent is lost, an exempliﬁed copy of the record thereof,
L.. § 2635; Camp v. (‘ar
52 Mich., 375; 18 N. W., 113:
Sullivan v. Hall, 86 Mich., 7: 48 N.
W., 640.
This certiﬁcate may be im
peached
for fraud: Johnson v. Van
Velsor. 43 Mich., 208; 5 N. W., 265.
l4—(‘. L., I 10200. The assignment
of a land office certiﬁcate for the
purchase oi lands, when ﬁled in the
oiilce of the commissioner of the gen
eral land oﬁice, in order to procure the
issuing of a. patent to the asslgnee, be
comes :1 part of the records of the ot
ﬁce, and may be proved by an exem
pliﬁed
authenticated
copy,
by
the
commissioner: Clark v. Hall, 19 Mich.,
356.
As to the mode of authenticating
records and proceedings of the courts
and departments oi‘ the United States,
see, Lacey v. Davis, 4 Mich.,
140;
Mich.,
145;
Giiman v. Rlopeile.
18
ante, Q 377, note 6.
1&—C.

penteg.

15—C, L., 5 1342.
A certiﬁcate of
purchase of school lands executed by
"A." for “B., Superintendent of Public
Instruction," is not sulilcient under the
revised statutes of 1838.
Nor is an
instrument purporting to be an assign
ment of :1 certiﬁcate ot purchase there
in reclteq or described, although duly
proved.
any evidence of the certiﬁcate
of purchase:
Lee v. Payne, 4 Mich.,
106.
16-—C. L., 5 8984.
17—C. L., 5 8985. A patent of state
swamp lands, issued by the governor
under the seal ot state. is admissible
in evidence to prove title in the pat
entee,
without proof ot title in the
state, or the authority of the governor
to issue the patent: Grant v. Smith, 26
Mich., 201.
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from 'the commissioner of the general land oﬂice, is competent
evidence."
Sheriff ’s certiﬁcate of sale of real estate on execution, and
copies thereof duly certiﬁed by the register of deeds in whose
ofﬁce they are ﬁled, are presumptive evidence of the facts
stated in such certiﬁcates."
Notices and advertisements which are required by law to be
published in any newspaper, may be proved by the aﬁidavit of
the printer, his foreman or principal clerk, or by certiﬁed
copies

thereof.'~'°

township treasurer’s receipt for the pay
ment of such taxes is an oﬂicial paper, and pri-ma. focie evidence
of such payment.“
Books of account kept in the oﬁice of the state treasurer, in
which it was his duty to keep or cause an account of the re
Tan; rece-ipts.—A

ceipts and disbursements of the state treasury to be kept, are
competent evidence against him.”
Printed reports of the state oﬁicers, printed by the state
under their direction, are also evidence against such oﬁicers.23
People, 3 Mlch.,
18—Bnrnham
v.
197; Lacey v. Davis, 4 Mlch., 140, 150;
see, Clark v. Hail, 19 Mlch., 356; Gil
man v. Riopelle, 18 Mlch., 145: Boyce
As to
v. Stambaugh, 34 Mlch., 348.
impeaching a patent. see. Bruckner's
Lessee v. Lawrence, 1 I)oug.. Mlch.,
19.
Parol evidence of the contents of
a U. S. patent oi.’ land, although lost
or destroyed, is not admissible. because
exempliﬁed copies can be obtained from
Platt
the government at Washington:
v. Haner. 27 Mich.. 167.
19-C. L., 5 9178. A properly re
is entitled to the
corded ccrtiiicate
same privileges as other conveyances:
Drake v. McLean, 47. Mlch., 102: 10
N. W.. 126. One attacking such a cer
tiﬁcate has the burden of showing that
he is a ban-a ﬂdc purchaser: Atwood v.
Bearss. 45 Mlch., 474; 8 N. W., 55.
under an execution are
Purchasers
“purchasers/' though they have not yet
received
deeds:
Atwood v. Bearss.
supra.
20-C. L., §§ 10162. 10163. 10164,
10165.
For requisites of the aﬂldnvlt.
etc., see the cases cited in the notes
to these sections of Compiled Laws.
An aﬂidavit of the publication of a
_

notice of mortgage sale. made eight
years after publication, has been held
to be made at too late a day; although
the party might still prove the publica
tion in the ordinary way by the testi
mony of witnesses having knowledge of
Mundy v. Monroe. 1
the publication:
Mlch., 68. And so where the proof ot
posting a notice may be made by adi
davlt, it was held that such an nai
davlt. made ten years after the posting
was too late to make the proof in that
manner:
Woods v. Monroe. 17 Mlch.,
Where statute required pub
235. 242.
llcation for six successive weeks, an
aﬂidavit of publication for “seven suc
Perrien v.
cessive times" is not good:
It is good
Fetters. 35 Mlch., 233.
proof if aﬂdavlt is made by the pub
Thompson.
Vroman
v.
51
lisher:
This
Mlch., 452; 16 N. W., 808.
method of proof is not exclusive:
v. Darrow
Schlee
Estate. 65 Mlch.,
362; 32 N. W., 717.
21———.1ohnsonv. Scott. 11' Mlch., 232.
244.

22-People

v.

McKinney,

10

Mlch.,

v.

McKinney,

10

Mlch.,

59. 96.

23—I‘eople
97-8.
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Miscellaneous
items of evidence.— Mathematical
such as are in general use, are competent.
Almanacs
are among these F4 tables of mortality are also in this class
§383.

tables,

of evidence?‘
Poll-b00ks.—The

poll-books at an election are evidence.”

Post-mark.—A post-mark on a letter is evidence of the date
of sending it.” And, as proof of the receipt of its contents.”
But it may be contradicted by parol evidence of the real date
of posting.”
_
Newspaper market reports are admissible in evidence to
prove market values of commodities and merchandise. And a
witness may testify as to such values from his knowledge de
rived from such newspaper quotations of market values.3°
A map of the location where an occurrence happened can
only be used in connection with the testimony of a witness for
the purpose of enabling the jury to understand clearly the
facts testiﬁed

to.31

-

Photographs.-—VVhere the subject matter permits, the photo
graph may be used on the same principle as the map or draw

it is a photograph it does not necessarily follow
correctly
represents the conditions to be shown. This
that it
proof, as in the case of any map or drawing, must be made
before it is admissible.”
ing.

Because

24—Page v. Faucet, Cro. Eiiz., 226.
No particular almanac is neces
sary:
1 Greenleat Ev., § 162; ed. 16.
25—-Quch
are only admissible upon
tor personal
the question of damages
injury.when the injury is permanent:
Mott v. Detroit. -etc., Ry. Co., 120
So in action
79 N. W., 3.
Mich.,|127:
Jones v. Mc
for wronghil
death:
Millan, 129 Mich., 86; 88 N. W., 206;
see, also, Wilkins v. Flint, 128
l7[lch.,
262: 87 N. W., 195.
26—Rex v. Davis. 2 Strange, 1048;
Queen v. Ledgard. 8 Ad. & Eii., 535.
27--Abbey v. Lill, 5 Bing.. 299; Rex
v. Plumer, R. & 8., 264; 1 Greenlt. Em,
227.

§ 40.

28-—Arcangelo
Thompson.
v.
2
620: see. Woodcock v. Houids
worth, 18 M. & W.. 124.
29—Stocken v. Collin, 7 M. & W..

(‘amph..

515.

30-—Sisson v. Cleveland & Toledo Ry.

Co., 14 Mich., 497; The Cleveland &
Toledo Ry. Co. v. Perkins, 17 Mich.,
301; Peter v. Thickstun, 51 Mich., 589.
593; 17 N. W., 68; Auils v. Young, 98
Mich., 231: 57 N. W., 119.
Harrington,
31—Hoi'tman
v.
44
Mich., 183; 6 N. W., 225.
32-—Leidlein
v. Meyer, 95 Mich.,
586 : 55 N. W.. 367.
Where the originals
are obtainable proof of handwriting by
use of photographic
copies
is incom
petent:
Maclean v. Scripps, 52 Mich.,
214; 17 N. W., 815: 18 N. W.. 209;
Matter of Foter‘s Will, 34 Mich., 21.
A photograph of an assured to show
condition of health held incompetent
in Brown v. Metropolitan
Life Ins.
Co., 65 Mich., 306: 32 N. W., 610;
see, also, Bedeil v. Berkey, 76 Mich.,
435: 43 N. W.. 308. The Roentgen-ray
photograph
was held admissible
in
Bruce v. Beall, 99 'I‘enn., 303; 41 S.
W., 445.
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Professional and scientiﬁc b0oks.—The reading of profes
sional books as evidence, to the jury, is inadmissible.
Scien
tiﬁc or expert testimony must be given by living witnesses,
who can be cross-examined concerning their means of knowl
and can explain in language open to general compre
hcnsion what is necessary for the jury to know."
edge,

c0mmun'icati0~ns.—Such
Tclcphonic
communications
once
proven are as effective as conversations between persons in the
immediate presence of each other. Proof of them must identify

This may be done by testimony that
persons communicating.
voices were recognized or by any other competent evidence to
establish the fttct.“
is no law making
Stcn0grapher’s notes of testimony.--There

an official stenographer’s notes of testimony evidence gener
ally.” His minutes of testimony cannot, except by consent, be
used in evidence, until their accuracy has been shown by his

Nor until every reasonable effort has
been made to discover the witness’ whereabouts, and to pro
duce him if he is within the jurisdiction of the court."
own oath or otherwise."

33—Peopie v. iiall, 48 Mich., 480.
490; 12 N. W., 665.
The rule in this
state is, that medical books are not
admissible as a substantive medium of
proof of the facts they set forth:
Plnney v. Cahlll, 48 Mich., 584; 12 N.
W., 862; People v. Millard, 53 Mich.,
63: 18 N. W., 562. But where an ex
pert witness refers to a medical book
as authority for his opinions, it will
be proper to read from that book to
the jury, not to prove the facts it pur
ports to set forth, but to disprove the
statement of the witness, and to show
the jury that the book docs not contain
what the witness ascribes to it, and
thereby save them from being imposed
upon
by his assumptions and ignor
A medical expert may tes
ance: Ibid.
tify to the accepted facts of medical
science.
But in the examination of
such a witness. it is not permissible
for counsel to read to him from a medi
cal book. before the jury, and then ask
him whether such statements or re
ports as those contained in the para
graph read were found in medical
books:
Marshall v. Brown, 50 Mich.,
148; 15 N. W., 55.
And it is not al
lowable for a witness on direct or

relate before the
theories or state
ments found in professional or scientiﬁc
People v. Millard, 53 Mlch..
books:
The only circum
63: 18 N. W., 562.
stances under which
cientiﬂc works
can properly be read in evidence
arc
where the witness has based his opin
ions upon them and referred to them
as authority:
Hall -v. Murdock, 114
Mich., 234: 72 N. W., 150.
34—Deal v. State, 140 ind.. 354:
39 N. E.. 930: Ogden v. Illinois, 134
Ill., 599; 25 N.,E., 755; Deering v.
Shumpik, 67 Minn.. 348; 69 N. W..
cross-examinatlon

jury the opinions,

to

1088.

Mich.,
Darling,
35—i\iisner
v.
44
438; 7 N. W., 77; Edwards v. Iieuer.
46 .\iich., 95; 8 N. W., 717.
3B—Edwards v. Heuer, 46 Mich., 95
8 N. W., 717.
37-—Mawich v. Elsey. 47 Mich., 15:
8 N. W.. 587; 10 N. W., 57: see. Peo
ple v. Becker, 48 Mich., 46-7; 11 N.
W.. T79.
The stenographer's minutes
of the testimony given upon a former
trial of the cause, by a witness who
has left the jurisdiction
of the court.
are admissible in evidence:
Stewart
v. Bank of Port Huron, 43 Mich., 257;
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Deeds, etc., recorded.—“A1l conveyances and other
§384.
instruments authorized by law to be recorded, and which shall
be acknowledged or proved as provided in this chapter,“ and
if the same shall have been recorded, the record, or a. transcript

of the record, certiﬁed

by the register in whose office the
same may have been recorded, may be read in evidence in any
court within this state Without further proof thereof; but the
effect of such evidence may be rebutted by dther competent
testimony.’

’3°

-

N. W., 302.
But not until the
stenographer has testiﬁed to their ac
curacy, or they have otherwise been
authenticated and sworn to be correct:
Misner v. Darling, 44 Mich., 438; 7 N.
\\'., 77; People v. Sligh, 48 Mich., 54;
Such minutes are not
11 N. W., 782.
depositions; they are mere minutes of
Sellgman v. Ten
verbal testimony:
Eyck‘s Estate, 53 Mich., 289, 290; 18
N. W., S18; see, People v. McKinney,
Testi
49 Mich., 334; 13 N. W., 619.
mony by the court stenographer that
by the aid of his minutes he can give
the testimony taken on a former trial
"just as it was given in court" is suiti
People v.
cient proof of correctness:
Macard. 109 l\iich.. 623; 67 N. W.,
963; see, also, Lucker v. Liske, 111
iliich., 683; 70 N. W., 421.
38—C. L.. chap. 241.
39-—C. L., § 8990.
that a
The presumption of law
person signing a deed uses his real
name, and there is no presumption that
he is known by different names. There
fore the record of a deed signed by
Harmon, and acknowledged by Hiram,
ls_not admissible in evidence as the
deed of Hiram. without proof that the
signing
and acknowledging
persons
were in fact the same. the presumption
in the absence of proof being that they
Boothroyd v.
not the same:
were
Eagles. 23 Mich., 19.
acknowledgment
A
of
certiﬁcate
showing that the grantee appeared be
acknowledging
oﬂicer and
fore the
acknowledged that
executed
the said deed, is defective in not show
ing that he, the grantor, acknowledged
it. So, where an acknowledgment pur

9

ported to be taken in another state be
fore a commissioner appointed by the
governor of this state, but no oﬂlcial
seal of the commission was attached to
the certificate, the acknowledgment was
held to be defective:
Buel v. Irwin, 24
Mich., 145.
As to the effect of a
record of a deed which omits to show
that the instrument was sealed:
See,
Starkweather v. Martin, 28 Mich., 471,

5

i,

i-—

481.
A deed purported

to have been made
in New York without witnesses, and
acknowledged in 1843.
The clerk's
certiﬁcate verifying
the acknowledg
ment was made in 1855,tnd did not
purport to have been made by the
Held, that
clerk of a court of record:
there is no law making such n certiﬁ
cate valid, and that the healing act of
1861
has no
(C. L., 55 9048-9051)
reference to such a document:
Dona
hue v. Klassner,
22 Mich., 254: but
-see, Shotwell v. Harrison,
22 Mich..
410, and Morse v. Hewett, 28 Mlch.,
481;
Heaiy
Worth,
Mich.,
v.
85
166; Post v. Rich, 36 Mich., 16.
As to when a seal is necessary to
the authentication of a deed executed
in another state, see, Pope v. Cutler,
As to the sufilciency of
34 Mlch., 150.
a
clerk's certiﬁcate, see, People v.
Marlon, 29 ll/Iich., 32.
A bill of sale
given as security, and properly flied in
the town clerk's ofiice, may be proved
by a sworn copy:
Pierce v. Rehfuss,
53; Bills v. Kessler, 36
35 Mich.,
Mich., 69.
This section is not appli
cable when the issue is one of forgery
People v.
of the original instrument:
Swetland, 77 Mich., 57: 43 N. W.,
770.
The deposition of a register of

383
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ll The

term ‘conveyance,’ as used in this chapter, shall be
construed to embrace every instrument in writing by which
any estate or interest in real estate is created, aliened, mort
gaged or assigned; or by which the title to any real estate may
be affected in law or equity, except wills, leases for a term not
exceeding three years, and executory contracts for the sale or
purchase of lands/'4”
The record of a deed, void for defective execution, is inad
missible in evidence.
The law makes conveyancesproperly
executed and recorded, evidence; but the record of those not
properly executed being entirely unauthorized, cannot prove
the existence of the originals.“
When the record of a deed is admissible in evidence, the
deed itself is also admissible without preliminary proof." The
certiﬁcate

of the acknowledgment

as to contents of records in his
oﬁice without giving copies is incom
petent: Angeli v. Rosenbury, 12 Mich.,
241.
This statute is applicable to re
corded certiﬁcates of execution sale:
Drake v. McLean, 47 Mich., 102; 10 N.
Our statute is peculiar in
W.. 126.
making the record of conveyances pri
like the conveyance
mary evidence,
itself: Bradley v. Sllsbee, 33 Mich.,
330: Mee v. Benedict, 98 Mich., 270;
A record is not notice
57 N. W., 175.
by
purpose not declared
any
for
Burton v. Martz. 38 Mich.,
statute:
762; Ramsdell v. Citizens L. & P. Co.,
A con
103 Mich., 93; 61 N. W., 275.
veyance which bears the certiﬁcate of
recording of the register is admissible
without further proof: Lacey v. Davis,
4 Mich., 140; 66 Am. Dec., 524; Webb
v. Holt, 113 Mich., 338; 71 N. W., 637.
40-C. L., Q 8094 : C. L.. chapter 241.
of
The register's certiﬁed transcript
only of what
the record is evidence
may be properly recorded. and not of
any fact stated in an unauthorized
on the record:
memorandum entered
Fanncrs‘ 8: Mechanics’ Bank v. Bron
The execution and
son. 14 Mich., 361.
delivery of a deed, when in issue. can
not be proved by parol; it is for the
court, and not the witness. to say
whether an instrument he calls a deed
is such in law: Thompson v. Richard.
172, 183.
14 Mich.,
But n witness
may be asked whether a deed or mort
deeds

of a deed,

if regular

on its

gage had been given; the question not
calling for their
contents:
Clemens
v. Conrad. 19 Mich., 170.
The deposi
tion of a register to the contents
of a deed recorded in his oﬁlce. with
out giving a copy,. is inadmissible:
Angeli v. Rosenbury, 12 Mich., 241,
257.

41—Farmers‘
and Merchants‘ Bank
Bronson, 14 Mich., 369; and sec,
Mich., 515;
Dutton
v.
5
Ives.
Gaipin V. Abbott, 6 Mich., 17.
But
where a recorded
deed
is made by
several grantors, and is properly ex
ecuted and witnessed as to a part of
them, but defectiveiy as to others. the
record is evidence of the deed as to the
former, but not as to the latter: Hail
v. Redson, 10 Mich., 21.
It a plat be
actually, though not legally, recorded,
it may be used for identifying lands dc
scribed in deeds referring to it: John
stone v. Scott, 11 Mich., 232.
As to‘
the effect to be given to imperfectly
conveyances and the records
executed
thereof, see. C. L., §§ 0048, 9050, 9051:
Brown v. (lady, 11 Mich., 535, and
Brown v. McCormick, 28 Mich., 220.
For further provisions as to recording
decds and mortgages. and the eifect of
the records as evidence, see, C. L., if
v.

8092,

8983.

42—Lacey v. Davis, 4 Mich., 140,
150; Webb v. Holt, 113 Mich., 388;
‘
71 N. W.. 637.
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it

it,

face, is received without proof of the oﬁicial character of the
was granted
or of his signature, or that
oﬂicer granting
within the jurisdiction where he was authorized to act.“
Powers of attorney to convey land, and executory contracts
for the sale or purchase of lands, may be acknowledged or
proved, and recorded the same as conveyances of land, and

a

a

when so acknowledged or proved, as provided by law, and the
transcript of such record
record thereof, when recorded, or
duly certiﬁed, may be read in evidence in the same manner and
conveyance of land recorded or en
with the like effect as

titledto record.“
acknowledged.-“Every
written instrument, except promissory notes and bills of ex
change, and except the last wills of deceased persons, may
be proved or acknowledged in the manner now provided by
law, for taking the proof or acknowledgment of conveyances
of real estate, and the certiﬁcate of the proper officer endorsed
thereon, shall entitle such instrument to be received in evidence
on the trial of any action, with the same effect, and in the
conveyance of real
such instrument were
same manner, as
Other instruments,

when

a

if

§385.

1

estate.”'“‘

Proof of execution, subscribing witness, etc.-If the
instrument has 'not been so acknowledged or proved and certi
ﬁed,
must, except in those cases otherwise provided for by
C. L.,
subscribing witness,
10199, be proved on the trial by
not, by proof of the handwriting of the
there be one, or
or by his admission that he executed the
party executing
one where the execution of
instrument; unless the case
will be considered as admitted
not denied on oath.“

if

,

if

it

is

it,

if

§

a

it

§386.

25

§

5

7

5

§

1,

5

44—C. L.,
8995.
As to proof of
letters of attorney to convey
lands,
which were actually received
in any
register‘s oﬂice
tor record prior to
March
1847, see. C. L.,
8996.
L.,
10168; Cameron v.
4-‘3—C.
Culkins. 44 Mich., 531:
N. W., 157.
46—See, C. L.,
Providing
826.
that under certain circumstances, un
les execution is denied under oath,
proves itself: ante,
the instrument
199.
It ls not necessary to produce
a subscribing witness to
lost Lnst.ru

385
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43—Thurman v. Cameron, 24 Wend.,
87; ives v. Kimball,
Mich., 808,
310.
This rule applies to acknowledg
It
ments
taken within the state.
taken
without the state. see, C. L.,
9050,
9051.
\\'hen a
55 S963-8965,
lost and unrecorded deed will be pre
see,
sumed to have been duly executed.
Godfrey V, Disbrow, Walker's Ch. R.,
260; Goodeil v. Labudie, 19 Mich., 88.
For the eilect ot the recital ot the
consideration. see. Mowrey v. Vand
Mich., 39.
ling,
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of the

If he can
instrument, he must be produced if practicable."
not bc found, or his testimony cannot be used, his handwriting
must be proved; or, if his handwriting cannot be proved, after
diligent exertions for that purpose, proof of the handwriting
of the party executing the instrument is admissible.“ Where
there are several subscribing witnesses, it is suﬁicient to call
An attesting witness may be dispensed with
one of them.“

if

he is out

of the state.”

ment. Such witnesses are not expected
to be able in all cases to identify in
struments. except such as bear their

own

genuine signatures,

and are not

to know the contents of the
presumed
Eslow v. Mitchel,
papers they attest:
26 Mich., 500; Raynor v. Norton. 31
Mlch., 210.
Subscribing witnesses can

not identify anything but the original
instrument signed by them:
Lee V.
Wisner, 38 Mich.. 87. Au objection to
a deed that one of the subscribing
witnesses signed by aﬂlxlng his mark,
is not tenable:
Brown v. !\ic(‘ormick,
28 Mich., 217; see, Comp. Laws, 5 50,
sub-div. 17. A witness cannot be com
pelled to answer whether a signature
shown to him ls his, unless he is per
mitted to examine the paper to which
it is attached:
North American Fire
ins. Co. v. Throop, 22 Mich., 146.
C. L.. I 10199,
referred to, provides
that unless the law requires the in
strument to be attested by subscribing
witnesses, as an essential of validity,
it is not necessary to call such wit
though the instrument be so
nesses.
attested.
This would seem to admit
the proof of deeds as between the orig
inal parties without calling the sub
scribing witnesses, such being valid
instruments: Baker v. Clark, 52 Mich.,
22; 17 N. W., 225; King v. Carpen
tcr. 37 l\iich., 389; Price v. Haynes, 37
Mlch., 487; Dougherty V. Randall, 8
Mich., 581.
47—Ilollenbeck v. Flemming, 6 Hill,
303.
The right of a party to testify
in his own behalt does not dispense
with the necessity of calling the sub
scribing witness to prove the execu
tion of a contract to which he is a
party: Hess v. Griggs, 43 Mich., 397;
5 N. W., 427.
See, ante, note 40.
48~Jackson v. Waldron, 13 Wend.,
178, 196; McPherson v. Rathbone, 11

If the instrument
Wend.. 96, 110.
was apparently executed in a foreign
country, that fact raises a suﬂicient
presumption that the subscribing wit
nesses are not within the jurisdiction
of the court, so as to let in other
evidence
of the execution.
And it
seems that where a witness appears
to have once resided within the juris
diction of the court, an inquiry made
at the place of his former residence,
and amongst those who had formerly
known him, and not finding him or
gaining intelligence of him, raises the
presumptlon that he is dead or beyond
the jurisdiction
of the court:
Valen
tine v. Piper, 22 Pick.. 89-90.
If there
are several subscribing witnesses, the
absence of all must be shown before
other proof of the execution can be
resorted to:
Prince v. Blackburn, 2
East, 250.
Proof of the handwriting
of the witness is suiilcieut if he be
dead or out of the jurisdiction
of the
court, without proof of the handwrit
ing of the parties:
lbid.; Lusk v.
I)ruse,‘4 Wend., 313; or blind: Pedler
v. Paige, 1 M. 8: Rob., 258; or insane:
Currie v. Child, 3 Camp., 283; Igguiden
v. May, 9 Ves. Jun., 381.
But not
where he is unable to attend merely
from illness:
Harrison
v. Blades, 3
Camp.,
457.
Nor because he is too
aged or infirm to attend, for his depo
sition could be had:
Jackson v. Root.
18 John., 60.
Nor will the fact that
the justice before whom the cause is
tried is the only subscribing witness,
and for that reason unable to testify,
authorize other proof of the execu
tion: Jones v. Phelps, 5 Mich., 218.
222; see, Currie v. Child, 8 Mich., 411;
see, post, ,6 397,
-i9—.Ta(-kson
v. Gager, 5 Cow., 385:
Russell v. Coﬂln, 8 Pick., 1-13.
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Subscribing witnesses, when dispensed with.—But the
§ 387.
rule requiring subscribing witnesses to be called to prove
the execution of instruments witnessed by them, is.now dis
pensed with in this state by legislative enactment, except in
those cases where subscribing
The enactment is as follows:

witnesses are required

by law.

~

“Whenever upon the trial of any action, civil or criminal, or
upon the hearing of any judicial proceeding, a written instru
ment is oifered in evidence, to which there is a subscribing wit
ness, it shall not be necessary to call such subscribing witness,
may be proved in the same manner as it
if there were no subscribing witness thereto,

but such instrument

might

be proved

except in cases of written instruments to the validity of which
one or more subscribing witnesses are required by law.”’"

Handwriting.—In proving handwriting in general,
§388.
there is no rule which requires any particular amount of skill
in the witness. Any one who has had the proper facilities, and
who can swear to a knowledge of the handwriting in question,
Knowledge of a person’s handwriting
may be admitted.-"*2
may be acquired from seeing him write; and seeing him write
but once has been held sufﬁcient; or such knowledge may be
acquired from letters and writings of the party in the posses
sion of the witness, and which he knows to be genuine from
their having been recognized by the writer, or from-his having
adopted and acted upon them as his, in business transactions.-"3
50--Prince v. Blackburn, 2 East.,
Rathbone,
250;
11
v.
McPherson
Wend., 96: Jackson v. Gager, 5 Cow.,
385.

L.,
51-—C.
386, note 46.

§

10199.

See,

ante, p.

52—Vint0n
v. Peck, 14 Mich., 287.
Evidence as to the gennineness of
handwriting
given by a witness of
the requisite experience and skill is ad
missible, and being so. must be cou
sldered, and given, in the light of all
just
thereon,
the evidence bearing
weight as the court and jury
such
deem it reasonably entitled to:
Uni
versity v. Rose, 45 Mich., 307; 4 N.
W., 738: 5 N. W., 674; 7 N. W., 875.
A mark attached by one who cannot
write, to his signature written
by
another, is evidence or an intention to

adopt the signature as his own.
But
this intention may be shown by any
other clearly expressed act.
If such a
person directs another to sign for him.
and it is done in his presence. it is
whether he attach his mark
good,
or not: Just v. Wise, 42 Mich., 573;
4 N. W., 298.
53—Vinton v. Peck, 14 Mich., 287;
see, also. 1 Green]. Ev., 5 577.
Before
beingadmitted
to testify to the genu
ineness ot a controverted signature
from his knowledge ot the handwriting
of the‘ party, a witness ought. beyond
all question, to have seen the party
write, or to be conversant with his
acknowledged signature:
Brigham v.
Peters, 1 Gray, 139, 145-6.
The evi
dence of one who testifies
ho
that
knows another‘s
handwriting,
either
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the witness has the proper knowledge of the party’s hand
writing, he may testify as to his opinion as to whether the
'
writing in question has been altered or changed.“
The value of a. witness’ belief must of course depend on cir
cumstances, but it is proper to go to the jury like other ques
The jury may also
tions upon the genuineness of writings.
for
themselves.
At
examine the papers
witness, it seems, may
also testify to his opinion of the genuineness of the disputed
writing from a comparison of such writing with other writings
that are admitted or proved to be genuine. But the writings
used for the comparison should be involved in the issue, or con
stitute a partof the records in the case; or at least their genu
Upon this point the supreme
ineness should be conceded.
court say, that “In the case of ancient documents proof by
comparison has always been permitted, although the compari
son can only be made by proving the genuineness of papers not
In other cases the rule has been inﬂex
involved in the cause.

ibly, and, we think, justly settled, that disputed papers which
do not belong in the cause, and are not involved in the issue,
cannot have their genuineness made a question of inquiry in
the cause, and cannot, therefore, be made a basis of inquiry
for either witness or jury. But- where the papers used as a
means of comparison are a part of the records in the cause,

and undisputed, it is held that the jury can compare them, and
that witnesses may also use them to form an opinion concerning
handwriting. And we feel constrained to hold that a compari
son of hands by witnesses, where there is an undisputed stand
ard in the cause, or where documents are fairly before the
jury upon the issue, is a1lowable.”1
from having seen him write. or from
correspondence
apparently
business
signed
by him, is competent for the
purpose of proving the iatter‘s signa
ture: Empire Mfg. Co. v. Stuart, 46
Mich., 482: 9 N. W., 527.
A witness‘ knowledge of handwrit
ing cannot be tested by showing him
rcai and what are claimed to be ﬁcti
tious specimens; at least not unless
both sides were agreed as to which
and which were false,
were genuine
as this would raise issues which would
Howard v. Pat
complicate the case:
rick, 43 Mich., 128; 5 N. W., 84.

54—When the question to when an
or erasure was made de
alteration
pends entirely upon the inspection of
the paper, the jury can determine upon
their own inspection, and as well with
out as with the aid ot experts:
Ives
v. Leonard, 50 Mich., 296; 15 N. W.,
463.

Peck, 14 Mich., 287.
as a standard of com
parison must be admitted, or shown be
yond dispute to be genuine:
People
Comparison
v. Cline. 44 Mich., 295.
with
outside pspcrs—that
is. with
papers not in the case, is not allow
1—Vinton

Writings
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Where objection was made to the testimony of a writing
master called to testify as to whether two papers were both
written with the same ink, on the ground that he was not
shown to be an expert in color, it was held that any experience
in using pen and ink would qualify a person of ordinary capac
ity to form an admissible opinion concerning such identity,
although it might be of small weight under doubtful circum
stances?

WiHs.—-Wills which have

been proved and certiﬁed as
in
the probate court, and the
provided by law, and recorded
record thereof, or a transcript of such record, certiﬁed by the
§ 389.

Howard v. Patrick, 43 Mich.,
able:
A disputed paper
128: 5 N. W., 84.
not in the case is not admissible as a
standard of comparison of handwrit
ing: Van Sickle v. People, 29 Mich.,
Unacknowledged writing found in
61.
:1 diary belonging to a party, is not ad
missible as a standard of comparison
to prove his handwriting: Ibid. Papers
not in the case cannot be proved and
received
for the purpose of being used
before the jury for the comparison of
handwriting;
nor is it proper to allow
a jury to take disputed writings
to
their room to determine their genuine
there:
Foster's
ness by comparison
Will Case, 34 Mich., 21. The igua
ture in question may be compared by
witnesses before the jury, with signa
tures of a party to papers in the case
Signatures to
and admitted to be his.
papers not in the case cannot be used.
Nor can a party be required to write
his name in court for the purpose of
comparison, nor be required to pro
for
duce specimens of his handwriting
purpose.
Bk.
of
that
First Nat‘l
Houghton v. Robert, 41 Mich., 709;
3 N. W., 199.
But where a. witness
had the defendant’s signature in his
which the witness had seen
possession,
defendant write, and therefore knew
to be genuine. he was allowed to com
pare it with the signature in question,
for the purpose of forming and giving
his opinion as to the genuincness of
that signature:
Worth v. McConnell,
42 Mich., 473, 475: 4 N. W., 198; see,
People v. Cline, 44 Mich., 290: 6. N. W.,
671. Comparison can only be made with
such writings as are part of the ﬁles

of the cause, or as are legally in evi
for some other purpose than
dence
that of such comparisonzi People v.
Parker, 67 Mich., 222: 34 N. W., 720.
But though papers are foreign to the
case. yet if the party on cross-exam
ination admits their genuinenes they
may be used:
Dietz v. Fourth Nat'i
Bank, 69 Mich., 287; 37 N. W., 220.
proof
handwriting
Where
of
is
sought to be made by comparison of
papers which are in evidence
before
the jury, they are not required to rely
solely on the comparisons and testi
mony of experts, but may make their
own inspections and comparisons, and
use their own judgment thereon in ar
riving at their conclusions:
People
v. Gale, 50 Mich., 237; 1.5 N. W., 99.
Letter press copies of a person's
handwriting
are
not admissible as
standards
of comparison:
Common
wealth v. Eastman,
1
189.
C1ish..
Photographic copies of papers cannot
be used to prove the handwriting
of
the originals
if the originals them
selves
are obtainable:
Maciean
v.
Scripps, 52 Mich., 218, 219; 17 N. W.,
815; 18 N. W., 209.
2—Vinton
v. Peck, 14 Mich., 296.
a chuncery case, where there was
evidence to show in whose handwriting
certain interlineations were made, but
none tending to show them to be in
the handwriting
of the defendant, it
was ‘held incompetent for the court
upon its own unaided inspection. and
contrary to the testimony, to ﬁnd them
to have been written by him:
Shel
don v. Hawes, 15 Mich., 519.

In
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however,

ought to be certiﬁed.‘
Books of account.—Charges
provable by books of
§390.
account must be for such things as are matters of book ac
count, and are usually charged on books, such as for articles

of property sold and delivered, services performed, and the use
of anything hired and returned, as the use of horses, oxen, etc.-'*
The right to make the charge must exist at the time of deliv
ering the articles, and arises in consequence of such delivery.
But charges for matters not usually charged in books, as for
not receiving goods pursuant to agreement; or the claim for
damages for a tort; or breach of contract for the sale of land;
or for the rent of land, are not admissible.“
This rule would exclude charges for money lent or paid, etc.’
But in this state the rule in respect to money charges has been
They are now admissible.
changed by statute.
The pro
vision is:
“In all trials, hearings, and proceedings in any cause or suit
in any court, or before any officer, arbitrators, or referees,
books of accounts, containing charges or entries for money
paid, laid out, furnished or lent, shall be received and admitted
as evidence, and deemed to be evidence of such charges and
entries, and that such moneys were so paid, laid out, furnished,
or lent, as is in such books charged or entered, and of the lia
1

3—C. L., 5 9297:
Mich., 308.

4—Morris

v.

Ives v. Kimball,

Keyes,

1

Hill,

The pass books and signature books
n savings bank, when aided by the
testimony of the bank oﬂlcers, are com
petent evidence to prove the existence
People v. Hurst,
ot deposits:
41
Mich., 328: 1 N. W., 1027.
The contents oi’ a bank blotter, be
ing a book of original
entries, and
being required for constant use at the
bank, may be shown without the pro
duction of the book itself, in ordinary
cases where no question or gr-nuincness
is likely to arise requiring a personal
inspection:
People v. Hurst, 41 Mich.,
331; 1 N. W., 1027.
6—Swiit‘s Dig., 81, 582; 1 Cow. &
Hill's notes to Phil. Ev. by Edwards,
note 108.
7—Low v. Payne, 4 Comst., 247:
Case v. Potter, 8 Johns, 211.

of

540.

5-1 Phil. Ev., Cow. & Hill's notes
by Edwards, 376.
And where a party
can testify from his recollection as to
it
the items charged in his books,
would seem that the books would not
be admissible, as not being the best
evidence: Jackson v. Evans, 8 Mich.,
476.

In an action on implied assumpsit
for work and labor, the entries made
in plaintiffs time book by his foreman
as to the number of days‘ work done,
is admissible in connection with plain
tiﬂ‘s testimony that he knows the en
tries to be correct:
Peters v. Galla
gher, 37 Mich., 407.
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bility of the person charged therefor, in the same manner and
to the same extent as books of account containing charges for
goods, wares, or merchandise, sold and delivered, are received
and admitted as evidence of sale and delivery of such goods
and merchandise,_ and of the liability of the person charged
therefor; Provided, this section shall not apply to cases where
person acting or having acted as commission merchants or
agents for the sale of produce, grain, or other property on
commission, except as to the amount charged as commissions

for selling, or buying such produce, grain or other property,
unless accompanied by a voucher or receipt~ for the money ‘so
claimed to be laid out, or lent, or furnished.”8
Books, to be admitted in evidence, must appear to contain
the ﬁrst entries or charges of the party made at or near the
time of the transaction to be proved, in other words, they must
be the books of original entries, and when the contrary is
discovered from the face of the book, or comes out on exam
ination of the party, they ought to be rejected as incompetent
evidence.”
_
It is no objection that the book is kept in the ledger form——
that is, having a separate page for the account of each person;
nor that the charges were all made upon a slate at the respec
tive dates, and were duly transcribed into the book."
This statute
8—C. L.. 5 10192.
not authorize the use of books of
account tor the purpose ot proving the
manner of the entry of the heading oi.’
of the
the account as corroboration
particular
theory of one party as to
Richards v.
what the contract was:
Burroughs, 62 Mlch., 117: 28 N. W.,
755.
Books of account are competent
evidence to show to whom the goods
were charged and to whom credit was
Montague v. Dougan, 68 Mlch.,
given:
It is not permis
98: 35 N. W., 840.
sible to permit a party to put his book
in evidence for an entry showing his
version ot a parol contract. Collins v.
Shaw, 124 Mlch., 474; 83 N. W., 146.
Books of account may be received to
show that note was for same amount
as they, the books, show to be due,
to corroborate the claim of its execu
tion where the effect oi‘ the books was
so limited:
Baker v. llaliecirs Es
does

180; 87 N. W., 100.
does
not authorize the
court, as a general
rule. to compel
the production of a party's
books:
(‘ummer v. Kent Circuit Judge,
38
Mlch., 351.
Ii’ there exist a. trust re
lation the production of the books may
tate,

128

Mlch.,

This statute

compelled:
Eddy v. Bay Circuit
Judge, 114 Mlch., 668; 72 N. W., 890.
See, further, upon this statute:
Les
ter v. Thompson, 91 Mlch., 245; 51 N.
W., 893.
9-1 Cow. 8: Hill's notes by Ed
wards, p. 380. 381; see, Prince
v.
Smith, 4 Mass., 455; see, Sickies v.
Mather, 20 Wend., 72. A pass book of
a bank given a depositor is a book of
original entries within this rule: Kux
v. Central M. Sav. Bk., 93 Mlch., 511;
53 N. W., 828.
10—Faxon v. Hollis, 13 liass., 427
he

8.
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The entries must be in the book of the party, kept by him
for the purpose of his daily accounts, generally, with all those
persons who may have dealings with him, and must be made in
conformity to his prevalent manner of keeping the book, and
in a regular course with other charges."
To entitle the accounts to credit, the entries should be made

without razure, alteration or interlineation. When people make
single entries only, the accounts should be fair and properly
dated. When books are not regularly kept, where there ap
pear to be razures, alterations, interlineations
or additions,
which cannot be plainly accounted for; and where the accounts
are made out after a dispute has arisen, there is a strong pre
sumption against their truth, and the party must have other
proof to support his books to enable him to recover."
Not only the day book, but if it appear in any way to be
posted, the ledger must be produced, that the other party may
have the beneﬁt of any items entered therein to his credit."

All

the books containing entries relating to the account, when
relied upon as furnishing evidence to sustain the account,
should be produced.
A party should no more be allowed to
withhold a part of the account while‘ he avails himself of an
other part, as evidence in his favor, than a part only of a. deed
or other document should be received in evidence. The fact
that the account ran into two books cannot vary the prin

ciple.“ It is the same in legal effect as though the defendant
had insisted upon sealing up one-half of the day book he of
fered, and having the remaining half received as evidence in
his favor. The only proper or safe rule to apply in such a
case, is that if a party in derogation of the fundamental and
salutary rule of evidence, that one shall not be permitted to
make a testimony for himself, seeks to introduce his own
entries, in his own books, as evidence of the dealings to which
Hill & Edwards‘ notes
11-—1 Cow.,
to Phil. Ev., 381. There is no require
ment of law that books upon which
entries are made shall be of any par
ticular kind. or the entries of any par
Thus, where an attor
ticular form.
ney‘s services were mlnuted
in his
register and other proper memorandum
it was held suﬂicient for the
books.
purpose of an account current in the

law, and that the fact of his not
having actually entered
the amount
of charges.
or made regular entries
on formal books of account, was im
material:
Payne v. Walker, 26 Mich.,
63.

12--Swift's Digest,

729.

13—Prlnce v. Swett, 2 Mass, 589.
14—Pendleton
Weed,
v.
3 E. I’.
Smith, N. Y., 72.
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they relate, he shall, at least allow the party to be affected
by such evidence, the beneﬁt of all the entries he has made.“

Proof, preliminary to the introduction of books of
§391.
8£c0lmt.—As to the preliminary proof essential to the intro
duction of the books it is suﬂicient if the books be shown to
of the party whose books they are claimed
to be; second, the books of original entry in which entries as
to transactions of the kind in issue are generally kept; third,
that the entries were made cotemporaneously, or substantially
so, with the transactions they record; fourth, that the entries
were made by one having knowledge of the facts recorded. and
ﬁfth-, that the books were correctly kept.“
be, ﬁrst, the books

Entries in other than books of account.-Entries in
§392.
books not strictly shop books or books of account but books
kept in the regular course of one ’s business in which is entered
I
15-—Larue v. Rowland, 7 Barn, 107;
Bigeiow v. Saunders. 22 Bari», 147
R; Low v. Payne, 4 Comst., 247: Win
When
ants v. Sherman, 8 iiill, 74.
once introduced. the books cannot be
withdrawn, without the consent of the
evi
opposite party; they are then
dence
for both parties:
Clinton V.
Rowland, 24 Barb., 634; see, Vibbard
v. Staats, 3 Iiill, 144.
16—Since the statute making parties
competent witnesses a party can tes
tify to the correctness of his books
as well as another so far as he has
Montague v. Dougan, 68
knowledge:
Mlch., 98; 35 N. W., 840.
in order
to entitle one to put his books of ac
count in evidence, it must appear that
he is usually precise and punctilious
respecting the entries therein and that
they purport to contain all the items
of the account which are proper sub
jects ot entry: Countryman v. Bunker,
101 Mlch., 218; 59 N. W., 422.
It is
not now necessary in order to the in
troduction of books of account to call
third parties to testify to their cor
through
gained
rectness
knowledge
from having settled from them,
as
was necessary under the old rule: (see,
Jackson v. Evans, 8 Mlch., 476); Sev
Day A. Pub. Assn. v. Fisher,
enth
Admr., 95 Mlch., 274; 54 N. W., 759:
Montague v. Dougan, 68 Mlch., 98;
A merchant's books
35 N. W., 840.

of account are not admissible when
authenticated only by the bookkeeper
the entries
who merely transcribed
from slips given him by salesmen, the
having no personal knowl
bookkeeper
edge of the sales:
Swan v. Thurman,
112 Mlch., 416; 70 N. W., 1023.
in
Taylor v. Woitenden & Co. v. Atkin
son, 127 Mlch., 633; 87 N. W., 89,
it was held, that where it was shown
that the ledger entries were made from
slips made out by the sales clerks in
duplicate, one of which went to the
delivery counter and the other to the
bookkeeper,
the slips being destroyed,
such showing was not suﬂicient au
thentication; that it was further neces
sary to prove that no entries were
made except from slips; that no such
ex
slips were scnt to the bookkeeper
cept when the goods with a. duplicate
slip were sent to the delivery counter
and were delivered.
Where one under
whose supervision books are made tes
titles that they are made at hi dic
tation and that they are correct, they
are admissible: Union Cent. Life ins.
Co. v. Smith, 119 Mlch., 171; 77 N.
See, also, Baxter v. Rey
W., 706.
nolds, 112 Mlch., 471; 70 N. W., 1039.
Where the person making original en
tries and having personal knowledge
of the transactions is beyond the juris
diction of the courts, the books may be
proven by showing them to be in the
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part of the regular course of one ’s
Weather
bureau records, train dispatchers’ records, etc., are illustra
tions. Such entries get their credit from the fact that they are
a part of a regular routine of business.
It is essential then,
a record

of transactions

business are admissible

as a

under some circumstances.

ﬁrst, that such entries be found where, according to the estab
lished order of the business, of which they are a part, one
would expect to ﬁnd them; second, that they be made by one

with knowledge of the fact and whose business it was to make
third, that they were made substantially as of the time
of the transaction they record."

them;

Proof of demands by affidavit, etc.—“In all actions
brought in any of the courts of this state, to recover the
§393.

amount due on an open account, or upon an account stated, if
the plaintiif or some one in his behalf, shall make an affidavit
of the amount due, as near as he can estimate the same over
and above all legal set-off, and annex thereto a copy of said
accoimt, and cause a copy of said aﬁidavit and account to be
served upon the defendant, with a copy of the declaration ﬁled

in the

cause,

or with the process by which such action is

com

such affidavit shall be deemed pri-ma facie evidence of
such indebtedness, unless the defendant with his plea shall, by
himself or agent, make an aﬁidavit and serve a copy thereof
on the plaintiff or his attorney, denying the same; and if the
defendant in any action shall give notice, with his plea of a
menced,

set-oif, founded upon an open account, or upon an account
stated, and shall annex to such plea and notice a copy of such
account,'and an aﬁidavit made by himself or some one in his
behalf, showing the amoimt or balance claimed by the defend
ant upon such account, and that such amount or balance is
justly owing and due to the defendant, or that he is justly
entitled to have such account, or said balance thereof, set off
against the claim made by said plaintiff, and shall serve a copy
of such account and affidavit, with a copy of such plea and
notice, upon the plaintiff or his attorney,
handwriting of such entrants, and
settlements have been made by
books and they had never been
Cameron Lumber Co. v.
puted.
erville, 129 Mich., 552: 89 N. W.,

that
such
dlsSom346.

such aﬂidavit shall

17—1 Greeni. Ev., 5 120a Ed., 16:
Meyer v. Brown. 130 Mich., 449; 90
N. W., 285: see, also. Slsson v. (‘leve
land & '1‘. Ry. Co., 14 Mich., 497; De
Armond v. Neasmith, 82 Mich., 231.

394

CH.

XXI.

or

EVIDENCE--RECORDS,

mo.

§ 394

prima fac-ie evidence of such set-oﬁ, and of the
liability thereon, unless the plaintiff, or some one in
his behalf, shall, * *" " " before trial, make an affidavit
denying such account, or some part thereof, and the plaintiif’s
indebtedness or liability thereon, and serve a copy thereof
upon the defendant or his attorney, and in case of a denial
of part of such set-off, the defendant’s afﬁdavit shall be
deemed to be prima facie evidence of such part of the set-off
as is not denied by the plaintiif’s affidavit: Provided, that
be

deemed

plaintiff

’s

any aﬁidavit in this section mentioned shall be deemed sulﬁ
cient, if the same is made within ten days next preceding the
issue of the writ or ﬁling of the declaration or plea/“B
RECORDS

NOT MADE EVIDENCE, LOST RECORDS AND PAPERS, ETC.

Records not made evidence by la.w.—A record or
§394.
document is not of itself admissible as evidence of the matters
therein stated, unless made so by law. Therefore, a book of
Before
the
18—C. L., Q 10191.
amendment of 1881 by which the pro
viso to this section was added, it was
held that the affidavit of the amount
the
due must be made at substantially
of
time of the commencement
same
And that such an affidavit
the suit.
made
several days before commence
ment of the suit was of no avail: Mc
Hugh v. Butler, 39 Mich., 185.
If a
plaintiff rests the proof of his case
upon such an aflidavit, he cannot, after
the defense has rested and his aﬂidavlt
is found defective, go back and prove
in the ordinary way as
his demand
a matter of right.
But the court may
in its discretion permit him to do so:
Although the aﬂidavit may not
Ibid.
be in compliance with the statute, or
may
be so defective as to render it
inadmissible in the absence of the de
fendant, or against his objection if
present, yet if the defendant is pres
ent at the trial, and the afiidavlt is
with his knowl
oﬂered and received
edge and without objection on his part,
it will be too late. after both parties
have rested. to claim that the affidavit
proves nothing:
Locke v. Farley, 41
A declara
Mich., 405; 1 N. W., 955.
tion with the return of the oﬂicer in
dorsed showing that the affidavit and

account were duly served on the de
fendant,
competent
were
evidence
in establishing a prima facie case:
Bjorkquest v. Wagar, 83 Mich., 226;
47 N. W., 235; Morrill v. Bissell, 99
Mich., 409; 58 N. W.. 324.
An affi
showing
davit
aflflant
is
the
the
treasurer of the plaintiff corporation
is suﬂicient though it does not other
wise purport to be made by him on
corporation:
behalf of
the
Forbes
Lith. Mfg. Co. v. Winter, 107 Mich.,
116; 64 N. W., 1053.
See, also, Bui
iock v. Ueberroth, 121 Mich., 293: 80
N. W., 39: Mero v. Button, 116 Mich.,
080: 75 N. W., 89.
The aiiidavit authorized by this sec
tion, § 10191,
like any other testi
mony, must be introduced in evidence
to become operative, the statute mak
ing no provision for its being ﬂied
justice—until thus
with
the
intro
duced, a defendant is not called upon
to object to its sufficiency or regularity
or to the return of service.
But if
he has appeared and is present when
the aﬂidavit is introduced. and is silent
he waives all such objections.
A return which fails to show service
of a copy of said afﬁdavit, with the
process
by which the suit was com
if objected to, is lnsuﬂicient
mpnced.
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township plats found in the ofﬁce of the register of deeds is not
evidence where there is no law requiring it to be kept, or de
ciaring it to be evidence." But a book kept by a county treas
urer, containing entries of tax sales and the names of the pur
not distinctly required

by any statute, yet
being necessary to the adequate performance of his duties, is
admissible in evidence to prove the facts therein stated as an
oﬂicial book, if it appear to have been kept in the oﬁice as one
chasers, though

of the regular

office books

for making such entries.”

§395. Non-existence of records, when presumed.—The law
presumes that all oﬁicers entrusted with public ﬁles and records
will perform their official duty and keep them safely in their
oiﬁces.
Therefore, where a paper is not found where, if in
existence, it ought to be deposited or recorded, the presump
tion arises that no such document has ever been in existence.
Until this presumption is rebutted, it must stand for proof of
'

such non-existence."
There is no room for presumption

for or against

a matter

Where there is record proof thereof.
allowable

Presumptions are never
where better evidence of a primary nature is re

quired by law to be preserved.”
§396. Lost records and papers, certiﬁcate of search for.—
“Wl1enever any oﬂicer to whom the legal custody of any paper,
document or record shall belong, shall certify that he has made
diligent examination in his oﬂice for such paper, document or
record, and that it cannot be found, such certiﬁcate shall be
presumptive evidence of the facts so certiﬁed, in all causes,
matters and proceedings in the same manner and with like

if

such ofﬁcer had personally testiﬁed to the same in
the court, or before the officer before whom such cause, matter
or proceeding may be pending.”‘*’3
effect as

of the
to authorize the introduction
original aﬂidavit in evidence.
To he
the
effectual as prlma facie evidence
And
statute must be compiled with.
compliance,
the record
must show such
must
or competent proof
be made
thereof:
Gordon v. Sibley, 59 Mich.,
250; 26 N. W., 485.
See. McGowan
v. Lamb, 66 Mich., 615; 33 N. W., 881.
v. Lawrence,
12 Mich.,
19—Smith
481; see, F. & M. Bank v. Bronson,

Mich., 371;
Mich., 328.

14
33

20—Groesbeck

Bradicy
v.

Seeiey,

v.
13

Siisbee,

Mich.,

341.

21—IIali v. Kellogg, 16 Mlch., 135,
139; Piatt v. Stewart, 10 Mich.. 260.
v. Treadway.
17 Mich..
22—1"eopie
485: see. Stevenson v. Bay City, 26
Mich., 44.
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is
Lost records and papers, restoring.—P1-ovision
§397.
made by law for the restoration of lost records, papers and
proceedings relating to causes or proceedings pending or de
termined in courts of record. For the mode of eﬁecting such
restoration and the eﬁect to be given to such substituted rec
ords and papers,

see

C. L., §§ 10276-10280.24

§398. Lost records and writings, proof of.-If a record is
lost or destroyed, its contents may, after proof of such loss or
destruction, be proved by parol evidenec, unless it appears
And the same rule
that there is other and better evidence.“

25—1 Greeni. Ev., i 509: People v.
The evidence
Lambert, 5 Mich., 349.
ot one who had been register of deeds,
that he had seen an unrecorded deed
to be lost. among a quantity
supposed
of unrecorded papers in the registers
as tending to prove
office, is competent
the existence of such a deed: Raynor v.
Norton, 31 Mich., 210.
The contents
of a complaint and warrant in a crimi
nal case, iqst after being returned into
court, may be proved by secondary
evidence; and witness to prove its con
tents may state the substance thereof
without giving the exact words. Com
monwealth v. Roark, 8 Cusb., 210;
and see, Simpson v. Norton, 45 Maine,
281; Iiali v. Manchester, 40 N. ii.,
410.
So the contents of a lost execu
tion may be proved by oral testimony:
There
Rash v. Whitney, 4 Mich., 495.
are no degrees in secondary evidence;
and where an original paper is lost,
and no counterpart is legally presumed
or required to exist, its contents may
be proved by parol a well as by a copy.
But if 21 party falls to produce a. copy
known to be correct, if in his power
to do so, it may well be regarded as
bearing against the credit to be given
to his oral testimony of the contents
Eslow v. Mitchell,
ot the lost paper:

26 Mich., 500.
When there is a dis
pute as to the contents of a lost
agreement,
the conversation
between
the parties at the time of putting the
agreement in writing may be admitted
as bearing upon the question of the ac
tual contents of the paper:
North
American Fire ins. Co. v. Throop, 22
Mich., 146, 155.
But parol evidence
of the contents of a lost U. S. patent
of lands is not admissible, because
an exemplified copy may be obtained
of the proper department at Washing
ton: Platt v. Iianer. 27 Mich., 167.
It is not necessary to produce a sub
scribing witness to a lost instrument
to prove its contents, because
such
witnesses are not presumed
to know
the contents of the papers they attest:
Eslow v. Mitchell,
26 Mich.,
500:
Raynor v. Norton, 31 Mich., 210.
But
when a paper has been destroyed by
agreement of the parties interested
in it under uch circumstances as to
make
it unjust for either party to
make any further claim under it, its
contents will not be allowed to be
Proved tor the purpose of making a
further claim under it: Gugins v. Van
Gorder, 10 Mich., 225.
It is suﬁicient
it the substance
oi.’ the lost instru
ment
is proven.
But this rule does
not allow the witness to give the sense
or eﬂect: he must give the words or
the substance of them:
iioliness V.
Deppert, 122 Mich., 275: 80 N. W.,
1094.
It will not defeat the proof of
contents of a destroyed
instrument
that the party desiring to prove it
consented
to its destruction where there
was no reason to think its preserva
tion necessary:
Davis
Teachout's
Estate, 126 Mich., 135; 8 N. W., 475.

397
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24—The proceedings to restore or
substitute must be upon notice to the
Mont
parties to be affected thereby:
The
gomery v. Henry, 10 Mich., 19.
contents of lost records of the court
may be proved by secondary evidence;
pro
the statute, C. L., §§ 10276-10280,
viding for restoring lost records. does
Drake v.
not preclude such proot:
Kinseii, 38_Liich., 234, ‘zss.
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applies to private writings and papers. But before such evi
dence can be admitted, it must be shown that a. diligent search
has been made in all places where the record or writing was
usually kept, and where it would be most likely to be found;
and that such earch has been unavailing. Such search must
be made in good faith, and must be suﬁicient to raise, in the

judgment of the court, a reasonable presumption of the loss
or destruction of the instrument." Where it was sought to
prove by parol the contents of a bond and aﬂidavit in an
attachment suit, they not being found in the office of the jus
tice who rendered the judgment, and no search having been
made for them in the ofﬁce of his successor, it was held that
without such search the loss was not suﬂiciently proved to
admit the testimony, as those papers should be, and perhaps

in the oﬁice of

successor, notwithstanding he
testiﬁed that he was very certain he had not received them."
might

be

the"

Papers in possession of opposite pari:y.—If the instru
ment to be proved is in the possession or control of the ad
verse party, and he will not produce it. the document may be
§ 399.

26-1

Greeni. Ev., § 558; Hogsett
Higgins v.
17 Mich., 374;
Proof that a
Watson, 1 Mich., 428.
letter had been entrusted to a. prose
cuting
attorney, and that‘ he had
searched
for it in the places where
to expect
he believed he had reason
to ﬁnd it, and did not fined it, suﬂi
eiently establishes the loss of the let
ter to admit parol evidence of its con
tents:
Stewart v. People, 23 Mich.,
Where a witness has sutliclently
63.
explained his failure to preserve a pa
People
per, he may stnte its contents:
v. Sharp, 53 Mich., 523; 19 N. W.,
Evidence from which a reason
168.
able inference of loss may be drawn
Howd v. Breckenridge,
is suﬂicient:
For
97 Mich., 65; 58 N. W., 221.
other illustrative cases upon the ques
tion of proof of loss, see: Dillon v.
Howe, 98 Mich., 168; 57 N. W., 102;
Alfred Shrimpton & Sons, Ltd. v.
Netzorg, 104 Mich., 225; 62 N. W.,
343; Burt v. Long, 106 Mich., 210;
64 N. W., 60; People v. Pope, 108
Mich., 361: 66 N. W., 213: Wheeler-v.
Detroit, 127 Mich., 329: 86 N. W.,
822; Thompson v. Flint & P. M. Ry.
v.

Ellis,

Co., 131 Mich., 95; 90 N. W., 1037.
The question of whether the evidence
of loss is sufﬂclent is for the court
and not for the jury:
Thomson v.
Flint & P. M. Ry. Co., 131 Mich., 95;
90 N. W., 1037.
Where the writing is
beyond
the jurisdiction
of the court
parol evidence will be received if reas
sonable elfort has been made to pro
cure it without avail. People v. Sea
man, 107 Mich., 348; 65 N. W., 203.
Contra, if no such effort has been
made: Phillips v. United States Ben.
Soc., 120 Mich., 1-12: 79 N. W., 1; 125
Mich., 186: 84 N. W., 57.
The burden of showing the loss of
a written instrument is upon the party
seeking to introduce secondary evidence
of its contents, and no instrument can
be said to be lost until careful search
has been mnde for it: ilansen v. Am.
Ins. Co., 57 Iowa, 741; 11 N. W., 670.
But a prime farie showing of loss will
be suﬂlcient, unless the opposite party
by cross-examination shows the search
to be insuﬂiclent:
Bottomley v. Gold
smith, 36 Mich., 27.
27——Hogsett
v. Ellis, 17 Mich., 351,
374.
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proved by an examined copy, or by parol evidence of its eon
tents, after proof that it is in his possession or control, and that
he has received notice to produce it.”
Without ‘such proof
and notice the secondary evidence i inadmissible.
As to his
The notice should
possession, slight evidence is suﬁ"1cient.'*’°
be in writing; it must describe the instrument with sufficient
particularity, so as to leave no reasonable doubt as to what
be served on the

must be served

a

and

it

it should
;31

paper is to be produced ;“°
his attorney, if he has one
time before the trial."

party or

reasonable

is

a

is

But notice to produce may in some cases be dispensed with,
duplicate
as where the document tendered in evidence
itself a
original,33 and where the instrument to be produced
Where, from the nature of the
notice, as a notice to quit.-‘*4
action, the defendant has notice that the plaintiff intends to
charge him with the possession of the instrument, notice to
ally:

after
reasonable
28-—The refusal,
notice, to produce
document in the
of the adverse party, and
possession
which the party demanding it is en
titled to introduce in evidence. author
izes proof of its contents by secondary
But it does not dispense
evidence.
with such proof as is attainable, nor
allow the tenor of the instrument to
less than
be made out by anything
satisfactory proof of all that is essen
tial: Moulton v. Mason, 21 Mlch., 369;
Bosw., 269.
see, Sheldon v. Wood,
Parol evidence of the contents of a let
ter mailed to a party or his agent
cannot be given without notice to pro
duce it; and it seems the party's tes
timony that- he did not recollect of
having received the letter, will not ob
Ferguson
viate the want of notice:
v. Hemingway,
38 Mlch., 159.
a

3

7

7

a

9

&

Q

Greenl. Ev.,
561.
Or a
of dishonor
of
bill oi ex
change.
Ibid.
A notice to quit may
be proved by parol without calling on
the defendant upon whom it was served
produce the original: Falkner v.
Beers,
Doug. Mich., 117, 119.
a

2

&

5

34-1

notice

to

1

I

83—Where contracts are executed in
duplicate, each party retaining an ex
ecuted copy, either may use his copy
in evidence in
suit between the par
ties, as an original, without calling for
the production
of the
other copy:
Cleveland
Toledo Ry. Co. v. Perkins,
17 Mich., 296; Crane v. Partland,
Mich., 493.

&

4

31——l‘iouseman
v. Roberts,
C.
P., 394.
It may be served on either
the party or his attorney: Greenl. Ev.,
562.
And should be served person

Barb.,

18

656.

&

2

446.

Acker,

v.

32—Utica. Ins. Co. v. Caldwell,
Wend., 296; Gotham v. Gale,
Cow.,
739; McPherson v. Rathbone,
Wcnd.,
216: Hammond v. llopping, 13 Wend.,
505-8-9.
Where parties reside at :1 dis
tance from the place of trial, a notice
to counsel
to produce
papers which
only allow time to communicate with
clients by telegraph is insuﬂicient; at
least not if the necessity for the use
of the papers was discovered in time
to give earlier
notice:
De Witt v.
Prescott, 51 Micb., 298; 16 N. W.,

2

29—2 Phil. Ev.,
Am. ed., C.
H.'s notes by Edwards, 519, 525.
30—Ibid., and Rogers v. Custance,
R., 179.
Moo.
But notice by parol
is said to be suiiiclent:
Ros. Cr. Ev.,
10: Kerr v. McGuire,
Tilt. N. Y.,

Rathbun

393.
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for

a

bill

of exchange.“
Corporate cha.rterS.—The production of the charter
§400.
and proof of acts of uscr under it are suﬂicicnt to establish
the existence of a corporation, where the charter confers cor
porate powers immediately and unconditionally. In such case

it is not necessary to make proof of the organization under
the charter.3“ But if the charter or act of incorporation pre
scribes any conditions and a compliance therewith, as prece
dent to the organization,
must

be

shown."

a compliance

When corporations

with such conditions
are organized under

general laws, corporate existence may be proved by certiﬁed
copies of their articles of association ﬁled in the oﬁice of the
secretary of state, or other place provided by law, or with the
colmty clerk, when authorized to be ﬁled there."

For the proving of corporations, the statute now provides
“That in any suit or proceeding, civil or criminal, hereafter
institutedlin any of the courts of this state, wherein it shall be
come

material or necessary to prove the incorporation of any
or corporation, or the existence of any joint stock

company

company or association, whether the same be a foreign or do
Where
35-1 Greenl. Ev., i 561.
trover is brought for the conversion
of a promissory note, plaintiff is en
titled to prove its existence and con
tents, without giving defendant notice
Lewis,
10
Rose
v.
to produce it:
Mich., 483.
So, the defendant is en
titled to the production, without no
tice, of all papers which formed any
part of the contract under which the
cause oi’ action in suit arose: De Witt
v. Prescott, 51 ii1ich., 298; 16 N. W.,
656.

36--Cahiii

Co.,

v. Kalamazoo Mutual
2 Doug. Mich., 12-4; Way v.

Ins.

Bili

ings, 2 Mich., 397.
The proof of user
must necessarily consist of evidence
of the acts 0! the corporation, showing
that they are doing business under
Cahili
their charter:
v.
Kalamazoo
Mut. Ins. Co., 2 Doug., 135.
37—F‘. & M. Bank v. Troy City
Bank, 1 Doug. Mich., 457, 465.
See.
Lock v. Leonard Silk Co., 37 Mich..
479; as to the incorporation
ot re

ligious societies:
Fredenburg v. Lyon
Lake M. E. Church, 37 Mich.. 475;
Church of Newark v.
see, Methodist
(‘iarl-1, 41 Mich.. 730. 736; 3 N. W.,
1;
207: Allen v. Duﬂie, -13 Mich.,
4 N. W., 427: Druse v. Wheeler, 22
i\Iich., 439; Wairath v. Campbell, 28
Mk-h., 111.
38—-In case of such corporation, the
general law under which‘ the corpora
tio is formed, and the articles of as
sociation made in puruance thereof,
are to be considered as the charter of
the company: Van Etten v. Eaton, 19
i\Iich., 194.
The corporate existence
of national banking associations may
be shown by certiﬁed copies of the
organization certiﬁcate ﬂied with the
comptroller of the currency, and by
his certiﬁcate that the bank has com
piled with the act of Congress "To
provide for
a
national currency":
Thatcher v. West River Natl. Bank.,
19 Mich., 196.
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company, or association, evidence that such
corporation, company, or association is doing business under
a. certain name shall be prima faoie proof of its due incorpora
tion or existence pursuant to law, and of its name.”3°
mestic corporation,

On plea of the general issue to an action by a corporation,
the plaintiif must prove its corporate existence,“ excepting in
the cases mentioned in the following provision of the statute:

“In

suits brought by a corporation created by or u_nder any
statute of this state, it shall not be necessary to prove on the
trial of the cause the existence of such corporation, unless the
defendant shall have pleaded in abatement, or given notice
under his plea to the action, that the plaintiﬁs are not a cor
poration, and annex thereto an affidavit of the truth of such
plea or notice.”41
And any railroad, when sued by the name in which its
business is conducted, shall not be permitted to deny, by
plea or otherwise, that it is a corporation existing under such

name."

.

The transactions

and acts of a corporation

Wilson Sewing
39-—C. L., I 10194.
Machine Co. v. Spears, 50 Mich., 534;
As against a plea oi!
15 N. W., 894.
mal tiel corporation, the plaintiil may
make his prima /acic case under this
statute by showing that the corpora
Such
tion was doing business as such.
the
conclusively
establishes
evidence
unless the
fact of one incorporation
evi
deiendant shall introduce some
it. In the ah
to contradict
dence
sence of such plea no proof of incor
Canal Street
poration is necessary:
Gravel Road Co. v. Pans, 95 Mich.,
372; 54 N. W., 907.
Where a body
assumes to be a corporation. and acts
under a particular name, a third party
denllng with it under such assumed
name is estopped to deny its corporate
existence unless there are no facts
which make it legally unjust to forbid
Estey Mfg. Co. v.
such
a denial:
Runnels. 55 Mich., 130; 20 N. W.
Rep., 823; Chapman v. Colby, 47 Mich.,
46; 10 N. W., 74.
See, Doyle v. Miz
ner, 42 Mich., 337; 3 N. W., 968: and
cases cited in note to C. L., 5 i0194.
40-—I<‘. & M. Bank tc. v. Troy City
Bank, 1 Doug. Mich., 457; Owen ct oi.
26

may be proved by

Farmers‘ Bank
of Sandstone, 2
l)oug., 134.
L., 5 10471.
41-—C.
See, Smith v.
Village of Adrian, 1 Mich., 495.
The
plea of the general issue to a declara
tion by a corporation, admits the cor
porate
existence
of
plaintiff;
the
Garton v. Union City National Bank.
34 Mich., 279.
in a suit by a cor
poration in Justice's court, by sum
mons to answer the plaintiff, naming it
by its corporate name, even it the dec
iaration
fails to allege the plaintli!
to be a corporation, yet the summons
and declaration taken together will be
deemed
a suﬂicicnt:
allegation
that
plaintiff is a corporation, so that, it
the general issue is pleaded the plain
tiff's corporate existence will be there
by admittcd:
Wilson Sewing Machine
Co. v. Spears, 50 Mich., 534: 15 N.
W., 894.
And
sec,
Superior
Lake
Building Co. v. Thompson, 32 Mich.,
293; Grand Rapids & Ind.
Ry. v.
Southwick, 30 Mich., 446.
42—C. L., 5 10439.
See,
Grand
Rapids & Ind. Ry v. Southwick, 30
Mich., 446.
v.
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entries made in its books." And a corporation is bound by the
acts of its oﬂicers de facto; and it need not be shown that they
were regularly elected in order to render their acts binding.“
The seal of a corporation aﬁixed to an instrument is pri-ma
facie evidence that it was affixed by proper authority; and the
contrary must be shown by the objecting party.“

proof 0f.—“In any suit or proceeding
hereafter instituted in any of the courts of this state, wherein

§40L

it shall

Pa.1'l;ne'rships,

material or necessary to prove the co-partner
ship of any ﬁrm or association, the plaintiffs may cause to be
served upon the defendant, with a copy of the declaration ﬁled
in the cause, or with the process by which suit is commenced,
become

an aﬁidavit stating that the piaintiifs were the persons compris
ing such partnership at the time the contract in question was
made, or the cause of action accrued; and such aﬂidavit shall
be prima facic evidence of such existence of such partnership

or association, unless the defendant shall ﬁle with his plea an
affidavit denying the existence of such partnership or asso
ciation.

’ ’4°

43—People v. Oakland Co. Bank, 1
Doug. Mich., 282.
The records of
municipal action by a city council can
not be contradicted or supplemented
by parol evidence.
When the law re
quires such records to be kept, they
of the
are the only lawful evidence
Steven
action to which they refer:
son v. Bay City, 26 Mich., 44.
4-i—(.‘ahill v. K. M. Ins. Co., 2 Doug.
Mich., 124.
45—Benedict v. Denton, Walk. Mich.,
Ch., 336.

48-0. L.,
In proving

5 10195.
a co-partnership,

it is not
necessary to show the unity of interet
of the members by direct proof.
This
fact may be established by circum
stances:
Hadden v. Shortrldge,
27
Mich., 212.
See, Wattles v. Moss, 46
Mich., 52; 8 N. W., 567.
Evidence of the admission of de
fendants that they were partners is
competent, although not restricted to
the precise time when the cause of ac
Sager v. Tupper, 38
tion accrued:
Mich., 258, 262; Armstrong v. Potter,
103 Mich., 409; 61 N. W., 657.
If
reputation and hearsay are admitted

prove
partnership
to
a
without
objection, the jury may consider it,
and the opposite side will not after
wards be allo.wed
to complain:
27
Mich., 212, supra.
To constitute one a partner as to
third persons, it is not necessary that
he should have agreed to share in the
of the business.
If he shares
losses
Sager
in the proﬁts it is suﬂicient:
v. Tupper, 38 Mich., 265; I-iinman v.
Llttell, 23 Mich., 484.
To constitute a partnershtp,
there
must be a community of interest in
some lawful commerce
or business, for
the conduct of which the parties, (or
partners)
are mutually principals
of
and agents for each other, with general
powers within the scope of the busi
which
powers, however, by
ness:
agreement between
the parties them
selves, may be restricted at their op
tion, to the extent even of making one
the sole agent of the others and of
the business. The test of partnership,
as between the parties themselves,
is
their intent; and as between themselves
they are never to he charged as part
ners unlcss by contract and with intent
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they have formed a relation in which
the elements of partnership as above
Partici
indicated are round to exist.
pation in the proﬁts of-a business does
not 0! itself make one a partner there
in; and therefore is not decisive of
that relation, except in so tar as it is
of the relation ot principal
evidence
and agent between the persons taking
the proﬁts and those carrying on the
business.
A partnership
cannot
be
implied as a matter of law, from a
business relation, it the parties thereto
have not made or intended to make a
partnership
contract and have done
nothing to estop them from denying
the existence of a. partnership.
While
parties may incur obligations as part
ners to third persons by so holding
themselves out to, and dealing with

403

them
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as partners

§ 401
and in such a way

induce such persons to believe
them to be and to trust and rely upon
them
as partners; yet there can be
no partnership
persons
as to third
when as between the parties themselves
there is no partnership and the third
persons have not been misled by con
cealment ot facts, or by deceptive
appearances, to rely upon them as part
ners:
Beecher v. Bush, 45 Mich., 188;
7 N. W., 785.
A dormant partner is a secret part
ner; one who becomes such by a secret
arrangement,
while his associate is
held out to the world as sole proprie
manager of the business:
tor
and
Beecher v. Bush, 45 Mich., 203; 7 N.
W-, 785.
as to
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§403. The exception as to evidence or

PRESUMPTIONS.

§402.
5403.
5404.
5405.

In general.

Classiﬁcation
Conclusive.
Disputablé.

pedigree.

§409. The exception as to evidence of
matters of public and general
interest.
§410. The exception as to evidence of
witnesses since deceased
or

of.

nmnssr nvronxcn.
5406. Deﬁnition.
§407. Some exceptions to the rule ot.

absent.

PRESUMPTION S.

is,

§402. In general.-A presumption of any fact is properly
an inference of that fact from other facts that are known.
When the fact itself cannot be proved directly, that which
comes nearest to the proof of it is the proof of the circum
stances that necessarily and usually attend such fact, and from
taken for granted
which it is inferred or presumed; that
until the contrary be proved} In the order of nature, facts
but each
connected with
or combination of facts, from which the
fact in question follows as an eﬁect from cause? Therefore,
the necessary or usual con
the ground of all presumptions
is

do not occur singly or independently

is

a

some antecedent fact,

nection between facts and circumstances.”

404

5

5

5

2

voluntary
wrongdoer,
for the law
rigidly holds all persons to the pre
sumption that they intended such re
sults as are to be expected from their
conduct, whenever these results arrive:
Daily Post Co. v. 1\icArthur, 16 Mlch.,
452; see, People v. Potter,
Mlch., 8:
Mlch., 10, 17:
People v. Carmichael,
Mlch., 296; People
People v. Scott,
v. Getchell, Ibid., 504.
In civil cases death may be pre
sumed
Irom circumstances, and it is
not necessary
to produce an eye wit
ness to the tact: John Hancock Mut.
Life Ins Co. v. Moore, 34 Mlch., 41;
6

7

Wend., 66.
1—-Jackson v. Warlord,
Mlch., 324.
v. Jenness,
every
3-—Thus the law presumes
mun to intend the legal consequences
which must naturally ﬂow from his own
voluntary acts, and every man ls held
If a debtor
responsible accordingly.
makes an assignment which, if carried
out, must necessarily hinder and de
fraud hls creditors, the legal presump
tion is, that the fraud was intended:
Mlch., 454. And
Pierson v. Manning,
in all cases a mischief or wrong which
is the natural and direct result of vol
untary action, necessarily indicates a
2——Pcople
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Classiﬁcation of presumptions.—Presumptions
are
§403.
usually classiﬁed into presumptions of law, and presumptions
of fact. Presumptions of law are either conclusive or dis
putable. This classiﬁcation is based upon common experience,

it

is

is,

which has shown that when fact a or facts a and b, or facts
with more or less certainty,
a, b, and 0 are found fact d
so universally true
found also. As to certain conditions this
shall
that the law has said when these conditions are shown
presumed that fact
exists, and no evidence
in such cases
permitted to show that, in the particular case,
does not exist. As to other conditions this common experi

has'not

been so

uniform in ﬁnding fact

the other facts are shown, as that
And
Bailey v. Bailey, 36 Mich., 182.
a person may be presumed to be dead
at the expiration of seven years from
the time he was last heard of or known
to be alive: Bailey v. Bailey, 36 .\Iich.,
181.
As to proving death within that
period, see same cases.
The law will presume that the name
by a person in signing an in
strument is his true name; thus, where
a deed was signed by Harmon, and ac
knowledged by Hlrom, the law will not
presume that it was signed and ac
knowledged by the same person, with
out proof that such was the tact:
Boothroyd v. Engles, 23 Mich.,
19.
Mich., 368.
See,
Dillin v. People,
But presumptions are never allowable
when better evidence of a primary na
ture is required by law to be pre
served; as, where a. record of the fact
kept:
People v.
is required to be
And if a
Tredway, 17 Mich., 485.
paper is not found where, if in exist
ence, it ought by law to be deposited
or recorded, the presumption arises
that no such document has ever been
in existence: Hall v. Kellogg, 16 Mich.,
135; see, Platt v. Stewart, 10 Mich.,
right to
No court or jury has
260.
presume the existence of a fact with
out evidence legaily tending to prove
It directly, or tending to prove other
facts and circumstances, from which
the existence of the fact in question
may be reasonably inferred.
Cicotte
et al. v. Morse,
Mich., 428.
And all
legal presumption must be reasonable:
Mich., 529. There
Hotchin v. Kent,

it

ence

d

it

is

d

be conclusively

to exist when
wise to ex

has seemed

fore a person's motives are presumed
to be good, and that he is honest in his
transactions, in the absence of evidence
showing fraud or improper motives, as
this is the more reasonable: Fleming
v. Slocum, 18 .lohn., 403; Bank of
Silver Creek v. Talcott, 22 Barb., 552.
So the law presumes
that a public of
ﬁcer will perform his oﬂlciai duty:
Hall v. Kellogg,,16 Mich., 139; Blair
v. Compton, 33 Mich., 424; Iln'd., 9.
And for this reason fraud will not be
presumed
upon slight circumstances,
nor from circumstances of an equivocal
nature, but must be clearly proved, so
as to leave no rational doubt upon the
Sherman,
mind: Buck
Doug.
v.
Mich., 176; lloliister v. Loud,
Mich.,
324; see, Hubbard v. Taylor,
]bizl.,
155; Baldwin v. Buckiand, 11 Iln'd.,
389.
At least the proof must create
a reasonable beiief—something
more
than a. suspicion of fraud: Watkins
v. Wallace, 19 Mich., 77.
A particular
fraud cannot be proved by presumption
alone; but when a fraudulent act is
shown to have been committed by one
or more persons,
presumption is al
lowable to show the complicity
of
others who have authorized or pro
cured it to be committed: Dayton v.
Monroe, 47 Mich., 193; 10 N. W., 196.
In the absence of any showing to the
contrary. the time of the delivery of
a deed will be presumed
to have been
the same as the date of its acknowl
edgment: Johnson v. Moore, 28 Mich.,

8

a

5 2

2

8

used

8
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elude evidence to show that in the particular case fact d does
not exist; and yet it is so uniform as that the rule has been
established that in these cases when the facts a, or a and b,
or a, b, and 0 are shown, fact d shall be presumed to exist in
the absence of evidence that it does not, and evidence is ad
mitted to show that in the particular case it does not exist.
In these cases of presumptions of law, the facts upon which
the presumptions are founded are given a probative force,
bylreason of the rzrle of law, which in the particular case they
might not have, except for the rule; in the one case establish
ing fact d and excluding all evidence to show that it does
not exist, and in the other, establishing fact d in the absence

of evidence to show it does not exist. In the case of presump
tions of fact, so called, the facts upon which it is founded
are given their natural probative value unaided by any rule
of law requiring any particular conclusion from them.
Conclusive presumptions of law, illustrations of.—
§404.
The statutes of limitations furnish illustrations of this class.
It appearing that the obligation arose at a time anterior to
the beginning of the period ﬁxed by the statute, and that there
has been no recognition of it within the statutory period, then
it is conclusively presumed that the obligation is extinguished.‘

Judicial records are conclusively

presumed to be correct.“
Estoppels, dis
Title by prescription is another illustration.“
cussed post, § 416, are also within the principle.

Disputable presumptions of law, illustrations of.—
Proof that an individual has acted notoriously as a public
oﬁicer, raises the presumption of his appointment to the oﬁice
and is prime facie evidence of his oﬁicial character and right
to perform the duties of the oﬁice, without producing his com
Proof that he was reputed to be,
mission or ‘appointment.’
officer
at the time in question, is prime
acting
as
such
and was
The rulelof law excluding parol proof when
facie sufﬁcient.8
§405.

4—See. ante, 55 222 ct seq.
5—Reed v. Jackson, 1 East. 355.
occupation
of
6——Uninterrupted
lands tor a period ﬁxed gives rise to
a conclusive presumption of title in
the occupier: Big Rapids v. Comtock,
65 Mlch., 78; 31 N. W., 811; Yciver
ton v. Steele, 40 Mlch., 538.

406

Ev., §§ 83, 92.
v.
Detroit Y. M. 8.. 1
Doug. Mlch., 119, 152: McCoy v. Cur
tiee. 9 Wend., 17. And so. evidence that
a man oﬂlciated regularly as a minis
7—1

Greeni.

8——Scott

ter or clergyman. may be
received.
and is suiﬂclent prime focfe to show
that he was such:
Goshen v. Ston
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there is written evidence, does not apply in these cases.” And
where it was shown that the person wasacting as justice of
the peace at the time in question, it was held to be sufficient
evidence that he was such oﬁicer. The court said: “It is not
usually necessary to prove more than this, and the acts of a
person in the full enjoyment of public ofﬁce do not require
any further sanction. The actual legal right of an incumbent
cannot be tried in a collateral action between third parties,
and the user of an office may be proved by anyone who knows
the‘fact.”1° And it is not material how the question arises,
whether in a civil or criminal case; nor whether the oﬁicer is
or is not a party to the record."

Other common illustrations of this class of presumptions
are found in the presumption of innocence ;12 that one intends
the natural consequences of his acts ;13 that a state of things
shown to exist continues ;14 that one absent from his home
ington. 4 Conn., 219; Berryman v.
Wise, 4 Term. 11., sec; Town otver.
non v. East Hartford, 3 Conn., 475;
Hayes v. P., 25 N. Y., 390; State v.
Rood, 12 Vt., 896.

9—Cahill v. Kalamazoo Ins. Co., 2
Doug. Mich., 124, 136.
\\'here it was
proved that a person who signed a
of insurance, was acting as
policy
president of the insurance company,
this was held sutlicient evidence that
he was such oﬂlcer, and to bind the
Ibid., p. 136.
company:
Where the
question of oﬂlclal character arises
collaterally, parol evidence is admissi
ble to show an actual ll1C\ll11l)(§DCy dc
lvheeier, 22 Mich.,
fGL"lO.' Druse v.
439; see, Wairath
Campbell, 23
v.
Mich., 117, and People v. Marlon. 29
Mich., 38.
Persons in the actual and
unobstructed exercise of oﬂiee, must
except in
he held to be legal ofilcers.
proceedings where their otlllcial char
acter is the issue to be tried as against
Jhons v. People, 25 Mich.,
themselves.
503; Keator v. People, 32 Mich., 484;
Corrigan‘s case, 87 l\iich.. 66.
And it
will not ‘be presumed that a do facto
oiﬁcer has neglected to make any neces
sary qualiﬁcation:
F. N. Bank of St.
Joseph v. St. Joseph, 46 Mich., 256;
9 N. W.. 838.
10—Facey v. Fuller, 13 Mich., 527,
407

And to this end evidence is ad
misslhle, not only to show that he
exercised the oﬂlce before or at the
period in question, but also, limited
to a reasonable time, that he exercised
it afterwards:
Doe v. Young, 8 Ad. G:
El. N. 8., 63; Cabot v. Given, 45
Maine, 144.
531.

11—1 Greenleaf Ev., § 92. It seems,
however, that executors, in an action
brought by themselves,
cannot prove
their oﬂlce by general reputation: Mid
dlesworth v. Nixon, 2 Mich., 425;
Aibright v. Cobb., 30 Mich., 355. When
letters of guardianship are issued, the
presumption is that they were regu
larly granted and after lawful pro
ceedings
had for that purpose: Bur
rows v. Bailey, 34 Mich., 64.
A per
son actnally obtaining an oillce with
the legal lndlcia of title is a legal of
ficer until ousted, so as to render his
oﬂiciai acts valid as if his title were
not disputed:
Auditors v. Benoit, 20
'
Mich., 176.
12—Maher v. People. 10 Mich., 212;
Monaghan v. Agricultural
F. I. Co.,
53 Mich., 238; 18 N. W., 797.
13—People v. Potter, 5 Mich., 1;
Allison v. Chandler, 11 Mich., 512.
14—Ormsby v. Barr, 22 Mich.,
Howland v. Davis, 40 Mich., 545.
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and unheard of for seven years is dead ;1-" that all persons are
sane ;1° that oﬁicials have acted regularly," and the like.
IIEARSAY EVIDENCE.
evidence is
§406. Deﬁnition of hearsay evidence.—Hearsay
evidence of the declarations of another not made under oath
and subject to cross-examination, oﬁered to prove the truth of
If offered to prove sim
the fact involved in the declarations.

were made, regardless of whether
is not hearsay. As where in defamatory action

ply that the declarations
true or false,

it

of the speaking of the words alleged as slanderous
is not hearsay.
So, evidence that the plaintiff called the de
fendant a liar offered in mitigation of damages in an action
evidence

for an assault provoked by the words.

The defendant does
not offer the evidence to prove that he, the defendant, is a liar,
but to prove that plaintiﬁf said so. The principal objections
to hearsay evidence are, ﬁrst, that the declarations offered
were not made

under oath; second, that the declarant, upon
whose credit the declaration depends, is not subject to cross’

examination."
There are, however, some exceptions to the rule, where the
circumstances of the case are such as to afford a presumption

that the hearsay is true

;1°

such as, when the hearsay is

15—Newman v. Jenkins,
10 Pick.,
515; People v, Eaton, 59 Mich., 559;
26 N. W., 702.
16—People v. Garbutt, 17 Mich., 9.
17-Scott v. Detroit Young Men's
Society, 1 Mich., 119, 150; Love v.
Wood, 55 Mich., 451: 21 N. W., 887;
Westbrook v. Miller, 56 Mich., 148;
22 N. W., 256.
18—Stoclrton v. Williams,
1 Doug.
Mich., 570; Hamilton
v. People, 29
Mich., 173; Ruggles v. Fay, 31 Mich.,
141; Hunt v. Strew, 33 Mich., 85.
Thus, the statements of persons not
witnesses,
through
whose hands a
treasury notc has passed, are not ad
missible in evidence,
cither for the
purpose of identiﬁcation, or to prove
the note counterfeit, in a suit by one
who has taken the note, to recover its
value:
Atwood v. Cornwall, 28 Mich.,
336.
In an action by a wife for aliena
tion ot husband's affections, the hus

a.

part

band's statements tending
to show
defendant's attitude toward the wife
cannot be shown against defendant:
Derham v. Derham, 125 Mich., 109:
83 N. W., 1005.
Letters written by
wife to defendant in a crim. con. case
tending to show alienation of her af
fections by defendant are competent:
Dalton v. Dregge, 99 Mich., 250; 58
N. W., 57.
Statements made by wife
to husband in absence
of defendant
tending to show defendant's guilt are
not competent:
Ibid. An inventory
based in part on information
received
by the one making it from other per
sons is inadmissible:
Black v. Simon.
116 Mich., 382: 74 N. W., 527.
Ev., §§ 98-99;
19-1 Greenieafs
Roscoe's Cr. Ev., 4th Am. ed., 22. A
judgment will not be reversed because
hearsay testimony, which is not irrele
vant, has been admitted without ob
jection at the time. By allowing such

408
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of the transaction in question, or relates

to matters

§ 407

of public

and general interest,

or to ancient possessions, relationship,
declarations against interest, and testimony of a deceased wit
ness.2°

Some exceptions to the ru1e—hea.rsay as a. part of the
§ 407.
i.ransa.cti0n.—\Vhere the inquiry is into the nature and char
acter of a transaction, not only what was done, but what was
said also, by both parties, during the continuance of the trans
action, is admissible.”

A

ill

person’s statements and expressions while suffering from
health or physical injury, are sometimes admissible for the

to be introduced without ob
jection, a party treats it as competent,
and is thereby precluded from raising
question on error:
iiadden
v.
the
Shortridge, 27 l\iich., 212.
20—Stockton v. Williams. 1 Doug.,
570; 1 Phil. Ev. Ch. 8: Edwards‘ notes,

v. Frisbie, 19 Conn., 205; and see, Dil
iin v. People, 8 Mich., 357. But
subsequent
statements of a party of

evidence

185,

201.

the
Where
defendant
referred
plaintiff to a third person for infor
mation upon a subject afterwards com
ing in controversy, the conversation
had with the third person and his
statements upon the subject referred
to him, are a part of the res gestac,
notwith
and admissible in evidence,
standing the defendant may have been
absent during the interview with the
Beebe
v. Knapp,
28
third person:
Mich., 53.
1 Doug.
21—Stockton
v. Williams,
Mich., 570; 1 C. II. 8: Edwards’ notes,
189, 202, note
81.
When the state
of mind, sentiment or disposition of
a person at a given time becomes per
tinent subjects of inquiry, his declara
tions and conversations, being a part
be
shown:
of the res yestae, may
Hill, 248.
Bartheiemy
v. People, 2
Where evidence of an act done by a
party is admissible, his declarations
made at the time, having a tendency
to elucidate or give character to the
act. and which may derive a degree of
credit from the act itself, are admis
gestae:
sible as a part of the res
And
Sessions v. Little, 9 N. H., 271.
so, when the declarations are so con
nected
with
a
material fact as to
explain or qualify it, or show the in
Ruse]
tent with which it was done:

his

motives

be received;

and intentions will not
it is only what was said

at the time of the transaction, which
as a part of the res gestuc,
is admis
sible:
Dawson v. I-iall, 2 Mich., 390.
Unless such statements bear against
him: Dillin v. People, 8 Mich., 357.
But where the allegation was that the
wife, by undue inﬂuence induced her
husband to make a will, evidence was
admitted that he said he regretted the
marriage; that he was not master at
home; that he was afraid of his wife,
and was compelled to submit to her
demands:
Cicotte, 12
Beaubicn v.
Mich., 450.
A witness testifying to an
occurrence, will not be permitted to
state what a. bystander, who is not 0.
witness in the cause, said about the
transaction at the time, as the by
stander‘s statements or version of the
affair would be merely hearsay: De
troit & Milwaukee Ry. Co. v Stein
berg, 17 Mich., 99, 107-8.
But where
the question was as to whether a
bone had been fractured,
and it was
important to know whether the move
ment of the limb produced a grating
sound,
it was held that the remarks
of bystander at the time the limb was
being manipulated, showing that they
heard such a. sound, might be proved:
Hitchcock v. Burgett, 38 Mich., 501.
Nor can a witness‘ statements out of
court be given in evidence to corrobo
rate his own testimony:
Brown
v.
People, 17 Mich., 429.
But see, Stew
art v. People, 23 Mich., 63.
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purpose of showing his condition at the time, such statements
being more in the nature of direct evidence than hearsay. Thus,
in an action for an assault and battery, the plaintiif’s com

plaints of pain and soreness, made to other persons, at the
time and soon after the assault, are competent in his own
behalf, in respect to the extent of the injury, when taken in
connection with other testimony,” and in case of malpractice,
the patient’s exclamations of pain and suﬁ'ering,- and her com
plaints as to the nature of her sufferings during and after the
This being the only mode in which
operation, were admitted.
their nature and extent can be ascertained, such exclamations
and statements are original evidence.”
is sometimes admitted to prove
Pedig'ree.—Hearsay
§408.
But such evi
parentage, marriage, descent and relationship.
dence is conﬁned to the declarations of deceased persons, who
were connected by blood or marriage to the person to whom
Therefore, what has been said by servants and
of
the family is not admissible.” But general
acquaintances
reputation in the family, shown by surviving members of it,
has been held admissible." On the same principle, entries in a
they relate.“

1 Kern
Murphy,
22—Caldweli
v.
416; ‘Vi-rely v. Persons. 1 Tiff. N. Y.,
344; Baker v." Griﬂin, 10 Bosw., 140;
188;
6
Aveson v. Kinnaird,
East..
Elliott v. Van Buren, 33 Mich., 49:
Mich.,
471
27
Johnson
v. McKee,
Grand Rapids & Indiana Ry. Co. v.
Huntley, 38 Mich., 503.
A physician
testify to examinations of pain
may
on an occasion when an examination
was being made for purposes of treat
ment:
Heddle v. City El. Ry. Co.,
112 Mich., 547; 70 N. W., 1096; Peo
ple v. Fogiesong, 116 Mich., 556; 74
N. W., 730; Butts v. Eaton Rapids,
116 _Mich., 539; 74 N. W., 872; Beath
Ry. Co., 119 Mich., 512;
v. Rapid
78 N. W., 537; Mott v. Detroit, ete.,
Ry. Co., 120 Mich., 127; 79 N. W., 3.
But not, it seems, it the examination
was made for the purpose of enabling
him to testify: Grand Rapids & I. Ry.
Co. v. Huntley, 38 Mich., 537: McKor
mick v. West Bay City, 110 Mich.,
265; 68 N. W., 148.

23-Hyatt

V. Adams,

16 Mich.,

And see, Johnson v. McKee. 27 Mich.,
471; Elliot v. Van Buren, 33 Mich.,
49.
But exclamations of pain during
an examination made by a physician
for the purpose of enabling him to tes
tify as to the extent of an alleged
injury,
are not admissible:
Grand
Rapids 8: Indiana Ry Co. v. Huntley,
38 Mlch.. 537, 543-4.
24-1 Greeni. Ev., 103; Jackson v.
Browner. 18 Johns. 37.
25—Johnson v. Lawson, 2 Bing., 86.
26—Doe v. Griﬂin, 15 East, 293.
Family
connection and membership,
deaths, births, marriages and relation
ship, may be shown hy the common
understanding and traditions
in the
family and among relatives, and need
not rest’ upon
the direct personal
knowledge of the witness: Van Sickle
v. Gibson, 40 Mich., 173.
Family his
tory, as known and recognized in the
family. seems not to be objectionable as
hearsay: Fraser v. Jennison, 42 Mich.,
206, 235; 3 N. W., 882.
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family Bible, made by

§ 409

parent, inscriptions on tomb
stones and on pictures, and charts of pedigree, are admitted.”
a deceased

Matters of public and general interest.-Hearsay is
§409.
admissible in this class of cases, upon the principle that, in
matters of public interest, all persons must be conversant;
and

rights

which are common, are naturally talked of in
The subjects to which such evidence is applicable

community.
are public prescriptions, customs, boundaries, highways, and
But hearsay under this head is admitted only in
the like.
cases of ancient rights, and in respect to the declarations of
persons supposed to be dead; the origin of the right being
antecedent to the time of legal memory, and incapable of
proof by living witnesses; the general rule being that facts,
which from their nature and antiquity do not admit of proof
by living witnesses, may be proved by hearsay. Such declara
tions, however, must have been made before any dispute arose.
But in matters of mere private right, evidence of reputation
or of common fame is inadmissible, and so of reputation or
Therefore general
hearsay with respect to particular facts.”
hearsay and public reputation are admissible to prove which
of two persons, claiming by the same name, were the grantees

or reservees in

In

§ 410.

some

a

Evidence

treaty.”
of witnesses deceased, or out of the state.
of what a witness since deceased has

cases evidence

In this case the objection that the
sworn to, is admissible.
declarant did not speak under oath and subject to cross-exam
ination does not obtain, but it is still in its nature, when used,
hearsay. To allow the admission of such testimony, it must be
shown that a prior trial was had between the same parties
To prove that fact the
and for the same cause of action.~”'°
record is the best evidence, and must be introduced.“ It must
also be proved that the witness is dead or unavailable."

It
27—1 Greeni. Ev., Q5 104, 105.
is competent for a person to testify
to his own age: Cheever v. Congdon,
34 Mich., 196.
1 Doug.
28—Stockton v. Williams,
Mich., 546. 570.
29—Ibid., and Cnmpau v. Dewey. 9
Mich., 381; see, Stockton v. Williams,
1 Doug. Mich., 546.
-

30—Wllbur v. Selden, 6 Cow., 162,
164; Osborn v. Bell, 5 Denio, 370.
31--Beals v. Guernsey, 8 Johns.,
446;
White v. Klbllng, 11 Johns,
128.

32-Powell v. Waters, 17 Johns.,
176; Wilbur v. Selden, 6 Cow.. 162.
When a witness has died, or is sick,
insane,
or beyond the jurisdiction
of

411
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The proof of what the deceased testiﬁed, may be made by
any person who heard him, even though he took no minutes of
An attorney or other person who took min
the evidence.“
utes at’ the time the witness testiﬁed, and swears to their

if,

accuracy, may state on a subsequent trial what the deceased
swore to, although he cannot testify from his mere recollection
after
without a reference to his minutes. It is sufﬁeicnt

is

is

it

is

is

refreshing his recollection from his minutes, he can then state
what the evidence given by deceased was.“
It
not necessary to prove the precise words of the de
all that
If the substance fully given
ceased witness.
required.“

3

2

2

a

1

3

1

a

it
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Hilt, 434.
33-—Grimm
v. Hamel,
i
Coclrburn, 14
34—Van
Buren
v.
Barb., 118: iluii' v. Bennett.
Sel
den. 337; see, Fisher v. Kyle, 27 Mich.
454.
A memorandum produced by a
party swore to
witness as to what
on a former trial, and made at that
time. may be admitted in another trial
as evidence
of what such testimony
was, but
is entitled to no greater
weight than should be accorded to
the evidence of the witness, if he were
swearing from his own personal recol
lection of what was testiﬁed to on the
Spalding v. Lowe, 56
former trial:
1\iich., 366; 23 N. W., 46.
Hilt., 79;
35—ChaBee v. Cox,
Clark v. Vorce, 15 Wend., 193; Clark
v. Vorce, 19 Wend., 232-3; Burson v.
Huntington, 21 l\iich., 415; see, also,
Halsey v. Sinsebaugh,
E. P. Smith,
485; Russell v. iludson R. Ry. Co.,
lbid., 134, 140; Crawford v. Loper, 25
Barb., 449.
it

court, his testimony given upon
former trial upon the same issue
and between the same parties may be
Patrick,
introduced:
Howard
v.
38
lliich., 685-9: People v. Sligh, 48 Mlch.,
54; 11 N. W., 782. And the fact that
the deposition of a witness, who at
the time of the second trial of
case
ls beyond the jurisdiction of the court,
has been taken by the consent of the
parties, will not prevent his testimony
on the former trial. as taken down by
the stenographer,
from being oifered
in evidence.
iiabar v. Crane, 56 Mlch.,
585, 23 N. W., 323.
As to whether it is competent to
prove the testimony given on a former
trial by a. witness who is only tem
porarily absent from the state. where
does not appear that he had been
subpoenaed,
or that any effort had
been made to procure his testimony or
personal attendance at the trial; see,
Hiscock v. Norton, 42 Mlch., 320;
N. W., 868.
the

a
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C1assi.ﬂca.tion.--This branch of evidence may be di
vided into direct admissions, those which are made expressly
for the purpose of being used in the particular suit, and col
lateral admissions, or those consisting in the acts or expressions
of the party aliunde without reference to the suit.

§i11.

is

is

demurer}

1—A plea or notice of tender is an
admission of the justice oi! the plaintlifs claim to the extent of the sum

413

tendered:
R.

Co.,

45

Roosevelt v. N. Y.
Barb., 554.

&

in abatement or

a

is

is

is

is

a

rule of pleading that every
By pleading'.—It
allegation in a declaration or other pleading, which
not traversed or denied by the opposite party,
admitted,
so that the party
precluded at the trial from asserting, and
the court or jury from ﬁnding the contrary.
As the general
in
of
this
only
issue
the
plea
bar, instances
description, before
a plea
judgment, are chieﬂy conﬁned to cases where there
§412.
material

H. R.

or
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Where a party agrees with the opposite party to admit a
certain fact on the trial of the cause, he will be conclusively
bound by such obligation.”

By record.—-Whatever

a person has admitted or con
or whatever has been foimd by verdict, or by
the court, against him, in a court having jurisdiction of the
§

413.

fessed on record,

from denying. Whatever is
not be proved, and cannot be

cause and parties, he is precluded

on the record need
If a defendant demur to the plaintiif’s declaration,
disproved.
withdrawn, precluded from deny
he
unless the demurrer
ing any matter alleged in it; for demurrer admits facts well
a

is

is,

admitted

the amount
-

is

pleaded, and the only question to be determined
of damagesﬁ

it

a

is

a

is

for
sum certain
§414. By tender.-Where the demand
in money, or capable of being ascertained by mere computation
tender may be made. The effect of such tender
to admit
would be necessary for the plaintiff to
every fact which
prove to enable him to recover the amount so tendered.‘

If

the

is

so made before

is

is

if

is

is

it,

it

i

suit and
paid into court after
action brought
belongs to the plaintilf absolutely; the de
fendant cannot reclaim
though paid by mistake. So much of
the p1aintiif’s claim
considered as stricken out of the declara
tion and he can only recover such excess as he
able to prove,
con
any.“ If tender
made after suit brought its effect
trolled by statutef‘ This statute does not bar further prosecu
tion of the action,’ but stops interest and subjects plaintiﬁ to
'
tender

Moore, 34 Mich., 41; Kimball
Co. v. Vroman, 35 Mk-h.. 321.

A. M.

1

4—'I‘hompson v. Townsend. 41 Micl1..
346;
N. W., 1042.

a

1

5—Thompson v. Townsend, 41 Mich.,
346;
N. W., 10-12.

&

2

6—C. L., §§ 10-105-10406.
Mich.,
v. Ranney,
14
7—Rathbun
382: Wetherbee v. Kustcrer, 41 Mich.,
359;
N. W., 45; Snyder v. Quarton,
47 Mich., 211; 10 N. W., 204: Wilcox
v. Laﬂln
R. P. Co., 44 Mich., 35:
N. W., 1091.
For other cases on the
law of tender, soc, ante,
242, at seq.
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a

2—The
circuit court rule 39,re
quires such agreement to be ln writ
ing, and they should be in justices‘
courts unless made
In open
court.
plalntiﬂ! declares, in
Where
suit
commenced
by process duly served, the
defendant's oral admission at the trial,
of the plnlntiifs cause of action, is
suﬂlcient to authorize the justice to
render judgment against hlm: Crouse
v. Derbyshlre,
10 Mich., 479.
3—See, ante,
A party can
280.
not be compelled to accept his adver
sary's admissions in lleu of record
evidence
unless he chooses to do so.
John Hancock M. Llfe Ins. Co. v.

&

subsequent costs.’

('11.
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By deed.—A party is estopped from averring the
§415.
contrary to what he has expressly alleged in an instrument
under his seal; thus, if he have entered into a bond to perform
the covenants in an indenture, he cannot set up as a defense,
'

was never executed.“
A recital in a deed is evidence against the party executing
or one claiming under him.” A recited instrument
only evi
is

it,

that the indenture

in the form of

a

unless such recital

is

is

it

is

is

dence of so much as
recited; if any other portion of the deed
required in evidence,
must be produced and proved in the
usual way.1° A recital
not allowed to operate as an estoppel,

direct and precise alle

gation.“

is

it it,

is

is

11—Dempsey v. Tyler,
Duer. 73;
Borst v. Corey, 16 Barh., 136; Hunt
ington v. Havens,
Johns., Ch., 23.
5

13—Dezell v. Odell.
219; Rickard v. Sears,

415

3

2

12—Estoppel
does
not arise from
silence or inaction unless the party
knows there is occasion to act or
speak:
Griﬂln v. Nichols, 51 Mich.,
575; 17 N. W., 63.
The conduct re
lied upon to create an‘ estoppel must
have been inﬂuential in leading another
to change hls'condition
so that except
for the estoppei he will be injured:
246;
Burdick
v. Michael,
32 Mich.,
Maxwell v. Bay City B. Co., 41 Mich.,
453;
N. W.. 639; Mlzner v. Kussell,
29 Mich., 229: Crane v. Reeder,
25
Mich., 303; Palmer v. Williams,
24
Mich., 328; De Mill v. Iiiottat, 49
Mich., 125; 13 N. W., 387.

lllil,
Ad.

216,
dc

783.

&

7

9

a

1

9

9

a

1

4

9

&

3

2

8—Cunningham
B.
v. Mackenzie,
P., 598
Wend.,
l)—Jackson
v. Parkhurst,
Barb., 419; Ford
209: Hill 'v. Hill,
Saik., 286. The recital oi’
v. Grey,
tact in a deed, is, as against the gran
tee in the deed, and all persons claim
ing under him through that deed, evi
dence of the tact recited therein: Lor
Paige, 649;
rcy v. Bank ot Orleans,
Demeyer v. Legg, 18 Barb., 14; Jack
son ex. dem. Banyar
v. Wlllson,
Johns., 92; see, Stockton v. Williams,
Doug. Mich., 546; Blanchard v. Ty
ler, 12 Mich., 339.
But the recital of
the consideration in a deed is not evi
dence of the real consideration
in
suit by the vendor to enforce his lien
tor the purchase price: Mowray v.
Mich., 39.
Vending.
Eil.,
Ad.
l0—Gillett v. Abbott,

6

if

it,

a

it

§

is

416. Estoppel by matter in pais.-This
the most impor
tant class of estoppels, and includes every act, representation,
and course of conduct, upon the faith of which one party has
induced the other to act, or by means of which he has acquired
an advantage to himself.” As far as regards the transaction
which has originated from such act, representation, or course
of conduct, the party doing or pursuing
concluded, as
against the other, from averring the contrary.
When party makes an admission with the intention to inﬂu
ence the conduct of another, and the latter acts upon
and
will be injured
the party
allowed to gainsay
the admis
sion
conclusive by way of estoppel."
But
would be

E.,

or
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otherwise, of a declaration made to a third person, without
any intention of inﬂuencing the conduct of the party, even
though he afterwards heard of and actcd on it.“

Admission by parties to the record.-An admission
§417.
is the statement or conduct of a party on the record, or one
with whom he stands in privity as to the right involved, which
when oifered in evidence is against the interest of such party.
The declaration or admissions of a party on the record are evi
dence for the opposite

party.“ But when the plaintiﬂ’ on the

469; see, Heane v. Rogers, 9 B. & C.,
586.

See note

12, ante.

14-—Reynolds v. Lounsbury, 6 Hill,
534; Strong v. Strickland, 32 Bar-b.,
284, 289: Pennell v. i-iinman, 7 Ib|'d.,
644; Dewey v. Field, 4 l\ietc., 381.
15-—Crouse
v. Derbyshlre, 10 Mich.,
496; Dawson v. Hall, 2 Mich., 390;
Thompson v. Richards, 14 Mich., 172.
Admissions made by a party to the
record, whether upon the witness stand
or elsewhere,
relative to matters ma
terial to the issue, may be given in
and
by the opposite party.
evidence
may
persons hearing the admission's,
be called to prove what was said, and
if the admissions were reduced
to
writing at the time, in the exact lan
writing is
used,
gunge
and it the
proven to be correct, the writing itselt
may be introduced as evidence of the
admission: Potter's appeal, 53 Mich.,
115; 18 N. W., 575.
But a written
agreement is not to be varied by the
paroi admissions of the party: Hunt
v. Thorn, 2 Mich., 213, 223.
Nor can
a party be compelled against his will
to accept his adversary’s admissions in
lieu 0! record evidence:
John Han
cock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Moore, 34
Mich., 41.
And it is a general rule
that verbal admissions are only re
ceivable oi facts provable by parol:
Lightfoot
People, 16 Mich., 512.
v.
An invalid
agreement, how
written
ever, is admissible as a. parol admis
sion of the facts recited in it, but it
is open to explanation and contradic
tion as parol evidence:
Hickey
v.
Hinsdale,
12 Mich.,
102.
Where 9.
defendant testifying
admits that an
alleged copy of a letter written by him
is substantially
correct, this is suf
ﬂcient to make it evidence: Kelley v.

Mclienna,
18 Mich.,
381.
An oral
admission, made as evidence merely, in
justice's court is not matter oi’ record.
Such admissions, made in open court,
alter issue joined, are, in the absence
of mistake, or misapprehension. con
clusive for the purposes oi! that trial,
but do not preclude an appeal, and
upon the trial on the appeal those oral
admissions are to be proved the same
as any other oral admissions:
Morri
son v. Riker, 26 Mich., 585.
A party‘s
statements cannot be proved in evi
dence in his own favor, but only so far
as they are admissions against his own
Page v. Stephens, 23 Mich.,
interest:
357.
The declarations ot a party re
specting his ownership of property may
in disparage
be received in evidence
ment of his title, but not to prove
ownership in himself.
But where the
nature of a person's possession is in
dispute, his claim ot ownership may
proved to show that
be
he holds
adversely, etc.: Mich. Paneling Co. v.
Parsell, 38 Mich., 475.
The declara
tions of a party against
his own
interest may be given in
evidence
as against him.
But if only a part
oi’ his entire statement or conversa
tion has been so given, he may show
whatever has been omitted which bears
upon the rest: Vanneter v. Crossman,
42 Mich., 404; 4 N. W.. 216.
The
statement oi a tact by one ot the par
ties in the presence ot the other and
not denied, is admissible as evidence
of the fact so stated: Atwood v. Corn
wall, 28 Mich., 336; see, Joselyn v.
McAllister,
25 Mich., 45.
As to how
tar acquiescence in the acts of another
will preclude a party, or be deemed
equivalent to an admission, see, Rus
sell v. Miller, 26 Mich., 1.
Silence

416

CH.

XXIII.

or

EVIDENCE—ADMISSIONS.

§ 417

record has assigned his interest in the debt, or chose in action, of
which the defendant had notice, evidence of admissions after
wards made by the plaintiff, as to the demands of the defend
ant against him, and which might impair the interest so as
signed or prejudice the rights of the assignee, for whose beneﬁt
the suit is brought, are not admissible."
Where an action was brought, in the name of the payee, upon
a note not negotiable, and no evidence had been given, on the

part of the plaintiff, that the payee was not the real owner of
the demand; and defendants under pleaof the general issue,
and notice that the note was given for money won at playing
cards, offered in evidence the written declaration of the plain
tiff, that he had not then, and never had, any property in the
note; that, at about the time it was given, the maker, and other
persons, played at cards, and both parties informed him that
the note was given for money won at cards; that it was made
payable to him without his knowledge or consent; and that he
did not know, at the time of making this statement, who was
the owner of the note—held, that this statement was proper
evidence.
While it shows no cause of action in plaintiff, it
shows none, legal or equitable, in any other person."

If

of

there are several parties on the same side, the admission
of them will not affect the others unless there is a joint

one

from, to
when assent to be presumed
statements made in a person's pres
ence: Barry v. Davis, 33 Mlch., 515.
The statement of a fact by one of the
parties to a suit, in the presence of
be
may
the other, and not denied,
shown as evidence of an admission of
the fact so stated:
Atwood v. Corn
wall, 28 Mlch., 336.
An admission
of the genulneness of a signature is
not necessarily an admission of the
execution of the note to which it ap
pears to be appended: Mack v. Cole’s
Estate, 130 Mlch., 85; 89 N. W., 564.
by
Admissions
obtained
means
of
duress are not admissible: Flagg v.
People, 40 Mlch., 706.
16—Frear
v. Evertson,
20 Johns.,
142.

17—Hogan v. Sherman, 5 Mlch., 60.
Where one party has voluntarily made
his trustee or agent the ostensible
principal. and the only one capable of
legal action, he will be bound by the
21

.—_i

admissions of such trustee or agent.
Where action is brought in the name
of one person, for the beneﬁt,
as
is claimed, of a bona ﬂde assignee, the
question whether there has been
a
bona ﬂdc assignment is not for the
court, but for the jury: and the court.
therefore, is not warranted
in ex
cluding the admissions of the nomi
nal plaintiff, on the assumption that
such assignment has been established
by evidence:
lbid.
If the owner of
property stands by and quietly and
without objection or making his rights
known.. sees another sell it as his own
and receive pay for it, the owner will
not be allowed thereafter to dispute
the title of the purchaser.
The rule
is, that if one remain silent when in
conscience
he ought to speak, he will
not be allowed to speak when in con
science
he ought to be silent:
Mich.
Paneling Co. v. Parsell, 38 Mlch., 480.

417
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interest or common design between them, a mere community
of interest is not suiﬁcient."
§ 418.

By parties in interest, though not on the record.—The

declarations,

or admissions of the party interested, are in all

in evidence; but they must have been_made
while he had an interest, and they are receivable only so far
as such interest is concerned."
cases receivable

§ 419.

Admissions

by co-trespassers.--Where

parties are es
or to have en

to be co-trespassers, or wrong-doers,
tered into the same criminal design, with a view to its estab
lishment, the admission of one, as to the motives and

tablished

circumstances of the trespass, will be evidence against all who
are proved to have combined together for the common object.”

By a.gents.—The declarations, representations and ad
§ 420.
missions of an agent, made while acting within the scope of
his authority, and in the discharge of his duties as agent, and
with reference to such duties, and the subject matter of his
employment, are admissible as evidence against his principal.“
18-—i1ackley v. Patrick,
3 Johns.,
536: Whitney v. Ferris, 10 Ibid, 86:
Dawson v. Hull, 2 Mich., 390.
And
where the interest is joint, it the et
fect of the admission is to create an
obligation, as, tor example,
where it
is an admission that a condition prece
dent has been performed. it is evidence
only against the
making
party
it:
Thompson v. Richards, 14 Mich., 172.
Thus, one joint maker of a promissory
note cannot by his admissions of pay
ment or otherwise so bind the other
as to take the note out of the bar
of the statute of limitations as against
Rogers v. Anderson, 40
the latter:
Mich., 290.
The declarations of
a
guardian, or next friend, are not ad
missible against the infant:
Rex v.
Merceron,
Stark,
366;
2
Webb v.
Smith. R. 8: M., 106.
The declaration
of a third person made in the presence
of a party, and assented to by him,
are admissible in evidence against him.
And the assent of the party is pre
sumed,
it nothing is said by him in
consistent
presumption:
with
that
Com. v. Call, 21 Pick., 515.
19-1 Greenleat Ev., § 180; see,
Paige v. Stephens, 23 Mich., 357.

20—Danlels v. Potter, 4 C. & P.,
262; Hough v. Marchant, 1 M. & M..
510; People v. Pitcher, 15 Mich., 403.
The general rule is well settled that,
where several persons are engaged in
one common unlawful enterprise, what
ever is said or done by any one of
them in the prosecution of the com
mon enterprise, or while it is still in
progress, is evidence
against all par
ties to it; but after the common
purpose or enterprise has been fully
completed or terminated,
the
state
ments ot one or more of them in ret
ercnce to anything connected
with the
past transaction.
become
as to the
others res inter alias, mere hearsay,
upon, nor evidence
neither binding
against any of the others, for the rea
son that they are no longer supposed
to he acting with one common design,
and one is in no sense the agent of the
other:
People v. Pitcher,
15 Mich.,
403-4.

Walk.,
21—Bencdict
V.
Denton.
Mich., 336; Iiorner v. Fellows.
Ch..
1 Doug. Mich., 54; Hunter v. Hudson
River 1. & M. Co.. 20 Barb., 494:
Miiburn v. Belloni, 34 Ib1'd., 607: Nel
son v. Cowlng, 6 liiil, 336.
The ad
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such declarations or admissions can be admitted the
agency must be established, and this cannot be done by gen
eral reputation.”

Before

Where a party adopts the acts or expressions of another, or
use of what another asserts, he thereby gives it all the
force of an admission by himself.
As, where the defendant
makes

procured another to make an affidavit of certain facts in order
missions of an agent are only evidence
against the principal when they con
stitute a part of the rcs g(’R!uC. They
must accompany the transaction
in
agent acted.
which the
What he
states at a subsequent time, as, after
the close of the transaction, or when
his agency is ended, is not admisible:
(fonvci-se
v. Blumrlch,
14 Mlch., 122;
Bowen v. School District,
36 Mlch.,
149; ilorner v. Fellows, 1 Doug., 54;
v. Brinckcrhoif,
4 Wend.,
Thallhimer
394; Fogg v. Child, 13 Barb., 246;
Budlong v. Van Nostrund, 24 Ibld.,
25: Isles v. Tucker, 5 Duer, 393; and
see, Michigan Central Ry. Co. v. Cole
man, 28 Mlch., 4-10; Kimball v. Vro
man, 35 Mlch., 310.
So, as to oﬂicers
of a corporation:
Beunk v. Valley
City D. Co., 128 Mlch., 562; S7 N. W.,
An agent in charge of an ele
793.
vator cannot make an admission of
want of repair or such elevator: Hall
v. Murdock, 119 .\iich., 389; 78 N. W.,
A statement by a telegraph op
329.
erator that a. message had not been
delivered made
to
one
entitled to
as an admission
know. is competent
against the telegraph company:
Car
land v. Telegraph Co., 11s Mlch., sea;
70 N. W.. ‘T62.
Although
the
declarations
of an
agent
when acting within the scope
of his agency and made in connection
with some transaction as such agent,
are receivable in evidence as a part
of the rcs gcstae; yet his mere posses
sion oi’ chattels belonging to his prin
Clpal, would not empower him to admit
away his principal‘s title:
Michigan
Paneling Co. v. Parscli, 38 Mlch., 475;
see, Cook v. Knowles, 38 Mlch., 316.
Admissions made during a suit by
the former agent of one of the parties
cannot be shown in evidence
in the
case unless for their bearing upon his
own credibility as a witness:
Cana
dian Bk. v. Coumbe, 47 Mlch., 360:

See, also, Benner v.
11 N. W., 196.
Feige, 51 Mlch., 568; 17 N. W., 60.
The admissions of an agent made after
the termination of his agency are not
competent or relevant evidence against
principal: North
Metz, 57
his
v.
Mlch., 612: 24 N. W., 759.
An agent to make an oi'i'er, is agent
reply:
Ferguson v.
to receive
the
Hemingway, 38 l\.iich.. 159.
22—I’erklns
v. Stebbins, 29 Barb.,
523.
The acts and declarations of one
who a_ssumcs to be acting as the
agent of another, are not evidence
against the supposed
principal
until
the fact of agency
is established by
other evidence:
Hatch v. Squler, 11
Mlch., 185; Carpenter v. Continental
Ins. Co., 61 Mlch., 635; 28 N. W.,
749.
Proof that a person is clerk for
another, does not etablish his right
to receive payment for his employer
of demands
not shown to have any
connection with the business, and evi
dence that payment was made to such
clerk of such demands.
is not a sui
ﬁclent showing of agency to authorize
of the admissions of such
evidence
clerk oi! the payment thereof to him:
Bowen v.
School District,
&c.,
36
Mlch., 149.
Stipulations made by the attorneys
in a cause will not bind their respect
ive clicnts in other suits.
Attorneys
as the agents of the parties whom they
represent in a cause, have authority,
by virtue of such agency, to make ad
missions which will be binding upon
the
parties in that particular
case,
but they have no authority by reason
of such relation to bind a person gen
erally by admission of facts: Isabelle
v. Iron Cilifs Co., 57 Mlch., 120; 23
N. W., 615; Fletcher v. Chicago, etc.,
Ry. Co., 109 Mlch., 364; 67 N. W.,
330; Evans v. Montgomery, 95 Mlch.,
497; 55 N. W., 362.
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to put off the trial, such affidavit was held admissible evidence
against the defendant of the facts stated therein.”
§421. Admissions by pa.rtners.—The admission of a person
proved to be a partner with another as to matters relating to
the partnership, is evidence against the other.“ But the fact
of the partnership must ﬁrst appear or be proved al-iunde
in order to let in the admission of one as evidence against the
other. The confession of a debt by one partner, however, after
the dissolution of the partnership, is not admissible evidence
against the other partners.“
v. Ward, 6 Esp.. 47;
23—Johnson
Gardner v. Moult. 10 Ad. & Eil.,
464.
So, the statement of a fact by
of
one of the parties in the presence
the other, and not denied. may he ad
of the fact so
mlssible in evidence
stated: Atwood v. Cornwall, 28 l\ilcl.\.,
And the ﬁling of the aﬂidavit
336.
of a physician as to cause of death is
an admission by the beneﬁciary ﬁling
it that death was caused as therein
Waey v. Travellers ins. Co.,
stated:
See,
126 Mich., 120; S5 N. W., 459.
also, John liancock L. I. Co. v. Dick,
So the
117 Mich., 518; 76 N. W., 9.
testimony of an agent on an inquest
is not competent as an admission
against
his principal:
Andrews
v.
Tamarack Mining Co., 114 Mich., 375:
if he
72 N. W., 242.
So sometimes
tall to deny a statement made by
another:
Matthews v. Forslund, 112
Mich., 591; 70 N. W., 1105; Conneli
v. McNett, 109 Mich., 330; 67 N. W.,
see,

344.

24—Nichol
1 Stark.,
v. Downing,
81; Walden v. Sherburne, 15 Johns.,
409; Pennoyer v. David, 8 Mich., 407.
A partner binds his tirm only on the
theory ot an implied agency for the
purpose of the mutual adventure, and
the agency does not extend beyond
what may be fairly regarded as com
ing within
its reach:
v.
Hotchin
Kent, 8 Mich., 528; see, Osborn v.
Osborn, 36 Mich., 48.
A partner's ad
missions cannot bind his associates in
transactions
foreign to the partner
ship; nor can his admissions bring
such matters within the scope of the
partnership
business:
lieﬁron v.
Hannnford,
40 Mich.,
305.
The ad
missions ot each of two persons made

diﬂerent occasions, that they were
partners, is sutﬂcient to establish the
partnership:
Fisher,
Chamberiin
v.
117 Mich., 428; 75 N. W., 931: Arm
strong v. Potter, 103 Mich., 409; 61
N. W., 657.
25-Baker v. Stackpole, 9 Cow., 420.
But the rule stated in the text as to
the effect of the admission of a part
ner after
is somewhat
dissolution.
modiﬁed in this state; upon that point
our supreme
court say, that “One
partner, after dissolution ot the firm,
cannot. by his admission or contract.
create a new partnership liability, nor
for a like reason can he by his admis
sion revive a claim against the ﬁrm
which has been barred by the statute
of limitations, since this is equivalent
to a new contract. On the other hand,
with the exception of claims barred by
the statute of limitations
and others
coming within a similar
reason,
we
think it equally clear on principle,
that the admission of a partner, made
after such dissolution,
having refer
ence
to previous
actual partnership
dealings .or transaction,
stands upon
grounds, and is evidence
the
same
against the ﬁrm in like manner. as if
made
such
before
dissolution.
The
dissolution
cannot destroy the joint
liability of the partners, nor alter
their relations to third persons in re
spect
to contracts made, or transac
tions which occurred betore the disso
lution.
The dissolution
acts upon
future, not upon past transactions.
As
to persons whose claims have been
contracted on the credit of the ﬁrm,
the partnership,
for all substantial
purposes, continues until such claims
have been satisﬁed.
And persons who
on
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an. action against persons as partners,

the declarations of
partners; they

one are not admissible to prove the others to be

are to be received as evidence of the fact only against the per
son making them."
§422. By g'ua.rdia.n.—-A guardian
admissions adverse to the Ward.2"

cannot bind his ward by

§423. Declarations by former owner of demand in suit.—
Declarations made by the former owner after parting with
title are not admissible to effect the rights of one deriving title
such former owner be dead. But where
made by a former owner, while he still was the owner, they
are competent against the subsequent purchaser.”
from him, although

§424. Admissions by husband or wife.-The admissions of
the wife when she can be considered the agent of the husband,
Therefore, where the wife has
are evidence against him.”
acted for her husband, and with his assent, in any department
have bad dealings with the ﬂrm during
its continuance, are, as to all matters
touching such dealings entitled to the
same benefit from the admissions of a
single partner, whether made before
or after the dissolution, unless shown
But the ad
to be false or fraudulent.
mission of a single partner, after dis
solution, of a pre-existing partnership
liability,
must be conﬁned
to gases,
where there have" been. in fact, pre
dealings with the
vious partnership
plalntiif, or some transactions of the
firm out of which a liability to the
might have originated;
and
plaintiff
the fact that there have been such
transactions,
dealings
or
must be
shown by some general
evidence
at
least, outside of the admission itself":
Pennoyer v. David, 8 Mich., 407.
26-—Whitney v. Ferris,
10 Johns.,
66: l\icl'herson v. Rathbone, 7 Wend.,
The acts and declarations of a
219.
partner actually engaged in a venture
in his own name, cannot be proved for
the purpose of ﬁxing a liability upon
the partnership in respect to such ven
ture:
Lockwood v. Beckwith. 6 Mich.,

Cooper v. Mayhcw, 40 Mich., 52.
Nor
The father
the natural guardian.
is the natural guardian of his child,
but he has no right to admit away the
rights of the ward whose person
is
committed to his custody. lie is guar
dian of the person of his child only,
and has no control of his estate:
Pmver v. liarlow, 57 Mich., 107; 23 N.
W.. 606.
28—And
where personal property
has been sold, the subsequent
admis
sions and declarations of the former
owner are not admissible to affect the
title of the vendee: Paige v. Stephens,
23 Mich., 857: Muncey v. Sun Insur
ance Oﬂice, 109 Mich., 542; 67 N. W.,
562; Stanseli v. Leavitt,
Mich.,
51
536; 16 N. W., 892; see, 1 Greenl. Ev.,
5 190, ed. 16. The death of a party to
a suit before
it is brought to trial.
does not exclude evidence of his admis
sions, nor affect the validity
of a
deposition taken during his lifetime:
Matson v. Melchor, 42 Mich., 477: 4
N. W., 200.
So as to entries in books
of a deceaed person:
Bliss v. Estate
of Plummer, 103 Mich., 181; 61 N. W.,

168.

263.

27—The guardian ad iitvm, of an in
fant defendant cannot bind his ward
admissions against his interest:
by

iiopkins

can

421

20-Riley

v. Suydam, 4 Barb., 222;
v. Mollinieux, 4 Wend., 465.

or
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of business, her admissions or acknowledgments are evidence
to charge the husband.-"*° But she cannot bind her husband by
admissions unless they fall within the scope of the authority
which may reasonably be presumed to have been derived from
him.
is,

The general rule
that the \vife’s admissions will not bind
the husband; except when acting as his agent. The declaration
of husband and wife are subject to the same rule of exclusions
is

which govern their testimony as witnesses.“
The wife
not
bound, nor can she be aifected by the admission of her husband
as to her separate estate,"
extent of and how construed.—The
en
in relation to
to be taken together, and
amounts to a denial of any present indebtedness,
will

488.

.'i2—Glover
As to

470.

v.
when

11
Alcott.
Mich..
the wife will be

a

the admission be that

estopped
by the act ot the husband
in the disposal of her separate prop
erty, see, Dann v. Cudney, 13 Mich.,

Where business is conducted en
tirely by the husband, but in the name
ot the wife, she will be bound by
the husband's statements and conduct
in the course
of the business, and
notice to the husband is notice to her:
Leland v. Collyer, 34 Mlch., 418; see,
Osborn v. Osborn. 36 Mlt-h., 4S.
The
wil’e is not affected by the statements
oi.’ the husband relative to his purpose
transferring
property
in
to
her:
Whelpley v. Stoughton. 112 Mich., 594;
70 N. W., 1098; Blanchard v. Moors,
85 Mich.. 380: 48 N. W.. 542.
33—'i‘homson v. Austen,
D.
Ry., 358.
The general rule is well
settled that the whole of an admission
must be taken together, though a Jury
are not bound to give equal weight to
that which operates in favor of the
party making it: Case v. Dean, 16
Mich., 22.
Where there is conﬂicting
testimony as to the admissions of par
ties, it is safer to trust to the inter
ences to be drawn from their conduct
than to attempt to reconcile such
conﬂict without regard to their con
Their acts clearly shown are
duct.
more reliable than any recollection of
Miller,
their words:
Russell
v.
26
Mich.,
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2

239.

a

a

a

6

2

5

5

2

1

1

3

1

Bing., 199:
30--Cliﬂord v. Burton.
Ibld., 170: Cotes
Petty v. Anderson,
N. P., 485: see,
Camp.
v. Davis,
Camp., 304; Pale
Crosby v. Percy,
Esp., 511: and
thorp v. Furnish,
205; Ed
Selden,
Gates v. Brower,
gerton v. Thomas. Ibid., 40.
31—1 Greenl. l~1v., 341; Dawson v.
Hall,
Mich., 390.
A wife's admis
sions, unless conﬁned to acts of agency,
cannot be used against her husband in
an action on contract against him, ex
cept
when they are res geattle, and
admissible as acts and not as relations
of facts: Rose v. Chapman, 44 Mich.,
S0, in an action
N. W., 681.
312:
involving
sale
to a wife through
made
admissions
her husband. his
after his wife's title had vested, and
when be was not acting in her busi
His
ness, cannot be used against her.
admlsions as to past transactions
cannot hind her unless they are a part
of the res geatae: Stansell v. Lenvltt,
51 Mich., 536; 16 N. W., 892.
woman is not
When a married
promissory note signed by
bound by
her,
her oral admission of liability
will
thereon will not bind her—nor
her oral promise to pay it: Buhler v.
Jennings, 49 Mich., 538; 14 N. W.,

So,

if

it

debt,
not alone be proof of the debt.”

it

is

if,

Admissions,

1.

§425.
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the demand once existed, but had been paid, it will not alone
be of any avail.“
But where a party admits the existence
of a particular debt or the accuracy of certain items charged
against him, although, at the same time, he sets up an off-set
of other items in his own favor, his admission is competent
evidence to justify a recovery for the debt of items thus ad
mitted, unless the alleged set-oﬂ:‘ is duly proved. Such a state
ment is an unqualiﬁed admission of a present indebtedness,
although accompanied by an assertion of a counter demand
in his own favor. But the assertion that a set-oﬂ exists does
not prove its existence, although the admission may conclu
sively establish the debt or items claimed to be due from the
party by whom the admission was made.“
A party whose admissions and confessions are resorted to as
evidence against him, has, in general, a right to insist that the
whole should be taken together; but the part called out by him
should relate to the point of fact inquired into on the other
side.“
Verbal admissions should be carefully scrutinized because of
liability to error through failure correctly to lmderstand or
recollect the words used."
DEPOSITIONS.

Taking of how regu1a.ted—upon notice.-The taking
of depositions is now regulated by Act No. 180, Public Acts of
This act provides for the
1895, being C. L., §§ 10136-10143.
taking of depositions de bene esse and in memoriam perpetuam;
and for taking them upon notice, by commission or under
The ﬁrst section of the statute is as follows:
stipulation.
§ 426.

34—Smlth v. Jones, 15 J’ohns., 229;
also, Carver v. Tracy. 3 Johns.,
427: Fenner v. Lewis. 10 IMd., 38;
Perego v. Purdy, 1 I-lllton, 269.
35—Delameter v. Pierce, 3 Denio,
see.

315.

36—-Garey v. Nicholson. 24 Wend.,
850; Dorlon v. Douglass, 6 Barh.. 451:
Rouse v. Whited, 25 IMd., 279; Rouse
v. Whited. 11 E. 1". Smith, 170. Where
a fact is sought to be shown by a
and admissions
party's
declarations
different
conversa
made
in several
bearing
tions, ail the conversations

upon the subject at inquiry must be
submitted to the jury:
v.
Nesbit
Stringer,
2 Duer.,
Halsey
‘.26: see.
v. Jarvis, 7 Bosw..-161.
And where
plaintiff proves a demand for the pay
ment of money in the hands of de
fondant, and a refusal, the defendant
may show the reasons given for the
refusal:
Bennett v. Burch, 1 Denio,
141.

37-Fiart

v.

Village

130 Mich., 181:
ple v. McArron,

W., 944.
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of New Haven.
W., 677: Peo
Mich., 2; 79 N.
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is

it

is

it

is

it

is

is

is is,

“The testimony of any witness may be taken by deposition
de bene eesse, in any civil cause or matter, begun or pending
in any court of record, at law or in chancery, or before any
probate court, or commissioners on claims appointed by any
probate court, or arbitrators, referees or circuit court com
missioner, or justice of the peace in the state of Michigan,
or
or in any other civil proceeding, when the witness
about
about to go or resides out of-the state of Michigan, or
to go or reside more than ﬁfty miles from the place of trial,
or beyond the jurisdiction of the court; or when the witness
reasonable cause for
sick, aged or inﬁrm or where there
apprehension that his testimony cannot be had at the trial of
needed for use on hearing of mo
the cause, or Where
tions, petitions, proceedings for injunctions, or upon any other
interlocutory or other proceedings prior to ﬁnal hearing of any
cause; and in all cases where aﬁidavits are permitted to be used
in proceedings before the court; also when
desired to take
conditionally and perpetuate testimony in suits to be begun;
shall
and in any other case not above provided for when
appear to the court or judge thereof that the purposes of jus

will

be aided thereby}

The deposition may be taken be

1——Under a statute similar to this
tar as there being any requirement
of a showing of ground or reason for
taking the deposition as a prerequisite
so

a

&

of its taking, it was held that no such
showing was necessary.
That it was
suﬂicient it, before the deposition was
put in evidence, some one of the rea
sons named in the statute. as ground
for its taking, be made to appear.
Such would seem to he the construc
Pat
tion to be put on this statute:
terson v. Wabash, St. L.
P. Ry. Co.,
54 Mich., 91; 19 N. W., 761.
Where a non-resident plaintii! in a
civil action notiﬁes defendant of his
willingness to appear
on the trial as
witness and to produce all books
relating
and papers in his possession
to the subject oi.‘ the litigation he can
not be compelled to submit to the tak
ing oi his deposition under this act
merely to enable the defendant to en
quire into the truth ot his testimony
Young v. Kent Circuit
before trial:
Judge, 116 Mich., 10; 74 N. W., 206.

Testimony may be taken by deposi
tion under this statute for use on
hearing of
motion for a new trial:
Eikhoif v. Wayne Circuit Judge, 129
Where
Mlch.. 150; 88 N. W., 397.
a deposition was taken under a stipu
lation that it should be used only in
case the witness should be unable to
attend court it was held not to be
error to receive the deposition where
she made an aliidavit of her inability
which was opposed only by the un
sworn statements of opposing coun
Styles v. Decatur,
sel:
Mich.,
131
444; 91 N. W., 622.
The admission oi’ a second deposi
tion, taken after due notice, to show
facts not shown in the ﬁrst, is in
the discretion oi’ the trial court: Fre
Tommei, 131
donia Nat‘l
Bank
v.
Mich., 674$ 92 N. W.. 348.
The de
position of the witness may itself be
made to show the reason
which jus
titles its taking or this may be made
otherwise to appear when the deposi
tion is oifered.
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§ 426

fore any judge of any court of the United States, or of any
state of the United States, or of any foreign country, or before
any commissioner of a circuit court in Michigan, or of the
United States, or of any state, or any commissioner for Michi
gan, or any consul, or consular oﬁicer, justice of the peace,
officer, or notary public, authorized by the laws of this state,
or of any other state, or of the United States, or by the laws
of any foreign country, to administer oaths, not being of coun
sel or attorney for either of the parties, nor interested in the
event of the cause. The seal of such court or official, or a cer
tiﬁcate of such authority given under the seal of any court of
record, shall be pr-ima facie evidence of authority to act. Rea
sonable notice must ﬁrst be given in writing by the party, his
attorney or solicitor, proposing to take such deposition, to the
opposite party, or his attorney of record, which notice shall
state the name of the witness or witnesses, and the time and
place of taking his deposition, and the name of the oﬁicial
before whom the same will be taken, and in all cases in rem,
attachment or replevin, the person having the agency or pos
session of the property at the time of seizure, shall be deemed
the adverse party, until a claim shall have been put in, or ap
pearance entered in the cause; and whenever, by reason of the

from the jurisdiction of the party, or want of an oppo
site attorney of record, or other reason, the giving of the
notice herein required shall be impracticable, it shall be lawful
to take such depositions as there shall be urgent necessity for
taking, upon such notice as any judge authorized to hold
courts within the jurisdiction where the suit is begun shall
think reasonable, and direct.” Any person may be compelled
to appear and depose as provided by this act, by the order or
absence

2—Where notice was served on Jan.
10th
for the taking of a deposition
on Jan. 14th, 267 miles distant. court
being then in session and a Sunday
intervening. it was held not an abuse
oi’ the discretion of the court to reject
the deposition for want of the "rea
sonable notice" of its taking required
Drosdowski v. Order
by the statute:
of Chosen
Friends. 114 Mich., 178:
Where the notice
72
N. W., 169.
stated an intention to take the depo
sition on “written interrogatories at

tached," and none were attached and
the deposition had been ﬂied
three
months before the objection was made,
it was held an admissible deposition:
Record Pub. Co. v. Merwin. 115 Mich.,
10; 72 N. W., 998.
As to what is
“reasonable notice" depends upon the
circumstances of each particular case:
See, iinrris
v. Brown.
63 Me..
51:
Trevelyan‘s Adm'r v. Loft. 83 Va.,
146; 1 S. l’<l.. 901; Harrls's Appeal,
492; 20 Atl., 617.
58 Conn.,
Under
the clause providing
for cases where
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process of any court, and to produce books and papers in the
same manner as Witnesses may be compelled to appear and
.
testify in court.”-'*

This statute applies to all classes of proceedings in all kinds
of tribunals in which it will become necessary to use evidence
and supersedes all prior statutes on the subject.

By commission.—Section 2 of the act provides for
§427.
the taking of the deposition by_commission in all cases where
it might be taken by notice. This section requires that “upon
affidavit showing reason therefor” “any circuit court com
missioner in the state of Michigan, or the court in which such
proceeding is begun or pending, or the judge, clerk or register
thereof, or in any case pending before a justice of the peace,
such justice” shall “issue a commission (upon which shall be

printed section four of this act) for the taking of the testi
mony” of the witness before the person appointed in the com
mission. “Written interrogatories to be put to such witness
by such commissioner may be attached to the commission; if
attached, a copy thereof shall be attached to the notice, which
shall in any case be given to the opposite party, or his attor
ney or solicitor, of the time and place of taking testimony
Cross and re-direct interrogatories,
under such commission.
desired
which it is
the commissioner shall put to the witness,
shall thereupon be promptly furnished to the respective parties,
and to such commissioner. Where default or order pro confesso
has been entered in the cause notices shall not be necessary/’4
service under the general provision
“impracticable,"
it seems to be re
quired that _a showing under oath be
rendering
made ot the circumstances
it impracticable.
3-—Before a deposition taken in the
absence of a party can be used it must
appear that he was required to attend
and has been put in default by the
Campsu v. Dewey. 9
proper notice:
It is purely a stautory
Mich.. 409.
proceeding and the statute must be
substantially complied with:
Thomp
son v. Clay. 60 Mich., 632; 27 N. W.,
A notary public of another tnte
699.
is presumed to have authority to ad
Pinkham v. Cockeil,
minister oaths:
77 Mich., 269: 43 N. W., 921.
4—'.i‘his statute does not require the

the
is

settling 01' the interrogatories by the
court or any oﬁcer before the cause
or proceeding may be pending. Indeed
it is not essential to this proceeding
by commission.
to take depositions
that there be any written interroga
tories.
See sections 2 and 4 of the
The person appointed by
act.
the
commission is qualified by virtue
of
such commission to administer oaths
and needs no other qualiﬁcation.
As
to whether ‘that clause of this sec
tion doing away with the requirement
of the statute as to notice, in cases
where default or orders pro confeaso
have been entered, should be construed
unnecessary
in
as rendering notice
cases
where default has been taken
to appearance, there may
subsequent
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Compelling attendance of witnesses.—Section 3 gives
courts of record of the state authority to “compel the attend
ance of witnesses and the giving of their testimony and the
§ 428.

production of books, papers and other evidences, before the
persons authorized to take testimony and also under commis
or letters rogatory, issued out of any court of any other

sions,

state, or of the United States, or of any foreign government
or country.” Section 1 of the act gives authority to compel
the attendance of witnesses Whose depositions are to be taken
to be used in proceedings in this state. This sedtion 3 is to give
such authority as to depositions to be used in courts outside
‘

this state.

4
Swearing, and examination of witness.—Section
§429.
provides that “Each witness shall be sworn or aﬁirmed by the
oiﬁcer or person empowered to take such testimony, to tell
the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, con
cerning the matter at issue in the cause. Every witness may be
examined, cross-examined, and re-examined, orally, and also
so examined

in addition to written, direct or cross-interroga

tories.
Examinations may be adjourned from time to time.
Testimony may be written or taken stenographically and tran
scribed under direction of the oﬁﬁcer so taking the same and
shall be signed by the witness and certiﬁed as correct by the
official before whom it is taken, but signatures of witnesses
may be waived in writing by agreement of parties.

Return of the deposition.—The deposition when taken
shall be forthwith enclosed by the official before whom the
same is taken and endorsed with the title of the court and
§ 430.

See,
question:
some
Ketchum _v.
Kent Circuit Judge, 115 Mich., 60;
The provision that
72 N. W., 1110.
“any person may be compelled to ap
“by the order or
pear and depose“
process of any court," etc., can have
reference to depositions taken within
the state only since n court of this
state cannot have compulsory prowers
boundaries of the state.
beyond
the
and no statute of the state can give
such power to courts outside the state.
As to the rights oi.’ parties if there is
failure to appear on the part of either
it can be said that it there is ren
be

sonabie time given for the other party
to appear, and he does not appear. no
rights are lost by assuming that he
does not intend to appear:
See. Stock
ton v. Williams. Wk. Ch., 120; Wixom

Stephens, 17 Mich., 523.
The of
ﬂcer taking the deposition may swear
an interpreter when necessary: Cam
As to
pau v. Dewey, 9 Mich., 408.
the taking ot the deposition in narra
Dewey,
v.
tive form. see, Cnmpau
supra, where under a statute similar
it was held that it
in its language.
was permissible at least unless ob
jection were taken at the time.
v.
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and how it is to be sent, and he shall sign the endorsement, and
the same shall be transmitted by mail or otherwise, to the court

in which the cause is pending, and in case such deposition is
taken for use before commissioners on claims appointed by any
probate court, to such court, and then be opened by the court
or clerk or register, and written notice thereof then given by
mail or otherwise to the parties.
Objections to notices of, or
objections to the manner of taking the testimony, or of certi

fying or returning the deposition shall be regarded as waived
unless made in writing within three days a'fter knowledge or
notice of the return thereof/’5
Depositions in perpetuam memoriam.-—Section ﬁve
§431.
of the act in question provides for the taking of testimony in
perpctuam me-moriam by any person who expects to be a party
to a. suit in a court of record and is not applicable in actions
before justices of the peace.
There is no provision of the
law for the taking of depositions of this sort for use in justices’
courts.

Taking of depositions by agreement.—Section sixof
§ 432.
the act authorizes parties to actions begun, or to be begun, to
take testimony by deposition in such manner as they may
agree, and they may bystipulation control the manner in which
5—An objection that notice was for
taking the deposition on “written in
terrogatories attached," and none were
attached, must be made within
the
three days of the statute: Record Pub.
Co. v. Merwin, 115 Mich., 10; 72 N.
W., 989.
That no notice of the ﬁling of the
deposition was given will not defeat
its use: Knight v. Emmons, 4 Mich.,
555.
Oral examination may be had
though the deposition is taken by com
mission accompanied by written inter
rogatories.
While this statute does
not expressly require the reading over
to the witness of the deposition after it
has been written, yet such practice has
been most strongly
commended: See,
People v. McKinney,
355;
49 Mich.,
13 N. W., 619; Godfrey v. White, 43
Mich., 189; 5 N. W., 243.
The only
certiﬁcate speciﬁcally required by the

statute is one that
the
testimony
transcribed
from a stenographic re
port ot the examination. when such
is the procedure, is correct.
It must
be made to appear, however, in some
way: (1) that the witness was sworn
in the manner required by the statute;
(2). how and by whom the witness
was examined; (3), when and where
the deposition was taken:
(4), that
the signature to the deposition is that
of the witness unless the signing is
waived by the written stipulation of
the parties.
In short, it must be
made to appear that the requirements
of the statute have been met, before
the deposition can be used. and a cer
tiﬁcate oi’ the oﬂicer before whom
it was taken is proper proof of these
facts: See, Bell v. Morrison, 1 Pet.
U. S-, 354.
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433

It is difﬁcult to
such deposition so taken shall be returned.
conceive that there can be any limitation of this authority by
In civil cases parties can usually by agreement
construction.
control the manner of producing and presenting the evidence
to the court so long as they do not attempt to interfere with
the orderly procedure of the trial.
Use of, and authority of the court over.—In section
seven provision is made that “Depositions taken under this
act may be read and considered in evidence at the trial or on
any hearing, and on appeals and retrials of the same cause of
§ 433.

action, but the court shall have power to regulate the use, to
prevent abuses thereof, and may order the retaking of testi
mony, or the production of the witness, if within the juris
diction, notwithstanding that his deposition has been taken.
In any case either party may obtain subpoena and compel the
usual attendance and re-examination of the witness, notwith
standing his deposition has been taken, if he is within the
jurisdiction of the court and able to attend, and give his testi
mony in the usual way for or at the trial.” The provisions of

this section

so

far

as they

purport

authority
declaration of

to give the court

to require the presence of the witness are but a
the law in the absence of such a provision.
It has always been
a good objection to the reading of a deposition that the reasons
which authorized it to be taken no longer exist.“

Fees for ta-king.—The provisions for fees for taking
§434.
are found in section eight. Two dollars are allowed for “tak
ing, certifying, sealing and forwarding: Ten cents for each one
hundred words to be considered as costs in the case.
For
copies furnished to parties, three cents per hundred words.
Each party is required to pay for his own examination, direct
or cross in the ﬁrst instance, but of course may tax them back
at the rate aforesaid

if

he recover costs."

6—Emlaw

v. Emiaw, 20 Mich., 11.
requirement
is no
that
7—There
copies 0! the deposition shall be furnished to parties, but it turnished, in

the absence of any agreement
as to
compensation, the statutory rate would
doutbless control.

\
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OF WITNESSES.

COMPETENCY

Who competent.--“No person shall be excluded from
§ 435.
giving evidence in any matter, civil or criminal, by reason of
crime, or for any interest of such person in the matter, suit, or
proceeding in question, or in the event of such matter, suit
or proceeding, in which such testimony may be offered, or by
reason of marital or other relationship, to any party thereto;
but such interest, relationship, or conviction of crime may be
shown for the purpose of drawing in question the credibility of
such witness, except as is hereinafter provided.”1
1-—C.

conviction

L..

1897,

of

crime

While
5 10210.
does
not dis-

quality, it may be shown as affect
ing
People
credibility:
Haun
v.
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§436

witnesses.—“On the trial of any issue
joined, or in any matter, suit or proceeding in any court, or on
any inquiry arising in any suit or proceeding in any court,
or before any officer or person having by law, or by consent of
parties, authority to hear, receive, and examine evidence, the
parties to any such suit or proceeding named in the record,
and persons for whose beneﬁt such suit or proceeding is prose
cuted, or defended, may be Witnesses therein in their own be
half or otherwise, in the same manner as other witnesses, ex
cept as hereinafter otherwise provided; and the deposition of
any such party or person may be taken and used in evidence
§436.

Parties

as

under the rules and statutes governing depositions, and any
such party or person may be proceeded against, and com
pelled to attend and testify, as is provided by law for other
witnesses.

'

’ "’-

When heirs, assigns, etc., of deceased persons are
§437.
a suit or proceeding is prosecuted or de
parties.-—“Wl1en
fended by the heirs, assigns, devisees, legatees, or personal
representatives of a deceased person, the opposite party, if
examined as a witness on his own behalf, shall not be admitted
to testify at all to matters which, if true, must have been
equally within the knowledge of such deceased person; and
when any suit or proceeding is prosecuted or defended by any
surviving partner or partners, the opposite party, if exam
ined as a witness, in his own behalf, shall not be admitted to
testify at all in relation to matters which, if true, must have
been equally within the knowledge of the deceased partner,
ausau, 60 Mich., 21; 26 N. W., 797:
People v. Foote, 93 Mich., 40; 52 N.
W., 1036: People v. Hall, 48 Mich.,
490: 12 N. W., 665.
The question ot bias or prejudice
as shown
as aitecting the credibility
by conviction of crime, interest or re
lationship to parties is not a collateral
one in such sense as that the answers
are con
of the witness so impeached
clusive and not subject to contradic
tion: Helwig v. Lascowskl, 82 Mich.,
The record of
619; 46 N. W., 1033.
the conviction only, and not the tes
timony ot witnesses as to his guilt,
as against the denial
can be received
or
by the witness of his conviction
'

f '.

guilt: People v. Maunausau, 60 Mich.,
21; 26 N. W., 797.
See cases cited
in the note to this section, 10210, of
Comp. Laws.
2-—C.

L.,

5 10211.

The remainder of this section relates
to testimony in criminal cases, and is
omitted. The sections of this act, viz.:
are repugnant to QS24,
55 10210-10213,
and therefore, now prescribe the only
and examl~
rule as to the competency
Goodcrich v. Allen,
nation of parties:
19 Mich., 250; see, Roberts v. Miles,
12 Mich., 305; Montague v. Dougan,
68 Mich., 100: 35 N. W., 840; People
v. Van Alstine, 57 Mich., 82; 23 N.
W., 594.
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and not within the knowledge of any one of the surviv
ing partners. No person who shall have acted as an agent in
the making or continuing of a contract with any person who
may have died, shall be a competent witness in any suit involv
ing such contract, as to matters occurring prior to the death
of such decedent, on behalf of the principal to such contract
against the legal representatives or heirs of such decedent
unless he shall be called by such heirs or legal representa
tives.
And when any suit or proceeding is prosecutedvor
defended by any corporation, the opposite party, if examined
as a witness in his own behalf, shall not be admitted to testify
at all in relation to matter, which, if true, must have been
equally within the knowledge of a deceased officer or agent
of the corporation, and not within the knowledge of any sur
viving oiﬁcer or agent of the corporation, nor when any suit
or proceeding is prosecuted or defended by the heirs, assigns,
devisees, legatees, or personal representatives of a deceased
person against a. corporation (or its assigns) shall any person
who is or has been an oﬁicer or agent of any such corporation
be allowed to testify at all in relation to matters which, if
true, must have been equally within the knowledge of such
Provided, That whenever the words ‘the
deceased person:
opposite party’ occur in this section it shall be deemed to
include the assignors or assignees of the claim or any part
thereof in controversy: And provided further, That whenever
the deposition, affidavit or testimony of such deceased party
taken in his lifetime shall be read in evidence in such suit or
proceeding, that the affidavit or testimony of the surviving
party shall be admitted in his own behalf on all matters men
tioned or covered in such deposition, afﬁdavit or testimony:
And provided further, That when the testimony or deposition
of any witness has once been taken and used (or shall have
heretofore been taken and used) upon the trial of any cause,
and the same was when so taken and used, competent and
admissible under this act, the subsequent death of such witness
or of any other person shall not render such testimony incom
petent under this act, but such testimony shall be received
upon any subsequent trial of such cause.”3
3—C. L., 1897, 5 10212, as amended
by Pub. Acts, 1901, p. 371, and by Pub.

Acts, 1903, p. 36: Gustatson v. Eger.
132 Mlch., —; 92 N. W., 893, a case of
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agency; see, Cook v. Stevenson, 30
Mich., 242; Chambers v. Hill, 34 Mich.,
525-6; Schratz v. Schratz, 35 Mich.,
485; Jones v. Beeson, 36 Mich., 214;
Hart v. Carpenter, Ibid., 402;'i‘wiss v.
Mich., 253.
George.
33
Under this
statute, it is for the court and not
the witness to determine whether the
knowledge of the deceased in regurd
to the transaction was such as to per
mit or exclude his testimony.
The
court and not the witness is to de
clde on the competency
of the testi
mony.
The admissibility of the party's
testimony does not depend upon the de
gree of his knowledge; that is, whether
he knows more about the transaction
or matter in question than the deceased
knew; but he is prohibited from tes
tifying
at all upon matters which
were within the knowledge of himself
and the deceased alike.
He is pre
cluded from putting in evidence
his
account of a transaction
known
to
both, when the death of the opposite
his account lrom be
party_precludes
ing heard also. Whenever there is a
fact bearing upon the issue which was
not in the knowledge of the deceased.
and the party testifies to it, his right
to give evidence
to that fact does not
entitle him to extend his testimony
to other facts which were within the
knowledge of the deceased: Kimball,
v. Kimball, 16 Mich., 211; see, Wright
v. Wilson, 17 Mich., 192; Mouiton v.
Mason, 21 Mich., 364, 372.
Although testimony offered by a sur
vivor may not fail within the literal
terms of the prohibition of this
tat
ute, yet if it is within the policy of
the prohibition it ought not to be al
Mundy v. Foster, 31 Mich.,
lowed:
313; Downey v. Andrus, 43 Mich.,
72-3: 4 N. W.. 628.
The rule that a party cannot testify
the knowl
to matters equally within
edge of a deceased opponent, does not
apply when the action is against the
surety of the deceased:
Lee v. Wis
Nor prior to
ner, 38 Mich., 82, 87.
the recent amendments did the rule
of exclusion apply to the testimony of
be
as to the transactions
a survivor
tween him on the one side and a sur
viving agent of the decedent on the
other, not in the presence of the de
cedent: Ward v. Ward. 37 Mich., 253;
De Mary v. Burtensh:1w‘s Estate. 131
23

§ 437

Mich., 326; 91 N. W., 647.
Since the
amendment of 1903
such surviving
agent is incompetent.
A survivor cannot testify adversely
as to his private dealings with a de
ceased person, even in rebuttal of an
other‘s testimony as to conversations
between the survivor and the decedent,
overheard by that other person: Chad
wick v. Chadwick's estate, 52 Mich.,
5-15; 18 N. W., 350; see, Downey v.
Andrus, 43 Mich., 65; 4 N. w., 628.
Nor can he testify as to the contents
of lost letters which passed between
him and the
deceased:
v.
Schratz
Schratz, 35|Mici1.. 485.
But when a
party whose testimony if objected to,
would be excluded under the provis
ions of this section, C. L., § 10212,
amended,
Pub.
Acts
of
1901,
p.
371, and 1903, p. 36 is giving testi
mony
in a cause, and the opposite
party calls out facts equally within
the knowledge of the
deceased,
and
afterwards seeks to prove the statements
so made under oath in a controversy
between
the same parties, as admis
sions. he must be held to have waived
the inhibition of the statute, and the
witness may testify fully in respect
to the subject matter of the admission,
although
it be equally
within
the
knowledge of the deceased:
Smith's
Appeal, 52 Mich., 415. 419;
18
N.
W., 195; Fox v. Barrett's Estate, 117
.\iich., 162: 75 N. W.. 440.
A corporation and the individual
corporators composing it are distinct
persons,
and in a suit between a pri
vate corporation and the estate of a
deceased
it would seem that
person,
the corporators are not precluded by
this section from testifying
to mat
ters equally in the knowledge of the
deceased,
unless they are oﬂicers or
acting as agents of the corporation:
Rust v. Bennett, 39 Mich., 521.
Because a witness testifies that eer
tain things occurred in the presence
of the deceased,
it does not follow
that the “survivor"
of the statute is
precluded from denying such
occur
rence:
Pillard v. Dunn, 108 Mich.,
301; 68 N. W., 45.
Objection under 'this statute may
be waived and a failure to make the
objection will operate as such waiver:
Barbler v. Young. 115 Mich., 100; 72
N, W., 1096; distinguishing
.\iciiugh
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Competency and credibility disti.nguished.—There are
§ 438.
two kinds of exceptions to witnesses: to their competency and
to their credibﬂ/ity. Exceptions to the credit of a witness are
such as do not at all disable him from being sworn, but merely
effect the degree of belief which the jury will give to his

is

277.
See,

434

to

this

also, cases cited in the notes
section in C. L.,
10212.
5

5agd

1

a

suit was not iucluded:' Seymour v.
Wallace, 121 Mich., 402; 80 N. W.,
242.
One entitled to have property
transferred to him, but consents that
may
be transferred
to another,
within the prohibition of the statute:
Berry v. Adams, 122, Mich., 17; 80
N. W., 792.
That deceased may have
been possessed
of knowledge of facts
inconsistent with the testimony offered
is not enough to exclude the testimony.
As, though deceased knew whether he
personal
was the owner of certain
property, this would not prohibit the
testimony of the opposite party to a
transaction, at which deceased was not
present. tending to show rights in the
opposite
party
to
such
property:
Moore v. Machen, 124 i\iich., 216; 82
N. W., 892, and cases
cited in the
opinion.
The testimony of parties to
the litigation
is competent,
notwith
standing this statute, where the estate
of the deceased will not be depleted
or increased by the result of the liti
gation, but it is a controversy between
Lorimer v. Lorimer,
claimants:
124
Mich., 631; 83 N. W., 609; Seymour
v. Wallace, 127 Mich., 669; 87 N. W.,
90.
The presence of a third person
does not remove the bar of the statute.
Such third person is the only one
competent to testify: Taylor v. Bunk
258; 36 N. W., 66:
er,
68 Mich.,
Micheis v. Underwriter's
Ass‘n., 129
Mich., 417; 89 N. W., 58.
For other
eases under this statute, see: Ladd v.
Brown, 108 Mich., 105; 65 N. W.. 520:
Slack v. Norton, 111 Mich., 213; 69
N. W., 497; Bailey v. Holden, 113
Mich., 402: 71 N. W., 841: Schmitl
v. Beals. 115 Mich.. 112: 73 N. W.,
109: Graham v. Alexander, 123 Mich.,
168; 81 N. W., 1084; Sheldon v. In
surance Co., 124 Mich., 303: 82 N. W..
1068; Dunn v. Dunn's~ Estate.
127
Mich., 385: 86 N. W., 801: Blodgett
v. Vogel, 130 Mich., 479: 90 N. W..

it

Dowd‘s Estate, 86 Mich., 412; 49
N. W., 216.
A wife having dower and homestead
interests in the property in question
is disqualiﬁed where her husband is
party and the contro
the surviving
versy ls over lands, which, if the
is sustained,
claim of the husband
would be subject to such dower
rights: Laird v. Laird.
homestead
One in
Mich., 352; 73 N. W., 382.
possession of personal property on the
death of the owner, is the represen
tative of the deceased within the mean
ing of the statute so us to disqualify
Burke v. Dunn,
the opposite party:
A
117 Mich., 430: 75 N. W.. 931.
mere naked trustee is not disqualiﬁed
v.
Jenkinson
statute:
under
this
Brooks, 119 l\ilch.. 108: 77 N. W., 640.
Assignees for the benefit of creditors
of one since deceased are not within
-Marquette v. Wilkinson,
the statute:
Nor
119 Mich., 413; 78 N. W.. 474.
does the contingent liability of sure
ties upon the bond of a custodian of
the
city funds bring
them
within
statute in the absence oi.’ anything to
show that the deceased principal was
Marquette v. Wilkinson,
not solvent:
supra.
it is not essential that one
in
from deceased
get rights directly
order to be within the prohibitions of
An assignee of an heir
this statute.
of deceased, or of a prior assig-nee of
Olin
is within the statute:
deceased
v. iienderson, 120 Mich., 149; 70 N.
W., 178; Ripley v. Sellgman, 88 Mich.,
189; 50 N. W., 143.
It is not neces
diquallﬂcation that one is an
sarily
oﬂicer or agent of a corporation. Such
person is disqualiﬁed only when his tes
tlmony has reference to something as
to act for
to which he has authority
Brennan v. Railroad
the corporation:
Co., 93 Mich., 156; 53 N. W., 358;
Wallace v. Mystic Circle, 121 Mich.,
263: 80 N. W., 6. The grantee of de
ceased who takes in consideration that
he pay debts of the grantor is disquali
that an obligation in
ﬁed to testify
v.

CH.

XXIV.

or wrrunssss.

comenrnzvcv

§ 438

Objections to the competency of a witness are
his being sworn at all on account of some inherent
incapacity or defect, or as being against the policy of the
law.
It is the province of the court to determine whether a wit

evidence.

against

is competent or the evidence admissible; and whatever
antecedent facts are necessary to be ascertained for the pur
pose of deciding the question of competency or admissibility
of evidence, as, for example, whether a child understands the
nature of an oath, or Whether the confession of a prisoner was
voluntary, or whether a party can testify, the other being
dead-—these and other facts of the same kind are to be deter
mined by the court and not by the jury}
ness

As

of the admissibility of evi
and what constitutes evidence, are questions for the
court; the weight or eﬁect to be given to the evidence is a
question for the consideration of the jury.”
When evidence is submitted to a jury, as being on a certain
point, it is for them and not for the court to determine whether
it tends to establish that point or not. Whether. it does so, in
a general rule, the question

dence,

their opinion, may depend not alone upon that particular item
1—Phii.

H.,

Edwards’
Kimball,
It is the province of
16
the court to determine whether a wit
is competent; but
ness or his evidence
de
the question of competency
when
pends upon a disputed fact, the ques
tion of fact may be left to the jury.
Thus, it is not competent to require
an attorney to disclose communications
made to him by a client in relation
to the aii'airs of the client, and the
of the attorney to testify
competency
as to those matters is to be determined
Hartford Ins. Co., v.
by the court:
Reynolds, 36 Mich.. 502.
2—Crane v. Litchﬁeld, 2 Mich., 340,
344, Sehright v. Moore, 33 Mich., 92;
The
Hayes v. Homer, 36 Mich.. 374.
is a question
materiality of evidence
of law. to be decided by the court:
People v. Hurst, 41 Mich., 331; 1 N.
W., 1097.
And in trials without a
jury the credibility and suﬂiciency of
the testimony must also be determined
Edwards v. Nelson, 51
by the court:
Mich., 121; 16 N. W., 261; Hyler v.
Ev.,

1-6;
pp.
1\iich., 211.

notes,

C.

Kimball

&.

v.

Nolan, 45 Mich., 357; 7 N. W., 910;
Butts v. Davis, 50 Mich., 310; 15
N. W. 486.
But in jury trials the
weight and eifect of the evidence
is
tor them to decide:
Winchester v.
King, 48 Mich., 280; 12 N. W., 220.
At the old common law all questions
of admissibility
of evidence
were for
the decision of the court rather than
the jury, though the court's decision
involved the determination oi’ intricate
questions of fact.
This rule has been
modiﬁed in many jurisdictions.
allow
ing the court to submit the preliminary
upon the question of admis
evidence
sibility to the jury with instructions
to consider or reject the questionable
according as they ﬁnd one
evidence
way or the other upon the preliminary
evidence:
Hartford Ins. Co. v. Rey
nolds, 36 Mich., 406; People v. Barker,
60 Mich.. 277; 27 N. W., 530: People
v. Swetland, 77 Mich., 53; 43 N. W.,
779: People v. Howes, 81 Mich., 396;
cases
45 N. W., 961, are illustrative
in Michigan.
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of evidence, but upon that evidence considered in relation to
the other evidence in the case, which may tend to qualify or
explain it.3 And so, if there is conﬂicting testimony.‘
When testimony is once before the jury, the credibility of
every portion of it is for them to determine, and there is said
to be no positive rule which entirely excludes the evidence of
a witness from consideration on account of his willful false
hood as to some portions of it. Such disregard of his oath is
enough to justify the
belief\that the witness is capable of any
amount of falsiﬁcation, and to make it no more than prudent
to regard all he says with strong suspicion, and to place no
reliance

on his mere statements; but where corroborated by
proofs or circumstances, the jury may give it such credit as
it may appear to deserve.“
,

§439. Religious opinions do not disqualify.-“No person
shall be rendered incompetent to be a ‘witness on account of
his opinions on matters of religious belief.”°
This refers only to the competency, and not to the credi
bility of the witness.’
But by statute, “No person shall be
deemed incompetent as a witness, in any court, matter or pro
ceeding, on account of his opinions on the subject of religion;
nor shall any witness be questioned in relation to his opinions
thereon, either before or after he shall be sworn/'8 Under this
section it is incompetent to question a witness in reference to
his opinions or belief upon the subject of religion, or in the
existence of a Supreme Being, for the purpose of impairing
his credibility; and if such questions are put and answered,
3—Perrott v. Shearer, 17 Mich., 54;
14
Chandler,
v.
and see, Edwards
Mich., 472.
v. Grand Trunk R. W.
4—~Brooke
Co., 15 Mich., 332.
5-Knowles v. People, 15 Mich., 412.
All considerations concerning the credit
due
to witnesses are for the jury:
Elliott v. Van Buren, 33 Mich., 49.
Juries are not hound to give credit
though
unim
testimony,
to
sworn
peached, it they do not in tact believe
Durant v. People, 13
it to be true:
Mich., 556.
And the testimony of a
witness, so far as his statements are
incredible, ought to be disregarded.
Em
whether he is impeached or not:

law v. Emlaw, 20 Mich., 11.
There
is no rule of law which excludes from
the consideration oi‘ the jury the un~
corroborated statement of a witness
who admits that he had perjured him
self on a former trial.
But his credi
bility under such circumstances is
exclusively for the jury, and there is
no rule of law which prevents them
from giving credit to such a witness
if they, in fact, do believe him: Fisher
v. People. 20 Mich., 135; Elliott v.
Van Buren. 33 Mich., 49: llamilton v.
People,
29 Mich., 173.
6—Const.. Mich., Art. VL, § 34.
7-—l’eople
v. Jenness, 5 Mich., 305.
8—C. L., Q 10207.
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witness cannot be impeached by proof of former
the
sistent statements which he denies having made.”

§ 440

incon

Husband and wife, competency of.-“VA husband
§440.
shall not be examined as a witness for or againsthis wife
without her consent; ,nor a wife fOr or against her husband

without his consent, except i11 cases where the cause of action
grows out of a. personal wrong or injury done by one to the
other, or grows out of the refusal or neglect to furnish the
wife or children with suitable support within the meaning of
act number one hundred and thirty-six of the session laws of
eighteen hundred and eighty-three, and except in cases where
the husband or wife shall be a party to the record in a suit,
action or proceeding, where the title to the separate property
of the husband or wife so called or offered as a witness, or
where the title to property derived from, through or under
the husband or wife so called or oifered as a witness, shall be
the subject matter in controversy or litigation in such suit,
action, or proceeding, in opposition to the claim or interest of
the other of said married persons, who is a party to the record
in such suit, action, or proceeding; and in all such cases, such
husband or wife who makes such claim‘ of title, or under or
from whom such title is derived, shall be as competent to
testify in relation to said separate property and the title there
to, without the consent of said husband or wife, who is a party
to the record in such suit, action or proceeding as though such
marriage relation did not exist; nor shall either, during the
marriage or afterwards, Without the consent of both, be ex
amined as to any communication

made by one to the other

during the marriage, but in any action or proceeding instituted
by the husband or wife, in consequence of adultery, the hus
band and wife shall not be competent to testify.”1°
9—Peopie

v.

Jenness,

5

Mich.,

305,

entirely

free to give or withhold con
Such testimony cannot be given
even in favor of the other, without
Perry v. Lovejoy, 49
such
consent:
Mich.. 529; 14 N. W., 485.
The rule
that a husband may not testify against
his wife without her consent,
cannot
be waived in her absence by the mere
omision 01.’ her attorney to object to
the testimony:
Hubbeii v. Grant, 39
Mich., 641.
But where a wife sued
sent.

319.

10—C. L., § 10218, as amended by
Laws of 1885, voi. 1, p. 288; see, Her
rick v. Odell, 29 Mich., 47. The com
mon law rule that one oi’ the married
parties cannot testify for or against
the other. has been so tar modiﬁed by
this statute as to permit one of them
to so testify in case of the consent
of the other, but leaving the latter
‘

437
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giving evidence in
by reason of mari

any matter, civil or criminal
tal or other relationship to any party thereto.”11
The common law reasons for the incompetency of husband
and wife to testify for or against each other, were in part their
legal identity of person and interest, but principally, as a ques
tion of social policy, to preserve domestic quiet and the peace
and harmony of families.
This common law disability, grow
ing out of the marital relation, has (subject to certain speci
ﬁcations), been removed by the statute."
I
The statute, in changing the common law rule, concerning
the testimonial incapacities of husband and wife, has not made
them competent witnesses for or against each other without
restriction, but has prohibited either from testifying without
the consent of the other ;‘3 and from divulging mutual conﬁ
dences without mutual consent. The right of the one to call
ﬁrm in which her husband was a
partner, making him one of the de
fendants, and he being in court at the
time when she testiﬁed in her own be
half, and making no objection thereto,
it was held that his consent was pre
sumed: Benson v. Morgan, 50 Mich..
A wife's admis
77; 14 N. W., 705.
of
to acts
sions,
unless conﬁned
cannot he used against her
agency,
husband except where there are res
gestac and admissible as acts, and not
as relations of facts: Rose v. Chapman,
44 liilch., 312; 6 N. W., 681. By this
statute in using the term "communica
tion" in the last paragraph uses it in
communi
the senseof the “conﬁdential
cation" of the common law; and com
munications not of this character are not
within the statute: iiagerman v. Wi
gent, 108 Mlch., 192; 65 N. W., 756;
Ward v. Oliver, 129 Mich., 300; 88
Husband and wife are
N. W., 631.
competent to testify in a suit between
respecting a business transac
them,
tion, without the consent of each oth
er: Dowiing v. Dowiing, 116 Mich.,
The wife is a
346; 74 N. W., 523.
witness against the husband
competent
in a. prosecution under C. L.. 5 5923,
People v.
failure to support:
for
Malsch, 119 Mich., 112; 77 N. W.,
But in an action against the
638.
husband to recover for support furn
a

ished the wife, the wife is not a com
petent witness against her husband:
Mich., 687;
Travis v. Stevens,
127
87 N. W., 85.
The ﬁrst paragraph
of this statute applies only during
coverture.
The coverture broken by
death of one, the bar of this clause as
to the other is released:
Ward v.
Oliver, 129 Mich., 300; 88 N. W., 631.
Not so as to last clause:
Derham v.
Derham, 125 Mich., 109; 83 N. W.,
1005.
For other cases under this
statute, see note to Rice v. Rice, 104
Mich., 382; 62 N. W., 833, where
many of the Michigan cases are col
lected.
See. also, People v. Isham,
105) Mich., 72; 67 N. W., 819; Mc
Kenzie v. Lautenschiager,
113 Mich.,
171: 71 N. W., 489; Wood v. Lentz,
116 Mich., 275; 74 N. W., 462; Whelp
ley v. Stoughton, 119 Mich., 314; 78
See, also, the notes
N. W., 137.
to
C.

L., I 10213.
11——C. L., I 10210.

This does not
obviate the necessity of gaining the
consent required by C. L.. 5 10213;
People v. Gordon, 100 Mich., 518:
W., 322; People v. Iiall, 48
50 N.
!\ilch.. 490: 12 N. W., 665: People v.
Maunausau, 60 Mich., 21; 26 N. W.,
797.

12—Grimm

v. People. 14 Mich.,

13——Except

in cases

the statute:
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in his or her behalf is a privilege ac
corded to them, to be used or not, solely at their option. If
either is upon trial, the omission to call the other as a witness
in his or her behalf, raises no unfavorable presumption against
the accused party; nor can such omission be commented on
before the jury. If such omission is to be treated as warrant
ing the conclusion that his or her testimony would be adverse,
then the privilege is entirely destroyed, and the other will
The law, in permitting hus
have to be called at all events.
bands and wives to testify on behalf of each other, cannot have
contemplated that any moral coercion should enable others to
force them into the witness box.“
Although neither husband nor wife may be examined as to
any communication made by one to the other during marriage,
without the consent of both, yet, what a person is overheard
to say to his wife may be used in evidence against him." It is
only where there is a valid marriage that the parties are
excluded from testifying against each other."
In case of pe-rsonal violence, however, committed by the
husband or wife against each other, the injured party is said to
be a competent witness against the other to prove such vio
lence." As, where the husband commits an assault and bat
tery on the wife.“
the other as a witness

§441. Infants as witnesses.-—No particular age is required
in practice under the common law to render the evidence of
a. child admissible.
The competency of children is regulated
not by their age, but by the degree of understanding which
they appear to possess. A child of any age, if capable of dis
tinguishing between good and evil, may be examined on oath,
and a child of whatever age cannot be examined unless sworn."
In a trial for murder,'a child of seven years of age was
14—Knowles

v.

People,

15

Mich.,

4-08, 413.

15—R. v. Slmm, 25 E. C. L., 532;
& P., 510.
16—Ros. C. R. Ev.. 148; Coleman
v. State, 14 Mo., 157; see, Dixon v.
People. 18 Mich., 84.
17—1 Whart. Am. Cr. Law, § 669; 2
Russell on Cr., 6 Am. ed., 984: State
v. Davis, 3 Brevard, 3; R. v. Pearce,
6 C.

9 C. & P., 295, 667: People v. Sebring,
66 Mich., 705; 33 N. W., S08.
18—Souie's Case, 5 Greenleaf R.,
407; see, People v. Sebrlng, 66 Mich.,

705; 83 N. W., 808; C. L., § 10213.
19—1 Greeni. Ev., § 367: State v.
Whittier, 21 Maine, 341.
But see, C.
L., 5 10205, referred to post in this
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of his credibil

ity, the court say, was for the jury.”
By Act 82, Pub. Acts, 1887, C. L., § 10215, the rule of the
common law was changed and the testimony of children under
ten years of age may be taken without oath on a promise
to tell the truth.
The statute was enacted following the
decision of Hughes v. Detroit, G H. & M. Ry. Co., 65 Mich.,

“Whenever a child
14; 31 N. W., 603, and is as follows:
under the age of ten years is produced as a witness, the court
shall by an examination made by itself publicly, or separate
and apart, ascertain to its own satisfaction whether such child
has suiﬁcient intelligence and sense of obligation to tell the
truth, to be safely admitted to test-ify; and in such case such
testimony may be given on a promise to tell the truth instead
of upon oath or statutory afﬁrmation, and shall be given such
credit as to the court or jury, if there be a jury, it may appear
The discretion of the trial court in permitting
to deserve.”
the child to testify without being sworn‘ will not be reviewed
unless abused?‘
as witnesses.-A person who
is deaf and dumb merely, if he has the use of his understand
ing, is not an incompetent witness, and he may give evidence
But when the Witness can
by signs, through an interpreter.‘
write, it seems, it would be a. more certain mode to make
him write his answers to the questions put to him?
He
should be examinedithrough
the medium he can best under
§

442.

Deaf and dumb persons

stand?
Persons intoxicated, as witnesses.—A person in a
§4-13.
state of intoxication is not a competent Witness, “And every
20—Washburn v. -People, 10 Mich.,
386; R. v. Williams, 7 C. & P., 320.
It is not perceived why an infant is
not a competent witness as well as an
adult, so far as relates to “opinions
on the subject of religion," nor why
he is liable to “be questioned in rela
tion to his opinions thereon" any more
The statute has no
than an adult.
exception of that kind: See, C. L.,
Com. v. Mullens. 2 Allen,295.
§ 10207.
It has been held that a child between six
and seven years of age may be properly
examined
as a witness in a criminal
case,
if the court is fully satisﬁed

that the child is conscious of the duty
to speak the truth, and it the Jury is
properly cautioned as to its
state
ments:
McGuire v. People, 44 Mich.,
286; 6 N. W., 669.
21-People v. Walker, 113 Mich.,
367; 71 N. W., 641; People v. Beech,
129 Mich., 622; 89 N. W., 363.
1—R. v. Huston, 1 Leach, 408; Sny
der v. Nations, 5 Blackf., 295; Com
monwealth v. Hill, 14 Mass, 207:
State v. De Wolf, 8 Conn., 93.
2-Morrison v. Leonard. 3 C. & P., 127.
3—Morrison v‘. Leonard, 3 C. & P.,12T.
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it,

court must necessarily have the power to decide, from their
own view, the situation of the witness offered, whether he be
intoxicated to such a degree as that he ought not to be heard.”4
It would seem, however, where the issue requires
the court
will adjourn the case to enable the testimony of the witness
to be secured.“

is

it

is

a

a

is

Idiots and lunatics as witnesses.—Lunatics
may be
§444.
witnesses in their lucid intervals; idiots or insane persons
for
cannot.
When
lunatic
tendered as
witness,
of compe
the judge to examine and ascertain whether he

is

if

is,

is

tent understanding to give evidence, and
aware of the nature
and obligations of an oath;
that
he
he should
satisﬁed
If such persons are offered as wit
be sworn and examined.“
admissible to show their incompetency.’
nesses, evidence

in

acter,

the course

of

a

to, privi1eged.—“No
Glergymen, communications
§445.
minister of the gospel, or priest of any denomination whatso
ever, shall be allowed to disclose any confessionmade to him
in his professional character, in the course of discipline en
joined by the rules of practice of such denomination.”3
But
minister in his professional char
admissions not made to
discipline enjoined by his church, would

be admissible.”

surgeon.”1°
16
'

Wharton‘s Cr. Law,
Cr. Pr.
Pl..
&

6-Archboid

492.
7——Livlngston

v.

Kicrsted.

10

Johns.
753.

(151),

John.,

L..

5

3

362.
8-—-C.

conﬁdence: Grand Rapids
Ry. Co.
v. Martin.
41 Mlch., 671;
N. W.,
173; People v. De France, 104 Mlcl:|.,
Where the rela
5702 62 N. W., 709.
tion is such that no conﬁdence is re
posed
the statute is not applicable:
Scripps v. Foster, 41 Mich., 742;
N. W., 216; Briesenmeister v. Knights
of Pythlas, 81 Mlcb., 531: 45 N. W.,
977: People v. Glover. 71 Mleh.. 307;
It should not be un
38 N. W.. 874.
derstood that the patient must deter

I.

Palmer,

5

5-1

v.

3

4—Harttord
143.

&

as

a

U/J

communications
to, privileg-ed.—“No
446.
Physicians,
person duly authorized to practice physic or surgery shall be
allowed to disclose any information which he may have ac
quired in attending any patient, in his professional character,
and which information was necessary to enable _him to pre
scribe for such patient as a physician, or to do any act for him

10180.

5

9—People v. Gates, 13 Wend., 311.
The object oi.’
10181.
10-C. I...
the statute is tn enable persons to se
cure medicai aid without betrayal of
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A

physician, consulted by a person who had seduced a
female,_as to the means of procuring an abortion, is not by this
'
section privileged from testifying."
communications to, privileged.—Where
Attorneys,
§447.
an attorney is consulted on business within the scope of his
profession, the communications between him and his client are
strictly conﬁdential, and the attorney should not be required,
by any judicial tribunal to divulge
them
against his client, if the latter object to the evidence." And
if a communication should be made to an attorney in fact by

nor permitted,

a party, under an impression that such attorney

had consented
or agreed to act as the attorney of such party, such com
munication would be privileged, although the attorney himself
may not have so understood the agreement. But to make the
communication a privileged one, either in that case or where
mine at his peril whether the infor
mation he gives is necessary to enable
the physician to give him medical aid.
it is enough if the communication is
made in good faith supposing it use
See, Briesen
ful for that purpose:
melster v. Knights of Pythias, supra.
A dentist is not within the provisions
of the act: People v. De France, 104
Mlch., 563; 62 N. W., 709.
It was
held in Brown v. Insurance Co., 65
Mlch., 306; 32 N. W., 610; 8 Am. St.
Rep., 894, that a physician might tes-.
tify as what the disease was for which
In Jones
he had treated a patient.
Y. Life Assurance Co., 120 Mlch., 211;
79 N. W., 204, the decision in the
Brown case was limited to that par
ticular casc. and it was held in this,
physican
the
Jones case, that
the
could not disclose for what he had
To the same ef
treated his patient.
fect: Lammiman v. Detroit C. S. Ry.
Co., 112 Mlch., 602; 71 N. WI. 153;
Rose v. Supreme C. 0. of P., 126 Mlch.,
577; 85 N. W.. 1073.
It is not com
petent for a physician or surgeon to
testify to facts which have been com
munlcated to him for the purpose of
enabling him to perform his profes
sional duty, or which in any way came
or were brought to his knowledge for
Briggs v. Briggs, 20
that purpose:
Mlch., 34. 41.
But the statute does not preclude

a physician

from testifying to informa
tion acquired in attending a patient
in his professional character, unless
it appears that such information was
necessary to enable him to prescribe
for such patient as a physician, or
to do some act for him as a surgeon.
The common
law gives no privilege
from testifying in such cases:
Cam
pan v. North, 39 Mlch., 506; People
v. Cole, 113 Mlch., 83; 71 N. W., 455.
A physician has no right to publish
matters of professional confidence with
out the consent of the patient:
Sull
ings v. Shakespeare, 46 Mlch., 408; 9
N. W., 451.
The rule prohibiting physicians from
disclosing information obtained in at
tending patients is a privilege belong
ing to the patient and continues in
deﬁnitely, and can be waived liy no
one but the patient himself:
Storrs
V. Scougale, 48 Mlch., 386, 395; 12 N.
W., 502; see, Page v. Page, 51 Mlch.,
88; 16 N. W., 245.
But it may be
waived by the patient. or by those
who represent his interests after his
decease: Fraser v. Jennison, 42 Mlch.,
206:

3 N. W.. 882.
See, also, Dotton v. Albion, 57 Mlch.,
577; 24'N. W., 788, and cases cited.

11—Hewitt

v. Prince,

31 Wend., 79.

12—1 Greenl. Ev., 5 237; Jenkinson
v. State, 5 Blackf., 465.
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the relation of attorney and client exists, it must have been
made to the attorney by the party or client as his legal adviser,
and for the purpose of obtaining his legal advice or opinion
The privilege
relative to some legal right or obligation,"
extends to information derived from the client by oral com
munications, or from books or papers shown to him by his
But it does not extend to
client, or placed in his hand.“

information derived from other sources or other parties, al
The
though obtained while acting as counsel‘ or attorney.“
client
which
the
protection extends‘ to every communication
makes to his legal adviser for the purpose of professional ad
Nor
vice or aid, upon the subject of his rights and liabilities.
is it necessary that any judicial proceedings should have been
commenced or contemplated; it is enough if the matter in
hand may by possibility become the subject of judicial in
quiry." The rule extends to counselors, attorneys, interpret
ers, and the clerks of attorneys and counselors, acting as
such ;" and the general rule must be observed, notwithstand
ing no fee was asked or expected by the counsel.“ But a
person in no way connected with the attorney or counsel,
present at a communication made to him by a client, may be
And communications made while seek
required to testify."
ing legal advice from

student at law in an attorney ’s oﬂice,
or clerk of the attorney for the pur

a

he not being the agent
pose,

are said not to be protected?"

Conﬁdential communications between attorney and client are
not to be revealed at any period of time, nor in actions between
third parties, nor after the proceedings to which they referred
are at an end, nor after the dismissal of the attorney.
The
privilege that the attorney shall not be examined upon such
points as have been communicated to him in his professional
capacity, is the privilege of the client and not of the attorney,
and

it never ceases.”

13—Alderman
414,

422.

'

v.

People,
‘

The\privilege, however,
4

Mich.,

v. Berger. 11 Paige, 377.
15———Crosby v. Berger, 11 Paige. 377.
16—-1 Green]. Ev., § 240.
17--Jackson v. French, 3 Wend.,

18—March
R., 35.

14—Crosby

337; Taylor v. Foster. 2 C. & P., 195;
1 Greeni. Ev., 5 239.
_

19——.lackson

v.

is personal to

Ludlam,
v.

3 Sandt.

French,

3

Ch.

Wend.,

337.

20—Barnes v. Harris, 7 Cush., 576,
578; Holman v. Kimball, 22 Vt. 555.
21—1 Phil. Ev., C. H. & Edwards’
notes,
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the client, and if he consent that the attorney may be exam
ined, it does not lie with a third person to object.”
It seems that this privilege is conﬁned to communications
having a lawful purpose. If a client conﬁde to an attorney a

criminal design, or the attorney be present when a public or
private wrong is done by the client, the knowledge thus ac
Thus, where a party sought pro
quired is not privileged.“
fessional advice or assistance to enable him to forge a. contract,
it was held that an attorney may testify to any communica
tion made to him to obtain professional advice or assistance
as to the commission of a felony or any other crime which is a
mal-um in so.“
22—Merle v. Moore, 2 C. & I'., 275;
Benjamin v. Coventry, 19 Wend.. 353.
The privilege is personal to the client,
Iiamiiton v.
and he may waive it:
But disclosures
People, 29 Mlch., 172.
to an attorney made in the presence
of an outside party, are not privileged.
And if the client has himself testified
to his communications to his attorney,
it seem this may operate as a waiver
Hartford Ins. Co., v.
to that extent:
Communi
Reynolds, 36 Mlch., 502.
cations made by one who has em
ployed the attorney on behalf of an
of that other
other in the presence
are not privileged in a suit between
the
two: Frank v. Moriey's Estate,
106 Mlch., 635; 64 N. W., 577.
The privilege of secrecy as to what
attorney and client.
between
passes
is the privilege of the client, and he
it does
may waive it if he chooses.
not prevent him from testifying to the
advice of his counsel, nor the counsel
from corroborating him: Passmore V.
1'assmore‘s estate, 50 Mlch., 626 : 16 N.
W., 170. An attorney acting as friendly
adviser of two persons. declining retain
er from either, or to have anything to do
with the matter if there was to be dith
cuity, is not an attorney in the sense
that communications between him -and
Evers v.
the parties are privileged:
White's Estate, 114 Mlch., 266; 72 N.
W., 184.
For other cases upon the
question of the privileged communica
tion between attorney and client, see,
Brinkerhoif
v. Peek, 114 Mlch., 628;
72 N. W., 621: Muske v. Pfenning's
Estate, 120 Mlch., 474; 79 N. W., 795:

Lorimer v. Lorimer, 124 Mlch., 631:
83 N. W., 609.
Whether an attorney
is a competent witness to impeach a
witness, who is not a party, but who
consulted the attorney, quacrc, Ford
v. Mcliane, 131 Mlch., 371; 91 N. W.,
617.

Matters of a public nature coming
to the knowledge of the prosecuting
attorney in his oﬂicial character. not
privileged:
Lange v. Perley, 47 Mlch.,
352; 11 N. W., 193.
Communications made to a prosecut
ing attorney by the complaining wit
ness in a criminal case for the purpose
of invoking his otiicial action, nre not
privileged so far as the witness is
concerned.
He is not the prosecutor's
client. and cannot control the use of
the
communications which are made
for the purpose of public justice: Peo
ple v. Davis, 52 Mlch., 569; 18 N. W.,
362.

23—Coventry
v. Tanahill,
1 Hill.
33; Bank of Utica v. Merserean, 3
Barb., Ch. R., 528.
2-i—l’eopie v. Blakely, 4 Parker
C.
R., 176.
Professional communications
are not privileged when they are for
an unlawful purpose, having for their
object the commission of crime. They
then partake of the nature of a con
spiracy, or attempted conspiracy. and
it is not only lawn! to divulge such
communications, but under certain cir
cumstances it might become the duty
of the attorney to do so. The interests
of public justice require that no such
shield from merited exposure shall be
interposed to protect a person who
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§448. When privileged from answering.—“ Any competent
witness in a cause shall not be excused from answering a ques
tion relevant to the matter in issue, on the groimd merely that
the a.nswer to such question may establish, or tend to establish,
that such witness owes a debt, or is otherwise subject to a civil
suit; but this provision shall not be construed to require a
a witness to give any answer which will have a tendency to
accuse himself of any crime or misdemeanor, or to expose him
to any penalty or forfeiture, nor in any respect to vary or alter
any other rule respecting the examination

of witnesses.”25

Examination of witnesses separately.—When
the
cause is called on, or at any time during its progress, the
court, at the request of either party, may order such of the
§

449.

witnesses as have not yet been examined, or who are not under
examination, to leave the court until they shall be called for in
their order, so that each witness may be .examined out'of the
hearing of other witnesses, who are to be examined after him.“
But an attorney in the cause, whose personal attendance in
court is necessary, though a witness in the cause, is excepted

from the order to withdraw.”
takes counsel how he can safely com
mit a crime. The relation of attorney
and client cannot exist for the purpose
The
of counsel in concocting crimes.
privilege does not exist in such cases:
People v. Van, Alstine, 57 Mich., 69;
23 N. W., 59-i, 598.
is
Provision
2-"3—C. L.,
I 10179.
made in C. L., 5 824, that either party
may, in all cases in justices‘ courts,
have the other sworn as a witness;
that if the plaintiff refuse to appear
or, being present.
on being subpoenaed,
refuse to swear, the case shall be dis
missed: and if the defendant refuse
or be
to appear on being subpoenaed,
ing present. refuse to swear, the plain
shall be taken as con
tiﬁ"s demand
fessed, no set-off allowed, and judgment
accordingly.
etc.
But since
entered
the enactment of this section, the legis
lature by act 125. laws of 1861. and
the amendments thereto
(see C. L.,
Ii 10210-10213). making parties com
petent as witnesses, have superseded.

I

and in effect repealed
the former 5
824; and by the latter ii 10210-10213,
have prescribed the only
rule
that
should govern as to the competency
and examination
of parties:
Good
erich v. Allen, 19 Mich., 250.
Parties
are now to be subpoenaed
and ex
amined iike other witnesses, and with
the same effect:
Ib£d.;
Roberts
v.
Mills, 12 .\iich., 305.
26-Southey v. Nash, 7 C. dz P.,
632; Commonwealth v. Knapp, 9iPick.,
495, 499; 1 Greenieaf's Ev., 5 432.
27—Everett v. Lowdham, 5 C. dz P.,
91; Pomeroy v. Badderiy, Ry. 8: M.,
430.
And so it is ordinarily,
with
experts and witnesses called as to
character: 1 Gr. Ev., § 432, n. 2. The
question of the segregation of wit
nesses is ieft entirely to the discretion
of the trial court and its exercise will
not be reviewed except for abuse? Peo
ple v. Burns, 67 Mich., 537; 35 N. W.,
154.
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If, after such an order, the witness do not withdraw, or if he
afterwards comes into court and be present during the exam
ination of some other witness, it is discretionary with the court
whether it will allow him to be examined or not."
Interpret!->rs.—Persons incapable of speaking the
§4=50.
English language must be sworn and examined through an
interpreter?” A deaf and dumb person may be sworn and
examined by means of signs and tokens; but when the witness
can write, it would be better to make him write his answers
The interpreter is sworn truly to
to the questions put ‘to him.
interpret between the court, the jury, the attorneys, and the
witness in the cause; the oath is then administered to the wit
ness in English, and interpreted to him by the sworn inter
The exam
preter, as it is pronounced by the court or clerk.
ination then proceeds in the same manner.
The interpreter should use care to translate the language
It is not proper for the
used by the witness into English.

interpreter to put his conclusion as to what the witness means
into English. He should give what the witness says and let
the

jury determine what

'

he means.

is,

Examination in chief—the leading question.--Upon
§451.
the examination of a witness in chief, the questions should
relate to the matter in issue. He should, in general, be exam
ined only upon matters of fact within his own knowledge.
It is a general rule that the direct examiner is not entitled to
by putting questions in
examine by leading questions; that

it

is

is

such form as to suggest to the witness the answer desired.
the rule, and under some circumstances viola.
While such
are clearly reprehensible, yet there
danger that
tions of
too much be made of the rule, which has its exceptions.
6

Blng.,
28—f‘arker v. Mcwilllams,
But the right to exclude the tes
Gr. Ev.,
timony is rarely exercised:
432; People v. Piper, 112 Mlch.,
Unless the party
644; 71 N. W., 174.
is, is in some way re
whose witness
sponsible tor the failure to obey the
order of the court, the witness should
That would be to
never be excluded.
The punishmept
punish the party.
should he of the witness for contempt.
29—It is not error to allow the next
it

5

1

683.

friend of an infant party to act as in
terpreter for a witness who cannot
speak the English language.
But this
should not be permitted except
for
satisfactory
reasons,
and whether it
shall be allowed in any particular case,
rests in the discretion of the court:
Swift v. Applebone, 23 Mlch., 252.
Jurors cannot he allowed to interpret
Lendberg v. Brother
for witnesses:
ton Iron M. Co., 75 Mlch., 84; 42 N.
W., 675.
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There is no real objection to the use of the leading question
As
except as to matter where there is a real controversy.
to all introductory matter and all matters, which, though
there is no real controversy concerning them, yet must be
proved, the use of the leading question is rather to be encour
Its use enables the examiner to get
aged than discouraged.
at once to the material matters and thus save much time of the
The use of the leading question under the limitations
suggested is in the direction of trying the real matters in
dispute and eliminating controversies over matters about which
Like many other questions con
there is no real question.
the
nected with
examination of witnesses, this one of the use
court.

is quite largely one for the trial court’s
to be exercised in the interest of the reasonable
dispatch of public business while protecting litigants against
the testimony of the examiner when it should come from the

of leading questions
discretion

witness.3°

In
be

will allow leading questions to
put upon an examination in chief, where it evidently ap
some instances the court

a

is

a

is

if

it,

pears that the witness wishes to conceal the truth, or to
favor the opposite party.“ Thus, a party ’s own witness, who
having given one account of the matter, when called on the
trial gives a different account, may be asked by the party
calling him whether he had given such account, stating
to
And
witness
in
hostile, or
the attorney.
situation
which of necessity makes him adverse to the party calling him,
counsel may, by permission of the court, examine him after the
manner of a cross-examination, asking him leading questions.
And where from the nature ofpthe case, the mind of the wit
ness cannot be directed to the subject of the inquiry, without

1

on

is a question entirely within the dis
cretion of the trial court: Fowler v.
Fowler, 111 Mich., 676; 70 N. W.,
336; Webb v. Feather's Estate, 119
Mich., 473; 78 N. W., 550; Bellows
v. Crane L. Co., 119 Mich., 424; 78
N. W., 536.
31—It is in the discretion of the
judge at the trial to permit
leading
question to be put to one's own wit
ness, when he is reluctant and hostile
to the party calling him, or where he
has exhausted his memory,
without

447

a

following
are illustrative
the subject ot the leading
People, 11
Morrissey
v.
question:
Mich., 327; McKeown v. Harvey, 40
Mich.,
226;
Bullard v. Hascall, 25
57
Mich.. 132; Hart v. Brockway,
Mich., 189: 23 N. W., 725: People v.
Jensen, 66 Mich., 711; 33 N. W., 811.
That a ruling on the leading ques
see,
tion is not subject to review.
Campau V. Brown, 48 Mich., 145; 11
N. W., 845; and Lyon v. Chamber
lain, 41 Mich., 119;
N. W., 983, but
30—'l‘he

cases
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a

is

is

is

it,

called to contra
a particular speciﬁcation of
as when he
dict another as to the contents of a letter which
lost, and
cannot, without suggestion, recollect the contents, the particu
witness
lar passage may be suggested to him. So, where
called to contradict
former witness, who has stated that cer
is

is

to

it

tain expressions were used, or such things were said,
usual
ask whether those particular expressions were used, or such
and such things were said, without putting the question in the
The examiner
general form, by inquiring what was said."
entitled to answers which are responsive and may rightfully
refuse to accept such as are not."
a

a

is

a

a

it

§

a

is

452. Reasons for recollection.—-When
in
disputed fact
witness to state as
reason for
competent for
question,
his recollection any circumstances occurring at the same time,
tendency to ﬁx the occurrence upon his mind.
which had
The value of his recollection will depend entirely upon the
degree of attention with which he observed the facts, and the
reasons which operated on his mind to excite that attention
And also, if, immediately
and ﬁx the facts in his memory.“
after the occurrence, an eye witness has the subject especially
manner as particularly to
brought to his attention in such
is

it

it

it

competent for him to state
upon his memory,
impress
the circumstances then occurring, which tended to make his
would otherwise have been,
recollection more distinct than
although those matters would not be as important as circum

5

1

is

N. W., 207; McCreery v. Green.
Mich., 172; Shaver v. Ingham, 58
Mich., 649; 26 N. W., 162.
If the
answer given would be admissible if
responsive, the objection that it is not
responsive can only be made by the ex
aminer:
Hamilton v. People, 29 Mich.,
173; Merkie v. Bennington, 58 Mich.,
157; 24 N. W., 776.
34-—Detroit
Milwaukee Ry. Co. v.
Steinberg. 17 Mich., 107; Angeil_ v.
Rosenbury, 12 Mich., 257.
"He should
therefore be allowed to state any facts
which had that etfect, whether rele
vant to the issue or not :" Ibfd.; Angeli
v.~Rosenbury, 12 Mich., 257: Grenell
v. Michigan
C. Ry. Co.,
124
Mlch..
141: 82 N. W., 843; Burt v. Long, 106
Mich., 210; 64 N. W.. 60.
26
38

448

&

a

a

stating the particular required; where
it is a proper name. or other fact
which cannot be signiﬁcantly pointed
or
interrogatory;
general
to by
where the witness is a child of tender
years, whose attention can be called
pointed or
to the matter only by
loading question: Moody v. Rowell, 17
Pick., 498: McBride v. Wallace, 62
A witness
Mich., 451; 29 N. W., 75.
cannot he examined as an unfriendly
made to appear that
witness until it
he is such: People v. Lyons, 51 Mich.,
See, also, Gil
215; 16 N. W., 380.
Co.,
116
Ry.
(7.
bert v. Michigan
Mich., 610: 74 N. W., 1010.
Ev., 167-8;
Gr. Ev.,
32~—Starkie's
see, Beauhien v. Clcotte, 12
435:
Mich., 4R7-8.
33—People v. Coifman, 59 Mich., 1:
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which called his attention to the subject at the time

of the occurrence; yet, as aﬂecting the credibility of his recol
But in
lection, they might still have an important bearing.
giving such reasons, the witness cannot be allowed to intro
duce hearsay before the jury, as, by stating what bystanders
afterwards about the occurrence ;35 or to relate his own
conversations reﬂecting on the motives of another witness.“
stated

a

is

a

if,

§453. Refreshing recollection.-Where a witness’s memory
is at fault, he may, even ‘during examination, read, or, if
necessary, hear the contents of a document read, for the pur
And
by that
pose of reviving his former recollection.
recollection of the facts ‘themselves as dis
means, he obtains
admissible in
tinct from the memorandum, his statement
to
refresh
a
witness’s
in
order
recollection,
evidence.-*7 ,Thus,
former
his attention may be called to his testimony on

1

4

1

491.
Barb.,
Benson,
v.
37—-—Butler
Ev.,
Loud.
Stark.
535;
526,
ed., 177.
And he may be required to

a

a

look at memoranda or papers within his
power, to aid his recollection: Chapln
It is not
v. Lapham, 20 Plck., 467.
necessary that the memorandum should
be read to the Jury: Raynor v. Nor
But the opposite
ton, 31 Mich., 210.
party has a right to examine the pa
memoranda
per to see if it is such
as would be likely to refresh the mem
ory of the witness as to the matter
Duncan
about which he is testifying:
And where
v. Seeiey. 34 Mich., 369.
plaintiff testifying, was allowed to
in
ﬂied
take his bill of particulars
the case and to answer the question
whether the list of articles therein
given was a correct list of those sold
by him to the defendant, held com
petent:
Cool v. Snover, 88 Mich.,
v. Comstock, 50
See, Hudnutt
562.
.\iich., 506: 16 N. W., 157.
3B—Beauhien v. Cicotte, 12 Mich.,
An attorney testifying, may, for
486.
29

the purpose of proving

what a witness
testiﬁed to on
former trial, read
the minutes taken by himself of the
testimony elven by the witness on that
trial. if he can testify that he knew
at the time that the minutes were cor
rectiy taken: Fisher v. Kyle, 27 Mich.,
454.
it is improper to hand to wit
nesses copy of their testimony taken
trial, and after allowing
on former
them to read it then to examine them
as to matters involved in such testi
mony: Lorimer v. Lorimer, 124 Mich.,
631; 83 N. W., 609.
It is not error
to refuse to allow a witness to read
her testimony given on a former trial
being
before
called upon to testify:
Vosburg v. Brown, 119 Mich., 697;
78 N. W., 886.
Crane Lumber Co. v.
Bellows, 116 Mich., 304; 74 N. W.,
481, is a case where it was held that
books and papers made in the general
course of business under the super
vision of the witness might be used
his
recollection.
by him to refresh
See, Halsey v. Sinesbaugh, 15 N. Y.,
As to whether a witness may
486.
read to the jury from a paper he
knows to be correct, for the purpose
of refreshing his recollection, although

449

a

Milwaukee Ry. Co. v.
Mich., 107, 108.
Mich.,
v. Cicotte,

17

4

35-—Detrolt
Van Steinberg,
36—McBrlde

&

a

trial, and counsel’s minutes of the former testimony may be
referred to and read for that purpose.”
witness has no present recollection of a.
And even where
fact, he may testify from a paper which he recognizes and
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remembers to have seen when the fact was fresh in his mem
ory, and which he then knew. to contain a correct statement
of such fact.”

And

witness may sometimes testify from a memorandum,
he neither recollects the fact or the writing, if the
writing is such as to enable him to state with certainty that it
would not have been made, had not the fact in question been
Such cases may occur, where a subscribing witness is
true.
a

although

called to prove the execution of a written instrument, of which
he has no present recollection, but is certain he saw it executed
from seeing his signature to the attestation, and he may speak
in like manner from memorandum and entry-books.“
The

it

s

174.

5
0

4

a

A witness may refresh his recollec
tion from memoranda copied from his
notwithstanding
entries
the
hooks,
therein are not in his own handwrit
ing, if he has a recollection ot the
facts and knows the entries to be cor
rect: Cameron v. Blsckman, 39 Mich.,
witness testlﬁes that he
Where
108.
has a complete recollection of the facts,
it is no ground of objection that the
memorandum used to refresh his mem
ory was not taken from his own en
tries: Ibld. It is apparent that there
are two conditions. quite distinct from
each other. involved in this discussion
We
of the subject of recollection.
have ﬁrst the case of really stimulat
ing recollection, so that the witness
as he testities actually brings back

4

41-A witness may refresh his rec
ollection by :1 paper purporting to be
written by his agent, and which he
and the
has acted on as authentic;
handwriting need not be proved: Wat
kins v. Wallace, 19 Mich., 57.

a

1

&

B

8

4

4

ed., 177.
39-1 Starkie's Ev.,
Lond. ed., 178;
40—Starkic's Ev.,
Plck., 1-13; Maug
Russell v. Collin,
C., 14;
B.
ham
v. Hubbard,
Greeni. Ev., §§ 436, 437.

:

486.

to his mind the fact or occurrence and
testiﬂes to what he now is able to
recall about it.
In the second condi
tion, by no effort of any sort, by the
witness himself, or through the sug
gesiions of others, is he able to recall
the fact or transaction and yet he may
be able to say with great positiveness
that the fact does exist, or the trans
action did occur. The seeing of one's
name in one’s own handwriting
as an
attesting witness on an old deed or
conveyance
is
common
illustration.
This last is really not a case of re
freshing recollection at ail.
It isn't
refreshed.
In the first condition
matters not so much that the memo
randum used be the memorandum of
the witness if it really has such
re
lation to the transaction and to the
knowledge really possessed by the wit
ness, as that it would naturally recall
to his mind. In such case it would
be competent to use it though not actu
ally made by him Besubien v. Cicotte.
12 Mich., 459; Watkins v. Wallace, 19
Mich., 57; Cameron v. Blackman, 39
Mich., 108; i-Iudnutt v. Comstock, 50
Mich., 596: 16 N. W., 157.
In the second condition it 1's appli
ent that the witness should not be per
mitted to testify from
memorandum
which he does not personally know to
he true.
42-1 Starkie's Ev.,
Loud. ‘ed.,

it

recently copied by him from originals
See.
by him some time before:
Mich., 186:
38
l\icCreery v. Green,
Dcaubien v. Cicotte, 12 Mich., 459,
made

it

it,

If he
paper need not be in the handwriting of the witness.“
of
must
be
independently
produced
cannot speak
in
court, so that the opposite party may cross-examine from it.“
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§ 454. Knowledge, belief.—A witness can testify to such
facts only as are within his own knowledge,“ but he is not
required to speak with that certainty
sible doubt in his mind.“

which excludes all pos

§ 455. Opinion evidence.—The general rule is that the wit
ness must testify to facts, not to deductions or conclusions
from facts; the drawing of these being for the court, or the
jury, if there be one.“ There are two conditions, however,
under which the witness may be permitted to give his opinion
First, where the facts are of such
or‘ conclusion from facts:
who are presumed to possess the
jury,
a nature as that the

ordinary measure only of skill and information in dealing
with facts, are incapable‘ of drawing conclusions from the
facts in the particular case Without the assistance of some
As where it is a question of
one of special skill Or learning.
the effect of the combination of certain chemicals, or the cause
of certain physical symptoms.“
Second, where the facts are
of such a character as, that the witness, though he may have
and received very deﬁnite impressions from
observed-them,
them, yet is unable to give them to the jury as he observed
thein. As in case of the speed at which an object was moving;

John Doe or Rich
the question of whether a person seen
was
ard Roe, they having the same general appearance; as to
whether the person seen was ‘above or under six feet in
height." In the ﬁrst case it is one of incompetency of the
43—Gibson v. Williams, 4 Wend., 320.
44—Mere impression does not rise
People
v.
to the dignity of evidence:
Gotshall, 123 Mich., 474;
82 N. W.,
274.

Bay R.
W., 518;
Lemon v. Chicago & G. '1". Ry. Co., 59
Mich., 618; 26 N. W.. 791: Evans v.
People,
12 Mich., 27; Harris v. Clin
ton. 64 Mich., 457; 31 N. W., 425:
8 Am. St. Rep., 842; Atherton v. Ban
croft, 114 Mich., 241; 72 N. W., 208;
Lindley v. Detroit, 131 Mich., 8; 90
N. W., 665; Page v. Beach, —— Mich.,
—-; 95 N. W., 981 (July, 1903).
46-—Peopie
v. Hall, 48 Mich., 4822
58
12 N. W., 665; People v. Sessions,
Mich., 594; 26 N. W., 291; People v.
Millard. 53 Mich-, 63; 18 N. W-, 562;
B.

Thunder
v.
45——Anders0n
Co., 61 Mich., 489; 28 N.

Tufts v. Verkuyl, 124 Mich., 242; 82
N. W., 891; People v. Thacker, 108
Mich., 652; 66 N. W., 562.
Expert
must be given by living wit
evidence
Books of experts are not com
nesses.
petent evidence: People v. Hall, supra;
People
v. Millard,
53 Mich., 63;
18
Brown, 50
N. VV., 562; Marshall
v.
Mich., 148; 15 N. W., 55.
47—Evans v. People, 12 Mich., 2'7,
35 (involving
a questiop
of existence
oi’ sickness). where
is found
an ex
principle:
upon
cellent
discussion
Mich., 459;
12
Beaubien v. Cicotte,
(a case of mental capacity); Laird v.
Snyder. 59 Mich., 404; 26 N. W., 654;
Rice v. Rice, 50 Mich., 448; 15 N. W..
(question of sanity); Kinney v.
545
Dutcher, 56 Mich., 308; 22 N. W..
866 (permanency of physical injuries);
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jury to draw the conclusion, having the facts, whereas in the
second case it is an inability to give them the facts from

which the conclusion is to be drawn. It is evident that in the
ﬁrst condition only a person of special learning, training, skill
or experience would be competent to assist the jury, while in
the second the person who has observed the facts, though

having no special qualiﬁcation, may express his opinion, if the
facts are such as commonly come under the observation of
The ﬁrst is the “expert” witness, the
ordinary persons.

second the “lay” witness.
The expert witness may ﬁnd himself in one of two positions:
He niay personally have observed the facts upon which his
opinion is to be given, or the facts may not have been observed
by him but have been brought to the court through other
In the ﬁrst case he may
Witnesses who did observe them.
pronounce his opinion after it is shown that he observed the
facts; in the second case he pronounces his opinion in answer
to hypothetical questions embracing the facts testiﬁed to by
other witnesses.
§456. Expert must be shown qua1iﬁed.—Before the expert
witness is permitted to give his opinion it must be made to
appear to the court, that he is an expert, that he does possess
the requisite skill, training or experience to enable him intel
ligently to pronounce an opinion upon the particular condi
tions presented. This showing of his qualiﬁcation should pre
If the opposite party would attack his
cede his opinion.
qualiﬁcations as such expert, whether by cross-examination or
A
otherwise, it should be done before the opinion is taken.
showing that a witness has had the training generally regarded
as suﬁicient to qualify one for pursuing some one of the pro
fessions, trades or occupations is suiﬁcient to establish him as
an expert in that particular ﬁeld. It is not necessary that the
witness shall have had experience with the particular condi
tions involved in the case in which his opinion is asked if he
is generally informed respecting similar matters.
Ry. Co. v. Van SteinMich., 99 (speed of railway
train); Conneil v. McNett, 109 Mlch.,
329; 67 N. W., 344 (value of horse);
Rivard v. Rivard, 109 Mlch., 98; 66
N. W., 681 (sanity); Lamb v. Lippin
Detroit

berg,

17

dz M.

cott, 115

Mlch.,

That a physi

611;

N. W.. 887
124 Mich.,
279: 82 N. W., 883 (sanity); Merts
v. Detroit E. Ry. Co., 125 Mich., 12;
83 N. W., 1036 (speed ot car).
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eian is a graduate of a reputable medical school is sufficient
to show him competent to give his opinion upon questions of
general medical science.
It is not essential that he shall have
had special training in the particular branch of medical science
involved; though it may be shown that he has or has not had
such special training as bearing upon the weight to be given
to his

opinion.“

The hypothetical quest-ion.——The hypothetical ques
§457.
tion need not embrace all the facts respecting which there is
A party must em
some evidence tending to establish them.
brace in such question all the facts, material to the conclusion
asked, which the jury must ﬁnd because there is evidence re
quiring the ﬁnding. Beyond this he may embrace such facts,
and such facts only, as the jury would be justiﬁed in ﬁnding
from the evidence, and as are consistent with his theory of
And he may frame as many different hypothetical
questions, within reasonable limitations, as there are materially
different combinations of facts which the jury would be justi
fied in ﬁnding and as are consistent with his theory of the

the case.

case.“
Objections to evidence.-When a question to a witness
is objected to, the reason for the objection should be stated} A
party objecting to evidence should state the true ground of his
objection; and if he neglects to do so, and the grounds stated
by him are untenable, the judgment should not be reversed on a
§ 458.

new objection‘ for the first time taken in the court of review,
de
qualiﬁcation
not necessari
ly upon his belonging to a particular
Peer v.-Ryan, 54 Mlch.,
profession:
The question
224; 19 N. W., 961.
of whether the oilered expert is quali
tied is tor the court: Ives v. Leonard,
A
296: 15 N. W., 463.
60 Mlch.,
physician need not to have had actual
experience in poison cases to be com
petent to give opinion as to whether
a given case is one of poisoning or
not: People v. Thacker, 108 Mich.,

48—An

pends

expert's

on his experience,

See, Pillard v.
652; 66 N. W., 562.
I)unn. 108 Mlch., 301; 66 N. W., 45,
on qualiﬁcation of expert on handwrit
ing.

cannot
49-—Experts
upon theories contrary

examined
be
to the uncon

tradlcted

facts of the case: People v.
Mlch., 482; 12 N. W., 665.
Hypotheses must be supported by evi
dence: People v. Hare, 57 Mlch., 506:
24 N. W., 843; Fraser
v. Jennlson,
42 Mlch., 206; 3 N. W., 882.
The
question need not he too minute as
Kelley v. Richardson, 69
to details:
Mlch., 430; 37 N. W., 514.
Such
questions are not objectionable because
long, it conﬁned to facts material to
the opinion desired: Mayo v. Wright,
63 Mlch., 32; 29 N. W., 832.
The
proper practice in such case would
be to write out the question:
Ibld.
1—Morrlssey
11 Mlch.,
v. People,
332: Lungerhnusen v. Crittenden, 103
Mlch., 173; 61 N. W., 270.

Hall,

453
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if it is

one that might have been obviated on the trial, had it
there been taken? And the reason for objecting to any wit
ness, or to any question put to him, should appear in the
bill of exceptions, or it cannot be presumed on error that it
'
was erroneously overruled.
Objections to leading questions should be taken before the
answer, and not after.3

The proper time to take an objection to the formal proof of
it is offered in evidence; and if no objection is
then made, and the paper is allowed to be read to the jury, the
party oifering it is always at liberty to infer that the other
party is satisﬁed with its due execution, and proposes to raise
An objection to papers as incom
no objection on that score.‘
petent or irrelevant, does not assail their genuineness, but
impliedly admits it.5 And where a copy of a map is put in
evidence without objection, the right to insist on the produc
tion of the original is thereby waived.“
Objection to irrelevant testimony may be made at any
It should always be excluded from the
stage of the cause.
consideration of the jury, whenever called to the notice of the
a paper, is when

2—Young v. Stephens, 9 Mich., 507;
and see, Rash v. Whitney, 4 Mich.,
495; Gilbert v. Kennedy, 22 Mich.,
\\'here an objection is made and
117.
the reason stated, all other objections,
if any, will be deemed waived. And a
judgment will not be reversed for the
admission of evidence which does not
in er
the plaintiff
affect injuriousiy
ror: iiolllster v. Brown, 19 Mich.,
163; see, iiamilton v. People, 29 Mich.,
174.
A zcnerai objection to the ad
mission of an execution on the ground
that it is not in proper form, or to
the admission in evidence of the record
of a judgment that the judgment was
not properly rendered, without speci
fying the particular defect complained
of, is too\indeﬁnite to be considered:
Jennison v. Haire, 29 Mich., 207. And
an objection to the admission oi’ any
documentary evidence.
which fails to
state the particular ground of incom
Lobdeli v.
is too general:
petency,
Bank of
Merchants‘ & Manufacturers‘
A general ob
Detroit, 33 Mich., 408.
jection to a document offered in evi
dence, that it is “incompetent, irrele

vant and immaterial,"
seems
to
be
insuﬂicient.
Some
specific defect or
objection should be pointed out: Mich.
State ins. Co. v. Soule, 51 Mich., 312;
Thus, where a lease
16 N. W., 662.
attested by a subscribing witness, was
oifered in evidence. it was objected to
as incompetent and immaterial,
and
when upon error it was urged in sup
port of the objection that the subscrib
ing witness was not called to prove
the execution of the lease. held, that
this specitic objection should have been
pointed out in the court below so that
the objection might have been removed
by calling the
subscribing
witness:
Jochen v. Tlbbells. 50 Mich., 33; 14
W., 600.
N.
So a general objection
that evidence is “incompetent" is prop
erly overruied if competent for any
purpose:
Gladstone Exch. Bank
v.
Keatlng, 94 Mich., 429; 53 N. W.,
1110.

8—Morrissey
v. People, 11 Mich.,
by Manning. J.
4—I’errot v, Shearer. 17 Mich., 5-’i.
5—Young v. Stephens, 9 Mich., 501.
v. Scott, 11 Mich., 232
6——Johnson

332-3,
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There can be no waiver which can make it proper to
a case to be decided on issues not authorized by the
pleadings, and the objection is never too late.’
judge.

allow

has been ex
right to cross-examine
conducted by leading
in the early jurispru
scope of cross-examination

a
Cross-exami‘na.tion.—When
aminedl in chief, the other party has a
him.” Such cross-examination may be
questions.
The rule which prevailed
§4=59.

dence

of

the

state,

limiting

the

witness

to such matters as the witness has testiﬁed to on direct exam
The rule
ination}? has been abrogated by the later decisions.
now as to the range of legitimate cross-examination
be

ing that the cross-examiner

may examine as to any mat
whether
on
material
to the issue,
testiﬁed
about
or not."
The
direct examination
cross-examiner
does
not, as to such new matter, make the witness his own;
he is not compelled to give credit to the witness as his own."
ter,

As

to impeaching questions, see post, §§ 463-468.

When privileged from
§-160.
on
cross-examination would
tion

answering.—Where the

ques

tend to -expose the witness
to a penal liability, or to a criminal charge, he cannot be
required to answer." If the answer may in'any way criminate
him, either by furnishing direct evidence of guilt, or by estab
lishing one of many facts, which together may constitute a
chain of testimony suiﬁcient to warrant his conviction, the
Witness must be protected

from answering,

Mining
v.
7—Pennsyivanla
Co.
Brady, 14 Mich., 265.
8—'I‘he testimony elicited on a legiti
of a witness
cross-examinatlon
mate
evidence
his
constitutes a part of
given on his examination in chief, and
both are alike to he treated as evi
dence given on the part of the party
calling the witness: Wilson v. Wagar,
26 Mich., 452. 458: Campau v. Trsub.
27 Mich., 217: Schratz v. Schratz. 35
Mich., 485.
Where u party was ex
amined as a witness on his own behalf,
and then refused to sumhlt to a cross
examination. his testomony was re
jected, and held to be rightly so: Page
v. Stephens, 23 Mich., 357.
9—Pe0ple v. Horton, 4 Mich., 81
2; approved in Campau v. Dewey, 9

if

he

claim the

Mich., 381, 442.
See the strictures
and criticisms upon the rule, by Chris
tiancy, J.. in the latter case.
10-—Detroit & M. Ry. Co. v. Von
Steinberg. 17 Mich., 109; People v.
Barker. 60 Mich., 279; 27 N. W., 539;
Ireland v. Cincinnati W. & M. Ry. Co.,
79 Mich., 163: 44 N. W., 426: New
York Iron.Mine v. Negaunee Bank, 39
Mich.,
644;
ilemmlnger v. Western
Assurance Assn., 95 Mich., 355.: 54
N. W., 949.
11-—New
York Iron Mine v. Negau
nee Bank. 39 Mich., 644.
12—-1
Greenleaf Ev.. Q 451; Bel
linger v. People.
Wend.,
596-7;
8
423;
Alderman v. People, 4 Mich.,
Pitcher v. People. 16 Mich., 149.
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he be required to explain how he would
by the answer, because the explanation would
require the very disclosure against which the law protects
him." But the privilege of declining to answer belongs to
the witness alone, and not to the party.“
If the prosecution,
to which the witness might be exposed, is barred by the ,lapse
of time, the privilege ceases, and he is not protected from
answering, notwithstanding his answer may tend to cast a
very great degree of reﬂection upon his character and con
duct." Nor is he protected, because the answer may tend to
prove him subject to any civil liability or debt."

privilege.

Nor can

be criminated

§461. Re-direct examination.—After the cross-examination
is closed, the witness may be re-examined by the party calling
him upon all the topics upon which he was cross-examined.
This gives an opportunity of explaining any new facts which
have come out upon the cross-examination.
Where a witness
has been cross-examined as to declarations made by him,
counsel have the right, on re-examination, to ask all questions
which may be proper to draw forth an explanation of the
sense and meaning of the expressions used by the witness on
cross-examination, if they be doubtful in themselves, and also
v. Mather. 4 Wend., 252
13-—People
Salina,
1
of
3-4; Henry v. Bank
Brewer,
27
Comst., 83; People v.
Mich., 134.
But a witness has no
privilege that excuses him from testi
fying to relevant facts that show him
to be guilty of fraud or dishonesty,
It is no excuse for
if not criminal.
his refusal to testify concerning them
that they may exhibit him in a light
His dishonesty
that is not creditable.
or fraud, when not criminal, may as
well be proved by him as by any other
Prentice,
Jennings
39
person:
v.
Mich., 421.
Shaw,
4
14—Con1monwealth
v.
Cush., 594: Cloycs v. Thayer, 3 Hill,
564; see, Taylor v. Wood, 2 Edw. Ch.,
If n witness discloses a part oi’ a
94.
transaction in which he is criminally
without claiming his privi
concerned.
lege, he must state the whole, if what
of the
he has disclosed
is
a part
transaction, otherwise not: Cohurn v.
Odell, 18 Fost., 540; Norfolk v. Gay

lord, 28 Conn., 369; Foster v. Ran
dall, 11 Cush., 437; Low v. Mitchell.
18 Maine, 372.
The witness cannot
claim such privilege. where a further
examination is necessary to understand
the facts already voluntarily
stated:
People v. Carroll, 3 Parker C. R., 83:
see, Hamilton v. People, 29 Mich., 173.
15—People v. Mather, 5 Wend.. 252
5; Close v. Olney, 1 Denio, 319, 323;
see, Bank of Sallna v. Henry, 2 Denio,
156; Henry v. Bank
Salina, 1
of
Comst., 83; Foster v. People, 18 Mich.,
272.

16—C. L., § 10179.
If a witness
decline to answer. on the ground that
his answer will tend to criminate him.
no inference as to his guilt or inno
cence
is permitted on that account:
nor can such refusal be commented on
Carne v. Litchﬁeld,
before the jury:
2 Mich., 340; Knowles v. People, 15
Mich., 413; Foster v. People, 18 Mich.,
273.
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of the motive which induced the witness to use those expres
sions."
And, after cross-examination, a witness may, by permission
of the court, be re-examined by the party calling him, as well
for the introduction of matter new in itself as for the purpose
of explaining the expressions and motives of the witness, when
the omission to examine as to such new matter, when ﬁrst
called, arose from inadvertence or other cause."
Recalling witnesses, rebutting, etc.—A party has a
§462.
right to suppose that the evidence of the _opposite side will be
offered and received in its logical order and sequence ;1° but
the introduction of testimony, even out of the usual order of
time, must to some extent be discretionary with the judge.”
And it is discretionary with the court to allow a party, after
his rebutting evidence is closed, to recall one of his own wit
nesses to give evidence which would have been proper when
the witness was on the stand before.“ And so, after defend
ant had closed his testimony, plaintiff was allowed to call a
witness to prove a fact deemed material; held, whether prop
erly rebutting or not, the judge had a right to admit it. And
whether, after the testimony is closed upon both sides, a party,
without claim of right, may have a witness sworn and his evi

of discretion,

admitted, is a question
decision of the court is ﬁnal."
dence

17—1

Starkie's

Ev.,

4

A question warranted

Lond.

ed.,

cross
examination may be asked on re-direct
People v. Hare, 57 Mlch.,
examination:
506; 24 N. W., 843.
Where the cross
examinatlon draws out a partial state
ment of facts it is proper on re-direct
examination to supplement such state
ment with snch other facts as serve
support or modify
to explain, complete,
Wilcox v. Ney, 47
statement:
the
Mlch., -121: 11 N. W., 225: Passmore
v. Passmore, 50 Mlch., 626; 16 N. W.,
170; Wright v. Towle, 67 Mlch., 255;
34 N. W., 578.
18—Clarlr v. Vorce, 15 Wend., 193;
and see, Detroit & Milwaukee R. Co.
v. Van Stelnberg, 17 Mlch., 99, 112.
But this rests in the discretion of the
court: Hemmens v. Bentley, 32 Mlch.,
231.

by

on which the

89; but see, 1 Greenleaf’s Ev., 5 467.
19—Brown v. People, 17 Mlch., 436.
20—Com. v. Eastman, 1 Cush., 217;
Detroit & M. Ry. (.‘.o. v. Van Steinberg,
17 Mlch., 9i); Torrent
v. Damm,
66
Mlch., 105; 33 N. W., 49; Kempsey v.
McGinniss,
123; Danieison
21 Mlch.,
v. Dyckman, 26 Mlch., 169; Bulen v.
Granger, 56 Mlch., 207; 22 N. W.,
306; Beebe v. Koshnic, 55 Mlch., 604;
22 N. W., 59.
21—White v. Bailey, 10 Mlch., 155,
160.
As to the order of testimony,
in regard to mental capacity, see, Tat!
v. ilosmer. 14 Mlch., 310;
People v.
Garbutt, 17 Mlch., 9, 7, 19;
Hem
mens v. Bentley, 32 Mlch., 89.
22—Detroit & Milwaukee Ry. Co. v.
Van Steinberg, 17 Mlch., 99; Daniel
son v. Dyckman, 26 Mlch., 169.
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WITNESSES.

What it is and by whom—in genera1.—Witnesses
§463.
may not be impeached by the party calling them.” This does
not prevent the party calling the witness from showing by
other witnesses the fact to be otherwise than as testiﬁed to by
To impeach a witness is to show that for some
the ﬁrst.“
reason the statements made by him as a witness are not en
titled to credit at the hands of the jury, or are not entitled
to that measure of credit they would naturally have, except
for the impeachment.

through cross-examination of
the witness or through the testimony of other witnesses called
This impeachment may

to the impeaching

come

facts.”-'5

A

witness may be impeached by showing bias, corruption,
mental incapacity, moral ob
inconsistent statements,
or
infamy.”
lriqu/ity,
error,

§464. Impeachment of witnesses, by showing bias, corrup
tion, etc.—B/ias may be shown by showing that the witness is
interested in the litigation or stands in such relation to one
of the parties, either in blood, by aﬂinity, or through business

or social associations as that he would naturally favor such
party in his testimony or be prejudiced against him.”
Corruption may be shown by evidence that the witness has
said he was willing to testify regardless of the truth—by
showing receipt of a bribe—or guilt of subornationﬁs
Ev., 5 442; see,
23——1 Greenleaf
Mich., 479;
22
Gibbs v. Linahnry,
Snell v. Gregory, 37 Mich., 500; Dar
ling v. Thompson. 108 Mich., 215; 65
This rule is not ap
N. W., 754.
compulsory
witnesses a
plicable
to
party is required to call: See, People
62 N. W.,
105 Mich., 92;
v. Case,
1017.
, 24—Snell

37 Mich., 500;
443; Smith v. Smith,
Mich., 234; 84 N. W.,
144; Darling v. Thompson, 108 Mich.,
215; 65 N. W., 754.
_
25—Helwlg v. Lascowski, 82 Mich.,
619; 46 N. W., 1033 (conviction of
crime) ; Wilbur v. Flood, 16 Mich., 40.
v. Gregory,

1 Green. Ev..
S. & Co.. 125

I

26—Michigan
Pipe Co. v. Ins. Co.,
Mich., 498; 56 N. W., 849.
27—(‘rippen v. People, 8 Mich., 117;
Geury v. People, 22 Mich., 220: An
derson v. Mich. Cent. Ry. Co., 107
Mich., 591: 65 N. W., 585; People v.
Turney. 124 Mich., 542; 83 N. W..
273; Michigan C. M. Co. v. Wilcox,
78 Mich., 451; 44 N. W., 281: see,
Marquette I1. 6: 0. Ry. Co. v. Kirk
45- Mich., 51: 7 N. W., 209;
wood.
Jones v. Portland, 88 Mich., 598; 50
N. W., 731; Hitchcock v. Moore, 70
Mich., 112: 37 N. W., 914.
28—Beaubien v. Clcotte, 12 Mich.,
484; 1 Green. Ev., § 450a. ed. 16.
97
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Error may be showgn by evidence
than as testiﬁed by the witness.”

§465

that the fact is otherwise

§465. Impeachment of witnesses, by showing inconsistent
Bta.tements.—Impeachment by inconsistent statements is where
it is shown that at some time prior to giving his testimony the
witness has, either under oath or without oath, and either orally,
or in writing, made statements which are inconsistent with
such as he has made on the stand.3°
Prior conduct incon
sistent with the attitude of the witness on the stand is com
petent for like reasons.
Before the inconsistent statement can be shown, if it was
oral, the witness must have been asked whether, on the par
ticular occasion, identiﬁed to the witness by giving the time,
place and such other known circumstances as will recall the
If it
occasion, he made the statement now repeated to him.“
was in writing it must be produced, if available, and shown
to the witness and he asked if it is his.”
This method of
impeachment is not allowed as to collateral matter, but only
as to matter material to the issue.”
§466. Impeachment of witnesses, by showing mental inca
pacity.—Mental incapacity—A witness may be shown to have
been in such mental condition as not to have been able to
O

Ev., § 461e, ed. 16.
29—1 Green.
This method of impeachment cannot
matter:
be adopted as to collateral
Hitchcock v. Burgett. 38 Mlch., 501;
Hamilton v. People. 46 Mlch., 188; 9
v. People, 47
N. W., 247; Driscoll
Mlch., 413; 11 N. W., 221.
30—lmpeaching testimony spends its
it has no
force in the contradiction.
aﬂirmatively
to
establish any
effect
fact in the case: Howard v. Patrick,
38 .\iich., 804;
Brown v. Dean, 52
Mlch., 267'. 17 N. W., 837; Catlin v.
Michigan C. Ry. Co.. 66 Mlch., 358:
Though the witness
33 N. W., 515.
when interrogated does not deny, di
rectly. the making oi the inconsistent
statement, but says he has no recol
lection of having made it. he may be
impeached by showing that he did
make it: Pringle v. Miller, 111 Mlch.,
663; 70 N. W., 345: Jensen v. Mich.
Cent. Ry. Co., 102 Mlch., 176: 60 N.
W., 57.
It the witness admits the

making of the contradictory statement
it is not competent to call witnesses
to prove it: Llghtfoot v. People, 16
Mlch., 513; Threadgool v. Litogot, 22
Mlch., 270.
The question to the im
peachlng witness must be substantially
identical with that put to the witness
to be impeached: DeArmond v. Nea
smith, 32 Mlch., 231.
31—Smith v. People. 2 Mlch., 415:
Johnston v. Disbrow, 47 Mlch., 50; 10
N. W., 79.
32—Lightfoot
v. People, 16 Mlch.,
513; Ilamiiton v. People. 29 Mlch.,
198; Maxted v. Fowler. 94 Mlch., 106;
53 N. W., 921; The Queen's
Case, 2
Brod. & Bing., 286; see, Zibbeil V.
Grand Rapids, 129 Mlch., 659; 89 N.
W., 563.
33—Driscoll
People, 47 Mlch.,
v.
v.
413: 11 N. W., 221; Hamilton
People. 29 Mlch., 173; Hitchcock V.
Burgett. 38 Mlch., 501.
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have gained the information testiﬁed to by him.
This may
have been by reason of insanity, intoxication or other cause

it,

producing that eifect. Or such incapacity may exist at the
time of the trial and the witness be unable with accuracy, by
reason of
to recall and detail the facts.“
Impeachment of witnesses, by showing moral ob
§467.
liq11ity.—A witness may be impeached by evidence that he is
unworthy of credit because of his bad moral character as re

truth and veracity." The rule does not now permit an
attack upon any other phase of character or upon the character
of the witness for general moral worth.“ Evidence to sustain
this impeachment must be addressed to the general reputation
of the witness for truth and veracity in the community where
he
generally known, at the time of the trial or within
time
a

is

spects

reasonably near to that of the

trial."

it

a

is

§

468. Impeachment of witnesses, by showing conviction of
c1"ime.—Infa-my—Closely akin to the last named
method of
that by showing that the witness has been
impeachment
convicted of crime. At the common law this was
disquali
now, in this state, goes to the credit only."
ﬁcation but
A witness may be asked not only as to his conviction of crime
but concerning any serious charge brought against him.“

529.

4

35—Lennard v. Pope, 27 Mich., 145
(not for honesty); Webber v. Hanke,
Mich., 198.
In the last case the cor
rect examinntion was outlined as be
ing ﬁrst, a question in following form:
"Do you know what the general repu
im
to
he
tation 0! (the u-(Incas
peached) is for truth and veracity in
the neighborhood where he resides?"
is that reputa
and second,
“What
tion?"
The lmpeachlng witness may
be asked whether from such reputation
he would believe
the witness under
oath: Hamilton v. People, 29 Mich.,
of the
173.
The cross-examination
impeaching witness may require ‘him
to give the names oi’ persons speak
ing against the wltness and what they

said:

Annis v. People, 13 Mich., 516.
36—Leonard v. Pope, 27 Mich., 145
Hamilton v, People,
(not for honesty)
29 Mich., 173; Calkins v. Ann Arbor
Ry. Co., 119 Mich., 312; 78 N. W.,
129 (failure
to pay debts).
37—People v. Lyons, 51 Mich., 215:
(throughout
16 N. ¥V., 380
a large
city); liamilton v. People, 29 .\iich.,
173 (at more than one place it witness
has recently changed domicile); Kea
tor v. People, 32 Mich., 484 (no ﬁxed
domicile).
10210; Helwlg v. Las
38—C. L.,
cowskl, 82 Mich., 619; 46 N. W., 1033,
and cases cited in the opinion.
People, 47 Mich.,
39—Driscoll
v.
417; 11 N. W., 221; Wilbur v. Flood.
16 Mich., 40.
But it seems the im
peaching matter must have some direct
tendency to aitect the credit of the
People v. Mills, 94 Mich.,
witness:

460

;

101 Mich., 585;
W., 284; see, Bowdle v. Detroit
S. Ry. Co., 103 Mich., 272; 61 N. W.,
N.

I

34-Mead v. Harris,

60
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And it is not only necessary to show the conviction, but also
the judgment."
A verdict of guilty on a charge of perjury
did not, at the common law, without judgment, render the
defendant infamous, so as to preclude his being a competent
Witness. Therefore, where the complainant at the hearing of
a. bill in chancery, for the purpose of discrediting the defend
ant, and destroying the effect of his sworn answer, offered evi
dence that defendant had been indicted and convicted by a
jury for perjury, in swearing to the same answer it was held
that such evidence was inadmissible for that purpose, for the
reason that no judgment had been rendered on the verdict,
the judgment having been arrested.“
Evidence of a convic
tion of an infamous crime in any other state or country would
be admissible here for the purpose of discrediting a witness."
§469. Impeachment of witnesses, by showing general bad
of every witness for
general reputation
reputation.-The
truth and veracity is open to examination." In impeaching
the credit of a witness, the inquiry must be conﬁned to his
general reputation for truth, and not be permitted as to par
ticular facts.“ The inquiry must be as to his general reputa
tion, where he is best known, and of those who can state what
is generally said of the person by those among whom he dwells,
or with whom he is chieﬂy conversant.‘-"’
The correct general question to be asked of the impeaching
witness on the subject is: “Do you know what the general
reputation of (the witness sought to be impeached) is for
truth and veracity in the neighborhood where he resides?”
N. W., 488 (want of charity
so. People v. O‘Hare, 124
Mich., 515; 83 N. W., 279; Derwin
v. Parsons, 52 Mich., 425; 18 N. W.,
200 (improperly approaching a judicial
While the
ofﬁcer and buying votes).
witness may be impeached by evidence
of this sort given upon cross-examlna
tion it is not competent
to introduce
by other
witnesses:
such evidence
I)rlscoll v. People, 47 Mich., 416; 11
N. W.. 221.
40-I‘eople v. Whipple, 9 Cow., 707.
41-—Smith v. Brown et al., 2 Mich.,
630;

does

54

not);

161.

42-Com.

Com.

v.

v.

Knapp,

Green,
0

17

Plck.,

Mass., 516;

Hauke, 4 Mich., 204.
Ev., § 461.
\\'here a
witness is sought to be impeached
by
proof of general reputation, it must
be for veracity, and reputation as to
honesty is not admissible:
Leonard
v. Pope,
27 Mich., 145.
45—\\'here
it was sought to im
peach a witness who was well known
all over a large city; held, that it was
erroneous to limit the inquiry as to
her reputation for truth and veracity
to that immediate part of the city
where she resided:
People v. Lyons,
51 Mich., 215; 16 N. W., 380.

496.

461

43—Weher

44-1

v.
Green].

If
is,

“What is that reputation?”
and secondly:
says he does not know What such reputation
end of the inquiry of him.
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it

is

is

it

is

it

Evidence to sustain the witness.-A party cannot
§470.
bring evidence to conﬁrm the character of a witness before
the credit of that witness has been impeached, either upon
cross-examination, or by the testimony of other witnesses.“
seems that Where the character of a witness for truth
But
attacked by general evidence of want of character "for
truth,
competent for the party calling him to give gen
eral evidence of his good character." But mere contradiction
no ground for general evidence
among witnesses at the trial
as to character for truth."
So
competent to sustain a
witness against an attack by evidence of inconsistent state
ments, by allowing him to explain the inconsistencies, or by
calling other witnesses in denial of the making of such incon

is

is

is

it

it

a

is

In general where an attack upon the cred
sistent statements.
made by the calling of witnesses to sup
witness
competent to call witnesses in answer.
port the attack,
competent to corroborate a witness, by proof that
Nor
he has on other occasions made statements similar to those
testiﬁed to by him in his examination in chief.“
And where
evidence not properly admissible has been contradicted
by
corroborative
of
the ﬁrst witness
the opposite side, testimony
equally inadmissible, although offered as rebutting merely
to the contradictory evidence.”
ibility of

Ev

4th

London

49—Deshon v. Merchants Ins. Co.,
Met., 199: Brown v. People, 17
Mich., 429.
But as to such corrobora
tion, where the other party has sought
on cross-examination
to impeach the
witness, see, Com. v. Wilson,
Gray,
337, 340; and see, Robb v. Hackley,
23 Wend., 50; State v. Winkiey,
14
N. IL, 480; and see, Stewart v. Peo
ple, 23'Mich., 63.
witness cannot
support his own positive
testimony
purporting to be given upon his own
knowledge, by testifying
himself
to
other consistent facts which arc im
material in themselves and which like
the fact sought to be corroborated
rests entirely on his own oath:
An
derson v. Russell, 34 Mich.. 109.
Mich.,
v.
Cicotte,
50-McBride

5

8

D

41--Although one who is callcd to
sustain a witness, may say that he
does not know what his reputation for
truth and veracity is, yet ii’ he would
be likely to know if the witness‘ char
acter ln that respect had been the
he
subject oi.’ unfavorable
comment.
whether he had ever
be asked
may
heard of his truth and veracity being
The fact that a person's
questioned.
truthfulness has never been the sub
ject of controversy, is very cogent evi
dcnce to prove him worthy oi’ credit:
Leno: v. Fuller, 39 Mich., 268. See,
i\icl’.sughlln v. Salley, 46 Mich., 219;
N. W., 256.
Plclr., 143,
48—Russell v. Fomn,
1.34; Stark v, People,
Denio, 106.

1

11

4

Starkie‘s
252.

A

46-1
edition,

478.
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CHAPTER XXV.
DAMAGES.
In general.
Exemplary damages.
Stipulated damages.
Double damages.
I475. Treble damages.
I476. Interest as damages.

5477. Proﬁts as damages.
§478. Duty to minimize.
§479. For breach of contract.

$471.
5472.
£473.
I474.

Q-480.

For

§481.

In actions for tort.

breach

of sale contract.

§471. In gen€ra1.—Damage is a pecuniary allowance made,
under rules of law, because of injuries suffered by him in
whose favor the allowance is made, through the unlawful act
'
of him against whom it is made.
As a general rule the injury must be the natural and proxi
mate result of the act complained of and not a remote conse
quence only}
A second general rule is that the damages must be com
pensatory for the injury received-—nothing more and nothing
less. This rule excludes an allowance of damages on the theory
of punishment of the defendant?
I
Damages are known in the law as either general or special.
General damages are such as the law implies or presumes to
Special dam
have accrued from the wrong complained of.
from
really
injury
resulted
the
such
as
are
complained
ages
of but are not implied by law? General damages may be
1—Shaw v. Hoﬂman, 21 Mich., 151;
Clark v. Moore. 3 Mich., 55; lieiser v.
Loomis, 47 Mich., 16; 10 N. W., 60;
Cuddy v. Major, 12 Mich., 368; Wet
more v. Pattison. 45 Mich., 439; 8 N.
WY. 67; Hitchcock v. Pratt, 51 Mich.,
v.
263; 16 N. W., 639; Rajnowski
Detroit B. C. & A. Ry. Co., 74 Mich.,
20; 41 N. W., 849; s. c. 78 Mich.,
681: 44 N. W., 335; Doran v. Butler,
74 Mich., 643; 42 N. W., 273; May
wood v. Logan," 78 Mich., 135; 43 N.
W., 1053; McKeliar v. Monitor Twp..
78 .\iich., 485; 44 N. W., 412; Riley
V. Littleﬁeld, B4 Mich., 22; 47 N. W.,
91 Mich..
576; Eddy 1. Courtwright.

264; 51 N. W., 887; Totten v. Bur
hans, 91 Mich., 495; 51 N. W., 1119;
Langworthy v. Green ’I‘wp., 95 Mich.,
93; 54 N. W., 697; Filer v. Smith, 96
Mich., 347; 55 N. W., 999.
2—Ten Hopen v. Walker. 96 Mich.,
236; 55 N. W., 657; liaviiand v.
Chase, 116 Mich., 214: 74 N. W., 477;
Boydan v. Haberstumpt,
Mich.,
129
137: 88 N. W., 386; McChesney v.
Wilson, 132 Mich.. 252; 93 N. W., 627:
Stuyvesant v. Wilcox, 92 Mich., 233;
52 N. W., 485.
3—Batemnn v. Blake, 81 Mich., 227;
45 N. W., 831.
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recovered under a declaration showing the violation of plain
tiﬁ’s right, and a general allegation that injury resulted. To
recover special damages, however, it is essential that there
allegations showing that in the particular case injuries
were caused not usually resulting from such conduct as is

be

counted upon, and for which damages are asked.
Special damages cannot be recovered under a declaration
containing a general allegation of damages only.4
One may be injured under such circumstances as that he

;~"

can have no allowance of damages—dam'nu-m
absque injurio
in the old phrase. Such is the case where there is injury
without any violation of duty so in case of inj\u~y resulting
from the enforcement of the police regulations of the state.“
a

'

a

’s

’s

is

Again in case of injury resulting to another from that use
lawful, as by digging well which
of one own lands which
injures a neighbor’s well.7
Nominal damages are given in cases where there has been
right, but with no substan
technical violation of another
tial injury shown.“

is

Exemplary da.ma.ges.—Exemplary damages are al
§472.
in the particular case the defendant in doing
because
lowed
the act complained of, acted wilfully, maliciously or in reck
The theory of exemp
less disregard of the rights of plaintiﬁ‘.
are
an
not
that
they
allowance for some
lary damages
thing in addition to that which will compensate for the actual
injury; they are only compensatory. They are an allowance

i.

&

3

5-—Post v. Campau, 42 Mich., 90;
N. W., 272.
6-Grand Rapids v. Grand Rapids
Ry. Co., 66 Mich., 42; 33 N. W.,

illustrating this rule
cases
see, Attorney General v. Evart

7—For
further,

9

8:

J:

15.

Booming Co., 34 Mich., 462; Upjohn
v. Richland, 4c Mich., 542;
N. W.,
845; National Copper Co. v. Minnesota
M. Co., 57 Mich., 83; 23 N. W., 781;
Highway Com'rs v. Ely. 54 Mich., 173;
19 N. W., 940; Gregory v. Bush, 64
Mich., 37; 31 N. W., 90.
8-Haven v. Beidler Mfg. Co., 40
Mich., 286: Ward's C.
I’. L. Co. v.
Eikins, 34 Mich., 439: Toll v. Wright,
93; Graham v. Poor. 50
37 Mich.,
Mich., 153: 15 N. W., 61; Ellis v.
Simpklns, 81 Mich., 1; 45 N. W., 646;
Wyatt v. Herring, 90 Mich., 581; 51
N. W., 684; Detroit Gas Co. v. More
ton T.
S. Co.. 111 Mich.. 401: 69
N. W., 659; Sax v. Detroit, G. H.
M. Ry. Co., 129 Mich., 502; 89 N. W.,
&

;

1

Allison,
10 Mich.,
v.
4—Chandler
460; Shaw v. Hoffman, 21 Mich., 151;
N.
Alien v. Kinyon, 41 Mich., 281;
W., 863; Shaddock v. Alpine P. R.
7; 44 N. W., 158;
Co.,
79 Mich.,
Kuhn v. Freund, 87 Mich., 545; 49
Siisby v. Michigan C. Co.,
N. W., 867
95 Mich., 204; 54 N. W.. 761; Beath
v. Rapid Ry. Co., 119 Mich., 512; 78
N. W., 537: Smediey v. Soule, 125
Mich., 192; 84 N. W., 63.

368.
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in addition to such allowance as would be made if the injury
were innocently inﬂicted, and so much in addition, as will
compensate for the aggravation of the injury by reason of the
malice or recklessness of the defendant.”

Stipulated damages.—Under certain circumstances
§473.
parties may, by their contract, ﬁx the amount of damages to
In order that agree
be recovered in case of a breach of it.
ments of this sort be upheld, it must appear that the agree
ment is really one which fairly measures the injury result
ing from the breach, and is not a provision in the nature of a

It is not what the parties
penalty for failure to perform.
intend which determines whether the stipulation will be en
forced or not,_but the inquiry is whether the sum ﬁxed is in
fact in the nature of a penalty."
,
The policy of the law is against allowing the parties to a
contract to ﬁx the amount of recovery for a breach of it by
calling the agreed amount “damages” when in fact it is clearly
The principle
a penalty or forfeiture for non-performance."
of stipulated damages does not forbid reasonable provisions
limiting the amount of recovery in certain cases. As in the
case of contracts of carriage with express companies, stipula
tions limiting recovery in case of injury or loss in transporta
tion to $50 unless the value of the goods is declared at the
So, in case of contracts
time of the contract, are upheld."
limiting the amount of
stipulations
with telegraph companies,
recovery for failure to properly transmit, in cases of unre

12—Smith v. American Express
Mich., 572; 66 N. W., 479.

108

a

a

5

Mich.,
v. Hudson,
10-—-Taquith
123: First Cong. Ch. v. Walrath, 27
Mich., 232.
In the absence of statute.
tee,
stipulation
for an attorney
to be
found in
note or mortgage,

paid in case proceedings are taken to
collect the same, is void: Bullock v.
Taylor, 39 Mich., 137; Myer v. Hart,
40 Mich., 517.
11——Davis
v. Freeman,
Mich.,
10
188; Richmond v. Robinson, 12 Mich.,
193; Myer v. Hart, 40 Mich., 517;
Daily
v..Litchﬁeid,
29;
10 Mich.,
Richardson v. Woehler, 26 Mich., 90.
It is against public policy to allow
damages
to be stipulated,
otherwise
trial, unless where the real
than by
damages
cannot be reasonably well
ascertained:
Hubbard v. Epworth, 69
Mich., 92; 36 N. W., 801.
a

',_

9-Scripps v. Reilly, 38 Mich., 10;
Watson v. Watson, 53 Mich., 168; 18
N. W., 605; Stilson v. Gibbs, 53 Mich.,
280; 18 N. W., 815; Ross v. Leggett,
61 Mich., 445; 28 N. W.. 695; Wilson
31 N. W., 81;
v. Bowen, 64 Mich., 133
Ford v. Cheever, 105 Mich., 679: 63
N. W.. 975: Haviiand v. Chase, 116
Mich., 214; 74 N. W., 477: Boydan v.
Haberstumpf, 120 Mich., 137; 88 N.
W., 386: McChesney v. Wilson, 132
Mich., 252: 93 N. W., 627; Peacock v.
Oakes, 85 Mich., 578; 48 N. W., 1082.

so
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for transmission,

are

upheld.”
§474. Double damages.—By statute in certain cases it is
provided that double damages may be recovered. C. L., § 11653
makes such a provision in case of wilful or negligent setting
of ﬁre by which another is injured in his property.“
The
statute giving damages in case of injury to the domestic ani
mals or person of one by the dog of another, also provides
for a double recovery."
This statute does not contemplate
such result except in case there is some fault in the owner.

Injuries inﬂicted, therefore, by a rabid dog with no fault in
the owner are not recoverable under this statute.“
The proper

practice is to have the

jury

assess the amount

of single damages and to apply, after verdict, to the court
to have judgment entered for double the amount
of the
verdict."
§475.

Treble damages.-—By statute it is also provided that
cases the plaintiff may recover treble dam
These damages are in their nature punitory and the

in certain speciﬁed
ages.

presumption is against their recovery in cases not clearly
within the statute, and which do not involve something like
wilful Wrong.“-3 The statute gives treble damages in case of
trespass involving the cutting and despoiling of trees where it

Under this statute the bur

is not casual and involuntary."
13—Birkett
v. Western Union Tel.
103 Mlch., 361; 61 N. W., 645.
14—Boyd v. Rice, 38 .\Ilch., 599.
These damages may be doubled by the
justice though the doubled damages
the limit of his jurisdiction
exceeds
Rosevelt v.
as ﬁxed by the statute:
llanold, 65 Mlch., 414; 32 N. W., 443;
see also, Talley v. Courter, 93 Mlch.,
473; 53 N. W., 621.
This statute does
15—C. L., § 5593.
law remedies:
common
not supersede
It is
Monroe v. Rose, 38 Mlch., 348.
not necessary to pver knowledge in the
owner or keeper ot the dog that he
New
was accustomed to do misehlet:
ton v. Gordon. 72 Mlch., 642: 40 N.
W., 921; see, Snow v. McCracken, 107
Mlch., 49; 64 N. W.. 866.
16—Elliott v. llerz, 29 Mlch., 202.
Co.,

The constitutionality
or this statute
was upheld in Fye v. Chapin, 121
Mlch., 675; S0 N. “Z, 797.
17—Swift
v. Applebone, 23 Mlch.,
252.
As to who is a "keeper" of a
dog within the meaning of the statute,
see, Jenkinson
v. Cogglns, 123 Mlch.,
7; 81 N. W., 974.
18—Shepard
Gates, 50 Mlch.,
v.
495; 15 N. W., 878: Michigan L. etc.
Co. v. Deer Lake Co., 60 Mlch., 143:
27 N. W., 10; Wallace v. Finch,
24
Mlch., 255; Russell v. Myers, 32 Mlch.,
522; Kllgannon v. Jenkinson, 57 Mlch.,
325; 23 N. W., 830.
19—C. L., § 11204.
Ward v. Rapp,
79 Mlch., 469; 44 N. W., 934; Long
year v. Gregory, 110 Mlch., 277; 68
N. W., 116.
Interest may be included
in this amount trebled: Gates v. Com
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den of showing that the trespass was casual and involuntary
is on the defendant."

Another statute allows the recovery of treble damages for
the forcible and unlawful ejection of one from lands or tene
ments, or, being out, for the forcible and unlawful keeping
of one out of possession of lands or tenements.“
By still
another statute it is provided that a complainant obtaining
restitution of any premises under the provisions of Chapter
308 of the Compiled Laws of 1897, shall be entitled to an
action of trespass or trespass on the case against the defend
ant, and may recover treble damages.”
It is also provided
that in case a member of a board of registration shall falsely,
maliciously or without credible information take the name of
a person registered from the list of registered electors, the
party aggrieved shall be entitled to recover treble damages
for the injury.”
§476. Interest as damages.—For any delay in making pay
ment of money, interest is considered a proper compensa
tion.“
So, for failure to deliver at time agreed, interest on
the value of the chattel may be allowed as compensation.“
Interest will not be allowed for failure to pay at a particular
time when the amount is not ascertained?“
So, in an action
of trespass under the statute, interest on the amount of the
depreciation in value, by reason of the trespass, may be al
lowed.” In an action in case for negligence, resulting in the
total loss of property involved , interest is properly allowed on_
stock, 113 Mich., 127; 71 N. W., 515.
recoverable under this
The damages
statute are for injuries to the freehold:
Achey v. Hull, 7 Mich., 423.
20—iiart v. Doyle, 128 Mich., 258;
87 N. W., 219; Gates v. Comstock, 113
Mich., 127; 71 N. W., 515; Michigan
L. & I. Co. v. Deer Lake Co., 60 Mich.,
143; 27 N1 W., 10.
21-C. L., S 11206; Vi/“ilson v. Mc
Crlllies, 50 Mich., 347; 15 N. W., 504;
Mattice v. Brinkman, 74 Mich., 705;
42 N. W., 172.
This section is
22--C. L., 5 11175.
character and has no re
penal in it
Newklrk v. Tracey,
troactive effect:
That
61 Mich., 180; 27 N. W., 884.
defendant acted in good faith will not

defeat treble damages under this stat
ute: Lanc v. Ruhl, 103 Mich., 38; 81
N. W., 347; see, also, Crozier v. Allen,
117 Mich.. 171; 75 N. W., 300.
23—C. L., § 3581.
24—Clark v. Craig, 29 Mich., 398.
25—Edwards
v. Sandborn, 6 Mich.,
348.

26—Lake Shore & M. S. Ry. Co. v.
People, 46 Mich., 193; 9 N. W., 249.
So it may be allowed in an action for
paid
without
money_
consideration
under a land
contract
where the
amount paid would
not adequately
plaintiff: Davis v. Stro
compensate
bridge, 44 Mich., 157; 6 N. W., 205.
27—Gates v. Comstock,
127; 71 N. W., 515.
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the value of the property lost.”
So, where the action is for
the conversion of chattels, interest may be allowed on the
value of the property converted from the time of the con

version.”
Proﬁts as da.mages.—As a general rule the loss of
§477.
proﬁts is not a proper element of damages where the amoimt
of such proﬁts is conjectural or spcculative.3°
But where
they can be ascertained with reasonable certainty they may
be allowed as an element of da1nages.31
In order that pros
pective proﬁts can be recovered the circumstances must be
such as to show, that they were fairly within the contempla
tion of the parties at the time of making the contract, as the
As where it
probable result of the breach complained of.
was known at the time, that the machinery was purchased
to enable the purchaser to perform certain contracts then
‘
existing.”
Duty of party asking damages to minimize them.
Plaintiif in case of breach of a service contract by his unlaw
ful discharge before the expiration of his term of service is
§478.

under obligation

to use reasonable diligence

to secure other

em|ployment."'3
28—Coan v.‘ Brownstown 'l‘wp., 126
Mich., 627; 86 N. W., 130.
29——Rough v. Womer, 76 Mich., 375;
43 N. W., 573; Wright V. Starks, 77
Mich., 221; 43 N. W., 868; Blaisdell
v. Scally. 84 Mich., 140; 47 N. W..
585; Spoon v. Chicago & W. M. Ry.
Co.,
86 Mich., 309; 49 N. \V., 35;
Woods v. Gaar, Scott dz Co., 93 Mich.,
143; 53 N. W., 14.
30—Allis v. McLean, 48 Mich., 428;
Petrie v. Lane, 67
12 N. W., 640;
Mich., 454; 35 N. W., 70; Davis v.
mm, 84 Mich., 324; 47 N. W., 555;
Pinch,
91
Mfg. Co.
v.
Hutchinson
Mich., 156; 51 N. W., 930; Hitchcock
100 Mich.,
of Maccabees,
v. Knights
40; 58 N. W., 640; Taylor v. Cooper,
104 Mich., 72: 62 N. W., 157.
S.
etc.
31—Burrell
v. New York
Co., 14 Mich., 34; Allis v. McLean, 48
Mich., 428; 12 N. W., 640; Goodrich
v. Hubbard, 51 Mich., 62; 16 N. W.,
232; Leonard v. Beandry, 68 Mich.,
312: 36 N. W., 88: S. C. 80 Mich.
183; 45 N. W., 66; Greenwood v.

Davis, 106 Mich., 231: 84 N. W., 26;
Llggett S. & A. Co. v. Michigan B.
Co., 10o M1¢n., 445; 64 N. W., 466:
Fell v. Newberry, 106 Mich., 542; 64
N. W., 499; Barrett v. Grand Rapids
V. W., 110 Mich., 6: 67 N. W., 976:
Industrial
Works
v.
Mitchell,
114
Mich., 29; 72 N. W., 25.
32-The rule ls well stated in In
dustrial Works v. Mitchell, 114 Mich.,
29: “Where notice is brought home to
the contracting party that the goods
are purchased to be put to a particular
use, he ls charged with
the
conse
quenccs oi’ a failure t‘o perform."
An
allowance oi proﬁts was made in this
case.

33—l"iarrlngton
v. Gies, 45 Mich.,
374: 8 N. W., 87; Owen v. Union
Match (‘o., 48 Mich., 348; 12 N. W..
Mich.,
175; Connor v. Hurley,
112
622; 71 N. W.. 158: Stenrns v. Lake
Shore 8: M. S. Ry. Co., 112 Mich., 652:
71 N. W., 148.
It seems that the bur
den is upon the defendant to show
that no eﬂort was made, or what ettort
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of eviction of

it

obligatory upon
him to make a reasonable effort to secure other premises for
This general principle is
the carrying on of his business.“
wherever
the
reasonable effort can
by
plaintiff
applicable
materially reduce the injury which otherwise he might suf
fer.“ With much more force can it be said that the injured
party must not wilfully or carelessly aggravate the injury.“
So,

in the

case

a tenant;

is

Damages recoverable for breach of contract—in
§479.
g'enera.l.—They should be such as may be said to fairly arise
from the breach, or to have been within the contemplation of
the parties when the contract was made, as the probable result
of the breach.”
Where there is partial performance of an un
apportionable contract, the party in default may recover the
value of anything done or furnished under the contract, from
which the other party has derived substantial beneﬁt through its
appropriation by him, subject to the reduction of such amount
by the amount of damages to which that other is entitled by
reason of failure of performance.” In case of a breach of a.
labor contract by refusal to permit performance the injured
party may recover for services actually performed, what they
were reasonably worth, though in excess of the contract
price.” Not so, however, when the failure to complete the
contract was the failure of the party bringing the action. In
such case the recovery can never exceed the contract price.“
Damages in case of breach of sale oontract.—In case
of failure of vendee to make payment of the purchase price
§ 480.

was made, by the plaintiff to get other
99
employment:
Allen v. Whitlark,
Mich., 492; 58 N. W., 470, decided
upon the authority of Farrell v. School
District. 98 Mich., 43; 56 N. W., 1053.
34—Haines v. Beach, 90 Mich., 563;
51 N. W., 644; see, Talley v. Courter,
93 Mich., 473: 53 N. W., 621.
35-—Gilbert v. Kennedy, 22 Mich.,
117; Hopkins V. Sanford. 41 Mich.,
244: 2 N. W., 39: Endriss v. Belle I.
1. Co., 49 Mich., 279; 13 N. W., 590;
Wonderly v. Holmes L. Co., 56 Mich.,
412; 23 N. W., 79.
36—Dennls v. Huyck, 48 Mich., 620;
12 N. W., 878.
v. Moore, 3 Mich., 55:
37—Clark
Hopkins v. Sanford, 38 Mich., 611:
Howe v. North, 69 Mich., 272; 3'! N.

W., 213; Goddard v.
Westcott,
82
Mich., 180; 46 N. W., 242.
38—Allen v. Mciilbbin, 5 Mich., 449:
Wagnr, 26
Wilson
v.
Mich.,
452;
Moon v. liarder. 38 Mich., 566; Gage
v. Meyers, 59 Mich., 300; 26 N. W.,
522; Wickes v. Swift E. L. Co., 70
Mich., 322; 38 N. W., 299: Sheldon v.
Leahy, 111 Mich., 29; 69 N. W., 76;
Phelps v. Beebe, 71 Mich., 554; 39
N. W., 761; Wells v. Board of Educa
tion. 78 Mich., 260; 44 N. W., 267.
39—iiemmlnger
v. Western A. Co.,
95 Mich., 355; 54 N. W., 949.
One
cannot be forced to accept work not
conforming to the contract:
Martus
v. Houck, 39 Mich., 431.
40—Alien
Mich.,
v. McKibben,
5
449: Wilson v. Wagar, 26 Mich., 452.
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the vendor_ is entitled to recover such price with the interest
from the time when it should have been paid.“
The measure
of damages in an action by the vendor where the vendee re
fuses to take or pay for goods and the vendor elects to retain
the goods, is the difference between the contract price and
the market price at the time and place of delivery under the

contract."
The measure of damages in case there is a failure to deliver
and the contract price has not been paid, is the
difference between the value "of the property at the time and
place of delivery and the contract price.“
In case the pur
chase price has been paid, the purchaser may recover the
money paid, or he may have the full market value of the
property at the time and place of delivery.“
In case of
breach of warranty of quality or failure to deliver goods of
the description contracted for the measure of damages, in
case the goods are taken by the purchaser, is the difference
in value of the goods, had they been as contracted for, and
their actual value as furnished.“
as agreed

Damages in actions for t0rt.—For a. discussion of
§481.
the subject of damages in trover see, post, §§ 646, 647. For
the rules in actions of replevin, see, post, Chap. xxxix.
In
actions for trespass to real property, see, post, § 620; in case of

defective fences, post. § 627-9. In trespass for carrying away
chattels the plaintiff may recover the value of that taken at
the time‘taken,4° with interest, 4" or the value of the use during
41-—Cooi:

242;

Kelly

Stevenson, 30 Mlch.,
v.
v. Waters, 31 Mlch., 404.

42—Browniee
v. Bolton, 44 Mlch.,
218; 6 N. W., 657; Williams v. Robb,
104 Mlch., 242; 62 N. W., 352.
43-Haskell v. Hunter, 23 Mlch.,
305: Chadwick V. Butler, 28 Mlch.,
349; McKercher v. Curtis, 35 Mlch.,
478; Peters v. Cooper, 95 Mlch., 191;
54 N. W., 694: Maxted v. Fowler, 94
Mlch., 107; 53 N. W., 921: Leo Aus
trian & Co. v. Springer, 94 Mlch., 344:
54 N. W., 50.
This general rule is not
applicable in case the article is not
kept in the market or is prepared for
a special purpose:
Den Bleyker v.
Gaston, 97 Mlch., 354; 56 N. W., 763.
44—See, West Mich.

F.

Co.

v.

Dia

G. Co., 127 Mlch., 651; 87 N.
W., 92.
45—Burdlck on Sales, p. 213: Jack
son Sleigh Co. v. Holmes, 129 Mlch.,
370; S8 N. W., 895.
In case of the
sale oi.’ fruit trees to be of a particular
variety, and a breach by furnishing
trees of a different variety, the meas~
ure of damages is the value that would
have been added
to the land it they
had been of the variety contracted tor,
beyond its value with the trees of the
variety furnished:
Hellman v. Pruyn,
122 Mlch., 301; 81 N. W., 97: Long v.
Pruyn, 128 Mlch., 57: 87 N. W., 88.
46—Kent County A. S. v. Ide, 128
Mlch., 423; 87 N. W., 369.
47—Rathbun v. Rathbun, 14 Mlch.,
mond

382.
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the time the

plaintiﬁ

was deprived

of

it,“

or

if it

is not returned,

for its de
would not be permitted that damages for the
detention together with interest on the value should be recov

he may recover its value and reasonable

It

tention.“

damages

cred.

In actions to recover for personal injuries the plaintiff is
entitled to recover compensation for all the injury received;
for the consequences already experienced, and such as are
reasonably certain to follow, including physical and mental
suffering, anxiety, suspense, fright and for expenses of nurs
ing and medical attention, for disﬁgurement or deformity,
loss of time and of capacity to follow one’s occupation or
The plaintiﬁ can
engage in any business or employment.”
only recover for injuries chargeable to the act complained of
and not for suﬂfering, the result "of conditions for which the

Fright unaccompanied by im
defendant is not responsible.“
mediate physical injury will not afford ground for an allow
ance of damages.“
48—Hart

v. Blake, 31 Mich.,
11
v. Parker,

49—Haviland

278.

Mich.,

8|;

103.
W. M.
v. Chicago
50——Sherwood
Ry. Co., 82 Mich., 374; 46 N. W., 773;
Kinney v. Folkerts, 84 Mich., 616; 48
N. W., 283; Ostrander v. Lansing, 115
Mich., 224; 73 N. W., 110; Lucas v.
Michigan Central Ry. Co., 98 Mich.,

1; 56 N. W., 1039; Beath v. Rapid
Ry. Co., 119 Mich., 512; 78 N. W.,
537; Goucher v. Jamieson, 124 Mlch..
21; 82 N. W., 663.
51—Schwingschlegl
v. Monroe, 113
Mich., 683; 72 N. W., 7.
52—Nelson v. Crawford, 122 Mich.,
466; 81 N. W., 335.
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Of judgments by con1‘ession.—“If any debtor shall
§482.
appear before a justice of the peace without process, and
confess in writing, signed by him in the presence of the
justice, that he is indebted to another upon contract in a.
certain speciﬁed sum, it shall be lawful for such justice, with
the consent of the creditor, to enter judgment on such con
fession againt the debtor, for any sum not exceeding three
hundred dollars.’ ’1
A justice can render judgment by confession, by this
section, only in cases where the indebtedness arises “upon
contract.”

_

The defendant must appear in person before the justice, in
court,“ and sign the written confession; and it must appear
from the entry of the judgment, that the statute has been
1--C. L., 5 705. Judgment by con
fession may be rendered notwithstand
by process.
ing suit was commenced
A confession of judgment that is suf
iieient without process is equally good
Giddings, 24
Hollister
v.
with it:
Mich., 501.
A judgment confessed by
an infant in his own name is void,
by
and so is a judgment confessed
an infant’s partner in the name of the
ﬁrm.
Partners have no implied au

thority to confess judgments for each
Soper v. Fry, 37 Mich., 236.
other:
The treasurer of a corporation has no
implied power, as such, to consent to
judgment against the corporation with
out the institution of suit: Stevens v.
Carp River Iron Co., 57 Mich., 4272
24 N. W.,_160.
See note to C. L.,
Q 705.

2—Bronaghin
v. Throop, 15 Johns.,
478; Tenney v. Filer, 8 Wend., 569.
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complied with, and that the confession was signed in the
presence of the justice, or the judgment will be void.“
A confession of judgment must be for “a certain speciﬁed
sum.” A justice would have no power to enter judgment on
3—Beach v. Botsford, 1 Doug. Mich.,
199; Clark v. Holmes, 1 Ibid., 390;
A
Allen v. Carpenter, 15 Mich., 32.
judgment on a confession not in writ
1
ing is void:
Wilson v. Farrand,
Mich., 157.
In Spear v. Carter and
of
Ilose (1 Mich., 19),
the entry
the judgment, after the title of the
cause, was as follows: “Judgment by
written confession of the above named
defendants in favor of the above named
plaintiff,
for forty-eight dollars and
cents, damages and costs of
eighteen
"The statute
The court said:
suit."
authorized the entry of judgment, pro
vided that such confession be in writ
ing, signed by the person making the
same,
in presence
of the justice, or
one or more competent witnesses. But
it does not appear that the defendants
appeared before
the jus
voluntarily
tice, or that he ever saw them, or that
any writing signed by the defendants
in the presence of the justice, or one
or more competent witnesses, was be
Nor does it appear what
fore him.
the cause of action was, upon which
And, there
the judgment was entered.
fore, it does not appear whether the
claim or cause of action was of such
character as that, by the tatute, the
justice was authorized to enter judg
ment upon it.
The statute provided a
mode, as the only mode, in which judg
ment by confession could be entered.
Until there has been a literal com
pliance with this provision of law, the
justice cannot have jurisdiction
of a
Farrand,
1
v.
defendant :" Wilson
Mich., 161.
Such a judgment being
void. the security for the stay of the
execution would not be liable. as there
would be no consideration to support
his undertaking:
Wilson v. Farrand,
1 Mich., 156.
Where in a confession the language
was. “I confers judgment on a demand
arising upon contract,“ &c., instead of
“1 am indebted on,“ &c., held, suf
Kinyon v. Fowler, 10 Mich.,
ﬂcient:
16.

Where the entry

of a judgment

by

confession recited that the parties ap
peared before the justice, but omitted
to state that the judgment was ren
held,
dered
by consent of plaintiff;
suﬂicient; that this imported that the
plaintii!
particl
was present
and
pnted in the proceedings, and his con
Kinyon v.
sent was to be presumed:
Fowler, 10 Mich., 17, 19.
In render
ing a judgment by confession, the jus
tice must strictly pursue the authority
given him by the statute. and all the
facts necessary to give him jurisdiction
must afllrmativeiy appear in his pro
ceedings,
presumed:
and cannot
be
Wilson v. Farrand, 1 Mich., 160.
The
entry of a Justice's judgment
docket
must be as certain in matters of sub
stance as the judgment of a court of
record:
Rood v. School District of
Bloomfield, 1 Doug. Mich., 502.
The
entry must show not only the deter
mination of the court upon the subject
submitted, but the parties in favor of
and against whom it operates: White
well, v. Hover, 3 Mich., 88; see the
form of entry in this case at page 85'».
Where the entry of a judgment recited
that, “lt is therefore considered that
the said P do recover against the said
D the sum of,” &c., held, that the
docket did not clearly and conclusively
show in whose favor and against whom
the judgment was rendered,
as it must
do; and that it was not admissible to
show by parol that P and D meant
plaintiff and defendant: Rood v. School
District of Bloomﬁeld, 1 Doug., 502.
Where judgment was confessed
on a
note, but the justice by error entered
the Judgment for only a part of the
amount, held, that the note and debt
upon which it was given were merged
in the Judgment, and that the judg
ment was a bar to a suit for the
balance of the amount; that before
stay or execution, the justice might
probably have corrected the judgment
by amendment,
but that after execu
tion on the judgment as entered, there
was no remedy for the balance of the
claim: Town v. Smith, 14 Mich., 348.
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for an uncertain and unliquidated amount.‘

The

confession should state that the damages confessed were upon
If there are two or more defendants, the confes
contract.“
sion must be signed by all.“ If the person giving the confes
sion consent‘ that execution issue before the time prescribed
by the statute,’ add at the end of the confession, “and con
sent that execution issue upon said judgment immediately,”
or, at such other time as is agreed on.
j
The provision of the statute requiring the confession to be
in writings applies only to cases where the parties appear vol
untarily before the justice, without process having been is
sued.

In

cases where suit has been commenced by service

of

confession of judgment or an admission of plain
tiﬁ"s cause of action may be made orally in court without any
of the formalities prescribed by that section?
process,

a.

Of judgments of nonsuit and discontinua.nce.
Judgments of nonsuit, with costs, shall be rendered against
a plaintiff prosecuting an action before a justice of the peace,
in the following cases:
If he discontinue or withdraw his action;
1.
If he fail to appear on the return of any process, within
2.
one hour after the same was returnable;
If, after an adjournment, he fail to appear within one
3.
hour after the time to which the adjournment shall have been

Cl

§483.

made;
4.

If

he become

nonsuited on the trial.”1°

As to contradicting the docket entry
where the judgment was by mistake
entered as upon confession, see. Dodge
v. Bird, 10 Mich., 518; ante, 5 374,
note 46.
4—Nichols v. Hewit, 4 .Tohns., 423.
5—(‘. L., Q 705; see, Loomis v. Fos
ter, 1 Mich., 165.
6—Ciarlr v. Holmes, 1 Doug. Mich.,
890.

7—C. L., Q 862.
8—C. L., 1 705.
9—Crouse v. Derbyshire, 10 Mich.,
But such confessions or admis
479.
sions must be made in court on the
return day or some adjourned day ot
the cause, and to and in presence of
the court while sitting in the cause:
Clark v. Holmes, 1 Doug. Mich., 390.
i

justice
may render
The
judgment
against a party upon his oral admis
sion of the cause of action made in
open court and after issue joined, and
if such admission be made without
mistake or misapprehension. it should
for the purpose ot that trial be held
Biker,
conclusive:
Morrison
v.
26
Mich., 385, 387.
A judgment of
l0—C. L., 1 836.
non-suit is a ﬁnal termination of the
suit, but does not bar a subsequent
action for same cause.
While it ﬁnally
disposes of that particular
suit it is
not res adludicafa as to the subject
matter:
Bowne v. Johnson, 1 Doug.
Mich., 186.
The court cannot compel
a plaintiff to submit to a judgment of
Cahili v. Kalamazoo M. I.
non-suit:
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a

is,

Under the 2d and 3d subdivisions of this section, a judg
ment of nonsuit is not to be entered for the non-appearance
of the plaintiff, unless the defendant appear and require such
judgment to be entered. If neither party appear, the suit will
in such case, to be en
be discontinued, but no judgment
tered, and each party must pay his own costs."
It would seem that
plaintiff cannot discontinue or with

is

draw his action at any time other than when the parties are to
appear before the justice, unless the defendant consent to -it.
By statute, the justice
required,'when the plaintiﬁ discon
tinues or withdraws his action, forthwith to render judgment."
If, before the return day of process, or the day to»which the
is

is

adjourned, the plaintiff discontinues or withdraws his
no mode of ascertaining the defendant’s costs,
action, there
in his absence, and therefore judgment of nonsuit cannot be
A different construction of the section would enable
given.
the plaintiff to deprive the defendant of the costs to which he
cause

had been put in preparing for trial.‘-'*

Of judgments upon tria.l.—“When the jurors have
§484.
agreed upon their verdict, they shall deliver the same to the

475

§

I

2

5

f

§

is adjourned, the justice loses juris
diction of the case, except to render
judgrnent of nonsuit and
for
costs
against the plaintiff: Brady v. Taber,
29 Mich.,
199.
As to the time for
plaintiff's appearance. see, ante,
149.
As to the absence of the justice beyond
the time, see, ante,
149, notes 32,
See, note to C. L.,
33.
836, and
Talbot v. Kuhn, 89 Mich., 30, 32; 50
N. W.. 791.
11—Edwards' Treatise,
ed., 117.’
12—C. L.,
843.
But if the de
fendant has given notice of set-off, the
plaintiff cannot discontinue or submit
to a nonsuit without the consent of
the defendant:
See, ante,
273. And
note to C. L.,
843.
13-—Where a cause was adjourned
by consent of parties, without plead
ings, and on the return day the justice
refused to proceed
with the cause:
Held, that such
might
refusal
be
treated as a judgment of nonsuit, and
might be appealed
from: Patridge v.
Lott, 15 Mich., 251.

I

a

a

2

Co.,
Doug. Mich., 133.
iVhere the
plaintiff
failed to appear within the
entered
hour and later the justice
judgment for him it was set aside in
Cagney
proceedings:
v.
mandamus
Wattles, 121 Mich., 469; 80 N. W., 245.
If plaintiff submit to a voluntary non
suit, as by failing to appear, he can
Schulte v. Kelley, 124
not appeal:
Mich., 330; 83
N. W., 405.
The
statute requiring the justice to wait
one hour for the appearance of the
plaintiff has been extended by judicial
to require the court to
construction
give the defendant
like opportunity
The statute,
to delay his appearance.
however, makes no provision of this
kind and
failure to do so would not
avoid the judgment upon the th'eory
that the court by so doing lost juris
The judg
diction over the defendant.
however, mightibc reversed
on
ment,
Talbot v.
special appeal or ccrtioru-ri.
Kuhn, 89 Mich., 30; 50 N. W., 791.
By the non-appearance of the plaintiff
within one hour after the time when
the cause is returnable, or to which it
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justice publicly, and thereupon the justice shall enter the same
in his docket, and render judgment thereor_1.”14
“Judgment for the defendant, with costs, shall be rendered
whenever a trial has been had and it be found by verdict, or
by the decision of the justice, that the plaintiff has no cause
of action against the defendant/’1°
“But whenever an action
is brought against two or more persons, the plaintiff may at
any time before the ﬁnal submission of the cause to the justice
or the jury, be allowed to discontinue the action as against
any of the defendants, and thereupon to amend his declara
tion and proceed against the other defendant or defendants
in a like manner as if the action had been originally brought
against them alone. But the plaintitf shall not be required to
discontinue as to any of them, but the jury shall show by
its verdict, or the justice by his ﬁnding, in a trial without a
The justice has
14—C. L., Q 832.
no control over the verdict; he must
accept it as given; he cannot destroy
its effect by refusal to enter judgment
upon it: Alt v. Lalone, 54 Mich., 304;
20 N. W., 52.
It has the ei!e4:t of a
judgment though there be no formal
entry of judgment upon it: Gaines v.
Betts, 2 Doug. Mich., 99.
The judg
ment entry is not the judgment but
the evidence
of it: Hickey v. Hine
dale, 8 Mich., 267.
This rule that the justice
must
accept the verdict of the jury and
enter the judgment accordingly, does
not prevent his putting in proper lan
guage a verdict which is informal yet
unambiguous:
People v. Foot, 1 Doug.
Mich., 102; Smith v. Dodge, 37 Mich.,
357; Wilson v. McCrillles,
50 Mich.,
349: 15 N. W., 504; Sleight v. Hen
ning, 12 Mich., 377; Hendrickson v.
Walker, 32 Mich., 68. Where the verdict
of a jury in replevin was, “This jury
iind for the plalntitf;" Held, that,
though not a formal verdict in re
plevin, yet it was suiﬂciently indicated
for which party the jury had found
the issue, and that it was the duty of
the justice to enter the verdict in the
proper form according to the ﬁnding,
and render judgment thereon: People
Where
V. Foote, 1 Doug. Mich., 102.
the entry in a docket was, “The jury
returned with a verdict for the plain
damages-—
dollars
tiﬂ of eighteen

$18.00—and costs of suit
taxed at
$5.00," there being no other formal
entry of judgment on the docket; Held,
suflicient: that the ﬁnding of a ver
dict in a justice’s court being in legal
eﬂect a judgment:
Gaines v. Betts, 2
Mich., 98.
Doug.
And so, where the
entry was, “After hearing all the evi
dence,
the jurors returned a verdict
for plaintiff
for the sum of $48.05
and costs of suit; damages,
$48.05;
$7.63;" Hold, that this entry
costs,
was valid and of eﬂ’ect as a judgment,
and suﬂiclent to
authorize execution:
Kelsey v. Detroit, 6 Mich., 315;.see
also, Zimmer v. Davis. 35 Mich., 41.
A judgment rendered and entered by
the justice upon his minutes, is not
void because not forthwith transcribed
into his docket:
Saunders v. Tioga
An objec
Manf. Co., 27 Mich., 520.
tion that the judgment is rendered for
a triﬂing amount of interest in excess
of the true amount, will not avoid it:
&c.,
District,
Bowen v. School
36
Mich., 149.
When a justice has ren
dered a judgment, he has no power to
vac-ate it or set it aside, or to render
a new judgment in the case; nor has
the circuit court any power to require
him by mandamus to do so:
O'Brien
v. Tallman,
36 Mich., 13; and notes
‘
to C. L., 5 832.
15-0. L., § 837, as amended by
Pub. Acts, 1901, p. 78.
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jury, which of them are, and which of them are not liable to
the plaintiff, and judgment shall be given accordingly.” The
effect of this statute would seem to avoid the effect of mis
joinder of defendants at the common law, but does not change
the rule as to misjoinder of plaintiffs.
When, upon theptrial of a cause, either with or without a
jury, and whether the defendant had appeared or not, a. sum
is found in favor of the plaintiff, judgment is to be rendered
against the defendant for such sum, and the costs.
“When a balance shall be found in favor of a party, either
by the verdict of a jury or upon a hearing before the justice,
exceeding the sum for which the justice is authorized to give
judgment, such party may remit and release the excess, and
may take judgment for the residue.”1‘*
If the jury ﬁnd a. verdict of damages for the defendant, in
a case in which he is not entitled to damages, as in an action
for a tort, the defendant may remit the damages, and upon
the justice entering in the docket that the defendant remits
the damages, he may enter judgment for the defendant gen
erally."
§485. Judgments against joint debtors.-“If process shall
have issued against two or more persons, jointly indebted,
and shall have been personally served upon either of the
defendants, the defendant who may have been served with
process, shall answer to the plaintiff, and the judgment in
such case, if rendered in favor of the plaintiff, shall be against
all the defendants, in the same manner as if all had been
served with process; but execution shall issue only in the manner
hereinafter

directed.

’ ’ 18

16—C. L.. 5 844.
17—Burger
v. Kortright, 4 Johns.,
414.

At the common
18—C. L., 5 840.
law, a judgment against one joint
debtor alone on the joint demand oper
ated as a merger of the demand into
the judgment, and thereby extinguished
the liability of the other joint debtor
Candee
and all remedy against him:
v. Clark, 2 Mlch., 255; Robertson v.
Johns.,
455;
Pierce
Lynch.
v.
18
Kearney, 5 Hill. 82: 4 Seiden, 413.
But a judgment rendered under the

joint debtor act, in form against two
joint debtors, only one of whom was

served
with process, is not an extin
guishment of the demand
sued upon,
and an action may still be maintained
against the debtor not served: Bone
steel v. Todd, 9 Mlch., 371; Holcomb
v. Tift, 54 Mlch., 647; 20 N. W., 627;
see, Storey v.
Bird, 8 Mlch., 316;
Mlch.,
Brooks v. Mclntyre,
4
318.
Where suit is brought on a demand
upon which several persons are jointly
and severally liable, the plaintiff can
not treat it as a joint demand against
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The above section applies only to cases in which the defend
ants are jointly indebtccl; and does not give any authority in
cases of tort.
of statutory provisions, where
Independent
process had issued against several, the justice could not try
the cause unless the process had been served upon all the
The declaration in a justiee’s court must agree
defendants."
with the process in respect to the number of the defendants.”
But in an action for a tort, if the process has not been served
personally on all the defendants, and those upon whom it was
not so served do not appear, the plaintiff may declare against
those only who were so served or appear?‘ If, in such case,
he should declare against all and obtain judgment against all,
it would be erroneous.“
VVhen one defendant is brought into court, and he estab
lishes a defence which is personal, as infancy, the plaintiff is
not entitled to judgment against the other defendants upon
whom process was not served." The statute directs judgment
to be against all the defendants, and there is no authority
for giving a diiferent judgment against those not served with
process from that rendered against those in court. And judg
ment may be entered as well when the defendant not brought
in is an infant as when he is an adult; and a judgment thus
entered against an infant defendant will not be reversed, ai
a part of the defendants oniy;'he must
treat it as several against each or

of the justice, and therefore not one
for which the former judgment could
be attacked collaterally
in the present
action founded upon it, while it re
mained nnreversed: Allen v. Mills, 26
Mich., 123.
A joint judgment cannot
against several defendants
be entered
when service of process against a por
tion of them has neither been made or
attempted: Proctor v. Lewis, 50 Mich.,
329; 15 N. W., 495.
A judgment
against all partners is not void for
want of service on ail:
Ilirsh v.
Fisher, — Mich., —; 101 N. W., 48;
Oct., 1904.
19—Rose v. Oliver et al., 2 J'ohns.,

joint

therefore,
against the whole:
where a judgment was entered jointly
against two out of three joint and
several obllgors, it was held erroneous:
Mich.,
9
380.
Winslow v. Herrick,
Where A sued B in debt founded upon
a former judgment against B, it ap
peared on the trial that the action in
which the former judgment was ren
was brought against B and C
dered
upon a joint promissory note signed by
both B and C, but service was had on
B only, the process being returned as
to C not found, and that the judgment
was rendered against B alone, he being
the only one served; Held, that while
this was an error for which the judg
ment might have been reversed upon
ccrtioran or special appeal, yet it was
not one which went to the jurisdiction
_

365.

20—See, ante, 5 162.
21—C. L., 5 775.
22-Richards v. Walton.

12

Johns,

434.

478

23-—Leggett v. Boyd, 6 Wend., 500.

C11.

XXVI.

or

JUDGMENTS.

§485

entered without the appointment of a guardian.“
“The act is framed upon the"idea of the non-appearance of
the debtor.” In case the infant defendant is personally served
though

with

or appears, then a guardian must be appointed.
VVhen a suit is commenced against joint debtors, those served
with process on appearing may confess judgment and bind
the property of all the defendants.
The judgment in such a
case is entered against all the defendants, and the execution
will confbrm to the judgment; but it can be enforced only
against the joint property of the defendants, and the separate
property of the party who confessed the judgment?“
process,

“Such judgment shall be conclusive evidence of the liability
of the defendant who was personally served with process in
the suit, or who appeared therein; but against every other de
fendant, it shall be evidence only of the extent of the plaintiff's
demand, after the liability of such defendant shall have been
established by other evidence.”2°
In an action of debt upon such judgment, upon the general
issue the judgment would not entitle the plaintiff to recover,
without other evidence of liability against the defendant not

is,

brought into court in the
be upon the plaintiif to
not upon the defendant
that the record
means
as

ﬁrst suit; the burden of proof would
show the original indebtedness, and
to disprove

it.

“What the statute

of the judgment shall not

be allowed

of any manner of effect, unless the jury shall believe there

joint obligation against
judgment on
two persons when only one of them
although
with
process,
25-Pardee v. Haynes, 10 Wend., was served
joint in form is in no legal sense a
630.
Where the docket joint obligation binding on both alike.
841.
26—C. L.,
showed a joint suit. and but one de-‘ It binds the defendant served, but does
and a not conclusively bind the other.
with process,
it
fondant served
“detendant,"
does not merge the debt upon
against
the
judgment
which
840,
was founded so as to preclude its
held, that the statute C. L.,
requiring that when only one of two being sued over again as to both.
And
joint debtors is served, the judgment any proceeding against the defendant
shall be in form against both; this not served, in order to bind him would
indi
ﬁnding against one suiliciently
have to be on the original obligation,
whether nominally on the judgment or
cated what judgment the plaintiff was
not.
In suing over such a judgment,
entitled to. and that his rights were
it would be competent to sue the de
not affected by the clerical error oi’ the
judgment
justice
entering
fendant served aione, and thus to treat
in
the
against the
“detendant"
instead oi! the judgment as his sole obligation:
against the “detendants:“
Zimmer v. Ibid., Holcomb v. Tift, 54 Mich., 647
Davis. 35 Mich., 89; Holcomb v. Titt, 8; 20 N. W., 627.
647; 20 N. W., 627.
54 Mich.,
v.

Denison,

11

Wend.,

a

24—Mason

A

5

it

5

612.
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was a joint liability on the cause of action, which it sets forth.
If there be no evidence raising even a question of this for
the jury, the record should be withdrawn from them alto
gethcr.”2"

Judgments _in suits commenced by at-tachment.—“A
§ 486.
judgment obtained before a justice in any suit commenced by
attachment, in which the defendant was not personally served,
and did not appear, shall be only presumptive evidence of
indebtedness in any suit which may be brought thereon, or in
which the same may come in question, and may be repelled by
'

the defendant.”28

Of the time when judgment is to be entered.—“In
§487.
cases where plaintiff shall be nonsuited, discontinue or with
draw his action, and where a judgment shall be confessed, and
in all cases where a verdict shall be rendered, or the defendant
shall be in custody at the time of hearing the cause, the jus
tice shall forthwith render judgment, and enter the same in his
docket; in ‘all other eases he shall render judgment and enter
the. same in his docket within four days after the same shall
have been submitted to him for the ﬁnal decision.”2°
The directions in the foregoing sections as to the time when
or within which judgments are to be rendered, are mandatory,
and must be strictly complied with. In those cases where the
27—Carman V. Townsend, 6 Wend.,
206; Mervin v. Kumbel, 23 \Vend., 293.
If defendant is
28—C. L.,"§ 842.
personally served and appears defects
in the levy or inventory will not defeat
Strew,
33
Hunt v.
judgment:
the
Mich., 88.
29--C. L., § 843. Under this sec
tion of the statute, a Judgment of a
justice of the pence in a cause tried
and
by him, without a jury, rendered
entered in his docket on the fifth day
after the trial, is void, even though
the fourth day be Sunday; and such
judgment is not the subject of general
appeal:
liarrlson v. Sager, 27 Mich.,
476; Brady v. Taber, 29 Mich., 199;
Weaver v. Lammon, 62 Mich., 368; 28
N. W., 905; Galloway v. Corbitt, 52
Mich., 460; 18 N. W., 218; Madge v.
Yapies,‘58 Mich., 310; 25 N. W., 297.
But when a Justice's judgment is ren
the time that would be
dered within

proper in ordinary cases, it cannot be
assumed on appeal, without proof that
he has exceeded his jurisdiction
by de
laying judgment while the defendant
was in custody; and if he in fact did
so a further return to show it, should
be applied for: Barker v. Wheeler, 4-1
Mich., 176; 6 N. W., 234.
The rendi
tion of judgment by a justice is a ju
dicial act, for the performance of
which it is necessary
to hold court.
Therefore, if :1 justice take four days
after trial before himself in which to
render judgment, he cannot render it
on any of the legal holidays mentioned
in C. L., § 4880, should such n holiday
come within the four days, nor could
he render it on the following
day if
the holiday should fail on Sunday, as
in that case the statute makes the fol
lowing day the holiday:
Hemmens
v. Bentley, 32 Mich., 89; see, C. L.,
5 843,
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judgment is to

be rendered forthwith, it must be done and the
taxed at once; if it be delayed until a subsequent day
the judgment will be void.3°
In those cases where the justice
is allowed four days, he may render the judgment on any
costs

day Within that time,“ but if delayed beyond the four days,
the judgment will be of no eﬂ"ect.32
The direction for entering
the judgment in the docket, however, is directory merely, and
the judgment will not be invalidated if not entered within the
To render judgment is one
time prescribed in the statute.
thing, to enter it another. The judgment is complete when pro
nounced, and until entered in the docket may be proved by the
'
oath of the justice or fromhis minutes.”
OF COSTS.

_

with costs.-—“Whenever a judgment
shall be rendered by any justice of the peace against any party,
unless otherwise herein provided, it shall be with costs of
suits; but the whole amount of all the items of such costs shall
not exceed ten dollars; and no counsel or attorney fee shall be
taxed in favor of the prevailing party, except in those cases
Judgment to

§ 488.

be

expressly provided by 1aw.”34
“No costs shall be recovered by the plaintiﬁ in actions upon
30—Sibley v. Howard, 3 Denio, 72.
Taxing costs is a judicial act, and a
part ot the act of rendering judgment:
Brig£I82
v.
Supervisors Onandaga
Mfg.
Denio, 26; Saunders v. Tioga
Mlch., 520.
After judgment
Co.,
27
a justice
on a. verdict for damages,
has authority to proceed on the same
day to ascertain and determine the
costs, and it necessary may, with con
sent of parties at least, hold the cause
open a reasonable time even beyond
that day for that purpose. The costs,
in such eases, being an incident to
the prin'cipai judgment, the determina
tion ot their amount relates back, and
takes effect as of the time of the ren
Saunders v.
dition of the judgment:
Tioga Mtg. Co., 27 Mlch., 520, and
see, Hickey v. Hinsdale, 8 Mlch., 267.
31—Draper v. Tooker, 16 Mlch., 74.
Wend.,
19
v. Davis,
32—Watson
371; Bisseil V. Bisseii, 11 Barb., 96.
As to the time of rendering judgment,
see,

ant-e,
31

§

483.

33-Hickey

Mlch.,
v. Hinsdale,
8
372; C. L., § i)61,and antc,§374.
A judgment rendered and entered by
the justice“ in his minutes, is not void
because not torthwith transcribed upon
his docket: Saunders v. Tioga Mfg.
Co., 27 Mlch., 520.
34—C. L., Q! 838, 11280, providing
for the taxation of additional
costs
for jurors
in certain cases.
Costs
when made up, are an incident oi! the
judgment, but are not so inseparable
from the damages as to invalidate a.
justices‘s
judgment,
when excessive.
Excessive costs when awardediby :1
justice‘s judgment. may be remitted:
Whelpiey
Nash, 46
Mlch.,
25;
v.
W., 570.
8 N.
Since the statute
providing
for attorney's fees in ac
tions ior labor debts has been declared
unconstitutional
(Chair Co. v. Runnels,
77 Mlch., 111: 43 N. W., 1006: Bur
rows v. Brooks. 113 Mlch., 307; 71 N.
\\’.. 460). there would seem to be lit
tle, it any. occasion for the applies.
367,
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judgments rendered in this state, unless good cause shall be
shown therefor upon oath.”35
_

“Any party causing witnesses to be subpoenaed, and not
swearing and examining them, if in attendance, shall pay the
costs occasioned thereby, unless the use of such witness or wit
be dispensed with by the admission of the opposite
party; any party calling more than two witnesses to a fact not
nesses

contradicted by any other witness, shall pay the costs occa
sioned by such supernumerary witness.”3°
A defendant neglecting to set oﬁ a demand which might
have been allowed him in the suit will be precluded from
recovering costs in any action thereafter brought to ‘recover
such demand."
The costs which are to be included in the judgment are only
those made by the party in whose favor the judgment is ren
dered; and it would be improper to include any costs made by
the opposite

party."

Fees of justices of the peace in civil cases.-—'I‘he foi
fees are prescribed by the statute for the services of
justices of the peace :3“
“For a summons, warrant, or venire, ﬁfteen cents; for trying
each cause, one dollar for the ﬁrst day; and for each additional
§ 489.

lowing

day the sum of one dollar; for issuing a writ of replevin
tion or the last clause of this statute
’i‘he costs referred to in this section
are exclusive of and in addition to the
allowance for jury fees paid as pro
vided in C. L., 5 11230.
The limitation of costs to 'ten doi
lars found in this
ection does not
apply to special proceedings under C.
L., §§ 10756 and 10770, providing for
enforcing liens for services:
La Goo
v. Seaman, —- Mich., -—; 99 N. W.,
393, (Apr., 1904).
35—C. L., Q 839: Whelpley v. Nash,
46 Mich., 26; 8 _N. W., 570.
36-—C.

L., I

825.
Q 781;
in full, ante, Q 269.
recovered
in a suit

see, the section
No costs can be
upon a demand
which might have been set off in a
previous suit by
party:
the
other
liuntoon v. Russell, 41 Mich., 316; 2
N. W., 38.
1 Johns.
88—Dennison v. Collins,
37——C. L.,

or

A justice of the peace acts ju
in determining the amount of
costs to be taxed in favor‘ of the pre
vaiiing party in suits tried before him:
Saunders v. Tioga Mfg. Co., 27 Mich.,
111.

dicially

520.

L., § 11226.
Costs in pro
betore Justices for forcible
entries and detainers are taxed under
the same
rules
as when brought
before circuit
court commissioners:
People,
Dibble
Mich.,
v.
22
371.
The payment of the fee for making
a
return
to
an appeal
may
be
by the Justice and by making
-waived
a return without it he does waive it.
He. however, is not called upon to
make his return until it is paid if he
desires to Insist upon it:
Wiley v.
Judge of Ailegan Circuit,
29 Mich.,
486; Stevenson v. Kent Yin-cult Judge,
44 Mich., 162; 6 N. W., 217.
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attachment, twenty-ﬁve cents; for entering any cause upon thc
docket after return of process, twenty-ﬁve cents; and for mak
ing all other entries upon the docket in any cause not other
wise provided for, twenty-ﬁve cents; for each subpoena not ex
ceeding four, ten cents; for swearing a jury, ten cents; for
swearing each witness in a cause, ten cents; for entering every
ﬁnal judgment, twenty-ﬁve cents; for issuing execution, twenty
ﬁve cents; prospective costs for one execution may be taxed ;‘°
for every continuance or adjournment at the request of the
party, ﬁfteen cents; for drafting any bond or recognizance,
requisite in any case before a justice of the peace, thirty-ﬁve
cents; for approving any bond or recognizance, ten cents; for
reducing the evidence, objections to evidence, and exceptions
taken by either party, upon [the] trial of any cause, ‘ten cents
for each folio; for making and ﬁling return upon appeal, one
dollar; for taking depositions, examinations, or confessions, ten
cents for each folio; for entering a discontinuance or satisfac
tion, ten cents; for entering every assignment of a judgment,
ﬁfteen cents; for entering an amicable suit, twenty-ﬁve cents;
for appointing appraisers of estates of deceased persons, ﬁfteen
cents in each case; for marrying and making return thereof,
two dollars; for taking acknowledgment of a deed or other
instrument, twenty-ﬁve cents for each person acknowledging;
for making a certiﬁed transcript of any judgment and of the
proceedings in any cause, ﬁfty cents; for certifying cause to the
circuit court on pica of title, ﬁfty cents; for making return on
special appeal or certiorari, two dollars; and no justice of the
peace shall receive any other fees or compensation for any
services rendered

in any civil cause

than such as is herein

”“
_
before, provided.
The term “folio” means one hundred words, counting every
ﬁgure necessarily used, as a word; and every portion of a folio,
when in the whole draft or paper there shall not be a complete
folio, and when there shall be any excess over the last folio, is
to be computed as a folio.“
_
40-c.
see,
501,

L.,

gg

Hollister

v.

503_

ssa

and 11244,

Giddings,

24

41-c. L.,

and
Mlch.,

42—(‘.
Sturgis.

483

L.,
38

'

§ 11220.
Q 11239:

Mlch.,

639.

Thornton

v.
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Constables’ fees in civil ca.ses.—Constab1es
are enti
§490.
tled to the following fees for services :43
“For serving a warrant, ﬁfty cents; for serving a summons,
twenty-ﬁve cents; for a copy of every summons delivered on
request, or left at the dwelling of the defendant, in his ab
sence, ten cents; for serving an attachment or writ of replevin,
seventy-ﬁve cents; and for a copy thereof, and of the inventory
of the property seized, twenty-ﬁve cents; for serving a sub
poena, ﬁfteen cents for service upon each witness summoned
by him; for serving an execution on the body, or goods and
chattels of the defendant, ﬁfty cents; committing a defendant
to prison on execution, ﬁfty cents; for traveling in the service
of process, ten cents for each mile necessarily traveled from
the place of service to the place of return; summoning a jury,
seventy-ﬁve cents; attending on a jury, ﬁfty cents; for collect
ing and paying over money on executions, four per cent upon
all sums not exceeding two hundred dollars, and for all sums
over that amount, two per cent; advertising sale of property,
ﬁfty cents; selling property, ﬁfty cents; for attending a circuit
court at the request of the sheriff, one dollar and ﬁfty cents
for each day, to be paid out of the county treasury.".

“When any cattle or other live stock shall be taken in execu
tion, it shall be the duty of the justice who issued the execu
tion, or other justice charged with the duty of collecting the
judgment whereon such execution issued, to allow the con
stable, for keeping of the same, a reasonable compensation, to
be taxed and collected as other costs in the suit.”44
No fees are allowed to an oﬁicer for traveling in order to
serve process, unless the service is actually made." If there
are several defendants residing at the same place, the con
stable will be entitled to but one travel fee for serving any
process upon them."
Sheriﬂ"s fees for performing duties of constables.
§ 491.
Any sheriff, under sheriff, or deputy sheriff of any county of
this state, may and shall hereafter be fully authorized to serve
or execute any and all process, civil or criminal, issued, or
G‘

L., § 11224.
L.. 5 B86: Bushey v. Baths,
45 Mich., 181; 7 N. W.,
80_2.
43—C.

44-0.
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45—Ez parts Wyles, 1 Denlo. 658.
46—Prlndle v. Harris, 1 Wend., 104.
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which may by law be issued by any justice of the peace, and
to have and to exercise all the powers and duties of constables;
and for such services they shall be entitled to the same fees
as are now,

cases.”‘"

or may

by law to constables in like

be allowed

J

ur0r’s fees.——“Each juror sworn in a justice ’s court,
§ 492.
or before any officer in any special proceedings, allowed by
law, or before any sheriff upon a writ of inquiry, shall be en
title to receive one dollar for each day ’s attendance, and one
half dollar for each half day’s attendance as such juror, and
the party requiring such jury shall be liable for the fees of
such jury, and shall advance the fees for one day’s attendance
before the vcnire shall be issued, and the fees for each succeed
ing day before said jury shall be required to sit and hear testi
mony or give any verdict in the same. And in case the party
so calling for a jury shall refuse at any time to advance the
fees, the jury, if impaneled, shall be discharged, and said cause
shall proceed as though no jury had been demanded in the
ﬁrst instance. And at the time of the discharge of such jury,
the officer to whom such fees were advanced shall pay to each
juror so much of said fees as he shall be entitled to, and return
the balance, if there be any, to the party of whom it was re
ceived; and when the party requiring such jury shall prevail
in such action or proceeding, the whole of the fees to which
such ‘jury shall be entitled, shall be taxed as costs in his favor,
in addition to the costs provided by section ﬁve thousand ﬁve
hundred a-ml seventy-three, Compiled Laws of eighteen hun
dred and seventy-one, as amended by act ninety-six of the Ses
sion Laws of 1873.” 48
at
§493. Fees of witnesses, including ga.rnishees.—“For
tending in any “‘ “ "‘ * justice court or before any per
son authorized to hold inquests on the view of dead bodies or
before any officer, person or board authorized to take the ex
amination of witnesses, seventy-ﬁve cents for each day and
thirty-seven and a half cents for each half day. For traveling
L.,

§ 2595; see, ante, 5 39.
L., 5 11230.
The section
"ﬁve thousand ﬂvc hundred and seventy-three" referred to in this section,
is an error; It should he Q 5375 of the
47-—C.

48-C.

Laws of 1871, being C. L.,
S38; see the section quoted ante,
477; see, Mr-Gruw v. Sturgeon, 29
Mich., 426, and untv, 5 314.

Comp.
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at the rate of ten cents per mile in coming to the place of at
tendance, to be estimated from the residence of such witness,
if within this state, or from the boimdary line of this state,
which such witness passed in coming, if his residence be out
of the state; but this section shall not be so construed as to
allow any fees to witnesses on behalf of the people in criminal
prosecutions, or in suits for the recovery of ﬁnes, penalties or
" ° " " .”‘°
forfeitures.

'

Under this section it matters not where a resident witness be
when subpoena is served upon him, the fees are to be computed
from his residence.
Garnishees are entitled to the same fees as witnesses.‘
Double costs.—In actions against ofﬁcers and in other
cases hereafter mentioned, the defendant, if he obtain judg
ment, is in such cases entitled to recover what is usually called
double costs, or, more correctly speaking, the taxed costs and
one-half thereof in addition.”
§ 494.

“In

the following actions, if judgment be rendered for the
defendant upon verdict, demurrer, non-suit, non-pros, discon
tinuance of the plaintiﬁ or otherwise, in’ any action, certiorari,
writ of .error, or other proceeding, such defendant shall recover
the amount of his taxed costs, and one-half thereof in addition:
oﬁicers appointed under the
1. In actions against public
authority of this state, or elected by the people; or against any
person specially appointed according to law, to execute the
duties of such public officer; for or concerning any act done by
such ofﬁcer or person, by virtue of his ofﬁce, or for or concern
ing the omission, by such officer or person, to do any act, which

it was his oﬁicial duty to perform;
2. In actions against any other person, for doing any act
by the commandment of such oiﬁcers or persons, or in their aid
or assistance, touching the duties of such oﬂice or appoint
ment;
3. In actions against any person, for making any sale, or
doing any other act by authority of any statute of this state.”3
49—C. L., § 11221.
1—C. L., ii 990, 994.
2—Doubie costs mean single costs
and one-halt oi! single costs in addltlon: Gilbert v. Kennedy. 22 Mich., 5.
This provision
3-—C. L., l 11265.

is independent of C. L., 5 838: see,
ante, 5 488.
And the party entitled
to double costs may tax them not
withstanding
that section:
Fuller v.
Wilcox. 19 Wend., 351.

486
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To obtain double costs an application should be made to the
justice for that purpose, at the time of rendering judgment.
If the fact that the act for which the defendant is prosecuted,
was done by him as a public officer, is not apparent from and
admitted by the pleadings, the justice will proceed in the pres
ence of the parties to inquire into the defendant’s right to
double costs.‘

When double or treble costs are awarded to the
defendant‘, they belong to him, and the oﬁicers, witnesses and
jurors are entitled only to the single costs allowed them by
law for their services!‘
If the party inthe process under

which the acts are done indemniﬁes the officer, and assumes
the defence of the suit, &e., he, and not the oﬁicer, is entitled
j
to the double costs.“

It is not, however, in all cases, that an officer is entitled to
double costs, although he recover judgment. If he plead jointly
with one sued with him, and judgment be in favor of both, he
can recover single costs only; in such cases he must plead sep
arately from the others." So, to be entitled to double costs,
the defendant must recover upon the whole record, and when
for, and another against him, he recovers
single costs only)‘
Thus,’ if the officer is sued for taking sev
of
and on the trial the taking of part of
articles
property,
eral
them is justiﬁed by his process, and for the other part judg
ment is in favor of the plaintiif, single costs only can be recov
one issue is found

ered.

Taxation of costs.—Unless the parties agree upon the
justice must determine the amount to which the pre
vailing party is entitled. The justice determines the amount
from evidence presented, except as to his own, and the jury
costs of which he has information as a matter of course. The
costs of the constable or sheriff will usually be evidenced by his
returns on the various writs and processes served by him. The
witness’ costs are shown by a bill showing the names of each,
§ 495.

costs, the

2 ed., 1028; Fuller
But in this
19 Wend., 351.
state it has been held that double costs
are vested in the party by the judg-

4--2 Cow. 'I‘reat.,

v.

v. Wilcox,

and that no special order or
ﬁnding of the court is necessary to en»
title him to have them taxed: People

Judge of Wayne Co., 14 Mich., 33.
5—C. L., 5 11268.
v, McLean, 6 Wend.,
G-—MeI<‘arland

297.
7——Wales

ment,

v.

8—Seymour
285.
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12 Wend..
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the residence of each, the distance of residence from the place
of attendance, and the days in attendance.”
OF

FILING A TRANSCRIPT.

In circuit courts, when may be demanded.—“When
§ 496.
ever an execution may by law be issued upon any judgment
rendered by a justice of the peace, for twenty dollars or over
exclusive of costs, the party in whose favor such judgment
shall have been rendered, his assignee or the attorney of either
of the parties may make and deliver to the justice of the peace
having the control of such judgment, an aﬁidavit, setting forth
in substance, that the deponent knows, or has good reason to
believe, and does believe, that there are not sufﬁcient goods
and chattels liable to execution to satisfy such judgment,
Within the county in which such judgment was rendered, be
longing to such person or persons against whom such execution
may issue; and thereupon it shall be the duty of the jus
tice of the peace having the control of such judgment, rendered
by himself or any other justice, on the demand of any person
in whose favor the same shall have been rendered, his assignee
or the attorney of either of the parties to give a certiﬁed
transcript of such judgment and of the proceedings in the ease,
so far as they appear upon the docket, together with the orig
inal security for stay of execution, if any such security shall
have been given, and the original affidavit required by the
preceding provisions of this section.” 1°
9-—See,
246,
7.

258;

Jeffery
25

v. Hursh, 58 Mich.,
W., 176; 27 N. W.,

10—C. L., 5 S4 $41 Before the amend
ment oi 1867, 21 transcript could not
until afler an execution is
be ﬁled
sued by the justice had been returned
See, Comp. Laws of 1857,
unsatisﬁed:
3786: Peck v. Cavell, 16 Mich., 10.
Nor could such execution under the
former law be returned previous to
And it is ap
Ibid.
the return day:
that, under the law as it
prehended
now stands, if an execution has been
it would be
issued by the justice,
while
erroneous to ﬁle a transcript
the execution was out in the hands of
the oiﬁcer and before its return unsat
But, in Udell v. Kahn, it is
isﬁed.

held that the issue and return of an
execution unsatisﬁed before the jus
tice, is not now necessary to authorize
the ﬁling of a transcript.
But it an
execution has been returned unsatis
ﬁed» that fact ought to appear on the
justice's docket.
But if he omits it,
that will not invalidate the judgment.
The transcript
will be correct it it
correspond with the docket: Udell v.
Kahn, 31 Mich., 195.
A transcript
cannot be made and ﬂied in the circuit
court until the arrival of the time when
an execution may be issued on the
judgment.
Hence in those cases where
execution cannot issue until ﬁve days
after the rendition of judgment (see,
C. L., § 862i. a transcript
made and
ﬁled before that time, would be void:

488
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A transcript must be a full and ‘correct copy from the docket,
showing the judgment and all the proceedings in the case, so
far as they appear upon the docket, and must be certiﬁed by
the justice."
O'Brien v. 0’Brien, 42 Mich., 15; 3
N. W., 233; Vroman v. Thompson, 42
Mich., 306; 3 N. W., 306.
it is not necessary that the aﬁidavit
required by this section should state
the amount due upon the judgment:
Smith v. St. Joseph Circuit Judge, 46
Mich., 338: 9 N. W., 440. But it may
do so; and in that case if the tran
script with the aﬁldavit is ﬂied in
and
immediately.
court
the
circuit
before lapse of time would raise any
presumption of payment of the judg
of
the
ailidavit
ment,
no further
amount due would be required on ﬁling
the transcript with the clerk: Ibid.,
and Bigelow v. Booth, 39 Mich., 622;
The
Udell v. Kahn, 31 Mich., 195.
ailiant‘s signature to the afﬁdavit is
not necessary to its validity, if it is
actually sworn to: Merrick v. May
hue, 40 .\ilch., 196; see. Dickinson v.
Simondson, 25 Mich., 113.
Aflidavit,
when and by whom
to
conse
requisites oi’, and
be made,
See, Berkcry
when defectlve:
quences
Judge. 82 Mich., 160; 46
v. Circuit
N. W., 436.
11—C. L., 5 845: Peck v. Cavell,
16 Mich., 9.
Where the certificate of
"I here
the justice was as follows:
that the above is a true
by certify
transcript of the above judgment, and
proceedings thereon,
of the subsequent
T...., justice of the peace,"
the court said:
"This certiﬁcate was
the plaintiifs
insuﬁicient to authorize
to be ﬁled
to request the transcript
and docketed, or the clerk to ﬁle and
docket it, and of course such judg
ment never became a judgment of such
It only shows that it
circuit court.
of itself, which
is a true transcript
may well be true. and yet, no cor
responding judgment to be found upon
any justicc's docket in the county, nor
does it show that it is a transcript
of the proceedings of any case, so far
as they appear upon any docket. Now,
it the duty of the
the statute makes
justice to certify both such judgment
and proceedings, and is not satisﬁed

by a certiﬁcate
sequent’
to the

of proceedings ‘sub
judgment.
Not only
should the certiﬁcate conform to the
requirements of the law in this respect,
but it should aiiirmutively show what
judgment and proceedings it certiﬁes,
as well as where such judgment re
mains, or is to be found, so that it
may appear from such certiﬁcate that
such judgment and proceedings were
transcribed from his docket, and the
judgment was rendered by him; or in
case it is a transcript
of a judgment
rendered
by another justice. of whose
docket the certifying
magistrate has
the custody, that it is a transcript
of the judgment and proceedings from
the docket of such other justice, then
in his, custody 1" Jewett v. Bennett,
if the transcript is a
3 Mich., 198.
correct copy from the docket entries,
it will be sufficient: Peck v. Caveli,
16 Mich., 11; Udell v. Kahn, 31 Mich.,
195.
it must be oﬁlclaily signed by the
justice; his name appearing in the
body
of the instrument is not suﬁl
Bigelow v. Booth, 39 Mich.,
cient:
165. V’And the proceedings in regard
to the transcript must conform strictly
to the statute:
O'Brien
v. O'Brien,
42 Mich., 15; 3 N. W., 233; Doty v.
Dexter, 61 Mich., 353; 28 N. W., 123;
Wedel v. Green, 70 Mich., 643; 38 N.
W., 638; Berkery v. Judge of Wayne
Circuit, 82 Mich., 160; -i6 N. W., 436.
The transcript in order to entitle it
to be ﬁled in the circuit court must
show a judgment which the justice
had jurisdiction
to render:
Wedel v.
Green, supra.
A transcript of a justicc‘s judgment,
when ﬁled in the circuit court, has, for
the effect of a cir
certain purposes,
cuit court judgment; but it is not a.
judgment
rendered
in that court:
Weimeistcr v. Singer, 44 Mich., 406.
Where the certiﬁcate to a transcript
given by a justice of a judgment ren
dered by another justice, declared the
transcript to be a “transcript from the
docket of H...., late a justice of the
peace of the city of G.... B...., in
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§497. Where transcript to be flled.—“If the plaintiff, his
assignee, or the agent or attorney of either of the parties shall
make an affidavit stating the amount due upon such judgment,
it shall be the duty of the clerk of the circuit or district court

for the county in which such judgment shall have been ren
dered, to file such transcript and security for stay of such
execution in his office when requested, and to enter and docket
the judgment in a book to be kept by him for that purpose,
noting therein the time of receiving it and the amount sworn
to be due.”12
“Such judgment shall have the same effect as a judgment
rendered in the circuit or district court, and may in the same
manner be enforced, discharged and cancelled; and execution
said county, of the judgment rendered
entitled cause,
by him in the above
and of‘ all the proceedings had by and
before him in the cause, so far as
they appear on his docket, which is in
and of which docket
my possession,
and the judgment I have control," it
that the certiﬁcate did
was objected
not show that the transcript had been
with the original judgment.
compared
there
and was a correct transcript
from, and oi’ the whole of such origi
nal; Iicld, that the certiﬁcate was suf
ficient under C. L., Q 960: that that
section was complete in itself, and the
transcript fully complied with its pro
visions. and that the general chapter
on “evidence" did not qualify the pro
Goodseil v.
visions of that section:
Leonard, 23 Mlch., 374, see, Alien v.
Mills, 26 Mlch., 123.
12—C. L., 5 846. ‘An aﬂidavlt of
the amount due upon the judgment at
is
the time of ﬁling the transcript
necessary to authorize the clerk to en
Peck
ter nnd docket the judgment:
v. Cavell, 16 Mlch., 9; Monaghan v.
McKimmie, 32 Mlch., 40; Bigelow v.
Such an aili
Booth, 39 Mlch., 622.
davit, or evidence of the fact required
is the
that
to be shown thereby,
amount due, is a necessary jurisdic
tional fact. in order to give the clerk
of the circuit court any authority to
act in the premises: Smith v. St. Jo
seph Circuit Judge. 46 Mlch., 338; 9
This 5 846 and 5 845,
N. W.. 440.
seem to contemplate that two separate

aiﬂdavits may be tiled in each case;
one under Q 845 when application
is
made to the justice for the transcript,
and the other, under 5 846 showing
the amount due when the transcript is
ﬂied with the clerk, and there are cases
where delay in ﬁling the transcript
might make it necessary.
But a sep
arate aﬂidavit from that required by
§ 845 seems not to be required if that
aiiidavit states the amount due upon
the judgment, and is ﬂied with the tran
script with the clerk of the circuit
court immediately after being sworn to,
and before any presumption could arise
of payments having been made between
the making and time of filing the aili
St.
davit and transcript: Smith v.
Joseph Circuit Judge, 46 Mlch., 838: 9
N. W., 440; Udell v. Kuhn. 31 Mlch.,
195. and Bigelow v. Booth, 39 Mlch.,
622: Berkery v. Wayne Circuit Judge,
It
82 Mlch., 160, 165; 46 N. W., 436.
was too late to enter a stay of execu
tion after an aihdavit has been ﬂied
with the justice for a transcript for the
circuit court. Hitchcock v. Circuit Judge
of Wayne County, 96 Mlch., 297; 55
The transcript when ﬂied
N. W., 841.
in the circuit court does not become a
it is the old judgment
new judgment;
to be controlled and enforced by the
The
process of
the circuit court.
runs from the
statute of limitation
entry of judgment by the justice and
not from the filing of the transcript:
Wilcox v. Lantz, 107 Mlch., 1; 64 N.
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may be issued thereon against both the surety and the person
against whom the judgment was rendered, or either of them, in
the same manner as if execution were to be issued by the

justice.’ ’1 3
Effect of ﬁling transcript.—After a transcript has
all control over the judgment ceases on the part of
the justice who rendered it.“ He would not be authorized to
receive payment of it. In general, payment of a judgment
may be made to the justice, unless the party has directed other
wise."
Judgments rendered in suits commenced by attachment,
would not probably be within these provisions as to ﬁling tran
scripts, unless the “attachment or summons had been personally
served on the defendant, or he appeared in the suit. A judg
ment rendered without personal service or appearance, is only
presumptive evidence of indebtedness, and may be repelled by
the defendant, but it is hardly to be supposed that the trial of
the indebtedness is to be made in an action of ejectment to
recover the land sold upon the execution from the circuit court.
In case there were several defendants, and part only were per
sonally served with process, or appeared, an execution upon
ﬁling the transcript could be levied upon the lands of such
§498.

been ﬁled,

parties

only."

Transcripts of judgments from the docket of one jus
tice to that of another justice.—“Whenever an execution may
by law be issued upon any judgment rendered by a justice of
the peace, the party in whose favor such judgment shall have
been rendered, his agent, attorney, or assignee, may make and
deliver to the justice of the peace having control of such judg
§ 499.

ment, an affidavit stating the amount due on said judgment, in
cluding a transcript fee of two dollars, which must be paid to
And is to be en
13—C. L., § 847.
cancelled or af
forced, discharged,
in
fected by the statute of limitations
the same way as a judgment originally
rendered in the circuit court: Arnold
and Jewett
v. Thompson. 19 Mich.,~333,
3 Mich.,
199.
The ten
v. Bennett.
applies to
yeur statute of limitations
ﬂied:
judgment when transcript
the
Cole v. Potter, — Mich., —-; 97 N.
W., 774 (Jan., 1904).

Judges, &c., 2
14—Sholts
v. The
Cow., 506.
After a transcript
has
been legally ﬁled in the circuit court.
it is not in the power of that court
to allow an appeal from the Justice's
court. under C. L., 5 909: Davlson v.
Elliott, 9 Mich., 252.
15—I)exter v. Broat, 16 Barb., 337.
16—See, C. L., 55 875, 10372-10374.
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the justice before any transcript shall issue, and setting forth
in substance that the deponent knows or has good reason to
believe and does believe that there is not suﬂicient goods and
chattels liable to execution within the county in which
said
judgment was rendered, belonging to any person or persons
against whom such execution may issue.”"
“Thereupon it shall be the duty of said justice to make a
certiﬁed transcript of such judgment and the proceedings in
the case so far as they shall appear on his docket, with a state
ment of the amount sworn to be due thereon, and send the

L.,

849.

I

18-—C.

492

19—C. L.,
20—C. L.,

§

Acts, 1885, p. 284, sec.
848.
p. 274; C. L.,
5

1880,

Q

17—Publlc

1; Am.

§

it

it

if

it,

same, with a fee of one dollar, by mail, postage prepaid, to any
justice of the peace within this state to Whom he shall be re
quested to send the same by the party procuring it. Provided,
that no transcript shall issue upon such judgment, when there
was no personal service.”"
“It shall be the duty of the justice of the peace to whom
such transcript shall be sent, on receipt of the same, to enter
said judgment in full upon his docket, noting thereon the time
of receiving
and the amount sworn to be due there0n.”1°
“Such judgment shall have the same force and effect as
in the ﬁrst in
had been rendered by the justice so receiving
in
manner
be
the
same
may
enforced,
discharged,
stance, and
and cancelled, and execution may issue for the amount due as
upon any other like judgment on said docket.”2°
850.
851.
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scribed, which shall be dated on the day when it actually is
sued, and be made returnable in sixty days thereafter/’1

of death of one of the parties.-If defendant
in execution die after levy and before sale, the sale may be held
as if he were alive. If he die before levy made, no further pro
§ 501.

In

case

If there are sev
ceedings shall be had under the execution.
eral defendants against whom execution may have issued, and
one dies or if the execution run against a defendant and his
surety for the stay of execution and the defendant die, the
execution shall be executed upon the property of the surviving
defendant, or of the surety for stay, as the ease may be.” In
case defendant die before execution issues it may nevertheless

If plaintiff
issue against the surety for stay of execution.“
die after the execution has issued it shall be executed and re
turned as if the plaintiff were livingﬁ

§502. In attachment, defendant not served.-“It shall be
the duty of any justice of the peace issuing an execution upon
a judgment obtained before him, in any suit commenced by
attachment in which the defendant was not personally served,
and did not appear, to direct the constable taking charge of
same, to levy the debt or damages with interest and costs on
goods and chattels so attached, and to bring the money
tained therefor, excepting his fees-, before such justice, at

the
the
ob

the

time and place therein mentioned, and pay over the same to
said justice, to render to the party who recovered the same so
much thereof as shall be necessary to pay his said damages
and costs, retaining the surplus money, if any there shall be

in his hands, for the defendant, to be paid said defendant at
any time when called for within two months from the rendition
of such judgment: Provided, Said defendant does not call for
said surplus money within, the two months aforesaid, it shall
1--0. L., 5 852, But no execution
can issue on a judgment against a town
ship, or against any township oﬂicers
in any action prosecuted by or against
C. L.,
them in their names oi’ oiﬂce:
An execution may issue at
5 10482.
any time within six years after the ex
C. L., $878.
ecution of the judgment:
But not after the judgment is barred
by the statute of limitations: Jerome
v. Williams,
13 Mlch., 521: Parsons

Circuit Judge, 37 Mlch., 287.
An execution should never issue except
requested: Percival v. Jones, 2 Johns.
Cases, 50: Taylor v. Trask, 7 Cowen.
249: Gold v. Blssell, 1 Wend., 210.
It will be presumed to have issued
on request:
Peck v. Cavell, 16 Mlch.,
9; see, Foster V. Wiley, 27 Mlch., 224.
2-—C. L.. 5 857.
3—C. L., 5 858.
4——C. L., 5 859.
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duty of the justice having charge of the same to deposit
such surplus money in the treasury of the township, giving
notice to the township ‘clerk in which such judgment was
rendered, whose duty it shall be to charge the same to the
treasurer of the township.” 5
“If the defendant, his agent, or his legal representative, en
titled to the possession of such money, shall appear within six
years after the rendition of such judgment, and establish, by
his own affidavit or otherwise, to the satisfaction of the town
ship treasurer, his right thereto, then he shall be entitled to
be the

receive the money, and shall give his receipt therefor, and the
township board, when settling with such treasurer, shall give
him credit for said receipt: Provided, That in cities the money
shall be paid into the city treasury, with like eifect and like
notice as above provided in the payment into the township
treasury.

’’

°

~

Against principal and aurety.—“Whenever it shall
from
the docket, or on the trial, that any of the defend
appear
§503.

ants are sureties, the justice shall note the same on the execu
tion; and it shall be the duty of the ofﬁcer executing the same,
ﬁrst, to levy on the goods of the principal, and if enough of
such goods shall be found to satisfy the execution, no levy shall
be made on the goods

of the surety.”

7

Unless the principal is made defendant in the suit, and judg
ment rendered against him, no such endorsement will be made.
“Every ofﬁcer having an execution in his hands for collec
tion, upon an afﬁdavit being served upon him, made by any co
defendant in such execution, his agent or attorney, showing the

principal debtor therein, shall ﬁrst exhaust all the personal es
tate of said principal debtor, which may be turned out by any
one of the defendants, before selling the property of any other
defendant who may be surety in the demand upon which the

judgment was rendered.”

3

To whom and how directed, form of, etc.—“Such
§ 504.
execution shall be directed to any constable of the same county,
5—C.

L.,

6——Public

L.,

5 sea.
7——C. L.,

the

one

5 898.

Acts,

5 879.

1873,

immediately

page

85;

C.

This section and
following

do

apply to sureties for stay of execution:
Sweeney
v. Lustfield. 116 Mich., 606;
75 N - W -. 136 .
8—C. L., 5 880.

not
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and shall command him in the name of the people of the state
of Michigan, to levy the debt or damages, with interest and
costs, of the goods and chattels of the person or persons against
whom the same shall be issued (excepting such goods and
chattel as are by law exempted from execution), and bring
the money before such justice, at the time and place therein
to be mentioned,
’
same.’ 9

to render

to the party who recovered

the

Against the body.-“In all cases where by the pro
§505.
visions of this chapter, an execution may be issued against the
body of any person, it shall, if the judgment cred-itor requires
it, contain a further command to the constable, that if no such
goods or chattels can be found, or not suﬁicient to satisfy such
execution, he shall take the body of the person against whom
the same shall be issued, and convey him to the common jail
of the county, there to remain until such execution shall be
A sheriﬂ or his
9—C. L., § 853.
deputy may serve an execution issued
by a justice, although not directed to
him, as the statute expressly empow
ers sheriifs to serve the process which
constables may execute: C. L., Q 2595;
Foster v. Wiley, 27
see, anic, 5 39;
Mlch., 244, 249; Faulks v. People, 39
The omission in a jus
Mlch., 200.
tice‘s execution of the year in which
the judgment was rendered will not
vltiate the execution, it being in all
v.
Perkins
regular:
other respects
And it_seems
Spaulding, 2 Mlch., 157.
that the omission of the plaintiﬂ’s
name in the execution will not render
it void if the writ is indorsed with
the title of the cause, giving there
the names of the parties correctly, as
the indorsement under our practice is
and when put
usual, if not necessary,
on forms a part of the process suﬂi
ciently for all purposes of identiﬁca
tion: McGuire v. Gaiiigan, 53 Mlch.,
So, the omission
453; 19 N. W., 142.
execution,
of
the
from a Justice's
name of the county or of any township
or city does not invalidate it, at least
when the defendant does not complain
of it: and as against a stranger resist
ing the claims of a purchaser at a sale
under the execution, the defect may be
cured and the judgment identiﬁed by
parol evidence:
Elliott v. Hart, 45

Mlch., 234; 7 N. W., 812.
Whore the
judgment was in replevin, but the ex
ecution issued was in form in assumpsit,
held to be erroneous. Williams v. Vail,
9 Mlch., 162. The levy must be made
before the writ is returnable.
It must
be so made as to identify or give moans
of identifying the property levied on
so as to make the property chargeable
to the oﬂicer.
There must he manual
seizure or such assertion of control
as may be made eifectuai to bring and
keep the property within the dominion
of the law for sale on
execution:
Quackenbush v. Henry, 42 Mlch., 75;
As to levy on part
3 N. W., 262.
ner’s interest, see, Sirrine v. Briggs,
31 Mlch., 445; Hutchinson
v. Dubols,
45 Mlch., 143; 7 N. W., 71-i.
As to
levy in cae where there are exemp
tions, see, post, §§ 526, et seq.
An execution which commands the
oﬂicer,
in addition to the legal costs,
to collect twenty-ﬁve cents for the ex
ecutlon, although this is not authorized
under the statute providing
for in
cluding the fees for an execution in
the taxed costs, is not for that reason
void.
The officer must be presumed
to know that by law the twenty-ﬁve
cents is not collectable, and this com
mand may be treated as surplusage:
Hollister v. Giddings, 24 Mlch., 501.
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paid and satisﬁed, or he be discharged by due course of law.” ‘
“An execution issued by a justice of the peace may authorize‘
the arrest and imprisonment of the person against whom the
judgment is rendered in the following cases:
1. When the action in which such judgment was rendered
shall have been commenced by warrant;
2. When the judgment was rendered in an action of replevin,
trespass, trover, or action on the case for tort;
3. In case of fraud or breach of trust, when the debt arises
on contract, or is founded on a contract express or implied;
4. In an action formoney collected by public ofﬁcers, or in
any professional employment;
5. When the plaintiff, or some one in his behalf, shall at or
after the time of rendering the judgment, make and ﬁle with
the justice an aﬂidavit, setting forth the facts and circum
stances which would have entitled him to a warrant against
the defendant, according to the provisions of this chapter, or
such facts and circumstances shall appear from the proceed
ings, or the evidence on the trial of the cause.” 2
An execution against the body cannot be issued on a judg
ment for costs against a plaintiff, where the action was such
that if judgment had been rendered in the plaintiff’s favor, he
could not have had execution against the body of the defend
ant; as upon an execution in any suit or proceeding for the re
covery of money due upon contract?

Not against body of female, except, etc.—-“Any ‘jus
the
of
peace having jurisdiction, and before whom any
tice
female may have been convicted of violating any of the pro
§ 506.

For the cases in
1-—C. L., § 854.
which execution may issue against the
The
see, C. L., §§ 860, 888.
body,
execution itself need not recite that it
in such an action as
was rendered
would authorize its running against
Fruitport Twp. V. Muske
the body:
Judge, 90 Mich., 23: 51
gon Circuit
This statute requires ac
N. W., 109.
tual conﬂnement and one out at bail
is not imprisoned within the meaning
Miller v. Strabbing,
of this statute:
92 Mich., 300; 52 N. W., 453; Griﬂln
v. Heime, 94 Mich., 494; 54 N. W.,
173; Rusiewski v. Michaiski, -— Mich.,
-—; 98 N. W., 1 (Ja.n., 1904). But the
s2

body of a husband could not probably,
be taken on an execution issued on a
judgment rendered against husband and
wife, in an action for tort committed
by the wife: C. L., § 10352.
In case the execution issues against
the body. the clause directing the im
prisonment must be conﬁned
to the
principal defendant and must not in
elude the surety for stay of execution
it there be one.
2-—C. L., § 860.
3—See, People v. Onondaga, C. P.,
9 Wend., 430; Phelps v. Barton,
13
Wend., 68.
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visions of chapter sixty-nine of the Compiled Laws of eighteen
hundred and seventy-one, embracing an act entitled ‘An act
to prevent the manufacture and sale of spirituous or intoxi
cating liquors as a beverage,’ may issue an execution against
the body of such female, and she shall be subject to all the
like penalties and proceedings mentioned in said act as are
males: Provided, That for no other cause shall a female be ar
rested or imprisoned upon any execution issued by a justice
6
of the peace/’4
“No female shall be imprisoned on any process in any civil
action except in actions for the violation of any of the provi
sions of an act entitled ‘An act to prevent the manufacture and
sale of spirituous or intoxicating liquors as a beverage,’ the
same being chapter sixty-nine of the Compiled Laws of 1871,
in which actions she shall be liable to the same punishment as
a male.” “

Interest on judgment-s.—Intel-est may be allowed and
upon all judgments at law for the recovery of any
money, and upon all decrees in chancery for the pay
any sums of money, whatever may be the form or
of
or suit in which such judgment or decree shall
action
cause
be rendered or made; and such interest may be collected on
execution, at the rate of ﬁve per cent per annum:
Provided,
That on a judgment rendered on any written instrument, hav
ing a different rate, which was a legal rate at the date of the
execution of such instrument, the interest shall be computed
at the rate speciﬁed in such instrument.“
When the interest is more than ﬁve per cent, the justice will
indorse on the execution a direction as to the rate of interest,
thus, “Collect interest on the within judgment at the rate of
seven per cent per annum,” or such other rate as was speciﬁed
in the written instrument on which the judgment was ren
dered; or such direction may be inserted in the execution.
I

§507.
received
sums of
ment of

¢

4—C. L., l 889; see, People ea rel
68.
27 Mich.,
Strickland
v. Bartow,
The chapter 69 referred to has been

Pub. Acts, 1903, p. 252.
Interest is
allowable under
upon
this
section
claims allowed by commissioners on
claims against the estates of deceased
repealed.
But chap. 69 oi.’ persons and upon costs allowed an
5-—C. L., 5 10342.
appellant from probate court:
Hay
the Compiled Laws of 1871 is now re
den v. Heiferan, 99 Mich., 263; 58 N.
pealed.
W., 59.
by
6—C. L., 5 4865, as amended
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Where execution has been stayed, etc.—“In all cases
where security shall have been given for the stay of execution,
as hereinafter provided, if the debt or damages, with interest
and costs, shall not be paid within the time limited by law
therefor, execution shall be issped by the justice on application
of the judgment creditor, his agent or attorney, against both
principal and surety for the stay, with the same effect as if
the judgment had been rendered against both such principal
and surety upon a joint liability, after the return of process
§ 508.

personally served, except that no such execution shall be issued
against the body of the surety.” 7

Procedure in case of death of defendant.-If the
§509.
judgment debtor dies before execution is issued, no proceed
ings could, formerly, have been had by execution on the judg
ment, and of course none against the surety for stay of execu
tion. This rule is changed by the following section:
“When
security is given for the stay of execution, and the defendant
against whom the judgment was rendered shall die before
execution is issued against him, it shall be lawful to issue
execution against the surety alone.” 8
“In case the defendant in the judgment shall die before
execution shall have been issued thereon, execution may never
theless be issued against the surety for stay of execution.” °
The proper course, in such case, would be to note on the exe
cution the death of the defendant, and direct the officer to
levy the execution on the property of the surety.
Formerly,
if the plaintiff died before execution had been levied, no fur

ther proceedings could be had, but now if the plaintiif die after
the execution has issued, the same shall be executed and re
turned, as if the plaintiff were living.1°
“When the defendant in an execution shall die after levy
and before sale, the property levied on shall be sold in the
same manner as if he was alive; but if no levy has been made
in such case, such execution shall be returned without
proceedings; but if an execution shall have issued
several defendants, and some of them die thereafter, or
the defendant in the judgment and his surety for the
See, Sweeney
7—C. L., 5 855.
Lustﬂcld, 116 Mich., 697; 75 N.

v.

W.,

136.
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8—C. L., 5 856.
9—C, L., § 8-'18.
10—C. L., 1 859.
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execution, and the defendant in the execution shall die before
levy, the execution may be executed upon the property of the
” 1*
surety.
In case the execution issues against the body, the clause di
recting the imprisonment must be conﬁned to the defendant,
and must not include the surety."
A slight variance between the execution and the judgment

will not render the execution void;

as where the amount of the
from
judgment varied ﬁfty cents
the execution." A justice has
no power to amend an execution issued by him, after it has
been executed.“

The remarks heretofore made, ante, § 138, in relation to the
protection of the oﬂieer by the process, apply to executions.
An execution void on its face would afford no protection to the
ofﬁcer. If a constable having two executions, one valid and
the other void, should sell property, he would, after selling
enough of ‘the goods to satisfy the valid one, be liable as a
wrong-doer

for the goods sold beyond that amount."

§510. When execution to issue.-—“In the cases mentioned
in the preceding section (C. L., § 860)," and also in suits com
menced by attachment, execution shall, on application of the
person in whose favor the judgment was rendered, his agent
01" attorney, be issued forthwith after the rendition of the judg
ment, unless such execution may be and is stayed as'herein
after provided.” 1'
“Upon all judgments rendered by justices of the peace, ex
cept in cases mentioned in the two last preceding sections (C.
L., §§ 860, 861), executions shall issue at the expiration of ﬁve
days from therendering of the judgment, unless such execu
tion shall be stayed as hereinafter provided; and such.execu
tion shall not issue sooner without the consent, in writing, of
the person against whom the judgment was obtained, or the
proof in the next section speciﬁed.” 13
Sec, Hochgruef
11—C. L., 5 857.
v. llendrle, 66 Mich., 557: 34 N. W..
But where property has been at15.
tached and the defendant dies before
execution issued, lt seems that executlon may still be levied on the property attached, and that It may be
sold: see, ante, 5 91, note 4.
12—C. L., 5 855.

13—Boi-land v. Stewart. 4 Wend.,
588: Jackson V. Page, IIn'd., 585.
14—Toot v. Bentley, 5 Wend., 276.
15—Aldred
v. Constable, 6 Ad. &
EL. N. S., 370.
_
16—/tnte, 5 505.
17—C. L., Q 861:
See, Pub, Acts.
1899,

500

p.

308.

18—C. L., 5 862.

But
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L., I
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“If

the party obtaining such judgment shall make it appear,
by his own oath, or other competent testimony, to the satisfac
tion of the justice, that such party will be in danger of losing
the amount recovered by him, unless execution issue sooner
than is prescribed in the last preceding section, such justice
shall issue execution immediately, unless the same be stayed
by the party against whom the same was rendered, as herein

after provided.”

1°

The mere oath of the party that he believes he is in danger
of losing the debt would not authorize the justice to issue an
execution under this section.
Where execution was issued
upon such an oath, the court said: “We are clearly of opinion
that it was never contemplated by the statute that execution
should be awarded on this evidence alone. The justice should
require proof of facts and circumstances tending to show dan
ger, and an award based solely upon such evidence as appears
in the docket entry under consideration is clearly erroneous,

and would be reversed if under review on ccrt»iorari.” “But,
suppose this evidence was incompetent, and that the only evi
dence upon which the justice could properly act, under the
statute, was proof of facts and circumstances, we still think
the award of execution was erroneous merely, and not void.” 2°

Of the application for execution.—“Applieation for
§511.
such execution may be made at the time of rendering the judg
ment; or, if a reasonable notice be given to the adverse party
of the intention to apply for such execution, such application
may be made at any time after the judgment shall have been
rendered.’

’

2‘

If

application for execution be made at the time of render
ing judgment, notice of the application need not be given.
But if the award of execution is after the cause is determined,
and the parties have left the justice’s ofﬁce, it would be irregu

lar without notice.”
provides that upon ail judgments men
tioned in that section, execution shall
So, C. L., 5 901, au
issue forthwith.
thorizing the immediate issue ot execu
tion on judgments for labor debts was
enacted after C. L., §§ 860. 861, and
by
such executions are not governed
See,
Grand Rapids
sections:
those
Chair Co. v. Runnelis, 77 Mlch., 111;

N. W.,
issue on
statute of
liams. 13
43

501

19—C.

1006.
An execution cannot
a judgment barred by the
limitations:
Jerome v. Wil
Mlch., 521.

L., 5 803.
v. Whitney,

20—Rash
21-—C.

L.,

22—Rash

4 Mich.,

495.

4 Mlch.,

495.

9 864.
v.

Whitney,

srav or
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The notice need not specify the time of making the applica
tion, but it must be given a reasonable time under all the cir
cumstances, before the application.
The defendant can pre
vent the issuing of the execution by giving security.”
It is,
however, advisable to state in the notice the time at which the
application will be made.
The notice, in general, should be served personally, but it is
not, in all cases, necessary. If it be shown that the defendant
is out of the way, keeps beyond the reach of notice, and that it
has been given to persons from whom he would probably re
ceive it, as his
and discretion,
The evidence
is not required

wife, or some one of his family of suitable age
at his dwelling house, that would be enough.“
in support of the application for the execution
to be in writing. It may be by parol.
Nor is
the justice required to set forth in his docket the facts stated,
in support of the application?“
The defendant cannot come in and contest the issuing of an
execution by cross-examining the plaintiﬁ or anybody else
who should make the oath of danger. The plaintiff is to prove
From this alone is
facts suﬁicient to convince the justice.
the justice to judge.“
An execution may be issued upon any judgment recovered
before'a justice of the peace, at any time within six years after
such judgment shall have been rendered, for the collection of
the whole or any part of such judgment remaining unpaid."
OF SECURITY

FOR STAY

OF‘

EXECUTION.

When a11owed.—“The party against whom any judg
§ 512.
ment shall be recovered, may stay the execution thereon, until
the expiration of the time hereinafter prescribed, by giving to
the party in whose favor judgment was obtained, and ﬁling
with the justice within ﬁve days after the justice shall be au
thorized to issue execution thereon, security in writing, with
one or more suﬁicient sureties, satisfactory to the judgment
creditor or the justice for the payment of the money, with
interest and costs, at or before the expiration of four months
23-Moulton
648.

v.

Kavana,

21

Wend.,

v.

Kavana,

21

Wend.,

_

24—Moulton

25-—Rash v. Whitney, 4 Mich., 495.
26—Mouiton
v. Kavana,
21 Wend.,
648.

64$,

650.

27—C.

502

L.,

5 878.
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from the commencement bf the suit, if such money shall not
exceed ﬁfty dollars, exclusive of costs; and at or before the
expiration of six months, if such money exceeds ﬁfty dollars,
exclusive of costs.”29
When stay not a1.lowed.—“No stay of execution shall
in the following cases, except at the option of the

§ 513.

be allowed

plaintiff
1.

:

In actions against any corporation, except at

of the plaintiif

the option

;

2. In any oﬁicial bond, or bond given to secure the faithful
discharge of the duties of any trust, as to the principal in such
bond ;
3. On judgments against justices of the peace, sheriifs, con
stables, or other oﬁicers, for money by them collected, or re
ceived as such justice, sheriff, constable, or other officer;
4. On any judgment against a constable for failing to make
return, making a. false return, or failing to pay over money col
lected in his official capacity;
5. On judgments against bail for the stay of execution;
6. On judgments in favor of bail, who have been compelled
to pay money on account of their principal;
7. On judgments obtained by constables on undertakings
executed to them for the delivery of property;
8. Against an individual for money deposited with him;
9. Upon judgments for costs only;
10. In actions of replevin; but in all such cases executions
shall issue forthwith.”2°
“When judgment shall be rendered against two or more per
sons, any of whom are sureties for other or others in the con
tract on which the judgment is founded, there will be no stay

It the stay of
28—C. L., 5 865.
execution be for a longer time than
that prescribed in the statute, it is
void; and if, in such case, the prop
erty of the surety for the stay should
be seized on an execution against him,
trespasser:
a
be
the justice would
Shadbolt v. Bronson, 1 Mich., 85. Not
withstanding
the stay. suit may be
and maintained upon the
commenced
putting
judgment. immediately after
the
time
for
in the stny,,although
which execution is stayed has not ex

pired.

McDonald v. Butler, 3 Mich.,
But a party putting in stay
of execution cannot appeal thereafter
from the judgment:
People v. Judges.
etc., 1 Mich., 134.
A stay of execu
tion cannot be entered after the util
davit for transcript
has been ﬂied;
Hitchcock v. Wayne Circuit Judge, 96
Mich., 297; 55 N. W., 841.
See, Lust
ﬁeld v. Ball, 103 Mich., 17; 61 N. W.,
558.

339.

503

29—C.

L., 5 866.

'
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of execution on the judgment if the surety or sureties, or any
of them, object at the time of rendering the judgment, unless
the bail for the stay of execution will undertake specially to
pay the judgment, in case the amount thereof cannot be col
lected of the principal defendant.” 3°

Nor shall any stay of execution be allowed in case of judg
ments rendered for personal services performed by the plain

tiff.“
Form of stay.—“In

all cases where stay of execu
by law, the party entitled thereto shall have
stay of execution, by his surety or sureties becoming such se
curity on the docket of the justice, in substantially the follow
§514.

tion

is allowed

ing form:

32

I, E. . .. F.

., hereby acknowledge myself surety for the
payment to the plaintiif by the defendant of the above judg
ment, with interest and costs thereon, at or before the expira
tion of . . . . months from the commencement of said suit.
Dated the

. .

day of ...., 19..
Witness,

L.

M.

. . .

. .

., Just-ice of the Peace.

And such entry shall have the effect of

and exe
cution may issue thereon in the manner prescribed in _this
chapter, and an action of assumpsit may be brought there
a judgment,

on.”3-3
§515. Recalling execution.—“In all cases where stay of
execution is allowed by law, if execution shall have issued
within the ﬁve days hereinbefore speciﬁed, if the judgment
30—C. L., 5 868.
31—C. L., 5 901, and Grand Rapids
Chair Co. v. Runnells, 77 Mich., 111;
43 N. W., 1006.‘
This section does
32-—C_ L., 5 867.
not require that the security entered
into shall follow precisely the form
given; it will be suﬂicient it it is the
snme in substance, and omits nothing
But
that the statute makes requisite.
the surety must sign the stay in the
of the justice, and he must
presence
attest the execution of it, otherwise
the stay will be void: (‘ox v. Crlppin,

13 Mich.,

502; see, Jerome v. Williams,
Mich., 522, 525, 526: Hollister v.
Glddlngs, 24 Mich., 501.
Where the
surety for the stay does not become
such by signing this undertaking on
it would seem that this
the docket
security must be executed
and ac
knowledged hefore the justice who ren
dered the judgment, and be witnessed
by him:
Cox v. Crippen, 13 Mich.,
13

502.
33-—C.
13

504

1

Mich.,

L.,
508.

5 867:

Cox v. Crippen,

,
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debtor shall, within that time, give security for the stay of
execution as aforesaid, the justice shall make an order recall
ing the execution; and if the same has been levied upon prop
erty, such property shall, upon the production of such order
to the constable, be forthwith released therefrom, and returned
to the person from whom it was taken; and if the judgment
debtor be in custody thereon, the officer in whose custody he
may be, upon the production of such order, shall forthwith
discharge him therefrom.” 34

When execution may

notwithstanding the
stay.-“When any person who has become security for stay
of execution, shall, before the expiration of such stay, remove
out of the county, the justice by whom the judgment was
rendered, or the justice having the right to issue the execution
on the judgment, shall, on demand, and on proof of such re
moval by the oath of the party, or otherwise, issue execution
upon such judgment, against the goods and chattels of the
party against whom the judgment was rendered.” 3°
The removal from the county of the security for stay of exe
cution should be clearly made out by the oath of the party, or
§516.

be issued,

by some other witness.

“when any security for the stay of execution shall
apprehensive that, by delaying the execution until
the full time of such stay, he may be compelled to pay the
judgment, it shall be lawful for him to make and ﬁle aﬁidavit
of that fact before the justice authorized to issue execution;
whereupon the justice shall issue execution against the judg
ment debtor: Provided, That such surety shall not thereby
be discharged from liability, but may be proceeded against
after the expiration of the time of stay, in the same manner
as if execution had not issued as aforesaid.” 3°
Again,

become

To justify the issuing of an execution in such

a case, an
in
surety,
be
made
the
the
must
form
by
prescribed
by
affidavit
the preceding section.
p
34—C. L.. I 869:
Wayne Circuit Judge,
55 N. W., 841.
35—C. L., Q 870.

Hitchcock
v.
Mlch., 207:

D6

36-C.
Lustﬁeld,
136.

505

L.,
116

5 871.

Mlch.,

See,

696;

Sweeney
v.
75 N. W.,
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Further security for stay.—“If the judgment debtor
shall, in either of the cases mentioned in the two preceding
sections, within ﬁve days after levying such ‘execution, give
further security for the stay of execution during so much
of the ﬁrst stay as remains then unexpired, and shall pay the
costs of the execution issued against him as aforesaid, it shall
be the duty of the justice to take such further security, and
recall the execution; and the person who became security shall
ﬁrst be proceeded against,_1mtil it shall appear by the return of
the constable that he had no goods and chattels on which to
§ 517.

levy or satisfy the judgment, before proceedings shall be had
against the security ﬁrst given.” 3"

Seciuity insuﬁlcient.—“At any time before the stay
§518.
of execution shall expire, if the justice having authority to
issue execution shall become satisﬁed that the security is in
sufficient, it shall be lawful for him to cause written notice
thereof to be given to the defendant; or if he be absent, that
the same be left at his residence, requiring him to give addi
tional security; if such defendant shall not have given. addi
tional security on or by the third day after the giving of such
notice, such fact shall be entered on the docket, and he shall
immediately issue execution against the defendant for the col
lection of the judgment-, if within ﬁve days after the issuing
of such execution, security to the satisfaction of the justice
is given, and the defendant shall pay the costs of the execu
tion issued against him as aforesaid, the execution shall be re
called and stayed until the expiration of the original stay.” -">3
Execution and transcript for beneﬁt of surety.-—

§ 519.

“W'hen any judgment shall have been satisﬁed, by any person
who shall have become surety for the stay of execution there
on, such judgment shall rcmain good and valid in law, for
the use of such security, who, at any time thereafter, may sue
out execution on such judgment, against the goods and chattels
of the defendant, for the use of such security, which shall be
so endorsed by the justice; such security shall also be entitled
to a transcript of such judgment, for his own use, which shall
have the same force and effect as transcripts in other cases.” 3°
31-c.

as-c.

a9—c. L.,

L., § s12.

L.,

5 s14.
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Of executions against joint debtors.—“When a judg
shall
ment
be obtained against joint debtors, upon process
which was not personally served upon all the defendants, exe
cution may be issued in form against all; but the justice shall
§

520.

endorse thereon the names of such of the defendants who did
not appear in the suit, as were not personally served with
process of warrant, summons, or attachment/’4°

“Such execution shall not be served upon the persons of the
defendants whose names are endorsed thereon; nor shall it be
levied upon the sole property of any such defendant, who
neither appeared in the suit nor was personally served with
such process; but it may be collected of the several property
of any defendant who appeared or was served personally with
process, or of the joint or copartnership property of all the de

fendants.” '"

_

If

the process has been served by copy on any who do not
appear, it will be, as regards the execution, as no service.
OF SERVI NG EXECUTIONS.

§521. Duty of oﬂicer on receipt of execution.—On the re
ceipt of an execution by a constable, it is his duty to proceed,
in a reasonable time, to collect the sum thereby directed to be
levied on the goods and chattels of the person against whom
the execution is issued, and if no such goods and chattels can
be found, or not sufficient to satisfy the execution, to take the
defendant, in case the execution so direct, and commit him to
jail.“ It is the duty of the constable to search for property
40—C. L., 5 875.
41—C. L., 5 876.
42—But he can make a levy or take
defendant only within the time
the
limited for the return of the execution:
An oﬂicer can search
C. L., 5 891.
for and seize property on execution
He cannot
only within his county.
perambuiate the state to make levies
or to perform other civil duties as
incident to the collection of executions
running within the county. And sales
of personal property on executions are
to be made only in the proper county
of the oiiicer to whom the writ is di
rected: Alvord v. Lent, 23 Mlch., 373.
An oiiicer serving an execution must

it in such a manner as to do
as little mischiet to the debtor as pos
sibie, and where it is important to
the debtor to have his exemption set
oil’ to him immediately, it is the ofii:
cer's duty to have it done promptly.
To seize and hold the whole of a
debtor's property, so as to preclude
him from engaging in his ordinary
business, or from keeping house, when
the enforcement of the process does
not at all require it, or to seize and
hold a greatly
excessive amount of
property unnecessarily and to the' in
jury of the debtor, cannot be justiﬂed:
Handy v. Clippert, 50 Mlch., 355; 15
N. W., 507.
An oﬂicer is not liable
execute
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to satisfy it before he takes the person of the defendant.
His
right to take the body depends upon the contingency of there
If, without searching or in
being no property to be found.

quiring for property, he immediately, upon receiving the exe
cution, arrests the defendant, he does it at his peril; and if it
is shown that the defendant had property in his open and
visible possession, which was subject to the execution, and
might, with reasonable diligence, have been found by the
oﬂicer, he is undoubtedly liable to an action for making the

A constable has in all

arrest.

for property before
and

execution;

if

eases a reasonable time to search

he is b0‘l1I1d to arrest the defendant

he acts

in good faith,

he

in the

will incur no re

sponsibility in omitting to take the body until search can be
made.
There may be cases in which no actual search is neces
sary. Where the defendant in the execution declares he has
no property, he has no right to complain if the constable credits
his assertion and proceeds accordingly.“
_

In such

the officer will be presumed to
have searched for property, and the burden is thrown upon
the defendant in the execution, of showing that he had prop
erty clearly subject to the execution, and that he disclosed the
fact to the constable, who, notwithstanding, refused to take
an action, however,

it.“

“Goods and chattels” mean not only all movable personal
property as contradistinguished from real estate, but includes
demands and choses in action. Choses in action, however, like
promissory notes, bills of exchange, and the like, are not sub
ject to execution.“ “Current gold and silver coin may be
taken in execution, and paid to the creditor as money col
for proceeding in

good faith to serve
an execution after he has been told by
the defendant that an appeal has been
taken where the justice insists that
the appeal has not been perfected. He
un
has a right to rely on his procea
til he is oliicially notiﬁed that it has
Foster v. Wiley, 27
been superseded:
Mich., 245.
4 Wend.,
43—Hoiiister
v. Johnson,
839.

44—Barhydt
People

v.

12 Wend., 145.
Dic.,
“Goods."
Auditors, &c., 5

v. Valk.

45———Burrili‘s

Board

Law
of

Mich., 223-4. But it seems that a lease
or estate in lands for a term of years
is such a chattel interest as may be
levied on and sold on execution the
same as goods and chattels:
Buhl v.
Kenyon, 11 Mich., 249.
The interest
of a lessee in personal property may
be sold on execution, and the purchaser
is entitled to the beneficial use of it
during the term:
Van Antwerp
v.
Newman, 2 Cow., 543.
And the inter
est of the lessor may be sold subject
to the right of the lessee:
See, Good
right v. Forrester, 8 East, 567.
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lected, and shall not be exposed to sale thereon.” 4° “Any bills
or other evidence of debt, issued by any moneyed corporation,
and circulated as money, may be taken in execution and paid
to the creditor at their par value as money collected, if he will
accept them, otherwise they shall be sold as other chattels.”‘"

Levy on mortgaged property.—“When goods or
§ 522.
chattels shall be pledged by way of mortgage or otherwise,
for the payment of money, or the performance of any contract
or agreement, such goods or chattels may be levied upon and
sold on execution against the person making such pledge, sub
ject to the lien of the mortgage or pledge existing thereon;
and the purchaser at such sale shall be entitled to pay to the
person holding such mortgage or pledge the amount actually
due thereon, or otherwise perform the terms and conditions
of the pledge, at any time before the actual foreclosure of such
mortgage or pledge, and on such payments or performance, or
a full tender thereof, shall thereupon acquire all the right, in
terest and property of which the defendant in execution would
have had in such goods or chattels if such mortgage or pledge
had not been made.”

48

46—C. L., § 10316.
Black v. Ward,
47—(?. L., § 10317.
27 Mich., 191.
See, Smith v.
48—C. L., 1 10318.
Menominee Cir. Judge, 53 Mich., 560;
57
19 N. W., 184; hi-ltzer v. Sweet,
.\iich., 620; 24 N. W., 764; Williams
v. Raper, ,6? Mich., 430; 34 N. W.,
Formerly
it was held in this
S90.
state that a chattel mortgage conveyed
the whole legal title of the property to
and that
the mortgagee conditionally,
upon breach of condition the title of
absolute; and
the mortgagee became
that having the general title, he was
entitled to the immediate possession
oi’ the property to hold until condition
broken, unless it was otherwise stip
ulated in the mortgage. And that an
oiﬂcer could not levy upon u mort
property whether in the pos
gaged
session of the mortgagor or mortgagee,
even if the mortgage was not due, un
less the mortgage contained an express
permitting
mortgagee
the
stipulation
a
deﬁnite
to retain possession for
period, nor then if that period had
elapsed: Tannahiii v. Tuttie, 3 Mich.,

10-1; Eggieston v. Mundy, 4 Mich., 295;
Bacon v. Kimmel, 14 Mich., 201.
But it is now held that a ehattle
mortgage is a lien and security merely;
and not a sale or trnnsfer of the title
People v. Bristol. 35
to the property:
Mich., 28, 33; Grove v. Wise, 39 Mich.,
161; Brink v. Freeof, 40 Mich., 613;
linynes
Leppig, 40 Mich., 606.
v.
And a levy of execution upon the mort
gaged property is now expressly
au
L.,
thorized
by
C.
10318,
and
5
such levy may be made at any time be
fore foreclosure of the mortgage: Nei
son v. Ferris, 30 Mich., 497; Cary v.
Hewitt, 26 Mich., 228.
And the right
continues until redemption is cut off
by the foreclosure:
Haynes v. Leppig,
40 Mich., 605.
It is only the right
of redemption that can be taken on the
Bayne v.
execution:
Patterson, 40
Mich., 659.
But this leviable right
pertains to the whole property.land
is
apportionabie:
not
Worthington
v.
iinnna, 23 Mich., 534.
Upon a levy
of execution the oﬂicer has the right
to take possession of the goods
and
chattels from the mortgagor, and de.
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A

mortgage of goods which are not in existence, or which do
not belong to the grantor at the time of executing the mort
gage, is void,‘ unless the grantor ratify the grant by some new
tain them in safe and convenient cus
tody, as against the mortgagee for the
time prescribed by law fol‘ bringing
Cary v.
them to sale on the execution:
The law aims
Hewitt, 26 Mich., 228.
as far as practicable, the
to secure,
of the debtor's property
application
to both demands, the mortgage and the
Wil
levy, upon principles of justice:
son v. Montague, 57 Mich., 638; 24
N. W., 851; see, Smith v. Menominee
Circuit Judge, 53 Mich., 563; 19 N.
W. 184. See, further also, as to levies,
and sale of mortgaged chattels: V\’ilson
v. Montague, 57 Mich., 638; 24 N. W.,
851; Walker v. White, 60 Mich., 428;
27 N. W., 554; Merrill v. Denton, 73
Mich., 628; 41 N. W., 823; Hyde v.
Shank, 77 Mich., 517; 43 N. W., 890;
Bosenileld v. Case, 87 Mich., 295; 49
N. W., 630; Anderon v. Cook, 100
If the
Mich., 621; 59 N. W., 423.
validity of the mortgage is denied by
the execution creditor the lcvy need not
be made subject to the mortgage: Wil
liams v. Raper, 67 Mich., 427; 34 N.
Replevln lies at once and
W., 890.
mortgagee
the
by
demand
without
against the oﬂicer levying in deﬁance
Merrill v. Denton,
of the mortgage:
73 Mich., 628; 41 N. W., 823.
In case of a pledge of property, a
property in the
levy on the pledged
hands of the pledgee after the debt
and before foreclosure,
due
became
would be proper under this section. as
delivery and possession of the prop
erty always accompany a pledge. By
a pledge, says Judge Cowen, the special
to
proper-ty.iI1 the goods only passes
property re
the pledgee, the general
maining in the pledgor: 1 Cow. Treat,
If the mortgagee sell part
2 ed., 302.
of the property by virtue of the power
for sufficient to pay
in the mortgage,
debt, ‘with interest and
the mortgage
all his right to the residue
expenses.
of the property is extinguished: Ihid.,
Commencing an attachment suit
305.
mortgage, by
for a debt secured-by
does
seizure of mortgaged property,
but is a
not discharge the mortgage,
Thurber v. Jew
waiver of forfeiture:
ett, 2 Mich.. 295, 305: see, Tannahlll
The mort
104.
3 Mich.,
v. Tuttle,

gagor of a chattel mortgage having
upon the day the mortgage debt be
come due, tendered
the amount to the
mortgagee,
is entitied
to the posses
sion of the property mortgaged: Ful
ler v. Parrish, 3 Mich., 211; see, Mey
nahan v. Moore, 5) Mich., 9; Eslow v.
Mitchell, 26 Mich., 500.
The statute authorizing a levy upon
the interest of the general owner of
personal property
incumbered by se
curlry allows the purchaser to acquire
the mortgagor‘s interest, only on pay
ing the amount due or performing
the conditions.
The rights of mort
only be divested by the
gagees
can
payment or tender of payment of their
Where a levy is made on
whole debt.
personal property covered by a chat
tel mortgage, the statute does not per
mit the officer to sell it in parcels. It
only allows the sale to be made sub
ject to the lien of the mortgage or
pledge existing thereon, and it is only
on payment or tender of payment or
performance, that the purchaser obtains
any rights whaiever against the mort
gagee; neither the oﬂicer nor
pur
chaser has any right to dispose of any
single article or part of the mortgaged
property hy itself, or in advance of
such payment.
The right lawfully sold
by the oiiiecr, is the right of redemp
Therefore, where, under a levy
tlon.
on a stock of goods subject to mort
gage, the oiiicer sold the goods in par
cels to different persons,
he became a
trespasser, and the sale was held to
be an unlawful
conversion, and that
the mortgagees
were not bound to fol
low the property, but might hold the
oiiicer in damages
for the injury to
Worthington v. Hanna,
their security:
23 Mich., 530.
It may be necessary.
and it is not illegal in levying on
mortgaged chattels to take possession
of distinct articles separately, hut a
levy on a part only is incomplete,
and would not justify a sale of the dis
separately:
tinct article
Iiarvey v.
McAdam, 32 Mich., 477.
In levying
upon mortgaged property it is the duty
of the oﬂlcer to levy on all the prop
erty covered by the mortgage and that
can be found within his jurisdiction,
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act done by him with that view, after he has acquired the
property in them.”
A pledge is deﬁned to be a bailment of personal property, as
a security for a debt or engagement. Whether the debt be due
presently or upon time, the rights of the parties to the pledge
are the same. The pledgee, on non-payment of the debt, may
either ﬁle a bill in chancery for a foreclosure and proceed to a
and to sell it in one lot or parcel
subject to the mortgage; and after
levying upon a part of the property a
reasonable time must be given him
to ﬂnd and levy upon the rest of it:
46 Mich.,
19: 8
v. Talbot,
Baldwin
N. W., 565; Laing v. Perrott, 48 1\1ich.,
298; 12 N. W., 192; Ganong v. Green,
A sale
71 -Mich., 7: 38 N. W., 661.
of chattels given under a prior mort
gage is not a conversion as against
mortgagee: Grimes v.
the subsequent
Rose, 24 Mich., 416.
has
who
creditor
execution
An
levied upon property subject to a prior
mortgage, has the right to redeem
therefrom as soon as he acquires a
lien by the levy of his execution, and
is not required to wait until he has
purchased the property on execution
sale; and upon redeeming, he has the
right to be subroguted to the rights of
and is entitled to de
the mortgagee,
mand and receive an assignment of
Wesson,
Lucking
v.
the mortgage:
25 Mich., 443. ,
The right of an oﬂleer acquired by
a levy on mortgaged property is not
lost by delay in advertising the sale
of the property. if requested to do so
by the mortgagee who intends to re
plevy it: Baldwin v. Talbot, 46 Mich.,
19: 8 N. W., 565.
But a mortgagee of chattels may
maintain
trover against any person
interfering
wrongfully
with his right
mortgaged
to the possession of the
property, even before condition broken:
Grove v. Wise, 39 Mich., 161.
The assignee of a chattel mortgage
holds the same interest and has the
same rights in the mortgaged property,
and in case of a levy thereon is en
titled to the same protection as the
McLaughlin v. Smith,. 45
mortgagee:
Mich., 277; 7 N. W.. 908: Mayer V.
Souiier, 48 Mich., 411: 12 N. W., 632.
1-—-Jones
v. Richardson,
10 Metc.,

481; see, Moody v. Wright, 13 Metc.,
29; Barnard v. Eaton, 2 Cush., 303;
Codman v. Freeman, 3 Cush., 309:
Rice v. Stone, 1 Allen, 569; Barnard v.
Eaton, 2 Cush., 294; Chesley v. Jos
selyn, 7 Gray, 490; and see, Grimes
v. Rose, 24 Mich., 416.
But where a
merchant mortgages his stock of goods,
and expressly provides in the mort
gage that it shall cover not only the
goods then in stock, but also all future
purchases and additions to the stock.
the mortgage will, as between
mort
gagor and mortgagee,
be a lien upon
both the goods on hand when
the
mortgage was given, and also upon
such goods as shall thereafter be added
to the stock;
and a purchaser from
the mortgagor of the stock and addi
tions thereto, with knowledge of the
mortgage and its provisions, will take
the same subject to the lien of the
mortgage upon the whole, additions
and ail:
American Cigar Co. v. Fo
ter, 36 Mich., 368; Robson v. M. C. R.
Co., 37 Mich., 70; People v. Bristol.
28; Cadwell v. Pray, 41
35 Mich.,
Mich., 307; 2 N. W., 52. But to sub
ject _after acquired property to the
lien of a chattel mortgage it must
descriptive
words.
come
within
its
Thus, where it was provided in the
mortgage that it should cover, “lgiso
all the stock, goods, wares and mer
chandise that the said parties of the
ﬁrst part may add to or get /or use
in said business," ete., it was held
that the words “add to" and “get for
purchased
use’ would not include good
or bargained for, to be used in the
business, but which never came into
the actual possession of the mortgagor,
and were therefor never put Into the
stock of mortgaged goods:
Curtis v.
Wilcox, 49 Mich., 425; 13 N. W., 803.
2—Lunn v. Thornton, 1 M. G. &
S.,
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without judicial process, upon giv
ing reasonable notice to the pledgor to redeem, and of the in
tended sale. And if the pledgor cannot be found and notice
cannot be given to him, judicial proceedings to authorize a sale
.

sale, or he may sell

must be resorted to.
The constable may take actual possession of the goods
pledged, and hold the same until he sells, because the goods
must be present at the sale, and within view of those attend

ing it.

But after the sale the pledgee is entitled to the pos
session of the goods until the purchaser redcems them.3
Levy on partnership property.--On an execution
against one of several partners, the constable may take the
goods of the partnership in execution, and sell the individual
share or interest of the defendant, and in so doing he may take
possession, remove and deliver the entire property taken to
§ 523.

The purchaser is, by the
the purchaser under the execution.‘
in
the goods of the partner against
sale, entitled to the interest
whom the execution was issued, encumbered with the joint
debts of the partnership, and subject to account for the full
value in favor of the partners, or through them to creditors.“
Although the constable may seize the whole, he can sell only
the interest of him against whom the judgment and cexcution
was, without subjecting himself to an action of trover by the
other partners, in which they would recover the value of their
individual shares in the property sold.“ The same consequence
illll, articles of the partnerhlp stock only.
6
v. Ellsworth,
3—Bakewell
484; Stiet v. Hart, 1 Comst., 20. But
has
when the object of the pledge
ceases to
been performed the pledge
be operative, and the whole beneﬁcial
be
interest in the property pledged,
absolute in the true owner of
comes
Ward v.
the equity of redemption:
Ward, 37 Mich., 256.
4—I’hiiiips v. Cook, 24 Wend., 389:
Scrugham v. Carter, 12 Wend., 131;
Upon
\Vaddcll v. Cook, 2 Hill, 47.
such a sale the purchaser becomes a
tenant in common with the other part
ners: Ibld.
5—Walsh v. Adams, 3 Denio, 125:
Phillips v. Cook, 24 Wend., 389.
Hill, 47:
v. Cook, 2
6—Waddeil
Walsh v. Adams, 3 Denlo, 125; Bates
An execution
v. James, 3 Duer, 45.
against only one of the partners of
a ﬁrm cannot be levied upon speciﬁc

The levy in such case must be upon
the partner's interest in the whole
stock, for the only individual interest
he has is his share in what
shall
remain after the partnership
debts
are paid and the accounts between the
partners
are adjusted:
Slrrlne
v.
Briggs,
Mich., -143-5;
31
see,
and
Haynes v. Knowles, 36
Mich.,
407.
The interest of a partner in partner
ship property is not an interest in
speciﬁc articles belonging to the ﬁrm.
but only an interest in the surplus
that shall remain after the debts of
the ﬁrm are paid.
His share is not
separable from the share of his co
partner, tor he has no separate prop
erty in the assets oi’ the ﬁrm.
Ills
share is also subject to the ﬁnal ad
justment of accounts between the part
ners themselves.
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would follow in any case where the defendant had a right to a
portion only of the property levied on, and the officer should
It is, therefore, advisable, in all cases,
sell the whole property.
to. sell only the interest of the defendant.
§524. Levy on growing crops.—Corn or other crops, grow
ing or sown on the ground, which go to the executor, may be
sold upon the execution; but clover or grass cannot. Any prod
uct of the soil, raised annually by labor and cultivation, belongs
As the trees
to the executor, and may be taken ‘in execution.’
belong to the heir, so does the fruit which they bear, not gath
ered, as apples, pears, etc., and it is not liable to execution.5
Nor can the defendant in the execution authorize the levying
of an execution upon trees, grass or fruit growing upon his
land, before severance; and a levy upon and sale of them,
upon their being turned out by the defendant, would be void.“

If

any levy of an execution can be
upon a partner's interest in the
property it must 'be so
partnership
made and enforced as to protect the
One man's interest
rights of others.
must not be sacriﬁced because another
who is associated with him in busi
Speciﬁc
ness happens to be in debt.
articles must not be taken on the ex
the speciilc chattels
ecution because
are owned by the firm and not by
The utmost
either of the partners.
extent of the oi'ﬁcer's right if he can
levy at all. must be to seize the in
terest of the partner, whoever it may
partnership
be,
subject to all
the
debts and to the ﬁnal accounting. Each
partner has an entire as well as a
joint interest in the whole of the joint
A levy, then, to affect the
property.
interest of a partner, cannot touch a
portion of the goods, nor the
speciﬁc
whole, because the other partner has
an interest and property
in every
part, as well as the whole, coupled
with a right resting in contract to use
them
for the purpose for which the
partnership was instituted.
One part
ner is, therefore, entitled to bring re
plevin for the whole property if he is
deprived of the possession of it by a
seizure on execution for the individual
debt of another partner.
Hutchinson
v. Dubois, 45 l\iich.. 143; 7 N. W., 714.
Whether in case of the levy of an
execution on a partner's undivided in
terest in partnership assets, an ac
made

33

counting should not be had before sale,
or whether on the other hand the of
ﬂcer might at once proceed to sell that
which he has levied upon, namely, the
undivided, unsettled and undetermined
judgment
interest
of
the
debtor:
Ouacre;
Dubois,
Hutchinson
v.
45
Mich., 146; 7 N. W., 714.
An oﬂicer making a levy, is as much
bound to respect and set out exemp
tions from execution where the prop
erty is that of n partnership, as in
other cases:
Waite v. Mathews, 50
Mich., 392; 15 N. W., 524; see. post,
note 22, 5 526.
v. Dwight,
7 Mass,
7—Penhailow
34; Evan v. Roberts, 5 B. & C., 829.
It is competent for an oﬁlcer who has
levied on a growing crop after the
land has been conveyed by the execu
tion debtor, to show in defense to an
action of replevin brought against him
by the grantee of the land to recover
crop, that the conveyance
the
was
fraudulent
and void as against the
creditor in his execution, and he is
not required ﬁrst to have the convey
ance set aside in a direct proceeding
for that purpose: Pierce v. Hill, 3-5
Mich., 194.
8—Bank, &c., v.
Crary, 1 Barb.,
122-3; Evans v.
542; 2 Biia. Com.,
Roberts. 5 B. & C., 829; Smith v.
Jenks, 1 Denio, 580.
9-Bank of Lansingburg v. Crary,
1 Barb., 542.
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If, however, the defendant be not the owner, but the tenant
of the land, grass and fruit may be taken in execution."

a

a

“When
levy shall be made upon grain while growing, or on
any unharvested crops, by virtue of any execution, the officer
making such levy shall ﬁle notice of said levy in the office of
the township clerk of the township, or city clerk of the city, or
city recorder of cities having no officer known as city clerk,
where such grain or crops are at the time of making such levy;
a

is

and such clerk or recorder shall ﬁle said notice in his office, in
chattel
the same manner as he
required by law to ﬁle
mortgage; and such notice shall be constructive evidence to
all persons of the interest of the plaintiff in the execution, and

a

if

a

shall be entitled to the same fees therefor, to be paid by plain
tiff in the execution, and shall be collected as costs in the case,
and no sale of said crops or grain shall be made until the
same shall be ripe or fit to be harvested, and any levy thereon
circuit court, or by
by virtue of an execution issued from
justice of "the peace, shall be continued beyond the return day
thereof,
necessary, and remain in life, and the execution
thereof may be completed at any time within thirty days after
such grain or other unharvested crops shall be ripe or ﬁt to be

harvested.”

11

it,

a

§

Levy on ﬁxtures.—Fixtures annexed to the freehold
cannot be taken, for they are not goods and chattels." There
fore, upon an execution against the owner of the land, ﬁxtures
which would go to the heir, and not
put up in house upon
525.

11——C.

L.,

v. Jenks,
§

10—Smith

1

to the executor, cannot be taken by the constable; but ﬁxtures
which may be removed by the tenant may be seized and sold on
10321:

Denio, 580.
see,

King

lent

v.

a

7

As a general
Moore, 10 Mlch., 538.
rule growing crops are a part of the
realty, but for the purpose of levy
and sale upon execution, the statute
Preston
treats them as personalty:
N. W., 819.
v. Ryan, 45 Mlch., 530;
to
Where lands have been conveyed
defraud creditors, while a crop was
growing, the crop itself may be levied
cred
upon and sold on execution by
itor, without taking any proceedings
to have the conveyance declared fraud
oulent: Pierce v. Hill, 35 Mlch., 194.
And the oﬂicer may show the fraudu

character of the conveyance in
of his levy: Ibid.
An oﬂicer
authority for threshing wheat
upon in the mow, be
he has levied
fore selling lt: Stllson v. Gibbs, 40
Mlch., 42.
Where an execution is lev
ied on growing crops the fact that the
execution is ﬂied with the justice after
being indorsed with the levy and a
second
issued,
execution
will not
operate to defeat the levy:
Friyer
v. McNaughton, 110 Mlch., 22; 67 N.
W., 978.
engine on brick
12—An
wail
in
building is not personalty:
People v.
Jones, 120 Mich,, 283; 79 N. W., 177.
defense
has no
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Property ﬁxed to demised prem
ises, by the tenant, for manufacturing purposes, is personal
So, copper stills, kettles, steam tubs, etc., created
property."
by a tenant for the purpose of carrying on the business of dis
tilling, though ﬁxed to the premises."
So, a cider mill and
press erected by a tenant at his own.expense, and for his own
A building
use, in making cider on the demised premises."

an execution against him.13

erected by one person on the land of. another, under an agree
ment or understanding that it may be removed, is personal

property."
fol
§526. What property exempt from execution.-“The
lowing property is exempt from levy and sale under any execu
tion, or upon any other ﬁnal process of a court : 18
see,
Sheriff,
180:
13—Watson's
\\‘nlker v. Sherman, 20 Wend., 639.
A bar, bar ﬁxtures, cupboard, bowling
alley, ways and racks, attached by a
tenant to a building occupied by him
as a saloon under a lease, have been
held to be permanent ﬁxtures, and so
annexed
to the freehold as to belong
to it, and become the property of the
landlord, and not removable by the
tenant, or one to whom he has sold
them as personal property; hence they
could not be taken on execution against
O'Brien v. Kusterer, 27
the tenant:
Mich., 289;
Adams v. Lee, 31 Mich.,
440.

14—Raymond v. White, 7 Cow., 319.
Adams v. Wilson, 31 Mich., 440;
150;
30 Mich.,
Kerr v. Kingshury,
603,‘
40 Mich.,
Wheeler v. Bcdcll,
Stokoe
v. Upton, Ibld., 581; Bewlck
v. Fletcher, 41 Mich., 625: 3 N. W.,
162; Morrison v. Berry, 42 Mich., 389,
397; 4 N. W., 731; Crlppen v. Morri
23; Jones v. Detroit
son, 13 Mich.,
Chair Co., 38 Mich., 92.
See,

15—Reynolds

v. Shuicr,

16—Holmes v. Tremper,
29; Walker v. Sherman,
638,

5 Cow., 323.
20
20

J'ohns.,
Wend.,

639.

17-—Smith v. Benson, 1 Hill, 175;
Ashmun v. Williams, 8 Pick., 402.
18—C. L., 5 10322.
Smith v. Smith,
Mich., 539: 18 N. W., 347; Char
pentier v. Bresnahan, 62 Mich., 360:
28 N. W., 916:'Wood v. Bresnahan,
The
63 Mich., 614; 30 N. W., 206.
52

object of this statute is beneﬁcial, and
should as far as practicable be con
strucd beneﬁcially and liberally for the
debtor: Alvord v. Lent, 23 Mich., 371;
Stewart v. Welton, 32 Mich., 56. 60;
Wilson v. Bartholomew, 45 Mich., 41;
7 N. W., 227.
And the beneficial pur
pose should not be frittcred
away by
constructions
destroy
which
would
their value:
Rosenthal v. Scott, 41
Mich., 633: 2 N. W., 909; Skinner V.
Shannon, 44 Mich., 87: 6 N. W., 108;
Hutchinson
v. Whltmore,
Mich.,
00
263; 51 N. W., 451.
If the property
is exempt the simple fact of offering
it for sale does not change it or ren
der it the less ext-mpt: O'Donnell v.
Scgar, 25 Mich., 373.
And the owncr
may keep it, and use it, or sell it, as
his necessities may require without ob
jection from creditors:
Rosenthal v.
Scott, 41 Mich., 633: 2 N. W., 909.
If
it consists of the $250 selected from
a stock of goods after failure or sus
pension oi’ business he may hold it for
such reasonable time as circumstances
require before
starting again, or he
may sell it or oﬂer it for sale at once:
Il»Id.,- Harris 'v. Haynes, 30 Mich., 140.
Where the exemption depends upon the
uses to which the property is devoted,
it is not necessary that it should be
in use all the time:
O'Donnell v. Se
gar, 25 Mich., 378.
Nor will a party
he deprived of his exemptions by dis
posing of all his property, except that
which is exempt.
He may change his
occupation to one allowing greater ex
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First, All spinning wheels, weaving looms with the appara
tus, and stoves put up and kept for use in any dwelling house;
Second, A seat, pew, or slip, occupied by such person or
family, in any house or place of public worship;
Third, All cemeteries, tombs, and rights of burial, while in
use as repositories

Fourth,

All

of the dead;

arms and accoutrements required by law to be
all wearing apparel of every person or

kept by any person;

family

;

1°

Fifth, The library and school books of every individual and
emptions, and sell property not exempt
in exempt
and place the proceeds
subjecting h imselt
property, without
to the charge oi’ fraud: Ibld.
Creditors have no right as against
And it is of no
exempt property.
concern to them as to what disposition
the debtor may make of it. The fact
that it may be covered by a void or
trnudulent chattel mortgage does not
Waite
v.
destroy the exemption:
Mathews, 50 .\lich., 392; 15 N. W.,
524.
A debtor may dispose of his
and
exempt property as he pleases,
such disposal cannot subject it to ex
ecution or attect the exemption: Buck
ley v. \\'heelcr, 52 Mich., 1: 17 N. W.,
216; Anderson v. Odell, 51 Mich., 492;
v. Bresna
16 N. W., 870; Freehiing
han, 61 Mich., 541; 28 N. W., 531;
06 Mich., 683;
Fischer v. McIntyre,
33 N. W., 762.
The exemption continues after the
suspension of the business, in the car
rying on ot which the property was
used, and while removing to anbther
locality with intention of renewing the
Harris v. Haynes, 80
same business:
Mich., 140: O'Donnell v.
Segar,
25
Mich., 378.
But whether the rule
would be the same while removing to
another state, Quarrc:
Ibid.
It. how
ever, the owner has lost his residence
in this state by changing it to another
betore levy made, he will have lost
the exemption as to property remain
ing in this state after the change, as
the statute was intended only for resi
Mcliugh v. Curtis, 48 Mich.,
dents:
262; 12 N. W., 163.
Property exempt
from execution cannot be reached by
garnishee process:
Wilson
v.
Bar
tholomew, 45 Mich., 43; 7 N. W., 227.

The purchaser of exempt property ob
tains a title which overrides any levy
thereto, and also any prior
subsequent
levy, unless it be on a claim for un
paid
purchase
money:
Buckley
v.
Wheeler, 52 Mich., 1: 17 N. W., 218.
The law gives the wife a remedy to
protect exempt property only when the
husband falls to assert the
right:
Harley v. Procunier, 115 Mich., 53; 72
N. W., 1009.
One partner may exe
cute a chattel mortgage on partnership
property in the ﬁrm name and it will
cover
the property against
the ex
emptions of individual
parties:
Ro
bards v. Waterman, 96 Mich., 235: 55
N. W., 662.
The husband may deal
with the property exempt under sub
division eight as he pleases
without
the assent or the wife:
Betz v. Bren
ner,
106 l\iich., 89; 63 N. W., 970;
Miller v. Miller, 97 Mich., 153; 56 N.
W., 348; Cullen v. llarrls, 111 Mich.,
20; 69 N. W., 78.
So with sewing
machines exempt under C. L., Q 10359:
Singer Mfg. Co. v. Culiaton, 90 Mich.,
639;
W.,
51
N.
687.
A pimm
is not household goods, furniture
or
utensils within the statute:
Kehi v.
Dunn. 102 Mich., 582; 61 N. W., 71,
An unbroken two-year-old colt is not
exempt where owner has a team be
Hogan v. Neumelstel‘, 117 Mich.,
side:
498; 76 N. W.. 65. Lands used as a
cemetery are within the exemption law
though owned by a private corpora.
tion: Avery v. Forest Lawn Cem. Co.,
127 Mich., 125: 86 N. W., 538.
Sec,
C.

L.,

5 10324.

19—The exemption of all wearing
apparel is absolute; there seems to be
no limit to the amount:
Elliott v.
Whitmore, 5 Mich., 536.
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and ﬁfty dollars,

and all

Sixth, To each householder, ten sheep, with their ﬂeeces, and
the yarn or cloth manufactured from the same; two cows, ﬁve
swine, and provisions and fuel for the comfortable subsistence
of such householder or family for six months; 2°

:

a

517

a

a

a

a

a

Hall v. Penney, 11 Wend., 44. Swine
exempt when alive, are protected from
execution when killed for the use of
the family: Gibson v. Jenny, 15 Mass.,
205.
The exemption of provisions for
family use for six months would pro
tect potatoes planted for that purpose
while growing and before they are
dug, the same as when taken out of
the ground and stored:
Carpenter v.
Herrlngton,
25 Wend., 370.
But on
this point, where an exemption was
claimed for corn and potatoes which
had just appeared above the ground
after planting, the supreme
court of
King
this state were equally divided:
v. Moore, 10 Mich., 538.
The exemp
tion of six months‘ provisions for a
householder and his family is for the
beneﬁt
of those of his children who
are over age as well as those who are
under, if they reside with their father
and have no home elsewhere: Stilson
v. Gibbs, 53 Mich., 280; 18 N. W., 815.
The right to determine which two of
several cows belonging to a married
man shall be exempt
rests with the
husband and is not subject to the
consent of the wife: Harley v. Pro
cunier, 115 Mich., 53: 72 N. W., 1099.
l21—A clock would come within the
description of household furniture
Wil
Denio, 466.
A boarding
son v. Ellis,
house keeper who is
householder is
entitled to the same exemptions as any
householder.
And
other
household
purchased for the purpose
furniture
of keeping a boarding house, will be
exempt
to the amount of $250. even
against
judgment for the purchase
price: Vandcrhorst v. Bacon, RR Mich.,
699; see, Wood v. Bresnahan, 63 Mich.,
614; 30 N. W., 206.
1

20-—The word “householder" means
head, master, or person who has
the charge of and provides for a fam
ily, and does not apply to the sub
or inmates of the
ordinate members
household: Browne v. Witt, 19 Wend.,
475, 476.
It is not necessary,.how
ever,
that the head of the family
should be with it, for when he had
left the state, leaving his wife and
children living together, it was held
house
that he was, notwithstanding
v,
Murray,
holder:
Woodward
18
Johns., 400.
In the same case it was
that the exemption continued,
decided
although the family
were removing
"To say
from one place to another.
that a family, while in the act of re
moval, and on the highway, may be
deprived of their bed and their cow,
they (lid not,
on execution, because
dwelling house,
for a time. inhabit
would be a perversion of the statute.
So long as they remain together, as
family, without being broken up and
incorporated into other families, the
privilege remains."
A person having
and providing for
household is a.
“househoider,"
and the character is
temporary ceasing of
not lost by
housekeeping:
Griﬂin v. Southerland,
14 Barb., 456: see, O'Donnell v. Segar,
And where a widow
25 Mich., 367.
lives with her infant children, and
provides for them,
is a house
she
holder, and a cow kept and used by
her for the support of her family, is
exempt to her as a householder: Brig
Barb., 596.
The
ham
v. Bush,
33
fleeces, or the yarn or cloth manufac
tured from the ﬂeece of ten Rh8l‘p, are
from execution While in the
exempted
hands of a householder. whether he
be or be not the owner of the sheep:
the

a

ﬁfty dollars

;21

To each householder, all household goods, fur
Seventh.
niture and utensils, not exceeding in value two hundred and
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The tools, implements, materials, stock, apparatus,
team, vehicle, horses, harness or other things to enable any
person to carry on the profession, trade, occupation or busi
ness in which he is wholly or principally engaged, not exceed

ing in value two hundred and ﬁfty dollars;”22
“The word team, in this subdivision, shall be construed to
mean either one yoke of oxen, or a horse, or a pair of horses,
as the case may be.”23 But, “The property exempted in the
subdivision, of which this act is amendatory, shall not be ex
empt from any execution issued upon a judgment rendered for
the purchase money for the same property, and any sale of
such property after the commencement of a suit to recover the
purchase price thereof, and the ﬁling of the notice hereinafter
required, shall be null and void as against such an execution:
Provided, The plaintiﬁ in any suit shall ﬁle or cause to be ﬁled
with the clerk of the city, village, or township in which the
owner of such property resides, a notice in which he shall state
the time when such suit was commenced, the amount claimed
to be due, that the suit is brought to recover the purchase
money for the property, a description of the property sought
to be reached, and the name of the defendant.
At the time of
ﬁling
notice
the
the
party
such
ﬁling
same shall pay to the
clerk the sum of twenty-ﬁve cents, and said clerk shall endorse
upon such notice the date of ﬁling the same, and make the
same record as in case of chattel mortgages.”24
22-—A married woman who supports
her family or contributes thereto by the
employment of a team, has the same
right to claim it as exempt from ex
ecution that a man would under like
Mciiugh v. Curtis, 48
circumstances:
Mlch., 262: 12 N. W., 163.
Each
member of a tlrm against which execu
tion is levied, may claim for himself
the amount of property exempted'by
And it two partners select the
law.
same piece of poperty, the oﬂicer may,
as to that property, select for them:
Skinner v. Shannon, 44 Mlch., 86; 6
N. W., 108.
A carpenter may hold lumber exempt,
although he may intend to use it in
the building of 11 house for himself:
Hutchinson v. Roe, 44 Mlch., 389; 6
And n farmer may claim
N. W., 870.
seed wheat under exemption, as prop

erty used in his business:
Stiison v.
Gibbs, 46 Mlch., 216; 9 N. W1, 254.
Pool tables are not exempt as prop
erty pertaining to
the business of
saloon keeping: Goozen v_ Phillips, 49
Mlch., 7; 12 N. W., 889.
23-—C. L., 5 10323.
See, Ostrander
v. Packer, 35 Mlch., 430.
2-i——C. L.. § 10324. as amended
by
Laws of 1883, Act 159, p. 214.
But
the purchaser of n note given for the
purchase price of the property is not
entitled to claim that as to his judg
note,
ment on such
the property,
though otherwise exempt, is liable to
execution, by virtue of the exception
in favor of purchase price claims:
Shepard v. Cross. 33 Mlch., 96.
The
term
“mechanical tools," used in the
foregoing 8th subdivision, includes a
dentist's tools and instruments,
and
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Ninth. “A suﬂicient quantity of hay, grain, feed and roots,
whether growing or otherwise, for properly keeping for six
months the animals in the several subdivisions of this section
Maxon v. Perrot, 17
them:
Mich., 332.
Where an exemption is
claimed of articles used by a debtor in
carrying on his occupation or busi
ness,
it is not essential that they
should be absolutely necessary; if they
are reasonably adapted to aid him,
and are actually used by him in such
business,
it is suiilcient.
Nor is it
necessary
that the debtor should have
requiring all,
one engrossing pursuit
or most, of his time.
If his entire
business occupies only a portion of his
time,
still he is entitled to the,ex
emption.
It the debtor carries on
several kinds oi’ business,
and the
articles are suitable for and used in
carrying on only one of those kinds
can
be
of business,
the exemption
for that business in
claimed only
which he is principally engaged.
But
it he pursues two separate kinds of
business,
and the articles claimed as
him to
are used to enable
exempt
carry on both, that would furnish a
for the exemp
much stronger reason
And it has been held that a
tion.
horse and wagon used by the debtor
in making collection and closing up a
and also in cultivat
former business,
ing a small piece tit land, may be
claimed as exempt for these purposes:
Kenyon v. Baker, 16 Mich., 373; see,
Morrlll v. Seymour, 3 Mich., 64. In
determining
which is the principal
business when'a party is engaged in
two or more occupations, regard is not
to be had as to which is the most
proﬁtable or productive; but that on
which the party chieﬂy relies for a
the
livelihood. and which engrosses
most or his time and attention during
the course of the year, is to be deemed
Smalley v.
business:
his principal
Marten, S Mich., 520; see, Worman v.
A person en
Glddey, 30 Mich., 151.
titled to a team to carry on his busi
ness,
hasia right to select instead
thereof, any other property to the
amount of $250. needed in his business,
though without a team he might be
obliged to change the mode of conduct
ing that business: Wyckoﬂ v. Wyllis,
And to secure the ex
8 Mich., 48.
exempts

emption it is not required that the
articles
should be absolutely neces
sary to carry on the business:
Stew
art v. Welton, 32 Mich., 56. it is in
cumbent
on a party in replevin who
seeks to recover
a yoke of oxen as
exempt from execution,
under C. L., 5
10322, to show: ist, that he owned or
was entitled to the possession
of the
oxen; 2d, that he was engaged
in
some kind of business or employment
which required the use of a team, or
yoke oi’ oxen; and 3d, that he had no
other team, or none which together
with this would exceed $250 in value,
or it they did that he had taken the
proper course to seieot these oxen, or
that he had been wrongfully prevented
from making such selection under C.
L., §§ 10325, 10326.
The mere tact
that 11 man oﬂers exempt property for
sale, will not deprive him of the ex
emption; but if he buys it and holds
it rather for sale orspeculation than
for the particular use which exempts
it, and it is not in fact needed or kept
for such use, it will not be exempt.
In replevin for a team claimed as
exempt from execution, the question of
the occupation of the piaintlif relates
only to the time of and previous to
the taking complained oi’, and his occu
patlon at any subsequent time is imma
teriai.
It is not fraudulent for a man
to sell property not exempt for the
purpose of, and actually investing the
in property which is exempt
proceeds
under the statute.
Such a transac
tion would not deprive him of the ex
emption in the newly acquired prop
erty so long as his occupation is such
as the statute requires
in order to
give the exemption,
and the property
is actually needed by him in that
occupation. One who is engaged in an
occupation which renders his team
exempt.
does not lose that right oi’
moving from
one
exemption while
the state for
place to another within
purpose‘ of resuming the same
the
occupation at the place of his destina
tion: O'Donneii v. Segar, 25 Mich.,
So, one who has failed in the
367.
and
hardware and tinning business,
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exempted from execution, and any chattel mortgage, bill of
sale, or other lien created on any part of property above de
scribed, except such as is mentioned in the eighth subdivision
of this section, shall be void, unless such mortgage, bill of
sale or lien be signed by the wife of the party making such
mortgage or lien, if he have any.”25
“All sewing machines owned by individuals and kept for the
actual use of themselves or their families, shall be exempt
from levy and sale on execution, not exceeding one such ma
chine for each family, etc.;”2°
“No property, except as exempted by the state constitution.
shall be exempt from levy or sale, under an execution, issued
upon a judgment obtained before any justice of the peace, for
work, labor, or services done or performed by any woman,
when such amount does not exceed the sum of twenty-ﬁve
made an assignment, reserving certain
tinners' tools and machines as exempt,
must, in the absence of proof that he
has gone into other business or relin
quished his former occupation, be held
entitled to retain them as exempt, not
withstanding
he has done
little or
nothing
in the business for four
llarris
months after the assignment:
To estab
v. Haynes. 30 Mlch., 140.
lish a right of exemption under sub
division eight. the business in which
debtor is wholly or principally
the
Murphy v.
engaged
must be shown:
Mulvena, 108 Mlch., 347; 66 N. W.,
224.

The ninth sub
25—C. L., $10322.
not exempt any more
does
division
hay, grain, feed, roots, etc., than is
necessary for six months‘ keeping oi’
such of the animals mentioned therein,
as the debtor has at the time of the
King v. Moore, 10 Mich.. 538.
levy:
In the cae of Holman v. Gillett, 24
Mlch., 414, it is said that the provi
sions of this statute making any chattel
mortgage, bill of sale or other lien
created on exempt property void un
less the same is signed by the wife,
etc., refers only to such conveyances,
pledges or conditional sales as are in
tended as a security. or which give a
lien for that purpose. and not to
absolute sales which are hy no statute
required to be in writing, and that so
it
far as this provision is concerned,

does not interfere
with the right of
the husband to make an absolute sale
of such property, as he may of per

sonal property, not thus exempt. and
that the assent of the wife need not
writing when the husband
be
in
makes an absolute sale.
But in Snyder
v. People, it is said in referring
to
this statute, that the husband is pre
cluded from selling or encumberin:
such personal chattels as are exempt
by law from execution unless with the
wife's assent, and that if he attempts
to do so, she may bring action to re
cover the same In her own name: Ibid..
Snyder v. People, 26 Mlch., 110.
And
see, Ingersoil v. Gage, 47 Mlch., 121;
10 N. W., 135.
In this state a wife has special
statutory
rights
in such household
goods as would be exempt from execu
tion: and if the husband leaves her,
he cannot get possession by writ of re
plevin:
Smith v. Smith, 52 Mich..
538: 18 N. W., 347.
The husband
26—(‘. L.. I 10359.
may dispose of or encumber a sewing
machine without the wife's consent:
Singer Mfg. Co. v. Culiaton, 90 Mlch.,
639;
51
N. W.. 687;
3
Howell's
Statutes, §§ 7717a, 7717b. 7717c, pro
viding for special exemptions in case
of labor debts was held unconstitu
tional in Burrows v. Brooks, 113 Mlch.,
307; 71 N. W., 460.
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dollars, exclusive of costs. Inentering any such judgnent, the
justice shall recite on the docket that the same was rendered
for the personal services and work of said plaintiff, and the
same fact shall also be recited in any execution issued thereon;
and in addition to all other costs allowed by law, the plaintiff
in any such suit shall recover an attorney's fee of ﬁve dollars,
to be taxed with the other costs in the cause, and to be col
lected in the same manner as such other costs are collected.”"
§527. Exemption is personal privi1ege.~—'i‘he exemption of
personal property from execution is a personal privilege of
which the owner only can take advantage.“ Formerly, this
exemption might be waived by the debtor, and even his assent
subsequent to a levy on property exempt by the statute, would
render the levy valid.” And such seems to be the law now,
in respect to the property mentioned in the eighth subdivision,
and in respect -to the property of all persons, except house
holders who are married.
But a. householder who has a wife
cannot waive the exemption to any property, or turn it out on
execution, except that mentioned in the eighth subdivision,
and should he attempt to do so, and should the property be
sold, the wife could maintain an action to recover it.3°
Selection of exempt propel-ty.—“When a levy shall
§528.
be made upon property of any class or species which is exempt
by law from execution to a speciﬁed amount or'value, the
officer levying such execution may make an inventory of the
whole of such property belonging to the person against whom
the execution shall be issued, and cause the same to be ap
praised at its cash value, by two disinterested freeholders of
the township where the property may be, on oath, to be ad
ministered by him to such appraisers.”31
27—C. L., 5 900.
28—-Mickles v. Tonsiey, 1 Cow., 114:
see. Smith v. Hill, 22 Barb., 656.
29—iiewes v. Parkham, 20 Plck., 90.
30—Kin;: v. Moore, 10 Mich., 538.
Exemptions
C. L., Q 8692. and notes.
from execution being intended for the
beneﬁt oi’ the family. a joint replevin
by husband and wife to recover exempt
property
is admissible
under
the

statute which authorizes the wife to
sue alone in such cases:
Shepard v.
Cross, 33 Mich., 96.
3i—('. L., Q 10325.
When an execution is levied upon
property oi’ any class or kind which is
exempt
by law to a speciﬁed
amount
or value, the whole property levied
upon
must be inventoried
and ap
praised, and the defendant must be
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“Upon such inventory and appraisal being completed, the
defendant in execution, or his authorized agent, may select
from such inventory an amount of such property not exceed
ing, according to such appraisal, the amount or value ex
empted by law from execution; but if neither such defendant
nor his agent shall appear and make such selection, the ofﬁcer
shall make the same for him.”32
'
“The appraisers mentioned in the twenty-eighth section of
this chapter, shall be entitled to ﬁfty cents each for their serv
aliowed to select his exemptions there
from; and it will be no defence to the
oﬂlcer to show that the defendant
owned other property of the same class
or species equal to the amount of his
exemptions that was not levied upon.
if the defendant falls to make his
selection the otilcer must make it for
him:
Elliott v. Whitmore, 5 Mich.,
538, 537; 8 Mich., 49; Ostrander v.
Packer, 35 Mich., 430; Vanderhorst v.
Bacon, 38 Mich., 672;
Sheldon v.
Rounds, 40 Mich., 427.
In such case
where no inventory and appraisal has
been made, the owner will be entitled
to recover from the oﬂlcer the value
of the property levied upon, not ex
ceeding the amount or value of the
exemption to which he was entitled:
Town v. Elmore, 38 Mich., 305: Stil
son v. Gibbs, 53 Mich., 280: 18 N. W.,
815.
Nor is it any excuse
to the
oﬂlcer that the debtor gave no notice
Vander
that he claimed exemptions:
horst v. Bacon, 38 Mich., 672.
But
the debtor can have no advantage from
to inventory and
the otiicer's failure
appraise the property unless his status
is such as to entitled him to an exemp
tion,
notwithstandlng
property
the
may belong to what is usually known
Ferguson v.
as the exempt
class:
Washer, 49 Mich., 390: 13 N. W., 788.
But it is not necessary, in levying
execution in one county. upon the
property of a debtor exempt to a. cer
tain amount or_value. that the whole
property of the debtor of the same
class situate in other counties should
he levied upon and appraised and the
debtor’s exemptions selected out of the
whole mass of property found in both
or all the counties:
Alvord v. Lent.
23 Mich., 369, 371.
The appraisers
must be disinterested persons: Bayne

v. Patterson, 40 Mich., 658; and the
appraisal
and inventory
be
should
made
in the place where the goods
Bacon,
are found:
v.
Vanderhorst
supra.
It seems that the inventory
and appraisal may be delayed up to
the time of noticing the property for
sale,
if no inconvenience or disad
vantage is thereby caused to the debt
King v. Moore, 10 Mich., 545.
or:
As to what will amount to fulﬁllment
of the oﬂleer's duty to allow the debtor
to select
his exemptions, see, Jones
v. Peek, 101 Mich., 389; 59 N. W.,
659.

32—C. L., Q 10326.
The debtor does
not waive the exemption by remaining
silent and not claiming it when a levy
is made:
Vanderhorst v. Bacon, 38
Mich., 669: nor by giving a receiptor
after levy; nor by the receiptor‘s sur
rendering the property to the oﬂiccr:
Ibizl.
If a portion of the property which
a debtor has a right
to select as
exempt,
is encumbered
by a chattel
mortgage,
and a portion of the same
class is unencumbered, [he debtor has
a right to make his selection from that
portion
not covered
mortgage:
by
Bayne v. Patterson,
40 Mich.,
658.
And this right is not affected by his
having covered his other property not
exempt,
with a fraudulent mortgage:
Baldwin v. Talbot, 43 Mich., 11: 4 N.
W., 547.
Nor is he precluded from
making his own selection by the fact
that he has property in another county
belonging to the exempt class: Ihid.
The levy is not rendered invalid he
csuse the oﬂlcer does not inventory
property
of the
debtor located
in
another county:
Aivord v. Lent, 23
Mich., 371.
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and six cents per mile for traveling, in going only, for
which the plaintiff in the execution shall be liable to them,
and the amount of their travel and fees shall be collected upon
ices,

the execution.”33

“Whenever the defendant in an execution shall have cows,
sheep, swine or other animals or articles, some of which are
exempt by law from sale on execution, and some of which are
not so exempt, the officer may take all of such horses, cows,
sheep, swine or other animals or articles into his possession,
and the defendant or his authorized agent may, immediately,
on being notiﬁed of the levy, select so many thereof as are ex
empt by law from execution, but if the defendant be absent,
or neglect to make such selection on being notiﬁed, the officer
shall make the same for him.”34
Successive 1evies.—Goods in the ‘custody of the law
§529.
cannot be taken in execution.
Therefore goods and chattels
which have been taken upon execution, by one oﬁicer, cannot
But, if an officer, after having
be levied upon by an0thcr.35
levied upon property with one execution, receives a. second,
the ﬁrst levy is suﬁicient for both executions.“
Where a con
stable, having in his hands an execution against the property
of M, levied on a horse and advertised it for sale, and prior
to the day of sale an attachment came to his hands against the
property of M, by virtue of which he attached the same horse,
which was sold on the execution, and a suﬂicient sum was
raised to pay the execution, and a surplus was left to pay the
amount due in the attachment suit, and after the sale of the
horse, judgment was obtained in the attachment suit, and

execution was issued thereon to the constable, who levied on
the same money which he had received on the sale of the horse
he had sold, it was held, that such money might be applied to
satisfy the execution in the attachment suit; that the lien of
the attachment on the horse, by operation of law, became trans
ferred, after the sale, to the surplus money in the hands of the
constable, and that such surplus money was the property of M,
33-0. L.,§

35—Hartwell

10327.

3-t—C. L., 5 10328.

v.

Blssel,

17

Johns,

128.

36—Russell
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and sale on the subsequent execution
1

Property fraudulently transferred or encumbered.—
§ 530.
The ofﬁcer may seize goods which have been fraudulently sold
or conveyed away; for such sale is void against creditors, and
a. principal badge of fraud is the defendant’s
continuing in
possession.“
Upon this subject, it is declared by statute that
“Every sale made by a vendor, of goods and chattels in his
possession, or under his control, and every assignment of goods
and chattels by way of mortgage or security, or upon any
condition whatever, unless the same be accompanied by an im
mediate delivery, and be followed by an actual and continued
change of possession of the things sold, mortgaged or assigned,
shall be presumed to be fraudulent and void, as against the
creditors of the vendor, or "the creditors of the person making
such assignment, or subsequent purchasers in good faith, and
shall be conclusive evidence of fraud, unless it shall be made

a

5

n

524

a

9

2

ii

Mich., 191; Bank of Fenton v.
Whittle, 48 Mich., 1; 11 N. W., 756:
Leppig v. Bretzel, 48 Mich., 321; 12
N. W., 199.
And a chattel mortgage
given and received to secure an honest
debt, will be valid, notwithstanding
it
may have been made by the mortgagor
with
fraudulent intent as to his other
creditors, unless the mortgagee partit-i~
pated in the fraudulent purpose:
An
drews v. Fillmore, 46 Mich., 315;
N.
W., 431. A party is presumed to intend
the natural and necessary consequences
of his own i1cts,snd. when prejudice to
the rights 0! creditors results, the act
fraudulent,
is constructively
notwith
standing good motive or intentions:
Schaible v. Ardner, 98 Mich., 72: 56
N. W., 1105.
The fraudulent charac
ter of
sale is not necesarily changed
because
a part of the
consideration
was indebtedness owing to the pur
Gumberg v. Trensch,
chaser:
110
Mich., 451; 68 N. W., 236.
For other
cases upon this subject see Ryan v.
Meyer, 108 Mich., 638; 66 N. W., 667:
Preston Nat‘i Bank v. Pierson, 112
Mich. 435; 70 N. W.. 1013: Kock v.
Bostwick, 113 Mich., .302; 71 N. W.,
473; Township
of Maple Valley v.
Foley, 113 Mich., 622; 71 N. W., 1086.
35

a

0|!

37—Wheeler v. Smith, 11 Barb., 345.
It is held that
38—C. L., § 9533.
since the enactment of C. L., §§ 9523
inclusive, this section has no
9520
eifect or application to anything else
than absolute sales, mortgages and in
struments intended to operate by way
security being controlled by C. L.,
Cooper v.
inclusive:
9523-9529
Brock, 41 Mich., 488;
N. W., 660;
Buhl iron Wks. v. Teuton, 67 Mich.,
623; 35 N. W., 804.
This section ap
plies to sales of chattels only, not to
Hang v.
transfers of real estate:
Third Nnt'i Bk., 95 Mich., 249; 54 N.
W., 888.
As to when
sale or trans
fer of property will be deemed fraudu
See, the
lent as against creditors:
9533.
A sale of prop
notes to this
erty to
bmm ﬂde purchaser, will not
by the tact that the
be invalidated
vendor made it with intent to hinder
Spring Lake
and defraud creditors:
Iron Co. v. Waters, 50 Mich., 13; 14
N. W., 679.
Property sold to pay an honest debt
due to the purchaser, even though such
purchaser is the wife of the vendor, is
lawful, notwithstanding
it may cut oﬂ
the redress of all other creditors. and ai
though intended to do so:‘ Jordan v.
White, 38 Mich., 256; Hill v. Bowman,
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to appear, on the part of the persons claiming under such sale
or assignment, that the same was made in good faith, and with
out any intent to defraud such creditors or purchasers.”-"9
“The term. ‘creditors,’ as used in the preceding section, shall
be construed to include all persons who shall be creditors of
the vendor or assignor at any _time whilst such goods and
chattels shall remain in his possession, or under his control.”4°
The question of fraudulent intent, the statute declares, shall
'
be deemed a question of fact, and not of law.“
See, Hasey v.
39—C. L., Q 9520.
White Pigeon Beet Sug. Co., 1 Doug.,
Mich., 194.
The change of possession contem
plated, is an open, visible, substantial
change,
and must be such as to give
notice to the public that there has
Doyle v.
been a change of ownership:
Stevens, 4 Mich., 93; Sheldon v. War
As to delivery
ner, 26 Mich., 403, 408.
and change of possession of ponderous
and bulky articles, see, Anderson v.
Brenneman, 44 ‘Mich., 198, 202; 6 N.
W., 222: Alderton v. Buchoz, 3 Mich.,
322; Carpenter v. Graham, 42 Mich.,
In case of a gift
191; 3 N. W., 974.
or sale from husband to wife while
living together, the question of change
of possession must be considered in
connection with the circumstances of
As between them there can
the case.
in general be no open and visible
And it will be
change
of possession.
suﬂlcient if she establish her right by
of evidence:
a fair preponderance
Davis v. Zimmerman, 40 Mich., 24;
Judge v. Vogel, 38 Mich., 568; Kipp v.
Lamoreaux, 81 Mich., 304; 45 N. W.,
1002: Jansen v. McQueen, 105 i\iich.,
201; 63 N. W., 73.
Because there is
no change of possession it does not
is
necessarily follow
that the sale
it is, but
fraudulent. Presumptively
it may be shown that it is not: Mol
ltor v. Robinson, 40 Mich., 200; Buhl
iron Works v. Teuton, 67 Mich., 623;
35 N. W., 804: Kipp v. Lamoreaux. 81
Mich., 290; 45 N. W., 1002; Hopkins
v. Bishop, 91 Mich., 328; 51 N. W.,
902: Ilauser v. Beatty, 93 Mich., 502:
It is suﬂicient to avoid
53 N. W., 628.
the sale that there is a fraudulent
intent in the seller only if there is no
change of possession:
Kipp v. Lamo
reaux, 81 Mich., 305; 45 N. W., 1002.
'

A sale of personal property without
delivery
and actual
and continued
change of possession,
etc., is presumed
Haynes v. Leppig, 40
fraudulent:
Mich., 609.
If the vendor is allowed
to remain in possession,
and exercise
dominion over and appear to the world
as the owner of the property, and
thereby gain the credit which that
character would give, the sale will be
void as to subsequent purchasers in
good
faith:
Sheldon v. Warner, 26
Mich., 403.
But want of change of
possession,
is only prima facle evidence
of fraud:
Molltor v. Robinson, 40
Mich., 200; Fcary v. Cummings, 41
Mich., 376: 1 N. W., 946.
A sale may
be good as between
parties but not
against creditors, either upon proof
of an actual intent to hinder, delay,
or defraud them, or upon the statutory
presumption of such intent where the
requisite delivery and change of pos
session are wanting:
Ilutch v. Fowler,
28 Mich., 212; Webster v. Bailey, 40
'
Mich., 6-i3.
As to subsequent purchases, etc., see,
Wetherel v. Spencer,
3 .\iich.,
123:
Cigar‘ Co. v. Foster,
American
36
Notice, etc., what sum
Mich., 368.
cient, see, Grimes v. Rose, 24 Mich.,
421; Kohl v. Lynn, 34 Mich., 361.
40—C. L., 5 9521.
41—C. L., 1 9538; Jackson v. Dean,
519; Pierson v. Manning, 2
1 Doug.,
Mich., 445; Oliver v. Eaton, 7 Mich.,
108,
157; Baldwin
v. Buckiand.
11
Mich., 391.
An illegal act prejudicial
to the rights of others, is a fraud upon
such rights, although the party denies
all intention to commit a fraud: Kirby
v. lngersoi, Bar. Ch.,.\iich., 172. Fraud
in fact, or an express intent to com
mit fraud, is not necessary
in order
to render a conveyance
fraudulent as
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The fact that there was a good consideration for the convey
in its being made in good faith. Therefore a
party claiming under a bill of sale, must prove that a consid
eration was paid or existed. To prove this, neither the recital
of a consideration in the instrument nor what parties said on
that subject at the ti.me the instrument was executed, is evi
dence against creditors.“ Where a debtor has made an assign
ment of his property, which was void upon its face as against
creditors, and the plaintiff had bought the property of the
assignee, and verbally agreed to pay for it at certain rates in
his notes, on time; but before making any payments or giving
any notes, the property was taken on attachment against the
fraudulent assignor; hold, that the verbal promise to pay was
not suﬁicicnt to protect the title of the purchaser against the
As against" the action of an attaching creditor,
attachment.
no one but a purchaser for a valuable consideration actually
passed can claim title to property which has been fraudulently
assigned. It is not suﬂicient that the purchaser has verbally
promised to pay for the property, or has given his written
obligation, not negotiable, for such payment."
There must be an actual and continued change of possession,
as well as a nominal and constructive change. A construction
which would allow the vendor to remain in possession of the
goods, and sell them as the agent of the purchaser or assignee,
would render the statute for the prevention of frauds a mere
ance is involved

nullity.“

against creditors:
It is suﬂicient if
the effect of the conveyance is to delay
or hinder creditors in ‘the collection of
Buck v. Sherman, 2
their
debts:
Doug., 176; Pierson v. Manning, 2
Mich., 445; but see, Ilollister v. Loud,
2 Mich., 309.
42—-Tift v. Barton, 4 Denio, 171.
To constitute a bona ﬂde purchaser, he
must buy the property for a valuable
consideration, which must be paid or
delivered before notice of any fraud,
defect. or want of title in the vendor,
and before notice of the claims of any
other parties in the title or interest pur
Dixon v. Hill, 5 Mich., 404:
chased:
Warner v. Whittaker, 6 Mich., 133;
33!);
v. Tyler,
12 Mich..
Blanchard
No
Stone v. Welling. 14 Mich., 514.

is protected ns a bona. ﬂde pur
chaser, who has not made payment
before notice.
It is not enough if he
purchases without notice, if he pays
Palmer v. Williams. 24
after notice:
Mich., 328; Kohl v. Lynn, 3-4 Mich.,
360.
But as a fraud is never to be
presumed,
a person who pays value is
to be deemed as the rightful holder
of the property, unless he is shown
to have had such knowledge as would
make him guilty of bad faith:
Miller
v. Finley, 26 Mich., 249.
43—Dlxon v. Hill, 5 Mich., 404.
44—-Butler v. Stoddard. 7 Paige,
166.
The question of fraud arising
from want of delivery and a. continued
change of possession
of goods sold or
assigned by way of security, is a ques
one

526

"

I

CH.

XX VII.

or sssvmc.

EXECUTIONS.

§ 531

Of transfer without delivery or recording.--“Every
§531.
mortgage, or conveyance intended to operate as a mortgage,
of goods and chattels, which shall hereafter be made, which
shall not be accompanied by an immediate delivery, and fol
lowed by an actual and continued change of possession of the
things mortgaged, shall be absolutely void as against the cred
itors of the mortgagor, and as against subsequent purchasers
and mortgagecs in good faith, unless the mortgage, or a true
copy thereof, shall be ﬁled in the oﬂice of the township clerk

of the township, or city clerk of the city, or city recorder of
cities having no officer known as city clerk, where the mort
gagor resides, except when the mortgagor is a non-resident of
the state, when the mortgage, or a true copy thereof, shall be
ﬁled in the office of the township clerk of the township, or city
clerk of the city, or city recorder of cities having no oﬁicer
known as city clerk, where the property is.”45

The ﬁling of instrument.—When,

the office of the
a
who
vacant,
had
person
being
of the oﬁice
charge
town clerk
§ 532.

tion of fact: Jackson v. Dean, 1 Doug..
519; Snook v. Davis, 6_ Mlch., 156;
Oliver v. Eaton, 7 Mlch., 108.
See notes 38 and
45——C. L., Q 9523.
This statute does
39, § 530, ante.
not apply to an assignment of open
accounts. but only to mortgages of
goods and chattels capable of delivery:
Preston Nut‘i Bk. v. Smith M. P. Co.,
H-I Mlch., 364; 47 N. W., 502; Farrell
F. & M. Co. v. Preston Nat'l Bk., 93
Mlch., 582: 53 N. W., 831.
An in
strument, if by the surrounding circum
stances
shown to have been intended
as security, will be construed a mort
gage: Cooper v. Brock, 41 Mlch., 488;
2 N. W., 660.
The following are cases
illustrating the rule that such are
Talcott v. Crip
treated as mortgages:
pen, 52 Mlch., 633; 18 N. W., 392;
Weed
29
v. Mirick, 62 Mlch., 414;
N. W., 78; First Nat'l Bk. v. Weed.
89 Mlch., 357; 50 N. W., V864; Read
v. Horner, 90 Mlch., 152: 51 N. W.,
207; Hudson v. McKaie, 107 Mlch.,
22: 64 N. W., 727; Beckman v. Noble,
The
115 Mlch., 523; 73 N. W., 803.
following
cases
illustrate
that class
which are not treated as mortgages:
Booth v. Oliver, 67 Mlch., 664: 35 N.
iron
W., 793; Lake Superior.
etc.
-

v. Mt-Cann, 86
Mlch., 106: 48
\\'.,
692.
A chattel
mortgage
will not be fraudulent
merely
be
cause the mortgagee
knew of a con
templated assignment by the debtor for
the benefit of his creditors, and that his
mortgage would postpone or cut oi!
the
claims of other creditors.
and
though the mortgagee also knows that
the debtor expects that the mortgage
will shield him, if there is no collu
sion to accomplish this:
Kalamazoo
Spring etc. Co. v. Winans, Pratt at Co.,
106 Mlch., 198; 64 N. W., 23, and
cases cited in the opinion. This statute
does not permit a transaction, which is
in substance a mortgage, to have the
effect of a sale, however disguised, to
the prejudice of parties dealing with
the debtor, in the absence of statutory
notice to such parties:
Damm v.
Mason, 98 Mlch., 237: 57 N. W., 123.
To this case in the original report is a
valuable note on the general subject.
A bill of sale given for the accommo
dation of the vendor, and assigned by
his direction to secure a loan to him
self, will he treated as a mortgage
from the vendor to the assignee: Pinch
v. Willard, 108 Mlch., 204; 66 N. W.,
42.
Among the later cases on the gen
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received a chattel mortgage brought to the office to be ﬁled,
indorsed it “Filed Oct. 20, 1845,” and placed it among the
chattel mortgages in the office; held, that this was a valid ﬁling
of the mortgage, within the meaning of the statute. “It is a
mistake to suppose that the marking or endorsing on the paper

of

it

it

a.

is it,
is

the time of ﬁling
the substantial thing, or the act of ﬁling.
Such indorsement
memorandum
the time of the
merely
ﬁling, and not the ﬁling itself.
The ﬁling consisted in pre
there, and
senting the mortgage at the oﬁice and leaving
in the proper place with the papers in the office/’1
depositing

a

is

528
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given by the ﬁrm in the ﬁrm name, and
as a partnership mortgage:
Hubbard
son Lumber Co. v. Covert, 35 Mich.,
254; C. L.,
9523.
1—Bishop v. Cook, 13 Bsrh., 326.
2—Doyie v. Stevens,
Mich.,
87.
The appointment of a clerk of the mort
gagor of a stock of goods, as agent of
the mortgagee,
for the purpose of tak
ing care of and selling them. where
there is no announcement of change in
business, no change of books, and no
other apparent change of ownership or
possession,
is not a change
posses
sion within the meaning of the statute.
The change of possession contemplated
is an open, visible, substantial change.
and must be such as to give notice to
the public that there has been a
change in the ownership:
Ibid.
chattel mortgage of
stock of goods
which leaves the mortgagor in posses
sion. and by inference authorizes him
to sell in the usual course of busi
ness, is good as between
the parties,
and is not necessarily fraudulent as to
Mich.,
creditors:
Gay v. Bldweli,
Mich., 108.
519: Oliver v. Eaton,
covering
But
chattel
mortgage
speciﬁc chattels and "ail other per
sonal property that may be owned or
7

a

3

erai subject are Vining v. Mlllar, 116
Mich., 144: 7-i N. W., 459; Ferguson v.
Wilson, 122 Mich., 97; 80 N. \\'., 1006;
Hammel v. First Nat‘i Bk., 129 Mich.,
176: 88 N. W., 397: Watson v. Mead,
98 Mich., 330; 57 N. W., 181, and note
to this case in 98 Mich., 331.
As to tiling. see, Watson v. Mead.
Wade v. Strachan,
supra, and note:
71 Mich., 466; 39 N. W., 582; Man
waring v. Jenison, 61 Mich., 141: 27
N. W., 899. As to renewal. see, Briggs
N. W., 231;
v. iiiette, 42 Mich., 12:
Eddy v. McCall, 71 Mich., 497: 39 N.
104
W., 734: Chapey v. Mathews,
Mich., 103; 62 N. W., 141: and see.
Sheldon v. Warner, 26 Mich., 403:
Hurd v. Brown, 37 Mich., 484; Kohl
But a chattel
v. Lynn, 34 Mich., 360.
mortgage, given in good faith, will be
held void for want of giving imme
diate possession of the goods, only where
rights have arisen or injury has rs.»
change
of
suited from the want of
in the interval before pos
possession,
Waite v. Mathews,
session was given:
A part
50 Mich., 392: 15 N. W., 524.
nership having a deﬁnite local abiding
place, may be said to reside there for
the purpose of determining the proper
place for ﬁling a chattel mortgage

a

mortgage?

‘

it

if

is a

§

Eifect of actual notice of prior incumbrance.—Where
of taking
conveyance or mortgage of goods,
receives direct and express notice that another party holds
prior mortgage on the property, or
the prior mortgagee
in possession of the property,
suﬂicient notice to put such
subsequent mortgagee upon inquiry as to the extent of such
lien, and in that case he takes the property subject to the ﬁrst
533.

one, at the time
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§534.
mortgage

Filing to be renewed at end of year.—“Every such

shall cease to be valid, as against the creditors of
the person making the same, or subsequent purchasers or mort
gagees in good faith, after the expiration of one year from the
ﬁling of the same, or a copy thereof, unless within thirty days
next preceding the expiration of the year, .the mortgagee, his
agent or attorney, shall make and annex to the instrument
or copy on ﬁle as aforesaid an affidavit, setting forth the inter
est which the mortgagee has, by virtue of such mortgage, in
the property therein mentioned; upon which affidavit the town
ship or city clerk shall endorse the time when the same was
ﬁled.”3
Provided, That such aﬂidavit being made and ﬁled
before any purchase of such mortgaged property shall be made,
or other mortgage received or lien obtained thereon in good
faith, shall be as valid to continue in etfect such mortgage as
if the same were made and ﬁled within the period as above

described.”

“The effect of any such afﬁdavit shall not continue beyond
from the time when such mortgage would otherwise
valid, as against subsequent purchasers and mort
in good faith; but within thirty days next preceding

one year

cease to be
gagees

the time when any such mortgage would otherwise cease to be
valid as aforesaid, a similar afﬁdavit may be ﬁled and annexed
as provided in the preceding section, and with the like effect.”4
§535. Eﬁ'ect of failing to re-ﬂ1e.—The omission to re-ﬁle a
chattel mortgage does not render it invalid as against pur
is
acquired" during a time speciﬁed
good faith at
void as to subsequent
purchasers:
taching
or
creditors
Ferguson v. Wilson, 122 Mich., 97; 80
See further as to mort
N. W., 1006.
gage of after acquired property: Ham
Bk., 129 Mich.,
mond
v. First Nat'i
176; B8 N. W., 397.
Nor is a chattel
valid,
rendered
mortgage,
otherwise
void by an express provision in it
that the mortgagor may continue to
sell from the mortgaged stock the
same as it the mortgage had not been
Wlngler v. Sibley, 35 Mich.,
given:
And it may be shown. to sus
231.
tain the mortzage, that it was exe
cuted ln good faith, and to secure an
and without any
actual indebtedness,
Sweetzer v. Mead,
intent to defraud:
34

5 Mich., 10f
a position to

But a creditoi.is not in
attack such a mortgage
as fraudulent, unless he was a creditor
at the time it was given: Gay v. Bld
well, 7 Mich., 519.
3—C. L., 5 9526.
The ﬁling of an
attldavit does not operate as an ex
tension of the credit of the sum sc
cured in the mortgage:
Dane v. Mal
lory, 16 Barb., 46; Fuller v. Acker, 1
Hill, 473.
Nor does the omission’ to
tile the aﬂidavlt invalidate
the mort
gage
agalnst
as
mortgagor:
the
3 Mich.,
Wetherel v. Spencer,
123.
See, (‘. L., § 9526.
Mnnwaring
4—C. L., 5 9527:
v.
Jenlson, 61 Mich., 141; 27 N. W.,
899.
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original ﬁling and

the

onziss/ion to re-ﬁle.
“Subsequent” means after the time when
it ought to be again ﬁled to preserve its validity.“ Nor does it

affect its validity as against a s\lbscquent mortgagee or pur
chaser with notice that the mortgage is unpaid.°

Priority of executions.—“Any execution or attach
§536.
ment issucd out of any court, not being a court of record, if
actually levied, shall have preference over any other execution
or attachment issued out of any court, whether of record or
not, which shall not have been previously levied.”"
Levy, how ma.de.—To constitute a levy, the ofﬁcer
§537.
should enter upon the premises where the goods of the defend
ant are, and take actual possession of them (if they are such
of which possession can be taken).
The goods should be

brought within his view, and subjected to his control, and it is
proper also, if not necessary, that an inventory should be taken
of them; the officer should assert his title to the goods by virtue
of the execution; and his acts as to the asserting of his rights
and the divesting of the possession of the defendant, should
be of such a character as would subject him to an action as a
trespasser but for the protection of the execution; they should
be public, open, and unequivocal, and nothing should be done
But the mere cir
to cast concealment over the transaction.“
Patchin,
14
N. Y.,
v.
5-—‘.§Iecch
71: see, Wethereli v. Spencer, 3 Mich.,
123.

6--ilili v. Beebe, 13 N. Y., 556.
The omimion to ﬂle the aﬂidavit does
not give priority or preference to a
purchaser
or
mortgagee
subsequent
\
with notice that the prior mortgage
3
Webherell v. Spencer,
is unpaid:
Though a mortgage is
Mich., 123.
taken from the clerk's ﬁles, yet. if it
purchas
he returned again, a person
ing the property after its return to
the ﬁles cannot hold it against the
mortgagee:
Woodrui! v. Phillips, 10
Mich., 500.
7~——C.L., § 10315.
v. Lansing.
B W‘end.,
8—Becl-{man
450; Watts v. Cleaveland, 3 E. D.
A levy cannot rest in
Smith. 553.
undivulgcd
intention
to seize
mere
there must be possessory
property;
Camp v.
a levy:
acts‘ to indicate

Chamberlain, 5 Denio, 198. The oiﬁcer
must assume dominion over the prop
crty, and have it within his power
and subject to his immediate seizure:
Price v. Bhipps, 16 Barb., 585; Green
v. Burke,
23 “'end.,
490;
Roth v.
Wells. 2 Tilt. N. Y., 471.
And it
seems that an oﬂicer cannot make a
valid levy on property not in his view:
Van Wycke v. Pine. 2 Hill, 666.
But
it is not necessary that there should
be a manual
interference with
the
property to contitute a levy.
it is
suﬂiclent it the property is present
and subject to the control of the oili
cer. and that he there openly and pub
licly states that he levies upon the
property, and asserts
his authority
over it by virtue of the execution and
levy:
Barker v. Binninger. 4 Kern,
270; Green v. Burke, 23 Weud.. 490,
492.
There must be such manual
seizure or assertion ot control as may
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cnmstance of the oﬁicer’s omitting to proclaim or to give
notoriety to his levy at the time it is made, is not of itself
fraudulent so as to impair its effect, although directed by the
plaintiﬂ to conceal the levy, if everything else was done to
constitute a levy.
The endorsement by the officer upon the
execution of the levy is evidence, and frequently the only evi
dence in his power of the levy.”
§538. Breaking doors.—The ofﬁcer cannot break open the
outer door of the dwelling house of the defendant to make
execution on his goods, or the goods of any member of the
family who have their ordinary residence there ;1° nor can he
open the door, though it be only latched, although the owner
be absent,"
or knock, and when the door is a little open,
thrust in with violence. But if the outer door be open and
the oﬁicer enters, he may afterwards break an inner door, or

trunks, to take goods." If the execution of the process has
been properly commenced, the outer door may be broken, if
necessary, for the purpose of continuing and completing the
And, it seems, the protection extends to the
execution."
property of a guest within the house unless he has gone there
to avoid the process held by the ofﬁcer.“
If, after a peaceful entrance at the outer door of the defend
ant’s dwelling house, the ofﬁcer or his assistants be locked in,
he may break open the outer door to get out.

Goods may be
of
if
windows
the
they are open."
house
taken through the
The officer may break open the outer door of a store, barn, or
outhouse, not connected with or within the same eurtilage with
made effectual to bring the prop
erty snd keep it within the dominion
of the law. The levy must be so made
as to either actually identify, or give
the property so
means of identifying
that the levying oﬂicer may be charged
with it:
Quackenbush v. lienry. 42
Mlch., 75: 3 N. W., 262.
See, also,
Grover v. Buck. 34 Mlch., 520; Patch
-16 Mlch., 249; 9 N. W.,
v. Wessels,
269: Lee v. Maxwell, 98 Mlch., 496;
57 N. W., 581.
v. Maynard,
11 Wend.,
9—Butler
be

548.

10—0ystead v. Shed. 13 Mass. 5201
Curtis v. Hubbard, 1 Hill, 336: Curtis
People v.
4 Hill, 437;
v. Hubbard,
_

Hubbard, 24 Wend., 369; lllsiey v.
Nichols, 12 Plck., 270,. A levy eifeeted
by committing a trespass is bad. Thus,
where the oﬁieer unlawfully broke into
a house to make a levy on property
therein, it was held that
levy
the
could not be sustained:
Bailey
v.
Wright, 39 Mlch., 96.
As to breaking
doors, see, Stearns
Vincent,
v.
50
‘Mlch., 209; 15 N. W., 86.
11—Curtis v. Hubbard, 1 Hill, 336.
12—Lee v. Gansel, 1 Cowp., 1;
Hutcliison v. Birch, 4 Ts.nnt., 619, 625.
13—Glover v. Whittenhail,
6 Hill,
597.
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14—Curtls v. Hubbard,
15—Bing. on Ex., 244,

1

Hill,
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the dwelling house, without a previous demand and refusal of
1

admission."

§539. Indemnity to 0ﬁicer.—“Whenever there shall be any
reasonable doubt as to the ownership by a judgment debtor
of any goods or chattels, or as to their liability to be taken
upon an execution, the oﬁicer holding such execution may re
quire of the‘ judgment creditor sufﬁcient security to indem
nify him for taking such goods and chattels thereon; and if
such security be refused, such officer shall not be liable for
omitting to take such good and chattels/’"
§540. Disposition of property after 1evy.—The goods after
the levy may be left with the defendant at the risk of the plain
tiff, or of the officer, or security for a delivery at a future day
Leaving the property in the possession of
may be taken.“
the defendant for a reasonable time, and without any improper
motive, after the levy, is not in itself fraudulent, and the rights
of the plaintiff and the ofiicer are not affected by it." The
officer is not, however, under any obligation to take security;
and where the ofﬁcer leaves the goods with the debtor, either
with or without a receipt from some third person, he assumes
the risk of answering to the creditor if the property be lost
through the negligence or any wrongful act of the debtor. If
a receipt be taken, which, either through defect of form or
the insolvency of the receiptor, proves to be of no value to
the officer, he must still answer to the creditor for the loss of
But he is not liable for any losses by theft, rob
the goods.
bery, or other accident, unless it is connected with his own
The constable cannot maintain an action against
negligence.
16——iiaggerty

v.

Wiiber,

16

Johns.,

287.

11-c.
Cicotte,

L.,
11

See,
5 10349.
383.

Smith

v.

Mich.,

18—Ray v. Harcourt, 19 Wend.,495.
When animals are taken upon execu
tion, the constable has no authority
to work them to pay the expense of
Bushey v. Raths. 45
keeping them:
Mich., 181: 7 N. W., 802. The statute
provides for the manner in which the
for the
oiiicer is to be compensated
and
live
of keeping cattle
expense

stock when taken on execution:
C. L., 5 886.

See,

An oﬂiecr levying upon unthreshed
wheat in the mow has no authority to
thresh
it
before sale:
Stilson v.
Gibbs, 46 Mich., 215; 9 N. W.. 254.
And if he does so he will be held re
sponsible for any that may be wasted
by reason oi’ removal and threshing:
Stilson v. Gibbs, 53 Mich., 280; 18
N. W., 815.
19—Butler

v.

Maynard,

11

W'end..

552.
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the receiptor, unless he is answerable over to the creditor.”
Therefore, it is a good defence in an action against the re
ceiptor, that the property has been taken from his possession
by the rightful owner, a third person,“ as the officer would
have no right to hold it under the execution. So, if the goods
have been destroyed by ﬁre under circumstances which would
preclude a recovery by the plaintiﬂ in the execution against
the oﬂicer."
But the receiptor cannot, under any circum
stances, defend himself upon the ground of an excessive levy.
This is a question between the officer and the execution debtor.
Where goods seized by a constable upon an execution were de
livered to a third person, on his giving a receipt promising to
re-deliver them by a given day, and when the day arrived he
refused to deliver them, claiming that the goods, at the time
of the levy and receipt, were his own, it was held that he was
estopped from setting up title in himself, unless he should
show that he was drawn into the admission of an adverse title
by fraud, or perhaps by some gross mistake of fact, or that
he interposed his claim at the time of the levy, and signed the
receipt, in terms, without prejudice to his right.” The oﬂicer
cannot take a receipt, or any other security, for the re-delivery
of the property, which will give him a remedy beyond his own
liability to the plaintiff in the execution; at least, the amount
is all he can recover on the receipt.“ If at the time the levy is
20—Brownlng

v.

Hanford,

5

Hill,

588.

21—Harvey v. Lane, 12 Wend., 563;
Edson v. Weston, 7 Cow., 278.
5 Hill,
22—Browning
v. Hanford,
588.
23-——-Deze.ll v.

Odell, 3 Hill, 215.
24—Browning
5 Hill,
v. Hanford,
In an action of trover by an
588.
oﬂicer against a receiptor of property
taken by the ofﬂcer on execution, it ls
the declaration
not necessary that
should allege that the judgment upon
which the execution issued was still
In force when the property was de
manded ot the receiptor; this may be
shown upon the trial. In such an action
the receiptor cannot question the regu
larity of the judgment upon which the
execution issued, nor can he deny hav
ing received the property receipted for
by him.

In trover by an oﬂicer against a re
ceiptor who has recelpted for the prop
erty by the procurement and at the
request
of the execution debtor,
the
maxsure of damages is the amount col
lectible upon the execution. If the prop
erty ls worth so much; if it is not
worth so much, then the damages
would be the value ot the property.
Where the receipting is procured by
and with the assent of the debtor, the
oﬂicer is entitled to recover no more
damages than will be suﬂicient to satis
fy his execution.
He would not be
entitled to the surplus‘ it the value
of the property
should exceed
that
amount, because in such case he would
not be liable over to the debtor for
the surplus.
Nor would he be entitled
to include in his damages
any charge
for time or services,
the tees
except
allowed by law tor serving the execu

533

§541

OF

CH.

snavmo EXECUTIONS.

XXVII.

made the receiptor claims the property, he cannot set up his
title in bar of the action on the receipts, though he might do
so, to reduce the damages.”
But after the goods have been
re-delivered to the officer by the receiptor, according to his
undertaking, he may recover them from the ofﬁcer.
By leaving the property with another and taking a receipt,
the oﬁicer does not part with his interest, but only his posses
The receiptor holds as his delegate or bailee, on the
sion.
terms speciﬁed in the receipt; upon the oﬁicer becoming en
according to those terms, the force of
the receipt is completely gone, and his property acquired by
If the receiptor detain
the oﬂieer may
the levy reverts.
bring replevin or trover for the wrong," or he may take pos
session of them without suit?"
it,

titled to a re-delivery

§541. Endorsement of levy.-“The constable, after taking
goods and chattels into custody by virtue of an execution, shall
endorse thereon the time of levying the same, and immedi
ately give public notice by advertisement signed by himself,
and put up at three public places in the city, village or town
ship where such goods and chattels were levied upon, and
in case the sale be made in any other city, village or town
ship than that in which the levy was made, also in the city,
execution.
It he does neither, the of
ﬂcer may sue in trover or upon the
contract.
The oﬂicer would not be re
quired to accept the property after
the return day oi! the execution, as it
would then be too late to sell it:
Bowen v. (‘ulp, 36 Mich., 224.
A mistake in describing the property
intended to be receipted, which did not
or could not mislead the parties, can
not be taken advantage of by the
receiptor when sued in trover for the
property.
Nor is it necessary that the
receipt should set forth in detail. or
describe minutely or with particularity,
the parties to the cause, the court. and
other facts appearing in tuli in the
execution.
25—Bursiey
v. Hamilton,
15 I‘iek.,
40.

26—Dezeii

27—Milier
352.

534

l'lili, 215.
v. Odell.
v. Adsit, 16 Wend., 351
3

tion, even by agreement with the debtor.
It the oﬂicer should levy upon and take
possession of the property and deliver
it to a receiptor without the consent
oi’ the execution debtor, then in trover
against the receiptor the oiiicer might
possibly recover the whole value ot the
although
exceeding
the
property,
amount due upon the execution, on
the ground of his liability over to the
debtor for the surplus. But this may
If, instead of trover,
he questioned.
the receiptor
the oiiicer should sue
upon his contract in the receipt to re
turn the propcrty. or in default there
of to pay the amount collectible on
the execution, he would be entitled to
recover the latter amount, irrespective
of the value of the property receipted:
Burk v. Webb. 32 Mich., 173.
The oﬂicer or any one authorized
by him may demand the property oi’
the receiptor, and it is at his option
to return the property or pay the
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village or township where said goods and chattels are to be
sold, when and where they will be exposed for sale; and the
said oﬁicer shall in no case remove said goods and chattels
out of the coimty where said levy shall have been made.”2B
The endorsement of the levy will be prima facie evidence,
for the oﬁicer, of a levy, even against third persons,” although
the execution has not been returned.-"*°
Notice of sa.le.—“Such notice [of sale] shall describe
the goods and chattels, and shall contain the names of the
parties to the suit upon which the execution issued, and shall
be put up at least ﬁve days before the time appointed for the
§ 5.4.2.

sale.”31

As to the time, place and manner of sale, a sound discretion
is vested in the oﬂicer. It is indispensably necessary to the due
administration of justice that the exercise of this discretion
should never be under the direction of one party, so as to op
press and bring ruin on the other. The oﬁicer is bound to con
L., 5 881.
As to whether
2S—-C.
the indorsement of levy is conclusive
as to the time ‘when it was made, and
as to whether parties claiming prior
liens on the property may dispute it:
See. Nail v. Granger, 8 Mich., 450.

Reasonable delay in giving notice
sale, when at the request of the
execution debtor, will not invalidate
the levy: Baldwin v. Talbot, 46 Mich.,
21; 8 N. W., 565.
As to the oﬂicer‘s discretion relative
to the length of time property may
be held before sale: expense oi keep
33
ing.
etc.: see, Bird v. Perkins,
Mich., 28, 32.
it the levy is upon a
part only of the property covered by
it will be the of
a chattel mortgage,
ficer‘! duty to delay the sale for such
reasonable time as may be required
to enable him to ﬁnd and levy on the
balance of the mortgage property, if
it is in his balliwick: Baldwin v. Tal
bot, 46 Mich., 19: 8 N. W., 565.
As to what is deemed a public place,
see. People v. Lagrange, 2 Mich., 190.
Where. upon a levy, the property is
delivered to a reeeiptor, the oﬂicer, or
any one authorized by him may de
mand a return oi.’ the property; and it
is optional with'the receiptor whether
It
to return it or pay the execution.
he does neither, the oﬂicer may sue
oi’

upon the receipt: Bowen v. Cnlp, 36
Mich., 224.
29—Cornell v. Cook, 7 Cow., 310.
The question whether an oiilcer has
levied upon a complete
title or only
upon an incumbered interest is one of
intent as to which the oiﬂcer need
make no statement beyond the indorse
ment on his writ which is the evidence
of his ﬁnal action whatever his intent
may have been: Wallen v. Rossman.
45 Mich., 333; 7 N. W., O01.
And it
seems that an otﬂcer who levics subject
to a mortgage can afterwards change
the levy: Ibid.
.'-i0—Giover
v. Whlttenhall,
2 Denio,
633.
When the endorsement of the
levy described
the property as being
"about twenty-ﬁve acres of wheat on
the ground on the farm of Veeder Col
grove, in the township of Madison, now
occupied by the defendant." and it ap
peared that the farm occupied by the
defendant, on which the wheat was.
was in Dover the mistake in the name
of the township was held to be imma
terial: Perkins v. Spaulding, 2 Mich.,
157.

31—C. L.. 5 882.
Manwaring
v.
Jenlson, 61 Mich., 143: 27 N. W., 899:
Ganong v. Green, 64 Mich., 488, 491;
81 N. W., 461.
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sult his own judgment, to act ﬁrmly but temperately, and in no
case can he, without just reprehension, lend himself to the
views of either party, or become the instrument to avenge their
real or imaginary wrongs."
Sale, when and how made.—“At the time and place
§-543.
so appointed, or at such other time as the sale may be adjourned
to within the life of the execution, the goods and chattels being
present, and pointed out to the inspection and examination of
the bidders, the constable shall expose them to sale at vendue
to the highest bidder/’33
This section requires the goods and chattels to be present at
the sale; therefore, a sale of property not present would pass
no title.“
On the sale, the property must be speciﬁcally designated.
a constable sold thirteen sheep, of a ﬂock of twenty-one

Where

2 Cow.,
32—McDonald
v. Neilson,
The otilcer has a large discretion
In determining the time, place and
manner in which he shall oﬂer the
Stiison
property levied on, for sule:
But where a
v. Gibbs, 40 Mich., 42.
levy is on wheat or grain in the mow,
it seems that the oﬂicer would not be
authorized to thresh it before offering
it for sale: Ibid.
33——C. L., § 883.
It the purchaser
at any execution sale fraudulently col
ludes with the officer to prevent com
petition at the sale, and is thereby
enabled
to purchase the property at
much less than its value, the sale will
Aldrich v. Maitland, 4
be held void:
Mich., 205.
So where the purchaser,
knowing of a chattel mortgage on the
property, procurcs the oﬁlrcr to ante
date his levy prior to the making oi’
the mortgage. for the purpose of de
{eating the title of the mortgagee,
the
will he of no eifectz
sale
Nail v.
Granger, 8 Mich., 450.
Johns.,
3-i—Cresson v. Stout,
17
116; see. Baker v. Case, 19 Mich.,
This must. however, be received
220.
thus, where
with some qualiﬁcation;
the whole property consisted of more
than u hundred articles, some of which
were present, some in the barn and
some in the ﬁelds,
and elsewhere on
the farm. and all was sold in one
parcel.
On the argument it was ob
170.

jected that the sale was void because
the property was not present.
The
court said:
"A part of it was in
the house;
some
was in the barn,
and some was in the ﬁelds and else
where on the farm.
The whole could
not be gathered, so as to he brought
into view at one time, without incur
ring great and useless expense.
The
sale was made on the farm, and some
property was actually present and in
view.
If the oﬂlcer had previously
declared what property in particular
was to be soid, and had pointed it out
to the persons in attendance, I think
the whole should he deemed present
and in view, within the meaning of
the statute :" Tlﬂt v. Barton, 4 Denio,
171: see, Bruce v. Westervelt. 2 E.
D. Smith, 440.
Ii’ a part of the prop
erty sold is preseut at the sale, and
the remainder absent therefrom, the
sale will be good as to the former,
though void as to the latter: Linden
doll v. Doe, 14 Johns, 222.
And it
is held that the interest of a piedgor
ln goods cannot be sold unless the
goods are present at the sale:
Bake
well v. Ellsworth,
6 Hill, 484: Stiet
v. Hart, 1 Comst., 20.
The sale of
a growing crop at a place a half or
three-quarters of a mile from the ﬁeld,
and from which the crop could not be
seen, is invalid:
Winﬁeld v. Adams,
34 Mich., 437.
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or twenty-two, designating them only as the best and fattest,
it was decided that he had no power to sell in such a manner,
or to authorize the purchaser to select thirteen from the ﬂock,
and that the sale was void.“
is,

to sell so much property only as will
The proper course
satisfy the execution, and which can conveniently and reason
ably be sold separately.“ This rule does not apply when the

a

a

is

of the interest of
mortgagor ;3" in such case the sale
and
should
of
all
the articles in one lot. Unless one
be,
may,
man purchased the whole, he would not acquire the equity to
compel other purchasers to contribute towards the satisfaction
of the mortgage debt. The purchaser of a part of the property
would have no ¢right to redeem pro tanto.
The mortgagee
could not be compelled to receive
part of the debt and relin
sale

quish the lien as to a part of the property.“
I‘
No constable shall, ‘directly or indirectly, purchase any
goods or chattels, upon any sale made by him upon execution;
and every such purchase shall be absolutely void.”39
is

If the constable deliver the goods sold upon an execution to
the purchaser without receiving the money, he
liable for the
amount, although the purchaser refuses to pay for them.“
Where the plaintiif purchases at the sale, the constable may
lawfully deliver the goods to him, without receiving the

4

9

4

9

2

1

8

8

Johns.
36-—Hewson v. Deygert,
It is not necessary to sell each
It is the duty of
article separately.
the constable to sell the property in
such lots and parcels as to command
the highest price; and if he willingly
sacriﬁces the property by disregarding
his duty, he will be liable to the party
injured:
Spaulding,
v.
Perkins
Mich., 161.
And he can sell so much
property only as is suﬂlcient to satisfy
the execution, costs and expenses: Al
ien v. Klnyon, 41 Mich., 281;
N.
W., 863.
333.

3’l'—W‘henever
the
interest of the
judgment debtor in the property to
be sold is special and limited, it is
the constablc's duty to declare that
fact to the bidders, and by express
words to conﬁne the sale to such title
and interest as the debtor may really
possess:
Eggleston
Mundy,
v.
Mich., 303.
Denio, 171:
38-—TiIlt v. Barton,
see. Manning
v. Monsghan,
E. P.
Smith, 530.
It the sale is of the debt
or's lnterest in property covered by a
chattel mortgage, the whole oi’ the
mortgaged property must be sold to
gether in one lot or parcel, subject to
the mortgage:
Baldwin v. Talbot, 46
Mich., 21:
N. W., 565.
39—C. I...
SR7.
Johns.,
40—Denton v. Livingston,
§

3£'r—Warring v. Loomis, 40 Barb.,
The property sold must be sep
arnted from the mass with which it is
mixed; thus the sale of a certain num
ber of pounds of hay, part of s larger
bulk in stack, but not separated, has
Stevens v. Eno, 10
been held void:
Barb., 95.
484.

96.
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But when there is a dispute between creditors as to
money.“
which execution the money is to apply, the constable may re
fuse the plaintiﬁ"s bid if he intend to insist on the money, or
he should re-sell on the plaintiif’s refusing to pay the money.
He cannot recover the money of the plaintiff after having de
livered the property to him."
“When the defendant in an execution shall die after levy
and before sale, the property levied on shall be sold in the
same manner as if he was alive; but if no levy has been made
in such case, such execution shall be returned without further
proceedings; but if an execution shall have issued against sev
eral defendants, and some of them
the defendant in the judgment and
execution, and the defendant in the
levy, the execution may be executed

die thereafter, or against
his surety, for the stay of
execution shall die before
upon the property of the

surety.”43
sale to a

Adjournment of sale.-The oﬁ‘icer may adjourn the
even after
diiferent place from that appointed for
it,

§544.

is,

is

if

is

in his discretion to do so, and
the sale has commenced. It
abused,
not
the sale will be valid.“ So, if
discretion
that
no bidders attend, he should postpone the sale, and give notice
who should attend.
to the party in whose favor the execution
and bid himself.“
RETURN

OF

THE EXECUTION.

if

§545. How made.—-“The constable shall return the execu
tion, and pay the debt or damages, and costs levied, to the jus
tice who issued the same; or in case of his death, absence or
removal from ofﬁce, then to the justice having the custody of
any, to the person against
his docket, returning the surplus,
whom the execution issued/'4“

§

§

But if property
857.
was attached, it seems that a levy may
be made and the property sold after
See, Hoch
the deccase of the owner:
graef v. liendrie, 66 Mich., 557; 34
N. W., 15.
Tinkom v. Purdy,
44—C. L..
883.
.lohns., 345.

5

2

2

139,

190.

46—C. L.,
884.
The return is not
conclusive as to the date of the levy
as to those claiming prior liens upon
Mich.,
the property: Nail v. Granger,
450: Winﬁeld v. Adams. 34 Mich., 437.
Neither the justice nor the constable
has authority,
without special direc
tions from the party entitled to the
money, to receive anything in payment

538

8

396.
43——C, L.,

v. Butts,
45—Pixiey
Cow., 421;
Cow.,
and see, McDonald v. Nellson,

I

5

5

41—Nichols v. Ketchum, 19 Johns.,
Cow.. 390.
84; Russell v. Gibbs,
Cow., 390,
42-Russell v. Gibbs,
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(C

Where any constable shall not have been able to levy on
any goods and chattels, until there shall not be time suﬂicient
after the levy to advertise for sale, he shall return with the
execution a schedule of all such goods and chattels.”4"
“No constable shall levy upon, or sell any property, or im
prison a. defendant, upon any execution, after the time limited
therein for its return, except as is provided in the next sec
‘
tion.”“3

“Whenever an execution is returned by an officer having the
that he had levied on property, but there was not suffi
cient time after such levy to advertise and sell the same, the
justice may renew such execution, etc.”*°
same,

§ 546.

Procedure

in

case

of body execution.-—“For want of

sufficient goods and chattels, whereon to levy, the constable
shall, /in the cases authorized by law, if the eatccution require it,
take the body of the person against whom the execution shall
have issued, and convey him to the common jail of the county,
the keeper whereof is hereby required to keep such person in
safe custody in jail until the debt, or damages and costs shall
be paid, or he be thence discharged by due course of law.”5°
§ 547.

In

case term

of oﬁlce of oﬂicer expires before return.

-—-“Every constable to whom any execution shall have been
delivered, and whose term of oﬁice shall expire before the time
within which the return or collection of such execution is re
quired by law, shall proceed thereon in the same manner, and
shall have the same powers in relation thereto, as if his term of
of the judgment but gold and silver,
or such money as is by law made a
legal tender. If he receive bank notes
in payment without such direction he
renders himself liable to the party
in lawful money for the amount re
Heald v. Bennett, 1 Doug.
ceived:
Mich., 513: Hooker v. State ca: rol
If the con
Haynes, 7 Biackford, 272.
table take n promissory note in satis
faction of an execution, without the
it is void
authority of the plaintiff,
as between the constable and the mak
er: and the plaintiff may sue the con
But if the plaintiff ratify the
stable.
transaction, the note will be valid in
his hands, and if he sue the officer

for money

had and received, the note,
would become valid as be
tween the officer
and
the maker:
Armstrong
v. Garrow,
6 Cow., 463.
As to how far a constabie's return may
be ~contradicted
or impeached, see, Nail
v. Granger, 8 Mich., 450.
47—C. L., 5 885.
See. C. L., 5 892
as to the\form of the schedule,
&c..
see, post, § 549.
“Of renewing execu
tions."
48—C. L., 5 891.
Burk v. Webb,
82 Mich.,
182: Bowen v, Cuip, 36
Mich., 224.
See, post, Q 549.
49—C. L., l 892.
"Of renewing executions," &c.
50—C. L., 5 888.

it
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oﬁice had not expired; and such constable and his sureties shall
be liable for any neglect of duty, and for moneys collected
upon such execution, in the same manner and to the same
extent as if the term of office of- such constable had not ex
'

pired.”“

“If

any constable to whom any execution shall have been
delivered, shall die, become insane, or by sickness, or other
wise, be incapable of completing the service and return thereof,
before such writ hall have been fully executed, any other
constable may proceed thereon in the same manner that the
constable to whom such writ was originally delivered might
have done.”‘2
§548. Eﬂ‘ect of a.1evy.—-Before closing the subject of exe
cutions, the eifect of a levy in satisfying a judgment will be
noticed. A levy on property suﬁicient to pay an execution is
said to be presumptively a satisfaction of the judgment, and
so our supreme court have decided.53
To this rule there are
several exceptions. It will not be a satisfaction if the levy
was abandoned by the request of the defendant and for his
benefit,“ nor if the property be released from the levy by the
act of the defendant, as by his pretending that the property is
owned by others,“ or otherwise defeated by the misconduct
of the defendant. The loss or destruction of the property after
it is taken out of the debtor’s possession by virtue of the

N)

4

2

it

or if a levy has been made. but not
followed
by
sale
and
satlfaction.
for any suﬂiclent reason. the levy ma_v
be confessed,
and its legal elect re
pelled by an allegation of any fact
which by law should withdraw
from
the operation of the general rulez"
Farmers'.& Mechanics’ Bank v. Kings
Dnug., at p. 402.
ley,
Where the
claimant of property levied upon, by
his own unlawful acts, prevents the
application of the property to the sat
isfaction of the execution. he cannot
claim that the levy has satisﬁed the
judgment:
Nelson v. Ferris, 30 Mlch.,
See, People v. Hopson,
497.
Denio,
" Mlch.,
574; Dunphy v. Whipple,
6

540

54—0strander v. Walter,
President, &c.,
5."?--'l‘he
Cow., 192.

2

10.

8

a

I

I

2

&-.

51—C. L., 55 893, 987.
52—C. L., § 894.
Mechanics‘ Bank V.
53—Farmers’
Doug. Mlch., 3792 and see
Kingsley,
In this case, Ran
cases there cited.
“Upon the most
som, Ch. J., says:
investigation
have been
thorough
am
able to make of this question,
brou;:ht to the conclusion that, as be
tween the creditor and principal debt
or, the rule of law is that for which
the defendant contends, viz.: that a
levy outstanding and unaccounted for,
upon personal property in suiﬂclent
amount to pay a judgment, is prima
satisfaction,
of
and.
facie evidence
therefore, constitutes a good plea to
sci. fa. or an action of debt on judg
ment.
That levy is such is conclusive
is not pretended
evidence of satisfaction
levy, there
A plea setting up such
fore if false in fact, may be traversed,

v.

Hill

329.

Hallett,

»
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Where the judgment was
process would be a satisfaction.
satisﬁed by the sale of a horse on the execution, and the de
fendant recovered in an action of trespass against the plaintiff
the value of the horse, the defendant insisting that'it was
exempt from execution, the judgment was held to be revived
by the recovery, and the plaintiif was entitled to recover in an

of debt upon it.

In

court of record, the plaintiﬁ
would, in such case, be allowed to amend or strike out the re
turn on the execution and to have a new execution. As a
justice has no power to order such an amendment, the only
remedy the party has is an action on the judgment.“
The constable cannot pay oif the plaintiff in the execution
with his own money and retain a levy and enforce it after
wards upon the property for his own beneﬁt.“
action

a

Of renewing executions, and the issuing of fmther
§549.
executions.-—“If any execution be returned unsatisﬁed in whole
or in part, a further execution for the amount remaining due
may be issued upon the request of the plaintiff, or party inter
lested therein, or the justice may renew the same by an endorse
ment thereon to that eifect, signed by him, and dated when
the same shall be made, which shall be deemed to renew the
execution in full force, in all respects, for sixty days; if any
part of s'uch execution has been satisﬁed, the justice shall en
dorse on the execution the sum remaining due thereon.”5s

A further

execution should not be issued until the previous
If a justice issue a second execution
upon the representation of the plaintiﬁ that the former one
was lost, when in fact it had been paid, he will be a trespasser.”
So, if an execution is returned satisﬁed, a new execution can
not issue; the party must resort to his action on the judgment,
if the fact be that the judgment is not satisﬁed by the proceed
The return must be in writing; verbal
ings on the execution.“
one is

duly returned.”

56-—-Piper

v,

Elwood,

175.

57—Reed v. Yruyn,
See, Sherman v. Boyce,
Blgelow v. Provost. 5

4

Denio,

7 Johns.,
15 Johns..

165,
426.

443;
Hill, 566; Car
penter v. Stillwell. 1 Kern., 61, 67.
Bigelow v. Barre.
58—C. L., 5 877.
30 Mich., 1.
59—-—Cumston v. Field, 3 Wend.. 382.
A second execution cannot be issued.

where a ﬁrst has been levied on grow
ing crops and after being lndorsed
with the levy, is ﬁled with the Justice.
The theory of abandonment of the
levy under the ﬁrst cannot be sus
tained on such evidence alone: Frlyer
110 Mich., 22; 67 N.
v. .‘\[cNaughton,
W., 978.
60» Lewis v. Palmer, 6 Wend., 367.
61—Plper v. Elwood, 4 Denlo, 165.
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it

if,

infprmatilon by the constable that the execution was unsatisﬁed
would not be suﬂicient to authorize the issuing of a further
A levy upon property sufficient to pay an execu
execution.
tion is presumptively a satisfaction of it ;°'~’
therefore,

a

a

it

appear upon the execution that
must
levy has been made,
appear from the return that the property has been sold, or
otherwise accounted for legally, or
new execution cannot
issue.

2

Q

2

&

M. Bank v. Kingsley,
62-F.
548, note 53.
Doug.. 378: see, ante,
ed., 1041.
63—2 Cow. Treat,

542

6-i—(?.

65—C.

L.,
L.,

5 5

a

if

a

is

_

a

An execution cannot be renewed without
return by the
constable, which would authorize the issuing of another exe
cution.
The further execution may be, in form, the same as the one
ﬁrst issued, directing the collection of the full amount of the
judgment; and in case anything was collected upon the prior
execution, the justice should endorse thereon the amount re
maining due."
“Where any constable shall not have been able to levy on
any goods and chattels, until there shall not be time sufficient
after the levy to advertise for sale, he shall return with the
execution a schedule of all such goods and chattels.”°4
returned by an otﬁcer having the
“Whenever an execution
same, that he had levied on property, but there was not suiti
cient time after such levy to advertise and sell the same, the
justice may renew such execution, or issue another execution
and annex thereto
copy of such return, and such property
may be sold on the renewed o'r alias execution, in the same
such property be in
manner as on the ﬁrst execution; and
suﬁicient, other property may be levied on to satisfy such exe
In case the oﬂicer
cution, either before or after such sale.
who levied upon the property shall be living and in office, the
renewed or alias execution shall be executed by him.”°°
A copy of the return and schedule must be annexed, by the
This copy should
justice, to the renewed or new execution.
be
of
the
to
the
return made by
justice
copy
certiﬁed
by
be
the constable on the previous execution, and of the schedule
of the property levied upon by the constable by virtue of such
execution.
_
885.
892.
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living
In case the constable who served the prior execution
and in 0/ﬁce, the renewed or new execution must be delivered
to him; if not, to any other constable.
§550. Of setting oﬂ‘ executions.—“Executions between the
parties, upon judgments recovered in their own right,
may be set oﬁ, one against another, if required by either party 7I
in the following manner: When one of the executions is de
livered to a constable to be served, the person who is the debtor
therein may deliver his execution to the same constable, and
same

such constable shall apply the amount thereof, so far as it will
extend, or so far as it may be necessary, to the satisfaction
of the ﬁrst execution; and the balance due on the larger execu
tion shall be collected and paid in the same manner as if there
had been no set-oﬂY.”“°

,

§551. Of the liabilities of the constable and his sureties.—
constable, upon his election or appointment, shall execute,
with sufficient sureties, to be approved by the supervisor or
clerk of his township, an instrument in writing, by which he
and his sureties shall jointly and severally agree to pay to
each and every person who may be entitled thereto all such

“A

sums of money as the said constable may become liable to pay
on account of any neglect or default of said constable in the
service or return of any process that may be delivered to him
for service or collection, or on account of any misfeasance of
the said constable in the discharge of, or failure of said con
stable to faithfully perform any of the duties of his said
oﬁice.”°"
The responsibility of the sureties is co-extensive with that
of the constable, and they are liable whenever he is liable to the
party in whose favor an execution has been delivered to him."
The sureties of the constable are not answerable beyond the
default of their principal in his oiﬁcial duties." When a party

instructs an ofﬁcer to depart from the line of duty which his
process and the law. impose upon him, the officer becomes
66-—C.

L.,

§

897.

67—C. L., § 2384. Robertson v. Baxter, 57 Mich., 131: 23 N. W., 711. Not
that any speciﬁc obligee be
necessary
Bay County v.
named
in the bond:
Brock, 44 Mich., 45; 6 N. W., 101:

the

see, Eaton Rapids v. Stump, 127 Mich.,
1, 3; 86 N, W., 438.
68—Sloau v. Case. 10 Wend.. 370.
69—Gorham v. Gale, 7 Cow., 739,
74.6.
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private agent of the party; and the sureties
answerable for his acts or default?"

CH.

XXVII.

would not

be

Neglect to return execution.-“If a constable shall
§551a.
neglect _or refuse to return an execution, and pay over the
moneys by him collected, within ﬁve days after such execution
shall have been paid, or shall neglect to levy an execution, or
otherwise execute the same according to law, the party in whose
favor such execution was issued, or who shall be entitled to
such moneys, may maintain an action of assumpsit in his own
name upon the instrument of security given by such constable
and his sureties; and in such suit the amount of the execution,
with interest from the time of the rendition of the judgment
upon which the same was issued, shall be recovered; and exe
cution shall issue forthwith, and no stay of execution shall be
allowed.

’ '71

If

an execution is delivered to a constable, he cannot avoid
any liability which may subsequently accrue upon it by deliv
ering it over to another oﬁicer."
_
In declaring against a constable and his sureties for neglect
70—Ibld.; Mickles
548.

v.

Hart,

1 Denio,

This statute au
71—C. L., § 890.
thorizes an action on the constables
bond before a justice though the pen
alty of the bond be an amount beyond
The
of the justice.
the jurisdiction
recovery. however, must be limited to
Mont
the jurisdiction of the Justice:
gomery v. Martin. 104 Mich.. 390; 62
N. W., 578.
An otﬂcer though in
demnified is not compelled to levy, if
in good faith he believes
the levy
If sued upon his
would be unlawful.
bond he can defend with the illegality:
(‘oville v. Bentley, 76 Mlch., 250; 42
As to the constable’s
N. W., 1116.
liability:
See,
Frost v. Weich, 1
Whipple.
Mlch., 30; Dunphy
v.
25
Mich,. 11; and as to pleadings. Clark
v. Gleason, 30 Mlch., 158.
When an execution is issued to a
sherlii!
and he fails to return it, the
to be lost. and the
debt is assumed
creditor is prime fncie entitled to re
cover of him the full amount. But the
oﬂicer is nevertheles allowed to make
the one excuse for not performing his
duty,—-that the defendant had no prop

erty from which the money could be
made.
And in case of a sale of prop
erty under the execution, the oiiicer
has no right to refuse to return his
doings on the writ because
of any
supposed
invalidity of the title sold:
he is not concerned with
the ques
tion whether the purchase
will be
available or not: Dunphy v. Whipple,
25 Mlch.,
11.
But an oﬂicer does
not render himself liable in trespass
for proceeding in good faith to serve
a. justices execution,
after
he has
been told by the defendant that an ap
peal has been taken. where the justice
insisted that the appeal had not been
perfected.
The oﬂicer has a right to
rely on his process until he is oiiicisi
ly notified of its having been super
seded: Foster v. Wiley. 27 Mlch., 245.
An execution regular on its face pro
tects an oiﬂcer acting under it when
against as a
proceeded
wrong-doer.
But in order to support a claim to
property under an execution levy, the
oﬂicer must show that it was issued
upon a valid judgment:
Adams v.
Hubbard, 30 Mlch., 104.
72-2 Cow. Treat., 2 ed., 1088.

544

C1-1.

XXVII.

RETURN

or THE

EXECUTION.

§ 552

ing to serve and return a justice’s execution, it will be suffi
cient to allege generally that the judgment was duly given,"
but under such an averment it would be required to prove the
judgment, and that the justice had jurisdiction of the person
of the defendant, and of the subject matter, as also the issuing
of a valid execution.
But if the constable had collected the
money, it would not be competent for him or his sureties to
say that the execution was issued without authority, when
they are called upon to account for the money which the con
stable has received by virtue of it.“ If, however, the execu
tion was void on its face, he could not be compelled to pay
over the money to the plaintiff.

Of the remedy of security for stay of execution
§552.
against judgment debtor, after payment of judgment by him.
—-“When any judgment shall have been satisﬁed, by ahy per
son who shall have become surety for the stay of execution
thereon, such judgment shall remain good and valid in law, for
the use of such security, who, at any time thereafter, may sue
out execution on such judgment, against the goods and chat
tels of the defendant, for the use of such security, which shall
be so endorsed by the justice; such security shall also be en
titled to a transcript of such judgment, for his own use, which
shall have the same force and effect as transcripts in other
a
cases/"'5
in
an
execution
is issued for the beneﬁt of
case,
such
When,
the security for stay of execution, the justice should endorse
it as being issued for the surety.
The execution, by the terms of the statute, is to be issued
against the goods (ind chattels only of the defendant.
73—C. L., 5 770: sec. ante, § 166..
Wend.,
13
v. Irwin,
74—Lawton
233; Burk v. Webb. 32 Mich., 178.

35

75—C.
Lustﬂeld,
138.

545

L.,
116

§ 873.

Mich.,

See,

696;

Sweeney
v.
75 N. W.,
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OF THE REMOVAL

. Stay

writ.

a

a

§

553. Proceedings for remova.l.—-“In all cases of judgments
justice of the peace, whether issue was joined
rendered by
before the justice or not, either party may remove such judg
writ of certiorari, into the circuit or district court
ment by

for the county in which the judgment

a

546

a

6:

1

a

application
particularly
where
the
amount is small: Vanderstoiph v. Boy
ian. 50 Mlch., 330: 15 N. W., 495.
A party may remove‘
by
cause
certiorurl although he did not appear
By neglecting to
before
the justice.
appear he waives nothing:
Campau
Mlch., 152.
v. Fairbanks,
Certiorari
is the proper proceedings to get rid of
a void judgment:
Lake Shore
Mich
igan Southern Ry. Co.
v.
Hunt. 39
Mlch., 469.
And so the writ will issue
to review the proceedings of
circuit
court commissioner to dissolve an at
tachment issued by a justice of the
peace: Zook v. Blough, 42 Mlch., 387.
A separate writ of certiorm-6
is
necessary
to bring up for review any
alleged errors in ancillary proceedings
by garnishment:
but such proceedings
will fall to the ground when Judgment
in the principal
case is
set
aside:
Withington
v. Southworth,
26 Mlch.,
Gurnishee proceedings may be
381.
revived upon a writ of certiorar-i sued
out by the defendant in the principal
case,
in his own name and in his
own behalf if the latter‘s rights are
cut oﬂ without his having an oppor
tunity for
hearing:
Wilson v. Bar
tholomew. 45 l\fich.. 41:
N. W.. 227:
ee, Cnmpau v. Button, 33 Mlch., 525,
7

n

a

9

3

a

2

5

v.
See, Morrison
935.
1—C. L.,
Emsley, 53 Mlch., 564: 19 N. W., 187;
Tyler.
56
23 N. W., 314: Mann v.
Mlch., 584; 19 N. W., 145; Antiau v.
Nadeau, 53 Mlch., 460; 50 N. W., 302;
White v. Boyce, 88 Mlch., 349; 18
v. Corbitt, 52
N. W., 218: Galloway
Mlch., 460; 13 N. W., 781; Erie Pre
serving Co. v. Witherspoon, 49 Mlch.,
tatutory writ of ccrtiorari
The
377.
lies only to review judgments rendered
by justices of the peace in the exer
jurisdiction: Warner
cise of original
Doug., 358.
it is in
v. Porter,
writ of error: McOmber
substance
N. W..
v. Chapman. 42 Mlch., 117;
The writ is never a matter of
288.
right, and can only issue upon satisfy
ing the circuit court commissioner or
circuit judge, that there has been error
committed: Young v. Kelsey. 46 Mlch.,
453;
Meads
v.
N.
W..
114:
(‘opper B. M., 125 Mlch., 456; 84
The allowance of the writ
N. W., 615.
justice of the peace from the
to
court is exceptional and will
supreme
only be made to prevent a failure of
justice: White v. Boyce, 88 Mlch.,
349: 50 N. W., 302: Citing, Adams v.
Abram. 38 Mlch., 302, and Withlugton
v. Southworth, 26 Mlch., 381. Interest
taxpayer merely will not justify
as

was rendered/’1

OF

CH_

BY CERTIORARI.

REMOVAL

“The party intending to apply for such certiorari, shall give
the justice notice in writing within ﬁve days after the rendi
tion of the judgment, of his intention of removing the cause
to the circuit court or district court by certiorari; and shall,
within thirty days, make or cause to be made an aﬁidavit, set
and Vanderstolph
330,

v. Boyian,

50 Mich.,

331.

As to whether a person not a party
to a suit, hut injuriousiy aiiected there
by, may remove the cause by ccrtioruri,
cited.
see the three cases last above
And as to when the statutory writ may
have
the force oi’ and operate as a
see the
common law writ of ccrtiorari,
same

cases.

The statutory ccrtiorari does not lie
in special proceedings, as in the case
of a judgment for a penalty under
2 Doug., 358, supra.
a village law:
Nor in cases where the law provides
for an appeal only: People v. Farwell,
556.
4 Mich.,
The oiiice oi’ a cortlorari is to review
questions of law, and not questions oi‘
And in examining into the evi
fact.
appellate court does so,
the
dence.
not to determine whether the probabili
ties preponderate one way or another.
but simply to determine whether the
is such that it will justify
evidence
the finding as a legitimate inference
v.
Jackson
from the facts proved:
120;
McGraw
v.
People, 9 Mich.,
Schwab, 28 Mich., 13: Overpack v.
iiinkiey v.
Rnggles, 27 Mich., 65:
Mich.,
Weatherwax,
And
510.
85
will not be reversed
judgment
a
for any technical omis
on cerﬂorurl
sion, imperfection or defect in the pro
ceedings
not affcctlnlt the merits, or
for errors that did not and could not
have
worked an injury tn the party
Berry v. Lowe, 10 Mich.,
complaining:
9, 14.

questions of law
Upon certlamri,
Higley v. Lant, 3
only can be tried:
Mich., 612; Berry v. Lowe, 10 Mich.,
9: l\icGraw v. Schwab, 23 Mich., 13:
and there can be no reversal oi! the
for errors of law:
judgment except
Parsons v. Dickinson, 23 Mich., 56.
The writ is not given to enable
parties to have a technical review of
all the justices's rulings, but to afford
and inexpensive remedy for
a speedy

substantial faults.
Where the alleged
errors of the justice go to the founda
tion of the action, it is proper to re
view them on ccrtinrnri; but where
they occur in the course of the trial,
and are of such a nature that they
might he obviated on a new trial,
proper
then
a
new trial
is
the
And where the case is one
remedy.
to be determined on disputed facts,
party
with
the
dissatisﬁed
the
judgment
should appeal
instead of
seeking a reversal on technical grounds
without the investigation oi‘ the mer
its: Erie Preserving (‘o. v. Wither
spoon, 49 Mich., 377; 13 N. W.. 781;
Ritter v. Daniels, 47 Mich., 617;
W., 409.
N.
This writ should not
be resorted to unless the alleged er
rors go to the foundation of the ac
tion: Galloway v. Corhitt, 52 Mich.,
460; 18 N. W., 218.
The remedy by ccrtlomri is not to
to be encouraged when alleged errors
are such as might have been obviated
on a trial on appeal in the circuit and
nothing will he taken by intendment in
favor of errors assigned upon it: How
ell v. Shepard, 48 Mich., 472: 12 N.
W.,,661; Mann v. Tyler, 56 Mich.,
564: 23 N. W., 314.
A writ oi’ ccrtlomri should not is
sue where the errors relied on do not
reach the substance of the controversy:
nor where the objection is that the
justice excluded testimony.
in such
a case an appeal is the proper remedy
where justice can be done
to
both
parties by a retrial oi.’ the cause: Mor
rison v. Emsiey, 53 Mich., 564: 19 N.
W., 187: Carver v. Detroit & S. P.-R.
Co., 126 Mich., 458; 85 N. W.. 1082.
Oertlorari held proper where
of
replevin was quashed upon an errone
ous determination that the description
of property in the writ was insuf
ﬂclent: Proper v. Cnnkling, 67 Mich.,
244; 34 N. W., 560.
So to review
peremptory
in permitting
an error
challenge to jurors in the panel struck
Eldridge v. Hubbei,
by the parties:
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ting forth the substance of the testimony

and proceedings
before the justice, and the grounds upon which an allegation
of error is founded/’2
So
119 Mich., 61; 77 N. W., 631.
where there was an entire failure to
Bullock v.
show a cause of action:
Ueberroth, 121 Mich., 293; 80 N. W.,
89.

-

Under a statutory certiorari, there
can be no reversal of a jusilce‘s judg
ment except for matters aﬂecting the
merits of the case: liinman v. Eaklns,
26 Mich., 80.
Oertiorari is not a ﬂexible remedy:
all that can he done under it is to
quash or refuse to quash the proceed
ings:
Whitbcck v. Hudson, 50 Mich.,
86; 14 Ni W., 708.
It does not se
cure a new trial, but ends the pro
ceedings: Knapp v. Gamsby, 47 Mich.,
311; 11 N. W., 2o-l.
When a justice's
judgment is reversed on ccrtiomri, the
whole case falls: Morrison v. Emsiey,
53 Mich., 584: 19 N. W., 187.
See Rodman v.
2——-(‘. L., § 936.
Clark, 81 Mich., 466; 45 N. W., 1001,
is
One
and note to C. L. § 936.
not entitled to a common law ccrtlorari
after the expiration of the statutory
Wayne
Circuit
Jacobs
v.
period:
Judge, 132 Mich., 55: 92 N. W.. 783
(Dec., 1902).
Mandamus is proper to
quash a writ of ccrtiorari issued after
the statutory period: Jacobs v. Wayne
Circuit Judge, supra. An aﬂidavit for
who
certiorari
made by an attorney
took charge of all the proceedings in
the case throughout. is suiiicient, not
withstanding it does not state that the
aiiiant is the agent or attorney of the
party in whose behalf the afiidavit was
Scoﬂeld v. Cahoou, 31 Mich.,
made:
206.
The aﬂidavit should not be en
titled, though if entitlcd in the suit in
the justice’s court it would not be ob
Warner,
Whitney
2
jectionable:
v.
Cow., 499.
But if entitled in the cir
court,
it would be erroneous.
cuit
Where neither the aﬂidavlt on which
the writ issue, nor the return of the
justice, which purports to give all the
in the case. shows that any
evidence
objection was taken to any of the evl
or to
dence introduced on the trial.
any process,
pleading or proceeding
before the justice. or that any question
of law was raised on the trial, and the

only error complained of in the adi
davit is that the testimony given on
the trial demanded
a dilfercnt verdict
from the one rendered,
and the tes
timony being such as to warrant the
verdict found by the jury, no question
of law is presented by the proceedings
for the circuit court to pass upon.
Such atﬁdavit, though suﬂicient for a
general appeal, furnishes
proper
no
basis for the writ of ccrtinrari:
Mc
Graw v. Schwab, 23 Mich., 13; Nichols
v. Cowles, 3 Cow., 345.
The aiiidavit
for the writ must show what questions
of law were raised before the justice.
and his rulings thereon:
McGraw v.
Mich.,
23
Schwah,
13.
And
the
grounds on which the allegations of
error are founded,‘ that is, in what the
alleged errors of the justice consist:
Welch v. Bagg, 12 Mich., 43.
No er
rors can be considered except such as
are set forth and alleged in the aili
davit: iiigley v. Lant, 3 Mich., 613;
Fowler v. Detroit & Milwaukee Ry. Co.,
7 Mich., 79; Lake Superior Building
Co. v. Thompson, 32 Mich., 293: With
erspoon v. Clegg, 42 Mich., 284; -4
N. W., 209; Case v. Frey, 24 Mich.,
251: Grand Trunk Ry. Co. v. Russ,
47 Mich., 500; 11 N. W., 289; Bige
low v. Brooks, 119 Mich., 208; 77 N.
W., 810; Westbrook v. Blood, 50 Mich.,
443: 15 N. W., 544; Wilson v. McCrll
lies. 50 Mich., 347; 15 N. W.. 504:
Matthews v. Forslnnd, 113 Mich., 416;
71 N. W., 854; Farrah v. Bursley, 100
Mich., 552;
59
N. W., 245.
Such
statement of the grounds of the alle
gations of error must be made as will
inform the court and opposite party
of the nature of the questions intended
to be raised:
Fowler v. Detroit dz Mil
waukee Ry. Co., 7 Mich., 79.
No er
rors can be presumed that are not
alleged and afiirmatively shown by the
justice’s return: Witherspoon v. 'Clegg,
W.,
Mich.,
284;
42
4
N.
209.
Nor will any allegation of error rais
ing only the question oi‘ the weight of
evidence
be
considered:
Smoke
v.
Jones, 35 Mlch.. 409.
As to what the
aﬁidavit should show when the justice
has inﬂuenced the jury by an erron
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§554. Allegation of err0rs.—It is not always necessary to
set forth the grounds upon which an allegation of error is
When it appears from the affidavit that questions
founded.

is

is

is

it

is,

concerning the regularity of the proceedings, the admission
or rejection of the evidence, or the like, were made and decided
on the trial, that will be substantial compliance with the stat
ute without specifying, at the close of the affidavit, the par
ticular grounds of error on which the party relies? But
that the evidence did not warrant
when the error relied on
not enough to detail in the affidavit the facts
the verdict,
the
proved, but the party must speciﬁcally state that such
founded.‘
ground upon which the allegation of error

the oﬂicer in allowing the writ, and
the court afterwards
in deciding the
case,
may
not be required
to look
through the whole case, to see
there
is not something on which
may
Thus,
be
reversed.
allegation
an
“That there wa no evidence to sus
tain the verdict,"
general.
is
too
When the objection ls, want of evi
dence,
particular
the
fact of which
there was no evidence before the jus
tice should be stated ‘in the aﬂidavit:
Welch V. BBl_ZlI. 12 Mich., 42, 43; see.
Hinkley v, Weatherwax. 35 Mich., 510;
L. S. Bldg. Co., v. Thompson, 32 Mich.,

2

eons charge. see, Chamberlin v. Brown,
A party
Doug. Mich., 120, 121, 122.
by

for

8

6

to
~|
0

&

it if

bound

509.
4»-—People cm rel Roe v. Suifoik C. P.,
A ground of error in
18 Wend., 550.
the aﬂidavit, "That the court erred in
rendering judgment in favor of the

7

&.

plaintiff, and against the defendant,"
is too general; the object of the stat
ute is, to require such a statement of
the grounds of the allegation of error,
as will inform the court and the op
posit party of the nature of the ques
Fowler
tions intended to be raised:
Ry. Co.,
Milwaukee
v. Detroit
Mich., 79. 83. The aﬂldavit must state
in what the error of the justice in
rendering the judgment consists, that

293.

An aiiidavit for ccrtim-or! should pre
sent the rulings objected
to as they
actually occurred. as in ll bill of ex
ceptions.
It should not combine in
one recital a series of detached
rui
ings on points that were not con
nectedly presented.
To make a recital
single proposition, or
of facts as
connected
chain of propositions, when
in truth they were never presented to
gether, but were detached rulings during
the trial. is objectionable, not only as in
correct in form, but as separating each
ruling from its own circumstances and
belongings. And an allegation of error
upon the alleged refusal of
based
magistrate to allow proof of certain
propositions.
recited together in an
aﬂldavit for ccrttorarl, is not support
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the allegations in his af
Carver v. De
the writ:
S. P. R. Co., 126 Mich., 458;
troit
An atﬁdavlt, indorsed
85 N. W., 1082.
with an allowance of the writ and ﬂied
with the clerk, cannot be used for the
Sher
allowance of a second writ:
45
wood v, Arnold, 80 Mich.,
N. W1. 134.
P.,
C.
3—People
v. Columbia
Wend., 554.
A statement of the points
relied on for error, besides setting forth
the testimony and proceedings before
the justice, is not necessary when the
alleged errors consist in the proceed
Ibld.: People ea: rel
ings set forth:
Wend.,
Leggs v. Onnondaga C. P.,
is

fidavit

a

§

Allowance of the writ.—“Such afﬁdavit shall, within
thirty days after rendering such judgment, be presented to one
of the circuit judges, or to a circuit court commissioner of any
555.
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county of this state, and if he be satisﬁed that an error has
been committed by the justice or jury in the proceedings, ver
dict or judgment, he shall allow the certiorari, by endorsing his
A
allowance thereon.”-'*

Bond on allowance of the writ.——“The party obtain
ing such certiorari shall execute to the opposite party a bond,
with one or more suﬂicient sureties, to be\ approved by the
judge or commissioner who allowed the certiorari, or by the
justice who rendered the judgment, in a penalty of at least
ﬁfty dollars, where the whole amount of the judgment or debt
or damages and costs shall not exceed twenty-ﬁve dollars; and
where the judgment for debt or damages and costs shall exceed
the sum of twenty-ﬁve dollars, then the penalty of said bond
shall be in double the amount of said judgment, if such judg
ment was rendered against the party applying for such certio
rari, conditioned to prosecute such certiorari to effect, and
abide the judgment of the circuit or district court therein, and
pay the debt or damages and costs that shall be awarded
against him.”°
§ 556.

“The party procuring the certiorari need not execute the
bond in the last section mentioned, if the same shall be exe
cuted by two or more sureties. The sufficiency of the surety
or sureties shall be approved by the person allowing the
certiorari, or the justice on whose judgment the certiorari is
brought.”'

No such bond shall be approved unless the surety
thereto justify their pecuniary responsibility in
writing and under oath, which said justiﬁcation shall be by
said justice or person allowing the certiorari, endorsed on
said bond, or the responsibility of such surety or sureties is
admitted in writing by the opposite party or his attorney, and
or sureties

endorsed on said bond.

“If the judgment was in favor of the person applying for
such certiorari, then such bond shall be in a penalty of at least
whlch shows that they
were not presented or ruled upon as
and that the proofs were
one otter,
Knapp
rejected for dllferent reaons:
v_ Gamsby, 47 Mich., 375: 11 N. W.,
ed by a return

204.

5—C. L., § 937.

It seems that a certtomri may be
allowed by a clrcult court commis
sioner, although the proceedings dld
not occur In his county:
Loder v.
Llttleﬂeld, 39 Mich., 374.
6—~C. L., 9 938.
7-—C. L., 5 939.
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ﬁfty dollars, conditioned to pay such costs as shall be awarded
against him, in case such judgment shall be ai¥irmed.”3
If the party obtaining judgment procures the writ, the pen
alty of the bond will be ﬁfty dollars.
It is to be noticed that by the amendment of C. L., § 939, by
,
Act 244 of Pub. Acts, 1895, it is now required that the surety
justify under oath and in writing on the bond, or that his
responsibility be admitted in writing by the opposite party and
the same be endorsed on the bond.

Filing a.iﬁdavit--issuing writ.--“The affidavit, after
§557.
the allowance of the certiorari shall have been endorsed there
on, and within ten days after such allowance, shall be ﬁled in
the office of the clerk of said circuit or district court, and
thereupon a writ of certiorari shall be issued by such clerk,
within three days after the ﬁling of such ai’ﬁdavit.”°
§558. Service of certiorari on the justice.—“Such writ of
certiorari shall, within ten days after it shall have been issued,
or within such other time as the oiﬁcer allowing the same
shall direct at the time of allowing the certiorari, be served
upon the justice by whom the judgment was rendered, to
gether with the bond given, and a copy of the affidavit on
which the certiorari was allowed; and the sum of two dollars
shall be paid to the justice for his fees for making a return
to the certiorari, an_d no certiorari shall be of any eifect until
all the preceding requisitions shall have been complied with.”1°

Stay of execution.-“If the certiorari, bond and copy
§ 559.
of the affidavit shall be served on the justice before an execu
tion shall have been issued, it shall stay the issuing of the
same; and if the execution shall have been issued, but not
collected, the justice shall grant the party requiring it a cer
tiﬁcate of the issuing of such certiorari, which, on being served
8-C.

L.,

§

940.

The aﬁidavlt, with
9—C. L.. 5 941.
endorsed
the allowance of the writ
thereon, must be ﬂied with the clerk
of the circuit court before the writ
issues. otherwise the certiorari will be
Peo
a nullity. and will he set aside:
v. Judge
(‘ass
Circuit Court, 2
ple
Mich., 116.
Doug.

10—C. L., Q 942.
Service ot a writ
of certiorari made on a Justice on Sun
day. is void:
Anderson ct al. v. Birce,
3 Mich., 280.
Where a writ of cer
tiorari is to be served within ten days
it will he ineﬂectuai it ten days elapse
the day of its issue and the
hetween
date oi’ its service:
Morrison v. -Ems
iey, 53 Mich.. 564: 19 N. W.. 187.
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on the oﬁicer in whose hands the execution may be, shall sus
pend such execution.”

11

§560. Justice's retiun to the certiora.ri.—“The justice, be
fore the return day of such certiorari, or within ten days after
the service of such ccrtiorari, shall make return thereto in
writing, and ﬁle the same; in which return he shall truly and
fully answer to all the facts set forth in the copy of the ai’ﬁ
davit on which the certiorari was allowed/’12
The justice to whom a certiorari is directed cahnot move to
Where a suit was
§ 943.
attachment,
whether
by
certiorari discharged the attach

i1—(‘. L.,
commenced
the
ment,

considered but not decided: Wil
Williams, 18 Wend.. 581.
12-0. L., 944. The case is heard on
the return alone: Dooley v. lilibert, 47
But
N. W., 408.
Mich., 615;
11
in his answer to a writ of ccrtiorari
required
to
only
is
justice
the
make return to the matters speciﬁed
Lake
in the aﬂidavlt for the writ:
Superior Building Co. v. Thompson, 32
Mich., 293. When the allegation oi’ er
ror, is the entire want of evidence
point, it is the
upon any speciﬁed
duty of the justice to return fully all
the testimony relating thereto: Hitch
And in
cock v. Sutton. 28 Mich., 86.
such case it will be presumed that the
return does contain all the evidence
Where a jus
Ibid.
upon that point:
tice, in his return to a writ of cer
as tol
ttarart, certiﬁes the evidence
“I do certify the following to
lows:
have been the evidence before me in
the above entitled cause ;" held, that
from such a re
it must he presumed
ls re
turn that the whole evidence
Cicotte v. Morse, 8 Mich., 424.
turned:
Where only a part of the testimony
to
taken upon a trial was reduced
writing. and the justice was therefore
unable to return the whole of it. it was
held that the presumption would be
that there was suﬂlcient to sustain the
Gray v. Wilcox, 56 Mich.,
judgment:
58; 22 N. W., 109.
The return oi’ the justice as to what
in the case
constitutes the evidence
is conclusive. even as against the af
ildavlt for the allowance of the writ:
Rawson v. McElvaine, 49 Mich., 194;
The return to a writ
13 N. W., 518.
son

v.

must be assumed to be correct: Young
v. Kelsey, 46 Mich., 414; 9 N. W., 453;
Galloway v. Corhitt, 52 Mich., 460:
18 N. W., 218; Mann v. Tyler,
56
Mich., 564; 23 N. W., 314.
It is not necessary that the return
should show that there was an entry
of judgment on the verdict of the
jury: Gaines v. Betts, 2 Doug., 98.
But the fact that security for costs
was given, together with the original
undertaking therefor should be returned
with the answer to the writ:
Mc
Lean v. Isbell, 44 Mich., 133: 6 N. W..
210.
If the justice fails to return
fully as to all the allegations of error
in the aﬂidavit for the writ, the remedy
is by an application to the court for
an order for a further return: Hitch
86; Mur
cock
v. Sutton, 28 Mich.,
quette and Paciﬁc Rolling Mill C0. v.
Morgan. 41 Mich., 296; 1 N. W., 1045.
A statement appended to the return
to a writ of certiomri oi’ what purports
testimony in the case.
to he further
which, though signed by the justice.
is not dated, and does not otherwise
purport to be a part of the return,
but is inconsistent with and contradic
tory of the return itself, and not ap
pearing to be made in pursuance of
any order for a further return, will
not be considered as a part of the rec
ord:
Powers v. Russell, 26 Mich..
A justice cannot supply a juris
179.
dictional fact in his return to a writ
of ccrtiorari by certifying to its ex
istence when his docket does not show
it: Noyes v. Hillier, 65 Mich., 636:
32 N. W., 872: King v. Bates,
80
Mich., 367: 45 N. W., 147.
The ap
pellate court cannot presume that there
was no evidence to support a judgment
against a return stating that the plain
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If, however, the pre

liminary steps required by the statute are not all complied
with, he may refuse to make a return.“ The return should
contain a concise statement of all the formal proceedings in the
cause.
The return must also “truly and fully answer to all the
facts set forth in the copy of the affidavit.” He must return
to these facts that they are true or untrue, according to the
best of his recollection and belief; and he will not be excused
from thus returning on his aﬂidavit that he has no minutes
and remembers nothing by which he can so return."
The
return must contain a complete history of the proceedings in
itself.
It would be irregular, and would be set aside, if it
merely refer to and adopt the aﬂidavit, stating that the facts
set forth in it are true or untrue?“ The justice should return
such facts only as are within his own knowledge." Nor is he
bound to return as to matters of which he is not presumed to
have any knowledge; as, the conduct of the jury after they
have retired."
The return need not be under seal; it is suffi
e
cient if it is imder the hand of the justice."
“The justice shall cause the certiorari, the bond, and the
copy of the aﬂidavit on which such certiorari was allowed, and
his return to the same, to be attached together and ﬁled in the
oﬂice of the clerk of the court from which the Writ of certiorari
was issued.”2°
The certiorari, bond and copy of aﬂidavit being attached
together, the justice should indorse the writ with a statement
to the effect that the execution of the writ appears by the writ
ings therewith returned.
Amended returns.-—“The
court may compel such
§561.
justice to make or amend such return by rule, attachment, or
mandamus, as the case may require.”21
in his own behalf: Sul-- with him within the statutory period:
511*‘-l‘W°0d V- Arnold.
30 M1011-, 272;
livan v. Hall. 86 Mlch., 7; 48 N. W.,
45 N. W., 134.
Sec, Twp. of Fruitport v. Judge
646.
15—Schuyler v. Warner, 1 Cow., 59.
of Muskegon Circuit, 90 Mlch., 20; 51
16—Mann v. Swift, 3 Cow., 61.
1\'_ w_, 109,
17—Mosely v. Landon, 2 Johns., 193.
2
13—Van
Patten
v. Onderklrk,
18—An0n1/mous, 3 Calnes, 106.
Johns" Cases, 108.
14-People v. Onondaga C. P., 7
19LScott v. Rushman, 1 Cow., 212,
Wend., 516: People ea: rel Reynolds v. note b.
L., 5 945.
20—(‘..
So he need
Rensselaer, 11 Wend., 174.
21—C. L., Q 946.
not make return if the bond is not ﬁled
Amended return,
tit‘! was sworn

»
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When a rule is obtained in the circuit court for the justice
to amend his return, it speciﬁes the particulars in which the
return is sought to be amended, and these the return must
answer.
Proceedings in the circuit court.-“When such re
turn shall be so ﬁled with the clerk, the cause may be brought
on to argument, at any term of the court thereafter without
any assignment or joinder in error, unless there be an alle
gation of error in fact, and without furnishing any other copy
or copies of the afﬁdavit, certiorari, and return to the court or
the opposite party, than those ﬁled with the clerk.”22
“The court shall proceed to give judgment in the cause as
the right of the matter may appear, without regarding techni
cal omissions, imperfections or defects in the proceedings be
fore the justice, which did not affect the merits; and may
aﬂirm or reverse the judgment, in whole or in part, and execu
tion shall issue thereon, as upon other judgments rendered in
e§

562.

the circuit or district court.”23
Mann v. Tyler, 56 Mich., 566; 23 N.
W., 314.
The circuit court may order a tur
ther return of its own motion: Gordon
v. Sibley, 59 Mich., 250; 26 N. W., 485.
Berry.v.
See,
22—C. L., § 947.
Lowe. 10 Mich., 11; Welch v. Bagg,
12 Mich., 42.
Gray v. Wilcox,
23—C. L., § 948.
it
56 Mich., 58-62; 22 N. W., 109.
will be presumed on the hearing in
the circuit court that there was evi
dence to sustain the ﬁndings in the
court below. though none appears from
the return to the certiorari, unless the
return shows that the whole testimony
Gaines v.
in the case is returned:
Betts, 2 Doug., 98; Snow v. Perkins,
2 Mich., 238; see, Cicotte v. Morse.
The circuit court will
8 Mich., 424.
not, on certlorari, reverse a judgment
on the ground that there was no evi
there was
dence to warrant it, unles
a total want of testimony to sustain
the ﬁnding of the jury on the point
in question: if there was any proof
ﬁnding,
the
verdict
to sustain the
should stand: Gaines v. Betta, 2 Doug.
Mich., 98.
The judgment of the jus
tice will not he set aside. for any
technical omission, imperfection, or de

fect that did not go to the merits, nor
for any errors that did not and could
not have worked an injury to the
party complaining.
ii‘ the alleged er
ror ls a total want of evidence to prove
some fact necessary
to
sustain the
judgment, the court will look into the
testimony to see it there was such evi
dence.
It there was, it will not weigh
it, or inquire into its suﬂiclency. but
aﬁirm the judgment.
If the return
shows no such evidence, and it appears
that all the evidence before the jus
tice was returned, the Judgment will
be reversed
on the ground that the
Justice erred, in law_ in rendering the
judgment he did without
evidence:
Berry v. Lowe. 10 Mich., 14. 15;
Welch v. Bagg, 12 Mich., 41; and see.
Hyde v. Nelson. 11 Mich.,~353: Higley
Mich.,
v. Lant,
812;
3
Cicotte
v.
Morse. 8 Mich., 424; Linn v. Roberts,
15 Mich., 443:
McGraw v. Schwah.
23 Mich., 12: Parsons v. Dickinson. 28
Mich., 56; Hlnman v. Eaklns, 26 Mich.,
80.

And it the plaintii!'s own testimony
forth in the return, shows that he
was not entitled to any judgment, the
judgment against him will not be re
versed for technical errors:
Burniiam
set

554

(;H_

XXV111

or

BY ciiirrlonxai.

REMOVAL

§562

“If the judgment be aﬂirmed, costs shall be awarded to the
defendant in error; if it be reversed, costs shall be awarded to
the plaintiﬁ' in error; if the judgment be affirmed in part, the
costs, or such part as to the court shall seem just, may be
awarded to either party/'2‘
“No judgment of a justice shall be reversed merely for the
omission or misrecital of an oath, or on account of any fees
having been improperly allowed by such justice, nor on ac
count of the informality or insufficiency of any bond that shall
have been given by the party bringing the certiorari:
Pro
vided, Another bond, to be approved by the court, shall be
given within such time as the court shall direct.”2°
“If a judgment, rendered before a justice, be collected, and
A justice’s
v. Glider, 34 Mich., 246.
judgment on its merit, should not be
reversed on certiorari, on the admis
unless
sion or rejection of evidence,
the party
that
it clearly appears
against whom judgment was given was
Whaley
v.
injured by the ruling:
Gale, 48 Mich., 193; 12 N. W., 33.
In deciding ﬁnally on certlorart, all
detects not aﬂecting the merits will
Young v. Kelsey, 46
be disregarded:
.\iich., 414; 9 N. W., 453; Whelpiey
8 N. W.,
v. Nash, 46 Mich., 25-6;
570.
See,

further,

as to the

proceedings

on certiorart in the circuit court, notes
to C. L., § 948.
it the judgment below is approved,
interest may be added thereto up to

of amrmance, and a new
the time
judgment may be entered in the circuit
court against the plaintiif in the cer
tlorari and his sureties for that
amount: and such new judgment will
stand as a substitute for the judgment
rendered by the justice: McDermid v.
Redpath, 39 Mich., 372.
The interest
may include interest upon the
added
costs awarded in the court below:
Whelpiey v. Nash, 46 Mich., 25, 27; 8
‘
N. W., 570.
The law which allows a judgment
to be rendered against a surety on ap
peal or certiorari
does not make that
the only proper method of holding him.
and when he objects to such a judg
ment he cannot complain if it is va
And it the bond is sued upon,
cated.

a suit against one of the obiigors is
good if the non-joinder of the others

is not pleaded in abatement:
Porter
v. Leach, 56 Mich., 40; 22 N. W. 104.
See, further, as to the judgment to
be rendered on certiorart:
Notes to
C. L., ii 949, 950, and Dooley v. Eil
bert, 47 Mich., 615; 11 N. W., 408:
Rodman v. Clark, 81 Mich., 466: 45
N. W., 1001.
The practice of resorting
to review by certiorori to reach errors
that can be more justly corrected on
appeal is criticized
by our supreme
court: See, Galloway v. Corbitt, 52
Mich., 460; 18 N. W., 218; Mann v.
Tyler, 56 Mich., 567: 23 N. W., 314:
O'Hara v. Merman, 79 Mich., 226: 44
N. W., 599; Stoil v. Padley, 98 Mich.,
18: 56 N. W., 1042; Forbes L. Mfg.
Co. v. Winter, 107 Mich., 118: 84 .\'.
W., 1053: Bullock v. Ueberroth, 121
Mich., 296: 80 N. W., 39, and cases
cited in the opinions in these cases.
24—C. L., 5 949.
Where the judg
is affirmed,
ment
that should be the
judgment and not a judgment de nova
entered:
Dooley v. Eilhert, 47 Mich.,
The circuit court
615: 11 N. W., 408.
cannot render judgment tor costs of
the suit incurred betore justice: Berry
V. Lowe, 10 Mich., 16.
25—C. L., 5 950.
Antiau v. Nadeau,
58 Mich., 461: 19 N. W., 145.
So a
failure of the suretles to. justify as
required by law is not jurisdictional:
Hatch v. Christmas, 68 Mich., 87: 35
N. W., 833.
See, Stoll v. Pndley, 100
Mich., 405; 59 N. W., 178.
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restitution of the
amount so collected, with_seven per cent interest from the time
of collection; to justify such award the party claiming shall
present satisfactory evidence of the fact of such collection
having been made to the court, at the argument of the cause.”2°
afterwards

be reversed, the court shall award

26—C. L., 5 951.
v. Jackson

Wllllug

See. People ca: rel
Ct. Judges, 1

Clr.

See, Whelpley
Doug. Mlch.. 302.
Nash, 46 Mich., 25; 8 N. W., 570.
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§563. In what cases may a.ppea1.—“Any party to a judg
ment rendered by a justiee of the peace, conceiving himself
aggrieved thereby, may appeal therefrom to the circuit or
district court for the coimty where the same was rendered, in
the following eases :
1.
Where ﬁnal judgment was rendered on an issue of law

joined between the parties;
2. Where ﬁnal judgment was rendered
joined between the parties;
3.

on an issue

of fact

Where the defendant did not appear and plead, and ﬁnal

judgment was rendered for the plafintiif on the merits of his
claim;
4.
Where a judgment of non-suit has been rendered.”1
This provision ni
1-—C. L., 5 902.
lowing an appeal in case of nonsuit is
held not to apply to a voluntary non
sult as where a plaintiﬂ fails to
Schuite v. Kelly, 124 Mlch.,
appear:
Where, on the
330: 83 N. W., 405.
adjourned day. the justice refused to
proceed with the cause, held, that the
refusal might be treated as a judgment
of nonsuit, and that an appeal might
Pattrldge v. Lott, 15 Mlch.,
he taken:
So, the decision of the justice
2.’-1.
dismissing a suit on motion for want
for an alleged defect
of jurisdiction,
is equivalent to a
in the summons,
judgment of nonsuit. and is appeal
Judge
Wayne
of
People v.
abie:
But a party
Circuit,
30 Mlch., 98.
who has put in a stay of execution
cannot appeal from the judgment: Peo
ple v. Judges of Macomh Circuit Court,

1 Mlch., 134.
Nor after a transcript
has been ﬂied; Davlson v. Elliott, 9
Mlch., 252.
But an appeal which has
been dismissed for failure to pay the
entry fee may, in the discretion of the
circuit court, be reinstated notwith
standing a transcript
has been ﬂied
and execution issued: Aldrich v. Judge
County. 49 Mlch., 609;
of Clinton
14 N. W., 565.
The party in interest,
and for whose beneﬁt
the
suit
is
brought may appeal:
Wilson v. Davis,
plain
1 Mlch., 156.
One of several
tlifs or defendants may appeal, and the
refusal of his co-parties to join in the
appeal cannot preclude him from ap
pealing in his own behalf:
People on
relation of Keal v. Judge of Wayne
Circuit, 36 Mlch., 331.
The right to
appeal is not conﬁned to the party to
thus, the assignee
of a
the record;
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The aﬂidavit for appea1.—“The
party appealing
§564.
imder the provisions of the preceding section, shall, within
ﬁve days after the rendition of the judgment, present to the
justice an affidavit made by himself, his agent, or attorney,
before any person authorized to administer oaths, stating that
such judgment is not in accordance with the just rights of
such party, as the person making such afﬁdavit verily believes;
and in case there shall be any objection to the process, plead
ings, or other proceedings, and to the decision of the justice
thereon, which would not be allowed to be made on the trial
of the appeal, the same may be set forth speciﬁcally in the
affidavit.’

'2

note not negotiable, who sues in the
name of the payee. is a party within
the meaning of the statute, and may
appeal: Lassell, Ex parte. 8 Cow., 119:

should be used to reach errors that
are committed upon the trial:
Forbes
Lithograph C0. v. Winter, 107 .\iich.,
116; 64 N. W., 1053: Bullock v. Ile
bcrroth, 121 Mich., 296; 80 N. W., 3!).
and cases cited in the opinions in these

People ca! rel Seymour v. Monroe
One of several
P., 1 Wend., 19.
defendants. it is said, may appeal, and cases.
2—C. L., 5 903.
the bond recognizing him as lmpleaded
The appeal must be taken within
others would be proper:
with
the
five days from the rendition
of the
v. Judges. etc., 1 Wend., 90;
Mecch
judgment; and if a justice takes time
see, Tower v. Lamb, 6 Mich., 362. But
to render his decision, but does not
the whole cause as to all is said to be
state at what time within the tour
removed by the appeal: Bates v. Cank
days allowed him for that purpose. he
ling. 10 Wend., 389: see, People ca: rcl
will give judgment, he may render it
Cross v. Onondaga C. P., 7 Cow., 493.
on any day within that time. and the
Where one of two defendants appealed,
parties must take notice of the time
neither appearing in the court below,
but both joining in a plea and trial of its rendition in order that they
may take their appeal within the five
on the merits in the appellate court.
days of its actual rendition:
Draper
hold, that an objection that the appeal
v. Tooker, 16 Mich., 74.
The affidavit
was taken by one only was waived:
and bond on appeal must be presented
Shaw v. Moser, 3 Mich., 71; see, Tow
But taking to the justice within five days after
er v. Lamb. 6 Mich., 362.
is not such an appearance the rendition of the judgment, and the
an appeal
fact that the ﬁfth day fails on Sunday
in the cause as waives an objection
to the jurisdiction of the justice over does not authorize the taking of such
Shaw v. appeal on the following
day:
Dale
the person of th'e appellant:
v. Lavigne. 31 Mich., 149.
See, Franks
Moser. 3 Mich., 71. Where the plain
v. Smith, 45 Mich., 326: 7 N. W., 906.
til! appeared by his next friend be
fore the justice, and the defendant But the parties may, by stipulation,
enlarge the time for appeal in those
and no ques
appealed the cause,
cases where the court. on cause shown.
pn
tion being made in the appeal
might allow an appeal after the time
pers as to the regularity of such ap
it will be assumed in the ﬁxed by the statute:
Climie v. Odell.
pearance,
20 Mich., 12.
The circuit court may
appellate court that the appointment
of the next friend and his appearance allow an appeal after the expiration
of the ﬂve days where the appellant
before the justice were regular: Kear
As to was led to believe by the opposite party
ney v. Doyle. 22 Mich., 294.
that he was going to appeal:
after appeal,
amendments
see. Evers
Potter
Judge, 119 Mich.,
The procedure v. Lapeer Circuit
v. Sager. 28 Mich., 47.
522; 78 N. W., 536.
So the appear
by appeal
rather than by ccrtlorurt
see,
C.
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The aiﬁdavit, strictly, should not be entitled at all; but if
entitled in the suit in the justice’s court, it will not be objec
of appeiiee in the circuit court
and noticing the case for trial waives
the objection
that the aiiidavit and
Goodin
bond were not ﬂied in time:
v. Van Haaften.
130 Mich.. 386; 90
The want of the aﬂiant's
N. W., 23.
signature to the aﬂidavit will not in
validate it. if it was actually sworn
to: Dickinson v. Simondson, 25 Mlch.,
113; l\ierrick v. Mayhue, -ii) Mich.. 196.
When the atﬂdavit is sworn to before
the justice who rendered the judgment,
his omission to sign the jurat will not
But if sworn to be
defeat the appeal.
fore any other oﬂicer, such an omis
sion would be fatal:
See. Dickinson
v. Simondson. supra, and Bradley v.
Andrews, 51 Mlch., 100, 102; 16 N.
W., 250.
And it seems that the fact
that the aﬂidavit was sworn to before
a notary who was an attorney for the
appellant is not suﬂicient cause for
dismissing
appeal peremptoriiy:
the
Ibid.: Bradley v. Andrews, 51 Mlch.,
And in fact it
100, 18 N. W., 250.
has been held that the inadvertent
omission to make oath to the aﬂidavit
is not so fatal as to preclude remedy
under C. L., § 924.
See. Hamilton v.
Jennlson. Judxze. 52 Mlch., 409: 18 N.
W., 193.
And it in such the appeliee
appears and notices the cause for trial,
Ibid.
the error will be waived:
The aﬂldm-it for an appeal. required
by the statute, cannot be waived or
dispensed with by the appellee.
And
where the jurat to an aﬂidavit for an
appeal was, "Sworn
and subscribed
this fourth day of May. A. D. 1858,
C.... P..... justice at the peace.,"
omitting the words "before me," held,
to be a nullity by reason of the omis
sion. and that the circuit court ac
quired no jurisdiction
of the appeal:
Smart v. Howe, 3 Mlch., 590: see, ante,
5 51, note 22, and see note to C. L.,

of the justice, but complains only of
the judgment on the merits, the appeal
will carry up only the issue of fact
for a retrial; and the appellate court
can take no notice of errors in the
process
or of any erroneous decisions
of the justice.
Errors relating to the
merits alone, can be corrected only
by a retrial on the merits in the ap
pellate court:
Chappee
v. Thomas, 5
Mich.. 56.
Special appcnl.—But
a party
may
avail imself on appeal, of objections
to errors in the proceedings and er
roneous rulings and decisions of the
justice in the course of the cause.
distinct
from the judgment on the
merits: to this extent giving the ap
peal the characteristics of a certiornri.
But to give the appeal this effect he
must specially set forth in his affida
vit, the particular matters and errors
complained of; and it seems,
that
there must have been a decision of the
justice upon the process. pleadings or
other proceedings,
to authorize the de
ponent to set them forth in the ai‘lida
vit. or to avail himself of them in
this form
appeal:
of
v.
Chappee
Thomas. 5 Mlch., 53: see. Mei‘-raw v.
Sturgeon, 29 Mlch.,
Manhard
430:
Schott,
Mlch.,
v.
37
But,
234.
on'speciai appeal the party is not con
ﬁned to the objections actually
made
before the justice; it is suﬂicient if
the objections are set forth in the af
ﬂdavit, whether made before the jus
tice or not.
And. if the objection is
one that goes to the jurisdiction.
the
party is_not obliged to appear be
fore the justice
to
make
it. but
may certify it up. either by special
Wright v.
appeal or by cerﬂnrari:
Russell. 19 Mlch., 346; see, note to C.

ance

5 903.

General llppml.e.——if
the aiiidavit
for the appeal is general, and relates
only to the judgment on the merits
upon
an issue
of fact, and does
not set forth or complain of any mat
ters connected with the process, or any
question arising
upon
it before the
justice. nor of any decisions or rulings

L.,

Q 903.

Special appeals can only be to re
justice
view the action of the
on
points. which would not be allowed to
be made on the trial of the appeal:
Dalton v. Laudahn,
30 Mlch.,
351.
implies
But
the
statute
at least,
that there must have been a decision
of the justice thereon, either express
ly or impliedly, to authorize the ap
pellant to set them forth in the aﬂida
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Appeal after ﬁve days.—.“Appeals may be authorized
§ 565.
by the circuit court, or by the circuit judge at chambers, after
the expiration of ﬁve days, when the party making the appeal
has been prevented from taking the same by circumstances not
under his control.
And in all such eases where the party in
whose favor such judgment was rendered appears by an attor
ney or agent it will be suﬂicient to serve such attorney or
agent with the notices of all subsequent proceedings in said
cause and all orders made by said court or judge may be
served on said attorney or agent. And such service shall have
Maxwell v. Deens, 46 Mich., 37;
W., 561; Benjamin v. Dodge, 50
Mich., 41; 14 N. W., 675; Peterson v.
Fowler, 76 Mich., 262; 43 N. W., 10.
Special grounds set forth in an at
iidavit for an appeal will be deemed
to be truly stated unless in some way
Brown
controverted by the return:
See, Lym
32.
20 Mich.,
v. Kelly,
burner v. Jenkinson, 50 Mich., 490:
15 N. W., 562.
A special appeal does not lie where
there is no question of jurisdiction,
and the case is in condition to be re
Benjamin v.
tried on
the merits:
Dodge.
50 Mich., 41; 14 N. W., 675.
Errors of fact must be rectiﬁed in
Lymburner v. Jen
some other way:
kinson. 50 Mich., 489-90; 15 N. W.,
562.
That the justice wrongfully held
declaration
was
that the plaintiff's
siiﬁlcient in law cannot be taken ad
vantage of on special appeal:
Stevens
v. ilarris, 99 Mich., 230; 58 N. W.,

vit:

8 N.

230.

Rulings of the justice on the ad
are not subject
mission of evidence
to review in the circuit court on spe
Sutton, 28
cial appeal:
Albert
v.
Mich., 2: Webster v. Williams,
69
Mich., 135; 37 N. W., 62.
Nor rul
ings on the trial concerning the sum
moning and swearing of witnesses:
McGraw v. Sturgeon, 20 Mich., 426.
430: Dalton v. Laudahn, 30 Mich., 349.
Questions which arose on the trial can
not he made the ground of such an
reversing!
judgment
for
the
appeal
Man
without a trial at the circuit:

hard v. Schott, 37 Mich., 2-i4.
The
statute does not contemplate n review
on special appeal,‘ of errors which do
not involve such decisions by the jus
tice, either express or implied, in the
exercise of jurisdiction:
Maxwell v.
Deens, 46 Mich., 37; 8 N. W., 581.
Mere irregularities
before the jus
tice cannot be considered on special
appeals.
But if a party wishes to
plant himself upon those he must re
sort to the writ of ccrtiorari.
Ques
tions of jurisdiction, however, are open
to him on special appeal:
Delta v.
32 Mich., 303: Fowler
Groesbeck.
v.
Hyland, 48 Mich., 179; 12 N. W., 28.
A special appeal takes the case up
for retrial on the merits, in case the
special objections are not sustained:
Hyland.
Mich.,
Fowler
v.
48
179:
12 N. W., 26.
An order in the appel
late court overruling the special ap
peal
and directing
that the cause
stand for trial on the merits, is not a
ﬁnal judgment from which error will
lie to review it:
Brady v. Toledo A.
A. & N. M. Ry. Co., 73 Mich., 457: 41
W., ClO50 Dodge
Nichols, ~—
N.
v.
Miﬁil-. ———: 98 N. W.. 737
(Man.
1904) : Tompkins v. Bowen, 123 Mich.,
377; 82 N. W., 51.
The objection that the attorney for
the plaintiff did not prove his author
ity, is properly raised on special ap
peal:
Robinson,
v.
49
Woodbridze
Mich., 228; 13 N. W., 527.
3—Whitney v. Warner, 2 Cow., 499.
4-Nichols v. Cowles, 3 Cow., 345:
see. dismissal ot appeals, post, 5 572.
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the same effect as though the same was made on the party

in whose favor such judgment may have

been

rendered/"

Bond on a-ppeal.-—“The party appealing under the
§566.
provisions of the preceding section shall also, within ﬁve days
L., 5 909.
As amended by
5-—C.
This
Laws of 1891. Act 73, p. 77.
amendment ,of 1891 is not retroactive:
Danvllle Stove Co. v. Circuit Judge,
it was
88 Mich., 244; 50 N. W., 140.
not intended b_v this section to give a
general discretion to the circuit court
to allow appeals in any case after ﬁve
days, where in their judgment it would
be equitable. or when the party had
made a mistake or drawn an erroneous
inference;
cases
but only in those
where the party had been prevented
days by
from appealing within the
ﬁve
his
control.
beyond
circumstances
Thus, where at the close of a trial
the justice took time to give judgment,
which he rendered the next day. and
the party, supposing that he would
render judgment on the fourth day.
did not inquire what the decision was
until the ﬂfth day after said fourth
day; held, that he was too late to ap
peal. and that it was not a case within
the discretion of the circuit court to
Draper v. Tooker,
allow an appeal:
Nor can the circuit
74.
16 Mich.,
court allow an appeal after a tran
script if the judgment has been legally
Davison v. Elliott, 9 Mich.,
tiled:
The fraudulent antcdating of a
252.
judgment whereby a party is misled
as to the time within which he has the
right to appeal. thus causing him to
lose an appeal, is suiiicient ground for
the allowance of a special appeal: Hall
Circum
39 Mich., 219.
v. Howard.
stances heynnd a party's control in
clude a case where he, or some member
of his family. is seriously ill: Braastad
v. A. H. Day I. M. Co., 54 Mich., 258;
So, where the party
20 N. W., 43.
did not hear of the judgment until
Oapeweli v. Baxter.
after ﬁve days:
The
58 Mich., 571: 25 N. W., 493.
absence of the justice is not suﬂicient
to authorise the granting of an appeal
after ﬁve days unless it appears that
advantage of the
he could not take
provisions of C. L., i 910, by leaving
the aﬂidavit and bond with some mem
as
4

ber of the Justice's family of suitable
age:
Combs v. Judge of Saginaw Cir
cult, 99 Mich., 234; 58 N. W., 71.
Deception by one's co-defendant is suf
iicient to Justify allowance after ﬁve
days:
Potter v. Lapeer Circuit Judge,
119 Mlch...522: 78 N. W., 536.
Ac
ceptance
of service of notice of appli
cation wlthout the state for leave to
gives no authority to consider
appeal
such application:
Danville S. & M.
Co. v. Judge of Kent Circuit, 88 Mich.,
244; 50 N. W.. 140.. The application
for the allowance of an appeal, where
the ﬂve days allowed by law for ap
pealing has expired, although not a
regular suit or action, is nevertheless
a special proceeding materially
affect
ing the legal rights of the judgment
creditor: and the circuit court or judge
cannot proceed
to allow the appeal
without obtaining jurisdiction over the
judgment crcdltor appellee. as in other
legal proceedings, and this can be ac
qulred only by personal service of the
notice required. and not by
mail.
Whether. without some statute to au
thorize it, a substituted service could
be had when
no other
is possible,
quaerc.
In applications for leave to
appeal, an order to show cause is the
better practice. so that the court can
see that the hearing shall he put for
ward long enough to give the opposite
party ample time to prepare to show
cause against the motion:
McCaslin
v. Camp.
26 Mich., 390: see note to
C. L., 5 909.
The only method of re
viewing the action of the circuit court
in passing upon the application for
leave to appeal is by mandamus:
Vin
cent v. Bowes. 78 Mich., 316; 44 N.
W., 270.
And mandamus will only lie
when there has been an abuse of dis
Bowes, supra.
cretion:
v.
Vincent
The Detroit justlce‘s courts act (Local
Acts, 1895. Act No. 460). does not give
the circuit court discretionary
power
with respect to dliatory appeals: Gold
hamer v. Wayne Circuit Judge, 107
Mich., 259; 65 N. W.. 97.
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after the rendition of the judgment, deliver to the justice a
bond or recognizance to the adverse party, in conformity with
the following provisions:
First, It shall be in a penalty not less than ﬁfty dollars, and
not less than double the amount of the judgment, excluding
costs;
Second, It shall recite the judgment so far as to exhibit the
names of all the parties, the character in which they prose
cuted or defended before the justice, the amount recovered,
and the name of the justice;
Third, It shall contain a condition that the appellant will
prosecute his appeal with all due diligence to a decision in the
circuit court, and that if a judgment be rendered against him
in such court, he will pay the amount of such judgment, includ
ing all costs, with interest thereon, and if his appeal shall be
discontinued or dismissed, that he will ‘pay the amount of the
judgment rendered against him, if any, in the justice ’s court,
including all costs, with interest thereon;
Fourth, It shall be executed by the appellant, with one or
more suﬁicient sureties, or by two or more suﬂicient sureties
Such bond or recognizances may be
without the appellant.
taken by the justice by whom the judgment was rendered, or
by any other justice of the peace of the same county, or by the
county clerk of the same county,”° etc.
“No justice of the peace or county clerk shall take any bond
see,
Weiss v.
6—C.
L.. 5 904;
Wayne Judge, 50 Mich., 158; 15 N.
W., 63.
Where there are several ap
pellants the bond must be signed by
all, or such as do‘ not execute the bond
will not be heard in the appellate
court: Jopp v. Kegel, 83 Mich., 50;
W., 1027.
Piaintiifs appeal
46 N.
bond in a replevin suit is a cumula
tive remedy in favor of the defendant.
It does not supersede or take the place
of the replevin bond given on the com
Brabon v.
of the suit:
mencement
On an appeal
Pierce, 34 Mich., 39.
taken by a corporation, a bond exe
cuted by two individual obligors is suf
ﬂcient, if otherwise regular in form,
although one of the obligors is named
instead of
in the bond as principal
surety:
People car rel. Detroit 8: B.
Plank
Road Co. v. Wayne Circuit

Judge, 27 Mich., 303.
In appeal cases
the parties are not entitled, under C.
L., I 929, to introduce new causes of
action by amendment or by the ﬁling of
new proceedings; still they may do this
by stipulation
between
but if
them.
such new cause of action is introduced
by agreement
or stipulation. the Sure
tics in the appeal bond will be dis
charged: Evers v. Sager, 2B Mich.. -47.
A Justice's neglect to make
return
within ten days after an appeal is per
fected, does not preclude a remedy on
the appeal bond: Nowlin v. Tibbits, 44
Mich., 77: 6 N. W., 118.
The bond
operates as a stay of proceedings:
Hascall v. Brooks, 105 Mich., 385; 63
N. W., 413.
Judgment against the
surety cannot exceed the penalty in
the bond:
Vreeland v. Loeckner, 09
Mich., 03; 57 N. W., 1093.
Formal
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or recognizance on appeal, as hereinbefore provided, unless the
person or persons entering into the same as surety, justiﬁes his
or their responsibility in writing and under oath, which justi
ﬁcation shall be by said justice indorsed on said bond.”T
“Such justiﬁcation shall not be necessary when the opposite
party, or his attorney, admits the pecuniary responsibility of
such surety or sureties to be sufficient; and it shall be the duty
of the justice, at the time of taking such bond or recognizance,
to certify whether the surety justiﬁed, or his responsibility was
admitted

as aforesaid.”B

In

oﬂice of justice vacated before appeal.
“When the term of oﬁice of a justice shall expire, or other
wise become vacant, between the rendition of a judgment by
him and the time limited for appealing, such justice may take
and approve the bond or recognizance, and it shall be his duty
to make return to such appeal in like manner as if he was in
oﬂiee at the time of taking such bond or recognizance, and of
§567.

case

making such return.”°
§568. Payment of costs and fees to the just-ice.—“The ap
pellant shall, within the said ﬁve days, in addition to the mak
ing and ﬁling of an affidavit and bond, pay to the justice the
costs of the judgment, together with the sum of one dollar
for making his return to said appeal, and the farther sum of
three dollars as clerk and entry fee, to be paid by said justice
to the clerk of the court to which said appeal is taken, which
sum, three dollars, shall be paid by the justice to the clerk of
the court at the time of delivering the papers pertaining to
the appeal, to said clerk, and no appeal shall be allowed until
the foregoing conditions are complied with, and all species
of appeals ordered or directed by any court or judge, shall be
and are hereby made subject to the same provisions of pay
'

ment.”‘°
detects in the appeal bond are waived
Sherwood v.
by general appearance:
Ionia Circuit Judge. 107 Mieh.. 136;
64 N. W., 1045; Goodiu v. Van Hast
ten, 130 Mlch.. 386: 90 N. W., 23.
7—C. L., § 9052 Cole v. Wayne Cir
cuit Judge, 106 Mich., 692; 64 N. W.,
741.

S—C. L., § 906.

0—C. L., 5 908.
10—C. L., 5 907.
The costs to be
paid are those included in the Judg
ment,
only:
and those
Em parts,
Beadlestone. 7 Cow., 507. If the plain
tiff appeal from a judgment in his
favor, he must pay to the justice the
costs for which judgment was given;
nor can he deduct the tees of witnesses
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Service of aiﬁdavit and bond.-—“The aﬂidavit and
§569.
bond or recognizance, in case of the absence from his dwelling
house of the justice by whom the judgment was rendered, may
be served on any member of his family of suitable age, and
the costs and fees may be paid to such person.”11
“On such certiﬁcate being presented to the ofiicer holding
the execution, he shall forthwith release the property, or the
body of the party against whom the same was issued, which
may have been taken; and if such party may have been com
mitted to prison, upon service of the like certiﬁcate upon the
jailor, he shall release him from imprisonment.” 12

Return to the appeal.-“Within ten days after any
§570.
appeal shall have been made, the justice shall make a return
of the proceedings had before him to the circuit or district
court for the county, in which shalljie stated:
1. The title of the cause, and the character in which the
parties prosecuted or defended before him;
2. The demand of the plaintiﬁ; and if his declaration
was
shall
forth;
a
thereof
be
set
copy
in-writing,
3. The plea of the defendant, and any notice of set-oif or
People cm rel.
which he has paid:
Lincoln v. Saratoga C. I‘., 1 Wend.,
282.
The justice cannot charge the
costs; the money
must be actually
paid: La Farge, or par-tc, 6 Cow., 61.
And paid to the justfce: payment to
favor judgment
in whose
the party
would not avail any
was rendered,
thing: Ear parte, Stephens, 6 Cow., 69
By C. L., 5 923, the fact oi a return
having been made is conclusive evidence
The
that the tees have been paid.
payment of one dollar to the justice
tor making return to the appeal is not
necessarily a jurisdictional
tact, since
the justice may waive it: but it not
paid, or the payment waived by the
justice. he is under no obligation to
make the return, and no court has the
right to compel him to do so, and he
may issue execution the same as if no
Wiley v.
appeal had been attempted:
Judge of Allegan Circuit,
29 Mich.,
487; Swarthout
Saginaw Circuit
v.
Judge. 99 Mich., 347; 58 N. W., 315.
The justice, while he may waive pay
ment ot the tees. cannot waive the pay
ment ot the costs, including the jury

tee, it there was one, as a condition of P
appeal:
Swarthout v. Saginaw Circuit“
Judge. supra.
A justice’s receipt for "the fees and
costs on appeal of case,” so binds him
that he must make return to the ap
peal, even though the tee for making
it has not in fact been paid. The ap
pellant has a right to rely on the
receipt, and cannot be deprived of his
appeal by a misunderstanding with the
justice:
Stevenson
v.
Kent (‘ircuit
Judge, 44 Mich., 162; 6 N. W., 217.
This decision was before the amend
ment ot 1983 to § D07.
11—C. L., 5 910; see, Combs v.
Saginaw Circuit Judge, 99 Mich., 234;
58 N. W., 71.
12-C. L., 5 911. Where the party
against whom the judgment was ren
dered, had paid the amount of it to
the oﬂicer having the execution before
the service of the certiﬁcate, it was
held, that the constable was justified
in returning the money to the appel
lant: Seymour v. Dascome, 12 Wend..
See, Bushey v. Raths, 45 Mich.,
584.
181 ; 7 N. W., 802

564

___

_

_

\

_

___.:\-_4.qi\$

\

I

CH.

XXIX.

or

APPEALS 'ro CIRCUIT couar.

§ 570

matter of defence given by him, and all other proceedings of
the parties upon which a trial was had or an issue was formed;
and if in writing, copies thereof shall be set forth;
4.

If the

trial was by jury, the names of the jurors and their

verdict;
5. The judgment rendered, and the time of rendering the
same; and,
6. The time when the affidavit and bond of recognizance
hereinbefore required were delivered to the justice, and the

of the justice were paid.” 13
“The justice, in addition to the particulars required by the
preceding section, shall make a full and complete return as to
all matters stated and set forth in such aﬁidavit mentioned in
the latter part of the preceding section one hundred and
eighty-four, and shall also return copies of all processes, re

fees

turns, pleadings and aﬁidavits upon which any process issued
or motion was made, and so much of the evidence and pro
ceedings as may be necessary fully to exhibit the questions,
motions and decisions, made and presented in such cause.”14
13—C. L., § 912. This section makes
for the return of all mat
ters required to he returned. where the
is on the merits, and the aﬂi~
nppeal
And the return
davit is not special.
provided for in this section, where the
the
is general and upon
affidavit
merits only. is not required to contain
And ii
the process, nor to refer to it.
returned, the court could not. in such
cases,
take judicial cognizance of it,
because
its return is neither required
nor authorized. and it would consti
tute no part of the record upon which
Chappee
could act:
v.
the
court
Thomas. 5 Mich.. 57, 58; see as to the
requirements for a return and the
effect oi.’ deﬁciencies
therein: Moore v.
Hansen, 75 Mich., 564; 42 N. \\’., 981.
L., 5 913.
The preceding
14—-C.
section 184 ls. (‘. L., 5 903: see the
section ante, 5 564.
This. C. L., 5
913. is intended to apply only to the
return in answer to the special aﬂi
davit provided tor by the latter por
tion of C. L., l 903, and to compel the
justice to make a full and complete
return to the special matters contained
in the aﬁidavit:
v. Thomas,
Chappee
5 Mich., 57, 58.

a provision

Where the return of the justice
that the cause was tried before
him without a Jury on the 12th. and
that he rendered judgment on the 17th,
held that it would not be presumed.
in support of the judgment. that the
cause was not submitted to him until
the 13th. there being nothing to show
that such was the tact:
Harrison v.
Sager. 27 Mich., 476; see. also. Hodges
v. Bagg, 81 Mich.,
243: 45 N. W.,
841.
Where the return fails to state
whether the pleadings were oral or
written it will be presumed
that they
were oral, since it they were in writ
ing the statute requires copies to be
returned:
Kerr v. Bennett. 109 Mich.,
546; 67 N. W., 564.
It is a good re
turn that the declaration was lost and
that attached is as near as it can he
reproduced:
Carver v. Smith.
113
Mich., 207; 71 N. W., 528.
A return
is not fatally
defective because
the
justice has not signed nt the end it
he has written his own name in the
caption: Smart v. Howe. 3 Mich., 590.
He should make no return of facts
coming to his knowledge after the
trial:
Savier v. Chipman, 1 Mich.,
showed

116.
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The justice should not ordinarily undertake to decide as to
the validity of the appeal; but leave it for the determination of
the circuit court. But if there be a palpable want of compli
ance with the provisions of this statute; as, if the affidavit and
recognizance are not served within ﬁve days after the rendition
of the judgment, or the costs and his fees be not paid within
that time, he may disregard the appeal, and not make a return.
But the justice should in no case undertake to decide, as to the
sufﬁciency, in form, of the bond or reco@izance, if one be duly
entered into; as the circuit court has the power to amend
or to allow
new one to be made.
§

571.

Filing return in the circuit court-.—“Within ten days

if

after the appeal shall be duly made, the justice shall ﬁle with
the clerk of the circuit or district court, his return made as
above directed, together with all papers ﬁled with him by
either party relating to the cause, and the aﬁidavit and bond or
recognizance delivered to him by the appellant.” "5
Under what circumstances appeal shall not be dis
§572.
missed.-“No appeal shall be dismissed on account of any in
formality or imperfection in the bond or recognizance, exe
he and his sureties
cuted by or on behalf of the appellant,
consent to amend the same, or if another sufficient bond, to be
approved by the court, shall be ﬁled; and in such case the court
shall amend or receive such bond accordingly.” 1°
“No appeal shall be dismissed on the ground that the costs
of the justice have not been paid, nor upon any other ground
than such as shall have been expressed in the notice; but in
all cases, the fact of a return having been made by a justice,
shall be conclusive evidence of such fees having been paid.” 17

487.

18—C.

L.,

§

into the facts for the purpose of as
certaining whether the tees to the jus
tice for making the return have been
paid or waived by the justice, or
whether the bond or recognizance, or
the aﬂidavlt, has been duly made and
ﬂied with the justice, or the appeal in
any other way duly taken: and if so,
to compel
return.
But in ascertain
ing these facts the appellate court
must get them from the justice him

E‘-‘ll by calling upon him, upon cause
shown by aiﬁdavlt. to state the facts
bearing on the question: and the court
and the parties must upon this ques
tion and in this proceeding, be gov
erned by the justice‘s return to such
facts: Wiley v. Judge, etc., 29 Mlch.,

Circuit Judge,

922: Cole v. Wayne
Mlch., 694; 64 N.

106

W., 741.

17-0. L.. 923: Swarthout v. Sag
inaw Circuit Judge, 99 Mlch., 347; 58
N. W., 315.
§

a

566
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§

return,
Without
914.
15—C. L.,
court gets no jurisdiction
the circuit
over the cause itself, and cannot try
it, though
has jurisdiction to inquire

it
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6‘

No appeal shall be dismissed on the ground of a defective
aﬁidavit, nor because the same does not conform to the pro
visions of this chapter. Provided, The appellant, his agent or
attorney, shall make an affidavit which shall conform to said
provisions.

’ ’ 18

For proceedings to appeal in case of the death, removal or
disability of the justice before whom the cause was tried, or
of a vacancy in his oﬁice, see, C. L., §§ 973 to 977, inclusive.
18—C. L., 5 924.
Under these sections, C. L., 55 922,
924, an appeal from a justice oi’ the
peace cannot be dismissed absolutely
in the
for detects and informalities
aﬂidavlt and bond tor appeal, where
the appellant tenders a new and proper
The proper prac
aiiidavit and bond.
tice on a motion to dismiss an appeal
for such defects, is to make an order
nisi, that the appeal be dismissed un
less within a time speciﬁed a new and
correct aﬂidavit and bond be ﬂied: Peo
v. Judge
of Wayne Circuit,
ple
27
Mich., 303.
Where the aﬂidavit for appeal was
sworn to before a notary who was the

attorney for the appellant, it was held
that the detect was one 0! those which
might be cured by ﬁling a new aili
davit: Bradley v. Andrews, 51 Mich.,
100; 16 N. W., 250.
And so where
there was an entire omission to make
oath to the aﬂiduvit:
Hamilton
v.
Jennlson. Judge, 52 Mich., 409; 18 N.
W., 193. The defective aﬂidavit which
under this section (§ 924) the party
is to be allowed to supplant with one
suﬂicient, is an uﬂiduvit
which
is
which is fatally defective; for if it is
not fatally defective, it is of course
suﬂlcient. and no new one is needed:
Ibid.
See notes to this, C. L., Q 924.
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CHAPTER XXX.
Or AMENDMENTS.
5573. Power of court to allow.
5574. The statute liberally construed.
I575. Ot process.
5576. 01 declarations.
‘
9517. or pleas.
May
be
made
on
the
trial.
5578.

After verdict.
Of judgments and executions.
Death before judgment.
Death after judgment.
gsss. Mai-riage'betore Judgment.

5579.
5580.
5581.
5582.

§573. The power of the court to allow a.mendments.—A
justice ’s court possesses the same power as to amendments, as
courts of record,“ before judgment.“
“The court in which any action shall be pending, shall have
power to amend any process, pleading, or proceeding in such
action, either in form or in substance, for the furtherance of
justice, on such terms as shall be just, at any time before judg
ment rendered therein.” 7

a

it

if

a

is,

The statute remedial and liberally construed.-In
§574.
the language of Campbell, J., “this statute of amendments is
the basis of all modern relaxation of rules of practice; and
to give parties who are
the manifest object of that statute
met with such objections as ought to have been raised by
trial, the right of amendment on reasonable
demurrer on
terms, and to make a verdict, where no point has been pre
viously made at all, valid to rectify all defects that are not
so radical as to leave nothing to amend, and to treat the record
This statute has uni
had been actually amended.”8
as
liberal construction in the carrying out of
formly received
Amendments which deprive the
the object so declared.”
W. Ry. Co., 77 Mich., 136, 154; 43 N.
W.,

911.

568

&

9—Beecher v. Wayne Circuit Judges.
70 Mich., 363; 38 N. W., 322: Ports
mouth Sav. Bk. v. Hart. Circuit Judge.
83 Mich., 646; 47 N. W.. 595; Smith
v. Pinney, 86 Mich., 492; 49 N. W..
305: Smith S.
Co. v. Grosslight, 123
Mich., 87: 81 N. W., 975.
'

&

Q

6

1

5—Brace v. Benson, 10 Wend., 213;
Babcock v. Llpe_
Denio. 139.
6—Ncar v. Van Aistine, 14 Wend.,
Mich.,
230: see, Farrand v. Bentley,
2824.
Attachment aﬁ110268.
7—C. L.,
Freer v.
davits cannot be amended:
White, 91 Mich., 74; 51 N. W., Q07.
8-—Schindier v. Milwaukee L. S.
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opposite party of no substantial right and do not take him by
surprise should, if in the furtherance of justice, be allowed; 1°
amendments will not be allowed to prejudice third persons as
to rights acquired before the amendments."
The matter of
amendment under this statute is submitted to the discretion
of the trial court and its action will not be reviewed except
for abuse of that discretion." This statute is applicable to

statutory proceedings as well as to proceedings according to
the course of the common law."
The court may allow an
amendment of a disclosure in a garnishee case at any time
before judgment upon due notice to the opposite party.“
Where

a defect is such

that an amendment would have been
permitted if raised on the trial an objection based thereon
raised for the ﬁrst time on appeal, will not be considered.“
The provisions of this statute are as applicable to justice’s
courts as to courts of record.“
of amendment

The action of the trial court
will not be reviewed upon

upon questions
mandamus."

Amendments of pr0cess.—The date of a summons
§575.
A mistake in, or the omission of the return
may be amended."
day, cannot be amended. If the amount claimed in the sum
mons exceed one hundred dollars,‘ or three hundred dollars,
as the case may be, the summons would be a nullity, and could
not be amended; it would be otherwise, probably, if no sum
10—Peoplc v. La Grange Twp. Bd.,
191; Lyman v. Becannon, 29
45
v. Beecher,
Mich., 466; Collins
Mich., -136; 8 N. W., 97; Chapman v.
Colby, 47 Mich., 47; 10 N. W.. 74:
Smith v. Sherman, 52 Mich., 637; 18
N. W., 894: Portsmouth Sav. Bk. v.
Hart, Circuit Judge. 83 Mich., 651:
47 N. W., 595; Wood v. Metropolitan
L. Ins. Co., 00 Mich., 437; 56 N. W.,
8; Tuller v. Ginsburg, 99 Mich., 137;
v. Three
57 N. W.. 1099: Edwards
Rivers, 102 Mich., 154: 60 N. W..
454: Hoban v. Cable, 102 Mich., 213;
60 N. W., 466.
Merrill,
11—Montgomery
v.
36
Mich., 97.

2 Mich.,

Circuit
12-Pratt v. Montcalm
Judge, 105 Mich., 499; 63 N. W., 506.
Hoyt
and cases cited in the opinion:

Wayne Circuit Judge, 117 Mich.,
172; 75 N. W., 295.
13—'1‘o
attachment
proceedings:
Barger v. Smith, 41 Mich., 144; 1 N.
W., 992: see, Kidd v. Dougherty, 59
Mich., 244: 26 N. W., 510, and Sar
miento v. The Catherine C., 110 Mich.,
120; 67 N. W., 1085.
14-—Dunn v. Detroit Savings Bk.,
118 Mich., 547; 77 N. W., 6.
_
15—Foiey v. Dwyer, 122 Mich., 587;
81 N. W., 569.
16—Kidd
v. Dougherty,
59 Mich..
243: 26 N. W., 510; Barber v. Smith,
41 Mich., 144; 1 N. W., 992.
17—St.
Clair Tunnel Co. v. St.
Clair Circuit Judge, 114 Mich., 417;
72 N. W., 249.
v.

Bradbury v.
18—S<-re. ante. 5 37:
Van Nostrand,
Barb., 194; see
45
Arnold v. Maitby, 4 Denio, 498.
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Where the christian name of one of the
were mentioned."
plaintiffs in the summons did not agree with the name men
was
tioned in the written direction to the justice to issue
held that the summons might be amended by inserting the
right name.” An attachment may be amended by inserting
the amount of the debt sworn to which the justice has omitted
to insert at the time of issuing the writ.“

is is
a

a

is

Amendment of dec1a.ra:ti0nS.—While the parties are
§576.
forming the pleadings to join issue, the justice may and ought
to allow either party to amend, until the pleadings are ren
Where non-joinder of other defendants
dered perfect.
pleaded in abatement, the plaintiff cannot amend his declara
tion by adding the name omitted.“ Where
ﬁctitious name is
used, and there
plea of misnomer interposed, or the de

it

a

if

fendant’s name
otherwise ascertained, the declaration and
summons or other process, etc., may be amended according to
the
the truth.23 In a suit by or against
eopartnership,
may be
names of all the several partners are not known,
commenced in the partnership name of the plaintiffs or dc
fendants, and the plaintiﬁs or defendants shall have the right
at any time before pleadings are closed to amend the same by
inserting the names of the parties composing such copartner

ship.“
be amended

5

5

1

§

8

5

§

21—Near v. Van Alstine, 14 Wend.,
80; as to amendment
230: and ante,
32, note 30.
of process, see, ante,
22—The Commission Co. v. Russ,
Cow., 122.
29; C. L.,
23—See, ante,
765.
24; see,
764; ante,
24——C. L.,
Vroman, 35 Mlch., 310.
Kimball
v.
For other cases illustrating the appli
cation of this statute, see, Wlllett v.

joined

and the

But

Michigan C. Ry. Co., 114 Mlch., 411:
N. W., 260; Arndt v. Bourke, 120
Mlch., 263; 79 N. W., 190; Hathaway
v. Detroit, T.
M. Ry. Co., 124 Mlch.,
610; 83 N. W., 598: Brown v. Owosso,
130 Mlch., 107; 89 N. W., 568.
Denio, 139.
25—Babcock v. Lipe,
And a declaration may be amended by
adding new counts, so as to allege the
contract or wrong in a different man
ner. but a new cause of action cannot
be introduced by amendment:
People
cm rel, Drew V. Judges of Washtenaw,
Doug., Mlch., 434.
"So long as the
piaintiii‘ adheres to the contract or in
jury originally declared upon, an al
teration of the modes in which the
defendant has broken the contract or
the injury
caused
is not an introduc
tion of
new cause of action.
The
72

1

4

3

229.

issue

&

§

A summons,
19—See, ante,
37.
by in
seems, cannot be amended
damages
of
creasing
the
amount
Kenyon
v.
claimed, after
verdict:
Woodward, 16 Mlch., 326.
Benson, 10 Wend.,
v.
20-Brace
E. D.
213; see, Stanton v. Leland,
Ibld.,
Smith, 88; Agrcdn v. Fauibcrg,
179: Final v. Backus, 18 Mlch., 218,
it

after

by adding a new count.”

570

a

cause even,

1

A declaration may
adjournment of the
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~

in such

case the justice should require the plaintiif to_consent
to an adjournment, unless the defendant shall not desire one.”

defendant may amend by
§577. Amending pleas.—The
The justice in such
adding a plea or notice after issue joined.
case should require his consent to an adjournment,
and if he
refuses this, should not allow the amendment.”
And a de
fendant may be allowed to amend by pleading the statute of
limitations." A plea in abatement cannot be amended?”
amend
test is whether the proposed
ment ls a different matter-another
same
the
subject of controversy——or
matter more fully or diiflerently laid to
meet the possible scope and varying
Strang v.
of the testimony":
phases
Branch Circuit Judge, 108 Mich., 229;
65 N. W., 969; Stanley v. Anderson,
A
107 Mich., 384; 65 N. W., 247.
common counts
on the
declaration
cannot be amended so as to set forth
and distinct cause of action
a new
upon a special contract which has be
come barred by the statute of limita
declaration
tions since the original
People, etc., v. Judge of
was ﬂied:
Newaygo Circuit, 27 Mich., 138: see,
People ea: rel, Long v. Wayne Cir.
Judge. 27 Mich., 16-1; Pratt v. Judge
of Montcalm Circuit. 105 Mich., 499;
63 N. W., 506; Nugent v. Judge of
Kent Circuit. 93 Mich., 462; 53 N. W.,
620; Flint &. P. M. Ry. Co. v. Wayne
Circuit Judge, 108 Mich., 80; 65 N.
W., 583.
But if proof of the matter intro
duced by the amendment might be
given under the declaration
before
amendment it‘may be allowed, though
the statute has run: ‘Flint & P. M.
Ry. Co. v. Wayne Circuit Judge. 108
Nor can a.
Mich., 80; 65 N. W., 583.
be
so
amended
as
to
declaration
change
the cause of action, as, from
People v. Judge
trover to assumpsit:
of Wayne Co., 12 Mich., 206. Or by
adding count for tort to a declaration
Doyles v. Pelton,
in assumpsit:
(Sept,
Mich., —; 96 N. W., 483
Nor, after verdict, can the
1903).
amount of damages
claimed in the
be increased by
amend
declaration
ment: Kenyon v. Woodward. 16 Mich.,
326.
As to amending as to damages

-

The statute, C. L.,
amendments to the
pleadings, or the ﬁling of new plead
ings in the circuit court or upon an
appeal from a Justice's court, does not
warrant
the
introduction
of a new
cause of action, or such a variation of
the piaintiﬂ‘s
claim as would have
ousted the Justice of jurisdiction,
if
made in the court below, as by increas
ing the ad-damnum beyond the limit
of his jurisdiction:
Evers v. Sager,
28 Mich., 47.
Wend.,
26—Coivin
v. Corwin,
15
537; Jennings v. Sheldon, 53 Mich.,
431; 19 N. W., 132.
As to amending
on trial on account of variance be
proofs
tween
and pleadings:
See,
ante, § 356.
A bill of particulars may
be amended: ante, 5 288.
Corwin,
Wend.,
27—Coivin
v.
15
567.
in a suit upon a promissory
note, the court has power to allow de
fendant to amend his plea by putting
in an afﬂdavlt denying the execution
of the note declared upon:
Poihemus
v. Ann Arbor Savings Bank. 27 Mich.,
44; Freeman v. Ellison, 37 Mich., 458.
So an amendment of the plea, in an
action on a bond for the jail limits, so
as to be able to show that the princi
pal was within the jail limits when
the suit was begun should be allowed:
Smith S. & Co. v. Grossilght,
123
Mich., 87; R1 N. W., 975.
See, fur
ther:
Baker v. Michigan
Mut. P.
Assn., 118 Mich., 431; 76 N. W., 970,
28-—Ripley v. Davis. 15 Mich., 75,
But such an amendment is in the
79.
discretion of the justice: IMd.,' Shank
111 Mich., 642: 70 N.
v. Woodworth.
W.. 140; see, mite, § 225, note 23.
29—'1‘rinder v. Durant, 5 Wend., 72.
see, ante, p. 33.
allowing
5 929,
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May be made on the trial.—Amendments on the trial
where the ends of justice will
be promoted thereby, but upon such terms as will protect the
rights of the opposite party.”
“If such amendment be made to any pleading in matter of
substance the adverse party shall be allowed an opportunity,
578.

may be allowed by the justice

according to the course and practice of the "court, to answer the
An amendment may entitle the oppo
pleading so amended.”31
site party to an adjournment.
Bonds required in legal proceedings, may also be amended."
a

verdict shall
§579. Amendment after verdict.-“When
have been rendered in any cause the judgment thereon shall
not be stayed, nor shall any judgment upon confession, default,
m'.hiL dicit, on non sum informatus, be reversed, impaired or in
any way affected, by reason of the following imperfections,
omissions, defects, nntters or things, or any of them, in the
pleadings, process, record or proceedings, namely:
a

1.

For any default or defect in process; or for misc0nceiv
ing any process, or awarding the same to
wrong ofﬁcer; or
for the want of any suggestion for awarding process, or for

3.

is

2.

any insuﬁicient suggestion;
For any imperfect or insufficient return of any sheriff or
other officer, or that the name of such oﬂicer
not set to any
return actually made by him;
For any variance between the original writ, bill, plaint
and declaration, or between either of them;
4. For any mispleading, miscontinuance or discontinuance,

is

5.

insufficient pleading or misjoinder of issue;
For the want of any warrant of attorney by either party;
except in eases of judgment by confession, where such warrant
expressly required by law;

upon the defendant:
Detroit, Hills
dale
Indiana Ry. Co. v. Forbes, 30
Mlch., 165.
31~C. L.,
10269.
32-0. L.,
10410.

572

5 Q

5

is merely to avoid a variance. it evi
dence
ot the whole transaction
has
been given,
and the amendment could
not tend to defeat the ends of justice
or operate as a hardship or surprise
8:

3

Holmes,
Mlch.,
v.
30—Hurt!ord
And so in case of variance:
ante,
An amendment of the
355.
may be allowed at the
declaration
of the trial, when it is
commencement
objected that the declaration sets forth
And it is in the
no cause of action.
discretion of the court to allow an
amendment to the declaration after
the evidence ls all in, when the object
465.

CH.

XXX.

or

AMENDMENTS.

§ 579

6. For any party under twenty-one
years of age, having
appeared by attorney, if the verdict or judgment be for him;
7. For the want of any allegation or averment on account
of which omission, a special demurrer could have been main

tained;
8. For omitting any allegation or averment of any matter,
without proving which the jury ought not to have given such
verdict;
9. For any mistake in the name of any party or person, or
in any sum of money; or in the description of any property;
or in reciting or stating any day, month or year, when the
correct name, time, sum or description shall have been once
rightly alleged, in any of the pleadings or proceedings;
10. For a mistake in the name of any juror or ofﬁcer;
11. For the want of a right venue, if the cause was tried
by a jury of the proper county;
12. For any informality in entering a judgment, or making
up the record thereof; or in any continuance ‘or other entry
upon such record;
13. For any other default or negligence of any clerk or
oﬂicer of the court, or of the parties, or their counsellors or
attorneys, by which neither party shall have beeflprejudiced.”-'*-'*
“The omissions, imperfections, variances and defects in the
preceding sections of this chapter enumerated, and all others,
of the like nature, not being against the right and justice of
the matter of the suit, and not altering the issue between the
parties or the trial, shall be supplied and amended by the court

the judgment
which such judgment

where

shall be given, or by the court into
shall be removed by writ of errors.” 34

33-C.

L., § 10272.
47
v. Prentis,
Subdiv. 1.
Boirue
Mich., 124; 10 N. W., 1:40: one v.
Hinkley, 109 Mich., 608; 67 N. W.,
915.

Elliott v. Farwell, 44
Snbdiv. 4.
Mich., 186; 6 N. W., 234; Schafer v.
Boyce, 41 Mich., 256; 2 N. W., 1.
Benailick v. People, 31
Subdiv. 5.
Mich., 204.
Subdiv. 7. Hoard v. Little, 7 Mich.,
468; Kean v. Mitchell, 13 Mich., 213;
Smith v. Cowles, 123 Mich., 4; 81 N.
W., 916.

Subdiv. 8. Barton v. Gray, 57 Mich.,
623; 24 N. W., 638.
Subdlv. 9. Bole v. S. & M. Lumber
Co., 77 Mich., 239; 43 N. W., 873.
Suhdlv. 11.
Grand Rapids & I. By.
Co. v. Southwick, 30 Mich., 446.
Subdlv. 12.
Ferton v. Feller. 33
Mich., 199; Savings Bank v. “Fiddl
comb, 114 Mich., 639; 72 N. W.. 615.
Bogus v. Prentis, 47
Subdlv. 13.
Mich., 124; 10 N. W.,~136: Bewick v.
Fletcher, 39 Mich., 29; Coe v. ilink
iey, 109 Mich., 608; 67 N. W., 915.
34—C. L., Q 10273: and see notes
to this section in Comp. Laws,
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This statute of jeofails, including § 10270 (providing what
defects may be cured after judgment) must be read as a whole
and reaches formal defects only or those by which “neither
party shall have been prejudiced.” 3-'>
Amendment of judgment and executions.-W-here
§580.
the justice, after the trial, and while the parties were present,
made up, entered in his docket, and declared judgment for
the plaintiff for $49.98 damages, besides costs, and the justice
on his return home from the place of trial, discovering that
he had made a mistake of ten dollars in favor of the plaintiffs,
altered his docket accordingly; the court held that the judg
ment was perfect and complete before the parties separated,
that his power did not extend to the amendment or alteration
of a judgment after it had been perfected, that that could
not be done, even if the parties were present, without their

consent."

An amendment of an execution returnable in thirty instead
days, cannot be made after it has been levied upon prop
The execution was void, and no protection even to the

of sixty

erty.
officer.”

“All

returns -made by any sheriff or other oﬁicer, or by any
court or subordinate tribunal, to any court, may be amended
in matter of form by the court to which such returns shall be
made, in their discretion, as well before as after judgment.” 33
Death before judgment-.—If a sole plaintiif or de
§581.
fendant die before ﬁnal judgment, the action abates. But when
there are several plaintiffs or defendants in any personal action,
the cause of which survives, either by the common law, or by
the provisions of this chapter, and any of them shall die before
35-—Denison
158.

v.

Smith,

33

Mich.,

36—Peopie v. Delaware, C. P., 18
Wend., 558; see, Sperry v. Major, 1
After the render
E. D. Smith, 361.
ing and recording of a judgment. the
jurisdiction of the justice to amend it
The justice could not cor
has ceased.
rcct the name of the defendant by
amendment, even with his consent:
Foster v. Alden, 21 Mich., 507; see,
O'Brien v. Taliman, 36 Mich., 13.
37-Toof v. Bentley, 5 Wend., 276.

An execution cannot be amended after
it has been levied or executed: Ibtd.
38-—C. L., Q 10271.
A justice may
permit a constable to amend his re
turn to a summons:
Perry v. Tynen,
22 Barb., 137.
And so the return to
attachment,
an
or
inventory;
the
Churchill
v. Marsh, 4 E. D. Smith,
369; Wilcox v. Sweet, 24 Mich.. 3.13;
Haynes v. Knowles, 86 Mich., 409;
Kidd v. Daugherty. 59 Mich., 243; 26
N. W., 510.
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ﬁnal judgment, the action shall proceed
viving plaintiif or against the surviving
may be.-39

§ 582

at the suit

of

the sur
defendant, as the case

Death after judgment.-If a sole plaintiif or de
§582.
die
after judgment and before execution, the action is
fendant
not thereby abated; but an action must be brought on the judg
“When an action is
ment, before an execution can issue.“
authorized or directed by law to be brought by or in the name
of a public officer, or by any trustee appointed by virtue of any
statute, his death or removal shall not abate the suit, but the
same may be continued by his successor, who shall be substituted
for that purpose by the court, and a suggestion of such substitu
tion shall be entered on the record.” 41

Marriage before judgment.-By statute, when any
§583.
action is brought by an unmarried woman, either alone or jointly
with others, and she shall be married before ﬁnal judgment, her
husband may, on his own motion, be admitted as a party to
prosecute the suit with her, and with the other plaintiifs, if
there be any, in like manner as if he had originally joined in
the

suit.“

“If

a female defendant marry at any time before ﬁnal judg
ment, her husband may, on his own application, or on the appli
cation of the plaintiﬁ, be made a co-defendant in the suit; but
if such husband be made a defendant on the application of the
plaintiff, he shall have the same right to contest the fact of his
marriage, as if the suit had been originally brought against 1him
as husband of such female defendant.” 43
If the husband appear and consent to be made co-defendant,
that would give the justice jurisdiction over him; but there is
no mode by which he can be compulsorily made to appear
in such case, as defendant in an action before a justice of the

peace.“
39-C. L.. 5 10121. In suit against
principal and sureties on a bond the
death of the princiuai does not defeat
the suit as against the sureties: iieaiy
v. Newton, 96 Mich., 228; 55 N, W.,
666.
The administrator
of a survlving partner, one of whom dies pending
party:
the sult, is not a necessary
Van Kieeck v. McCabe. 87 Mich., 599;
49 N. W., 872.

40—Johnson v. Parmeie, 17 Johns.,
271; see, Woodcock v. Bennet. 1 Cow.,
771; and ante, § 509.

41_c_ L"
42_C_ L“

5 10131

As to suits by
5 10130‘
married W0m en _' S ee‘ an t e’ § 178 ‘
43'_C- L-v 5 10131
44—Coiegrove
125.
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CHAPTER XXXI.
OF ACTIONS BY AND AGAINST Exncuroas AND ADMINISTRATORS.
5584. in what cases may sue in justice‘s court.
5585. On contract, with executors.

5586. Actions for tort.
5587. Declarations by executors.
5588. The evidence.

In what cases may sue in justice’s court.—-Actions
§584.
against executors and administrators as such, except in the
cases specially provided by law, are not cognizable by justices
Jurisdiction to inquire into and settle claims
of the peace}
the
estate
of the deceased is vested in the probate court,
against
and no action can be commenced against an executor or adminis
trator, except actions of ejectment, or other actions to recover
the seizin or possession of real estate, and actions of replevin.2
But, in a suit by executors or administrators before a justice, on
a demand of the estate, the defendant may set off any claim he
may have against the deceased, and if the set-off is established,
and the defendant is entitled to judgment, such judgment must
be rendered against the plaintiffs in their representative char
acter, &e.3
Executors and administrators
such in justice’s court.

In

may sue, but cannot be sued as

of personal contracts which run not with the land,
where the party with whom they were made is dead, the executor
of such party is entitled to maintain an action for the breach of
But it is otherwise if the covenants run with the landﬁ
them.
the case

1—C. L., 5 704. Justices oi‘ the peace
in suits against
have no jurisdiction
executors and administrators, either as
principal defendants or garnishees for
distributive
the
of
recovery
the
amounts due creditors under C. L., 5
9408: Basom v. Taylor, 39 Mich., 082.
2--C. L., § 0381; Singer Mtg. Co. v.
Benjamin, 55 Mich., 330. 21 N. W.,
358: 23 N-. W., 25: Willard -v. Van
Leeuwen, 56 Mich., 17: 22 N. W., 185.
The manifest object of these statutes
is to protect the executor and admin
“

istrator from being harassed with suits
by creditors oi’ the estate and compel
presentation of claims before commis
sioners, on claims, and at the same
time permit the trial of title to real
and personal property during the set
tlement ot the estate:
Singer Mfg.
Co. v. Benjamin, 55 Mich., 330: 21 N.
W., 358; 23 N. W., 25.
3-—-C. L., 5 780.
4—Webb v. Russell. 8 Term. R., 401.
403; Brandon v. Pate, 2 H. BL. 310.
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may sue in their representative

character, in all
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cases where the money, when recovered, would be assets.‘

Such
personal actions as are founded upon any obligation, contract,
debt, covenant, or other duty, survive the death of the testator,
and are transmitted to his executor.“
The common law rule, that personal actions die with the person,
has never been applied to causes of action on contracts. But
no action can be maintained by an executor or administrator
upon an express or implied promise to the deceased where
the damage consisted entirely in the personal suffering of the
Thus, for
deceased, without any injury to his personal estate.

of promise of marriage merely.’
Replevin will lie for or'against executors, where the goods
taken away continue still in specie in the hands of the wrong
docr, or of his executor.“
a breach

On contracts made with executors, etc.—Executors
§585.
or administrators may sue on contracts entered into with them
selves, in all cases where the money, when recovered, would be
assets. An executor may sue for goods sold by him as executor ;°

for money paid by him as such ;1° for money had and received
to his use as executor;" upon an account stated with him
respecting money due to him as executor ;12 for money lent by
him as executor."
The personal representatives may also sue in many cases
upon a cause of action occurring in their own time, upon a
contract made with the deceased in his life-time, on which the
Thus, if A covenant
deceased himself could not have sued.
with B to make him a lease of certain lands by a. certain day,
and B dies before the day, and before a lease is made, upon
refusal on the day to grant the lease to the executor, he may
sue on the covenant."
v. Fenwlck, 3 East; 104.
11——Petrle
v. Hannay, 3 Term. R.,

5—Kln;z v. Thom. 1 Term. R., 487;
Petrle v. Hannay, 3 Ibld., 659.

6_wheat1y
a_ "U

v_ Lane‘

1 Sauna"

216'

1_

7-Chamberlain

v. Williamson,

2 M.

& S" 408'

8—-Lc.\Ieson v. Dixon, W. Jon., 173;
Wheatly v. Lane. 1 Saund., 217, n. 1.
9—Cowell
37

v. Watts.

6

East,

405.

10—0rd

659; Smith V. Barrow. 2 Ibld., 477.
12—Ileashall
v. Roberts, 5 East,
150; Richardson v. Grlﬂhi, 2 Chltt. R.,
'

325.

Spencer,
3 B. & A.,
365
14_w9n¢_ En-5., 188; 1 Saund. Pl.
& Ev., 5 Am. ed., 1110.
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§586. Actions by, for torts.—It is a maxim of the common
law that actio pcrso/nalis mar-itur cum persona. Therefore, at
common law, executors could not sue in the case of torts. The
statute has very materially changed the rule of the common
law. It provides that in addition to the actions which survive
by the common law, the following shall survive, that is to say:
actions of replevin and trover, actions for assault and battery,
or for false imprisonment, or for goods taken and carried away,
and actions for negligent injuries to the person, and for damage
done to real and personal estate."
When any action mentioned
in the preceding section shall be prosecuted to judgment against
the executor or administrator, the plaintiff shall be entitled to
recover only for the value of the goods taken, or for the damage
actually sustained, without any vindictive or exemplary dam
ages, or damages for any alleged outrage to the feelings of the
injured party." By statute enacted in 1897,17 it is provided
that assumpsit will lie to recover for an injury to the person,
property or rights of any party, resulting from the fraudulent
representations or conduct of another, in all cases where an
action on the case for fraud or deceit might by law be brought;
and that such actions should survive. Any action for the mal
feasance, misfeasance, or non-feasance of a sheriff or any of his
deputies may be prosecuted against the executors or adminis
See, Bigelow v.
15—C. L., 5 10117.
Kalamazoo, 97 Mich., 121, 125: 56 N.
W., 339, and Van Brunt v. Cincinnati,
J. dz M. Ry. Co., 78 Mich., 530: 44 N.
W., 321.
That clause of this statute
with reference to "damage done to real
and personal estate" was intended to
include only those cases where the in
jury is occasioned to property by the
direct wrongful act of a party upon
Stebbins v. Dean, B2
the property:
Mich., 385; 48 N. W., 778.
An action
Norris v.
for malpractice survives:
Judge of Kent County, 100 Mich., 256;
The right of action
58 N. W., 1006.
given by this
for negligent injuries
statute is an entirely different action
from that given to personal representa
tives under C. L., 5 10428, for pecu
niary injury resulting from his negli
Hurst, Admr., v. Detroit
gent killing:
City 1iy., 84 Mich., 539; 48 N. W., 44.

Actions for injuries sustained from de
fective highways given by C. L., |
3441. survive by virtue of this section
10117; Rach
v. Detroit,
Mich.,
90
D2; 51 N. W., 360; Roberts v. Detroit,
102 Mich., 67; 60 N. W., 450.
An
executor or administrator
may bring
the action when the right accrued but
was not sued upon in the decedent's
Rogers v. Windoes, 48 Mich.,
lifetime:
628: 12 N. W., 882.
16—C. L., § 10118.
17—C. L., 55 10421 and 10422.
A
declaration under this statute should
plead the statute though it is not es
sential that it should:
Hallett v. Gor
don, 128 Mich., 364; 87 N. W.. 261.
An action will lie under this statute
against an agent for fraudulent rep
representations by which plaintiff was
induced to contract with the princi
pal: Haliett v. Gordon, supra.
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trators of such sheriff, in like manner as
survived at common law."

§587

ETC.

if

the cause

of action

Declarations in actions by executors, etc.—In any
§587.
declaration by an executor or administrator, as such, he should
describe himself accordingly in the commencement, though it
will be suﬁicient if the fact appear in other parts of the declara

tion."

But when the cause of action accrues after the death
of the testator, or intestate, the executor or administrator may
sue as such or not, at his option.2°
Executors who contract
of
or
make any other agree
for the sale
their testator’s eifects,
ment in their representative character, are not bound to de
clare in that capacity, but may sue in their individual right.”
In stating

debt or promise to an administrator or executor,
the word “as” executor, &c., must be inserted, or the omission
It is not enough to say
will be fatal even after verdict.“
a

“executor,” or “being executor.”23 In actions of debt, the
words “owes to” should be omitted in the commencement of
18—C. L., 5 2588.
1l)—Gallant v. Bouteﬂower, 3 Doug.
(Engnl 36; see, Patchen v. Wilson, 4

Hill, 57.
20—Ibld.; and Grlssel

v. Robinson,
3 Bing. N. C., 10; see, Bright v. Cur
rie, 5 Sandf., 433; and cases cited.
be tor
the goods of the deceased

if

tiously taken or wrongfully converted
after his death, the executor or ad
may sue for them in his
ministrator
own name without describing himself
Patchen
as executor or administrator:
Reynolds v.
4 Hill, 57;
v. Wilson,
Collin, 3 Hill, 441.
And an executor
can maintain a suit in his own name
or as executor on a note given to him
as executor for a debt due to the tes
tator at the time of his decease. but
if such action is brought by the exe
cutor in his own name, the defendant
cannot set oi! a demand which existed
ayzainstthe testator at the time of his
Merritt v. Seaman. 6 N. Y.,
death:
168: Root v. Taylor, 20 John., 137;
Bailey v. Burton. 8 Wend., 35'-0; Mer
It is com
cein v. Smith, 2 Hill, 210.
petent for an executor or administra
tor to sue either in his individual or
money
character,
for
representative

had and received after the death of
the testator or intestate, for the use
of the estate, but in order to recover
for money received in the lifetime of
the deceased,
the executor or adminis
trator is required to sue in his rep
resentative character. and to allege
that it was received to the use of the
deceased: Barnum v. Stone, 27 Mlch.,
334.

21--Basslngton

v. Ault,

2 Blng.,

177.

22—-Heashall v. Roberts. 5 East,
150; Powley v. Newton, 2 Marsh., 151.
23—Il>ld.;
see
v.
Mlddlcsworth
Nixon, 2 Mlch., 425.
Where the dec
laration commences “C. . . . ll. 51.. . . .,
executor of the last will and testa
ment of J. . . . S. . . .. deceased, plain
tiff in this suit, by A.... K...., his
attorney, complains," &c., but nowhere
else in the declaration
described the
plaintiff as executor; held, that the suit
was brought by the plaintiff in his in
dividual capacity merely, and that the
words "executor of," &c., were to be
regarded merely as a description of the
person of the plaintlﬂ’, and dld.not
constitute
it the declaration of the
plaintiff as emccutor:
Merritt v. Sea
man, 2 Selden, 168, 171.
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the declaration; it should be that the defendant “detains”
only,“ where it was held that the allegation might be rejected.
If the plaintiff sue as executor or administrator in trespass
to the goods of the deceased, after his death, he may declare
that the deceased was possessed of the goods, and the trespass
committed after his death, to the damage of the executors
or administrators,“ or as the property in the goods draws to it
the possession in law, they may declare on their own pos
session as executors."
So in trover, where the goods are
taken and converted after the testator’s death, and before the
executor has obtained possession of them, he may either sue
in his own name without alleging himself executor,” or he may
sue as executor. and declare either that the testator was p0s~
sesscd of the goods, and the defendant after his death con
verted them, or he may allege that he himself was possessed as
executor, and the defendant converted them."
After the conclusion, to the damage, &c., a profert of the
letters testamentary, or letters of administration,
should be
made; unless where the plaintiff is unnecessarily described as
executor.
But the omission is ground of special demurrer

only."

If

it is material for the plaintiff to avail himself of a promise
or acknowledgment, or other cause of action, since the death
of the testator, a count to meet it should be inserted.”
The estate of the testator or intestate vests in the executor
or administrator from the time of the death, and the letters
testamentary or of administration relate back to that time, and
authorize the bringing of any appropriate action in relation to
the property, for any cause.of action which may have existed
or'arisen between the death and granting of letters."
24—Collett V. Collett, 2 Dowl., 211;
Iiope v. Bague, 3 East., 2.
25-1 Saund. Pl. & Ev., 5 Am. ed.,
1117.

26-2

Saund., 47 n.
2'i'—-Ienkins v. l‘lomb, 6 Mod., 181.
v.
28--2 Saund., 47 n.,- Fraser
Swansea C. Co., 1 Ad. & E., 354.
29-1 Snund. Pl. & Ev., 1117: Vick
ery v. Bier, 16 Mich., 53.
v. Smart, 6 B. & C..
30—Tanner
608; Sarcll v. Wine, 3 East., 409.

3i—Weichman

v. Sturgis, 13 Ad. &
The one in possession oi’
personal property oi.’ an intestate may
maintain trover tor the conversion of
it against a mere wrong-doer, or one
having no better right than himself:
and it the one in possession die. his
administrator may also maintain trover
for a conversion of the property after
his intestatc‘s death, and prior to his
appointment as administrator.
i'ntll
administration
and distribution
of the
estate, the next oi’ kin of an intestate

Ell.,N.
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of action is proved

as

in

cases.

The plea of the general issue, in general, admits the charac
ter in which the plaintiff sues.” But it would not be an ad
mission of his character if the cause of action accrued subse
quently to the letters of administration or letters testamentary
being granted as in trover, on the possession of the testator,
In such case,
and conversion in the time of the plaintiﬁt'.33
strict proof of title is necessary, except where the executor,
&c., had actual possession
i

of the goods, which alone

is prima

facie evidence of title.“
In general, therefore, if the defendant would controvert the
fact of the plaintiff’s being executor or administrator, he must
plead that he is not.
The p1aintiﬁ’s character as executor may be proved by the
letters testamentary, or a certiﬁed copy under the seal of the
The probate alone would not be evidence for
probate court."
that purpose, because if any person named executor in the will
refuses to accept the trust, or neglects to give bond as re

from intermeddling

quired by law, he is prohibited
as

or acting

executor.“

The fact that the plaintiff is administrator is proved by the
letters of administration or a certiﬁed copy under seal of the
probate court.
The defendant, when this question is in issue, must prove
that the grant of letters was void, it is not sufﬁcient to show
them to be voidable. Thus he may prove that the person upon
has no more right to the posession
of the personal property of the intes
Cullen
tate than any other stranger:
4 Mich., 132.
v. 0’Hnra,
32-Thyme v. Protheroe, 2 M. & 8.,
553; Vickery v. Bier, 16 Mich., 50. But
where, alter the plea of the general
issue,
the plaintiff dies and the suit
the
is revived by his administrator.
his
oﬂicial
not
admit
plea
does
character: he must prove that he is
administrator:
Ibid.
33—iIunt v. Stevens, 3 Taunt., 113.
34-1 Saund. Pl. & Ev., 5 Am. cd.,
1126.
35-——C. L.,

Proof of udmln
§ 648.
istration granted upon an estate, and of
whom are administrators or executors,

does not fall within the rule applicable
to _the proof of otﬂcial character in the
case oi’ public oﬂicers, where it is in

general

suﬂicient prima for-ie, so far
rights of third persons are con
to show that
cerned.
an individual
has acted notoriously as such public
officer.
The appointment of admin
istrators being the judicial action of
a. court of record, it should be proved
by the letters of administration
them
selves, or by the record, or a certiﬁed
copy of the proceedings, or of the ap
pointment, as the action of courts is
proved in other cases:
Albright v.
Cobh., 30 Mich., 360; Middlesworth
v.
Nixon, 2 Mich., 425.
36—C. L., § 9313.
as the
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whose estate the letters are granted is still l.iving,3" or that the
probate co1u't has not otherwise jurisdiction of the estate.
He
may also show that the letters were revoked, or that the oﬁice
had terminated in any other manner.”
In all other points the evidence is the same as when the
action is brought by and against persons in life.
37—Allen v. Dundas, 3 Term. R.,
130; Wooliey v. Clark, 5 B. 8; A., 744.
Or that the letters testamentary or of

administration
were granted in another
state: Vickery v. Bier, 16 Mich., 50.
38—C. L., 5 9334.
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5589. Not to be imprisoned when,
5590. When a warrant may be applied
for.
5591. Aﬂidavit necessary.
5592. Warrant to issue when.
§ 589.

5593.
5594.
§595.
5596.

Arrest of defendant
Proceedings after arrest.
The judgment.
Proceedings on application
discharge.

Not to be imprisoned in suits on contract, except,

—“No person shall

tor

etc.

or imprisoned on any civil
process issuing out of any court of law, or on any execution
issuing out of a court of equity, in any suit or proceeding insti
tuted for the recovery of any money due upon any judgment
or decree founded upon contract, or due upon any contract
expressed or implied, or for the recovery of any damages for
the non-performance of any contract. :11
“The preceding section shall not extend to proceedings as
be arrested

for contempts to enforce civil remedies; nor to actions for ﬁnes,
penalties, or forfeitures, or on promises to marry, or for mon
1—C.

L.. 5 9553.

The constitution

ality of this act was attacked in Dum

Mlch., 481;
107
v. Nungesser,
mer
W., 564, upon the following
65 N.

1—As in conﬂict with art.
pro
of the constitution
hibiting imprisonment for debt founded
2—As in conﬂict with
upon contract;
art. 6, sec. 31, prohibiting the impo
sition of cruel and unusual punish
ment: 3—As in conﬂict with art. 6.
certain rights
28,
guaranteeing
sec.
to one charged with crime, and 4—as
in conﬂict with art. 6, sec. 1, vest
ing judicial power in certain courts
not including
circuit court commis
The
act
wasvupheld as
sioners.
against the ﬁrst attack because
the
provision expressly ex
constitutional
cepted cases of fraud: as against the
second because the debtor has it in his
own power to
ccure his release by
grounds:
6.

sec.

33,

complying with the terms of the stat
ute; as against the third because the
proceeding is not criminal,
and as
against the fourth, upon the authori
ty ot Streetor v. Paton, 7 Mlch., 341,
because they were not “courts" within
the meaning of that term as used in
Ree, Fuller v. Bow
the constitution.
ker, 11 Mlch., 204.
A party against
whom a judgment for costs ~in an ac
tion or contract was rendered is pro
imprisonment
tected
from
by
this
Phelps v. Barton, 13 Wend.,
section:
A person cannot he held for false
68.
imprisonment
tor suing out a pro
ceeding under this act. unless the pro
ceeding was actually
void, notwith
standing he may have acted from had
and indefensible motives, and the proc
irregular
may
ess
have
been
and
improvidentiy
issued:
Johnson
v.
Maxon, 23 Mlch., 129.
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by any public oﬂicer, or for any misconduct or
in
neglect
office, or in any professional employment/’2
Nor does it extend to suits founded in tort, although a con
tract may be set forth as the inducement to the plaintiff’s right
eys collected

of action.3 Nor to a case of bailment, where the bailee has
rendered himself liable to be, and is sued in trover instead of
assumpsit on the contract of bailmentﬁ
Where the plaintiff
recovered, on a declaration containing counts in trover and
assumpsit, upon all the counts, the defendant cannot be im
prisoned on the judgment.5 But in such case the plaintiff may
be imprisoned for the costs.“

An attorney prosecuted in assumpsit for not paying over
money collected for his client, is within the exception of § 9554.
His omission to pay over the money collected to his client is
professional misconduct and neglect.’
Suits against physicians, surgeons, &c., for misconduct or

in any professional employment, are also excepted.
Actions for wrongs, to persons individually, or to their relative
rights, to their personal or real property, actions of trover,
trespass or replevin, are not within the ﬁrst section, for these
neglect

do not arise upon any contract};

When a. warrant may be applied for.—“In all cases,
§ 590.
where by the preceding provisions of this chapter a defendant
cannot be arrested or imprisoned, it shall be lawful for the
plaintiff who shall have commenced a suit against such defend
Since the enact
2—C. L., 5 9554.
ment of this statute. this exemption
from imprisonment has been extended
so that there is
by the constitution,
now no power to arrest in some of
the cases mentioned in this section.
The statute has not been altered to
Badger
conform to the constitution:
As to whether
v. Reade, 39 Mich., 771.
the proceedings under the fraudulent
debtors’ act are of a civil or criminal
character was left in doubt in Brom
But in
iey v. People, 7 Mich., 472.
Johnson v. Maxon. 23 Mich., 129, it
was held that the proceedings under
this act are not criminal in such a
sense as to render the act unconstitu
the
tional because of its authorizing
proceedings to be had before a judicial
oliicer without a jury, and in Wayne
County v. Randall, 43 Mich., 137; 5

N. W., 75, the proceedings under this
act were speciﬁcally held not to be
See, also, Bronson v. New
criminal.
berry, 2 Doug., 38.
3—McDuiﬂe v. Beddoe, 7 Hill, 578.

4-Suydam

v.

Smith, 7 Hill,

5—Brown
v. Treat.
1
Suydam v. Smith, 7 Ibid.,
6—~Milier

Hill,

182.

225:

182.

v. Scherder, 2 Comst., 262.

7--Stage v. Stevens, 1 Denio, 267.
But the failure of an agent to pny
over moneys
which he has been em
ployed to collect, is not misconduct
or neglect in a professional employ
ment wlthin the meaning of § 955-i.
unless the agent is an attorney at
law: Bronson v. Newberry, 2 Doug.,
38.

8—Prac.
Imp. Act.,
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ant, or shall have obtained a judgment or decree against him
in any court of record, or justice ’s court, to apply to any judge
of the court in which such suit is brought, or to any circuit
judge or circuit court commissioner, or to any justice of the
peace before whom such suit is pending or judgment

obtained,

or before whom such proceedings shall have been transferred,

for

a

warrant to arrest the defendant in such suit.”°

The aiﬁdavit for the warrant.-“No such warrant
§591.
shall issue unless satisfactory evidence shall be adduced to
such ofﬁcer, by the aﬁidavit of the pla-intiif, or of some other
person or persons, that there is a debt or demand due to the
plaintiff from the defendant, and specifying the nature and
amount thereof as near as may be, for which the defendant,
according to the provisions of this chapter, cannot be arrested
or imprisoned, and establishing one or more of the following

particulars:
1.
That the defendant is about to remove any of his prop
erty out of the jurisdiction of the court in which the suit is
brought, with intent to defraud his creditor or creditors; or,
That the defendant has property or rights in action,
2.
which he fraudulently conceals, or that he has rights in action,
or some interest in any public or corporate stock, money, or
evidence of debt ‘which he unjustly refuses to apply to the pay
ment of any judgment or decree which shall have been ren
dered against him, belonging to the complainant; or,
3.
That he has assigned, removed or disposed of, or is about
to dispose of any of his property, with the intent to defraud
his creditor or creditors; or,
4.
That the defendant fraudulently contracted the debt, or
which
such suit
is
incurred the obligation, respecting
brought.

’ ’1°

9—C. L., § 9555. The “preceding pro
visions" referred to are C. L., §§ 9553,
As to when a suit shall be
9554.
see, ante, Q
deemed to be commenced,
Iiill,
20;
v.
6
Johnson
Comstock}
11.
It is no objection to proceeding
under this statute that the time tor
issuing execution upon the judgment
People v. The
has not yet arrived:
Nor that
Recorder. &c., 6 Hill, 429.
an execution has been issued and a

levy made upon‘ the property of the
judgment debtor:
Johnson v. Maxon,
These proceedings must
23 .\iich.. 129.
justice before
be taken
before the
whom the civil action
is pending:
Stensrud v. Delamater. 56 Mlch., 145;
22 N. W., 272.
As to competency
of
the justice to act in proceedings un
der this section. see, Clark v. Wicke
sell, 81 Mlch., 45; 45 N. W., 377.
10—C_ L., 1 9556. It is not necessary
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The demand must be a judgment founded upon contract, or
a demand due upon a contract_ express or implied, or for the
recovery of damages for the nonperformance of a contract."

Aﬁidavits of other persons beside the applicant may
to substantiate

the facts

relied

upon

to

prove

be taken

the alleged

fraud."
The affidavit will vary according to the class of frauds which
are alleged against the defendant.
As many, whether one or
more, as can be substantiated, should be stated. The aﬁidavit
as to these must not be in the disjunctive; that is, it must not
charge that the debtor has “rights in action, or, some interest
in some public or corporate stocks, money, or evidences of
debt.” It should state that there are effects in all the forms
mentioned in the statute, or in some one or more of them,
This may not in all cases be necessary,
specifying which.
where the creditor gives the reason why he cannot comply with
such requirement.
When he shows that there was tangible
property which had been converted into something else which
he cannot trace, he may then add his belief that the avails exist
in some of the forms mentioned in the statute, without specify
ing the particular one. If he knows that the debtor has prop
erty in such a form that it cannot be reached by execution, he
must of necessity be able to specify the particular form in
that the creditor sought to be de
frauded should be a judgment creditor:
People v. Underwood. 16 Wend., 546;
Johnson v. .\faxon. ‘.33 Mich., 129. Nor
in demanding choses in action of the
subdivision
debtor under the second
of this i 9556 is it necessary to specify
in
what choses
to him particularly
action he is required to appropriate to
Stewart v. Bidle
pay the judgment:
Something more
cum. 2 Comst., 103.
than immoral conduct must be shown,
constructive
than
mere
more
and
fraud: Watson v. Hinchmnu, 42 Mich.,
29; 3 N. W.. 236.
it is no legal ob
jection to the aiﬁdavit that it is made
attorney;
nor that
by the plaintiff's
the aﬂiant does not speciﬁcally state
that it is made on his personal knowi
edge if it does not appear that the
facts are such that he could not have
Dum
of them:
personal 'kuowiedge
mer v. Nuugesser, 107 Mich., 481; 65

N. W., 584.
The jurisdiction to issue
the warrant
is made
by the statute
to depend on the proof being satis
factory to the officer to whom the ap
plication
for the warrant -is made.
And the warrant will not be void. pro
vided there is evidence. however slight,
in the aiiidnvit for the warrant. tend
ing to show each of the statutory
requisites or grounds for issuing the
same:
Johnson v. Maxson, 23 Mich.,
129.

As to what the aﬂidavit must show:
Mnrhle v. Curran. 63 Mich., 283: 29
N. W., 725; Proctor v. Prout. 17 Mich.,
475; Badger v. Reade, 39 .\flch., 771;
Sheridan v. Briggs, 53 Mich., 569;
19 N. W., 189; Pauius v. Grobben, 104
Mlch.. 42: 62 N. W., 160.
11—(‘. L., 5 9553.
12—C. L., Q 9556. See. Marble v. (‘ur
rnn. 63 Mich., 285: 29 N. \\’., 725.
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which the property exists;

and he should specify instead of
If he does not know, and only
swearing in the alternative.
arrives at his conclusions by a process of reasoning, he should
give the facts on which his inference is based."

'

Warrant to issue, when.—“Upon such proof being
§592.
made to the satisfaction of the oﬁicer to whom the application
shall be made, he shall issue a warrant under his hand, in be
13—Pe0ple v. Van Valkenburgh. 6
Vredenburgh v. iiendricks,
17 Barb., 179; Broadhead v. McCon
The oﬂicer should,
nell, 3 Barb., 175.
as a matter of propriety and prudence,
require clear and cogent evidence be
Johnson v.
fore issuing the warrant:
Maxon, 23 Mich., 137.
The atiidavit
must make out a prima. fucie case:
Matter of Teachout, 15 Mich., 346.
But the warrant will not be void for
if the affidavit
want of jurisdiction,
has a legal tendency to make out a
proper case in all its parts, though the
proof is slight and inconclusive: Ibid.
People v. Lynch,
See same principle:
29 Mich., 280; Horn v. Wayne Circuit
Judge, 39 Mich., 20: Supe v. Francis,
49 Mich., 266; 13 N. W., 584.
The aﬂidavit must set forth such
and circumstances within the
facts
knowledge of the aﬂiant as will au
thorize the Justice who is to issue
the warrant to ﬂml such a state of
facts as is required by the statute
to authorize the proceeding; and if
the complainant is not personally ac
quainted with and cognizant
of the
facts and circumstances relicd on, he
must procure the atildavit of some one
who
And the aﬁidavit must show
reasonable certain
on its face with
ty. that the afiiant has personal knowl
edge of the facts set forth.
The war
rant cannot issue upon hearsay. nor
upon
positive.
statements
however
founded merely on hearsay:
Proctor
v. Prout,
17 Mich.,
473: Bfown v.
Kelley, 20 Mich., 23; Marble v. Cur
ran, 63 Mich., 283: 29 N. W., 725. But
see, Dnmmer v. Nuugesser, 107 Mich.,
481: 65 N. W., 564. holding that it
is suﬂicient
if the allegations are
positive
though
in character
there
be no speciﬁc allegation
that afﬁant
is making the statement upon personal
knowledge:
See, also, Paulus v. Greb
ben,
104 Mich., 42; 62 N. W., -180.

Hill, 429;

i.

This section

does not require the af
iiaut to attach documentary evidence
of facts within his own knowledge:
Paulus v. Grohbcn, supra.
The aﬂidavit must set up facts on
knowledge, and not on belief, and if
complainant does not know the facts,
other aﬂidavits must be produced from
those who do know them.
And the
facts must bc specified and not general,
so that a defendant may know precise
ly what he is called on to controvert:
and they must be stated as a witness
would be allowed to state them on the
stand, not infereutiaily,
but directly
Badger v. Reade, 39
and positively:
Mich., 771.
The aﬂidavit will be insuﬂicient if
it sets forth merely by way of recital
that the respondent is indebted to the
parties
commencing the proceeding;
Matter of Lee, 49 Mich., 629; 14 N.
W., 683.
It is not necessary that creditors pro
ceeding undt-r the first, third or fourth
clauses of C. L.. § 9556, have carried
their suits to judgment before applying
for a warrant: Johnson v. Maxon. 23
Mich., 13$-9.
But if the claim is in
judgment it is necessary to set forth
such a Judgment as will authorize
the proceeding, and to confer jurisdic
brought distinctly
tion it must be
within the statute.
The judgment
identiﬁed,
and
must be accurately
while the aiﬁdavit may stand in lieu
of an exempliﬁed copy, it should give
the same information as to its iden
tity. The form of the action, the claim
upon which the judgment was rendered
and its date, must be set forth: Badger
v. Reade. 89 Mich., 771.
For further
bearing upon the requisites of
cases
the aﬂidavit, see notes to C. L., 5] 722
No one can be held
724. 9096. 9999.
under this statute for a constructive
fraud: Watson v. Hinchman, 42 Mich.,
29; 3 N. W., 236.
Nor where he is
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half of the people of thi state, directed to the sheriif or any
constable of the county within which such oiﬁcer shall reside,
therein brieﬂy setting forth the nature of the complaint, and
commanding the oﬁicer to whom it shall be directed, to arrest
the person named in such warrant, and bring him before such
oiﬁcer without delay; which warrant shall be accompanied by
a copy of all aiiidavits presented to such officer, upon which
the warrant issued; which shall be certiﬁed by such oﬁicer,
and shall be delivered to the defendant at the time of serving
the warrant by the oﬂieer serving the same.”1
The justice must deliver to the oiﬁcer with the warrant, cer
tiﬁed copies of all affidavits presented to him upon which the
warrant issued, to be delivered by the officer to the defendant
at the time of serving the warrant. ,

Arrest of the defendant.—“The ofﬁcer to whom such
warrant shall be delivered, shall execute the same by arresting
the person named therein, and bringing him before the oﬂicer
issuing such warrant; or in case of the absence or inability of
such oﬂicer, before some other oiﬁcer, having jurisdiction in
the case, and shall keep him in custody until he shall be duly
discharged, or committed as hereinafter provided/’2
§ 593.

Proceedings after a.rrest.—Upon being brought before
§ 594.
the oﬁicer, unless the defendant controvert the facts and cir
cumstances on which the warrant issued, or comply with some
of the requirements of the tenth section, the ofﬁcer must com
mit hinr. In such case, the case is made out on the part of
the plaintiff by the evidence on which the warrant is issued.
The allegations of the defendant controverting or denying the
facts on which the warrant issued, must be veriﬁed by his own
oath or by proof introduced on his part; he may verify his
allegations by his own affidavit, or he may introduce his proof
guilty of no personal delinquency him
self, and the act complained of is
that of another, as E I1l1l'IIJ9l‘. Etc-1
Ibid.
Johnson v. Max
1—C. L.. Q 9557.
A warrant issued
on, 23 Mich., 136.
by attachment,
after suit commenced
is not made void by the tact that
there is a preceding levy under the
attachment; but as to whether the pro

ceedings
under the warrant
should
continue in such case; see, Johnson v.
Maxon, 23 Mich., 141-2; Wlllison v.
41 Mich., 156; 2 N. W.,
Desenberg,
201.

2—C. L., Q 9558.
The oﬂicer can
not make the nrrcst out of the county
in which
the justice
resides:
Moak
v. DeForest, 6 Hill, 605.
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without being sworn himself; but unless he make the afﬁdavit,
or introduce the proof, he must be committed. A mere denial,
without afﬁdavit or proof, amounts to nothing. The complain
ant is not required to produce proof to substantiate his charges
until after they have been controverted by the defendant’s affi
davit or proof.~'*

In

case the defendant veriﬁes his allegations

by his own affi
For
davit, the complainant proceeds to prove his allegations.
this purpose he may examine the defendant on oath, touching
any fact or circumstances material to the inquiry. The answer
of the defendant on such examination must be reduced to
writing, and subscribed by him.‘ It would be advisable to re
duce to writing the whole of the testimony taken on the hear
ing.

During the proceedings on the complaint, an adjournment of
the hearing of the allegations and proofs of the parties may be
What shall be deemed such cause,
made for reasonable cause.
in
the
discretion of the officer. Probably
of
much
course,
rests,
the rules that prevail in courts of record respecting the post
Such
ponement of trials would afford a satisfactory guide.
adjourn
In
case
of
an
limited
as
time.
is
not
to
adjournment
ment the justice may take recognizance, with surety, from the
defendant for his appearance, etc.“
“The oﬂicer conducting such inquiry shall have the same
authority to issue subpoenas for witnesses and to enforce obedi
witnesses refusing to
testify, as are conferred by law upon such ofﬁcers in case
them, and the defendant
[cases] of other proceedings before
if he demand one, to
jurors,
of
six
jury
shall be entitled to a
try the issue joined in the matters charged or alleged against
ence to such subpoenas, and to punish

3-E2

parte, Spencer v. Hilton, 10
The
608; see. C. L., § 9559.
L.,
tenth section referred to is C.
is
respondent
When che
§ 9562.
brought in he may controvert the al
iegntions and verify his denial by af
fidavit, in which case only a further
examination is had on the facts. The
allegations
the
whole issue is upon
of the complaint and the result dc»
and their truth,
upon those
pends
which is held admitted if not denied:
Badger v. Reade, 39 Mich., 773.
We-nd.,

4-C. L., § 9559. When complainant
examines the defendant, his answers
must be signed; but when examined
on his own behalf, it is not required:
41 Mich., 158
Wiiiison v. Desenberg,
9; 2 N. W., 201.
5—i’|-ac. Directions, p. 23, see, C.
L., § 9559.
If defendant refuses to
give the recognizance, he may be com
mitted to jail during the adjournment:
lbid.
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him in the affidavit or affidavits exhibited to or before the said
officer conducting such inquiry, which jury shall be selected
and summoned in the same manner, as near as may be, as in
the trial of criminal cases before justices of the peace, and the
said oﬁicer shall have the same power in relation to the selec
tion, summoning and swearing such jury and conducting such
as near as may be, as is given to justices of the

jury trial,
peace

in the trial of criminal

causes

before them.”°

The judgm6'nt.—If, after a hearing of the evidence on
either side, the justice is satisﬁed that the allegations of the
complainant are substantiated, etc., he is to commit the de
§ 595.

fendant,’ unless prevented by the defendant in some of the
modes prescribed by the next section.
Upon complying with either of the conditions of the 10th
section,“ the defendant is to be discharged.“
'As the form and nature of the security mentioned in the
are not prescribed, it is presumed that any
pledge of personal property, or mortgage of real estate, or the
undertaking of any responsible person, might, according to the
But the most safe and
circumstances, be deemed satisfactory.
second subdivision

prudent course, would be to take a bond or note for the pay
ment of the amount, which can be very readily ascertained. It
will include the plaintiif’s debt, the costs of the suit, and the
fees of the justice and sheriﬁf or constable on the complaint'.1°

in a penalty not less than twice the amount
of the debt or demand claimed, with such surety or sureties as
shall be approved by the justice.
Any defendant committed is to remain in prison until he
shall have complied with some of the requirements of the
'
eleventh section."
This bond must

be

6—C. L., 5 9560.
The whole issue
7—C. L., Q 9561.
is upon the allegations in the com
piaint.
the truth of which is held
Badger v.
admitted it not denied:
39 Mich., 773.
Reade.
It is competent for the otﬂcer, and
good practice to put his determination
in writing, and explain upon the record
upon the facts:
the way he passed
42 Mich.. 28:
Watson v. iiinchman,
Bcinre the amendment
3 N. W., 236.
Of 1881, see, C. L., 5 9561, allowing

jury and appeal, the magistrates
ﬁnding as to facts, was conclusive,
provided there was any evidence tend
ing to sustain the allegation: Willison
v. Iiesenlierg, 41 Mich., 159; 2 N. W.,
a.

201.

8——C. L., Q 9562.
Marble v. Curran,
63 Mich., 287; ‘.39 N. \\'., 725.

9—Townsend

v.

Mon-ell,

10

Wend.,

577.

l0—I'rac.
11—(.‘.

iows:

590
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Proceedings upon application for discha.rge.—Upon
§596.
application by aﬁdavit to the justice for his discharge, it will
be prudent to require notice to be given to the complainant,
have objections to urge against the application.
The mode of eﬂeeting the discharge would be by a super
sedeas."
The phrase “legal costs and expenses,” in the fourteenth
section, means only legal taxable costs in criminal cases."
The removal, concealment, or disposal of property exempt
from execution cannot be the ground for a complaint or pro
ceeding under the statute.“
The sixteenth section gives the measure of damages in an
action on a bond given under the tenth section, and the nine
teenth compels all persons to testify in relation to any fraud
as he may

prohibited by that chapter.
provided, shall remain in cus
tody in the same manner as other
prisoners on criminal process until a
ﬁnal judgment shall have been rendered
in his favor in the suit prosecuted
creditor, at whose
instance
the
by
defendant shall have been com
such
mitted, or until he shall have assigned
his dis
his property and obtained
agreeably to the provisions of
charge,
either of the one hundred and forty
or of the one hundred and
second
forty-third chapter of the revised stat
utes
(C. L., 1897, chapters 262 and
263): but such defendant may be dis
charged by the oﬁicer committing him,
or any other person authorized to
discharge the duties of such oﬂicer, on
defendant paying the debt or demand
claimed, or giving security for the pay
ment thereof, as provided in the tenth
ection of this chapter, or on his
executing the bond mentioned in the
third subdivision of aid section; but
any defendant committed, or ordered
to be committed, may at any time
twenty-four
within
hours
after
the
making of such order, appeal there
from to the circuit court of the coun
ty, provided said defendant shall en
ter into a recognizance to the people
of the state of Michigan in a sum not
less than ﬁve hundred dollars,
with
one or more suﬁicient sureties, to be
approved by said oﬂicer,
conditioned
to appear before said court on the ﬁrst
day of the
next term thereof and
above

his appeal to effect; and
order and judgment oi’ said
court, and the oiﬂcer from whose or
der or judgment an appeal is taken
shall thereupon discharge the said de
fendant from custody or order his
discharge, and shall make a special
return of the proceedings had before
him, and shall cause the aﬁidavit or
atﬂdavlts and warrant and the ‘return,
together with the recognizance, to be
ﬁled in the said circuit
court on or
before the ﬁrst day of the next term
thereof, to be holden for said county,
and as perfecting said appeal by giv
ing such recognizance.
The said cir
cuit court shail thereupon have full
jurisdiction of said case, the same as was
held by theoﬂicer below before whom
such proceedings were commenced, and
may conduct the same to a ﬁnal hear
ing and determination in like manner
with the same right to the defendant
to demand to have a trial by jury."
See, Clark v. Mikeseil, 81 Mich., 50;
45 N. W., 377.
12-i"'rac. Directions, p. 25.
13—C. L., 5 9569.
The provisions
of this statute apply only to prop
erty that may be removed or concealed,
Atty. Gen. v.
and not to real estate:
etc.,
Mich., 224;
41
Police Justice,
2 N. W., 25: see, Potter v. Richards,
10 Wend., 607.
14—C. L., 5 9567.
See, County of
Wayne v. Randall,
Mich.,
137;
43
5 N. W., 75.
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§599. Warrant may issue.

$597. When may punish tor.
5593. How may punish.

When may punish for contempt.-“In the following
justice of the peace may punish, as for criminal con
tempt, persons guilty of the following acts:
1.
Disorderly, contemptuous, or insolent behavior towards
such justice, while engaged in the trial of a cause, or in the
rendering of any judgment, or in any judicial proceeding,
which shall tend to interrupt such proceedings, or to impair
the respect due to his authority;
Any breach of the peace, noise, or other disturbance,
2.
tending to interrupt any oﬁicial proceedings of a justice;
3. Resistance wilfully oifered by any person in the presence
of a justice, to the execution of any lawful order or process
§ 597.

cases a

made or issued by him.”1

How may punish.—“Punishment for contempts, in
§598.
the foregoing casesfmay be by ﬁne not exceeding twenty-ﬁve
dollars, or by imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding
ﬁve days, or both, in the discretion of the justice; but no per
son shall remain imprisoned for the non-payment of such ﬁne
more than ten days.”’
“No person shall be punished for a contempt before a jus
tice until an opportunity shall have been given him to be heard
in his defence; and for that purpose, a justice may issue a war
i—(‘. L.. I 980. Unless the justice
has jurisdiction
of the cause, he can
There
not punish for a contempt.
can be no contempt where there is no
authority: Piper v. Person, 2 Gray,
120.

2—C. L., 5 981. A judgment punish
ing :1 contempt which provides that
respondent should “pay a ﬂue Of $25,

within one hour, and. in default of
the payment of said ﬂne within the
time speciﬁed
that he be imprisoned
in the common jail of the county for
the period 0! ﬁve days" is had
for
being in the alternative:
Turner v.
Smith. 90 Mk-11., 309; 51 N. W., 282;
Sioman v. Judge of Wayne Circuit, 95
Mlch., 264; 54 N. W., 869.
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rant to bring the oﬁender before him; or, if the contempt was
committed in the presence of the justice, he may cause the
oﬁender forthwith to be arrested therefor, without issuing any
process in the ﬁrst instance.”3
“Upon convicting any person of contempt, the justice shall
make a record of such conviction, stating therein the particu
lar circumstances of the offence; and the warrant of commit
ment for any contempt shall also state the circumstances of the
oﬁence, or it shall be void.”4

a

it,

Warrant may issue.—If any person guilty of con
§599.
tempt has left the court before being called upon to show
cause why he should not be punished for
warrant must
issue for his arrest.“

3—C.
4—C.

L.,
L.,

5 5

J

a

if

is

If he still present in court, he may be required to answer
without any warrant being issued.
After making the record of conviction, the justice will make
the judgment requires that respondent
commitment,
out
be imprisoned, which he will deliver to a. constable as his
authority for taking respondent into custody and delivering
him to the keeper of the jail.

9

8

it

The justice acts
judicially in convicting for contempt,
and
is held in New York, under a
statute like ours, that no civil action
can be maintained against the justice
The proceedings,
for the conviction.
however, must be regular, and show
upon their face u compliance with the
See, Robbins v. Gorham, 26
statute:
Barb., 586; Robbins v. Gorham, 25
N. Y., 588; also, Mather v. Hood,
Johns., 44; and see, Mallory v. Ben
Howard, 410.
jamin.
5—This warrant will be served in

38

manner as a civil warrant.
oﬁender is brought before
the justice, he should state distinctly
to the offender the offence with which
he is charged, and cull upon him for
his dctcnce.
If the offender can show
any facts which will excuse his con
duct from being considered as con
temptuous, the justice may discharge
him. But if he falls or refuses to do
0, the justice will proceed to convict
him.
No evidence is necessary in such
a case. since the justice proceeds
en
tirely upon matters which occurred
in his presence.
the same

982.
983.
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What shall
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papers
5601. Filing
judgments.

in.

and

indexing

in the docket.—“Every justice

be entered

of the

peace shall keep a docket, in which he shall enter:
The title of all causes commenced before him.‘
The time when the ﬁrst and subsequent process was
2.
issued against the defendant, and the particular process is
sued ;2
3. The time when the parties appear before him, either
without process, or on the return of process ;3
4. When the pleadings are made orally, a concise statement
of the declaration of the plaintiff, the plea of the defendant,
the further pleadings of the parties, if any, and the issue
1.

joined ;‘
enters judgment against
Mayo in a suit begun against
Held, error might be
Mayhue.
the summons:
by following
amended
Merrick v. Mayhue, 40 Mich., 196.
2—The date oi the service of the
summons need not be shown in the
Van Kleek v. Eggleston, 7
docket:
Mich., 514.
It docket does not show
when summons issued the judgment
Purdy v. Law,
is void on its face:
132 Mich., 622: 94 N. W., 182.
3—Although
the statute does not
justice
the
strictly
require, it yet
should make his docket show in what
whether
manner the parties appeared,
Morton v.
by attorney or in person:
Crane, 39 Mich., 529. The docket must
show the hour as well as the day of
Failure as to either is
appearance.
Madge v.
fatal to the judgment:
Yaples, 58 Mich., 307; 25 N. W., 297.
is re
Where. however, the process
It is suﬂlcient
turnable “tort.hwlth"

1—Justice

Peter
Peter

the day of appearance is given
though the hour is not: Frultport v.
Judge of Muskegon Circuit, 90 Mich.,
20; 51 N. W., 109.
It defendant does
not appear on the adjourned day the
docket must show that plalntiﬂ! ap
peared within one hour of the time to
which the adjournment
was
taken:
Post v. Harper, 61 Mlch.. 436: 28 N.
W., 161.
It time of appearance not
shown it is to be assumed that there
Purdy v. Law,
was no appearance:
132 Mich., 622; 94 N. W., 182.
4—When on entering the substance
oi’ an oral
declaration
the justice
made
a mistake which was not cal‘
culated to mislead, held, not to vltiate
judgment:
the
Smoke
v. Jones.
35
Mich., 409.
Where a docket recited
that the plalntltt declared “orally in
assumpsit on the common counts, and
it cannot in an
specially in writing."
action on the judgment. be assumed
that. in declaring specially. he added
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Every adjournment, stating on whose motion, and to
5.
what time and place ,5
6.
The issuing of a venire, stating at whose request, and
the time and place of its return;
7.
The time when a trial was had, the names of the jurors
returned summoned who did not appear, and the ﬁnes imposed
upon them, if any;
8.
The names of the jurors who appeared and were sworn,
the names of the witnesses sworn at the request of either party,
stating at whose request; the objections, if any, made to the
competency of a witness, and the decision thereon;
The verdict of the jury, and when received;
9.
10.
The judgment rendered by the justice, and the time of
rendering the same ;
The time of putting in any stay of execution, and the
11.
name of the surety or sureties therefor;
The time of issuing execution, and the name of the
12.
oﬁicer to whom delivered.“
The return of every execution, and when made;
13.
The fact of an appeal having been made from any judg
ment rendered by him, and the time when made;
14.

of action not
count on a cause
or that,
cognizable by the justice,
even if he did, the judgment was ren
Schlat—
the bad count:
upon
dered
terer v. Nickodemus, 50 Mich., 315;
Where the defendant
15 N. W., 489.
notiﬁes the justice orally what his de
fense is he should enter it in due form
on his docket unless imperfect in sub
stance,
and even in such a case he
should be allowed to amend his state
Eddy v. Manshaun,
ment of defene:
42 Mich., 532; 4 N. W., 286.
neglect of the justice to
5—The
record in his docket the place to which
a cause is adjourned, is a clerical ir
regularity
which the judgment
for
if the defendant
cannot be reversed.
was not misled and appeared and an
swered: Whelpley v. Nash., 46 Mich.,
25; 8 N. W., 570.
Where docket en
try shows that a motion to adjourn
was overruled and case adjourned to
entry is suiiicient
one
o'clock such
though no date is give, it being fairly
that it is a holding
to be inferred
a

till one o'clock of the same day:
Loder v. Reed, 129 Mich., 180; 88 N.
\v., ass.
A liolding over of the (‘BS9
from day to day is not technically
an adjournment, within the meaning
of that term in this clause of the stat
ute, so as to make necessary
the en
tries required in cases of adjournment:
Mich.,
Woempener v. Ketchum,
110
34; 67 N. W., 1106.
The failure of
the docket to show place to which
the cause is adjourned is fatal to a.
judgment rendered on the return day,
the
defendant
not then appearing:
Waldron v. Palmer, 104 Mich., 556;
62 N. W., 731.
It will not be pre
sumed
that the adjournment was to
the oflice of the justice: Waldron v.
Palmer, supra.
To the same point!
Fltzhugh v. Rivard, 109 Mich., 154;
66 N. W., 947.
6—A failure to comply with this
provision held not to vltlate an execu
tion properly lssued:
Grand Rapids
Chair Co. v. Runnells, 77 Mich., 117;
43 N. W., 1006.
open
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The fact of his having given a. trahscript of the judg
ment to be ﬁled in the clerk’s oﬂice, and the time when the
15.

same was

given.”"

(S

The several items in the preceding section enumerated,
shall be entered under the title of each cause to which they re
spectively relate; and in addition thereto, the justice may enter
any other proceedings had before him in such cause, which he
shall think it useful to enter in such docket/’8
A docket entry
7—C. L., 5 957.
which recites the date and return
but contains no
day of the summons,
other date except that at the end of
it, which is the same as the return
day of the summons, and does not
state on what day the parties were
called and plaintiff appeared and de
fendant failed to appear, is not suf
ticient to comply with C. L,, Q 957;
it was not the intent of this statute
to leave the time of appearance to be
referred to the date of the judgment
in cases where, from anything appear
ing on the face of the record, the two
acts might have occurred on different
A docket entry which does not
days.
show on what day the plaintiﬂ ap
peared, does not show that he appeared
within an hour after the time of re
turn of process; and, as under C. L.,
§ 836, a failure of the plaintiff to ap
pear within that time works a discon
tinuance. such docket entry falls to
show that the justice was authorized
to render judgment. and is therefore
not admissible to prove the validity of
Redman v. White, 25
the judgment:
Mlch., 523.
As to the docket. see. further. King
v. Bates, 80 Mlch., 367; -15 -N. W.,
147; Hodges v. Bagg. 81 Mlch., 243:
89
45 N. W., 842: Talbot v. Kuhn,
Mlch., 30; 50 N. W., 791; Township
Circuit
of Fruitport v. Muskcgon
Judge, 90 Mlch., 20: 51 N. W., 109.
8-—C. L., 5 958.
The docket entry of a jusllce‘s judg
ment is not technically a record, but
it has all the effect of a record, and
should be made in language as explicit
and certain. as to matters of sub
as a judgment record of the
stance.
There should be no
circuit
court.
doubt or uncertainty as to the parties:
who they are. plaintiff and defendant,
and in whose favor. and against whom.

the judgment
was rendered, should
clearly and conclusively appear from
the docket itself: Rood v. School Dis
trict. &c., 1 Doug., 502; Howard v.
People, 3 Mlch., 209; see. Wiiitweli
88; Aldrich v.
3 Mlch.,
v. Emory,
The record
Maitland. 4 Mlch., 205.
of the court of a justice of the peace
consists of the entries required by the
statute to be made in his docket:
Goodrich v. Burdick, 26 i\iich.. 39. An
oral admission made as evidence mere
ly in a justice’s court, is not a mat
Morrison v. Riker, 26
ter of record:
Mlch., 385.
And, in a legal point of
view. it is as necessary for a justice
to sign, oﬂicialiy, any judgment ren
dcred by him, as for a judge of a
court of record to sign oiﬂcially, the
daily proceedings and judgments en
kept by the
tered upon the journal
Howard v. People, 3
clerk thereof:
Mlch., 207.
Where the entry of judg
ment on the docket was followed im
mediately by the entry of a stay of
execution in the same case, each being
dated separately, but both dates being
the same: held, that it was interabie
from the docket that both entries were
time, as one
made
at the
same
transaction. and that the oﬂicial sig
nature of the justice being appended
at the foot of the entry of the stay.
the judgment was not void for want of
signature, nor the stay for want of
attestation:
Holiister v. Giddings, 24
Mlch., 501.
The entry by the justice of the pro
ccedings in a cause, in his docket, is
a ministerial
and not a judicial act
and the statute requiring
such en
tries, is directory merely:
Hickey v.
Hinsdale, 8 Mlch., 267, 272; People
Township, 9 Mlch., 147-8.
v. Lowell
As the docket entry of a judgment is
not the judgment itself, but only the
evidence
of it, it seems that the time
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of entry whether at the rendition of
the judgment, or subsequently, is not
But it has
8 Mich., ‘272.
material:
been held that a justice could be re
quired by a mandamus to enter the
verdict of a jury and judgment thereon
in accordance therewith:
Lamberton
v. Foot, 1 Doug., 102.
The docket entries should include
everything necessary to show that the
justice had jurisdiction,
both as to
the subject matter and the person,
and all the proceedings required to
Barnes
constitute a valid judgment:
v. Harris, 4 N. Y,, 385; Goodrich v.
Burdick. 26 Mich., 39; see, Allen v.
A justice’s
Carpenter, 15 Mich., 33.
docket
record must disclose jurisdic
tion, and all docket matters which
the law imperativeiy requires to be en
tered, but it must be construed fairly
and reasonably, and in view of the
fact that the justice is not to be ex
pected to be a legal expert or master
of legal forms.
And as to whether
the language of the entries does or
does not show all these things, is a
subject of construction.
Reasonable
certainty, or certainty to a common
intent, is all that is necessary: Vro
man v. Thompson, 51 Mich., 452; 16
N. W., 808.
A justice cannot give himself juris
diction to proceed as in case of per
sonal service, or preclude a defendant
from proving the truth, by reciting in
his minutes or docket that there was
personal service, when the service was
not personal and the evidence of serv
ice before him failed to show that it
Smaliey v. Lighthali, 37 Mich.,
was:
But, if a justice enters upon the
348.
docket all that the statute requires
him to enter, the ordinary presump
tion in favor of the correctness of his
oﬂicisi action, must support the judg
ment:
Peck v. Cavell, 16 Mich., 11.
Therefore a judgment will be sustained
although the docket does not show
the day on which process was served,
that to be
the statute not requiring
entered on the docket, and if it be
necessary
comes
to
show
suﬁicient
service, that may be done by parol
en
or by the return of the oﬂicer,
dorsed upon the process; and for the
same reaon a judgment cannot be im
peached
because
the docket does not
show to whom the note upon which
it was rendered, was payable, or

§600

whether it was negotiable: Van Kieck
Eggieston, 7 Mich., 511.
As to the
form of the docket entries in this case,
see, IMd., 512.
Where an issue was
tried by a jury, and the justice en
proceedings as
tered the subsequent
follows: “After hearing all the evi
the jurors returned a verdict
dence,
for plaintlﬂ for the sum of $48.05,
Damages,
and costs of suit.
$48.05:
Held, that this entry
costs,
$7.63.“
was in effect a judgment, and sufficient
to authorize the issue of an execution
Overall v. Pero, 7 Mich.,
thereon:
315.
And so. where the entry was,
“The jury returned with a verdict for
the piaintlﬂ of eighteen dollars dam
ages ($18.00) and costs of suit taxed
at ﬂve dollars ($5.00) ;" but no formal
judgment was rendered thereon; held,
that the verdict itself was the judg
ment of the law in the case, and that
might
execution
issue:
Gaines
v.
Betts, 2 Doug., 98.
Where execution can issue only after
of the
ﬁve days from the rendition
judgment unless upon proof of facts
showing a necessity therefor, the jus
tice need not enter the proof in his
4 Mich.,
docket:
Rash V. Whitney,
Nor is it necessary that the dock
495.
et should show that an execution was
issued at the request of the plaintiif,
Peck v.
as that will be presumed:
Cavell, 16 Mich., 9.
Entries in the docket, of facts com
ing within the personal knowledge and
observation of the justice, cannot be
disproved;
as that the parties ap
Facey v. Ful
peared, or pleaded, etc..
ler, 13 Mich., 532.
After a judgment
has been entered in the docket, and the
parties have left the presence of the
justice, he has no power to amend
Foster v.
the record of the judgment:
Alden, 21 Mich., 507; King v. Bates,
80 Mich., 367-8; 45 N. W., 147.
Amendment of docket entries by the
See,
competent:
justice,
whether
Nicoils v. Lawrence, 30 Mich., 395. 399.
And see, King v. McKenzie, 51 Mich.,
461; 16 N. W., 813.
A justice can
not amend his docket after it is once
made up and oﬂiciaily signed by him:
Kluck v. Murphy, 115 Mich., 128;
Parol proof is inad
73 N. W., 128.
missible to vary or explain a justice’s
docket as to give him a jurisdiction
Mudge v.
not apparent on its face:
Yaples, 58 Mich., 307; 25 N. W., 297.
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Filing papers and indexing judgments.--“Every

tice shall carefully preserve and ﬁle all afﬁdavits
delivered to him to be ﬁled in any cause.” 9
“Every justice shall keep an alphabetical index
ments entered in his docket book, in the course of
proceedings had before him, in which shall be
names of the parties to each judgment, and the
docket where such judgment is entered.”1°

jus

and papers

of all judg
any judicial
inserted the
page of his

For

the transfer of causes and proceedings in relation thereto,
see chapter VIII., ante, and C. L., §§ 964-977, inclusive.

“When the same justice shall be re-elected and qualiﬁed to
ﬁll the vacancy occasioned by the expiration of his own term
of oﬁice, his authority shall be considered as having continued
without interruption; and all business commenced by or before
him during his former term of oﬁ‘iee, may be prosecuted and
completed in the same manner as

if such former term had not

expired.”11
To establish

judgment the
a
valid
must show that the justice
acquired and retained jurisdiction and
omissions in this regard cannot be supplied by reference to the ﬂies in the
docket

case: Rasch v. Bisscii,
64 N. W., 7.
9—C. L., Q 962.
10—C. L., § 963.
11—C. L., 5 965.
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PART II.
More Speciﬁcally of the Several Actions Cognizable by
Justices of the Peace.
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§603.
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5605.
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Deﬁnition‘
General issue, action tor.
Evidence in.
Exemplary damages.

§608. Deﬁnition.
under
5609. Defense

general

issue.

ASSAULT AND BATTERY.

Deﬁniti0n.—An assault is an attempt with force or
§602.
violence to do corporeal injury to another, accompanied with
such circumstances as denote at the time an intention, coupled
with the present ability, of using actual violence. There need
not be even a direct attempt at violence; but an indirect prepa

a

it

it

a

a

a

a

it,

ration towards
under the circumstances mentioned, such as
drawing
sword or bayonet, or even laying one’s hand upon
his sword, would be sufﬁcient.1
Riding after a person, and
obliging him to run away into
garden to avoid being beaten,
was holden to be an assault? Where school-master took very
indecent liberties with
female scholar of thirteen, who did
not resist, but
was against her will,
was holden to be an
female patient strip naked
Making
assault and battery?
medical man, cannot
that the defendant,
he takes off her clothes,
an
otherwise judge of her illness,
The intention of the party must co-operate with the
assault.‘
If A lays his hand upon his
act. to constitute an assault.“
were not assize time
would
sword, and says to another, “If
a

pretence

8:

8: 8:

1 4

3

1

Bla. Com., 120: Hayes v. PeoDrew v. Comstock.
57 Mich., 176; 23 N. W., 721.
P. 373;
C.
2--Martin v. Shoppe,
P., 349.
C.
Stephens v. Myers,
R.
R. C. C..
3—R. v. Nichols,

4-8.

Hill, 351;

130,

R.

M. C. C..

19.

5-It

need not be a speciﬁc intent
against the person Injured. It is sut
ﬂcient it the intent was to unlawfully
injure another:
Talmadge v. Smith,
101 Mich., 870; 59 N. W., 658.

601

v

v. Roslnski,

&

1-3

pie,

not an assault, be
1

not take such language from you;” this

is

I

it

is

if

under

iissauur AND BATTERY.

§ 602
cause

XXXV.

CH.

it is obvious he did not at the time intend to

do him any

corporeal ‘hurt!’ Mere words do not constitute an assaultf‘
A battery is any injury whatever, no matter how small, that
is actually done to the person of another, in an angry, revenge
ful, rude, or insolent manner, as by spitting in his face, or in
any way touching him in anger, or violently jostling him out
of the way, and the like.“ The least touching of another’s
person wilfully or in anger is a battery.” If the act constitut
ing the battery were done without due caution, or in a negli
gent manner, it is a trespass, although the party had no design
by it to do an injury to any person.1° "But when the act is inev

People v. Lilley,
to the deed intended:
43 Mich., 521;
N. W., 982; Nelson
v. Crawford,
122 Mich., 466; 81 N.
W., 335.
5

8:

An
shooting a person
intentional
with a pistol loaded with ball is an
assault: People v. Mortimer. 48 Mich..
Forcible resist
37: 11 N. W.. 776.
ance to an officer includes an assault:
People v. Haley. 48 Mich., 495: 12
People v. Warner, 53 Mich.,
N. W.. 671
78: 18 N. W., 568.
8—1 Hawk, C.. $3
5"
Queen v.
Cotesworth,
Mod.
172: Ford v.
Skinner.
C.
P.. 239; Purseli v.
Horn,
E., 604.
Ad.
8

&

4

&

6

'F“

2
:

:

a

9-3
10-1

Blackstone's
Archbold

Com.,

120.

N. P., 378.

&

5

3

1

11—Wakeman v. Robinson.
Blng..
213; Bullock v. Babcock.
Wend., 391.
12—.lames v. Campbell,
P.,
C.
372.

602

13—Glbbon

v.

Pepper,

2

9 &

Ev., 141; see,
6-1 Saund.‘Pi.
P., 626;
C.
Blake v. Barnard,
Regina v. St. George, Ibid., 483.
7—1 Russ. on Crimes, 750; Queen
An assault
V. Nun, 10 Mod. R., 187.
is an inchoate violence to the person
the present means of
of another,-with
carrying the intent into effect. Threats
are not suﬁlcient; there must be vio
actually offered within such
lence
distance as that harm might ensue
An
if the party was not prevented.
act done with intent to commit an
assault is not suﬂicient, if the purpose
is abandoned or the party is prevented
from carrying out his purpose, while
at a distance too great to make an
An attempt to com
actual assault.
mit violence although accompanied by
acts preparatory thereto. is not suf
ilcient to constitute an assault. There
must also be present ability to carry
out the intent. and the act done must
be criminal and suﬂiciently proximate

a

it

if

a

a

it,

itable, and the conduct of the defendant is without fault, it
does not constitute a legal battery."
If two persons are ﬁghting, and one of them unintentionally
strikes a third, he is answerable in trespass; and the absence of
intention will avail only in mitigation of da.mages.1‘*’ If a man
in
ride an unruly horse, for the purpose of breaking
place
much frequented by people, and the horse run away with the
man and hurt him, trespass will lie. But
rider, and run over
under ordinary circumstances, a horse take fright, run away
battery
would not be
with his rider, and run against a man,
The
ﬁrst
attacked
cannot
party
in the rider."
maintain this
action against the other party, if he uses so much violence to

Saik.. 837.
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§ 603

the other, exceeding the bounds of self-defence, that he would
not be justiﬁed under a plea of son assault demesne, were he
the defendant.“
.

i

it,

Not only the person who actually committed the assault,
but also all who ordered or incited him to commit the act, or
procured it to be committed, and all present aiding or abetting
the commission of
are liable.‘-"

it

General issue-the evidence under it.-Under this
§603.
plea, the plaintiff must prove the assault and battery stated in
his declaration; the manner in which
was committed, the
defendant’s conduct and expression, the degree of‘ violence

of the injury. The day or place mentioned
in the declaration
immaterial; the plaintiff may give evidence
of an assault and battery. at any time or place." If there
but one count in the declaration, the plaintiﬁ, after proving
one assault will not be permitted to waive that and prove
joint
another." So, when the action
against several for
a

is

is

is

used, and the extent

after proving a trespass by some, the plaintiff will
not be allowed to prove another by all; or, after proving
trespass against some of them only." The injuries stated in
the declaration are to be proved, and no other injury not set
forth in the declaration can be proved, if
might have been
set forth.
Under the words “other wrongs to the said plain
tiff then and there did,” damages and matters which naturally

it

a

trespass,

a

liable on the ground that he was
looker-on and did not use active meas
ures to prevent the unlawful
acts:
Miller v. Sweitzer. 22 Mich., 394-5.
If one is sued for an assault in which
participate, it is compctent to
several
prove what the others, though not par
ties to the suit. did, that the jury
may judge whether the defendant was
acting
concert with them, and as
to whetier he should be held for the
whole damage: Miller v. Sweitzer, 22
Mich., 391,
16—1 Saund. Pi.
Ev.,
Am. ed..
152.
That is within the statute of
limitations.
17—Sante v. Pricket,
Camp., 471,
1

5

&

v. Anderson,

603

C.

.\i.

&

P., 73;
C.
R.. 282; Wynne
P., 596.
6

Harris,

v.

llnrris.

6:

v.

&

Tait

1

473.
1-‘1—Tait

3

a

1 2

Wend.. 497.
v. Brown,
Salk, 408-0.
v. Cole,
15—Brltton
Any person who is present at the com
mission of a trespass, encouraging or
exciting the same by words, gestures,
looks, or signs. or who in any way
or by any means countcnances or ap
proves the same, ls in law deemed to
be an alder and abetter, and liable as
principal: and proof that a person
is present at the commission of a tres
without disapproving or oppos
pass,
ing it, is evidence from which, in con
nection with other circumstances, it
is competent for the jury to infer that
he assented thereto, lent to it his
countenance and approval, and was
thereby aiding and abetting the same.
spectator, innocent
But if he is only
of any unlawful intent, and does not
act to countenance or approve those
who are actors, he is not to be held

if

14—Elliott

Q

§604
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arise from an assault, or cannot with decency be stated, may
be

proved."
In a joint action against several, the damages cannot

be sev

ered so as to give more damages against one than the other;
but a verdict may be given against all the defendants to the
amount which the jury think the most guilty ought to pay?“

If

separate suits are brought against the persons who com
mitted the act, the plaintiif may recover separately against
each, but he can have but one satisfaction; he has his election
which judgment to collect, and the other wrong-doers will be
obliged to pay the costs of the suit against them respectively.“
The plaintiif is not bound to prove the whole of the facts as
stated in his declaration; proof of part will entitle him to a.
recovery; thus the defendant may be found guilty of an assault
only, though an assault and battery be stated.“

Evidence in mitigation.-The defendant may give in
§ 604.
evidence in mitigation of damages what was said at the time, to
19-1 Saund. Pi. 8: Ev., 153, 154.
A permanent bodily inﬁrmity caused
or aggravated by an assault and bat
provable, under a
tery, is properly
declaration averring sickness and pain
to have been caused by the assault,
and needs no other or fuller averment:
In
Johnson v. McKee, 27 Mich., 471.
such a case the injured person's state
ments concerning present feelings and
sufferings are admissible in evidence,
but his relations of past sufferings
Ibid., Johnson v. Mc
would not be:
Kee, 27 Mich., 471; see, Hyatt v. Ad
In actions of
ams,
200.
16 Mich.,
trespass, malice and attendant circum
stances may be proved in aggravation
of damages; and the rule is the same
where the facts in aggravation might
have been made the ground of a sep
Druse v. \Vheeler, 22
arate action:
Proof of a subsequent de
Mich.. 439.
upon
sire to settle is not relevant"
liability for
the question of original
disprove
not
an assault, and does
malice at the time of its commission:
Johnson v. McKee, 27 Mich., 471.
Special Dam-agcs.—-Where
in an as
sault and battery case, the declara
tion averred, "that the plaintiff, be
cause
of the wounds. bruises and
injuries inﬂicted on him by the de

fendant, was
greatly
hindered and
prevented from doing and performing
his work and bulness and looking
after and attending to his necessary
aﬂalrs and avocatlons for a long space
of time," etc., it was sought to show
was a farmer owning
that plaintiff
a grass farm: that when assaulted he
was about half through cutting his
hay: that he was bothered about help,
and, that the cutting was delayed be
cause of his injury and that the crop
of hay was damaged
in consequence:
held, that the allegations in the dec
laration were not suﬂlciently speciﬁc
to cover this kind of damage.
That
where the damages are such as do not
follow the injury as a necessary con
they should be speciﬁcally
sequence,
alleged in the declaration:
that this
is a rule of fairness, that the de
fendant may know what case it is
intended to make against him, and be
prepared to meet it, if it is false or
falsely colored:
Ileiser v. Loomls, 47
Mich., 18-19: 10 N. W., 60.
20-Brown v. Allen, 4 Esp., 158:
Hill v. Goodchlld, 5 Burr., 2790.
21—Livingston
v. Bishop, 1 Johns.,
290; Boardman v. Acer, 13 Mich., 77.
22—Buiier’s Nisi Prins, 94;
lliott
v. Van Buren, 33 Mich., 49.
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or object of the parties; for everything
part of the transaction on which the plaintiﬂ:"s
action is founded.“ But the acts or declarations of the plain
tiff, at a different time, or any antecedent facts which are
not fairly to be considered as part of one and the same trans
action, though they may have been ever so irritating and pro
show the intention

which

passes is

voking, are not admissible.
The provocation must be so re
and
immediate
to
cent
as
induce a presumption that the vio
lence done was committed under the immediate inﬂuence of the

it.“

feelings and passions excited by

Exemplary da.mages.—The fact that the defendant
§605.
had been indicted and ﬁned, and the ﬁne paid, would not pre
vent the plaintiff from recovering exemplary damages; and it
seems that such evidence is not admissible in mitigation, if the
plaintiff object. In such a case the court say: “The recovery
of such damages (exemplary) ought not to be made dependent
on what has been done by way of criminal prosecution, any
more than what may be done. Nor are we prepared to concede
that either a ﬁne, an imprisonment, or both, should be received
in evidence to mitigate damages. True, if excluded, a double
punishment may sometimes ensue; but the Preventive lies with
The former have
the criminal rather than the civil courts.

if they but choose to exert it, of preventing any
from
excess of punishment.”2°
injury
great
ample power,

Ev.,
156.
Pi.
&
Saund.
and provoking language ut
some days previous to an al
tered
leged assault and battery, will not ex
Such language
or justify it.
cuse
addressed to the defendant or mem
bers of his family might sometimes
excuse an immediate assault and bat
tery provoked thereby. or might au
thorize the jury to deal leniently with
But provoking words
the defendant.
cannot be allowed as a justiﬁcation
for blows given after the blood has
to cool:
had time and opportunity
Heiser v. Loomis, 47 Mlch., 17; 10
Insulting words will not
N. W., 60.
Justify an assault or battery: Goucher
v. Jamieson, 124 Mlch., 21; 82 N. W.,
As to uncontrollable anger and
663.
See, People v. Mortimer,
excitement:
48 Mlch., 37: 11 N. W., 776; Welch
v. Ware, 32 Mlch., 77.
23—1
Abusive

But one who commits an act‘ of un
lawful force and thereby brings on a
conﬂict in which he assaults another,
cannot Justify the assault by showing
that the person assailed was reputed
to be violent, and that he acted in
Miller, 49
People
v.
self-defense:
Mlch., 23; 12 N. W., 895.
24—Lee v. Woolsey, 19 Johns., 319;
see, Beardsley v. Maynard, 4 Wend.,
338: Maynard v. Beardsley, 7 Ibkl,
But in an action by husband
560.
and wife for an assault upon the wife,
no act or words of the husband, un
less the wife was privy to and par
ticlpated in them, can be proven in
mitigation
of damages:
Everts
v.
Everts and wife, 3 Mlch., 580.
As
25—Cook v. Ellis, 6 liiil, 466.
see, Allison v.
to exemplary damages,
Chandler, 11 Mlch., 542.
Exemplary
are such added or increased
damages

605
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Notice of defense of possession.—Upon this notice the
defendant must prove, 1.—That at the time of the trespass he
was in possession of the house mentioned in the plea, as by
carrying on business, or living in the house.’-'6
2.——That the
§ 606.

plaintiff was in the house at the time of the alleged assault.
seems to be immaterial whether he was making a noise or
disturbance, as is usually stated in a notice, or not; for no man
without authority by law can lawfully remain in the house or
close of another after the occupier has required him to leave
it; for although the plaintiff is in the house or close, by license
of the defendant, by a request to leave it the license is deter
If,
mined, and the plaintiffs continuance there is illegal.”
however, it were an inn, in which the public have a right to
go and remain at proper hours, it would be different; for then
it must be shown that the plaintiff was making a great noise
and disturbance, or otherwise misbehaving himself, to justify
3.—That before the as
the inn-keeper in turning him out.“
sault was committed, the defendant, or some person for him,
requested the plaintiff to leave the house, and that the plaintiff
refused to do so. If a person enter a house with force and
violence, the person whose house is entered may turn him out
(using no more force than is necessary) without previously
requesting him to depart; but if the person enter quietly, such

It

a request is necessary before he can be turned
as are allowed by reason oi.’
damages
the aggravated character ot the injury
consequent upon the peculiar circum
Whether called
stances of the case.
“vindic
“punltory,"
“exemplary,"
“added"
or
tive,"
"compensatory“
question ls,
important
the
damages
what is the character of the wrong
suifered or of the injury sustained, and
if it can be compensated for in money
what is the amount which will so com
Ross v. Leggett, 61 Mich.,
pensate:
Further upon
445; 28 N. W., 695.
this question of exemplary damages,
see. Elliott v. Van Buren, 33 Mich.,
49; Welch v. Ware, 32 Mich., 77;
Scripps v. Reilly. 38 Mich., 10; Wat
son v. Watson, 53 Mich., 168; 18 N.
W., 605: Stilson v. Gibbs, 53 Mich.,
280: 18 N. W., 815; Wilson v. Bowen,
133; 31 N. W., 81; Bau
64 Mich.,
mler v, Antiau, 65 Mich., 31; 31 N. W.,

out."

888; Jastrzembski v. Marxhausen, 120
Mich., 677; 79 N. W., 935.
See, ante,
§ 472.

26-C00k’S Case, Cro. Car., 537:
Dean v. llogg, 10 Bing., 345; 1 Saund.
Pl. & Ev., 158.
27—Jelly v. Bradley, 1 C. & M..
270; see, Scribner v. Beach, 4 Denio,
448
28—Archbold’s
Nisl Prius, 384.
29-Tullary v. Reed. 1 C. & P.. 62
78;
R.,
T\'envcr v. Bush, 8 Term.
Scribner v. Beach. 4 Denio, 443.‘ But
no more force must be uaedlthan
is
reasonably necessary for the purpose:
See, Com. v. Clark, 2 l\ietc., 23; Com.
monwealth v. Goodwin, 3 Cush., 154.
See, Phillips v. Jamieson.
51 Mich..
153: 16 N. W., 318.
An intruder with
or without title cannot by getting a
foothold in a single room of a house
in the peuceabie occupancy 01‘ another,
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Notice of justiﬁca.tion.—Under

a notice that the

§ 607

plain

tiff ﬁrst assaulted the defendant, the defendant will be required
to show that the plaintiff committed the ﬁrst assault, and that
it was such as to require the dcfendant’s self-defense and the
Every assault will not
consequent assault on the plaintiﬂ.
justify every battery; but it is matter of evidence wheter the
assault was proportionatc- to the battery.
It is necessary to
prove an assault commensurate with the trespass sought to be

justiﬁedﬁ"

If

parent in a reasonable and proper manner chastise his
child, or a master his servant, or a school-master his scholar; or
if a man gently lay his hands on another, and thereby stay him
from inciting a dog against a third person; or if I beat one who
wrongfully endeavors with violence to dispossess me of my
lands or goods, or of the goods of another delivered to me to
be kept for him, and will not desist upon my laying my hands
a

gently on him; or, if a man beats one who makes an assault
upon the person of his wife, parent or child; in all these cases
the party may justify,“ if the battery was not greater than
was necessary; and in all these cases, notice of the defense
So as to justification by authority of law,
must be given.

without or under legal process."
FALSE IMPRISONMENT.

Deﬁniti0n.—Every conﬁnement of the person is an
§608.
imprisonment, whether it be in a common prison or in a private
house, or even by forcibly detaining one in the streets.” False
imprisonment consists in such imprisonment without author
This jurisdiction of the justice is seldom invoked.
ity.-“
the occupants‘
then obstructing
entry into the main structure, claim
that he has such a constructive pos
session of the whole as will authorize
him to assault the occupant when re
Soule v.
ebstructions:
moving
the
Hough, 45 Mich.,418; 8 N. W., 50, 159.
See, People v. Adams, 52 Mich., 105;
A person will he jus
17 N. W., 715.
tiﬂed in using just suﬂicient force to
protect his property and possession,
(‘arter v. Sutherland,
but no more:
See,
52 Mich., 597: 18 N. W.. 375.
Ayres v. Birtch, 35 Mich., 501.
and

30-1 Saund. Pl. & Ev., 5 Am. ed.,
156; Buiier‘s N. P., 18; Reece v. Tay
lor, 4 N. & M., 470.
The degree of
force permisible in sell-defense must
People v.
on circumstances:
depend
Doe, 1 Mich., 451.
31—Leeward v. Basilie, 1 Ld. Raym.
62; Atkinson v. Crouch, 1 Salk., 407:
3 Salk., 47; Pond v. People, 8 Mich.,
150.

176.

Chit. Pl., 10 Am. ed., 501.
33—Archboid's N. P., 571.
34—And such detention will be un
lawful unless there be suﬂlcient au
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Actions of this sort are usually brought in courts with more
extended jurisdiction as to damages.
thorlty for it, arising either from some
process of the courts of justice or
from some warrant of a legal oﬂlcer
having power to commit under his hand
and seal, and expressing the cause of
commitment;
or arising from some
sanctioned from
other special cause
the necessity of the thing, either by
Croweil
law or by statute:
common
Words are
v. Gleason, 10 Me., 325.
not usually sufiicient to constitute an
Fuller v. Bowker, 11
imprisonment:
Mich., 212, 213.
An actual manual
arrest of the person is not necessary
A
to constitute false imprisonment.
violence,
of physical
demonstration
which to all appearance can only be
avoided by submission, operates as ef
fectually, if submitted to, as if the
arrest had been forcibly accomplished:
Brushaber v. Stegeman. 22 Mich., 260.
An arrest and an imprisonment exist
where a party submits to an arrest
without requiring the oﬂicer to resort
The mildness of
to actual violence.
only bears on the
thedmprisonment
amount of the damages: Josselyn v.
Mich.,
McAllister,
25
45.! Though
manual seizure is not essential to an
arrest yet there must be some sort of
Hill v. Taylor, 50
personal coercion:
Mich., 549: 15 N. W., 899.
This ac
tion will not lie, where the warrant is
suﬂiciently regular on its face to pro
tect the oilicer against one who made
the complaint upon which the warrant
issued. his attorney or the" oﬂicer him
self, though the magistrate may not
have had the facts suiilclent to au
thorize its issue if he had jurisdiction
to issue the process if the showing
\\'heaton v. Beecher,
were suﬂicient:
49 Mich., 348; 13 N. W., 769; Hill v.
Taylor, 50 Mich.. 549; 15 N. W., 899.
The action will not lie against one
called by the sheriff to assist to make
an arrest, unless after being so com
he act wantonly;
and this,
manded
though the sheriif is acting without
authority:
Firestone
v.
suﬂicient
Rico, 71 Mich., 377; 88 N. W.. 885.
So, where the complaint and warrant
charge no offense,
qucstion of
the
probable cause is wholly immaterial
except upon the measure of damages:

Livingston
Burroughs, 33 Mich.,
v.
511; Colter V. Lower, 35 lnd., 285; 9
Am. Rep. 735; Rich. v. Mclnerny, 103
Ala., 345; 15 $0.. 663; 49 Am. SL, 32.
If an imprisonment is under legal
an action for false imprison
process,
An action
ment cannot be sustained.
for malicious prosecution may be sus
tained if the prosecution was without
Rich
probable cause and malicious:
Mcinerny,
supra.
An action for
v.
false imprisonment on an illegal arrest
in a civil action may be maintained
before the proceedings are terminated
Josselyn v. Mc.-illis
by a judgment:
But a voluntary
tcr. 22 Mich., 300.
going with an oﬂicer to a magistrate,
without any declaration by the omcer
that he arrested him, would not be
suflicient to constitute an imprison
ment; nor would the voluntary giving
of hail, where there had been in fact
no arrest: nor the remaining in the
county where the party had given
a void bond for the Jail limits: Fuller
v. Bowker, 11 Mich., 204.
In all cases
of false imprisonment, the jury are en
titled and required to give such gen
eral damages as they deem appropriate
under the circumstances for the arrest
and detention, as well as any special
which are fully proved, and
damages
they
give
are
never
conﬁned
to
either nominal or special damages if
there has been a real personal injury,
and every deprivation of’ liberty is so
regarded: Page v. Mitchell, 13 Mich.,
68: see, Teft v. Windsor, 17 Mich.,
Where a party is arrested upon
486.
a complaint and warrant
which docs
not set forth any oifense known to the
law, the person making the complaint
is liable for false imprisonment, not
withstanding
he may have believed
that there was just cause for making
the complaint: and evidence
that he
acted in good faith, supposing there
was just cause for the prosecution, is
no defense except to shield him from
exemplary damages.
Exemplary dam
ages may be allowed when the defen
dant is guilty of fraud. malice, gross
negligence or oppression:
Livingston
v. Burroughs.
33 Mich., 511.
In an
action for a false imprisonment, the

608

XXXV.

CH.

moss

IMPRISONMENT.

§ 609

§609. Defense under the general issue.—The general issue
is a suﬁicient pica only when the defendant did not imprison
the plaintiﬁf; of any other defense notice must be specially
given.
recovery will not be limited to nomi
nal damages, because there is no aile
gation or proof of special damages:
Josseiyn v. McAiiister,
22 Mlch., 300.
And in a case where exemplary dam
ages are allowable, they can only be
measured by the sound discretion of
the jury.
An averment in a declara
tion that an imprisonment of the plain
of
tiff had been effected by means
threats
and violence, is a suﬁicient
averment of malice to permit proof of
it, and to justify a recovery or an ag
gravation of damages on that ground:
Bushaber v. Stegeman,
22 i\Iich., 266.
Where a person is sued for n malicious
imprisonment,
his
arrest and false
statements made after the arrest, con
cerning his motives and doings in re

39

gard to the proceedings, are receivable
as admissions against him to show
malice; and all of his conversation with
and threats to the party arrested, in
advance of the arrest. should be re
ceived against him for the same pur
pose: Josselyn v. McAllister, 25 Mlch.,
45; see. also, 22 Mlch., 300.
When
a person is sued for false imprisonment
for causing the arrest of another, he
has the right to show in mitigation of
damages
the statements and informa
tion upon which iie acted, and the
so that
sources of that information,
the jury may judge of the good faith
and care with which he acted:
Liv
ingston v. Burroughs, 83 Mlch., 511.
614.
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Under what circumstances the action lies.-'I‘1-espass
lies to recover damages for inmledlklte wrongs, accompanied
with force, to personal property, by destroying, damaging,
taking away, detaining, or converting it. To sustain trespass,
the injury must be immediate and not consequential; that is,
the .act complained of must itself occasion the injury; it must
If one throw a. log
not be a mere consequence of that act.‘
into the highway, and, in the act of throwing, it hit another,
trespass lies; but if, after it is thrown into the highway, an
injury ensue in consequence of its being in the way, case would
be the proper form of remedy for it.
The act must be com
of
force
with
with which it was
force,
but
the
degree
mitted
The intent with which the act
done will make no difference.
is done is immaterial; though the injury arise from accident,
§ 610.

trespass lies.’

1.
by
failure of defendant to
turn to the right as required by law:
Evers v. Sager, 28 Mich., 47.
For
cutting rope used with terry:
Run
nelis v. Pentwater, 109 Mich., 513: 67
N. W., 558; for cutting trolley wire:
Saginaw St. Ry. Co. v. Michigan Cen
tral Ry. Co., 91 Mich., 860; 52 N. W..
49; in case of levy on property of
stranger to the process though the
Heyman v. Covell, 36
writ valid:
Mich.,
157.
So
where unthreshed
wheat was levied upon and the oﬂicer
levying threshed it before making sale:
Stllson v. Gibbs. 40 Mich., 42.
2—Guilie v. Swan, 19 Johns., 3R1:
Wilson v, Smith, 10 Wend., 324: Per
In
cival v. Hickey, 18 Johns., 257.
however,
general.
where goods and
personal property have been wrongful
taken and disposed of, so that tres
caused

610

l_v

1—Thus. trespass is the proper ac
tion for an injury to plaintiifs cow,
by defendant's setting his dog
caused
Wood v. Lakue, 9 Mich., 158.
on her:
who levies
And a sherlﬂ or officer
execution on the goods of a stranger
to the judgment is liable in this action
Weber v. Henry, 16 Mich.,
theretor:
399,
403.
The representatives of a
partner, before the partner
deceased
ship business is settled and the debts
paid, and before they have been let
into joint possession by the surviving
partner, have only an equitable in
terest in the partnership property, and
in law.
are not tenants in common
and a right of action for trespass to
during this
the property is vested,
interval. solely in the surviving part
ner: Pfeffer v. Steiner. 27 Mich., 537.
So trespass lies tor injury to a horse
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§611. Defense under the general issue.—The general issue
is suﬁicient unless the defendant rely upon matter in justiﬁca
tion or excuse, in which case notice of such matter must be
given.“ The defendant cannot, under the general issue, show

property out of the plaintiﬁ in a strangerﬁ
When the general issue only is pleaded, the plaintiif must
prove his right to the property injured, the injury, that defend
ant committed the injury, and the damages.
in actual possession of the property at the time

the

\’

of]

By and against wh0m.—The plaintiﬂ? must either have

§ 612.

been

:1

a

6

611

1

1

8

Q

5

9

a

a

132; Root v. Chandler, 10 Wend., 110;
Esty v. Smith, 45 Mlch., 402.
In trespass for taking goods, a de
fense
that they were taken under an
attachment against
third person, al
leged to be the owner, is not admis
sible under the general issue without
notice of the special defense: Rosen
Mlch., 508.
bury v. Angeli,
Nor is
the defense
of license admissible ex
under
notice:
Vanderkarr
v.
cept
Thompson, 19 Mlch., 82.
in an ac
tion against a justice for issuing an
execution against a man's property, it
is not enough to show the judgment
and execution and that he was such
justice. but it must appear that the
necessary proceedings were taken to
give him jurisdiction
of the parties
and the cause of action.
And so
supervisor, when justifying in trespass
for the taking of personal property tin
der his warrant for the collection of
taxes
attached to a tax roll, must
show, not only that he was super
visor at the time, and signed war
rant as such, but also that the assess
ment roil came from the hoard of
supervisors as provided by law, and
that the various taxes levied had been
certiﬁed to him for assessment by the
proper authorities:
Clark v. Axford,
Mlch., 182.
4—Aiken ads. Buck,
Wend.. 466:
Hanmer v. Wllsey, 17 We-nd., 91. But
everything in mitigation
of damages
may be shown under the general issue:
Mlch., 97.
All
Deievan v. Bates,
the circumstances may be shown under
Sutherland v. in
the general issue:
gails, 63 Mlch., 620: 30 N. W., 342.
see,

5

or trover would lie, the owner
waive the tort and sue in assump
slt for the value of the property; see,
Mlch., 508, 519;
Ward v. \Varner,
If
12 Mlch., 328.
v. Allison,
I-‘iquet
trespasser takes property and sells
or disposes of it wrongfully, and re
worth for
or money's
moneys
ceives
it. the owner may waive the tort and
made in his behalf,
athrm the sale
and recover the proceeds in an action
But if the trespasser
oi’ assumpsit.
still retain the property in his pos
session,
assumpsit will not lie for the
value of it; the law will not imply a
promise when the circumstances repel
all implication in fact of any promise
Watson v. Stever, 25 Mlch.,
to pay:
386; see. Barnum v. Stone, 27 Mlch.,
332; Tolan v. Hodgeboom,
38 Mlch.,
624; Mciiaughlin
v. Sulley, 46 Mlch.,
219;
N. W., 256; Bowen v. Rutiand
School District, 36 Mlch., 149: Detroit
v. Michigan
Pav. Co., 36 Mlch., 335.
Waiving the trespass and suing in as
sumpsit is an election to regard the
defendant as owner of the property:
Nield v. Burton, 49 Mlch., 53; 12 N.
W., 906.
See, further. upon right to
waive the tort and bring assumpsit:
post,
683.
Tuttle v. Campbell, 74
Mlch., 652: 42 N. W.. 384: 16 Am. St.,
652; Newman v. Olney, 118 Mlch.,
545; 77 N. W., 9; Grinnell v_ Ander
son, 122 Mlch., 533; 81 N. W., 829:
(‘astner v. Darby, 128 Mlch., 241; 87
N. W.. 199; St. John v. Antrim Iron
(‘o., 122 Mlch., 68: 80 N. W., 998;
iiailett v. Gordon, 122 Mlch., 567: 81
N. W.. 556; 82 N. W., 827 (by statute).
See. post,
671 and notes.
3-—Demie v. Chapman, 11 .'Iohns.,
pass
may
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trespass, or he must have a general or special property in the
goods, and the right to immediate possession.‘ Actual posses
sion is enough to sustain the action against a mere wrong
doer, and against all except the owner.“ The general owner
ship of property gives a constructive possession, but unless the
plaintiﬁ, in such case, has the right of immediate possession,
at the time of the trespass, the action cannot be sustained.

A sheriif or constable, having duly seized goods under an
execution, has such a special property in them that he may
maintain trespass for an injury to them.
But the plaintiff in
an execution has no lien upon property in the goods, and can
\Vhere a constable sues and
have no action for the injury."

attempts to build up a title under the process, he must show a
or regular proceedings, as well as regular
good judgment
process. When there is a defect of jurisdiction, or the proceed
ings are void for any other cause, he cannot maintain the
action, at least against the defendant in the execution.“ Any
one who has a right of property in the goods suﬂicient to
A receiptor of goods
maintain trover may maintain trespass?
on execution cannot maintain trespass or trover," unless he
has engaged to deliver them by a certain day, or pay the

amount of the execution."
The same rule applies in this action as in actions for trespass
on lands, with respect to the defendants. Trespass will not lie
against a person for the taking of property by his servant, by
5-Putnam v. Wyley, 8 Johns., 422;
Aiken v. Buck, 1 Wend., 466.
6—l1anmer v. Wilsey, 17 Wend., 91.
The plaintiﬂ may maintain trespass
if he has at the time of the act such a
title as draws after it a constructive
possession: Walcot v. Pomeroy. 2 Pick.,
121; Ayer v. Bartlett. Q. I’ick., 156;
A bare
Howe v. Keeler. 27 Conn., 538.
is sutﬂclent to enable the
possession
plaintiff to recover in trespass against
u wrong-doer who takes the property
without authori
out oi’ his possession
ty: Cook v. lloward, 13 .Tohns.. 276:
132;
lb4d.,
11
Demie v. Chapman,
Jackson c.'r (fem. Feller v. Feller, 2
Wend., 466; Butts v. Collins, 13 Ib€d.,
143: Potter v. \\‘nshburn. 13 Vt.. 558:
Wend., 91:
17
flamner v. Wilsey.
Barker v. Chase. 24 Maine. 230.
7—Bsrker v. Mathews, 1 Denio, 335.

8—Dunlsp v. Hunting, 2 Denio. 843:
but see, Biackley v. Sheldon, 7 John.,
32.

9—See, title, “Trover."
Where one
property has been wrongfully
taken from him, replevled it. but be
ing nonsuited in the replevin suit.
the defendant had judgment
against
him for the value of the property:
held, that he still might bring trespass
tor the taking of the property. and
recover damages not only for the de~
tentlon of the property while the dt
fcndant had it, but also its value as
assessed
in favor of the defendant in
the replevin suit: Haviland v. Parker,
11 Mich., 103.
whose

10~Dillcnbeclr

v.

Jerome.

7

Cow.,

294.

612

11—Milier

v.

Adsit,

16

Wend., 335.

Cu.

XXXVI.

raasrass T0 PERSONAL

rsorsarr.

§ 612

mistake, when no direction or authority is given by the princi
pal to take the particular property in question, and there is no
subsequent assent to the taking." A principal is not liable in
it,

trespass for the act of his agent, unless he authorized it before
hand, or subsequently assented to
with knowledge of what
had been done."

if

a.

is

The plaintiff in an execution
not liable
the constable
levy upon the property of
third person, 11111688 he interfere
with the levy, or assent to what has been done by the ofﬁcer.“

.

a

is

Nor
plaintiﬁ in any case liable for the issuing of a process
unless he directed or sanctioned it."

a

it,

A person, not being an infant, or feme covert, who, after the
commission of the trespass, committed for his use and beneﬁt,
trespasser."
becomes
assents to
The intent with which the trespass was committed may be
in giving damages, either to enhance

taken into consideration,
or mitigate them."

is

given, the evidence will de
When notice of special matter
of
A
return
the property taken, though
the
notice.
pend upon

13—Freeman

EL,

v.

Rosher,

13

Ad.

&

1

A master is not liable
N. 8., 780.
for the willful act of his servant:
M., 29.
C.
Chandler v. Broughton,
But where he orders his servant to
do an act the natural consequence
of

1

&

9

B

a

trespass. the master is
is
notwithstanding
servant
the
care,
ordinary
and the master
uses
directed him not to trespass: Gregory
C., 591.
v. Piper,
Denio,
14--Averill v. Williams,
which
liable,

501.
1

Wend.,
15—Gold et al ads. Bissell,
But
seems that he will be
liable for illegal process, if he directed
Saund.
or assented to its issue: see,
Ev.,
Pl.
Am. ed.. 1117, 1118.
Ev.,
Am. ed.,
16——2 Saund. Pl.
1121: see, Newsom v. Hart, 14 Mich.,
5

&

5

&

2

it

210.

233.
a

Lyons,
Starkie's
person unlawfully
'2

17—Sears v.
But if

218.

R.,

in

jure the property

of another, he is
liable for the damages without regard
to the intention with which the act
was
done:
Amick
v.
O'Hara.
Blackf.,
258.
And it is immaterial
whether he actually contemplated the
damages
which resulted or not.
He
must be held to have contemplated
legitimately
all the damages
which
resulted from his illegal act: Allison v.
Chandler, 11 Mich., 542; see, Gilbert
v. Kennedy, 22 Mich.. 117.
If a tres
pass was committed while the defen
dant was acting in good faith and
under an honest belief that he had
a legal right to do the act complained
of. the plaintiff can recover only the
actual damages sustained by him. and
not damage of a punitory character:
Allison v. Chandler. 11 Mich., 542.
Absence of bad faith can never excuse
a trespass, though the
existence of
bad faith may sometimes aggravate it.
Every one must be sure of his legal
right when he invades the possession
of another: (‘ubit v, O'Dett, 51 Mich.,
351; 16 N. W.. 679.

613

6

298.

dz

8

Wend.,
l2—Broughton
v. Whaion,
474; see, Smith V. Webster, 23 Mich.,
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accepted by the plaintiff, is no bar to the action; it will avail
only in mitigation of the damages."
The act must amount to a trespass when done, if a trespass
at all. The relation back of the title of a defendant in tres
pass

who satisﬁes

a judgment

against

him

cannot

so

aﬁ’ect

third persons

as to make them trespassers as to acts done
before the judgment was satisﬁed.”
Where trespass de bonis asportatis for a conversion of goods
is brought and judgment obtained against defendant, and satis
ﬁed, the effect is to pass title to goods converted to the de

fendant."‘°

Joint trespassers.-In

general, where one of sev
trespassers or other wrong-doers is used, and a
recovery had against him for the full amount of the in
jury committed by all, and he is compelled to pay the
whole amount, such payment operates to discharge
the

§613.
eral joint

joint trespassers, but gives claim for contribution
from the others for any share or part of the damages paid by
him." But the rule that there is no contribution between joint
tort-feasors, does not apply to a case where the party asking
contribution is a tort-feasor only by inference of law; but is
conﬁned to cases where it must be presumed that the party
knew he was committing an unlawful act.“
other

18—i'Ianmcr

v.

Wilsey,

17

Wend.,

91.

Mich.,
10-—Bucon v. Kilnmell,
14
The doctrine of relation is rem
edial.
Its use is to prevent wrongs
and punish trespass.
It can never
have the effect to make that a wrong
which was innocent when done: Flint
& P. M. Ry. Co. v. Gordon, 41 Mich.,
420: 2 N. W., 648: Goefchius v. San
born, 46 Mich., 330; 9 N. W., 437.
Mich.,
Kimmeli,
14
20—Bacon
v.
201.

201.

21—Merryweather x. Nixan, 8 Term.
R., 183, 186; Andrews v. Murray, 33
Barh., 854.

’

614

22—Conventry v. Barton. 17 Johns,
142; Stone v. Hooker, 9 Cow.. 1.‘-4.
If separate judgments are obtained
against several persons who were joint
ly liable for the same trespass. the
suing out oi’ an execution upon one
of them is an election ‘by the plaintiff
to enforce that Judgment. and he can
not enforce the others.
The case dif
fers from that where it is the ques
tion of enforcing n single judgment
against
several defendants:
Board
man v. Acer. 13 Mich., 77: Kenyon v.
Woodruif, 33 Mich., 310, 315.
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Q 619. The evidence.
§ 620. The damuges—in general.
damages—under
gen
the
5 621. The
eral issue.
I 622. Notice oi’ title to lands in ques

tion.
oi title
§ 623. Notice
counts only.

plea

plaintitt

5627. In
§628.

In

case oi‘ detective
common
law.

fences,

at

oi! defective

fences,

by

fences,

in

case

statute.
5629

In

case ot defective
case of agreement.

§630. License, eifect of.
In abating public nuisance.

particular

5 631.

Deﬁnition.-Every unwarrant-able entry upon the land

of another, whether it be enclosed or not, is a trespass. Even
shooting at game on another’s land, though without an actual
The owner of cattle is liable in
entry, is in law a trespass}
trespass for their entering upon the land of another.’
who anchors his boat in
1~One
waters outside of the navigable por
tion of a stream.
throws out decoys
and engages in duck hunting from the
boat is a trespasser as against the
riparian owner:
Hall v. Alford, 114
Mich., 165; 72 N. W., 137.
One who
breaks a store or dwelling for service
ot a writ of replevin on goods therein,
after having ﬁrst demanded admission,
is not guilty of trespass: C. L., §§
106.'>5 and 752: Rentsciiler v. Fox, 130
Mich., 498: 90 N. W., 275.
2—Wells v. llowell, 19 Johns., 385:
Adams v. Freeman, 12 Ibid., 408;
Blake v. Jerome, 14 Ibid., -106. Where
a person
makes an excavation by his
neighbor's land, into which the land
from its own weight and of necessity
must fall. and does immediately after
tall,
trespass will lie against him
therefor:
Buslrirk v. Strickland,
47
Mich., 389; 11 N. W., 210.
The
projection of the eaves of a building
over the lands of another held not a

trespass: Bureau v. Marshall, 55 Mich.,
234; 21 N. W., 304.
The cutting oi!
of a portion of plaintiffs line fence
from the top, is a trespass though it
improve the fence:
Fisher v.
may
Dowling, 66 Mich., 370: 33 N. W.,
The throwing of earth excavated
521.
from a drain on the lands of plaintiff
outside the boundaries of that portion
taken for the drain is trepass: Clark
v. Wiles, 54 Mich., 323: 20 N. W., 63.
taking ﬁsh from a small lake
One
nearly surrounded by the lands of
plaintiff, a public usage to do so pre
Marsh v.
vailing, is not a trespasser:
Trespass will
Colby, 39 Mich., 626.
lie in case of riparian owner against
Clute
one entering and cutting ice:
65 Mich., 48; 31 N. W.,
v. Fisher,
S
See also, Lorman v. Benson,
614.
Mich., 18. As to right of vendee in a
land contract to bring trespass, see.
Pﬂstner v. Bird, 43 Mich., 14; 4 N.
W., 625; Witheral v. .\iuskegon Boom
ing Co., 68 Mich., 48; 35 N. W., 758.

615
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a

is
a

it,

§ 615. Who may bring the a.otion.—-The person in actual pos
session of land, whether that possession is legal or not, may
A person having
maintain this action against a wrong-doer.3
may
title to land, although not in the actual possession of
lessor
one
title.‘
A
having
not
maintain trespass against any
stranger while there
cannot maintain this action against

in possession.“ The action must be brought by the
lessee.
Trespass lies for an entry upon land and an ouster of
the plaintiﬁ, but damages can be recovered only for the simple
entry and ouster, and not for the continuance of the trespass;
tenant

a

damages for the latter are not recoverable until after the plain
tiff has gained possession by re-entry.° Whoever has an exclu
sive right in the soil, as to
crop of wheat growing thereon,

§

may maintain

trespass.’

Against whom the action may be brought.—The same
in civil actions for trespass, as in criminal pro

616.

rule prevails

s vendee in a land contract who has
neither uctunl nor constructive posses
sion: Moyer v. Scott, 30 Mich., 345;
Gates v. Comstock, 107 Mich., 546:
65 N. W., 544; Des Jsrdins v. Thun
der Bay R. B. Co., 95 Mich., 140; 54
N. W., 718.

4

8

8

4—Vsn Rensselaer v. Radclilt, 10
Wend., 639; Hubbel v, Rochester,
Cow., 115; Van Deusen v. Young, 29
Johns.,
Barb.. 9: Putnam v. Wyley,
432; O'Brien v. Cavanaugh, 61 Mich.,
368; 28 N. W., 127.
A party having
title to unoccupied lands is construc
tively in possession, and may maintain
trespass against one who without his
license,
and without
color of title,
enters and cuts timber:
Saiford v.
Basto,
Mich., 406: see, Cummings
v. Freer. 26 Mich., 129.
Constructive
possession
cannot exist where there is
an nctual adverse possession:
liiiller
v. Wellman, 75 Mich., 353: 42 N. W.,
843; Ruggles V. Sands, 40 Mich., 561.
1

8

Pick., 235:
5—Lienow v. Ritchie,
Campbell v. Arnold.
.Tohns..
511:
Wickhsm v. Freeman, 12 Ibld., 183.
6—i'iolmes

v. Seely, 19 Wend.. 507.
7—Austin
v. Sawyer,
Cow. R.,
39.
Where one is in possession of
lands of another, there being no coin
piaint that he holds them wrongfully,

616

9

n

6

9

4 2

7

-i

3

5

6:

8

1

it

s

tax certiﬁcate
One who enters under
and cuts timber is a trespasser: Busch
v. Nester, 62 Mich., 381; 28 N. W.,
A highway commissioner who
911.
cuts and carries away shade trees from
premises, they
in front ot plaintii!'s
not obstructing the highway, is a tres
Clark v. Dasso, 34 Mich., 88.
pusser:
appear that what he did
Not so it
was lawfully performed by virtue of
of the public and in
the possession
of the needs ct public
furtherance
travel: Wolf v. Holton, 61 Mich., 550;
28 N. W., 524.
v. Peat,
3—Grsham
East. 244:
Burr., 1563; Carpenter v. Mason, 12
E., 629; Revett v. Brown,
Ad.
Bing, 9; Inhabitants ot Barnstable v.
Thacher,
Metc., 239: First Psrish
in Shrewsbury v. Smith, 14 Pick., 297;
Pick., 305; Iiurd
Kempton v. Cook.
Cow., 752; Orser v. Storms,
v. \\'est,
Ibld., 687; Gourdier v. Cormack,
Fl. D. Smith, 200; Althous v. Rice,
E. D. Smith, 347; Newcombe v. Irwin,
55 Mich., 620: 22 N. W., 66; O'Brien
61 Mich., 368; 28 N.
v. Csvansugh,
W., 127; lioifman v. Harrington,
44
Mich., 183;
N. W., 225.
Not so
mere intruder as against one showing
title: Vial v. Hofen, 106 .\iich., 160;
64 N, W., 11: see, Newcomb v. Love.
Nor
112 Mich., 115: 70 N. W., 443.
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In mis
ceedings for misdemeanors, in respect to defendants.
demeanors, all persons who order or incite others to commit
the offense, or procure it to be committed, and all persons pres
it,

aiding and abetting in the commission of
“are princi
as fully as the person by whose hand
actually com
to be
mitted; so, in trespass, all persons who order or procure
are guilty of the trespass.“
done, or incite others to do
Where the defendant ascended in a balloon, which descended
short distance from the place of its ascent, into the plaintiff
garden, and the defendant. being entangled and in
perilous
ituation, called for help, and a crowd of people broke through
the fence into the plaintiﬂ”s garden, beat and trod down his
a

a

's

it,

it

it

is

ent,

pals,

'

it

is

garden.”
It no defense to the action of trespass that the defendant
acted in good faith though
may affect the question of the
In common with other causes of
amount of the dama.ges.1°
action ‘which survive, causes of action for injuries to real estate
may be assigned."
The declaration.
The declaration should particularly
describe the land.
A general description would be sufficient
unless the defendant should plead title, and thereby remove
the cause to the circuit court, in which case the defendant
would prevail in that court, upon proving title to any land in
To avoid this
the township mentioned in the declaration."
617.

&

8

ster, 23 Mich., 298.
9—Guille v. Swan. 13 Johns., 381:
Percival v. Hickey, 18 Johns., 257.
10—Isle Royale Mining (‘o. v. Her
tln. 37 Mich., 332; Cuhit v. 0'Dett, 51
Mich., 347; 16 N. W., 679: Estey v.
Smith, 45 Mich., 402:
Z\'. W., 83.

11—Flnal v. Backus, 18 Mich., 218:
Grant v. Smith. 26 Mich., 201; Gates
v. Comstock, 107 Mich., 546; 65 N.
W., 544.
Wend., 503:
12-—E|lice v. Boyer,
Tuthill v. Clark, 11 Wend., 642; Mc
Farlane v. Ray ct 111., 14 Mich., 465.
But where the ‘plaintiff declares de
scribing the premises by metes and
bounds,
is not necessary that he
should, on trial. show title to every
part; it is enough if he show title to
that part of the close in which the

617

8

2

he is not iiahie in trespass for using
them in the ordinary way, for the pur
they
are adapted:
for which
pose
Burnham v. Glider, 34 Mich., 246.
Saund.
8—1 Archb. N. I’., 304;
Pi.
Ev.. 1117; see, Smith v. Web

it

§

'

a

a_

a

it

was held that though the ascension
vegetables, ﬂowers, etc.,
in a balloon was
lawful act, yet, as the defendant’s descent,
under the circumstances, would ordinarily and naturally draw.
the crowd into the plaintiﬁ"s garden, either from
desire to
curiosity which he had excited, he
assist him, or to gratify
was answerable for all the damages done to the plaintiff’s

§ 618

TRESPASS T0 REAL PROPERTY.

On.

XXXVII.

and other difficulties, the declaration should carefully describe
the land on which the trespass was committed.

By sta.tute—trebie damages.-“Every
person who
§618.
shall cut down or carry oif any wood, underwood, trees or tim
ber, or shall girdle or otherwise despoil or injure any trees on
the land of any other person, without the leave of the owner
thereof, or on the lands or commons of any city, township,
village or other corporation, without license therefor given,
shall be liable ‘to the owner of such land, or to such corporation,
in three times, the amount of damages, which shall be assessed
therefor in an action of trespass, by a jury, or by a justice of
the peace in the cases provided by law.”13
King v.
trespass was committed:
“in this state
I)unn, 21 Wend., 253.
a declaration in trespass for breaking
and entering plalntiifs close, without
asserting and describing the title in
to the lands. is not such
the plalntlﬂ
a claim of titie_as. under the statute
is admitted by the
(C. L., 5 11257)
The land
plea of the general issue.
is the close oi’ the plaintiff if he had
even though he
possession,
peaceable
had no title, and is not the plaintii!'s
close it the defendant is in peaceable
Under such a declaration
possession.
the plaintiff relies upon his possession
and the defendant may disprove it
under the general issue": Ostrom v.
Potter, 104 Mlch., 115; 62 N. W., 170;
Vandoozer v. Dayton, 45 Mlch., 247;
It the action is brought
7 N. W., 814.
the declaration must
by an assignee
allege the assignment: Gates v. Com
stock, 107 Mlch., 546; 65 N. W., 544.
A declaration alleging that the “de
fendant with force and arms the lands
said piaintitt
and premises ot the
situated (describing them), broke and
entered," etc., is not a suﬂicient alie
it is only
gation ot title in plaintiff.
such an allegation as would be made
by one relying upon possession to sup
Orris v. Kempton,
port his action:
105 Mlch., 229; 63 N. W.. 68.
Treble dam
13—C. L., 5 11204.
under this
ages
are not allowable
statute where the trespasser has prob
able cause for supposing he has title
in himself, or that he has authority
from the real owner to do the act com
plained oi: Russell v. Myers, 32 Mlch.,

522; sec, C. L., Q 11205.
This stat
ute was not framed to protect pos
sessory rights, but was made to give
the owners of the lee a right to sue
injuries
in trespass for
the
men
tioned ln the section, done to their
It the party in posses
inheritance.
sion, whether owner or tenant, seeks
damage for the'disturl>ance ot his pos
session,
he is still left to his common
But under this
law action for that.
section, the damages
which are al
lowed to be trebled are not damages
but to the freehold.
to the possession.
And it is no defense that the alleged
trespasser was in possession ot the
land at the time of committing the
acts complained of: at most it would
be important only for the purpose of
preventing the trebllng of the damages
in case it were shown that he had
reason to believe that he owned the
damages
under
land.
The pialntiif’
this section would include not merely
the value of the timber or wood cut
and carried away, etc., but such dam
ages as occurred to the freehold by
When the action is
their destruction.
merely for carrying away timber al
ready cut. the damages could not well
go beyond its value: but where stand
ing trees are cut down, the rule of
damages
should fairly be lthe amount
ot which the value of the estate is
And
diminished by
destruction.
‘their
it would seem- that the declaration
under this section should expressly
aver the plaintitfs ownership in the
fee, and that such ownership must be
strictly proved, unless informal proof

618
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“If, upon the trial of any such action, it shall appear that
the trespass was casual and involuntary, or that the defendant
had probable cause to believe that the land on which such tres
pass was committed was his own; or that such wood, trees or
timber were taken for the purpose of making or repairing any
public road or bridge; judgment shall be given to recover only
the single damages assessed/’1“

I

without objection: Achey
liull, 7 Mich., 423; Reynolds v.
v.
Maynard, —— Mich., —; 100 N. WC,
But if tile declara
174 (June, 190-1).
tion contains a statement of owner
ship suiﬂclent to support proof of a.
holding by the plalntilf in fee simple,
an objection that his title is not al
with that directness and cer
leged
tainty dictated by the rules of plead
ing is purely technical, and should be
Clark v.
raised only by demurrer:
Field, 42 Mich., 345: 4 N. W., 19.
In order to recover treble damages
under this statute, the declaration or
some count in it must be framed upon
Pleading the statute is
the statute.
stating the facts which bring the case
within it. and counting on it, is mak
ing express reference to it by apt
terms to show the source of right re
lied on: Howser v. Melcher, 40 Mich.,
is admitted

185.

Where a defendant in trespass for
cutting timber on the land of plaintiff,
by letter
had in good faith accepted
plaintiff's oi‘l’er to sell him the land,
but which acceptance, by delay of mail
did not reach plalntlﬂ until after he
had sold the land to another, all the
acts of trespass being after the ac
and before
defendant had
ceptance
notice of the sale to the third person:
held, that this was no defense to a
recovery of single damages; but that
if the defendant made his acceptance
in good faith and committed the ai
ieged trespass in the belief that his
would secure to
letter of acceptance
him the title of the land, then he was
not a trespasser within the punltory
operation of the statute
(C. L., 5
11204), and was liable only for single
damages:
Wallace v. Finch. 24 Mich.,
255.
In an action under this section.
11204, the burden is on the plaintiff
to show that the cutting was without
leave
of the owner:
Padman
v.

Mich., 434; 85 N. W.,
1130.
On the other hand the burden
is on the defendant under section
11205 to show that the trespass was
casual and involuntary
if he would
escape the penalty of treble damages:
Michigan L. & I. Co. v. Deer Lake
Co., 60 Mich., 143; 27 N. \\'.. 10; 1
Am. St., 491; Iiart v. Doyle, 128
Treble
Mich., 257: 87 N. W., 219.
damages
under this statute are in
their nature punltory and cannot be
given where the injury arises from
neglect; there must be active
mere
misconduct: Michigan L. & I. Co. v.
Deer Lake 00., 60 Mich., 143; 27 N.
W., 10; 1 Am. St., 491.
In New
York
it is held, under a similar
statute, that the owner of land sub
ject to the life estate of another can
not, during the continuance of the life
estate, have treble damages for a tres
pass committed by one who enters by
permission of the tenant for life: Van
Dusen v. Young, 29 N. Y.. 9.
1~i—C. L., 5 11205. Under a declara
tion containlng a count for a common
law trespass and a count for a statu
tory trespass under the preceding 5
11204,
if the jury return a general
stating
verdict
of guilty,
without
under which count they ﬁnd. a judg
ment for single damages only can be
rendered.
in such case it is not com
petent for the court to apply the ver
dict to the count under the statute
and then proceed to render judgment
for treble the single damages returned
by the jury.
In such a case, in order
to
authorize a judgment for treble
it is necessary that the jury
damages,
return with their verdict, that they
ﬁnd the defendant guilty under the
count upon the statute:
Osborn v.
Lovell. 36 Mich., 245.
Notwithstanding
there may be only
single count in the
a
declaration,
claiming treble damages,
if the
yet
Rhodes,

126
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“And in all cases where a party has a right of action for the
taking of timber, or other trespass on lands, or for any injury
to lands, whether direct or consequential, it shall be lawful for
the party having such right of action to waive the tort and
bring assumpsit therefor/"-" And such suit may be commenced
by attachment!“
“If any person shall be ejected or put out of any lands or
tenements in a forcible and unlawful manner, or being put out,
be afterwards
holden and kept out by force, or with strong
hand, he shall be entitled to maintain an action of trespass,
and shall recover therein three times the amount of damages
assessed by the jury or a justice of the peace in the cases pro
vided by law.”"**
This section applies only to damages for a forcible eviction
and detainer. The taking and conversion of personal property,
though committed at the same time, and forming a part of the
same transaction, is distinct and different in its nature from an
If the declaration claims damages for
eviction and detainer.
both the eviction and the taking or injury to personal property,
the plaintiff, if he wishes to avail himself of the beneﬁt of
the statute, must take a separate assessment of the damages
by the eviction and detainer, and of those occa
occasioned
sioned by the taking and conversion of the personal property.
proof show that the trespass comes
any of the exceptions in 5
within
judgment for single damages
11205,
The jury can
only can be rendered.
find and assess single damages only,
and then it the proofs show that the
trespass comes within any of the ex
ceptions mentioned in the statute, the
single damages will be the amount for
which recovery may be had; but it
the prpofs fail to bring the trespass
within any of those exceptions,
then
the justice will treble the damages and
render a judgment for that amount:
Clark v. Field, 42 Mich., 342; 4 N.
W., 19.
15—C. L., 5 11207.
16—C. L., Q 11208.
18a—C. L., 5 11206.
A lessee of
lands, if in possession,
as well as the
owner. may maintain an action under
this section; therefore, a tenant for
years will be entitled to recover treble
damages
against his landlord for li.
wrongful and forcible entry under cir

cumstances speciﬂed
in the section:
Shaw v. Hoilfman.
21 Mich., 151.
A
tenant
who
has
unlawfully
been
evicted from i1 barn which he occupied
as a livery and boarding stable, by
his landlord, who destroyed the barn.
may recover damages
for the proper
length of time for the loss of proﬁts
from boarding the horses of others
as well as the diiference in cost of
keeping his own horses and oi’ hiring
them boarded,
where such damages
were the natural and proximate con
sequence of the trespass and eviction
complained of; and in a case coming
within the statute, such damages may
be trebied.
But damages to personal
property in a barn from which one has
evicted, and kept out.
been unlawfully
cannot be trebled under the statute:
Shaw v. Hoffman, 25 Mich., 162: Wil
son v. McCriiiles.
50 Mich., 347-8: 15
N. W., 504: Kiignnnon
v. Jenklnson,
.17 Mich., 325; 23 N. W.. 830.
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Unless he does so, the damages for the eviction and detainer
cannot be trebled."

To entitle the defendant to treble damages under either of
the sections, 11204 or 11206, he must declare upon the section
under which he claims the damages. But, if the‘ declaration
contains a count upon the statute, and a general count or claim
for damages for a trespass or injuries for which the statute
does not give treble damages, and damages are assessed by the

jury, generally, upon all the counts, or for both claims, the
damages cannot be trebled."
It will be a decisive objection that the declaration does not
refer to the statute. “This is essential, as notice to the de
fendant of the extent to which the plaintiff claims; otherwise
the former cannot be prepared to narrow the claim by bringing
The declaration
himself within the provisions of the act.”
should refer to the statute, so that the defendant may be ap
prised of the extent of the demand; and unless the defendant,
upon the trial, shall bring himself within the proviso of § 11205,
the jury will if it ﬁnd him guilty of the trespass alleged, assess
single damages, and upon this ﬁnding, the damages are to be
trebled by the court.” If the jury ﬁnd that the case is within
the second section, they should so state in their verdict, to pre
vent the trebling of the damages.”
17—Thayer
173.

176.

v.

Sherlock,

4

Mich.,
'

18-Benton v. Dale, 1 Cow., 160;
Moores v. Allen, 2 Wend., 247; Thayer
v. Sherlock, 4 Mich., 173; llowser v.
Melt-her, 40 Mich., 185: Ilitchcock v.
Pratt, 51 Mich., 263; 16 N. W., 639.
In such case the Jury should specify
in their verdict the amount of dam
ages awarded under the count upon
the statute, and the amount awarded
on the other count or claims: then
the damages awarded under the former
Ibld., Thayer
count may be trebled:
v. Sherlock, -1 Mich., 176, 177.
Un
der a declaration containing a count
law trespass, and a
for a common
count for a statutory trespass claim
ing treble damages,
it a general ver
dict oi’ guilty is returned. it is not
competent for the court to apply the
verdict to the count under the statute
and proceed
to render judgment tor
treble the damages.
In such case the
621

judgment on the verdict must be tor
only: Osborn v.
the single damages
Lovell, 36 Mich., 246; Russell v. My
ers, 32 Mich., 522; see, Clark v. Field,
42 Mich., 342; 4 N. W., 1i).
Under
the general issue pleaded to a declara
tion under the statute claiming treble
damages.
the defendant may‘ give evi
dence that the trespass was involun
tary and made under a bona tide claim
of right. and he need not give notice
of this defense
under the plea.
In
tort whatever goes in mitigation
of
damages may be given in evidence un
der the general issue: Osborn v. Lov
ell, 36 Mich., 246.
19—Brown v. Bristol, 1 Cow., 176;
Newcome
v. Butteriield, S J0hns., 343;
Howser v. Melcher, 40 Mich., 185.
20—Newcome v. Butteriield, 8 .‘Iohns.,
343; King v. Havens, 25 Wend., 420;
see,
Swift v. Applebone. 23 Mich.,
As to the construction of C. L.,
252.
5 11175, providing tor treble damages
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§619. The eviden08.—-Under the plea of the general issue
the plaintiff will have to prove: 1, the trespass; 2, the place
in which it was committed, so as to make it correspond with
the description of it in the declaration; 3, possession of the
place, and 4, the damage.
This may be done by some
1. He must prove the trespass.
person who was present at the time and saw it committed, or
by the admissions of the defendant, or in any manner connect
The time of the com
ing the defendant with the transaction.
mission of the trespass is immaterial, if it was before the com
mencement of the suit.
But evidence of only one trespass can
be given, unless the declaration contain several coimts, or the
trespass is stated to have been committed on such a day, and
“on divers other days and times between that day and the day
of the commencement of the suit.” In such case, the plaintiif
may prove as many acts of trespass of the nature laid in the
declaration, as he has counts, or as were committed between
the ﬁrst day mentioned and the commencement of the suit, as
he can; or at his option, he may in the last case give evidence
of a single trespass committed at some other time, but he can
not do both.21 The latter mode of stating a trespass would be
improper if the trespass must necessarily all have-been done
at one time, as taking a horse. But in such a case the plaintiﬁ
cannot recover but for one trespass." Under the allegation of
“other wrongs,” the plaintiif cannot prove anything not stated
in the declaration, unless it could not with decency be men
'
tioned in it."
2. It must be proved to have been committed by the defend
In an action of tres
ant, or by his orde-rs, or at his instigation.
pass against several defendants, it was held that to entitle the
plaintiff to a verdict against all the defendants as joint tres
passers, it must appear that they acted in concert in commit
ting the trespass complained of; that if some aided and assisted
the others in the trespass, all were equally guilty; or if some
employed the others to commit the trespass, or assented to the
in an action of
to be recovered
pass by complainant obtaining
tutlon of premises, see, Lane v.
ms Mlch., as; o1 N. W., 347.
2l—1 Saund., 24; Jamieson‘s
Hodson, 1 Starkie,
signees
v.

tresrcstiRuhl,

Gilbert v. Kennedy, 22 Mlch., 5; Mg.
Diarmid v. Caruthers, 34 Mlch., 49.
22—-2 Saund. Pl. _& Ev., 5 Am. ed.,
1004.

As151:
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23—1 Ibld., 158, 154.
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trespass committed by the others, having an interest therein,
they were all jointly guilty; that they must be convinced from
the evidence that all the defendants were acting in concert in

the trespass in question, or they could not all be found guilty;
but it would not be material if they have unequal interests in
the avails of the trespass, for all those who confederated to
do an unlawful act are deemed guilty of the whole, although
their share in the proﬁts may be small; but if any of the defend
ants were not guilty at all, or if any of them, though guilty,
were acting separately and for themselves alone, without any
concert with the others, they ought to be acquitted, and those
only found guilty who were acting jointly.“ The mere assent

of

party to

trespass committed does not always render him
a trespasser; it must have been com/mitted for his beneﬁt, or a
subsequent assent to or adoption of it will not have that
a

a.

If

the action be against several, and the plaintiif give
evidence of a trespass by all, he cannot afterwards give evi
dence of another trespass by some of them only, even although
he offer to waive the ﬁrst trespass; or if he give evidence of a
eﬁ'ect.25

trespass in which some only of them are implicated, he shall not
afterwards be allowed to give evidence of another trespass by
all." If the plaintiﬁ elect to prove a trespass against some
only of several defendants, the rest are entitld to an acquittal,
and may be acquitted immediately; so if at the close of the
plaintitt"s case there is no evidence against one defendant, the
plaintiff may then elect to go on against the other defendant
only.

It

proved that the trespass was committed in the
the declaration.
A material variance in this
In
trespass for breaking and entering
respect will be fatal.
the plaintiif’s close, “and then and there” taking and carrying
3.

must

close described

be

in

away his goods, the plaintiff cannot recover, even for the goods,
unless he prove an entry into his close, and a taking of the
The breaking and entering the close in such
goods therefrom.
24-—-Williams v. Sheldon, 10 Wend.,
654: see, East v. Cain, 49 Mich., 473;
13 N. W., 822.
25—Wilson v. Barker, 4 B. & Ad.,
614.

26—Howe v. Wilson. 1 Denio, 181.
But a separate count for taking and

i623

carrying away might be added, under
which a recovery for that part of
the trespass could be had:
Ihld.: see.
Ropps v. Barker, 4 Pick., 239; and
Van Leuven v. Lyke, 1 Comst., 516,
517.
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allegation, the substantial ground of
A dee
action, and the rest is laid as matter of aggravation?"
laration that defendant’s horse broke and entered plaintiiT’s
close, and injured p1aintiﬂ”s horse therein, need not allege that
kick and ﬁght, and
the defendant’s horse was accustomed
that defendant knew it.” The rule, that a scienter must be al
leged in the declaration, does not apply where the mischief
done by such animals while committing a trespass upon the
land of another.”
Possession
the close by the plaintiff at the time the

of

4.

is

t0_

case, is 'the substantive

a

is

The plaintiff must prove actual or
trespass was committed.
constructive possession of the premises, to sustain his acti0n.3°
The plaintiﬁ may so frame his declaration as to avoid
proof of possession in justice’s court. Thus, where a claim
of title
made in the declaration, the statute provides that
plea of title and delivers to
unless the defendant interposes
therein
a
bond
as
justice
the
directed, the justice shall have
jurisdiction of the cause, and shall proceed therein, and the de
fendant shall be precluded in his defense from all evidence

S

&

9

7

2

1 4

2

6

29—Higby
16 Johns.,
v. Williams,
P., 73;
215; Tait v. Harris,
C.
Ibfd., 596.
Hogarth v. Jackson,
30——But it seems not necessary that
the plaintiff should show possession to
in
every part oi’ the land described
it is sufficient if he
the declaration:
has possession of that part where the
King v.
trespass
was
committed:
Dunn, 21 Wend.. 253.
iVhile. as a
general rule, possesion
is necessary
to maintain an action of trespass on
lands, yet possession alone is suflicient
for that purpose against a mere wrong
Althous v. Rice,
doer or trespasser:
E. D. Smith, 347; Smith v. Milles,
R.,
480; Gourdier v. Cor
'l‘erm.
mack,
. D. Smith, 200; Hoyt ‘v.
(lelston, 13 .Tohns., 141; Ilurd v. West,
Cow., 752; Orser v. Storms,
Ibtd.,
And particularly
in cases where
687.
the plaintiﬂ is in the peaceable and
he may, whether
exclusive possession,

2

Comst.,

4

Leuven v. Lyke,

1

28—Van
515.

he has title or not, maintain the action
tor a trespass upon it against any
person except the real owner, or a per
son who has the right to the posses
sion: Palmer v. Aldridge, 16 Bax-b.,
131; Jackson v. Hazen,
Johns., 22;
lMd., 203, 211.
Jackson v. Harder,
But actual possession is not necessary
if pialntiﬂ! is the owner of the land
and entitled to immediate possession:
Wend., 466; Put
Aiken v. Buck.
Johns., 432.
nam v. Wyley.
A party
having title to unoccupied lands is
constructively in possession, and may
maintain trespass against one who en
ters without license or color of title:
Mlch., 406.
Sattord v. Basto,
Where
piainiiif sues for trespass upon wild
and uncultivated lands, which are not
in the actual possession of any one,
he must necessarily
show his title,
constructive pos
and thus make out
Cow.,
session: Iiubbel v. Rochester.
115; Hamilton
v. Accessory Transit
Co., 26 Barb., 46; Main v. Cooper. 11
See, ante,
E. P. Smith, 180, 184.
615 and notes.
a

Barb.,

S

11

4

Kocker,

a

v.

387.

5

27—Dunkle

1

drawing in question the title to lands, and any claim to title to
lands made by the plaint'1fi:' in his declaration, and therein
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described, shall be deemed to be admitted by the defendant.“
A claim of actual possession merely in the declaration would
not probably be of any avail under this section. The ques
tion of actual possession is not one of title within the statute,
and this the justice is authorized to try and determine.”
Where objection was made that the plaintiff in the justice’s
court failed to show himself in the actual possess-ion of the land,
the court said:
“The evidence was abundantly suﬁcient to
establish the pla.intiif’s actual possession of the premises in

lt

was shown that the lots on which the trespass
question.
was committed, had been used as the wood lot to the farm on
which the plaintiﬁ lived for about twenty years; that during
all that time, the plaintiff and his father, under whom he
claimed title, had cut their ﬁre-wood, saw-logs and rail-timber
on the lot, and had also made maple sugar thereon, and had a

for that purpose; that it was the only wood-lot
the plaintiff had, and had been used as such for twenty years;
that it was not fenced, nor was there any clearing upon it.
The precise dimensions oricontents of the lot are not given;
but it is fair to be inferred, from the evidence, that it was not
larger than was required for the purpose of fuel, fencing, etc.,
The plaintiff had all
for the farm to which it was attached.
the possession which can be had of a wood-lot, reserved and
A constant and unin
used exclusively for fuel, fencing, etc.
terrupted use for those purposes, is undoubtedly sufﬁcient to
constitute an actual possession, and to enable the plaintiff to
maintain trespass for an encroachment upon it.”33 But there
are cases in which the plaintiff cannot maintain an action at all
house thereon

A declaration in
31—C. L., 5 786.
trespass for breaking and entering the
plalntifﬂs close, without asserting and
describing a title in the plaintiff to
the lands. is not such a claim of title
as, under the statute, is admitted by
The land
the plea of the general issue.
was the close of the plalntlﬂl if he
even though
had peaceahle possession.
he had no title, and was not the pinin
if the defendant was
close
t1if‘s
Under such
possession.
in penceable
relies upon
a declaration the plaintiff
and the defendant may
his possession.
disprove it under the general issue:
Vandoozer v. Dayton, 45 Mich., 247:
40

7 N. W., 814.
But if the plaintiff
claims and describes a title in himself
in his declaration, it seems that the
the general
issue
defendant under
merely, will not be allowed to dis
pute it or claim any right of posses
slon in himself inconsistent thereto,
either before the justice or on appeal.
Ibid.: Gay v. Ilults, 55 Mich., 328: 21
N. W.. 357.
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32

iihle

v.

Quackenboss,

6

iiill.

537: Dewey v. Bordwell. 9 Wend.. 65.
33—l\iachln v. Geortner, 14 Wenti..
239; see, Jackson v. Myers. 3 Johns.,
388; Clowes v. Hawley, 12 Ibid., 485.
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without showing a title; these are when he is not in actual posp
session at the time of the commission of the trespass.“ In such
case he must make out a constructive possession by showing
an actual title. He must do so where the land is entirely wild,
vacant or common; indeed, in all cases where a pedis possessio
cannot be shown.“ It is to such eases and some others the
section“ applies; by which “If it appear on the trial, from the

plaintiﬁ"s own showing, that the title to the land is in question,
which title shall not be admitted by the defendant, the justice
shall certify the cause and papers to the circuit or district
court,” etc. The preceding remarks, as to showing title, have
no application to cases of trespass on land tried by a justice,
where any claim of title to the land is made by the plaintiff in
and therein described.

his declaration

it,

The damages—in general.
The intent with which the
§ 620.
trespass was committed, may be taken into consideration in
giving damages. Where the defendant had entered upon the
land as a surveyor, to measure off a portion of
which had
been sold for quit rent, he was allowed to show these facts in
mitigation of damages, as they tended to show, that the trespass

.'l4—iIubbel

v.

Rochester,

8

is

was not wilful and malicious, and that the defendant entered
under an honest though mistaken belief that his entry was
lawful.” It
provided by statute, that in certain cases the
Cow.,

115.

35—Willoughby
96.

v. Jenks,

20

Wend.,

98.

36--C. L.,

5

787. Ostrom v. Potter,
Mich., 44; 38 N. W.. 670.
Goertner,
37-—Wllloughby
V.
14
Wend., 239.
Where one commits a
trespass, it is immaterial whether he
expected
damages
to result
or not.
lie must be held to contemplate all
which legitimately follow
the damages
from his illegal act.
And ii’. from
the nature of the case, the amount of
the damages cannot be estimated with
certainty, or only a part oi’ them can
be so estimated. all the circumstances
of the case, having any tendency
to
snow the probable amount of dam
may
ages.
placed
be
before
the
Jury, so as to enable them to make
the most intelligible
and probable es
timate which the nature of the case
71

will permit.
Where, by defendant's
trespass, the plaintiti! was deprived tor
the remainder of his term, of premises
leased
by him, he is not limited
in
damages
to such sum
as the term
might be worth to others, or to the
diiference between
the rent he was
paying and the fair rental of the prem
ises.
If the premises were of much
greater and peculiar value to him on
account of the business he had es
tablished there. and the resort oi’ cus
place and
iomers to that particular
the good will of the place in his trade
or business, and if the trespass ren
dered the piace untenable whereby he
was obliged to remove to another place
of business,
he is entitled
to show
that his business fell oi! in conse
quence.
and how much, and to have
damages
accordingly:
Allison
v.
Chandler, 11 Mich., 542; see, Druse
So, where
v. Wheeler. 22 Mich., 439.
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plaintiff shall recover three times the amount of the damages
which shall be assessed therefor by the jury or justice.
The
mode of proceeding under the statute is this: the jury, or
justice, ﬁnd him guilty of the trespass alleged, and assess the
single damages in terms, and this is to be trebled by the court
and judgment rendered for the amount.-*8
The verdict is,
that the jury ﬁnd the defendant guilty, and assess him single
damages therefor to the amount of . . . . dollars.
Defense under the general issue.—It is competent‘ for
§ 621.
the defendant to prove that he did not commit the trespass,
or order or procure it to be committed, or that it was not
committed in the place described in the declaration, or that the

plaintiif was not in possession of the land at the time the tres
pass was committed, or any matter in mitigation of the dam
ages.
But he cannot set up any title in himself, or a third
person to the premises; and if any claim of title to the land
is made by the plaintiff in-his declaration, and therein de
scribed, it is admitted by the defendant," otherwise it would
defendant’s trespass, piaintiﬁ! was
deprived of pasture which
he
was
using, to fatten beef cattle, and for
want of the pasture the cattle lost in
ﬂesh
and quality of the beef: held,
that he was not limited in damages
to the market value of the pasture of
which he was deprived. but that he
might receive the difference between
the value of the cattle as they were
and what they would have been at the
end of the pasture season if they had
had the beneﬁt of the pasture, anl also
as he was necessarily
such expense
put to in providing pasture elsewhere
for the cattle.
In an action of tres
the declaration being full and
pass
speciﬁc as to the means by which
the damages
claimed were occasioned,
evidence
of damages concerning which
the declaration is silent, and contained
allegations
no
which would include
them, is inadmissible:
Gilbert v. Ken
For a discussion
nedy. 22 Mich., 117.
of the measure of damages in trespass,
see that case.
Where drain proceed
ings were invalid. damages in trespass
for the construction
of
the
drain
by

would be nominal if in fact the drain
as constructed was a beneﬁt rather
than an injury if plaintiff did not in
tend to ﬁll up the drain; but if plain
tii'l.' did intend to ﬁll it up as not
desiring the same, the cost of doing
so is a proper element of damages:
Burtraw v. Clark, 103 Mich., 383; 61
N. W., 552.
In case of willful tres
pass with cutting timber an allow
nnce of interest from the commission
of the trespass is permissible:
Gates
v. Comstock, 113 Mich., 127; 71 N. W.,
515.
The motive and reasons for
entering plaintiffs close may be shown
as affecting the question of damages:
Carter v. Bedortha, 124 Mich., 548;
83 N. W., 277.
ante, Q 618,
38-—See,
and notes,
and cases cited; and Swift v. Apple
hone. 23 Mich., 252.
39-C. L., 5 786. Ostrom v. Potter,
104 Mich., 115; 62 N. W., 170; Sands
v. Manlstee Circuit Judge, 116 Mich.,
9: 74 N. W., 178. So he may prove
of damages:
anything in mitigation
Carter v. Bedortha, 124 Mich., 548; 83
N. W., 277.
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declaration setting forth possession of the land
merely, would not be such a “claim of titlb,” as to excuse the
plaintiif from proving his right to recover, in the same manner
not

be.

if no

claim of title had been made in the declaration.
The term “title,” here, as well as in other places in the chap
ter, would not embrace the fact of possession, nor any right
founded on possession alone.“
as he must

Notice of title to 1and.—“In every action where the
in anywise come in question, the defendant
may give notice thereof, under the general issue, upon the
return day, or any adjourned day of such action, and may also
§622.

title

to lands shall

give notice of any other matter of defense to the action.”41
This notice may be given not only in actions for trespass on
lands, but in all actions where the defense involves the trial of
a question of title to lands.
The defense that the place in
which the trespass was committed is a private or public way,
involves the title, and cannot be tried by a justice,“ not even
by consent of the parties.“ A plea in abatement in an action
Iiill,
6
v. Quackenboss,
40—Ehie
537; see, Vandoozer v. Dayton, 45
Mich., 247; 7 N. W., 813.
If the
is licensed to enter notice of
defense
v.
Vanderkarr
it musti be given:
Thompson, 19 Mich., 82; Seneca] v.
Labadie, 42 Mich., 126; 3 N. W.,
296; license to enter for one pur
if entry is for
is no defense
pose
Kent County Ag. Soc. v.
another:
Ide, 128 Mich., 423; 87 N. W.. 369.
Statute of limitations must be plead
Mich.,
127
ed:
Bellows v. Butler,
100: 86 N. W., 533.
Jackson v. Sou
41——C. L., § 782.
tler, 82 Mich., 648: 46 N. W.. 1027.
After a plea of title interposed. the
plaintiff cannot amend his declaration.
Therefore, the declaration should de
scribe the lands upon which the al
trespass was committed; if it
leged
does not, and if on such plea or no
tice the defendant. at the trial in the
court, proves himself
to be
circuit
the owner of any lands in the same
lands lie,
township where plalntiﬂ‘s
McFarlane
_he will defeat the action:
v. Ray, rt ai, 14 Mich., 465. The claim
of title oi’ plaintii! is to be deemed
admitted unless the notice is given:

Van Doozer v. Dayton, 45 Mich., 247;
7 N. -W., 814; Ramsby v. Blgler. 129
Mich., 570: 89 N. W., 344.
Tenancy
is a species of title within the mean
ing of
in the
that
term
stat
ute:
Van Doozer v. Dayton, supra,
C. L., 55 782 and T89 contemplate a
trial in the circuit court upon the
merits where the justice certiﬁes the
case
and
it is not proper practice
to dismiss the case because it is de
termined that title does not come in
question:
Dolahanty
v. Lucey,
101
Mich., 113; 59 N. W., 415; Newcombe
v. Irwin, 55 Mich., 520: 22 N. W.. 66;
Taylor v. Montcalm
Circuit Judge,
122 Mich., 692; 81 N. W., 965.
A party may, for the purpose of
identifying
and proving his title to
personal property, show that it was
taken from off certain lands and that
he was the owner thereof. but this does
not bring the matter of the title to
land in question:
Hart v. Hart. 48
Mich., 175: 12 N. W., 33.
42—Striker v. Mott. 6 Wend., 465;
see, Brooks
1 hIich..
v. Delrymple,
145: Randall v. Crandali, 6 Hill.. 342.
v. Mott, 6 Wend., 465.
43—Striker
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of trespass on land of non-joinder of a tenant in common with
the plaintiff, is a plea showing that the title to lands will
come in question, and, if veriﬁed, must be received by the jus
tice.“ It would seem that.such a defense must be pleaded, as
the general issue would be a waiver of it.
“Such plea and notice shall be in writing, and signed by the
defendant or his attorney, and delivered to the justice.”‘“‘
This defense is not conﬁned to the action of trespass to land
only; it may be interposed in all actions where title to lands
is involved.
Proceeding, where notice of title to a portion of
§623.
counts only.—“If the plaintiﬁE"s declaration in a suit before a
justice shall contain several counts or causes of action, to one
or more of which a defense, bringing in question the title of
lands, shall be interposed by the defendant, and he shall ten
der a plea and notice to such count [court], and deliver a bond
as above provided, the justice shall discontinue proceedings for
such cause of action; and for the other causes of action the

justice may continue his proceedings.”4°
Thus, if the plaintiif’s declaration contain, as it may, several
causes of action, as for an entry on lands, and also for taking
away and injuring personal property, unconnected with an
entry on lands. and the defendant wishes to plead title to lands
to a part only, as, for instance, to the entry on the lands, the

it

is,

plea of the general issue with notice of the title should be con
ﬁned to that part, and to the residue, that
the count or
counts for taking, etc., the personal property, he may plead
the general issue, or any other plea, or not plead at all, and the
as in other
justice as to such residue will proceed and try
The costs in such cases would abide the event of the
cases.“
'

suit before the justice.

342; Riggs v. Sterling, 51
159; 16 N. W.. 320.
46-C. L., 790. See, Riggs v. Ster
ling, 51 Mich., 159; 1e N. W., .220;
Dolahanty v. Lucey, 101 Mich., 117:
59 N. W., 415.
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47—Edwards’

Treatise,

2

§

Hill,

Mich.,

§

v. Hall, 13 .‘iohns., 286;
East v. Cain. 49 Mich., 473; 13
N. W.. 822.
The notice ot title
783.
45—C. L.,
under the plea must be in writing.
An oral notice would not be in com
pliance with the statute. and the jus
tice should disregard it and proceed
Randall v. Crandaii,
with the cause:

6

44-Austin

see,

ed.,

69.
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notice.-“At

the time of tender
ing such plea and notice, the defendant, with at least one
suﬂicient surety to be approved by the justice, shall enter into
a bond to the plaintiff, in a penalty of at least two hundred
dollars, conditioned that such defendant will pay any judg
ment that may be rendered against him in such action in the

Bond with plea and

§ 624.

circuit court of such county, and shall also pay the plaintiff’s
costs legally incurred at that time, not exceeding the amount
allowed by law in justice’s courts, and also the sum of one
dollar to the justice for certifying the cause to the circuit
court, together with the sum of two dollars as an entry fee
for the use of the county, which last sum shall be paid to the
clerk of the county by said justice at the time such justice shall
certify the cause to the circuit court.“
“Such bond shall

and such fees and costs shall
be paid to the justice at the time of tendering such plea and
notice, and the justice shall thereupon, without further pro
ceeding, certify the cause and papers to the circuit court of the
county where the same may be tried; and the costs so paid by
the defendant shall be allowed to him if he recover costs in the
be delivered

action in that court.”'*°
notice of title in an action for a trespass to land de
scribed in the declaration, the defendant is entitled to a verdict,
if he establish a title to that part of the land on which trespass

On

a.

was committed, and is not bound to prove a title to the whole
land.°°

“If such

bond be not delivered and such fees and costs paid
as herein directed, the justice shall have jurisdiction of the
cause, and shall proceed therein, and the defendant shall be
precluded in his defense from all evidence drawing in question
the title to lands; and any claim of title to lands made by the
plaintiff in his declaration, and therein described, shall be
deemed to be admitted by the defendant.”°1
48—C.
49——C.

L.,
L.,

Q 784.
5 785: Gay v. Hults, 55
21 N. W., 357.
It the

Mich., 327;
justice certiﬁes the case without receiving
uﬂicient to pay costs
and
without approving the bond the certiﬂcation is ineffective:
Hindeman v.

Spauldlng,
901

-—

Mich.,

(Oct, 1904).

—;

100

N. W.,

50—Smith v. Royston, 8 M. G: W..
381; King v. Dunn, 21 Wend.. 253.
51——-C. L., 5 786.
See, Gay v. Huits,
55 Mich., 328; 21 N. W., 357.
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If

it

it,

the defendant does not give the bond, the notice of title
amounts to nothing, and the action goes on just as though title
had never been mentioned.
The defendant cannot avail him
self of
was received at joining issue without objec
though

fendant only admits title,

stated in the declaration.
a

a

a

suit

is

removed from
justice by the delivery of
plea and notice, and
bond as above provided, the plaintiff in
such suit shall not be permitted to declare or to give evidence
only for the same cause of action whereon herelied before the
a

“When

if

a

a

The defendant cannot set up
trial, because
title on
the statute says he shall not." By not giving the bond the de

tion.

justice, and the plea and notice of the defendant
which he tendered before the justice.”°3

shall be the

same

is

’s

’s

it

Title in issue on plaintiff
own showing.—“If
§625.
own showing, that the
appear on the trial from the plaintiff
in question, which title shall not be admit
title to lands
defendant, the justice shall, without further
proceeding, certify the cause and papers to the circuit or dis
trict court of the county where the same shall be tried; and the
party in whose favor judgment shall be rendered in the circuit
ted

by the

or district court, shall recover costs, which shall include
costs before the justice.”°4

his

is

“If

it

The section of the statute of New York upon which the cases
shall appear on the
hereinafter cited arose, enacts that,
trial, from the plaintiﬁ"s own showing, that the title to lands
in question, which title shall be disputed by the defendant, the

v.

Crandali,

Iiiii,

1

§

5

In New York it
53-C. L..
788.
has been held that where defendant
pleads title to a declaration for tres
court. the
pass on lands, in ;|ustlce's
piaintlﬂ.
if he prosecute the suit in
the common pleas. might there declare
describing the land,
particularly
by
although the declaration in the jus
tice's court was general, and contained
People v.
no description of the land:
Albany C. P., 16 Wend., 123; but
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I

to the contrary,
McFarland
v.
Ray et al, 14 Mlch., 465, 470.
See,
also, Gay v. Ilults, 55 Mlch., 329; 21
N. W., 357; Labeau v. Labeau. 61
Mlch., 84-5: 27 N. W., 861.
Gay v. Hults, 55
787:
54—C. L.,
Mlch., 3271 21 N. W., 357. holding
that the oﬂ'er of deeds in evidence of
right of possession
showed
title in
See, Brooks v. Deirympie.
question.
Mlch., 145, and Ross v. Finlay. 27
Mlch.,
Graydon v. Church,
268:
Mlch., 44.
see,

342.

7

52—Iiandail

6

justice shall dismiss the cause,” etc. It will be noticed that
the words in our statute are, “Which title shall not be admitted

§ 626

TRESPASS T0 arm. PROPERTY,

On.

XXXVII.

In case the declaration sets forth any
by the defendant.”
claim of title to lands made by the plaintiff, the defendant
would be precluded in his defense from any evidence drawing
in question the title to lands. In some cases it will be neces
sary for the plaintiﬂ’ to prove a title to land, in order to main

tain his action. Thus, if an action be brought for a trespass
on land of which the plaintiﬁ" has no actual possession, as, for
instance, wild lands, he will be compelled, unless he has set
forth in his declaration his claim of title to the lands, to prove
a title to them, and thus make out a constructive possession.
Proof of title may be necessary in other actions beside tres
pass on lands, and it is to such cases this section applies. When
the title is not pleaded before the justice, he is not ousted of
jurisdiction, because it may be necessary to prove title; unless
such title shall be disputed (shall not be admitted) by the
defendant." If the party will entitle himself to a dismissal,
he must call the justice ’s attention speciﬁcally to the objection,
by at least disputing the title claimed. If he admits this, it is
a waiver a.nd virtual assent that the evidence of title shall
be received; and that the title, as made out, shall pass with
out being drawn into dispute. The statute is founded on the
impropriety of a title to land being tried and determined by
If it be conceded, or be assumed by both
a justiee’s court.
parties, thus passing without dispute on the trial, the plaintiff
does not in the words of the statute show it to be in question.
There is, in fact, no question about it; and the evil of trying
the title does not arise. ‘The justice has jurisdiction of the
subject matter, as it is presented by the pleadings, and it is
in the election of the defendant whether he shall retain it. The
defendant may move a dismissal; and probably, under the stat
ute, disputing the title would be equivalent to that.
But if he
omit to do so, he comes within the rule that consent takes away

error."
Of judgment.-“If the judgment in such suit in the
circuit or district court shall be for the plaintiﬂ, he shall re
§626.

55—-Bellows v. Sackett, 15 Barb.,
Browne v. Scoﬂeld. B Ibld., 241;
Koon v. Mazuzun, 6 H111, 44; Koon v.
Mazuzan,
v.
Ibid., 271; Wllloughby
!’\6;
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Wend., 96; Whiting v. Dud
Wend., 373.
56-Koon v. Mazuzan, 6 HIIL, 44;

Jenks.
ley.

271.

19
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cover double costs; if it be for the defendant (other than judg
ment of nonsuit), and the presiding judge of the court before
which the issue is tried, shall certify that the title to lands
did not come in question, the defendant shall not recover costs,

but shall pay costs to the plaintiff.

”"

case of defective fences—at common law.
-—At the common law, a man was not bound to fence his lands
§ 627.

'I'respa.ss

in

against cattle. but the owner of the beasts was bound to re
strain them, and was answerable for any trespass which they
might commit upon the lands of another. And it was a matter
of no moment whether the cattle came in from the highway,
or from the land of the owner of the beasts, or through the
land of

a

third person.

Such was the general ruleﬁs

And now, in. relation to such animals as cannot be restrained
by those enclosures which farmers of experience would pro
nounce proper and sufficient fences, the owner would be bound
to keep them within l1is own close, and would be answerable
for all injury arising from their being abroad." By statute,
“When any person is injured in his land, by sheep, swine,
horses, asses, mules, goats or neat cattle, he may recover his
damages in an action of trespass, or trespass on the case,
against the owner of the beasts, or against the person having
the care and control of such beasts, or by distraining the beasts
doing the damage, and proceeding therewith as hereinafter
directed; but if the beasts shall have been lawfully on the ad
joining lands, and shall have escaped therefrom in consequence
of the neglect of the person who has suffered the damage, to
maintain his part of the division fences, the owner or person

having the control of the beasts shall not

be liable

for such

da.mage.”°°
To the above mentioned rule of the common law, there are
1, By statute; 2, By agreement; 3, By pre
three exceptions:
The ﬁrst two only have any application here.
scription.
57——C. L., 5 789.
See. People v.
Wayne Ch-. Judge, 14 Mich., 33: and
Gay v. Hults, 55 Mich., 327; 21 N. W.,
Double costs in such cases con357.
sists of the usual single costs and
Gilbert
one-halt thereof in addition:
V. Kennedy: 22 Mich., 519.

58-Stafford
59—Bush
note

a.

60—C.
368.
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lngersol. 3 Hill, 39.
Bralnard, 1 Cow., 79.

v.

v.

5 10691.

See, 20 Mich.,
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§628. Trespass in case of defective fences—by statute.—By
statute, “all fences four and one half feet high and in good
repair, consisting of rails, timber, boards, wire or stone walls
or any combination thereof, and all brooks, rivers, ponds,
creeks, ditches and hedges, or other things which shall be con
sidered equivalent thereto, in the judgment of the fence view
ers, within whose jurisdiction the same may be, shall be deemed
legal and sufficient fences.”°1
“The respective occupants of lands inclosed with fences,
shall keep up and maintain partition fences between their own
and the next adjoining enclosures, in equal shares, so long as
both parties-continue to improve the same.”62
This statute relates to partition fences between the owners or
occupants of adjoiwing lands only.“ The remedy given by the
statute is not limited to the owner of the fee, but any person
occupying land, and interested in making and maintaining a

division fence, be his estate or interest in the premises what it
may, is entitled to avail himself of the provisions of the stat
ute.“ The neglect to build or repair, as required by the stat
ute, renders the parties liable, in damages, for injuries arising
from such neglect. But before the party can be made liable for
defect of his partition fence, the proportion which he is bound
to build or repair must be assigned, by agreement or pursuant
to the statute,“-" and until this is done neither party is obliged
to maintain any part of it.“ When the proportions are ascer
tained, the liability of the parties begins. Then the party in
default in making or keeping in repair his proportion of the
fence is liable for any injury to the owner of the adjoining
61—C. L., § 2415;
As amended by
Pub. Acts, 1903. p. 123, to include
wire fences.
See. 21 Mich., 407.
62—C. L., 5 2416.
See. for an in
terpretation of this statute, Johnson
v. Wing, 3 Mich., 167: Aylesworth
v.
Herrlngton,
17 Mich., 417; Lantis v.
Reithmiiier, 95 Mich., 45; 54 N. W.,
713.

63—Staii!ord v. Ingersoi, 3 Hill, 38.
6-i—Bronk v. Becker. 17 Wend., 320.
65-—C.
L.. § 2419.
66—Bush v. Brainard,
1 Cow., 79,
note 0.: Ayiesworth v. Herrington,
17
Mich., 417.
\\'bere one oi.‘ two owners
of adjoining lands put cattle on his

lands, from which they entered
the lands ot the other, there be
fence,
ing no partition
it was held
that he was liable therefor:
Johnson
3 Mich.,
v. Wing,
163.
And it is
apprehended that this is the rule now,
unless. by agreement between the ad
joining owners, or by assignment un
der the statute, the respective portions
of the fence to be maintained by each
has been assigned to him, and the
cattle entered by reason oi’ defect in
the fence assigned to the plaintiff to
be maintained by him:
See. C. L.,
5 2436, and Ayiesworth v. Herrington,
17 Mich., 417.
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land by reason of his cattle going on to such land, and the
owner of the adjoining land, not in fault, is not liable for any
injury arising from cattle going from his land upon the land of
the one who is in fault.
The rule would be the same in case the
cattle going from the land of the latter on the land of the other
were lawfully on the land of the party in default."
In such
case, to excuse himself, the owner of the cattle must show, not
only that the fences which the adjoining proprietor was bound
to maintain were out of repair, but also that the cattle passed
over such defective fence."
The statute further provides that, “No person shall be en
titled to recover any sum of money, in any action at law, for
damages done upon lands by any beast or beasts, unless the
partition fences by which such lands are wholly or in part en
closed, and belonging to such person, or by him to be kept in
repair shall be of the same height and description as is required
by the provisions of section one, chapter eighteen, of the Re
vised statutes of eighteen hundred and forty-six, being section
six hundred and ﬁve of the Compiled Laws.“
67—Stafford v. Ingersoil, 3 Hill, 38.
68—Deyo v. Stewart, 4 Denio, 103.
The supreme
69—C. L., 5 2436.
court, in construing this, and C. L.,
held, that
the purpose of
Q 2416,
the provisions was to compel
every
person to discharge his duty in re
gard to partition fences at the peril of
such
losses
as he might suifer from
the depredations committed in conse
of his neglect,
quence
by the beasts
of those persons to whom the duty was
owlng—the
adjacent occupant:
that
the duty of any person
to keep up
fence is created by stat
a partition
ute in favor and for the protection
and that
of the adjoining proprietor:
before that duty can become ﬁxed so
us to require him to keep in repair
any particular portion of such parti
ﬁrst,
tion fence,
it must appear:
that the adjoining proprietor improves
his land: and, second. that either by
consent or by the action of the fence
viewers, a portion of the partition
fence between them has been assigned
Adjoining
to him to keep in repair.
proprietors are at liberty. if they see
tit, to dispense with partition
fences
altogether. and if such
fences
are

portion thereof
no particular
to either to be kept in repair
by him, until in some legal mode the
partition is made.
Until one or the
other has taken the necesmry steps
to effectuate such division,
it is to
be presumed he is satisfied to trust
his property to such securities as the
rules of the common law can give him,
and to respond in damages under those
rules, if his beasts commit injury on
the lands of other persons: that until
an apportionment and division, neither
occupant is required to keep any fence
on any part of the line between them,
but each is liable in ‘trespass if his
cattle go upon the land of the other,
whether there be any partition fence
or not. So where the cattle of C went
on to the lands of A, and from thence
premises of B,
on to the adjoining
there being no fence between the lands
of A and B, nor any apportionment
of the respective parts of the parti
tion fence to be maintained by each.
held, that no matter whether C's cat
tle were lawfnily on the land of A or
not, he was liable in trespass to B:
Aylcsworth
v. Harrington,
17 Mlch.,
And it would seem from the
417.
erected,
belongs
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§ 629. Trespass in case of defective fences—in case of special
agreement.—An agreement settling the proportions of the par
tition fence would, doubtless, have the same effect as an assign
ment under the statute; though in order to be effectual, it must
be made by the parties to the suit, or those under whom they

claim."
_
As against a highway, where cattle have no right to run, no
fence at all is necessary to enable the owner of the land~ to
maintain trespass. The only right which the public acquire by
laying out a highway is to pass and repass thereon; the fee of
the land subject to this right still remains in the owner, and he
receives no compensation for anything else. For no other pur
pose have the public any right there. The owner of cattle can
not turn them into the highway to graze or,pasture there on
'
the lands of others."
If any person shall determine not to improve any part of his
lands adjoining any partition fence that may have been di
vided according to the provisions of this chapter, and shall
give six months’ notice of such determination to all the ad
joining occupants of lands, he shall not be required to keep up
or support any part of such fence during the time his lands
shall lie open and unimproved."
The effect of this section, is to place the parties in the same
situation as they were by the common law; the party giving the

notice is bound to keep his cattle on his own premises, and if
they pass on to the adjoining land where the fence assigned
him is located, he will be liable in trespass.”
License, what is, and effect 0f.—A license to enter on
§ 630.
land is a mere authority, personal to the grantee, and revocable
at the will of the grantor," unless upon a valuable considera
is not
case that a proprietor
required under any circumstances to
fence against the beasts of any person
whose premises do not adjoin his.
in an action between adjacent own
ers for trespass by cattle, the plaintiﬂ
cannot recover if the responsibility
for the support oi.’ the line fence has
been divided under C. L.. 5 2416, and
the cattle entered
in consequence
of
his failure to keep up his share; but
the defendant has the burden oi’ prov
ing that such division was made: East
v. Cain, 49 Mich., 473; 13 N. W., 822.
above

70—Burger v. Kortright, 4 Johns.,
414; Rust v. Low, 6 Mass., 97: Bush
v. Brainard,
1 Cow., 79:
note u..;
Aylesworth
v. Harrington.
17 Mich.,
417; Talmadge v. The Rensselaer 8: S.
R. R. Co., 13 Barb., 493.
71—Stackpole v. Henley. 16 Mass,
33; Wells v. Howell. 19 Johns., 385.
See.

C.

L.,

§ 2271.

72—C. -L., § 2432.
73-—Holladay
v. Marsh,

142.
74—l?.'v

Mumford
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parts, (‘oburn. 1 Cow., 568;
Whitney, 15 Wend., 380;
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It is an authority to do a particular act, or series of
acts, upon another’s land, and conveys no interest therein; it
is executory, and may be revoked at pleasure; but acts done
under it before the revocation are no trespass.’-’* It is founded
in personal conﬁdence, and not assignable. This doctrine is
applicable only to the temporary occupation of land, and con
fers no right or interest in the land. If A agrees with B that
he may enter upon his land -and occupy it for a year, that is not,
properly speaking, a license merely-; it is more—it is a lease. If
an interest greater than a temporary occupation was to be cre
ated, it might be an easement, as, a right of way; such an ease
ment is or may be a permanent interest in the land, and must
tion.

Such an interest is not properly a li
It cannot
cense; it may be assigned and cannot be revoked.
be granted by parol."
The statute" declares that no estate
or interest in land, other than leases, for a term not exceeding
one year, etc., shall be created, etc., unless by act or operation
of law, or by a deed or conveyance in writing, etc. Notwith
be founded upon grant.

standing this statute, however, a parol grant of an estate or
interest therein mentioned, would not be absolutely void; it
would operate as a license and protect the party, to whom it
was given, in all acts done under it prior to its revocation.”
An agreement to sell land, whether in writing or not, is not of
itself a license to enter, nor does an actual license to enter,
confer a right to cut the timber.”
A
Druse v. Wheeler. 22 Mlch., 439.
licensc is a permission to do some act
or series of acts on the land of the
llcenser, without having any perma
It is founded on
nent interest ln it.
and is not the-re~
personal conﬁdence,
fore assignable; it may be in writing
or by parol: it may be without con
it is subject to revocation
sideration:
of
the statute
and is not within
frauds: Morrlll v. Mackman, 24 Mlch.,
279: as to revocation, see, Hltchens
v. Shaller, 32 Mlch., 496.
75—-Millerd v. Reeves, 1 Mlch., 111;
Wetherbee v. Green, 22 Ibid., 311: Mll
ler v. Auburn & Syracuse Ry Co., 6
Hill, 61; Pierrepont v. Barnard, 2
Seld.,
A mere license to enter
279.
upon land an}! cut timber need not be
in any particular
form. nor will it
confer any legal right to do so; but

it will protect

the licensee so far as
has acted under it before revoca
tion: Wetherbee v. Greenand others,
22 Mlch., 311; Haskell
v. Ayres. 35
Mlch., 89.
A contract for the future
sale and conveyance of land gives no
present right of possession to the ven
dee wlthdut special provisions to that
elfect:
Druse v. Wheeler. 22 Mlch..
439; and see. Druse v. Wheeler, 26
Mlch., 189.
76—Mumford v. Whitney, 15 Wend..
he

380.

77—C.

L.,

5 9509.
v. Auburn

78-—Mlller

& Syracuse
Ry. Co., 6 Hill, 61.
79—Sulfern v. Townsend. 9 Johns,
35; Cooper v. Stower, Ibtd., 331: Eg
gleston v. New York & H. R. R. Co.,
35 Barb., 162, 167; Erwin v. Olmsted,
7 Cow., 299.
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it

it,

Where it appeared that the defendant had bought some hay
being on plaintiff ’s land, and by the terms of sale, to which the
plaintiff was a party, the buyer was to be allowed to enter at
was held that after the sale, the plain
any time to remove

tiff could not countermand the

that
was an essential
part of the contract and irrevocable; and that the defendant
having broken open the gates (which had been locked by the
plaintiif to prevent defendant from entering), entered and took

it

license,

I

a

man takes my
away the hay, was justiﬁed in so doing.” “If
goods and carries them into his own land,
may justify my
entry into the said land to take my goods again; for they came
there by his own act.”81
But a. right to come in and remain for
a certain time on the land of another, can be granted only by
deed; and a parol or written license to do so, though money be

is

it

of

a

is

it,

revocable at any time, and without paying back
paid for
the money."
The preceding case," was
case of not mere
interest,
license, but of a license coupled with an
The hay, by
the sale, became the property
the defendant, and the license
to remove
became irrevocable by the plaintiff.
Where an authority to enter on land
given by law, and
the party after the entrance abuses the license thus obtained,
becomes
trespasser from the beginning; but when the
entry
by the license in fact of the other party, an abuse of
that license will not have that effect.“ One who stands in a
street, on soil belonging to the owner of an adjoining lot, and
abusive and insulting language towards him,
a trespasser, but not ab initio.“
there wrongfully, and
is

there uses

is

is

a

he

a

a

is

a

Ad.

Ell.,

82—W0od

v.

Manly.

11

Ad.

EIL,

34.

M.

W.,
W.,

84--Dumont v. Smith,
Denlo. 319;
Wend., 506; Van
Allen v. Crofoot.
Brunt v. Schenck, 13 John.. 414: Ad
ams v. Rivers. 11 Barb.. 390.
85—Adams v. Rivers, 11 Barb., 390.
5

4

v. Colerlek,

484.
838.

83—Wood

&

11

k

81—I'atrlck

Manly,

&

v.

3

80~—Wood
34.

&

it

is

it

it,

a

it

it

§

Individual cannot justify that he was aba-ting pub
lic nuisance.-A private person cannot justify damaging the
property of another, on the ground that
nuisance to a
does him a special injury.
public right, unless
If there be a
nuisance in
public highway,
private individual cannot of
his own authority, abate
does him a special injury,
unless
and he can only interfere with
so far as
necessary to ex
631.

v. Ledbltter,

13 M.
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his right of passing along the highway; an‘d without
considering whether he must show that the abatement of the
nuisance was absolutely necessary to enable him to pass, we
clearly think that he cannot justify doing any damage to the
ercise

it,

property of the person who has improperly placed the nuisance
he might have passed with
in the highway, if, avoiding
reasonable convenience.“

2

&

6

6

9

3

on a. public way is not necessarily a
nuisance, an owner of the soil
legal
in any way which does
may use
not interfere with the public conven
A public nuisance cannot be
ience.
lawfully abated by a private person
special
some
unless he has suffered
damage not common
to others: Clark
v. Lake St. Clair Ice Co., 24 Mich.,
it

86—Wetmore v. Tracy, 14 Wend.,
250; Harrower
37 Barb.,
v. Rltson,
301: Rogers v, Rogers, 14 Wend., 131;
Hill, 604; i-iart
Drake v. Rogers,
Wend., 571;
v. Mayor oi.’ Albany.
Wend., 651; Koon
Denning v. Roome,
Hill, 271; Dimes v. Pet
v. Mazuzan,
ley, 15 Ad.
Ell.. N. S., 276; and
Doug. Mich.,
see, Welsh v. Stowell.
332; and Clark v. Lake St. Clair Ice
Co., 24 Mich., 508.
An encroachment

508.
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5635.
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Nature
Having
Actual

of the action.
title without possession.
possession
suﬂicient.
Proof of conversion essential.

was. Conversion

through

wrongful

taking.

through
wrongful
§637. Conversion
exercise 01 dominion’
c0l1V8i‘Bi0l1

d°t°"“°"5 839.

Demand when

tl1l'0llRh

wrongful

necessary.

of demand not
5640. When refusal
conversion.
5641 A lien will justify retention.
£5642 Conversion by accession.
by
ceﬂfvslon
of
5643 C°"@"*l°"

56“

goods.

by tenams in c°m'
Cogfilrslon
§645. Defense under the general issue.
1
§646_ Lfeasure of damages_
of damages.
~56-17 Mitigation
Judgment for plalntlﬂ, effect of.
§6-48

Nature of the action.-—'I‘rover is a. form of remedy
§632.
adopted for the recovery of damages for an injury occasioned
to a person having the property in, or right of possession of,
personal property, through a wrongful conversion by the de
fendant of such property.
Trover is in general a concurrent remedy with trespass for
the unlawful taking and conversion of goods.
Trover may
often be brought where trespass cannot; as where goods are
lent or delivered to another to keep, and he refuses to deliver
them on demand, trespass does not lie, but the proper remedy
is trover. So where the taking is lawful, or at least excusable,
trespass cannot be supported, but the owner must bring trover.1
1—1 Chltty's Pl., 10 Am. ed.. 161:
And
is wrongfully
where property
taken from the possession of the owner
and sold. he has his election to bring’
replevin or to recover its value in
Eggieston v. lilundy, 4 Mich.,
trover:
295.
Trover lies for the conversion
of personal property or chattels only:
It will not
2 Saund. Pl. & Ev., 1155.
lie for ﬁxtures while attached to the
freehold:
Felcher v. McMillan,
103
Mich., 49-i: 61 N. W., 791.
Though,
from
nfter they have been severed
the freehold. trover will lie for them:
Minshall v. Lloyd, 2 M. & W., 4501
64O

Weston v. Woodcock, 7 Ibid., 14. And
so it will lie for detached portions of
machinery which are not attached to
the freehold, although the principal
part of the machine may be: Davis v.
Jones, 2 B. & Ald., 165.
But where
plaintiﬁ! constructed
placed
and
a
engine and its appurtenances
steam
in a mill on the land of another, thus
attaching it to the land, but under
an agreement that he should be secured
by a chattel mortgage upon the engine
for the purchase price of it, and that
until the execution of the mortgage
he should remain the owner of‘ the en
.

i
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A

bona. ﬁde purchaser of goods, tortiously taken, is not liable
to the owner in trespass, but only in trover. S0 of any person
who comes to the possession of the goods by delivery and
without fault on his part.”
Two or more persons cannot be
joined as defendants in trover where distinct acts against each
in which the other is not concerned are relied on.-3
This action may be maintained for the injury suffered, al
though the owner has repossessed himself of the property.
In
gine.
and the chattel mortgage was
given according to the agreement; helrl,
that trover would lie against a sulr
sequent“ purchaser
of the ~l11nd with
knowledge of the mortgage and claim
of the plaintiff, upon his refusal to
deliver the engine to piaintit! under
Crippcn v. Mor
the chattel mortgage:
rison. 13 Mich., 23.
Trover will lle for a chattel note
wrongfully converted:
liicks v. Lyle,
46 Mich., 488; 9 N. W., 529.
And for
a promissory
note:
1l1id.:
Rose v.
Lewis, 10' Mich., 583: and tor bonds:
Barnum v. Stone, 27 Mich., 332; and
for timber cut by one claiming_under
a void tax deed: Moret v. .\Iason, 106
Mich., 340; 64 N. W., 193. And so it
will lie against the bailee oi! note, who
without authority gives it up to the
Ibid., Hicks v.
maker to be canceled:
Lyle, 4.6 Mich., 488; 9 N. W., 529.
Trover will also lie for the conversion
oi a certiﬁcate of stock: Morton v.
Preston, 18 Mich., 60: Daggett v. Da
vis, 53 Mich., 35; 18 N. W., 5-18; Hlne
v. Bay City C. Bank, 119 Mich., 448;
78 N. W., 471: McDonald v. McKin
non, 104 Mich., 428: 62 N. W., 560.
And so it will lie for shares of stock
of a wrongful
converted by means
use
of the certiﬁcate representing
Ibid.
Trover will not lie for
them:
a conversion oi.’ money unless there is
on deteudanifs part to
an obligation
return the speciﬁc money intrusted to
Alfred Shrimpton & Sons
his care:
v. Culver. 109 Mich., 577; 67 N. W.,
And a wife may maintain this
907.
action for an animal belonging to her
from execution,
husband but exempt
when unlawfully seized and sold by a
Ingersoll v. Gage, 47
pound mater:
Mich., 121: 10 N. W.. 135.
Nor is
her right to sue in her own name

41

’

tor such property limited to cases in
which the husband has encumbered
the property, or in which it is taken
on ﬁnal process of a court:
Ibid.
As to when a vender- may maintain
trover for machinery that the pur
chaser has attached to the freehold,
but which was purchased upon the
agreement that the title should not
pass until it was paid for; see, Inger
soll v. Barnes, 47 Mich., 105; 10 N.
W., 127. An executor may bring trover
for property converted in his testa
Rogers v. Windoes, 48
tor’s life-time:
Mich., 628; 12 N. W.. 882.
So the
action will lie tor sheep let on con
tract to be returned in four years
doubled in number:
Dietrich v. Hoe
telmeir, 128 Mich., 145: 87 N. W.,
111.
And for logs, upon
which a
has a common
contractor
law lien,
and they are taken from his posses
sion by the general owner without his
liaughton v. Busch, 101
permission:
Mich., 267; 59 N. W., 621: and for
timber cut by one claiming under a
void tax deed: Moret v. Mason, 106
Mich., 340; 64 N. W., 193.
As to when trover will not lie for
animals taken damage fcasrmt:
see.
Norton v. Rockey, 46 Mich., 460; 9
N. W., 492.
2—Barret
v. Warren,
3 Hill, 348.
Trover is a transitop;/action.
and lies
against the original
trespasser who
cut the trees: Greeley v. Stilison. 27
Mich., 153. A right of action in trover
is assignable: Brady v. Whitney, 24
Mich., 154.
Judgment
tor a joint
conversion cannot be entered against
a defendant who had not been served
McLean v. Isbcil, 44
with process:
Mich., 129, 6 N. W., 210.
3—Strawbridgs
v. Stern, 112 Mich.,
16: 70 N. W., 331.
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this action, as in trespass, the return and acceptance of the
property, by the plaintiff, either before or after the bringing of
the suit, will avail only to reduce the damages.‘
One with title, though without actual possession, may
maintain trover.—-He who has an absolute or general property
may support this action, although he has never had the actual
possession; for it is a rule of law that the property in personal
chattels draws to it the possession, so that the owner may bring
either trespass or trover, at his election, against any stranger
who takes them away. In like manner a man who has deliv
ered goods to a carrier or other bailee, and so parted with the
actual possession. may maintain trover for a conversion by
a stranger. for the owner has still possession in law against
a wrong-doer, and the carrier, or other bailee, is no more than
his servant.-"
This rule, however, does not apply unless the
having
person
the general property has also a right to pos
§ 633.

'

session.

If a bailee of goods, for a. particular purpose, transfer them
to another, in contravention of that purpose, the general owner
may maintain trover against that person, even although he be
4—Murray v. Burling, 10 Johns.,
172; McGraw v. Sumpllner, 107 Mich.,
The declara
141: 64 N. W., 1060.
tion in trover need not set out the
nature of the plaintiffs title, nor the
of ii;
These are matters
evidences
Thus,
merely.
where
of
evidence
piaintltt claimed under a chattel mort
gage, hcld. that it was not necessary
to allege that‘ fact: Harvey v. Mc
Adams. 32 Mich., 472: and see, Bur
rows v. Keuys. 37 Mich., 430.
5—To maintain trover, the piaintii!
must have a general or speciﬁc prop
erty in_the thing converted:
Steph
And
10 Mich., 433.
enson v. Little.
or the right
the actual possession,
at the time of conver
to possession
sion.
Possession is actual when the
thing is in the immediate occupancy
of the party: and constructive. when
n. man claims to hold by some title,
without having the actual occupancy:
816.
1 Waii‘s Law and Prac., S14,
In order to maintain trover the plain

titt must have either the actual pos
session
ot the property or the im
mediate right to it:
Stevenson v.
Fitzgerald. 47 Mich., 1,66: 10 N. W.,
185.
And he must show his owner
ship or title and right of possession:
Ribble v. Lawrence, 51 Mich., 569;
17 N. W., 60.
The possession by the
wlte oi‘ personal property belonging to
the husband during his temporary ab
sence,
is the possession of the hus
and and the wife cannot in her own
name bring trover to recover tor its
conversion:
Janauscheck v. Eddy, 108
Mich., 190: 65 N. W., 752.
The question a
to whether the
plaintiff
in trover is the owner of
property,
the
or whether
has
he
which will estop him
done anything
from making such claim, or proclaim
ing the right of possesion.
is to be
determined from the evidence by the
jury:
Ashman v. Epstcine. 50 Mich.,
And so, when
360: 15 N. W., 509.
there is conﬂicting evidence as to the
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So

if

a lien on goods

a person having

wrongfully part with them, the owner’s right to the possession
revives, and he may maintain trover for them."

A

verbal gift of a chattel, without actual delivery to the
or his agent, does not pass the property to the doneef‘
But, it seems that such gift by deed would transfer the prop
A delivery, however, may be
erty without actual delivery.”
inferred from circumstances, the same as in other cases."
donee

An action of trover is maintainable to recover the value of
goods which have been stolen from the plaintiif, and which the
defendant has innocently purchased, although no steps have
been taken to bring the thief to justice; for the obligation which
the law imposes on a person to prosecute the party who has
stolen the goods, does not apply when the action is against a
third party innocent of the felony."

If goods are taken fcloniou-sly, the felon acquires no title and
can convey none to a. bona ﬁde purchaser." The term feloni
ously does not apply to larceny only, but to all cases in which
the obtaining of the property was under such circumstances as
to render the person obtaining liable to an indictment for a
felony.
A

sale of goods, procured through the fraud of the vender,
will not operate to change the property if the defrauded party
so elect."
It is equally voidable as between the parties,
whether

the fraud in its nature be indictable

Stansell v. Leavitt,
sources of title:
A
Mich., 225; 12 N. W., 179.
plaintii! in trover, who has assigned
his title to the property atter conver
can only recover nominal dam
sion.
ages, unless there has been some spe
clal damage caused by the taking or
Whitney,
Brady
24
v.
detention:
Mich., 154.
6-Wilson v. King, 2 Camp.. 335:
Locschman V. Machin, 2 Stark., 311.
7—-—Nash v. Masher. 19 We-nd.. 431;
see, Mount v. William, 11 Wend., 77.
8—Noble v. Smith, 2 J0bns.. 52;
Johns.,
7
Pearson v. Pearson,
26:
293.
Granglac v. Arden. 10 Johns.,
As to when a gift becomes elfectual,
see. Duncombe v. Richards, 46 Mich.,
166; 9 N. W., 149.

9—Irons

48

v.

or not.“

Smallpiece.

2

But

B. 8: A.,

551.

10—Grangiac

v.

Arden,

10

Johns.,

293.

11—White V. Spetlgne, 13 M. & W.,
608; Neal v. Isaacs, 4 B. 6: C., 334;
See, Glmson v. Woodfull, 2 C. k P., 41.
'12-—Mowrey v. Walsh, 8 Cow., 238:
Andrew v. Dieterich, 14 Wend., 31.
13—N0ble v. Adams, 7 ’I‘aunt,, 59:
where the vender obtained them
IBM; and see.
by false pretenses:
Irving v. Motly, 7 Bingz, 543; Duclns
v. Ryland,
5 Moo.. 518;
see. also,
Fitch v. Newberry. 1 Doug. Mich., 13.
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14—Cary v. Flotailing, 1 Hill. 311.
Where plaintii! sued in trover for a
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though goods are obtained by a fraudulent purchase, and there
fore the sale is voidable as to the purchaser, and can be taken
on execution against him, yet

if

the the latter sell them to a bona

ﬁde purchaser, without notice of the fraud, the property passes
to the vendee."

The vendee of goods cannot sustain trover for them, lmless
right of property be vested in him at the time of the con
version of them.
The principle that runs through all the cases
that where something remains to be done, as between buyer
and seller, or for the purpose of ascertaining either the quan
is,

the

is

In such case a complete
tity or price, there
no delivery."
present right of property does not attach in the buyer, and
consequently he cannot maintain trover as against the seller.

is

is

When goods are sold to be paid for, by the contract, at the
delivered
time of delivery, in cash or notes, and the property
by the vender, without at the time requiring the notes or the
no
cash, or annexing any condition to the delivery, and there
is

a waiver of the
fraud to avoid the contract, such delivery
condition, and the property passes to the vendee."

In the

of

a

sale

I

is

carriage,

it

to build

a

of

a

chattel not in existence, as upon a
though the purchaser pays the
contract
ﬁnished
whole price in advance, he acquires no property till
and delivered to him." But when the materials of another
are united to materials of mine, by my labor, or the labor of
another, and mine are the principal materials, and those of the
acquire the right to property in the
other only accessory,
case

whole by right of accession."

v.

v.

KIIBDP,

Walsh,

28

Mlch.,

Cow., 238.

7

6

Mackie,
16—Rappleye
Cow.,
v.
250; Ward v. Shaw,
Wend., 40-1.
Cow.,
v. Lathrop.
Wend., 77:
Lupin v. Marie,
Marston v. Baldwin,
17
Mass.

see,

6

6

17-——(‘hapman

110:
606.

2

5

1

Taunt,
18-—Mucirlow v. Mangles,
318; Carruthers
Bing.,
v. Payne,
Denio, 628.
270; Gregory v. Stryker,
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7

19-Jiierriit v. Johnson.
Johns.
Denio, 628.
473; Gregory v. Stryker,
2

‘

Beebe

53.
15——Mowrey

8

plaintiff:

a

horse which defendants obtained from
worthless prom
him in exchange for
which they represented
issory note,
to be good and the maker responsible;
held, ‘that to maintain trover in this
case it was not necessary tor the jury
to ﬁnd that the defendants knew that
their representations as to the note
and the maker thereof were false
provided they found that the defen
them
to be false. or
dants helieved
that they made them recklessly, with
out any knowiedge or belief as to
the truth of their representations, in
and defraud the
tending to deceive

CH.

XXXVIII.

TROVER.

§ 634

A landlord

has such a property in timber wrongfully cut
down during a lease, as to enable him to support trover, if it
be removed.
But it does not lie for injuries to land or other
real property, even by a severance of a part of what properly
belongs to the freehold, unless there has also been an asporta
tion.2°

Proof by plaintiff of his having a special property in the
goods will suffice to enable him to maintain this action.
A
bailee under a general bailment,“ or even a gratuitous bailee,“
has a suﬂicient property to enable him to recover. So a mort
gagee under a chattel mortgage may maintain this action for a
conversion of the mortgaged property."

Actual possession alone suﬂicient to support the ac
ti0n.—Possession alone gives the possessor such a property as
will enable him to maintain this action against a. wrong-d0er.24
The ﬁnder of a chattel has such property as will enable him to
§ 634.

maintain trover.”
The proof
same as in trespass.

of

right of possession is the

Proof of conversion essential.—A conversion before
§635.
the commencement of the action is essential to the support of
it." It may be either: 1st, by wrongfully taking chattels;
20—Gordon v. Harper, 7 Term. R.,
13; 1 (‘hitt. PL, 146-7.
21—Burton
v.
2 Blng.,
Hughes,
173; Sutton v. Buck, 2 Taunt., 302;
Green v. (‘iarke, 2 Kern., 343.
22—Nl('hols v. Bastard, 2 C. M. 8:
R.. 659: Bouverie v. Miles, 1 B. 8: Ad..
39.
Thus a person
intrusted
with
goods
to take care of them though
compensation:
without
Faulkner
V.
Brown. 13 Wend., 63.
23—Canﬂeid v. W. J. Gould & Co.,
115‘ Mich., 461: 73 N. W., 550.
24—Cuiien v. O'Hara, 4 Mich., 132.
Thus, until
administration
and dis
tribution, the next of kin ot an in
testate has no more right to the pos
session of the personal property of
the estate than a mere stranger; but
it- the next of kin or any other person
has possession
of the personal prop

erty of an intestate. he may maintain
trover for its conversion against a
mere
wrong-deer, or one having no
better right than himself:
Ibid.
25—1\iathews v. Harsell,
1 E. D.
Smith. 393.
And a person in posses
sion of estrays may maintain trover
against any one who takes them away,
unless it be the true owner:
Hen
dricks v. Decker, 35 Barb., 298; see,
Hartman v. Proudﬂt, 6 Bosw.. 194.
The possession.
by the wife, of per
sonal property belonging to the hus
absence,
band durlng his temporary
is the possession of the husband, and
the wife cannot, in her own name,
bring trover to recover for its con
version:
Janausrheck
v. Eddy,
108
Mich., 190; 65 N. W., 752.
6 Johns.,
26—Storm v. Livingston,
44; see, Beebe v. Knapp, 28 Mich., 53;
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2dly, by some other illegal assumption of ownership, or by
illegally using or misusing it; or 3dly, by a. wrongful deten
tion.
Conversion through wrongful taking.-A tortious
of itself,
conversion, and, in such case, no demand
necessary in order to maintain the action."

§636.
is

a

is,

taking

a

a

is

conversion.“

If

bailee sell the goods,

6

4

6

a

30-—.\Iurrny v. Burling,
10 Johns.,
Thus, if
172.
person hires a horse
to go to a. particular
place. and goe
beyond
it. from which an injury re
a

suits, the action is
conversion: Fish
Duer, 49: Disbrow
v. Ferris,
v.
Tcnbroeck,
E. D. Smith, 397; Fisher
v. lﬁvle,
454.
27 lliich..
Conversion
does not necessarily imply a complete
and absolute deprivation of property:
deprivation which is
there may be
only partial or temporary. and where
the property of the plaintlii! remains
in or is restored to him.
The dlifer
ence between
such
case and one of
total deprivation of the property. is
only.
one aﬂectlng the damages
In
n

a

3

646

757.
a

W., 252.
27—Farrington
v. Payne, 15 Johns.,
431; Tompkins v. Eiaile,
Wend., 406.
Trover (or goods sold without the own
er's authority or ratiﬁcation, may be
maintained against the purchaser with
Hake V.
out any formal demand:
Buell, 50 Mich., 89; 1-i N. W., 710.
One who, though in good faith, saws
the logs of another and mlngles the
lumber with his own, as it It were
oi.’ conversion:
his own, is guilty
116
Crane Lumber Co. v. Bellows,
Mich., 304; 74 N. W.. 4R1.
An of
ficer who, levying on property exempt
up to a certain value, tnlls,to allow
the defendant in execution to select
his exemptions, is guilty ot conver
sion of such portion as he sells:
Parker v. Canﬂeld, 116 Mich., 9-i; 74
N. W., 296.
So one who in any way
participates in an unlawful taking is
guilty of conversion:
Davidson
v.
Kolb, 95 Mich., 469: 55 N. W., 373.
There can be no conversion while the
party complaining is in actual pos
session and using the property in the
place and manner contemplated by the
McMillan, 103
parties:
Felcher
V.
Mich., 494': 61 N. W.. 791.
Demand
and refusal do not necesarily amount
to conversion:
Felcher v. McMillan,
103 Mich., 494: 61 N. W., 791.
An
invalid attempt to foreclose a chattel
con
mortgage
does not constitute
version where the property is bid in
by the mortgagee and remains in his
N.

possession:
Mynard,
Brown
v.
107
Mich., 401: 65 N. W., 293.
A mere
levy without taking possession from
owner is not a conversion which will
support
trover:
Kunze v. Cox, 113
Mich., 546; 71 N. W., 864.
A delay
for the purpose of reasonable consid
eration and consultation is not such
a refusal or a demand
as will amount
to a. conversion:
Flannery v. Brewer,
66 Mich., 509; 33 N. W., 522.
Hill,
Hoﬂman,
28—IIsw-kins
v.
586; Packard v. Getman,
Wend., 613.
Property covered
by
chattel mort
gage, and which is taken out from its
operation by the fraudulent
contri
vnnce of the mortgagor. is wrongfully
converted, and an action of trover
may
be brought
for it: Matter
of
llicks, 20 .\ilch., 280.
29—Packnrd
v. Getman,
Cow..

a

v. Starr, 32 Mich., 297; Ben
v. Moody, 100 Mich., 554; 59

4 5

Bissell
detson

a conversion.3°

;

is
a

it

defendant’s hands,

a

if

by mistake,"
a

though

a

wrong
carrier who delivers goods to
or
any conversion can be
proved.” An abuse of
possession originally lawful, or
breach of the trust under which the property was placed in the
Trover lies against

person,
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through wrongful exercise of dominion.
over the property in ex
clusion, or in deﬁance of the plaintiﬁls right, it is a conversion,
whether for his own or another person’s use." Therefore, a.
servant is liable in trover, though the conversion be done for
the beneﬁt and by order of his master-.33 But it does not lie
for the taking of too many goods on execution.“
§637.

Conversion

-—-If a person exercises a dominion

Conversion through wrongful detention.-In cases
§638.
where the defendant came lawfully into the possession of chat
tels but refuses to surrender that possession on demand made
after the right has ceased, there is such a conversion as will
sustain the action.
Demand, when necessary.-Where the property came
into the possession of the defendant by delivery or ﬁnding, or
in any lawful manner, there must be a demand of it by the
plaintiff, and a refusal by the defendant to deliver it up, to
§ 639.

constitute a conversionﬁﬁ’ and, in all cases where the plaintiﬁ’
is not prepared to prove a wrongful taking or assumption of
property by the defendant, he must prove a demand and re
fusal.“ If there has been no actual conversion, a demand and
are for the whole
value of theproperty, and in the other
Daggett v.
it is commonly less:
Davis, 53 Mich., 38; 18 N. W., 548.
31—Nash v. Maher, 19 Wend., 431.
So, a refusal to deliver property re
ceived in store at the bailor's risk. to
be returned or redelivered when called
for, is a conversion:
-Bates v. Stan
sei. 19 Mich., 91.
32—Bristol
v. Burt, 7 Johns, 254;
Ibid.,
Murray v. Burllng.
10
172:
Wheeler v. Raymond, 5 Cow., 233;
Allen v. Crary. 10 Wend., 349; Fonda
v. Van iiorne. 15 Ibid., 633; see. Whit
ney v. McConnell. 29 Mich., 13. Where
an oﬂiccr levies an attachment on prop
erty not belonging to the defendant
in the writ, inventories it. has it ap
praised. and subject it to his control,
such intermeddling
is a conversion.
and
renders
him liable in’ trover:
Cool: v. Hopper. 23 Mich.. 511. 514;
and see. Worthington
v. Hanna.
23
Mich., 530.
So, a defendant in re
plevin who has obtained judzment tor
a return of the property, may maintain
one case the damages

trover for any of such property not
found and recovered
on an execution
issued for its return.
The defendant
is not conﬁned to his remedy on the
replevin bond:
Smith v. Demarrals.
39 Mich., 14.
33—Stephens v. Elwall, 4 M. & S..
529.
So it lies for a levy on goods
not liable to execution:
Connah v.
Hale, 23 Wend., 462; Bates v. Conk
ling, 10 Ibld., 391.
34-——Lea v. Teller, 1 C. & P., 146.
35-2 Saund. Pl. & Ev., 5 Am. ed..
1160; Bates v. Conkllng, 10 Wend.,
389; see. Thompson
27
v.
‘Moesta.
Mich., 182; Whitney v. McConnell. 29
Mich., 13.
36—Nixon v. Jenkins, 2 H. Bl.. 135.
and
refusal
A
demand
constitute
prlma fncie evidence
of conversion:
Boyle v. Roche, 2 E. D. Smith. 336,
339: Lockwood v. Bull, 1 Cow., 322:
Blssell v. Starr, 32 Mich., 297. But
are
not necessarily conclusive:
they
the presumption of conversion arising
from a refusal. may be rebutted by
which shows that there was
evidence
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sion at the time of the
demand; in such cases,
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for the action of trover,
the property demanded in his posses
refusal, so that he can comply with the
the party aggrieved must resort to his
a
remedy by
special‘ action on the case, or assumpsit, as the
case may be."
_
A demand may be either verbal or in writing; if in writing
it is suﬁicient if left at the defendant ’s house.“ If there be a
a foundation

verbal, and also a demand in writing, at the same time, and
neither referring to the other, evidence of the verbal demand
is suﬂicient, without producing that which was in writing.

A demand of payment for the goods is

a suﬂicient demand.”
the demand be made by a third person for the plaintiif, it
must be proved that he was duly authorized to make it.4°
Where property is entrusted to one to keep on the joint
account of two or more owners, one alone, without the author
ity of the others, cannot lawfully demand it.“ So, in case of
bailees, a demand of, and a refusal by one of them, is not
sufficient to charge both; it would be otherwise if the defend
ants are partners, as then a refusal by one would be evidence
of a conversion by both." When several joint owners of a
chattel deliver it to a third person, he may retain it until all
the joint owners require him to return it. If a common car
rier obtains possession of goods wrongfully, or without the
consent of the owner, express or implied, he has no lien on
on demand, he refuses to deliver
them for freight, and

if,

If

them to the owner, such owner may bring trover for their

value.“
1 1

7

1

39-—La Place v. Aupoix.
Johns.
407; Thompson v. Shirley.
Esp., 31.
Brod.

Harvey,

v.

42—.\Iitchell

v.

Ev., 1160; Gun
B., 447.
13

East.

Williams,

4

41--May

397.

Hill,

43-Fitch
Mlch.,
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v.

Newberry,

1

13.

6

438.

Pl.

Raund.

ton v. Nurse,

&

40-2

1

cases,

&

1

463.

2

a

a

a

38—Logan v. lioulditch,
Esp., 22;
Cow., 69:
Manhattan Co. v. Osgood,
see, Rogers v. Weir,
Tlﬂ. N. Y.,

1.

party
conversion. as in case of
who was not in possession of the prop
erty at the time of the demand: An
drews v. Shattuck, 32 Barb., 396. Or.
compliance with the demand
where
Hill v. Coveli,
was impossible:
Comst., 522; and where reasonable
time was not given to comply with the
demand
failure to comply is not
conversion:
Felcher v. McMillan, 103
See,
Mlch., 494;
N. W., 791.
61
Pierce v. Underwood, 112 Mlch., 186;
70 N. W., 419.
Barb.,
37—Keisey
v. Griswold,
no

Doug.

2

VIII.

TROVER.

§ 640

§640. When refusal of demand not convex-sion.—If the re
fusal be from a bomz ﬁde doubt as to the plaintiif being
entitled to the goods,“ or, where the demand is not made by
the plaintiff himself, whether the party making is authorized
to do so,“ or where any reasonable excuse is bona ﬁde made,

showing that the party does not wish to appropriate the goods
to his own use, or in exclusion of the real owner, the refusal
is no evidence of conversion.“ So, where the defendant at
ﬁrst refused to give up the goods, but afterwards tendered
them before action brought.“

A lien will justify retention.—If the person in whose
§ 641.
possession the goods are, has a lien upon them for a debt due
to him from the owner, the plaintiif cannot recover without a
payment or tender of the money, before bringing the action.“
But if one having a lien upon goods, when they are demanded
of him, claim to retain them upon a different ground, making
no mention of the lien, a tender of the amount of the lien is
not necessary.“
A party having a lien upon goods may
transfer the possession of them, subject to the lien, to a third
person, who may lawfully hold them until the lien is paid.°",
Conversion by a0cesSion.—Property in goods may be
§ 642.
acquired by accession; which includes the acquisition of prop
erty proceeding from the admixture or confusion of goods.
The common law will not allow one man to gain a title to the
property of another upon the principle of accession, if he took
As against a
the other’s property wilfully as a trespasser.“
trespasser the original owner of the property may seize it in its
new shape, whatever alteration of form it may have undergone,
if he can prove the identity of the original material. Where
44—Green

v.

n.

45--Tattle

v.

Dunn, 3 Campb., 215,
Gladding,

2

E.

D.

Smith. 157.
46—Archbold

N. P., 459.
1 M. &
v. Leaward,
47——-Hayward
Scott, 459: see, Bailey v. Adams, '14

Wend., 201.
Demand and refusal to
deliver property, do not of themselves
constitute conversion, but they are
evidence of it to go to the jury: Dag
gett v. Davis, 53 Mich., 38; 18 N. W.,
548.

When, upon a demand

for property.

will
the defendant replies that he
neither admit nor deny the claim, and
will neither consent nor forbid that
the plain-tin’ may take it away. there
is a suﬁclent refusal to establish a
Ingeisoll
v. Barnes, 47
conversion:
Mich.. 104; 10 N. W., 127. .
48-2 Saund. Pl. & Ev., 1161; Col
ler v. Shepard, 19 Barb., 305.
49-Boardman v. Sill, 1 Camp.,
410: see, Bush v. Lyon. 9 Cow., 52.
Nash v. liiosher, 19 Wend., 431.
50
51—2 Kent's Com., 363: see. Sals
bury v. McCoon, 3 Comst., 379.
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A

entered_upon the land of B, and cut down trees, and made
shingles of them and carried them away, it was held that the
property in the shingles was in B.“ So where a trespasser cut
wood on another’s land, and converted it into charcoal, it was
held that the charcoal belonged to the owner of the land.“ So,
when one takes trees wrongfully from the land of another, and
saws them into boards or plank, the owner of the trees may
take the boards or plank or bring trover for them, and the
value of the boards or plank will, in such case, be the measure

of the damages. The rule in case of a wrongful taking is, that
the taker cannot, by any act of his own, acquire title, unless he
either destroy the identity of the thing; as by changing money
into a cup, or grain into malt; or annexing it to and making it
part of some other thing, which is the principal; or changing
its nature from personal to real property, as when it is worked
Thus, cloth made into a garment,
a dwelling-house.
leather into shoes, trees squared into timber, and iron made
into bars, may be reclaimed by the original owner, in their
new and improved state.“
into

If

wrongfully take another’s grain and manufacture it
whisky, the property is not changed, and the whisky
belongs to the owner of the original material, and a creditor
having an execution against the owner of the corn may seize
the whisky, and sell it to satisfy his debt.“ It was held in
this case that if a chattel wrongfully taken retains it.s original
form and substance, or may be restored to its original mate
rials, it belongs to the original owner; and this rule, it seems,
holds against an innocent purchaser from the wrongdoer,
without regard to the increased value bestowed by him upon
the chattel.
But if the chattel be converted by an in-nacent
purchaser or holder, into a thing of a different species, as
where wheat is made into bread, olives into oil, grapes into
wine, the original owner cannot reclaim it. But there is no
such distinction in favor of a wwlfal wrong-doer.
He can ac
quire no property in the goods of another by any change
wrought in them by his labor or skill, however great the
one

into

52—Betts

53-Curtis
54—Brown

v. Lee, 5 Johns., 348.
v. Groat, 6 .lohns.,
169.
v.

Saxe,

7 Cow., R., 95.
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55—Salsbury
stock, 379.

v.
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3
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change may be, provided it can be proved that the improved
article was made from the original material.“

by confusion of goods.-With respect to
the case of a confusion of goods, where those of two persons
are so intermixed that they can no longer be distinguished,
the common law gives the entire property to him whose prop
erty was originally invaded, and its distinct character de
If a mortgagor of goods, who is entrusted with
stroyed.“
the possession, intermix them, purposely or through want of
proper care, with his own goods, so that they cannot be dis
tinguished, and consigns them for sale to a third person, who
sells them, the mortgagee is entitled to recover of the consignee
the value of the whole.“
“If one wilfully intermixes his
money, corn, or hay with that of another man, without his
approbation or knowledge, or casts gold in like manner into
another’s melting pot or crucible, our law to guard against
frauds allows no remedy in such a case, but gives the entire
property, without any account, to him whose original dominion
is invaded, and endeavored to be rendered uncertain without
§ 643.

Conversion

his own consent.”
§644. By tenants in c0mm0n._-One tenant in common can
not maintain trover against the other for a thing still in his
56'—But it seems that where a per
innocently and supposing he has
the right so to do takes property,
though actually belonging to another,
upon
and by his own labor bestowed
it substantially changes or destroys
its
its identity and greatly enhances
value, the original owner cannot re
See the question discussed
claim it.
at length in Wetherbee v. Green, 22
Mich., 311.
57-2 Kent's Com., 364; Wingate v.
Smith. 7 Shep., 287; see, Stephenson
10 Mich., at page 441. and
v. Little.
opinion of Campbell. J., in same case;
see, Johnsonv. Bnllou, 25 Mich., 460;
311,
22 Mich.,
Wetherbee v. Green,
son

317.

58—Willard v. Rice, 11 Metc., 493:
Couch v. Ingersoii, 2 I’ick., 298: see,
People v. Bristol. 35 Mich., 33-4.
59--2 Bla. Com.. 405. Mingling the
wheat or goods of two persons in a
mass,
so as not to be dis
common
it with the knowledge
tinguishable,

consent of both parties. makes
tenants in common of the whole.
and the disposal of the entire mass
by one of the co-tenants subjects him
to an action of trover by the other
for his share:
Nowlen v.- Colt, 6 Hill,
-161.
So if a. party store his grain
in an elevator with the grain of oth
BPS ill 8. COIDITIOII IDBSS, ill 11CC0l‘dﬂl1CP
with the usage by which each person
is to receive not the identical grain
stored by him, but an equal amount
of like quality, and it the owner of
the elevator dispose of the whole with
out the consent ot the party storing,
he is liable in trover tor an amount
of grain equal to that stored by the
party: Erwin v. Clark, 13 Mich., 10.
One who, though in good faith. saws
the logs of another and mingles the
lumber with his own, as if it were
of
his own, is guilty
conversion:
Crane Lumber (‘o. v. Bellows, 116
Mich., 304; 74 N. W., 481..
and

them
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possession, for the possession of one is the possession of both.°°
But if one tenant in common destroy the thing in common,
But converting the article
the other may bring trover.°1
owned in common to its general and proﬁtable application, as
grinding wheat into ﬂour, is not a conversion." A sale by
one of two tenants in common of the whole of the property
has been held a conversion.“ But a sale by one of his share
only is not.“
Defense under the general issue.—Under the general
the
defendant may dispute the plaintiiT’s property in
issue,
the goods; he may show title in a third person though the
plaintiff was in possession ;°° he may show his right of pos
§ 645.

session to them at the time of the alleged conversion; he may
deny that there was any conversion; or show any ground of
defense which proves that the conversion was lawful; or that
the action was not maintainable for any cause, except that it
was barred by the statute of limitations.“
appropriated it to his exclusive use
under circumstances
which rendered
a delivery in the manner agreed upon
impracticable; hold, that this amount
ed to a conversion. and trover would
Ripley v. Davis, 15 Mich., 75.
lie:
One tenant in common oi’ chattels can
maintain an action of trover against
525.
his co-tenant, after demand made that
62-2 Saund. Pl. 8: Ev., 11,64.
he be admitted to his rights as co-ten
63——Wiison
v. Reed, 3 Johns., 175;
Hyde v. Stone, 9 Cow., 230; White
ant. and a refusal to recognize such
rights, coupled with a distinct claim
v. Osborn. 21 Wend., 72; Benedict v.
r
of entire ownership:
Grove v. Wise,
Howard. 31 Barb., 569.
39 Mich., 161: and see, Bray v. Bray,
64—-St. John v. Standrlng, 2 Johns.,
30 Mich., 479.
Where a tenant raises crops on
No demand is essen
468.
tlnl where one tenant
in common
shares on the land of another, to he
ownership
entirety
asserts
in
as
divided between them, the tenant and
against his co-tenant. coupled with a
landlord are, until a division, tenants
denial of the right of the other to
in common oi’ the crops raised. And
if, when the crops are ripened, either
hold at all:
Williams v. Rogers. 110
Mich., 418; 68 N. W., 240.
takes possession of the whole. exclud
ing the other trom having his share
65—Stephensoh v. Little, 10 Mich.,
and denying his right to such share, 433; Rihble v. Lawrence, 51 Mich.,
572; 17 N. W., 80: Westbrook v. Mil
it is a conversion, and trover will
lie; or the party excluded may waive ler, 64 Mich., 129: 30 N. W.. 916;
Seymour v. Peters. 6"! Mich., 415; 35
the tort and sue'in assumpsit for the
W., 62; Wessels v. Beeman,
N.
value of his share: Fiquct v. Alison,
87
Mich,. 481; 49 N. W., 483.
So, where two owned
12 Mich., 328.
of logs, and one of the
66-—In trover. the right oi’ prop
a quantity
co-tenants was bound to the other by erty is in issue: and to sustain the
contract to deliver and divide the action the pialntiif must prove prop
joint property at a certain place, but ery in himself, either general or spe
6 5 ‘)
60——Hoiliday
v. Causel, 1 Term. B.,
658; Smith v. Stokes, 1 East, 363;
Mcisiiroy v. O'Callaghan,
Mich.,
112
124: 70 N. W., 441.
6l—St. John v. Standring, 2 Johns.,
468; Gilbert V. Dickerson, 7 Wend.,
449; Sheldon v. Skinner, 4 Wend.,
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§646. Measure of damages.-—The measure of damages, in
general, is the value of the property at the time of the eon
vcrsion, to which interest may be added.“ Special damages
cial.
Possession is evidence of prop
suﬂered to defend by showing title in
erty, but in this action it does not 0. third person with whom he does con
precludes the, defendant from showing
nect himself:
lbid. And a mortgagor
property in a third person: and this
of chattels may maintain trover against
a person who, without any right, takes
may be done under the general issue
Stephenson v. Little, 10
in trover.
the chattels out of his possession and
Mich., 433.
But a defense that the converts them, and it is no defense
properly was taken or held upon an
that the mortgagee had a right of
possession at the time:
attachment or other legal process. can
Parkhurst v.
not be shown under the general issue Jacobs, 17 Mich., 302.
A mortgagee
notice, of. .ﬁlL1.'l1__..ll1S11lt‘1cation of chattels who sold them before con
without
broken,
dition
under that plea;, Fry v. Soper, 39
was
held liable in
Mich., 727.
But such notice was held trover for not restoring them upon a
lawful
tender of the
not necessary where an olticer sought
amount
due.
Such a sale was unlawful, and could
to justify upon an execution levy on
not exonerate the mortgagee from the
a mortgagor's interest in chattels, and
morigagee‘s
duty of having the property on hand
interests
defendant
the
ready to be returned at that time:
were not attacked or questioned: Mc
Mitchell,
Laughlin v. Smith, 45 Mich., 277: 7
Eslow
v.
26
Mich., 500:
see, Wildey
116;
v. Cox,
But the plaintirs pos
25 Mich.,
N. W., 908.
and Thompson v. Moesta, 27 Mich.,
session merely is suﬂicient to enable
183.
him to maintain trover against one
67—Diilenback
who has no better right, or who has
V. Jerome, 7 Cow.,
294.
Where there are no special cir
taken the property out of his posses
cumstances which require a different
sion without any right; n mere strang
measure
er, or one who has himself no right
of damages to be applied, it
is proper to award to the piaintiﬂ
cannot question the pos
of possession,
Cullen v.
the value of the property at the time
of another person:
session
of the conversion, with interest from
O'Hara, 4 Mich., 132.
The defendant
Ripley v. Davis, 15 Mich.,
that time:
is entitled to dispute either the plain
Thus, where there was a. refusal
80.
tiii"s ownership or right to the pos
to deliver on demand wheat received in
session of the property, or both: Ribble
store, to be returned when called for,
v. Lawrence, 51 lllchf‘ 572: 17 N. W.,
Thus, in trover against a sheriff
measure
the
of damages
was held
60.
to be the value of the wheat on the
for chattels seized upon execution, the
day of the demand, and a subsequent
defendant can show, to defeat the ac
rise in the value of wheat before suit
tion, that the plaintiff had no general
was not allowed to increase the dam
or special property in the goods, nor
And
the ages: Bates v. Stanseil, 19 Mich., 91.
of them.
any possession
The damages for the conversion of a
nature of the plaintiff's pretended pos
quantity of wheat was held to be its
can be inquired into upon his
session
value at the time of the conversion,
cross-examination:
Stearns v. Vin
209; 15 N. W., 86.
less the cost of threshing and market
cent,
50 .‘\iich.,
ing of it: Jackson v. Evans, 44 Mich.,
But it seems to be laid down as good
510; 7 N. W., 79.
law, that one who has peacenble pos
So the measure
of damages
for the conversion of
session
of chattels by claim of right
property purchased in good faith from
may maintain trover against a wrong
doer, that is a person who takes them
a willful trespasser, is its value when
taken
under
the
defendant's
from him having no good title, and first
control:
Tuttle v. White. 46 Mich.,
converts them to his own use, and
If the plalntiﬂ
that not only is plaintiff's possession 485; 9 N. W., 528.
can be indemniﬁed by a sum of money
in such case, evidence of title in his
less than the tull value or the prop
favor. but the wrong-doer will not be
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erty, as when he has only a special
property, subject to which the de
fendant is entitled to the goods, that
of damages; but,
sum is the measure
if he is responsible over to a third
person. or if the defendant is not en
titled to the balance of the value. then
is entitled to the whole
the plaintiff
value. Where an oﬂicer levied on prop
erty. which at the request of the ex
ecution defendant was recelpted by a
recciptor procured by him for that
purpose, in trover by the oﬂicer against
the recelptor for the goods, held, that
notwithstanding
receipt required
the
the receiptor to produce the property
or pay the execution, yet the officer
could recover no more than the amount
collectible on the execution. nor could
he recover any more than the value
of the property, if that value was less
than the sum due upon the execu
tion: Burk v. Webb, 32 Mich., 173.
for the conversion of
The damages
articles having a regular market value
are measured generally by that value.
Where they have not such standard
market value, then their value to the
owner, so far as they are susceptible
which is
of pecuniary measurement,
or merely speculative,
not fanciful
furnishes the true test: so for the con
version of a promissory note. where
the court is satisfied that the note
was available at its nominal amount
to the plaintiff, he may recover that
amount notwithstanding the maker is
from
proved not to have property
which a collection might be enforced
Lewis,
Rose
by execution:
10
v.
Mich., 483.
And in trover for the
and
conversion of a certiﬁcate
sale
of shares of stock in an incorporated
company.
the defendant is liable for
the value of the nharca which he is
considered as having converted. and
not merely for the paper certiﬁcate
which represents those shares:
Mor
ton v. Preston. 18 Mich., 60. Where
a defendant wrongfully took logs from
plaintiff’
premises in one county and
transported them to another ‘county,
and
there manufactured them into
lumber,
held, that the taking in the
first county might be treated as the
conversion, or that the time of man
ufacture into lumber might be claimed
as the period of conversion, and the
by the value at the
damages measured

Cu.
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latter time and place: Final v. Backus,
18 Mich., 218, and see, Symes v. Oliver,
13 Mich., 9.
Evidence of what the
property sold for at auction shortly
after the conversion is admissible. as
tending to prove its value at the
time of conversion:
Smith v. Mitchell,
12 Mich., 180; and see, Davis v. Zim
merman,
40 Mich.. 24; Dyer v. Rosen
thal, 45 Mich., 588; B N. W., 560.
But the appraisal of property taken
on an attachment is inadmissible
as
evidence of their value in favor of the
oﬂicer who levied the writ and ap
pointed the appraisers,
in a suit
against him
for
their
conversion:
Dyer v. Rosenthal, 45 Mich., 588; 8
N. W., 560.
But it seems that such
an appraisal may be received
in evi
Worthing
dence against the otiicer:
ton v. llanna. 23 Mich., 530.
Where
a defendant sells or disposes
of prop
erty belonging to another. the meas
ure of the damages is the value of the
property at the time and place of con
Greely v. Stiilson, 27 Mich.,
version:
152.
Where a plaintiff in trover trans
ferred his title to the property after
the conversion, held, that
he
could
only recover nominal damages
unless
there was some special damages caused
by the taking or detention: Brady v.
Whitney. 24 Mich., 154.
Where one
contracts to purchase property. and for
the possession
of it under the con
tract, but the title to remain in the
vender until the whole of the pur
price is paid. and converts it
chase
if
before completing the payments.
the vender brings trover he will be
entitled to damages only to the amount
and
of the unpaid purchase money
interest (if any) thereon: Johnson v.
Where a
Whittemore. 27 Mich., 463.
lease contained a clause,
that in case
of default in the payment of rent the
landlord might take possession
of the
personal
property
tcnant‘s
on
the
premises and sell ii: for the rent. the
same as on a chattel mortgage, and on
the day on which an installment of
rent fell due, the landlord seized cer
tain of the tenant's goods, and on a
day sold them at auction
subsequent
as provided in the lease, and the ten
ant brought trover. held, that
the
landlord's seizure was premature as
the tenant had the whole of that day
in which to pay the rent, and that the
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to the plaintiff, by reason of the conversion, may be
if stated in the declaration.‘
_

resulting
recovered

Mitigation of da.mages.—In mitigation of damages,
§647.
the defendant may show that he has returned the property.”
He may also \show. that he was tenant in common with the
defendant,

to reduce the damages to a proportionate

share.-'4

plaintiif has only a lien on the goods. In such
if the action be against a. stranger, the plaintiff may

So, that the
case,

the full value, though exceeding his lien, and then
stand as trustee for the general owner for the balance; but
when the action is against the general owner, or one acting
under him, the plaintiif can recover only according to his
A defendant cannot show title in another,
special interestﬁ
recover

tenant was entitled to damages to the
value of the property seized,
and that it was no defense nor any
mitigation of damages that the land
lord would have been legally entitled
on the next day after seizure to have
taken the property, nor could the in
stallment of rent for which seizure
from the ten
was made be deducted
And that the owner
ant's damages.
taken is en
of property tortiously
titled in trover to full compensation
in damages,
and no mere act of the
wrong-doer can discharge him from
liability, and a subsequent sale on legal
process in favor of the wrong-doer
and against the owner will not avail
to reduce
the 'damages:
Dalton v.
Laudahn,
Mich., 529.
Damages
27
which are peculiar to the case, and
spring from exceptional circumstances,
must be specially alleged or they can
Brink v. Freoff, 44
not be proved:
The
Mich.. 69, 72: 6 N. W., 94.
plaintiff cannot introduce evidence
of
damage
for breaking up his business
by the conversion of his goods until
he has shown that his business was
actually broken up thereby:
Dyer v.
Rosenthal, 45 Mich., 588: 8 N. W.,

v. Bcsser, 131 Mich., 481; 91
W., 737; Saltmarsh v. Chicago &
G. T. Ry. Co., 122 Mich., 103: 80 N.
W., 98: Woods v. Gaar, Scott & Co.,
93 1iiich.. 1-H; 53 N. W., 14; Schmitt
diel v. Moore, 120 Mich.. 199; 79 N.
W., 195; Isaacs v. McLean, 106 Mich.,
79: 64 N. W., 2.
2—2 Saund. Pi. & Ev., 1168.
A de
fendant in trover cannot show in miti
gation of his unlawful taking of the
piaintiifs property, his own unnu
thorlzed application of the fruits of
his tort. upon a naked personal dc
mand of his own against the plalntiif
which has not been put in judgment,
and is‘ not a lien on the property con
Northrupp
verted:
v. McGiil, 27
Mich., 234.
Conversion is not excused
by the subsequent taking of the prop
erty from the defendant on an attach
ment against the plalntiif in the action
though the appropriation
of trover;
of the property in this manner to the
plaintiffs use may be cause for miti
gation of damages:
Erie Preserving
377;
49 Mich.,
Co. v. Witherspoon,
13 N. W.. 781.
3—Heaih v. Hubbard, 4 East, 110,
derson
N.

-whole

560.
1-—-Brink

v. Freoif. 44
See, Dyer v.

Mich., 69; 6

Roenthal, 45
N. W., 94.
Mich., 588: 8 N. W.. 560.
For other
cases
the subject of damages
upon
recoverable in trover. see, Grant v.
mith. 26 Mich., 201: Moret v. Mason,
106 Mich., 340; 64 N. W., 193; An

121.

4—Davidson
v. Gunsolly,
1 Mich.,
388: Ingersoll v. Bokkelln, 7 Cow.,
In trover by an assignee of
681. n.
property levied on by a sheriff on
held,
execution against the assignee,
competent to show that the property
was sold on a levy prior to the assign
ment, and that therefore the plaintiif
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of interest in himself

claim

derived

Effect of judgment for plaintiﬂ‘, and its satisfaction.
in trover and payment of the damages, the
property vests in the defendant.“
But where there is no
actual satisfaction of the judgment, but only an imprisonment
If judgment has
upon the execution, it would be otherwise.’
been rendered against one of several liable in trover, a tender
of the amount of the judgment to the justice will bar an action
A judgment in favor of a defendant,
against the others?
upon a trial involving the right of property, will bar an
action against all claiming the property under the defendant,
or in privity with him. The term privity denotes mutual or
succcssive relationship to the same rights of property.”
§ 648.

—By

a recovery

was not injured; also. that it was
proper to show that the goods were
charges
held and sold for railroad
Smith v.
which were a prior lien:
Michel. 12 Mich., 180.
_ 5—Duncau v. Spear, 11 Wend., 54;
see, Parkhurst v. Jacobs,
17 Mich.,
302.

6—Hoag v. Bremen, 3 Mlch.. 161;
Cow., 43;
Osterhout v. Roberts. 9
Brady v. Whitney, 24 Mich., 154.
7-Osterhout v. Roberts, 9 Cow.,
43; Livingston
1 Johns.,
v. Bishop,

John A. Tolman Co. v. Waite.
Mich., 341; 78 N. W., 124.
8—Dexter v. Broat, 16 Barb.. 337.
If a judgment in trover is rendered
and execution issued thereon against
one of several persons by whom the
property was converted. this is a bar
to any recovery against the others for
Kenyon v, Wood
the same conversion:
ruii', 38 Mich., 310, 315.
Holbrook,
2 Mich.,
9—i‘rentlss
v.
290;
119

272.
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Nature of the action-when it may be brought-at
§649.
common la.W.—This action has for its object the recovery of the
possession of speciﬁc personal chattels. The gist of the action
unlawful detention. In certain cases because of the lack of
ﬁnancial responsibility of the defendant, it is the only prac
tical remedy. The plaintiif in replevin must have a general or
special property in the goods taken, and a right to the pos
session ‘of them, at the time of the taking or detention, and
of the issuing of the writ, or he cannot maintain the action}
But it is not necessary that the plaintiff should ever have had
the actual possession before bringing the suit.” At common
is

1—Sharp v. Whittenhall, 3 I-Iill., 578;
Dodworth v. Jones, 4 Duer, 201; see,
ante, § 100, notes; Dunham v. VVyckoi‘l,
3 Wend., 280; and Hatch v. Fowler, 28
Mlch., 205; Taylor v. Boardman, 24
Mlch., 292; Hunt v. Strew, 33 Mlch.,
85; Hall v. Kalamazoo, 131 Mlch., 404;
It seems that one who
91 N. W., 615.
has the present right of possession needs
no other property right to enable him
Woolston v.
to maintain the action:
Smcad,
42 Mlch., 54; 3 N. W., 251;
Eldridge v. Sherman, 70 Mlch., 266; 38
N. W., 255.
Cattle taken damage /easant and im
pounded,
can be replcvied only under
chapter 295, C. L., 1897:
Campau v.
Konan, 39 Mlch., 362: Marx v. Wood
ruff, 50 Mlch., 361; 15 N. W., 510.
A mortgagee of chattels cannot main
tain replevln against an officer who has
taken the goods from the possession of
42

mortgagor before foreclosure, under
an execution against him,
notwlthstfnd
ing the mortgage is past due and un
paid, so long as the oﬂicer is proceed
ing in due course under the statute to
a sale
of
the mortgugor‘s interest:
Macomber v. Saxton, 28 Mlch., 516. The
mortgagor has a redeemable
interest
until actual foreclosure which is levia
ble, and the oﬂicer has a right to the
possession
of the goods for a. suﬁlcient
length of time to sell them on his proc
ess: Carey v. Hewitt, 26 Mlch., 228.
2—Dunham v. VVyckoi’f, 3 Wend., 280;
Baker v. Fales, 16 l\‘Iass., 147; Gates v.
Gates, 15 Iln'd._. 810; Jackson v. Dean‘,
1 Doug. Mlch., 519, 526.
The plalntil‘l's
rights depend upon the condition of the
title and the right of possession at the
commencement
of the action:
Crouse v.
Derbyshire, 10 Mlch., 482: and Carey v.
Hewitt, 26 Mlch., 228. But a party can
the
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law, as a general rule, replevin would lie whenever trespass
de bonis could be sustained ;3 but not always may there be a
choice between these actions.‘
Under the statute, perhaps, the
correct rule would be that it can be brought in all cases where
trover could be supported.5
The action can be maintained for the taking or detaining of
personal chattels only.“ It does not lie for things ﬁxed to the
freehold.’
When one enters and ousts the owner of land, and
continues in possession, cutting and removing the crops,
replevin will not lie for them, although they were sown by the
Several persons cannot join their several rights in
this action, but each must have a separate replevin; but joint
tenants, or tenants in common may.” If one part owner of a

owner?

bring replevin for property already
Thus, where a
in his own possession.
constable
levied upon personal property
in the possession of the judgment debtor,
but never took it into his own possession
nor in any way interfered with the
debtor's possession,
the debtor could not
sue the officer
in replevin:
Bacon v.
Davis, 30 Mich., 157; see, ante, § 100,
n, 3; and
Morrison v. Lumbard, 48
Mich., 5-i8; 12 N. W., 696.
The prin
ciple which governs in replevin obliges
the plaintiff to establish a substantial
of the property as the very
detention
The
groundwork of the action:
Ibid.
action rests on a tortious taking or de
tention of property, and should not be
brought against one not in fault: Cad
well v. Pray, 41 Mich., 312; 2 N. W.,
Replevin will lie at the suit of the
52.
mortgagee
to recover property taken on
the value of which did
an execution
not exceed the amount of the mortgage:
Stack v. Olmsted, 127 Mich., 359; 86 N.
not

VV.,

851.

Replevin does not lie against one who
is not unlawfully detaining the property
at the time the affidavit for the writ is
sworn to and when the writ ls delivered
Burt v. Burt, .41 Mich.,
to the officer:
82; 1 N. W., 936; see, Adams v. Wood,
Goods
51 Mich., 413; 16 N. W., 788.
of defendant
in
not in the possession
replevin on the day the writ issued were
presumably not in his possession when
Reid, Murdock & Co.
it was sued out:
v. Parks, 122 Mich., 363; 81 N. W.,
252.

3—Stewart

v.

Wells,

6

Barb.,

79:

Rogers v. Arnold, 12 VVend., 30: Chap
man v. Andrews, 3 Wend., 240; Pang
burn v. Patridge, 7 J0hns., 140; Cres
son v. Stout,
17 Ibid., 116; Clark v.
Skinner, 20 Ibid., 465; see, antc., § 100.
property has been wrongfully
“Where
taken or wrongfully disposed of by one
to whom it was given in charge, the
owner may replevy it from any one who
has bought it even in good faith and
without notice of the title to the real
owner,
and without any previous de
Trudo v. Anderson, 10 Mich.,
mand:
357, 358; see, Ballou v. O'Brien, 20
Mich., 304, 324; see, Bristol v. Braid
wood, 28 Mich., 191. Where goods are
of,
the
wrongfully sold or disposed
owner may rcplevy them from the hands
of the purchaser, or sue in trover for
Eggleston v. Mundy,
the conversion:
4 Mich., 295.
.
4——Gamble v. Cook, 106 Mich., 561;
64 N. W., 482.
_5—McBrian v. Morrisop, 55 Mich.,
351; 21 N. W., 368.
6—Nibblet v. Smith, 4 Term. R., 504.
Not lie against undertaker for corpse:
Keyes v. Konkel, 119 Mich., 550: 78
N. W., 649.
v. Whittem, 3 Ad. & E.,
7-—Outten
N. S., 961; Darby v. Harris, 1 Ibid.,
899; ante, § 100, notes; and Hatch v.
Fowler, 28 Mich., 205.
8—Demott v. I-lagerman, S Cow., 220.
9—2 Saund. Fl. &- Ev., 5 Am. ed.,
Husband and wife may join in a
770.
suit to recover property exempt from
The statute which authorizes
execution.
the wife to sue alone for property of
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chattel sue alone, the non-joinder of the other or others may
If he sues for a
be pleaded in abatement,” but not in bar."
moiety only in his writ, the suit shall be abated." The rule is

well established that
erty cannot maintain

in common of personal prop
replevin against his cotenants."

one tenant

By statute.—“Whenever, by any statute, executors
§650.
or other persons, suing in the right of another, are authorized
to maintain actions of trespass or trover, for any personal
property, unlawfully taken, or unlawfully detained, such per
sons may maintain actions of replevin for such pr0perty.”1‘*
“No replevin shall lie for any property taken by virtue of any
warrant for the collection of any tax, assessment or ﬁne, in
pursuance of any statute of this state.”‘*"
her

exempt
from execution,
prevent him from joining with
her in replevin for such property: Shep
ard v. Cross, 32 Mich., 96.
10—l-lart v. Fitzgerald, 2 Mass., 509.
So, if the husband sue alone in replevin
property belonging to his
to recover
wife held in her own right, or that of
another person, he will be non-suited,
and the non-joinder of the wife need
not be pleaded:
Brown v. Fiﬁeld, 4
Mich., 322, 326.
The owner of a part
interest in property which cannot be
divided, cannot maintain replevin for his
undivided share if the execution of the
writ would deprive his cotenant whose
of his right of pos
title is undisputed,
session: Kindy v. Green, 32 Mich., 310.
But where a party brought replevin tor
an undivided half of a
and recovered
crop of wheat standing in shock, the de
fendant having no interest in the other
undivided half, held, that he could not
raise the objection that the suit could
the wheat
not be maintained because
the writ issued:
was undivided when
S0,
Crapo v. Seabold, 36 Mich., 444.
where a tenant of farming lands agreed
to pay to the landlord one-half of the
grain raised thereon, in good order on
the farm as his share for the rent, held,
that they were tenants in common of
the grain, and that when it was threshed
and ready for delivery, the landlord was
entitled to the half thereof, and that
upon
the tenant's removing the grain
from the farm and refusing upon de
mand to deliver one-half to the land
husband

does not

lord he might maintain replevin for his
undivided half against the tenant: Suth
erland v. Carter, 52 Mich., 471; 18 N.
W., 223.
11—Wright v. Bennett, -4 Barb., 451.
12—D’Wolf v. Harris, 4 Mason, 515.
538; see, ante, § 100, notes.
13—Wetherel
v. Spencer,
3 Mich.,
123, 127.
Nor against his cotenant‘s
bailee:
Russell v. Allen, 3 Kern., 173.
See, also, Bray v. Bray, 30 Mich., 479;
Kindy v. Green, 32 Mich., 310; Kline v.
Kline, 49 Mich., 419; 13 N. W., 800;
and Coan v. Mole, 39 Mich., 454.
14—C. L., § 10649.
See, ante, § 100,
15-—C. L., § 10651.
note 5; Scott v. Whelan, 96 Mich., 624;
55 N. VV., 1025. The property of a party
seized for a tax for which the party was
not liable to be assessed, may be replev
ied; the statute has no application to a
case in which no valid tax could be as
sessed:
Le Roy v. East Saginaw City
Ry. Co., 18 Mich., 233. The prohibition
against bringing replevin for property
taken under a tax warrant does not ap
ply where there was no jurisdiction to
levy the tax:
McCoy v. Anderson, 47
Mich., 502; 11 N. W., 290; Lantls v.
Reithmiller,
95 Mich., 45; 54 N. W.,
713; Whittaker
v. Fuller,
96 Mich.,
141; 55 N. W., 612.
The statutory
prohibition against bringing replevin for
property taken in satisfaction of a tax
levy while it does not cover cases in
which the tax is manifestly unlawful on
its face, or is levied against a stranger
to it, cannot be defeated by a mere claim
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“No replevin shall lie at the suit of the defendant in any
cution or attachment,

to recover

exe

goods or chattels seized by

virtue thereof, unless such goods or chattels are exempted by
law from such execution or attachment; nor shall a replevin
lie at the suit of any person, unlew he shall, at the time,
have a right to reduce into his possession the goods taken or
detained.”1“
The dec1aration.—“It shall be suiiicient for the plain
tiﬁ in his declaration, whether the original taking was lawful
or otherwise, to allege with requisite certainty of time, place
and value, that the defendant received the property to be deliv
ered to the plaintiff when thereunto afterwards requested, and
that the defendant, although rcquested so to do, has not deliv
§ 651.

ered the same to the plaintiff, but hath unlawfully detained
the same, to the damage of the plaintiﬁ such sum as he may
specify.’

’1"

Z

that the tax is invalid, if it is appar
ently regular:
Hlll v. Wright, 49
Mich., 229; 13 N. W., 528; Forster v.
Brown, 119 Mich., 86; 77 N. W., 646;
Where
and cases cited in the opinion.
jurisdiction to levy and assess the tax
the court can have no fur
is established
ther concern with matters affecting the
exercise oi’ such jurisdiction, however ir
regular or invalid they may have been
Hood v. Jud
in the action of replevin:
kins, 61 Mich., 575; 28 N. W., 689;
West Michigan Lumber Co. v. Dean, 73
Mich., 459; 41 N. W., 504; Michigan L.
S. P. Co. v. Atwood, 126 Mich., 651; 86
Where property is seized
N. W.. 139.
proper oﬁicer
under a tax
by
the
roll and warrant fair on their face re
Michigan Lumber
plevin will not lie:
Co. v. Dean, supra,‘ Boyce v. Peterson,
84 Mich., 490; 47 N. W.. 1095; Mogg
v. Hall, 83 Mich., 560; ~17N. W.. 553:
North-W'estern, C. & L. Co. v. Scott. 123
Mich., 357; 82 N. VV., 76; Curtlss v.
Witt, 110 Mich., 131; 67 N. W.. 1106.
Where replevin was brought. contrary to
this statute for property taken under a
tax levy. it was held proper on quashing
the writ. to give judgment for the defend
of the tax lien:
ant for the amount
229; 13
Hill v. Wright, 49 Mich.,
N. W., 528.
in replevin for property duly seized
for a village tax regularly assessed, the

validity

of the village organization and
of the charter under which it has acted
for a number of years, cannot be con
sidered: Coc v. Gregory. 53 Mich., 19;
18 N._ W., 5-i1.
And one whose prop
erty ls seized upon a tax warrant against
a third person may replevy it:
Travers
v. Inslee. 19 Mich., 98; Tousey v. Post,
91 Mich., 631; 52 N. \V., 57; Pioneer
Fuel Co. v. Malloy, 131 Mich., 466; 91
N. W., 750.
16—C. L.. § 10652.
See. ante, § 100,
note 6; Macomber v. Saxton. 28 Mich.,
516.
If a husband abandons his wife,
leaving her in possession
of household
goods exempt from execution.
he cannot
replevin
get
possession
by
of
them
against her:
Smith v. Smith, 52 Mich.,
538; 18 N. W., 347.
Replevin lies for
property seized upon an execution issued
in void garnishment proceedings:
Iron
Cliffs Co. v. Lahals, 52 Mich., 394; 18
N. \V., 121.
17—C. L., § 10670.
The declaration
a Justice
may be
in replevin before
oral: Smith v. Dodge. 37 Mich., 354.
In declaring. it is sufficient to follow the
form prescribed by the statute:
Elliott
v. Whitmore. 5 Mich., 535.
The statute
recognizes no distinction between replev
in tor taking and that for detaining. but
the action is in form in all cases for de
talnlng only:
Trudo v. Anderson, 10
Mich., 370; whether the taking
be
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“It shall not be necessary for the plaintiﬁ‘ to state in his dec
laration, a place certain within the township, city or village, as
~
that where the property was detained.”18
Plea and notice.—“The defendant may plead the
§ 652.
general issue to such declaration, which shall be in the same
form as in personal actions, and shall put in issue not only the
detention of the property, but also the property of the plaintiff
therein, and his right to the possession thereof at the time of
the commencement of the suit, and under such plea the defend
ant may give notice of any special matter of defense to the
’
action. ’1°
Dema.nd.—In trover, a. demand must be proved if the
defendant came lawfully into possession of the property; the
§ 653.

wrongful or not:
Le Roy v. East Sag
inaw City Ry., 18 Mlch., 234, 240; Mc
Graw v. Pettibone, 10 Mlch., 537; Riley
v. Littleiield, 84 Mlch., 22; 47 N. W.,
576.
re
Description of the propcrt;/.—In
plevin tor grain or othe-r chattels deﬁned
by measurement,
a description indeﬁnite
as to quantity, and not otherwise made
certain, is detective:
Farwell v. Fox,
Thus, property described
18 Mlch., 169.
as “a quantity of corn consisting oi!
about two hundred bushels, and a quan
tity oi rye consisting of about one hun
Stevens
dred bushels," is insuﬂicient:
But a declara
v. Osman, 1 Mlch., 92.
property as "six
tion describing the
Farweil v. Fox, 18
oxen" is suﬂleient:
Mlch., 166.
And in replevin for prop
erty taken in execution and claimed as
exempt, the declaration need not specif
the character
oi! the
ically describe
property so as to show it to be exempt;
Elliott v. Whitmore, 5 Mlch., 532; see,
In a declaration in
ante, § 102, n. 4.
trover tor various articles, it is not nec
essary to state the separate value oi
each, but only the value of the whole:
Where
Root v. Woodrufi, 6 Hill, 418.
in
and declaration
the aﬂldavit, writ
replevin set iorth the value of the prop
erty at less than one hundred dollars, and
the general
the defendant has pleaded
issue, the tact that the plaintiffs own
testimony shows the value of the prop
ertytobe more than one hundred dollars,
does not oust the justice of jurisdiction:
28 Mlch., 171.
Henderson v. Desborough,

It

is a. variance in the description
property in the declaration from
that found in the writ it must be taken
advantage
oi before plea to the merits:
Reeder v. Moore, 95 Mlch., 594; 55 N.
W., 436.
18-—C. L., § 10671.
19—C. L., § 10672. Singer Mfg. C0. v.
Benjamin, 55 Mlch., 332; 21 N. W., 358;
Any thing going to show
23 N. W., 25.
that the plaintiii in replevin had no
right to the possession,
when he com
menced the suit, may be proved
under
the general issue; as, that the sheriff
had taken the property on a lawful writ,
from the plaintiﬂ, and continued law
fully to hold it under that writ: Bei
den v. Laing, 8 Mlch., 503; Clark v.
West, 23 Mlch., 242; 26 Mlch., 228;
Macomber v. Saxton, 28 Mlch., 516. So,
that the property was taken on execu
tion against a third person who claimed
Snook v.
to be the owner thereof:
Davis, 6 Mlch., 156. Or, that the prop
erty was seized and held under writs 0!
attachment,
may be shown under the
general issue without notice:
Craig v.
Grant, 6 Mlch., 455.
In replevin it is
competent to disprove the plaintii’i"s title
to the goods, and this may be done by
showing that some one else owns them:
Nicholson V. Dyer, 45 Mlch., 610; 8 N.
W., 515.
In order to recover damages
for injuries not the ordinary result of
the execution
of the writ the defend
ant must give notice oi’ such claim with
his plea:
Bateman v. Blake, 81 Mlch.,
227; -15 N. W., 831.
there

ot the
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It is said, however, that
rule applies to this action.”
proof of a refusal to deliver the property need not be strong in
this action, in the form in which we are required to bring
as in trover.“
defense, the
Whenever the defendant has given notice of
a

it,

same

3

Hill, 348. quires an affidavit for the writ to be made
20—Barrett v. Warren,
the taking is lawful, and there after the cause of action accrued, and be
has been no wrongful conversion by the fore the issuing of the writ: Darling v.
Legler, 30 Mich., 54.
When the orig
defendant,
there is nothing to put him
in the wrong until the person entitled inal taking was felonious, no matter in
whose hands the property may be sub
demand for the property and
has made
up:
sequently found, the owner is entitled
the defendant. has refused to give
because
Adams v. Wood, 51 Mich., 413; 16 N. to his writ, without demand,
W., 788. In replevin against
wife for no person can acquire a rightful po'
property mortgaged by her husband, and session through a felonious taking. And
kept in use upon a farm belonging to the same is true when the original tak
ing was
trespass,
so long as the tres
the wife where she and her husband re
pass remains unsatisﬂed and the owner
sided, hcld, that the property being law
fully in the possession of the wife, she is not in some way estopped from assert
But a different rule
could not be subjected to the costs and ing the wrong.
prevails when the taking is wrongful,
expenses of the suit until after demand
arises out of contract relations
upon her; and that the fact. that she though
claimed to own the property was not with the rightful owner, and is claimed
In all such
sutiicient to dispense with a. demand: to be in pursuance thereof.
Campbell v. Quackenbush, 33 Mich., 287. cases, before any wrong can be imputed
But where property has been taken to the party in possession in good faith,
and before he can be subjected to the ex
wrongfully by the defendant, _no demand
suit: Le Roy v. penses of a suit, he must be requested
is necessary
before
East Saginaw City Ry. Co., 18 Mich., to give up the property and refuse to
do so.
But unless the plaintiff is en
233.
Demand
before bringing replevin
where the defendant's titled to have his demand complied with
is unnecessary
Bertwhistle v. at the time it was made, it can lay no
possession
is wrongful:
Goodrich, 53 Mich., 457; 19 N. W., 143. foundation for this action or change the
where a. character of the defendant's possession:
Nor is any demand necessary
wrongful taker, or one to whom the Adams v. Wood, 51 Mich., 411; 16 N.
W., 788.
Replevin will not lie upon
property was given in charge, has dis
demand which when made was in viola
posed of it without authority, notwith
standing the defendant may have bought tion of an injunction of a court of com
Smith v. Smith, 52
it in good faith, and without any notice petent jurisdiction:
Mich., 538; 18 N. W., 347.
Trudo
Proof of
of the title of the true owner:
demand on defendant's agent in posses
V. Anderson, 10 Mich., 357; Ballou v.
O'Brien, 20 Mich., 304, 324, and see sion of the property and who was acting
Whitney v. McConnell, 29 Mich., 12 for defendant is suﬂicient demand on de
Congdon v. Bailey, 121 Mich.,
fendant:
replevin
will lie without de
And
has 570; 80 N. W., 369. A demand by the
an
officer
who
against
mand
owner, or his agent before his death,
plaintiff's property on an exe
taken
in will support an action after his death:
person
a
third
against
cution
Moore v. Machen, 12-1 Mich., 216; 82 N.
whose hands the oﬁicer found the prop
W., S92.
It is not necessary, in case of
Doug. Mich.,
erty:
Jackson v. Dean,
demand of Sheriff for property attached,
But where a demand is necessary
519.
that the demand specify the nature of
in order to lay the foundation for re
the interest of the demandant:
plevln, a demand made by the ofﬁcer
School
after the issuing of the writ, and while craft v. Simpson, 123 Mich., 215; 81
ready for N. W., 1076: see, ante,
100-103.
he has it in his possession
service, is insufiicient under the statute.
21-—Holbrook v. Wright, 24 Wend.,
750, which expressly re
169.
C. L., 1897,
66
2
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jury must pass upon the _matter and incorporate it in their ver

if

the defendant sets up property in a third per
jury should be, that the property of the
in
such person. When the trial is by the
goods and chattels is
justice, the same course must be taken to authorize a judgment
for the return of the property. The general issue alone would

dict.”

Thus,

son, the verdict

of the

not, probably, authorize judgment for a return.”
§654. Judgment for p1a.intiﬁ', etc.—“If, upon the trial of
the cause the verdict be in favor of the plaintiff, the same jury
shall assess the damages which he has sustained by the 1mlaw
ful taking and detention, or by the unlawful detention of the
property; but if judgment pass for the plaintiff by default,
or upon an issue of law, the damages may be assessed by the
court, in the same manner as in personal actions.”2*
This provision of the statute contemplates not merely nom
inal damages, but such actual damages as the plaintiff has in
fact sustained, by reason of the taking and detention, or the

unlawful detention of the property;

and they are not to be
inferred, but must be proved.‘-’~" The value of the services of an
attorney and counsel for the plaintiff, or any fees actually paid
by the plaintiff to his attorney and counsel in the prosecution
of the suit, constitutes no part of the damages contemplated
22—Boynton v. Page, 13 Wend.,

425.

v. Van Dyke, 6 Hill, 613;
118 Mlch., 553; 77
v. O'G0l'man,

23—Pierce

Harris
N. W.

Where the prop
24—C. L., § 10674.
has been delivered to the plaintiff,
a verdict on the trial,
and he recovers
the value of the property is never as
Merrill v.
sessed by the court or jury:
Butler, 18 Mlch., 295. Recovery in re
plevin of that portion of a fraudulent
purchase
of goods found in the posses
sion _of the defendant
does not bar an
of trover for the remainder:
action
Reid, Murdock & Co. v. Ferris, 112
Mlch., 693; 71 N. W., 484: and cases
Plaintiff cannot
cited In the opinion.
recover for property known by him to
possession
or out
be out of defendant's
of existence when the writ was sued
Reid, Murdock & Co. v. Ferris,
out:
supra. The expense of replacing a build
ing wrongfully removed may be recov
erty

Byrnes v. Palmer,
as damages:
Depre
I13 Mlch., 17; 71 N. W.,~331.
ciation in value of a race horse because
not properly cared for is a proper ele
Riley v. Littleﬂeld,
ment of damages:
84 Mlch., 22; 47 N. W.. 576.
ered

25—Phenix, etc., v. Clark, 2 Mlch.,
But if no evidence
of damage
was submitted
to the court or jury, a
Judgment for any more than nominal
damages
would be erroneous.
Ibid.

327.

Damages

allowed

a

defendant

in

re

plevin may include the value of the use
of the property while it is kept from
him by means of the replevin proceed
ings:
Burt v. Burt, 41 Mlch., 82; 1
N. W., 936.
The plaintiff in an un
founded suit in replevin may become lla
ble for damages
for withholding the
property
from
defendant,
the
even
though the latter is not the owner of
it: Ibid.
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by the statute, and cannot be legally taken into consideration
in the assessment of such damages?“
If the cause is tried by a jury, and they ﬁnd for the plaintiil,
they will assess the damages; if tried by the justice, he will do
the same; if the defendant does not appear and plead, or judg
ment is given against him on demurrer, the justice will assess
’
the damages.

In case goods are not found.-“If the goods and chat
§ 655.
tels speciﬁed in any writ of replevin shall not be found, or
shall not be delivered to the plaintiff, he may proceed in the
action for the recovery of the same, or the value thereof/’27
“If the goods and chattels speciﬁed in the declaration, shall
not have been replevied and delivered to the plaintiif, such
plaintiff, in case he shall recover upon the whole record, shall
be entitled, in addition to his damages and costs, to a further
judgment that such goods and chattels be replevied and deliv
ered to him without delay; or in default thereof, that such
plaintiif do recover from the defendant the value of such goods

and chattels, as the same shall have been assessed.”28
“The execution to be issued upon such judgment shall com
mand the sheriif to levy the plaintiif’s damages and costs, of the
goods and chattels, lands and tenements of the defendant, as in
other executions against property; and also to replevy the
goods and chattels described in the declaration, which shall
also be speciﬁed in the execution, and to deliver them to the
26—Hatch v. Hart, 2 Mich., 289.
27——C. L., § 10660.
Maxon v. Perrot,
17 Mich., 334.
A replevin suit in which
the property is not taken on the writ,
and the piaintii‘! proceeds for damages,
property.
determines
the title to
the
The same principles apply to such a
case as to an action of trover:
Parme
lee v. Loomis, 24 Mich., 242; see, ante,
Where in replevin the de
§ 6-i7.
fendant was in the wrongful possession
of the whole of the property before the
issuing oi the writ, the plaintiffs right
to recover the value thereof is not de
hy the oﬂ1cer's iailure
feated
to levy
the property.
Nor is the p1a.intii!'s
recovery conﬁned to the property ac
tually heid by the defendant at the date
oi’ the writ:
McBrian v. Morrison, 55
This statute
M_ich., 351; 21 N. W., 368.

on

does not authorize a recovery for prop
erty not in the possession of defendant
when the writ was sued out: .Reid, Mur
dock & Co. v. Parks, 122 Mich., 363;
81 N. W., 252.
See also Hanselman v.
Kegel, 60 Mich., 5-14; 27 N. W., 678.

in replevin tor tools of plaintiffs
the estimate
trade taken on execution
to the
of value should be conﬁned
amount exempted by law, and the dam
ages tor their detention
should be lim
during which the
ited to the period
plaintiff was deprived
oi his exempt
property:
53
McGuire v. Galligan,
Mich., 453; 19 N. W., 142.
2S—C. L., § 10676.
v.
Rathburn
Ranney, 14 Mich., 387. See Reid, Mur
dock & Co. v. Parks, 122 Mich., 363;
81 N. W., 252; Hanselinnn v. Kegel, 60
Mich., 549; 27 N. W., 678.
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if they can be found within his county, and if the same
cannot be found, then that he levy the value of such goods
and chattels, specifying the same, together with the aforesaid
damages and costs, of the goods and chattels, lands and tene
plaintiff,

ments of the defendant, as above provided/’2°
“The sheriﬂ’ shall proceed in the same manner to collect any
moneys directed to be collected upon such execution, as upon
executions against property in personal actions, and he shall
possess the same powers in respect to the replevying of the
property described therein, as are herein provided upon the

execution of writs of replcvin; and if the goods and chattels
described in the execution are replevied and delivered to the
plaintiﬁ, they shall be irrepleviable/’3°

Judgment for defendant, etc.—“If the property spe
§ 656.
ciﬁed in the writ shall have beendelivered to the plaintiff, and
the defendant recover judgment by the discontinuance or non
suit, such judgment shall be, that the defendant have return
of the goods and chattels replevied, unless he shall elect to
waive such return as hereinafter provided; and also that he
recover the damages sustained by him by reason of the deten
tion of such goods and chattels, which damages ‘shall be
assessed by a jury in the proper eo1u't.”-“'1.
L., § 10677.
An execution
issue against the body under C. L.,
See, Tomlin v. Fisher, 27 Mich.,
§ 860.
524.
29—C.

may

30—C. L., § 10678.
being
31-—C. L., § 10679.
This
a
statutory action the judgment must be
such and such only, as the statute au
thorizes:
Bateman v. Blake, 81 Mich.,
232; 45 N. iV., 831. No entry of waiver
of return need be made beyond such re
cital in the judgment:
Kline v. Kline,
Accept
49 Mich., 419; 13 N. W., 800.
ance of verdict for value and entry of
judgment thereon is sumcient evidence
of waiver:
Mueller v. Provo, 80 Mich.,
484; 45 N. W., 498.
It seems that
where plea is the general issue and
defendant prevails upon sole ground that
his possession
no
was lawful
because
demand had been made he is not entitled
to a return of the property but only to
Far
a judgment for nominal damages:
rah v. Bursley, 100 Mich., 547: 59 N.
W., 245.
A return need not be award
ed in a judgment for the plaintiff in rc

plevin, where the property was delivered
Smith v. Dodge,
under the writ to him:
37 Mich., 354.
And a judgment for the
return of the property to the defendant
would be erroneous, where the plaintiﬂ
fails for the reason that the property
was in his own possession when the writ
Gidday v. Witherspoon,
35
issued:
Mich., 368.
A judgment quashing the
in replevin, is equivalent to
proceedings
or discontin
a judgment of nonsuit
case,
when
the
uance.
And in such
property has been given to the plain
tiii under the writ, the party dispos
sessed has a right to have a return, or
to waive a return and have Judgment for
the
value of the
chattels replevied:
Humphrey v. Bayn, 45 Mich., 565; 8
See, Hill v. Webber,
50
N. W., 556.
Mich., 145; 15 N. W., 52; Soper v.
Hawkins, 56 Mich., 528; 23 N. W., 206;
Chllson v. Jennlson, 60 Mich., 235; 26
N. W., 859.
A verdict that "defendant
did not unlawfully detain" does not en
title defendant to a return of the prop;
erty. If the verdict were general, how
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“Whenever the plaintiif or defendant shall be entitled to a
return or surrender of the property replevied, instead of taking
judgment for such return or surrender, as above provided, he
may take judgment for the value of the property replevied, in
which case such value shall be assessed on the trial, or upon
the assessment of damages, as the case may be, subject to the
provisions of section twenty-nine of this chapter. And in such
to a judgment against the sureties
in the bond given by the opposite party, on the delivery of the
property to him by the oiﬁcer, as well as against the principal.
When judgment shall be rendered against a party and his
sureties, pursuant to the provisions of this section any exe
cution issued thereon shall direct the oﬁicer to whom it is
directed to make the amount thereof out of the goods, chattels,
case he should be entitled

land and tenements of the principal, naming him, and for want
thereof, out of the goods, chattels, lands and tenements of the
’
sureties. "*2
a. judgment for return would be
proper: Harris v. O'Gorman, 118 Mich.,
553; 77 N. W., 12. The giving of the
bond in replevin does not have the effect
to pass title to plaintiff if property be
replevied and delivered to him: Lind
say v. Morse, 129 Mich., 350; 88 N. W.,
881; liiannausau v. Wallace, 87 Mich.,
543; 49 N. W., 1082.
Judgment for re
turn vests title in the defendant in trial
on merits and he may have trover for
its value. His remedy is not alone on
Smith v. Demarrais, 39
the bond:
Mich., 14. If defendant waives judgment
for return or value of the property and
in consequence no judgment for either
judgment
is rendered he cannot have
for damages.
Under such circumstances
a judgment for
return with general
damages
Bnteman
should be given:
v. Blake, 81 Mich., 227; 45 N. W.,
ever,

831.

On an assessment

of damages,

re

turn being waived, all questions concern
ing the amount recoverable must be set
tied and the assessment
is the conclu
liability on the replev
sive nicasure
0‘
Paddock, 75
in
bond:
Treadwell
v.
Mich., 286; 42 N. W., 820; Ryan v.
Akeley, 42 Mich., 516; 4 N. W., 207;
v. Robinson, 101 Mich., 240;
Simmons
59 N. W., 623.
he fact that defendant
had judgment for return on the trial be
fore the justice, does not prevent his

taking a judgment for value on trial of
plaintiffs appeal:
McCabe v. Looms
foot, 119 Mich., 323; 78 N. “K, 128.
Where plaintii! fails to appear on return
day in Justice's court and the oﬂicer re
may
fuses to return the writ defendant
show delivery of the goods to the plain
tiﬂ and take judgment for their value
if he so elects:
Frank v. Brown, 119
Mich., 631; 78 N. W., 670.
If plaintiff
fail to 'appear defendant is entitled to
a judgment of nonsuit: Cagney v. Wat
tles, 121 Mich., 469; 80 N. W., 245.
To entitle defendant to judgment for
value it is not essential to show more
than possession under claim of title:
Steere
v. Vanderberg, 90 Mich., 187;
51 N. W., 205.
32—C. L., § 10680.
The section 29
referred to is Comp. Laws, § 8754; and
provides. among other things, that when
either party in replevin has at com
of suit only a lien, special
mencement
property, or part ownership in the goods,
etc., and is not the general owner, the
court or jury shall ﬁnd according to such
fact,andjudgment shall be rendered only
for such interest. And under these C. L.,
§§ 10675; 10680, as amended, Pub. Acts,
1899, pp. 384, 386, the dekndant who
sets up only a special property in the
chattels replevied, and waives a return
and claims only pecuniary damages, can
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“The damages and value of the property mentioned in the
thirty-third and thirty-fourth sections of said chapter shall be
by the justice, and no notice thereof shall be
necessary, nor shall any exceptions be taken to the sureties of
ascertained

not have a recovery exceeding the extent
of his interest as proved:
Weber v.
Henry, 16 Mich., 399; Darling v. Legler,
Thus, where mortgaged
30 Mich., 54.
property is taken by the mortgagee, and
the mortgagor replevies it and has judg
ment and waives a return, he can have
judgment only for the value of the prop
erty and over and above the amount re
maining secured
unpaid on the
and
mortgage.
If he demands a return of
the property he is entitled to it regard
less of what may be unpaid on the mort
gage; but in that case the lien remains,
and the property may be taken to en
force it should a breach occur.
But
when instead of demanding a return, the
defendant asks judgment for the value,
he must be content to take such judg
ment as would be equitable under the
circumstances.
As the lien would be
gone, an equitable judgment would be
the value less the amount still to be
paid on the mortgage: Fowler v. Hoff
man, 31 Mich., 215-221; see, Carey v.
Hewitt, 26 Mich., 228.
If defendant
waive a return of goods upon which
plaintiff has a lien he is entitled to an
assessment of the value less the lien of
plaintiff and judgment for that amount:
Kennedy V. Dawson, 96 Mich., 82; 55 N.
W. 616.
A defendant in replevin who
fails to take judgment for damages in
replevin when he may, cannot have a
separate
action for them: Drewyour
v. Merrell, 112 Mich., 681; 71 N. W.,
486.
A defendant in replevin whose lien
under a chattel mortgage on the goods
replevied is sustained, cannot in any
event recover beyond, the value of the
goods; and in the absence of any proof
of such value, the appraisal made under
the writ will govern: Walrath v. Camp
bell, 28 Mich., 111.
If the defendant in
replevin sets up no right or claim to the
property, but denies having been in pos
session
when the writ was issued and
served, ahd defends on that ground, and
has a verdict in his favor that he did
not unlawfully detain the property, he
has no claim to a judgment for the re
turn of the property, or for its value:
Hinchman v. Doak, 48 Mich., 168, 12

N. W. 39.
When a defendant has no
real interest in the property, either gen
eral or special, but is still entitled to a
judgment for want of a demand before
suit brought, he can only have nominal
damages: Darling v. Legler, 30 Mich.,
a
54.
Whenever in replevin before
justice, the defendant is entitled to re
cover for the va,lue of the property taken
from him on a writ at the instance of
the plaintiff, the judgment for the value
and for damages in the aggregate
is not
limited to one hundred dollars, but may
proved by the
be for the real amount
evidence,
$500, the limit
not exceeding
fixed by the constitution:
Henderson v.
Desborough,
28 Mich., 170; Humphrey
v. Bayn, 45 Mich., 565; 8 N. W., 556.
In replevin against the sheriff who has
against a
taken property on execution
third person, and not from the posses
sion of the plaintiff, if the judgment is
in favor of the sheriff, his damages on
waiver of a. return may be assessed
at the full value of the property, not
withstanding it exceeds the amount due
on the execution in his hands; the plain
tiff has no right to the property, and as
between him and the sheriff the latter
had the whole title, and would be bound
to account for any surplus to the execu
tion debtor: First National Bank of
Marquette v. Crowley, 24 Mich., 492.
Upon a discontinuance against the plain
tiff, the defendant is bound to elect
whether to claim or waive a return, and
of damages can only be
an assessment
made when there is on the record some
distinct claim in one form or the other
to base it upon:
Wheeler v. Wilkins,
19 Mich., 78, 81.
And it is essential
to a judgment for the defendant for the
value of the property, that the record
should affirmatively and distinctly show
an election to take the value instead of
a return of the property:
Adams v.
Champion, 31 Mich., 233.
See note 31,
ante.

In replevin against an ofilcer for goods
taken and sold on-execution at public
sale after full notice, ete., the price
obtained

may

evidence

upon
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“If the prop
the plaintiff, in the bond taken by the justice.”1
erty speciﬁed in the writ shall not have been replevied and
delivered to the plaintiif, and the defendant recover judgment,
such judgment shall be for costs only.”2
“Whenever judgment shall pass against the plaintiﬁ in
replevin, whether by default or otherwise (except when the

of some default in the writ
on the service thereof, or in the affidavit), and a return of the
property is awarded, no writ of second deliverance shall be
allowed, nor shall any second or other writ of replevin be
brought for the same cause, but the plaintiff in replevin shall
not thereby be barred from bringing an action of trespass
or trover for the same property, unless the judgment in the
action of replevin shall have passed against him on the
merits.’ ’*'*
case shall be dismissed by reason

value. But it is immaterial as to whether
the oﬂicer was indemniﬁed
or not: Jen
nings v. Prentice, 39 Mich., 421.
A waiver made in open court and en
tered by the justice at the defendant’s
request,
is suiﬁcient to authorize judg
ment for the value instead of the return
of the property; Humphrey v. Bayne,
45 Mich., 565; 8 N. W., 556.

The waiver need not be made before
and no entry need
be made of it beyond the proper recital
in the judgment:
Kline v. Kline, 49
Mich., 419; 13 N. W., 800; see Just v.
Porter, 64 Mich., 569: 31 N. W., 444.
A joint judgment in replevin is proper
when the possession
of the defendants
was joint and they were connected in all
the transactions on which it was based:
West Mich. Sav. Bk. v. Howard, 52
Mich., 423; 18 N. W., 199.
But a
judgment against the plaintiff for the
value of the property, cannot be given
jointly,
in favor of several defendants
when only a part of them were inter
ested: Steele v. Matteson,
50 Mich., 313;
15 N. W., 488.
1-—C. L., § 751. The thirty-third
and
thirty-fourth sections referred to are the
above C. L., §§ 10679, 10680.
Where
a plaintiﬂ in replevin, before a justice
of the peace, has judgment of discon
against him by the
tinuance rendered
justice, it is the duty oi’ the justice to
proceed and assess the damages in iavor
of the defendant, when he waives a. re

trial nor in writing,

turn of the property, and if the justice
refuse to do this, a writ of mandamus
will lie to compel him: People v. Tripp,
15 Mich., 518.‘ Where goods were taken
upon a writ of replevin issued out of the
circuit court, but which tailed to describe
any property, the only description being
in the affidavit annexed, and the writ
was quashed
as being void on that
ground, it seems to have been held that 1
the defendant
could not have judgment
for the value of the property, on the
ground
that it is only for “property
speciﬁed in the writ," for which he can
judgment:
have
Parsell
v.
Gcnesee
Judge, 39 Mich., 542.
But the fact that
the description in the writ is of such
property or of such an interest in prop
erty as should not be made the subject
of replevin, does not deprive the court
of jurisdiction to award a judgment of
return. It is only where no description
of any property at all is set forth in the
writ, that the jurisdiction to award a
judgment for value, fails:
Humphrey
v. Bayn, 45 Mich., 565; 8 N. W., 55"».
2——C. L., § 10682.
3—C. L., § 10683.
One whose prop
erty has been wrongfully taken from
him replevied it, but being nonsuited in
the replevin suit, defendant lhad judg:
inent against him for the value of the
property.
He then sued in trespass for
the taking of the property, and it was
held that he was entitled to recover in
this suit not only his damages for the
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When parties have liens on1y.—“When either of the
parties to an action of replevin, at the time of the commence
ment of the suit, shall have only a lien upon, or special prop
§ 657.

erty, or part ownership in, the goods and chattels described
in the writ, and is not the general owner thereof, that fact
may be proved on the trial, or on the assessment of value, or
on the assessment of damages, in all cases arising under this
chapter; and the ﬁnding of the jury or court, as the case may
to such fact, and the court shall there
such judgment as shall be just between the

be, shall be according

render

upon

,
parties.”‘*
This section is intended to introduce, in actions of replevin,
the following rules, which govern in actions of trover.
In
trover by one having a lien on goods against the general owner,
or one who has converted the goods by his direction, the plain

of the property while defendant
held it, but also its value as assessed
in favor of the defendant in the replevin

detention

Dillll
103.

1-laviland

v.

Parker,

11

A judgment in replevin

Mich.,
determ

ining only the right of possession of the
property atithat time, does not prevent
the defeated party from recovering back
the possession afterwards under a change
of circumstances:
Deyoe
v. Jameson,
33 Mich., 94.
See further Farrah
v.
Bursley, 100 Mich., 551; 59 N. W., 245;
Mich., 382;
Rathbun v. Ranney,
14
Hutchinson v. Hutchinson, 102 Mich.,
636; 61 N. W., 60.
4—C. L., § 10675.
See ante, § 656.
The object of this statute was to per
mit any special property or part own
ership to be proved and determined
on
the trial of the case, and by the same
jury if a jury trial were had, or on the
assessment
of value where a. demurrer
-has been interposed,
or assessment
of
damages in case of judgment by default
and other like cases.
It does not au
thorize an assessment of damages by a
second jury after the cause has been
tried before another Jury on the merits:
v. Henry, 38 Mich., 369.
Quackenbush
See, Alderman v. Manchester, 49 Mich.,
48; 12 N. W., 905.
One from whom
chattels
have been taken by mere tres
passers while he was in peaceable pos
session and holding subject to claims of
persons other than the defendants,
can
maintain replevin: 27 Mich., 104.
This

C. L., § 10675: contemplates.
that in an action of replevin, the exact
extent of the special property of either
party may be shown, so that the judg
may correspond to the
ment rendered
justice of the case: Kohl v. Lynn, 34
Mich., 360.
When the verdict is for the
defendant whq claims only a lien or
special interest in the property, the gen
eral title being in the plaintiff, it is
necessary that the verdict should specify
the amount of the defendant’s
interest:
Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co. v. St. Clair,
Mich., 518.
The lien must be
34
specially found; and if not so found the
court cannot recognize
it: Gidday v.
Wltherspoon, 35 Mich., 369. And a ﬁnd
ing that defendant
did not unlawfully
detain the property,, that he had a lien
sum, and that
on the same to mspeclﬂed
the plaintiff was the general owner suir
ject to defendant's lien, will authorize a
judgment for the defendant
for the
amount of the lien as found: Moore v.
Vrooman, 32 Mich., 526.
But where
goods held by an oﬂicer under an attach
ment are taken from him on a writ of
replevin a judgment in his favor, before
the attachment proceedings
are decided,
must be for a return of the property and
not for the special
value of his lien.
Frederick v. Mecosta Judge, 52 Mich.,
529: 18 N. W., 343. See further Upham
v. Caldwell, 100 Mich., 264, 58 N. W.,
1001, and note to this case collecting
the Michigan cases in 100 Mich., 265.
statute,
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tiff can recover only according to his special interest; but
in a like action against a stranger, the full value of the goods
may be recovered, although exceeding the lien; and the plain
tiﬂ’ will then be a trustee for the general owner, as to the bal
ance.
If the goods converted are of less value than the amount

is,

is,

of the lien, no more can be recovered than their value.“ In
the ﬁrst case, instead of taking a judgment for a return, the
plaintiff may take judgment for the value of the property;
in regard to him, its
that
the amount of his lien, which

is

it

is

is

value.
In an action of replevin against a carrier of goods claiming
compe
the right-to retain them until the freight
paid,
tent for the owner to prove damages to them in their transit,
in order to reduce the amount of freight actually due, or to
due; thereby manifesting that the defend
show that nothing
ant had no right to the possession of the goods“
If the jury or the justice ﬁnd the property in part of the
goods and chattels replevied to be in the defendant, and in the
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it

ought to entitle him to a return of the
goods or their value as against such a
plaintiff who had no interest; and prob
ably in this respect, it was not intended
by the latter case to overrule the case
Where,
Mlch., 388, above cited.
in
in replevin against two, the court ﬁnd
that each of the defendants had a sep
arate and independent lien to a speciﬁed
is erroneous
amount on the property.
to render a joint judgment in their tavor
for the amount oi’ their claims: Swcetzer
Mlch., 107, 111. In replevin
v. Mead,
cable,
for detaining
the
defendant
under the general issue gave notice of
property in himself, and on the trial the
jury returned a verdict as follows: “This
jury ﬁnd for the plaintii‘i';" held, that
although the verdict was informal, the
justice ought to have entered
accord
ing to the substantial ﬁnding, in form
following the issue, and rendered judg
ment
tor the plaintiff: Lamberton v.
Foote,
Doug. Mlch., 102.
Unless the
special
facts in a replevin suit require
ﬁnding, a verdict that, “this jury ﬁnds
for the plaintiff,"
is sufficient,
and s
judgment must be entered on it: Smith
v. Dodge, 37 Mlch., 254.
Mlch., 619.
G—Bancroft v. Peters,
1

7

5—lngersoli v. Van Bokkelin,
Cow.,
note u; see, Davidson v. Gunsoily,
Mlch., 390, 391.
__
Mlch., 388,
In Davidson v. Gunsolly,
was held under the above section
10675, that where either of the
C. L.,
parties at the commencement of the suit
has only a lien upon or a special interest
in the goods replevied, he can only
recover according to his special inter
est. as against o. general owner or one
who has taken the goods by his direc
tion; but as against a stranger, the
full value of the property may be recov
although exceeding
ered,
the lien.
or
special interest, and the plaintiff will be
a trustee for the general owner as to
the balance.
But in
later case,—
Weber v. Henry, 16 Mlch., 399, 404
it was held that. where a defendant sets
special interest in the prop
up only
erty replevied, and waives a return and
claims only pecuniary dsmages,' he can
have no recovery in any case beyond the
pecuniary extent of his special interest:
See, page 404 of the case.
It would
seem, however,
appeared
that where
on the trial that the plaintiff had no
1'ntt’1't‘8t whatever in the property, that
special interest and pos
the defendant's
of the suit
session at the commencement
681,

-
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residue in the plaintiff, each party has judgmeiit according to
the ﬁndings."
Replevin of goods atta.ched.—“If any goods or chat
§ 658.
tels which are replevied had been attached, they shall, in case of
judgment for a return, be held liable to the attachment, until
ﬁnal judgment in the suit in which they were attached, and

for thirty days thereafter,

in order to their being taken in
execution; and if such ﬁnal judgment be rendered before the
return of the property, or if the property when replevied was
seized and held on execution, it shall be held subject to the
or seizure for thirty days after the return, in
order that the execution may be served thereon, or the service
thereof completed, in like manner as it might have been if
such property had not been replevied.”8
same attachment

Replevin bond, action 0n.—“If any writ of return,
§659.
or other execution, issued in favor of either party in the action.
shall be returned unsatisﬁed in whole or in part, the party in
whose favor such writ is issued or his representatives may
have an action upon the bond executed by or on behalf of the
opposite party, to recover against the obligors therein the
value of the property replevied, and the moneys, damages and
costs awarded to such party, and such bond shall be assigned
to such party so entitled to an action thereon, or his represen
'

tatives, on their request/’9

.

still make what he can out of
sureties: Greenlee
v. Lowing,
35
See, Frederick Tr. Mich.,
8—-C. L., § 10684.
6'3.
Where the defendant in
Mecosta Judge, 52 Mich., 529; 18 N. W., replevin has judgment and has a return
343; Berger v. Clippert, 53 Mich., 469;
of the property, and plaintiff pays the
19 N. W., 1-19.
Execution cannot issue
costs in the suit before the justice, but
against the body in replevin in the cir
then appeals to the circuit court, where
again has judgment, the
cuit court: Fuller v. Bowker, 11 Mich., the defendant
204.
But may on judgment in justice sureties in the replevin bond are liable
court under C. L., § 860; but if the case on the bond for delendanfs costs in the
circuit; the bond given on appeal is
were appealed to the circuit, such execu
tion could not issue from the judgment me-rely' cumulative and does not super
in that court: Tomlin v. Fisher, 27 sede the replevin bond: Brabon v. Pierce,
Mich, 524.
34 Mich., 39.
If plaintiﬂ wrongfully
9—C. L., § 10685.
No judgment can retains his goods taken on the writ de
against the sureties in a fendant is not precluded from resort to
be rendered
replevin bond exceeding the amount of other remedies because he has an action
the penalty of the bond and costs of the
on the replevin bond: Scott v. Scott, 50
suit:
Frazer v. Little, 13 Mich., 195. Mich., 372; 15,N. W., 515.
Action on
It is a good defense for the sureties in the replevin bond lies only after judg
a replevin bond that the plaintiff has
ment
and execution returned unsatis
released the principal (the defendant
in ﬁed: Scott v. Scott, supra.
Abatement
replevin), upon an understanding that ct the suit does not give an action on
7—Wright

187.

v.

Mathews, 2 Bluckford,

he

the
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In an action on a replevin bond, the plaintiff cannot recover
unless he proves a writ of retorno habendo, or other execution
in his favor, returned unsatisﬁed in whole or in part.1° But this
need not be averred in the declaration; it is sufficient if it be
proved.“

“In

such action the plaintiﬁ shall assign breaches of the
condition of such bond as in other cases; and the return of the
sheriff to the execution issued in the action of replevin shall
be evidence of such breach; the amount recovered in such ac

tion of replevin, and remaining uncollected, shall be the meas
ure of the damages, if the value of the property replevied shall
have been so recovered, and if not so recovered, and a return
4

Remedy,
in such event, is
the bond.
replevin for the property or trover for
its value: Kidder v. Merryhew, 32 Mich.,
The defendants
in the action on
470.
the bond are estopped from setting up
by
any inﬁrmity
in the proceedings
of the
which they got the possession
property: Jennison v. Haire, 29 Mich.,
207.

10—Cowden v. Stanton, 12 Wend.,
122; Williams v. Vail, 9 Mich.,
163; Scott v. Scott, 50 Mich., 372; 15 N.
W., 515. Where an otﬂcer having a writ
of execution for the return of the prop
erty, demanded a. return of the sureties
in the bond with which they refused to
comply, and the writ was then returned
unsatisﬁed, and
thereupon
suit was
brought against them on the bond, held,
that when demand was made it was the
duty of the sureties to be active in re
turning the property according to their
obligation in the bond; and that they
could not object that the 0fﬁcer's return
did not show that he had made any at
tempt to find or seize the property, .or
Nor is it "any
that he could not ﬁnd it.
defense to the sureties, that the writ of
replevin is issued without the necessary
aﬂidavit. They are estopped from setting
up any irregularities in the proceedings
by which they obtained
the property:
It is
Jennison v. Haire, 29 Mich., 207.
to aver in the declaration
not necessary
for the prop
the issue of an execution
erty, or its return unsatisﬁed: Ibid.
The remedy of a defendant in replevin
of his property
who has been deprived
by a replevin suit which has abated
120,

without any judgment for return or for
value of the property, is an action
of replevin to recover it, or possibly
trover for its value, and not by an action
on the replevin bond: Kidder v. Merry
hew, 32 Mich., 470.
the

Mich.,
Haire,
29
v.
11-—-Jennison
211; Cowdin v. Pease, 10 Wend., 333.
After a judgmwent for the value of
the property for the defendant in re
plevin, an execution was issued in form
in assumpsit, and purporting to be in
favor of the plaintiff, and returned un
sued;
satisﬁed
and the replevin bond
held, that this could not be considered
as an execution
on the judgment in
replevin, consequently
no liability upon
by its
the replevin bond was created
return unsatisﬁed: Williams v. Vail, 9
Mich., 162.
In an action on the bond
the plaintiff
must prove an execution
in the replevin suit and its return un
satisﬁed: Ibid.: Phillips v. Waterhouse,
40 Mich., 273; and should also prove the
judgment in replevin: lbid.
The fact
that the judgment was rendered by con
sent upon a verdict rendered by a jury,
does not defeat an action on the bond:
Estey v. Harmon, 40 Mich., 645.
But
if the principal fraudulently consents to
a judgment by secret collusion with the
defendant,
the sureties on the bond will
be released: Wright v. Hake, 38 Mich.,
525.

The defendant
must have an assign
ment of the bond in proper form before
he can recover upon it: Smith v. Demur
rais, 39 Mich., 14.
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or surrender thereof shall have been awarded, such value shall
be added to the damages and costs recovered in the action of
replevin, and the amount of such value, damages and costs,
remaining uncollccted, shall form the measure of damages.”12
“In any action prosecuted on such bond given by either

it,

party in action of replevin for the deliverance of any property
the defendant may show, in mitigation of damages, that the

a

or special prop
obligee in such bond had only a lien upon
time of com
said
at
the
property
erty, or part ownership in,
mencement of suit in replevin, and that the defendants, or
part ownership or other
either of them, had at the same time
interest in said property; and
‘such lien, special
property, part ownership, or other interest of said obligee,
with interest thereon, amount to less than the value of the
property replevied.
corresponding reduction shall be made
from such value.’ '13
a

if

valuable

13—C. L.,
10687.
Acts, 1889, p. 387.
§

As amended Pub.
Before the enact
of
by
ment
amendment
this
sec
tion (March 15, 1865), it was held
that where, on the nonsuit of plaintiff,
judgment in replevin
defendant
took
re
for the value of the property
pievied,
it was no defense to a suit
on the bond to recover

the amount

of the

673

\

43

a

it

a

a

9

judgment in the replevin suit, that the
defendant in replevin who was plaintiff
in the suit on the bond had no interest,
in fact, in the property: See, Williams
Mich., 162.
v. Vail,
Where the prop
erty, taken
by virtue
of
writ of
replevin, is
living animal, and therc
good
is judgment for return,
is

4

623.

in bar, in an action on the bond,
that before the Judgment in the replevin
suit, the animal died Without the default
of the plaintiff in the replevin suit: Car
See,
penter v. Stevens, 12 Wend., 589.
as to the rights of sureties when sued
Henry v. Ferguson,
upon
the bond:
55 Mich., 401; 21 N. W., 381.
If the defendant in replevin waives
return oi‘ the property and has his dam
sued
ages assessed,
the obligors when
by him on the bond, cannot introduce
evidence under this section in mitigation
that the obiigee had only
of damages
n special
interest: Ryan v. Akeiey, 42
Mich., 516;
N. W., 207.
This section
applies only when the obliges has taken
judgment for return of the property:
Ibid. As to what may be shown by the
obiigors in mitigation of damages, see,
Henry v. Quackenbush,
48 Mich., 418;
12 N. W., 63-1: Lindner
v. Bock, 40
Mich., 618.
In suit on this bond the
true interests in the property may he
shown: Treadweii v. Paddock, 75 Mich.,
287; 42 N. W., 820.
plea

a

4

§

10686, as amended Pub.
12—C. L.,
Acts, 1899, p. 386. The measure of the
recovery
on the bond where defendant
prevails in the replevin and waives re
turn, is the amount of his recovery in
the replevin suit: Ryan v. Akeiey, 42
Mich., 516;
N. W., 207; Simmons v.
Robinson, 101 Mich., 243; 59 N. W.,

I

CHAPTER XL.
OF COVENANT.
E660. In genersl——When will lie.
§661. Parties to action of.

§662. Actions on implied covenants.
§663. Delenses.

In genera.1—when will 1ie.—The action of covenant
§660.
remedy
provided by law for the recovery of damages for
is the
It cannot be maintained
the breach of a contract under seal.‘
unless the contract is sealed by the defendant; a mere recog
nition of the contract, though sealed by the other party, will
No action

not be suiﬁcient.2

will lie on

a covenant by C to pay

of money to A, B and himself C, or the survivors or the
survivor of them, on their joint covenant.“
This action may be brought on the condition of a bond,‘ and
in all cases arising upon contracts under seal, or upon judg
ments, when an action of covenant or of debt may be main
tained, an action of assumpsit ma.y be brought and maintained,
in the same manner in all respects, as upon contracts without
a sum

'

seal.“

Pl. & Ev., 5 Am. ed., 853.
of the statute per
mitting assumpsit to be brought when
ever covenant may be this action is very
uncommon
in justice's courts. C. L., §
1—-Saund.

Since

the

enactment

10-117.

2—Gale v. Nixon, 6 Cow., 4-15.
3—Fawikner
v. Lowe, 4 Exch.,

R.,

598.

The action of cove
4——Antc, § 12.
nant lies in justice's court on a money
large the pen
bond,
no matter how
alty, it given to secure speciﬁc sums
of money, in one or several installments,
the aggregate
shall not exceed
provided
See, C.
one hundred and fifty dollars:
L., § 709; Gray v. Stafford, 5'2 Mlch.,
497; 18 N. W., 235.
The statute pro
of
in such cases for an action
vides
covenant for any separate installment,
installments,
and for several
successive
independent
as
actions.
it necessary,

But it the bond is not strictly s money
bond, it is not taken
from the rules
governing in other cases, and if the
penalty exceeds the jurisdiction oi’ a jus
tice, no suit can be brought before him
upon it: 1birl.; see, Bishop v. Freeman,
42 Mlch., 533; 4 N. W., 290.
5—C. L., § 10417.
This section does
not compel a party to resort to an action
of assumpsit on a sealed instrument:
Goodrich v. Leland, 18 Mlch., 118: see,
Jerome v. Ortmsn. 66 Mlch., 670: 33
N. W., 759; Stewart v. Sprague, 71
Mlch.,
58;
W.,
38
N.
673.
This
statute does not affect the rules of
pleading. While the common counts may
be joined with special counts, yet wher
ever the cause of action requires a special
count it must still be employed: Gooding
v. Hiugston, 20 Mlch., 440; Stewart v.
Sprague,
71 Mlch., 58; 38 N. W., 673.
Neither does this‘ statute aﬂect the
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Parties to actions 0f.—It is a general principle, that
action can be brought upon a. covenant by a person who
was not a party to the deed, though the covenant name him,
and be made to him expressly, and for his beneﬁt.“
§ 661.

no

If

if

a

it,

the covenant be made to two or more jointly, all the cove
even although the cove
nantors must join in an action upon
thing for the beneﬁt of one of them only. And
nant be to do

any of the eovenantees

fact must be averred in
man covenant with two or more, and with
be dead, the

a

If
the declaration.’
them and each of them, and the interest of the covenantees be
several and not joint, each of the covenantees may alone main

on the covenant?
But where the interest
joint,
several as “with them and each of
the covenant
If the covenant be joint and not
them,” yet all must join.”
several, the action must be brought against all the covenantees
jointly; but
the covenant be joint and several, the cove
nantee has his option in bringing the action against all the

is

tain an action

if

is

though

covenantors, or against any one of them, even although they
be jointly interested in the subject matter of of the covena.nt.1°

Actions on implied covenants.—This action lies as
§662.
Well on covenants implied from the terms of the deed, as on
those which are express. But no covenant shall be implied in
any conveyance of real estate, whether such conveyance con
tain several covenants or not." The term conveyance embraces
every instrument in writing by which any estate or interest
created, aliened, mortgaged, or assigned; or
by which the title to any real estate may be affected in law
or equity, except wills, leases for a term not exceeding three
years, and executory contracts for the sale or purchase of
is

in real estate

is

is

6

& 1

8

a

Bradford
v. Stuckey,
Charles v. Brown,
B.

Blng., 225;
0., 718.

6

'

&

P., 73.
&

M.

0., 21s.

Jur., 616; Hop
Ell. N. S., 964.

9

&

9—I-Iopklns v. Lee,
kinson v. Lee,
Ad.

B.

10"‘En75 v' D°mth°m°'
Burr» 1190;
S““"d- PL
EV» 861
Brayton
v.
11-——C. L.,
S959.
My-lthew, 56 Mich., 168; Gage v. Jen
klnaon, 58 Mich., 172-3.
8994, and note.
12-—-C. L.,

675

2

covenants: as upon an ofﬂclal bond
bank teller: Detrolt Sav. Bk. v.
of
Zlegler, 49 Mich., 157; 13 N. VV., 496.
Moo., 88;
6—Bradf0rd v. Stuckey,

out

v. Ladbroke,

&

’

8—MllIs

’

"m"“;‘°" “PPl;:l=
lefwgi ;l',c,?ra§;?'
229;?’' “,vergO;'
i
' Ag:
"
"
sumpslt will lie upon a penal bond with
'§:°“§h:

7——Scott v. Godwin,

1

assumpsit ls

§

It

§

Ye"

7

a

81*

1

"1;

statute of llmltatlons.

a

An implied covenant, in its proper legal sense,
covenant not formally stated in
collected
deed, but which
lands."

§663

oovsnsnr.

.

C11.

XL.

by constructive inference from the terms used in it. Thus a
covenant to supply one with lime at a stipulated price, at all
times and seasons of burning lime, is an implied covenant to
So, a stipulation in a charter
burn lime at all such seasons."
should
be
allowed for unloading and
forty
that
days
party,
loading again, implies a covenant on the part of the freighter
that the vessel should not be detained longer in unloading and
loading again."

Defenses.-The plea of the general issue at the com
§663.
mon law only put in issue the giving of the deed, and admitted
all the material averments or breaches contained in the dec
laration."
Since the enactment of the statute abolishing spe
cial pleas,1“ the general issue requires the plaintiff to prove
every fact necessary for hi_m to allege in order to recover."
Of all other defenses notice must be specially given.

If the performance of a covenant becomes impossible by the
act of God, or the act of the plaintiff, or by the intervention of a
statute, the defendant will be excused, and he may plead the
matter in bar.

B.

8:

13-—Shrewsbury v. Gould,

2

if

a

a

if

a

it

it

it

is

a

it,

is,

When the law creates a duty, and the party
by the act of
without any fault in him, and he
God, disabled to perform
has no remedy over, the law will excuse him; but when
party, by his own contract, creates a duty or charge upon him
bound to make
he can, notwithstanding
self, he
good,
any accident by inevitable necessity; because he might have
by his contract. And, therefore, if a lessee
provided against
covenant to repair
house, though
be destroyed by light
ning, yet he must repair it. So,
party covenant to build
and keep in repair
bridge for seven years, he will be held to
the observa.nce of his contract, although the bridge be, by the
act of God, by an extraordinary and unusual ﬂood of water,
A..

1

9

1

declaring,

in which case its execution
deemed admitted
not denied
at the time of pleading: C. L.,
826; Wren v. Mchnren, 48 Mlch., 197;
188.
12 N. W., 41; see, ante,

will

be
on oath

if

§§

Kinne

676

§

10071,

10072.
Mlch.,
v. Owens,
Mlch.,
249: Young v. Stephens,
Q90.
Under the general issue in covenant, the
defendant may show the deed is not his,

17-Scc,

§

7

14—Rundull v. Lynch, 12 East, 179.
W'end., 194:
15-—-Legg v. Robinson,
Cooper v. Watson, 10 Wend., 202.
16—C. L.,

by proving a lack of power in the agent
who executed
in his behalf: Agent,
Mlch., 438: unless
etc., v. Lathrop,
the writing containing the covenant was
ﬂied with the justice at the time of

it

487.

CH.

XL.
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broken down."

But in

§ 663

some cases where the act of God ren

ders performance absolutely impossible, the covenantor will
be discharged;
as, if a lessee covenants to leave a wood in
as good a plight as it was at the time of the lease, and the

trees a.re blown down by a tempest; or if one covenant to
serve another seven years, and he die before the expiration
of the term; or one covenant to deliver a horse to another
and the horse die, the covenant in either case is discharged,

the act of God defeats the possibility of perfonnance."
When a right of action depends upon the performance of a
condition precedent, performance is not excused, although it
has become impossible by the act of God.2°.
because

When H covenants not to do an act or thing which was-law
ful to do, and an act of parliament comes after and compels

if

If

is

it,

thing which

is

to do a

it,

the statute repeals the covenant; so
H covenants
lawful, and an act of parliament comes
in and hinders him from doing
the covenant
repealed?‘

him to do

if

it

a

one covenants not to do
thing, which was then unlawful,
and an act comes and makes
lawful, the statute does not
repeal the covenant. Nor
he covenants to do a thing which

was then unlawful, and a subsequent statute legalizes the‘ act,
said statute does not repeal the covenant.”
198; Presbyterian church v. New York
Clty,
Cow., 538; see, People v. Haw
Mich., 330.
ley,
22—P1att on Covenants, 588.
3

5

18—PIatt on Covenants, 274-5.
19—Ibid., 583-4.
20—Carpenter v. Stevens, 12 Wend.,
21—Brewster

v.

Kltcnel,

1

589.

Salk.,

(‘-77
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CHAPTER XLI.
OF DEBT.
§664.
§665.
§666.
§667.

In general—when will
On
On

lie.

simple contract.
bond

and

deed.

Profert and oyer.
§ 668. Evidence in debt on bond or deed.
§669. Debt on judgment.
§670. Declaration on judgment.
§671. Debt on penal statute.
§672. Whose duty to prosecute.

§673. Action, where to be brought.
§674. Action, how brought, etc.
§675. Form of declaration in.
§ 676. Declaration in assumpsit for pen
alty or forfeiture.
§677. Declaration in trover for goods
forfeited.
§678. Plea and evidence.
§6T9. Debt on by-laws.

In gene:-a.l—when will lie.-—This action is founded
§664.
upon contract, express or implied, to pay money or render
It is a concurrent remedy with
some other speciﬁc thing.‘
indebitatus assumpsit to recover the price or value of goods
sold and delivered, or of work or labor performed, money lent,
paid, or had and received, a balance due upon an account
stated, or upon any other executed consideration for which
money is to be paid? It is one remedy upon a bond, but not
the only one. Covenant may sometimes be brought on a bond,“
or assumpsit, or debt, and assumpsit may be brought upon

It is the only remedy, by action, for a forfeiture
judgments.‘
under a. by-law. In all cases not otherwise specially provided
for by law, where a pecuniary penalty or forfeiture is incurred
by any person, and the act or omission for which the same is

imposed is not also a misdemeanor, such penalty or forfeiture
may be recovered in an action of debt, or in an action of
assumpsitﬁ

Debt on simple contra.ct.—Debt on simple contract
§665.
lies in all cases where indebitatus assumpsit lies. It lies on a.
& Ev.,
5 Am. ed.,
1——Saund. Pl.
896-7; Doyle v. Powell, 4 B. & A., 268.
But does not lie to recover unliquldnted
damages: Buller’s N. P., 167, note a.
2-——Archbold‘s N. P., 200.
3—See,

4—C.

§ 660.
§ 10417; see, ante,

ante,

L.,

§ 660,

5—C. L., § 9797: see, ante, § 14.
note Z,
Where a penal statute is re
penled without 0. reservation or saving
clause in favor of penalties that had
been incurred under it, such penalties
cannot afterwards be collected: Engle,
etc., v. Shurts, 1 Mich., 150

note 5.
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promissory note by the payee against the maker, and by any
endorsee against the maker or any endorserﬁ It lies on all con
tracts for the payment of money.’
Debt, as well as assumpsit, may be maintained for rent due,
whether claimed in fee or otherwise, and the deed of demise,
or other instrument in writing, may be used in evidence by
either party to prove the amount due from the defendant.“

it,

But when a sum of money is secured by deed, and a balance
is struck for the purpose of ascertaining how much remains
due thereon, and the obligor admits the correctness of tho
debt on simple contract on an
amount, and promises to pay
account stated, will not lie, but the action must be brought on
the deed.“

a

is

if

a

is

a

is

Debt on bond and deed.-An obligation or bond
§666.
a deed whereby the obligor obliges himself, his heirs, executors
certain sum of money to another,
and administrators to pay
If this be all, the bond called single
day appointed.
at
the
generally a condition added, that
one; but there

particular act, the obligation shall be void,
in
full
force. In case this condition
not per
or else remain
formed, the bond becomes forfeited, or absolute at law, and an
action may be brought upon it.1°
does some

is

obligor

If

a

is

if

it

a

no time of payment be mentioned in the condition of
at any time after the
bond, an action may be brought upon
time be mentioned, the action cannot
executed; but
bond

until after the time shall have expired. “\Vhen
an action shall be prosecuted in any court of law, upon any
bond for the breach of any condition other than for the pay
ment 'of money, or shall be prosecuted for any penal sum, for
the non-performance of any covenant or written agreement,
the plaintiff, in his declaration, shall assign the speciﬁc breaches
be commenced

53.

G., 623.

2

10—Blackstone's

Justice
only
L,
709; Richland
Township v. Clitf, 131 Mich., 628; 92
N. W., 685, and cases cited in the
opinion.
has jurisdiction
in
up to $150; C.

679

Com.,
debt
§

7—C0myn's Dlg., Debt, A.
8—C. L.,
9255.
See McIntosh
v.
Hodges, 110 Mich., 319; 68 N. W., 168;
For a distinction be
70 N. W., 550:
for
tween rent and compensation
use
§

&

and occupation, see, Hogsett v. Ellis, 17
Mich., 367.
9—Middleditch v. Ellis,
W. H.

3

6—Plerce v. Crafts, 12 Johns., 90;
Wilmarth v. Crawford, 10 Wend., 343;
Onondaga County Bank v. Bates,
Hill,

340.

on

bond

CH.
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for which the action is brought.”“ The plaintiff is bound to
assign his breaches in the declaration, and cannot assign them
in the replication or upon the record.” To this declaration the
defendant will plead the general issue, and give notice with it
of any defense which he may have to the breaches assigned."
“Upon the trial of suchaction if the jury ﬁnd that any assign
ment of such breaches is true, and that the plaintiff should
recover damages therefor, they shall assess such damages, and
shall specify the amount thereof in their verdict, in addition
to their ﬁnding upon any other question of fact submitted to

them.”" The verdict of the jury assessing the damages (or

as

if tried

assessed by the justice,
by him,) must be entered on the
record, or docket, and judgment shall be rendered for the pen
alty of the bond, or for the penal sum forfeited, as in other

actions of debt, together with the costs of suit, and with a.
further judgment that the plaintiff have execution to collect
the amount of the damages so assessed; which damages shall
be speciﬁed in such judgment."
The execution is to be in the
usual form in actions of debt, but shall have endorsed thereon
in addition a direction, to collect the amount of damages so
assessed, which must be stated, with interest thereon from the
time of such assessment, and the costs of such suit.“
§ 10378; see, Young v.
Mich., 500; Spencer
v.
Perry, 18 Mich., 399; Bishop v. Free
As
man, 42 Mich., 535: 4 N. W., 290.
assignment
to what will be a sufficient
of the breach under this section, see,
Delashman v. Berry, 21 Mich., 516. See,
White Sewing Mach. C0. v. Dakin, 86
Mich., 581; 49 N. W., 583.
11-—C.
Stephens,

L.,
9

12—Reed v. Drake, 7 Wend.,
Nelson v. Bostwlck, 5 Hill, 37.

345;

13—See, ante, § 188.
L., § 10379; see, Delashman v.
Berry, 21 Mich., 516.

14-0.

In an action
15--C. L., § 10380.
replevin bond,
against the sureties in
for an
no judgment can be recovered
the penalty of the
amount exceeding
bond and costs of suit: Fraser v. Little,
The object of the pen
13 Mich., 195.
alty or penal sum in a bond, is to fix the
limit of the liability of the obligor, and
against
judgment cannot be rendered
him for a sum exceeding that amount.
If a surety in a bond other than official

I

pays without suit the amount for
which he is liable on the bond. it will be
a. satisfaction of, and a defense to an
The obligation
action on the bond.
on such a bond is created by the bond.
In official bonds the obligation is created
by the statute,
and the bond is only s.
collateral security for the performance
In such cases
of the legal obligation.
the bond applies only to the amount for
which the party is in default, and not to
sums which may have been paid over
in the performance of oﬂlcial or legal
by the bond:
obligation, not created
Spencer v. Perry, 18 Mich., 394.
There
is no provision of law in this state for
bringing successive
actions on bonds
In the action
other than money bonds.
it
on such bonds if there is a recovery
is for the penalty of the bond with an
of damages for the particu
assessment
Damages
for fur
lar breaches proven.
ther breaches are collected through scire
/acias proceedings: Bishop v. Freeman,
42 Mich., 533: 4 N. W., 290.
16—C. L., § 10381.
bonds

680
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A scroll

or device used as a seal upon any deed of convey
ance or other instrument whatever, has the same force and
effect as a seal." Such was the law previous to the present
statutes; now, no bond, deed of conveyance or other contract
in writing, signed by a.ny party, his agent or attorney, shall be
deemed invalid for want of a seal or scroll affixed thereto by

party."
At common law, the declaration must show that the instru

such

it

is,

the
ment declared on had been sealed by the defendant, that
sealing must have been either expressly averred, or the instru
ment must have been named by some word which would import
that
was under seal, such as indenture, deed, or writing oblig

atory."

is,

it

is,

it,

a

a

§

is

667.
Profert and 0yer.—It
a. general rule in all plead
ings, whether by
plaintiff or defendant, if deed be alleged,
and the party claim or justify under
he must make profert
into court to
of the deed, that
must profess that he brings
be shown to the court and his adversary; the import or mean
that the party has the deed itself ready to
ing of which

a

a

is

it

a

is

it,

is

give to the opposite party oyer of it.2°
Where the deed
stated only as an inducement, or where
or the counter
the plaintiff has no right to the possession of
unnecessary. If there be anything to excuse
profert
part,
the profert, as, either that the deed has been lost or destroyed,
or
in the possession of the defendant,
must be stated ac
cording to the facts, as the opposite party has
right to trav
erse the excuse.
Where
'profert, or an excuse for the want

of

it

is

if

it,
is

the plaintiff profess to produce the deed,
necessary,
not prepared to do so, and the defendant plead the
general issue, the plaintiff will be defeated on the trial, as

when he

Parties to a written contract, not re
quired by law to be ln writing, may
vary or cancel
by parol:
Barton v.
Gray, 57 Mich., 63-1; 24 N. W., 638;
Blagborne v. Hunger, 101 Mich., 375;
59 N. W., G57.
19—Cabell v. Vaughn,
Saund. Rep.,
to glve the unsealed
in
was lntended
290: note 1.
strument all the force and effect that 11
20——'1 Chltty‘s Pl., 10 Am. ed., 364
Glvlng oyer of the lnstrument, ls
5.
sealed one of the same tenor would have
had; as a legal lnstrument is not to be Slvlng El CODY of it; Green's Practice,
95,
Vickery v. Belr, 16 Mich.,
322.
affected by the want of that formality:
Miller,
McKinney
1.‘) Mich.,
151.
53.
v.
§

1

8

lt

§ §

17—C. L.,
9005.
See, Fowler v.
18—C. L.,
10417.
I-Iyland, 48 Mich., 181; 12 N. W., 26;
Lockwood v. Bassett, 49 Mich., 549; 14
N. W., 492; McKinney v. Miller, 19
151;
Mich.,
Splcer v.
Bonker,
45
Mich., 635:
N. W., 518.
This section

681

§ 667

Cn.

DEBT.

will not

XLI.

in that case to prove the deed to have
been lost or destroyed, or in the defendant’s possession. \Vhen
a profert, or an excuse for the omission, is unnecessary, the
statement of it will be considered as surplusage, and will not
entitle the other party to oyer. The insertion of an excuse
of profert will not preclude the plaintiff from introducing the
A profert
deed on the trial, if it should afterwards be found?‘
is required only when oyer can be demanded; it is therefore
unnecessary in setting forth the records and proceedings of
courts, with the exception of letters testamentary and of
administration."
If the plaintitf in his declaration, or the defendant in his plea,
necessarily make a profert of anydeed, letters of administra
tion, etc., the other party may pray oyer, which cannot be re
fused by the court. But if a profert be unnecessarily made,
the other party cannot crave oyer. Nor can it be craved if the
deed be lost or destroyed, etc., and that fact be stated in the
pleading. If a profert be necessarily made, and oyer be craved
and given, the party has a right to make use of it. As oyer
cannot be craved except where profert has been made, the party
Though a party
should demur specially to the declaration.
be suﬁicient

be entitled

to crave oyer, yet he is not in general bound to do

so.” A party who craves oyer of a deed is entitled to a copy
of the attestation and the names of the witnesses,’-"* and not
only a true copy of the instrument itself, but of all endorse

u

it

a

it

it

is

is

it,

and of all papers attached to it;
ments and memoranda upon
so that\he may have the same view ‘of the matter as if the deed
had been brought into court.” Where the deed
not set out
on oyer, but
pleaded according to its legal eﬁ'ect, the general
issue puts in issue not only the execution of the deed, but the
as alleged in the pleading;
construction of
8.II10\1l1tS to a
deed having such etfect as
denial that the party executed
Had the deed been set out on oyer
stated in the pleading.
would have been otherwise; for then the plea (the general issue
containing oyer,) “Would have been inconsistent'in itself if
Pl., 10 Am. ed., 364-5.
22—Commercl:1l Bank, etc., v. Sparrow,

2

21——1 Chitty's
Denlo,

24—Smlth V. Alworth, 18 J'0hn., 445.
25—Van Rensellaer v. Poueher, 24
Wend.,

97.

316.

23—1 Chltty‘s Pleadlngs, 10 Am. ed.,
430,

-431.
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the deed it set out didinot have the construction put on it by
the other part of the plea” (the deed was pleaded in this case,)
“and so the objection would be raised on demurrer.”2“
Oyer having been granted, the party may, sometimes, in his
pleading, set forth the deed or not, at his election; and may
plead the general issue, or any other plea without stating the
oyer.2"

.

Profert may be made in the following language or language
of similar import: “All of which will more fully appear by
said (deed, mortgage, letters testamentary, etc.) now ready
.
to be produced as the court may direct.”
The excuses of the profert are as follows:-—If the bond be
lost—“and which said writing obligatory having been lost,”
or, “and which said writing obligatory having been destroyed
by accident,” or, “by the said defendant, the said plaintiff
cannot produce the same to the said court here.” If the bond
which said writ
be in the possession of the defendant—“a.nd

ing obligatory being in the possession of the said defendant,
the said plaintiff cannot produce the same to the said court
here.”

Evidence in debt on bond or deed.—The only evi
§668.
dence required from the plaintiff, under the general issue, at
the common law, was proof of the execution of the bond in the
ordinary way.” This plea at the common law put in issue the
execution of the deed only; all other material averments in
the declaration were admitted by it.” Since the enactment
of the statute C. L. §§ 1,0071-10073 abolishing special pleas in
bar and providing for notice of certain defenses under the
general issue, a plea of the general issue in all cases denies
every fact necessary for the plaintiif to allege to recover.“
Notice must be given of matter which shows that the deed
was merely voidable, on account of infancy, duress, void by

Ell.,

§

191,

and

notes.

1

9

27—If the plalntlﬂ set out the deed in
his declaration a formal pi-ofert would
seem to be unnecessary: Regents, etc., v.
Detroit, etc., Society, 12 Mlch., 157.
28——See, ante,

29—Gardner v. Gardner, 10 Johns.,
47; Dale v.. Roosevelt,
Cow., 307.
Mlch., 249;
30—Klnnle
v. Owen,
Young v. Stephens,
Mlch., 500.
31—That ls, notlce of the defense must
be glven under the general Issue.
9

v. Wakeﬁeld, 13 Ad.

8;

26—North
N. S., 536.

it,

So performance or any other matter
statute, or payment.31.
as non dammficatus to a. bond of indemnity; no

in excuse of

.

683

§ ass

DEBT.

C11.

XLI.

award, to an arbitration bond; and niatters_in discharge of the
action, as tender, set oﬂi, accord and satisfaction, former recov
ery and release, notice must be given of them. So, if the agree
ment upon whieh the bond was given be illegal, immoral, or
against public policy, it must be pleaded; unless the fact
appear upon the face of the condition, and in the pleadings;
when the defendant may demur. In any action upon a sealed
instrument, and where a set-off is founded on any sealed
instrument, the seal is only presumptive evidence of a suf
ﬁcient consideration, which may be rebutted in the same man
ner, and to the same extent, as if such instrument were not
This defense, however, cannot be made unless notice
sealed.“
of it is given with the plea of the general issue."

it

it

is

it

it,

As to when the obligee is discharged by the act of God, etc.“
Under the general issue, the plaintiff must prove the execu
tion of the bond, unless it is ﬁled with the justice at the time
of pleading and the defendant fails to deny its execution under
oath.“ In order to prove this, the bond must be produced, if
or the excuse for not having
profert has been made of
has been lost or destroyed, or
in
must be proved; that
and
has
of
the
been
him
opposite
party,
given
possession
notice
and he has failed to do so.
to produce

In the

is

cases indicated above proof of execution
unneces
So where the opposite party pays money into court, on
the count in which the deed is set forth,“ or stipulates in
writing to admit the execution of the deed on the trial of the
cause; in such case the court will allow the deed to be read
Without further-_ proof, although the party stipulating will not
admit the execution." And where a party to
suit, pursuant
to notice, produces an instrument to which he
party, or
under which he claims
beneﬁcial interest,
not neces
10185; see, Dye v. Mann

684

9
2

357.

38—Burllng
570

&

1

Campb.,

v. Paterson,

Car.

&

663.

191; Klnne v. Owen,

9

5 §

§

ante,
ante,

§

291.

10186; see, Hobbs v
33—C. L.,
Brush El. Light Co., 75 Mich., 553; 42
N. W., 965; Boyer v. Sowler, 109 Mich.,
481; 67 N. W., 530; Robson v. Dayton,
111 Mich., 440; 69 N. W., 834,
34-—See,
85—See,

Mich., 249; Young v. Stephens,
Mich., 500.
36—C. L., §~826. Dunning v. Cnlklns.
51 Mich., 556; 17 N. W., 54; Newton v.
Prlnclpaal, 82 Mich., 273; 46 N. \V.,
234; ante,
191, and notes.
37—Dyer v. Ashton,
C., 3;
B.

1

32—C. L.,
10 Mich.,

§

a

it

a

is is

a

sary.3°
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sary to prove the execution of it.-*9 Deeds acknowledged or
recorded prove themselves.“
The recital of a deed, in another deed, is evidence against
the party executing the reciting deed,“ and the obligee and
under him."
the deed is essential, and must be proved; it
will be suﬂicient if af party manifests his intention, in any man
ner, whether by action or word, to deliver or put the deed into
The delivery is usually proved
the possession of the other.“
by the fact of the party to whom it is made having the deed
If the-deed be executed by virtue of a
in his possession.“
those

claiming

A delivery of

power of attorney for the obligor, the power of attorney must
excused and its contents
be produced,“ or its production
proven.

When the general issue is pleaded, and the execution denied
under oath,“ some evidence must be given to show that the
defendant, and the person who executed the deed, are the
same.

Debt lies on any contract under seal to pay money, if the
demand is for a sum certain or capable of being reduced to a

certainty.“

-

Debt on judgment.—Debt lies upon the judgment
§669.
of a court, whether of record or not, and whether rendered in
this state or any other state or country.“
A judgment rendered in a court of record in this state would

it appear from the record
that the court had not jurisdiction.“
In this state it has been
held; ﬁrst, that in an action in one state, upon the judgment of
a court of general jurisdiction‘ of another state, no plea or
proof can be received in contradiction of any material fact
appearing by the record, unless such plea or proof would be
received in an action upon it in the court in which it was ren
be conclusive upon the parties, unless

39—Jacks0n

v.

Kingsley,

17

Johns.,

44—Jackson

2 Wend.,

308.

.

45—Corbin v. Jackson, 14 Wend.,

619.

15‘:-0_see . a H te . § 384 41—Jackson v. Brooks, 8 Wend., 426.
42—Jackson v. Harrington, 9 Cow.,
86.
As to manner of proving handwriting and the execution of the instrument,
5”» “'"*-'1§386~
43—Ver Plank v. Sterry, 12 Johns.,
536.

v. Perkins,

46_see' ante’ § 191'
47_1 Chlttfs Pl-- 10
48—1

Saund

Pl.

&

A111 ed» 110

Ev.,

5 Am.

ed.,

898.

49—Bradshaw
408_.
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dered; second, that if the record shows a want of jurisdiction,
the judgment is a nullity; third, that if the record does not
show either that the court had or that it had not jurisdiction,
the jurisdiction will be presumed; but in such case, facts show
ing a want of jurisdiction may be alleged by plea, and if estab
lished, a recovery may thus be defeated; and, fourth, that
when the record shows that where the process was not person
ally served, and that the defendant did not appear in person
in the suit, but that an attorney of the court appeared for
him and made defense, the authority of such attorney so to
appear

will

be presumed.5°

is

a

against an action on the judgment.
ever, an action may be brought on
diately after its rendition.“

In all other cases, how
justice judgment imme
’s

it

is,

A judgment obtained before a justice in this state, in any
suit commenced by attachment, in which the defendant was
not personally served, and did not appear, is only presumptive
evidence of indebtedness, which may be repelled by the defend
ant. And, probably, an action cannot be brought on the judg
ment until the property attached has been sold on the execu
The same reason which would prevent its being set
tion.-'*1
that
presumed to be satisﬁed by the property
off,“ that
taken on attachment, would seem to be equally available

A judgment rendered in an action against joint debtors is
conclusive evidence of the liability of the defendant who was
personally served with process in the suit, or who appeared

is

is

to

is

is

it

evidence only
therein, but against every other defendant,
of the extent of the plaintiff’s demand, after the liability of
such defendant shall have been established by other evidence.5_3
In actions upon judgments rendered by justices, the proper
question the rendition of the judgment,
the
plea by which
bound to show
general issue. Under this plea, the plaintiff
the original liability of the defendant, not served, etc., by evi
dence other than the judgment.
The judgment itself
no
evidence of that fact.“ The defendants may set up the statute

686

§

3

53—I-Iale v. Angeli, 20 Johns. 342;
Mich., 558.
v. Butler,
L.,
See, ante,
10372.
485.
55—Mervln v. Kumbel, 23 Wend., 293.

Mr-Donald
54-—C.

§

2

Mich., 165.
50-—Wllcox v. Caaslck,
51—Johnson v. Moss, 20 Wend., 148.
52—Mlllcr v. Starks, 13 Jol1ns., 517.

\
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of limitations to the original demand if they were not person
ally served with process, and did not appear in the cause.“
In all cases where an action is brought on a justice’s judg
ment, the defendant may show that it is void by reason of
irregularity in the proceedings.“
The imprisonment of the defendant on a justice’s execution
is a satisfaction of the judgment, at least while the imprison
ment continues,“ and an action could not be maintained on
the judgment.
So, if one of several defendants is imprisoned,
The defendant may also
the consequence would be the same.-">9
plead payment of the judgment or any other matter which
shows that the judgment has been satisﬁed or discharged.
When a judgment is insisted on as a seboﬂ’, and submitted to
and passed upon by court or jury, or whether the same be
allowed or not, the judgment is extinguished.“
Declaration on judgment.—Formerly, in declaring
§670.
the
of a justice, or setting it forth in any other
judgment
upon
pleading, in strictness, the party should have begun by alleg
ing the issuing and service of the summons or other process
by which the suit was commenced, and then have passed to
the rendition of the judgment, by stating that such proceed
ings were thereupon had in said cause, that on such a day
judgment was rendered, etc. If jurisdiction was acquired by
the party appearing and joining issue, or confessing judgment,

it should have been so stated.Q1 The declaration must also
have shown that the justice had jurisdiction of the subject
matter.
The particularity in pleading of. the common law is
not now required in justice ’s courts. In pleadinga judgment
or decision of a court or oﬁicer of special jurisdiction, it is
suﬂicient to allege generally, that judgment or decision was

duly made."
56—Bruen v. Bokee, 4 Denio, 66. And
it seems that a delendant in such case
may avail himself of any defense which
it would have been competent for him
to make in the original action It he
had been brought into court: Carmen v.
Townsend, 6 Wend., 206.
57—As to proving judgments, see,

tit!’ is remitted to his former rights, and
Mt-Guinty v. Herrick, 5
the bar ceases:

Wend., 2-10.
v. Hatt,

59—~Chapman

60—McGulnty

v.

41.

5

VVend.,

Hill,

35, and

240.

61—Corneii

v. Barnes, 7

c, p. 37.

ante,

note

v. Loder, 5 Wend., 58.
But Lt the detendant escapes, the plain

62——C. L., § 771.
ard, 23 Mlch., 374.

§ 374.
58——Sunderland

11 Wend.,

Herrick,
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Debt on penal statutes.—“In all cases not otherwise
provided for by law where a pecuniary penalty or
forfeiture shall be incurred by any person, and the act or
omission for which the same is imposed shall not also be a mis
demeanor, such penalty or forfeiture may be recovered in an
action of debt, or in an action of assumpsit; and if it be 0.
forfeiture of any property, it may be sued for and recovered
in an action of trover, or other appropriate action.”“3
-

§ 671.

specially

“By

statute justices of the peace shall have jurisdiction of
all actions for the recovery of penalties or forfeitures, where
the amount [of] the penalty or forfeiture shall not exceed one
hundred dollars.”°4

If

the act or omission for which the penalty or forfeiture is
imposed shall also be a misdemeanor, no action can be main
“When any act or omission is
tained under this chapter.
punishable according to law, by a ﬁne, penalty or forfeiture,
and imprisonment, or by such ﬁne, penalty, or forfeiture, or
imprisonment, in the discretion of the court, such act or omis
sion shall be deemed a misdemeanor,”‘"' and “in all cases
where the penalty or forfeiture shall be one hundred dollars, or
more, such penalty or forfeiture may be recovered by indict
ment in the proper court of the county.”“

\

Whose duty to prosecute.-“It shall be the duty of
§672.
every supervisor whenever he shall know, or have good reason
to believe that any penalty or forfeiture has been incurred
within his township, which shall be recoverable by action
before a justice of the peace, according to the foregoing pro
visions of this chapter, forthwith to commence and prosecute
a suit, in the name of the people of this state, for the recov
cry thereof/"" “It shall be the duty of every other township
officer, who shall know, or have good reason to believe that
63—C. L., 5 9797; see, Engle v.
Shurta, 1 Mich., 150. Assumpsit may be
brought under this statute: Canal Street
‘G. R. Co. v. Pans, 95 Mich., 372; 54 N.
W., 907. When a penal statute has been
penalties which have accrued
repealed
previous to the repeal cannot he recov
Engle v. Shurts, 1 Mich., 150;
ered:
Breltung v. Lindauer, 37 Mich., 230, and
ante,

L., § 9799; see, (mic, p. 14.
See, People v. Brady. 90 Mich.,
459; 51 N. W., 537, distinguishing Peo
ple v. Navarre, 22 Mich., 1.
64—C.

note

3.

65—C.

L., § 9807.

66—C. L.. § 9806.
can

not

These proceedings
court.

be taken‘ in Justice's

67—C. L., § 9808.

p. 14, note 3.
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any penalty or forfeiture has been incurred within his town
Ship, forthwith to give notice thereof to the supervisor/’°8

Action, where to be brought.—“Every action for a
§673.
penalty or forfeiture, shall be brought in the county where
the act was done, or Where the act omitted was required, in
whole or in part, to be done, upon which the penalty or for
feiture attac-hcd.”“°

Action, how brought and conducted.-“Every such
§674.
action shall be brought in the name of the people of the state
of Michigan, and shall be conducted and prosecuted in the
same manner as personal actions, and shall be subject to all
the provisions of law concerning personal actions, not repug
nant to the provisions of this chapter.”

Form of dec1ara.tion—in debt.—“In actions of debt
§675.
brought to recover any penalty or forfeiture imposed by any
statute, it shall be suﬁicient, without setting forth the special
matter, to allege in the declaration, that the defendant is
indebted to the plaintiffs in the amount of such penalty or forl
feiture; whereby an action hath accrued according to the pro
visions of the statute by which such penalty or forfeiture is
imposed, specifying the section and chapter, as the case may
require, or in some other similar terms referring to such
statute.’

’"

“When a penalty or forfeiture is imposed by law for any act
or omission, not exceeding any speciﬁed sum, an action may
be brought for the highest sum so speciﬁed; and the jury, or
justice before whom the trial shall be had, shall award the
sum so speciﬁed to the plaintiff, or such part thereof, within
the limitation prescribed by law, as shall be deemed propor
tionate to the offense.”"2

Declamtion in assumpsit for penalty or forfeiture.
“Whenever an action of assunipsit shall be brought for the
recovery of any penalty or forfeiture imposed by any statute,
§ 676.

68-C.
69-0.

Hart,

L., § 9809.
L., § 9800.
1 Mlch., 467.

70—-C.

L.

§ §9T98.

See,

People

v.

People
See
v.
71—C. L., § 9801.
Grand Rapids & W. P. R. Co., 64 Mlch.,

44

y-3}

618; 31 N. W., 546, for declaration held
fatally defective to support a Pause ot
action for a penalty brought in justli-e‘s
See, also, Benalleck v. People,
court.
31 Mlch., 200.
72—C. L., § 9805.
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without setting forth the special matter,

to allege in the declaration, that the defendant, being indebted
to the plaintiffs in the amount of such penalty or forfeiture,
according to the provisions of the statute by which such pen

alty or forfeiture is imposed, referring to such statute as pre
scribed in the last section, undertook and promised to pay the
same.”"3
Declaration, in trover, for goods forfeited.—“If an
§677.
action of trover be brought to recover any goods or other
things forfeited by the provisions of any statute, the declara
tion may allege that such goods or other things were forfeited

of such statute, referring to the
in the ‘foregoing sections, and that the
defendant converted the same to his own use, without setting
forth the special n1atter.”“
according
same

to the provisions

as prescribed

Plea and evidence.—“To every declaration for a
§678.
penalty or forfeiture, the defendant may plead the general
issue, which shall be in the same form as in personal actions;
and may give in evidence under such plea any special matter
in bar of the action, or in discharge of the defendant there
from, in the same manner, and with the like effect as if a spe
cial notice thereof had been given.”7~"

is it,

is

it

Debt on by-laws.-Where a by-law enacts a penalty
§679.
to be incurred, when its restrictions are not complied with,
or assumpsit.“
debt may be brought for the recovery of
But, where
enacted that the penalty
to be recovered
by debt, then debt only can be maintained."

“In

it

it

it,

it

an action of debt for the penalty of a by-law, the time
was made, the parties by whom
was made, their
authority to make
the by-law itself, and the breach of
by
the defendant, must be set forth; that the Court may judge

1

§
§

a

it to prove title to lands: Ramsby v.
Bigler, 129 Mich., 570: 89 N. VV.. 344.
7G—~Fe1tmakers
v. Davis,
Bos.
P., 98.
77—Com. Dig., "By-Law," 21. \\'heu
ever the mode of enforcing obedience to
a by-law is prescribed by such by~law,
pursued:
that mode must be strictly
Dillon on Municipal Corp., 345.
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5

§

L.,
People v. Brady,
9802.
Mich., 462; 51 N. W., 537.
74—C. L.,
9803.
75--C. L.,
9804.
This section
is
not applicable to an action to recover a
penalty for obstructing
highway
a
brought before
justice of the peace, so
as to enable the defendant
by virtue of
73-—C.

90

&

when
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both whether the by-law be good and whether the defendant
'
be a proper object of the action.”'“3
78-2

Kyd on Corp., 167; cited and
approved in Coats v. Mayor, etc., 7 Cow.,
In the work of Judge Dillon
585.
Corporations, it is said
on Municipal
that the courts. unless it be the courts
of the municipality, do not judicially
notice the ordinances of a municipal cor
poration, unless directed by the charter
Therefore, such
or statute to do so.
Ordinances,
when sought to be enforced
by action, or when set’ up by the defend
should be set out
ant as a protection,

It is
in the pleading.
they
be referred to
It is,
title or section.
to be sufﬂcient, in the
provisions
legislative
manner of pleading,

not suﬂicient that
generally by the
however,
absence

believed
of special

prescribing
set forth

to

the
the

i
legal substance
of that part of the
ordinance alleged to have been violated,
it being advisable, for purposes of iden
tificatlon, to refer to the title, date and
section.
In a declaration to recover a
penalty for the violation of a by-law or
ordinance, the facts which make the lia
bility of the defendant
should
be dis
tinctly stated, and regularly, as before
stated, the by-law should be set forth,
or its substance stated, and the breach.
But where, as in some of the city char
ters in this State, it is provided that
prosecutions
in
for
violations
of
ordinances it shall be suﬂicient to refer
to the ordinance violated, by its title, it
would not be necessary to- set out the
ordinance or its substance.
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Of earnest and part-payment.
The memorandum.
Sales at auction.
Representations as to credit of

§716.
§717.
§718.
§719.
§720.
§721.
§722.
§723.
{724.

another.
§ 695.

Consideration
pressed

§ 696.

in

need
not
the writing.

be

ex

Leases for longer term than one
year.
UPON

§
§
§
§

PROMISSDBY

NOTES.

§ 705.
§ 706.

§707.
§ 708.

§'ro9.
§71o.
§711.
§112.
§11s.

OF

When appropriate.
What plaintlﬂ must prove.
Defenses.
The damages.

Husband's liability for goods tur
nished to wife.
Eﬂect of separation between.
Elfect of divorce.
Cohabitation though without mar
riage.
Liability of parent for goods fur
nished to infant child.

van or common couurs 1.\' ACTION
wonx, LABOR AND nsraamns.
§725. In general.
§726. In case contract

.

not

fully

1-‘on

per

formed.

697. Essentials of a. promissory note.
698. Actions by payee against maker.
699. In case of lost or destroyed
note.

700.
§ 701.
§ 702.
§ 703.
§ 704.

OF

§715. What circumstances justify.
USE OF COMMON COUNTS
IN CASE
GOODS SOLD AND DEJVIRED.

OF FRAUDB.

required

is no special count.

IN CASE
COMMON COUNTS
GOODS IBABGAINED AND SOLD.

OF

Bond, where note lost.
Interest.
Compound
interest.
Action by indorsee against maker.
against Ln
Action by indorsee
dorser.
Presentment for payment.
Presentment, by whom.
Presentment, at what place.
Presentment, in case two or more
liable.
Waiver of demand and notice.
The notice to the indorser.
When may be served by mail.
Guaranty of payment of note.
Suretyship.

usa 01-"common

FOR

§727. In general.
use or common couxrs IN ACTIONS
money PAID.

r-on

couxvrs IN ACTIONS
MONEY LENT.

§728. In general.
§729. Payments by sureties.
§730. Contribution in case of torts.
USE OT COMMON COUNTS IN ACTIONS
MONEY HAD AND RECEIVED.
5 731.

§732.
§733.
§734.
§735.
§736.
§'T37.
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Received
from plaintiff.
Received
on plaintiifs account.
Received
for property of plaintiff.
by stakeholder.
Received
Received
under void authority.
Received
from plaintiff on forged
paper.
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\

§ 738
§ 739

Paid by plaintiff through mistake.
of
consideration
after

Failure

money

paid.

§'I41

Obtained by fraud.
Paid by plaintiff under compul

§7-i2
§743

Money due, contract performed.
Paid under moral obligation.

§ 740.

USE OF THE COMMON COUNTS IN ACTIONS
FOR USE AND OCCUPATION.
§ 746.
§ 747
g 14s.

sion.

§ 749
§ 750
§ 751

USE OF THE COMMON COUNTS IN ACTIONS
UPON ACCOUNTS

Damages.

Assignment or surrender of term.
AS UMPSIT ON WARRANTY.

STATED.

§ 752.
§ 753.

5744. In general.
§'I-15.

Form of remedy.
Must be founded in contract.
Defendant's occupation.
Evidence for defendant.

§754

Defenses.

What constitutes n warranty.
Implied warranties.
Measure of damages.

IN GENERAL.
On contracts not under sea1.—Assumpsit is the rem
§680.
edy for the recovery of damages for the breach of simple con
tracts or promises not under seal; and that whether the contract
or promise be express or implied, oral or written, as the law
always raises an obligation to do that which a party is legally,
liable to perform.‘
1—1 Saund. Pi. & Ev., 5 Am. ed.,
162: Woods v. Ayres, 39 Mich., 345.
in
Implied contra,ct.—The liability,
case of an implied promise, is founded
law imposes
upon
a duty which the
upon the party receiving a benefit to
this
pay for it; and the law enforces
duty, under the ﬁction of an implied
Hosmer v. Wilson, 7 Mich.,
contract:
294, 301.
And whenever a beneﬁt ac
crues to a party, whether for services
rendered,
money expended,
or property
cause,
used, or from any other
upon
which a duty to make compensation to
another arises, the law will, in the ab
promise to make
sence of an express
imply one from the
such compensation,
Thus, if A
transaction and the duty.
performs labor or renders services for
B at the latter’s request,
or with his
knowledge and assent, but without a
contract for compensation,
the law will
imply a promise by B to pay A there
for what such labor or services shall be
reasonably worth:
Ward v. Warner, 8
Mich., 519.
But where there
is
s
merely spontaneous
services,
such as
an act of kindness
rendered
without
request, or where the circumstances ac
count for the transaction on some ground
more probable than that of a promise
no promise will be im
of recompense,

plied:
Woods v. Ayres, 39 Mich., 351.
See, Fitch v. Newberry, 1 Doug., Mich.,
17; St. Jude's Church v. Van Denberg,
287; Lange v. Kaiser, 34
31 Mich.,
Mich., 317; In re Young's estate, 39
Mich., 429.
Services prompted by kin
ship or other relationship with no inten
tion to pay or to receive compensation
therefor will not raise an implied ob
ligation to make compensation:
Estate
of Young, 39 Mich., 429; O'Connor v.
Beckwith, 41 Mich., 657; 3 N. W., 166;
Mason v. Dunbar, 43 Mich., 407; 5 N.
VV., 432; Martin v. Sheridan, -16 Mich.,
93; 8 N. W., 722; Allen v. Allen, 60
Mich., 635; 27 N. W., 702. VVhere one
has performed services from which an
other has received a beneﬁt, he is en
pay therefor, if the
titled to recover
circumstances and facts were such as
would create an implied promise, or, in
other words, a clear duty on the part of
the other to pay a reasonable compen
sation; and the fact that defendant had
previously paid for like services has a
tendency to show such promise:
Strong
v. Saunders, 15 Mich., 339, 345.
S0,
where a party enters
upon land under
a contract to purchase it, which he fails
to perform, and after such
failure is
notiﬁed that, if he remains in possession,
he will be required to pay rent; if he
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In all
0n_contra.cts under seal, etc.—By ‘statute.
arising upon contracts under seal, or upon judgments,
when action of covenant or of debt may be maintained, an
action of assumpsit may be brought and maintained, in the
2
same manner, in all respects, as upon contracts without seal;
§681.

cases

etc.
remain, the law will imply a promise
to pay rent from the time of such no
But in such case there can be no
tice.
promise implied to pay rent for the
occupation while the contract was in
force, because no rent could, during that
time, have been in contemplation of the
duty existed.
parties, and
no
such
W'here one has the clear right to the
use and control of property, and permits
upon
condition of
its use by others,
payment therefor,»when the condition is
speciﬁc
in terms,
the law will imply
from the use by one having knowledge of
the terms, an assent
to them,
and a
corresponding promise to pay; and when
not known, a promise of reasonable
com
pensation. In the ﬁrst case, the impli
cation is founded upon the knowledge
of the terms and conditions of the use,
and the latter upon the duty arising
from the use; but in neither will the
promise or duty be implied, if the party
using it asserts adverse rights, and ac
quires and uses the property under an
Thus, where A
adverse claim oi.’ right.
assisted
B to dig a canal across B's
lands for the purpose of ﬂoating logs,
and afterwards used the canal for that
purpose
under a claim of right to do
so, without payment
of compensation
to
B for the use of the canal, and denying
B's right to charge for such use; held,
on a suit by B to recover compensation
for the use of the canal, that A's use
of the canal under a claim of right and
denial of B's right to compensation,
precluded every presumption of the rec
ognition of A of a duty upon which a
contract to pay could be implied. That
the law implied the duty only where
the right of dominion over the subject
matter was conceded, or not questioned:
and never where the use was under an‘
adverse
claim of right or denial of
that asserted.
In such case, if A's
claim was unfounded.
his entry, being
adverse to B, was a naked trespass, upon
which no duty to compensate,
which

into a contract,
could be converted
arose; for such duty can only be im
plied where the conventional or implied
ex
relation of promiser and promisee
the duty springs from
ists, or where
some change of relation after the wrong
ful act, as in the case oi’ the conver
sion of property wrongfully taken, into
money, and the like:
Ward v. Warner.
8 Mich., 508.
When there is an express
contract, none can be implied:
Gallo
way v. Holmes, 1 Doug., 330; Peters v.
Gallagher, 37 Mich., 407; Van Fleet v.
Van Fleet, 50 Mich., 1; 14 N. W., 671.
But it seems that where a party seeks
express
contract for
to recover upon
services rendered for another, he may
still insist that in case the evidence fails
contract, but does
to show an express
show circumstances from which an im
plied contract to pay may be inferred,
that he may recover under the latter:
Ibid., Van Fleet v. Van Fleet, 50 Mich.,
1; 14 N. W., 671.
Further as to im
plied assumpsit, see, Grand Rapids & B.
29 Mich.,
C. Ry. Co. v. Van Deusen,
431; St. Jude's Church v. Van Denberg.
31 Mich., 287; Cicotte v. St. Anne's
Church, 60 Mich., 552; 27 N. W., 682;
Philadelphia W. Co. v. Detroit W. L.
Co., 58 Mich., 29: 2-1 N. W., S81.
The law will not raise an implied con
tract against a municipal corporation
in any case where it has no power to
make an express one: Detroit v. Robi
son, 38 Mich., 1161
See ante, § 660.
2-—C. L., § 10417.
The intent of this statute is to
note 2.
permit the action of assumpsit to be
brought “in all cases," where before an
action of debt might be brought on a
contract under seal:
Detroit Savings
Bank v. Ziegler, 49 Mich., 157; 13 N.
WY, 490: Christy v. Farlin, 49 Mich.,
319; 13 N. W., 607. But C. L., § 9728,
bars the action of assumpsit where cov
enant might be maintained. in six years.
The form of the action and not the char
acter of the obligation determines what
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By assignees of dema.nds.—“The assignee of any
§682.
bond, note or other chose in action, not negotiable under exist
ing laws, which has been or may be hereafter assigned, may
sue and recover the same in his own name, upon such bond,
note or other chose in action; and the defendant in all such
suits may set up and avail himself of any defense he may have,
arising before due notice of such assignment, and which
accrued prior to such action, in the same manner and with the
like effect as if the assignor had prosecuted the same in his
own name.

’ ’3

of limitation
applies,
whether
Avery
the six or ten year limitation:
v. Miller, 81 Mich., 85; 45 N. W., 503.
This section does not compel a party to
resort to an action of assumpsit on B
statute

instrument: Goodrich v. Leland,
18 Mich., 118; Stewart v. Sprague,
71
Mich., 50; 38 N. W., 673. This section
does not make any changes in the rules
of pleading applicable to suits on judg
sealed

and sealed instruments.
There
fore in suing in assumpsit on a judg
ment, the declaration should set out the
judgment specially, and describe it ac
curately; it could not be proved under
a count upon an account stated:
Good
ing v. Hingston, 20 Mich., 440, 441.
But it seems that a. count upon a judg
ment msy be joined with the common
Hog
counts in the same declaration:
sett v. Ellis, 17 Mich., 351, 360; see,
remarks at page 360, on the case of
Drew v. Circuit Court, etc., 1 Doug.,
Mich., 434.
ments

3-C. L., § 10054. This statute is
permissive and the assignee may still
sue in name of assignor:
McR0berts v.
Lyon, 79 Mich., 31; 44 N. W., 160.
every
right
It
reaches
in
prop
erty which was
assignable in
ever
or capable
equity,
oi survivorship
to
executors; thus a written contract for
the sale of land is such a chose in ac
tion as can be sued by the assignee in
his own name: Cook v. Bell, 18 Mich.,
So, a guarantee of the collection
387.
oi’ a promissory note is assignable, and
may sue_ thereon
in his
the assignee
own name:
Waldron v. Harring, 28
Mich., 493.
And so is the right oi ac
tion upon a contract tor breach of the
warranty therein:
Felt v. Reynolds, R.

F. E.

Co., 52 Mich., 602; 18 N. W.,
And a corporation to whom an
insurance policy has been assigned can
sue upon it in its own name:
Water
town Ins. Co. v. Grover 8: Baker Sew
ing Machine Co., 41 Mich., 131, 137; 1
N. W., 961. Accounts existing, and
assigned:
to be, may
be
Fuller v.
Rhodes,
78 Mich., 36; 43 N. W., 1085:
Preston Nat‘l B'k v. George T. Smith
M. P. Co., 102 Mich., -162; 60 N. W.,
981: Dunn v. Michigan Club, 115 Mich.,
409; 73 N. W., 386.
A chattel note is
assignable and the assignee can sue upon
it: llicks v. Lyle, 46 Mich., 488; 9 N.
378.

W,

529.

joint contractor may assign his
interest in a right oi action under the
contract to his <0-contractor: but can
not thereby release himself from his ob
ligstions under the contract:
Hart v.
Summers, 38 Mich., 399.
And even the
the right oi! action for torts (excepting
only those torts which are merely per
sonal, and which on the death of the
person
wronged
die with him), as for
torts for taking and converting personal
property, or for injury to one's estate,
and generally all such rights of action
tor tort as would survive to the per
sonal representative, may, it seems, be
assigned
so as to pass an interest to
the assignee
which he can enforce by
suit at law:
Final v. Backus, 18 Mich.,
231: Finn v. Corbett, 36 Mich., 318.
Thus a right of action for a tort in cut
ting and removing timber from the land
of another,
is assignable, and may be
by
assignee
enforced
the
in his own
name:
Grant v. Smith, 26 Mich., 201.
Actions for fraud are not assignable:
Felt v. Reynolds R. F. E. Co., 52 Mich.,
606: 18 N. W., 378; Brush v. Sweet, 38
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Mich., 574; Dayton v. Fargo, 45 Mich.,
153; 7 N. W., 758.
Nor is the wid
dower:
Gal
ow's right to unassigned
braith v. Fleming, 60 Mich., 408; 27 N.
W., 583.
It is no longer necessary for assignees
to sue in the name of the assignor, or
to bring an action in the name of one
person
for the use and beneﬁt of an
other, even in cases of tort where the
action is assignable:
Watson v. Wat
son, 49 Mlch., 540; 14 N. W., 489. One
joint wrong-doer who has satisﬁed the
demands
of the injured party for the
tort, cannot hold the other joint wrong
doers for their proportionate share of the
amount paid. Nor can he take an as
signment of the claim after such pay
ment and then sue the other wrong
doers for the whole or any part of the
damages, either in the name of the as
Upham v. Dick
signor or otherwise:
ens, 38 Mich., 338.
But the general doctrine ls, that
nothing is assignable that does not di
rectly or indirectly involve a right of
property.
Hence,
causes of action on
the case for deceit, are not assignable:
Dayton
v. Fargo, 45 Mich., 153; 7 N.
W., 758.
As to the method of assignment there
is no particular requirement of the law.
Whenever an assignment would be good
in equity it will be good at law: Draper
v. Fletcher, 26 Mich., 154.
Need not
generally be in writing:
Donovan v.
Halsey Fire Engine Co., 58 Mich., 38;
24 N. W., 819.
An assignment by way
of gift is suiiicient:
Briscoe v. Eckley,
A non-negotiable note
35 Mich., 114.
may be assigned by indorsing "without
recourse,
Geo. H. Young, Trustee"
(he
being the payee), and delivering the
Merchants‘ Nat’l B'k
same to assignee:
v. Gregg,
107 Mich., 146; 64 N. W.,
1052; Steere v. Trcbilcock, 108 Mich.,
464: 66 N. W., 342.
The assignee of a non-negotiable chose
in action takes it subject to all equities
existing between the debtor and cred
itor. It is not necessary that the equi
ties should have existed at the incep
tion of the debt or contract. It is sulﬁ
cient if they exist prior to the assign
ment, ns the assignee has it in his power
to protect
himself against them by in
quiry of the debtor, before the assign
ment:
Warner v. Whitaker, 6 Mich.,
133; and see, Bloomer v. Henderson, 8
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Mich., 402, 403. Any set oi! or defense
accruing before notice of the assign
ment, w7ill be available against the as
signee: Finn v. Corbett, as Mich., 313;
Spinning v. Sullivan, 48 Mich., 5; 11
N. W., 758; Edison v. Gates, 44 Mlch.,
253; 6 N. W., 645. This statute, which
allows assignees to sue in their own
names, is only permissive; the assignee
is still at liberty to sue in the name of
‘the contracting party:
Sisson v. Cleve
land & Toledo Ry. Co., 14 Mich., -196.
The statute does not require any par
ticular method of assignment,
and was
evidently intended to remove the old in
direct method of suing in the name of
the nominal for the use of the real own
Assignments of things in action,
er.
have never (except under the statute of
frauds), been required to be in writing:
any purchaser becomes assignee by his
purchase.
A parol assignment when
good in equity is equally good under this
statute.
And a declaration by an as
signee need not aver any formal assign
ment, but is sufficient if it avers the
plaintiff to be the owner and holder:
Draper v. Fletcher, 26 Mich., 154.
It
is not necessary
that the transfer of a
claim should be in writing.
If the evi
plaintiff is the
dence shows that the
owner at the time of the trial, that is
suiiicient:
Donovan v. Halsey Fire En
gine Co., 58 Mich., 38; 24 N. W..
819.
Vvhere one person held an account
against another and drew upon him in
favor of a third person for the amount
of it, and attached a statement of the
account to the draft, it was held to _be
assignment of the account:
a. valid
Moore v. First Nat'1 Bank of Madison,
57 Mich., 251: 23 N. W., 800.
An assignment may be absolute
or
qualiﬁed, as the parties choose, so long
as no one is injured or defrauded; so,
transfers may be made to agents or at
torneys for convenience
of suit or re
lease, or in trust, or by way of security:
Herbstreit v. Beckwith, 35 Mlch., 93.
Assignments of choses in action may be
made by way of gifts as well as for a
consideration, and an assignment of sev
eral claims to the same person so that
they may all be adjusted
in one suit
is permissible:
Briscoe v. Eckley, 35
Mich., 112.
In a suit by A in his own name upon
a negotiable
note payable to the order
of "A. & Co.,” the possession and pro
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§683

Waiving tort and suing in assumpsit.-In some cases,
§ 683.
where the cause of action is founded in a wrong, the party
may waive the tort and bring assumpsit.
duction of the note by the plaintiff, is
not alone sufficient evidence of his title
The language
to entitle him to recover.
of the statute, permitting an assignee of
a chose in action “not negotiable tinder
existing laws,” to sue and recover in his
own name,
does not apply to such a
case; the statute expressly excepts all
paper negotiable under existing laws:
Redmond v. Stansbury, 24 Mich., 445;
Brennan v. M. & M. Nat’! B'k, 62 Mich.,
347; 28 N. W., 881; Redmond v. Stans
bury, 24 Mich., 447; Matteson v. Mor
ris, 40 Mich., 55.
The holder by verbal assignment only
of a note payable to order and not in
dorsed,
cannot sue thereon in his own
name.
A note payable to a person or
his order, is negotiable, although not
indorsed.
The term "negotiable," is one
of classification, and does not of neces
sity imply anything more than that the
paper possesses the negotiable quality:
Robinson v. Wilkinson, 38 Mich., 299.
The title to negotiable paper may be
transferred by mere verbal assignment,
or by an assignment written upon the
paper itself or upon a separate paper.
But in such cases the transferee must
sue upon it in the name of the assignor.
assignees
of
The statutes authorizing
choses
in action to sue in their own
names does not apply to such assign
In order to
ments of negotiable paper.
enable the transferees of negotiable pa
per to sue thereon in their own names,
assignment or transfer
thereof
the
must be made in the commercial sense
and in the manner appropriate to and
with the usual and cus
in accordance
tomary method of transferring commer
Ibid.; Spinning v. Sullivan,
cial paper:
And, un
48 Mich., 5; 11 N. W., 758.
paper is transferred in
less negotiable
this way the assignee will take it sub
ject to all the equities existing between
Thus,
maker.
the
the assignor and
note
where the holder of a negotiable
payable to his order, made and signed
a transfer written thereon as follows,
“I hereby transfer my right, title and
interest to the within note to S. A.," it
was held that this form of assignment

Thus,

if

a man by

the negotiability of the note
transferred it subject to all the
equities existing against it while in the
hands of the assignor:
Aniba v. Yeo
mans, 39 Mich., 171.
And so, where the
holder of a note payable to his order,
transferred it not by indorsement,
but
by an instrument of assignment written
upon a separate
paper:
Spinning v.
Sullivan, 48 Mich., 5; 11 N. W., 758;
Matteson v. Morris, 40 Mich., 55.
The
assignee of an undivided half interest in
join
a lease may,
under this statute,
with the owner of the other undivided
Bly v.
interest in a suit for rent:
Bliss, 123 Mich., 195; 81 N. W., 1080.
Where a suit is brought on a contract
in the name of the promisee
/or the
use and benefit of another person named.
the promisee is still the legal plaintiff,
and it is not necessary
to show on the
trial that the contract or claim has been
assigned to the person for whose use the
suit is brought.
But where the inter
ests of the defendant may be affected by
the ownership, as, where he claims pay
ment or a set-oil’, proof of the transfer
may become necessary,
as the validity
of the defense may depend on the time
when it was made, and when the knowl
edge of it came to the defendant:
Far
well v. Dewey, 12 Mich., 40, 441.
The
purchaser of a demand due upon con
tract, whether before suit brought upon
it or afterwards, may still pursue his
remedy in the name of the original con
tracting party:
Harder, 38
Moon
v.
Mich., 566; see Peters v. Galligher, 37
Mich., 407.
In a suit upon a claim
assigned,
by ‘writing
by the
executed
attorney in fact of the assignee the fil
ing of the written assignment with the
justice will not dispense with proof of
the assignment, nor put the defendants
in the position of admitting the execu
tion of the assignment unless denied on
oath; the statute, C. L., § 826, applies
only to instruments purporting to be
by one of the parties to the
executed
Hinckley
Weatherwax,
suit:
v.
35
Mich., 510.
It is not necessary to aver an assign
ment in actions of replevin or trover by
destroyed
and
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trespass -take-my goods and sell them, and receive the money
for them, I may bring an action of trespass, or may maintain
an action for money had and received.‘

I

assignee: Warren
Dwyer, 91
v.
Mich., 414; 51 N. W., 1062.
But it is
necessary
to make
such
averment in
case where a husband brings action on
a due bill running to the wife:
Black
wood v. Brown, 32 Mich., 104.
So in
an action by assignee of claim for work
Cilley v. Van Patten, 58
and labor;
Mich., 404; 25 N. W., 326. So, by as
signee of an open account:
Peirce v.
Ciosterhouse, 96 Mich., 124; 55 N. W.,
663
S0 by an assignee for the beneﬁt of
creditors:
Powell v Williams, 99 Mich.,
30; 57 N. W., 1041.
An averment that
the plaintiff was the holder and owner
of a non-negotiable note upon which ac
tion is brought is a sufficient averment
of an assignment: lDraper v. Fletcher,
26 Mich., 154.
It is suiﬂcient if the
assignment appears in the bill of par
ticulars:
Snell v. Gregory, 37 Mich.,
See further upon necessity for the
500.
averment of assignment:
Conrad Seipp
Brewing Co. v. McKittrick,
86 Mich.,
191; 48 N. W., 1086, and cases cited in
the opinion.
1—Putnam v. Wise, 1 Hill, 234, 240.
Thus, where the goods of A have been
wrongfully taken or held by B and sold,
although the act of B in taking them,
or in their conversion, may have been
tortious, yet, as he has sold them, and
received a beneﬁt from such conversion.
A may waive the tort and bring as
sumpsit for the price for which they
were sold.
And the court add: “But we
are not aware of any principle upon
which it can be held, that a mere naked
trespass can be made the basis of an im
plied assumpsit. If a trespass on lands
be proved,
no presumption of an gree
ment for compensation
can be raised;
for the act of entry is in contravention
of, and
not
in
subordination to, the
rights and claims of the party injured.
For such injury the law has given a dif
ferent remedy; and one founded on the
injury, and no promise can be implied
arises to com
‘to pay, but a liability
for the wrong and injury:"
pensate
8 Mich., 519, 520.
Ward v. Vi/arner,
And in the same case it was said by
Manning, J.:
“When plaintiff's goods
the

'

have been wrongfully taken, it is said
he may waive the trespass and bring
assumpsit for goods sold and delivered.
This may be so where defendant lays no
claim to the goods, and the trespass is

wholly wanton on his part.
But when
he claims them as his own, or claims a
right to the possession
of them, and
justiﬁes for the taking on that ground,
trespass and not assumpsit is the prop
er remedy.
In case of a pure trespass,
by which I mean one committed
with
out color of right to the property taken,
the court may well say to the defendant,
you shall not be permitted to defeat the
action by showing that you took the
goods without intending to pay for them,
or with an intention to do a wrong
with which the plaintiff, by putting a
more
charitable construction on your
conduct,
thought proper to
has
not
charge you.
This, I think, is all that
is meant by waiving the trespass and
suing for goods sold and delivered:”
Ibid., 525. And where one pastured his
cows on the land of another, it was
said by Manning, J., Martin, Ch. J.,
concurring, that, if he used the land for
that purpose without plaintiff's consent
he was a trespasser,
and plaintiﬂ might
sue him in trespass, or waive the tres
pass and bring an assumpsit for pastur
ing the cattle:
Welch v. Bagg, 12
Mich., 4-1. But there seems to be some
diversity of opinion as to whether, if a
person
takes goods and chattels under
such circumstances as to make him a
trespasser or wrong-doer, the owner can
waive the tort and sue in assumpsit, un
less he has sold and converted
the ar
ticles into money
or its equivalent:
see, the cases cited in 1 Hill, 2-10, note
(a); and Fiquet v. Allison, 12 Mich.,
328, 332.
If one has wrongfully taken
possession
of the property of another
and sold or disposed of it, and received
money or money's
worth, therefor, the
owner is not compellable to treat him as
a wrong-doer but may affirm the sale as
made on his behalf, and demand in this
form of action the beneﬁt of the trans
action. But it cannot be safely said that
the law will go much farther than this

698

l—

m.

a

CH.

XLII.

in implying
cumstances

ASSUMPSIT—IN GENERAL.

a promise, where the cir
repel
all implication of a

promise in fact.
Damages for a tres
pass are not in general recoverable in
assumpsit; and in the case of taking
personal property, it is generally held
essential that a sale by the defendant
Thus, where one took
should be shown.
logs belonging to another and claimed
to own them, and still had them in his
possession, held, that assumpsit for their
value would not lie: Watson v. Stever,
25 Mich., 386.
See a discussion of this
113 Mich.,
case in Nelson v. Kilbride,
637; 71 N. W., 1089.
It is here held
to aver the
that it is not necessary
tort out of which the assumpsit is im
plied. And upon like principle, where
purchased
A‘ had possession
of bonds
with the money of B, and delivered them
over to C, who claimed that they were
purchased for him, and were in fact his
property.
A neither undertaking to
transfer any title to the bonds, nor re
ceiving or contracting to receive any
benefit from the transaction, but merely
C,
yielding the possession
to
on his
claim of ownership: held, that B could
not maintain assumpsit against A for
Barnum v.
the value of the bonds:
But where one
27 Mich., 332.
Stone,
wrongfully obtained a school district or
der and used it as money for his benefit,
the tort may be waived, and he may be
in assumpsit for the amount:
sued
Bowen v. School District, etc., 36 Mich.,
One tenant in common may waive
149.
the tort of the other in converting the
share of the first, and sue in assumpsit
Loomis v. O’Neal, 73
for the value:
Mich., 582; 41 N. W., 701.
In Tuttle
v. Campbell, 74 Mich., 652; 42 N. W.,
384; 16 Am. St., 652, the general rule
"Before a party
is stated as follows:
can waive a tort for the conversion of
personal property and bring assumpsit,
the property in the hands of the tort
feasor must have been sold and con
verted into money upon the theory that
for the
has been received
the money
plaintiff's use.
There is, however, an
other class of cases where the property
has been converted but not sold, where
the tort may be waived and assumpsit
brought for the value of the goods con
This class belongs to those re
verted.
lations where a. contract may exist and
at the same time a duty is superimposed

§683

or arises out of the circumstances sur
rounding or attending the transaction,
the violation of which duty would con
In such cases the tort
stitute a tort.
may be waived and assumpsit be main
tained, for the reason that the relation
of the parties, out of which the duty vio
lated grew, had its inception in con
usually
are
These relations
tract."
such as
those of trust and confidence,
those of agent and principal, attorney and
client, or bailee and bailor.
In McCor
mick, H.-M. Co. v. Waldo, 128 Mich.,
135; 87 N. W., 55, it is stated in this
language:
“The right to waive the tort
and sue in assumpsit exists in at least
two classes of cases-—one where the de
fendant has come into possession of the
plaintiff's property without his consent
money upon a subse
and has received
quent sale of the same; the other where
he has come into possession through con

relations with the plaintiif, and
contract has been rescinded or
failed, and he persists in keeping the
property, refusing to deliver it upon de
mand."
In Grinnell v. Anderson, 122
Mich., 533; 81 N. W., 329, it is stated
again in the following
“The
words:
rule is that, before a party can waive
the tort and sue in assumpsit for the
conversion of personal property, the
tort-feasor
must have
converted the
property into money, or the relation ex
isting between the parties must have
in contract."
For
had its inception
other cases on the general subject, see,
Coe v. Wager, 42 Mich., 49; 3 N. W.,
248; Aldine Manf. Co. v. Barnard, 84
Mich., 632; 48 N. W., 280; Ginsburg
v. Cutler & Savage
L. Co., 85 Mich.,
439; 48 N. W., 952; Bryant v. Kenyon,
123 Mich., 151; 81 N. W., 1093; Cast
241;
Darby,
128 Mich.,
87
ner v.
N. W., 199; St. John v. Antrim Iron
Co., 122 Mich., 68; 80 N. W., 998;
Brown v. Foster, -— Mich., —; 100 N.
W., 167 (June, 1904).

tract
the

Waiving the tort of a conversion of
property, and suing in assumpsit for the
value of the property converted, amounts
to an election to regard the defendant
as the owner of the property, and estops
the plaintiff from bringing trover there
for against one to whom the defendant
had sold it:
Nield v. Burton, 49 Mich.,
53.
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S0, the master of an apprentice may bring assumpsit for the
value of the work and labor of an apprentice who has been
seduced from him?
The consideration.—Every promise, to be binding,
§684.
must be founded upon a suiﬁcient consideration.
It must be
If the promise be founded on or arise from
of some value.3
2—Foster v. Stewart, 1 Maule & S.,
191; Lightly v. Clouston, 1 Taunt., 112.
4 East.,
v. Ashburnham,
3—Jones
455.
A promise is a suﬂieient consid
eration for a promise if there is an ab
solute mutuality of engagement between
the parties, so that each has the right
at once to hold the other to a positive
engagement; 1 Parsons on Contracts, 4
ed., 373, 374.
As illustrating doctrine
that there must be mutuality of prom
ises to support an executory contract
see, Wilkinson v. I-Ieavenrlch, 58 Mich.,
574; 26 N. W., 139; Koppitz-Melchers
B. Co. v. Behm, 130 Mich., 649; 90
N. W., 676. It is a suﬂlcient considera
tion for giving a note, that‘ the payee
an obligation
in conse
has assumed
it, which he
quence of having received
can be compelled either at law or equity
If the entire consideration
to perform.
for a promise be void, the promise is
If one or more of several
not binding.
considerations for a promise are friv
olous and insuﬂicient, but not illegal,
and others are good, the insufficient con
siderations will be disregarded, while
those which are valid will sustain the
promise: Wesleyan Seminary v. Fisher,
Mich., 515.
4
‘Where
several sub
scribe to a fund to be used to effect a
laudable or worthy purpose, each agree
ing to pay the sum set opposite
his
name,
the several promises are mu
tually considerations for each other, and
any one appointed by the subscribers to
collect and disburse the funds, and ac
cepting the appointment, may in his own
name, enforce payment by the subscrib
ers, whether he was named as payee in
the subscription paper or not:
Com
stock v. Howd, 15 Mich., 237.
Nor is
it necessary to the validity of the con
sideration that the subscribers should
be pecuniarily beneﬁted by the accom
plishnient of the purpose intended: Un
derwood
v. Waldron, 12 Mich., 89, 90.
An agreement with defendant to forbear
Suit against a third person who was

to plaintiff, is a good considera
tion for defendant's promise to pay the
debt:
Rood v. Jones, 1 Doug. Mich.,
188; Calkins v. Chandler, 36 Mich., 320.
So, an extension of credit is a suﬂicient
consideration to uphold a contract of
suretyship:
Lee v Wisner, 38 Mich.,
86.
The compromise
and settlement
of
an asserted claim, involved in legal con
troversy, be it never so doubtful, is a
suflicient consideration for its settle
ment, and for any obligation given by
one party to the other in consideration
of such settlement: Van Dyke v. Davis,
2 Mich., 144, 149; see, Weed v. Terry,
2 Doug.,
344.
A claim made in good
faith, with color of right, although there
be in fact no right, so long as the party
asserting it does not know he has no
right, is sufficient to sustain a compro
mise; for a party may buy his peace
in a case in which he knows there is no
right against him:
Gates v. Shutts, 7
Mich., 133; see, Hale v. Holmes, 8
Mich., 37; Converse
Blumrich, 14
v.
Mich., 109.
Nor can a person knowing
the facts of his case, and having means
of reflection
and consultation with his
friends, be relieved against the conse
quences of his own want of ﬁrmness in
yielding to the arrogant claims and
threats of civil litigation from an ad
verse party, and submitting to an unjust
compromise:
Mayhew v. Phoenix Ins.
Co., 23 Mich., 105; Hull v. Swarthout,
29 Mich., 250.
But unaccepted offers of
compromise
cannot affect the rights of
the parties.
An assignment of a mort
gage obtained
from a timid and ig
norant man, by threats of prosecution
for slander, was held to have been pro
cured
without consideration:
Tate v.
Whitney,
Har. Ch., 145; see, Lyon
v. Waldo, 36 Mich., 345.
The delivery
of property manufactured under a eon
tract. is a suﬂlcient consideration for an
agreement
by the party accepting deliv
ery to waive any claim for damages for
the non-fulﬁllment of the contract with
debtor
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any illegal transaction,‘ or an immoral
contrary to public policy, an action

or fraudulent
cannot

be

one,

or

sustained

upon it.5

A

seal to an agreement in writing purports a consideration,
and it is not necessary to aver or prove one where the agree
ment is under seal.“ And even in those cases where the statute
requires agreements to be in writing, it is not necessary that
Moon v. De
in the stipulated time:
troit, etc., 14 Mich., 266. And it seems
that a moral obligation to pay a debt is
a suﬂicient consideration for a promise
to pay, although the remedy for its col
lection at law may be suspended: Ed
wards v. Nelson, 51 Mich., 121; 16 N.
W., 261.
The suﬂiciency of the consid
eration for an honest bargain cannot be
inquired into if there was any considera
Kennedy v. Shaw, 43
tion of value:
Mich., 359; 5 N. W., 396.
A seal im
ports a consideration:
Lee v. Wisner,
The seal, however, is but
38 Mich., 82.
prima facle evidence of consideration:
A
Green
v. Langdon, 28 Mich., 221.
promissory note of the wife imports a
proper consideration, prima facie:
Na
tional L. Bank v.‘Miller, 131 Mich., 564;
A benefit to his prin
91 N. W., 1024.
cipal will support a consent of the surety
to an extension of time:
Borden v.
Fletcher's Estate, 131 Mich., 220; 91
N. W., 145.
The moral obligation to
pay a debt barred by the statute of
limitations is a. sufficient consideration
for a new promise to pay it:
Koons v.
Vauconsant, 129 Mich., 260; 88 N. W.,
630.
So if made by a. surety :, Per
kins v. Cheney, 114 Mich., 567; 72 N.
W., 595.
The subscription of one to a
common object finds its consideration in
the subscriptions of the others:
Waters
Co., 129 Mich., 640;
v. Union Trust
89 N. W., 687; First U. Church v.
Pungs, 126 Mich., 670; 86 N. W., 235.
The consideration of an assignment is
no concern of the debtor: Hicks v. Steel,
126 Mich., 408; 85 N. W., 1121.
A re
lease of claim for damages in considera
tion of reimployment for such time as
might be satisfactory to the employer,
the claimant being then in his employ, is
without consideration: Potter v. Detroit,
etc., Ry. Co., 122 Mich., 179; 81 N. W.,
80; 82 N. W., 245. Not so if at the time
the claimant is not in employ of the de

fendant: Sax v. Detroit, etc., Ry. Co., 125
Mich., 252; 84 N. W., 314.
An agree
ment not to attack a transfer to the wife
of all the husband's property is suiiicient
consideration for wife's note where a
claim of fraud in the transfer is made
in good faith: Harris v. Gates, 121
Mich., 163; 79 N. W., 1098; Whelpley
v. Stoughton, 112 Mich., 594; 70 N. W.,
1098; Acme E. I. & A. Co. v. Van Der
beck, 127 Mich., 341; 86 N. W., 786.
4—Van Dyke v. Davis, 2 Mich., 1-15.
5——1 Archb N. P., 26, 36; 1 Pars. on
Contracts, 4 ed., 380.
A mortgage ex
ecuted for the purpose of preventing a
prosecution of the mortgagor's son for a
felony is invalid for illegality of con
sideration:
Koons v. Vauconsant, 129
Mich., 260; 88 N. W., 630.
So a con
tract cannot be supported by an under
taking to procure an appointment to
office.
It contravenes public policy;
Harris v. Chamberlain, 126 Mich., 280;
A note given in settle
85 N. W., 728.
ment of a charge of embezzlement
is
valid to the extent of the money em
bezzled: Beath v. Chapaton, 115 Mich.,
506; 73 N. W., 806.
An agreement to
conceal from the public the guilt of the
maker, of the crime of adultery will vi
tiate a note of which it is a part consid
eration: Case v. Smith, 107 Mich., 416;
65 N. W., 279.
For other cases on the
subject of consideration see, Johnson v.
Bratton, 112 Mich., 319; 70 N. W., 1021,
holding that an agreement to release a
debtor from personal responsibility and
security for the
look to the mortgage
remainder in consideration that the deb
tor will pay a portion of his debt is
invalid for want of consideration in
law: Perkins v. Brown, 115 Mich., 41;
72 N. W., 1095, holding that total fail
ure of consideration will defeat a once
valid obligation.
6—Dye v. Mann, 10 Mich., 291.
A
seal is presumptive evidence of consid
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the consideration should be set forth in the agreement or in
any writing, but it may be proved by any other legal evidence.’
Contracts made on Sunday.—The statute provides
§685.
that no person shall do any manner of labor, business, or work,
except only works of necessity and charity, on the ﬁrst day of
the week.“ The evident intent of this statute was, and such
are its terms, to prohibit all business on that day, whatever
might be its character, except works of necessity and charity,
Nor, can
and that, too, whether done openly or privately.“
any
of
and in the absence
to the contrary is conclusive:
statute
Lee v. Wisner, 38 Mich., 85; see, C. L.,
eration,

§ 10185.
7——C. L.

§ 9512.

8—C. L., § 5912 and note.
v. Hamel], 2 Doug. Mich.,
9-—Adams
Therefore, where two persons
73, 76.
traded horses on Sunday, and one of
them on the same day gave the other
his promissory note for the difference in
value of the horses as agreed, held, that
the transaction was in violation of the
statute,
and that the note was void:
Ibid. A horse trade made and posses
sion given on Sunday, is void, and can
and either party ca.n
not be rstiiled;
reclaim his property at any time unless
a new contract is afterwards made by
the mutual assent of both parties: Win
ﬁeld v. Dodge, 45 Mich., 355; 7 N. W.,
In order to make such a trade
906.
good a new contract must be made be
tween the partles at a time when it is
legally competent for them to make one.
An action to recover money paid on
Sunday for a horse purchased
on that
day, is not subject to the defense that
the plaintiff has unreasonably delayed to
rescind for there is nothing to rescind
Nor, upon
where the contract is void.
rely
a trade could
the plaintiff
such
upon any warranty and the breach there
of, as no legal warranty could be made
on Sunday.
Nor could the defendant
in such an action for money had and
received
avail himself of the defense
that plaintiff had misused
or injured
the horse while it was in his possession.
Such damages could not, from their un
liquidated nature, be applied by way of
set-oil; nor could he recoup, because the
damages
do not arise out of any con

which the plaintiff is seeking to
upon:
Brazee v. Bryant, 50
Mich., 136: 15 N. W., 49.
Michigan
in
law
"It is settled
that s Sunday contract is a pro
illegality
of
the
hibited transaction,
which forbids it being made a sale by a
mere delivery later.
The delivery must
by circumstances which
be accompanied
supply the necessary ele
in themselves
ments of a contract without depending
upon
the Sunday transaction for any
essential“: Aspeil v. X-Iosbein, 98 Mich.,
117: 57 N. W., 27; Pillen v. Erickson,
If one
125 Mich., 68; 83 N. W., 1023.
of the parties performs on a week day
and the other accepts he must pay for
what is done: Bollin v. Hooper, 127
Mich., 287; 86 N. W., 795.
The statute takes away the legal ca
pacity of the parties to make a contract
on Sunday.
Therefore the vendor of
property sold on Sunday may on a aub
sequent day tender
back the purchase
price, and recover the property by re
plevin if it is not restored on demand;
and the vendee, on tendering back the
property, may recover the money or
property given in payment or exchange
of such contract ex
as if no pretence
isted: Tucker v. Mowrey, 12 Mich., 378.
Still the statute does not declare that
notes made contrary to the Sunday law
shall be void under all circumstances.
Thus, where a note was made on Sun
day, but dated Monday; held, that in
the hands of a bona ﬁde purchaser be
fore due, and without knowledge that
it was made on Sunday, it was valid,
and that the maker could not set up his
own
fraud to defeat the note in the
hands of such a. holder: Vinton v. Peck,
14 Mich., 287, 291.
A contract made
tract

recover
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for a deceit practiced in the exchange
of property on Sunday.
The law will not lend its aid to a
When
party who founds his action on an illegal transaction.
the parties are in pari delicto, the court will not interfere to
an action be maintained

assist either of them by giving effect to that which the law
forbids." An action will lie to recover the money paid or prop
erty delivered under such contracts."
one has
Rescinding contracts for frai1d.—Where
§686.
been induced to enter into contract relations with another
through fraud practiced upon him by that other the law affords

him two remedies, either of which he may elect, but having
elected, the other is no longer open to him. He may aﬁirm the
contract and sue to recover the damages incurred by reason
of the fraud, in an action on the case, or he may disaﬁirm or

for the fraud and bring the appropriate
action to recover the money paid or property delivered pur
suant to the fraudulent contract."
Assumpsit will lie to

rescind the contract

from necessity on Sunday is not void.
Thus, taking a prisoner to jail on Sun
day, under legal process,
is a work of
necessity; and hiring a horse for that
purpose is not an illegal contract under
the statute: Fisher v. Kyle, 27 Mich.,
454.

A note made on Sunday
the

common

law.

Hence,

is not void at
a note made

in another State on Sunday, will not be
void unless proof is made of some
of that State invalidating
it:
statute
O'Rourke v. O'Rourke, 43 Mich., 58;
Making the note payable
4 N. W., 531.
out of the state would not change the
rule: Arbuckle v. Reaume, 96 Mich.,
2-13; 55 N. W., 808.
A note may be
signed on Sunday if delivered on a week
day:
Berger v. Farnham, 130 Mich.,
-187; 90 N. W., 2S1.
The mere fact
note
is
handed
over on
that the
Sunday will not vitinte a transfer of
it: Steere v. Frebilcock, 108 Mich., 464;
The fact that delivery
66 N. W., 342.
of goods sold was made on Sunday will
not defeat
action
for contract price:
Holmes v. Sheeban, 118 Mich., 539; 77
N. W., S8.
As to what is a work of necessity or
charity, is a question of law and not of
fact, and cannot be left to depend upon
the opinion of jurors.
Mere convenience
held

of time
test
day

and

opportunity

cannot

be

the

as to whether a work done on Sun
is one of necessity.
All the neces

sary and usual work connected with re
ligious worship is a work of charity.
The support of public worship is a work
of charity that may properly be done on
Sunday. And subscriptions for that pur
pose, or to pay off a church debt, or to
purchase a house of worship, taken from
a congregation assembled
for religious
exercises on Sunday, is a work of char
ity, and will be sustained: Allen v. Duf
iie, 43 Mich., 1; 4 N. W., 427.
The rescission of a contract requiring
certain steps to be taken by the party
seeking to rescind, is as much a matter
of business as that of making the con
tract itself, and therefore if done on
Sunday, is illegal and void.
Thus a
party who has been defrauded in a horse
trade made on a week day, cannot on
Sunday take the necessary steps to re
scind the bargain, so as to enable him
to recover the property of which he was
by the bar-gain: Benedict
defrauded
v.
Batcheider, 24 Mich., 425.
10-—-Robeson v. French, 12 Metc., 24.
11—Tucker v. Mowry, 12 Mich., 378;
Brazee v. Bryant, 50 Mich., 136, 15 N.
W., 49.
12—Jewett v. Petit, 4 Mich., 508. A
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recover money paid, in case of rescission; or, if property has
been parted with under the inﬂuence of the fraud practiced,
replevin or trover will lie, and in case defendant has disposed
of the property so received, assumpsit will lie for its value."
sale procured by fraud may be rescinded
by the vendors: White v. Mitchell, 38
Mich., 390.
Where one party to a con
tract has been defrauded by the other,
he may rescind the contract on discov
ering the fraud; but if he would do this

it must be done promptly after the dis
covery: Martin v. Ash, 20 Mich., 166;
A
Craig v. Bradley, 26 Mich., 353-4.
recission must be within a reasonable
time; if a party knowing all the facts
which would warrant a rescission of his
contract, asks of the adverse party fur
ther time to perform his part of the
contract, he thereby waives his right to
Hubbardston Lumber Co. v.
rescind:
But where the
Bates, 31 Mich., 158.
adverse party upon rescission was only
entitled to the refunding of his money,
and no action or right was otherwise
involved, a delay of three days before
rescinding, even with full knowledge of
all the facts warranting a rescission, was
nor, in refunding was
held immaterial;
it necessary to return the identical pieces
of money received, as in law one dollar
is equivalent to any other dollar: Michi
gan
Central Ry. Co. v. Dunham, 30
Mich., 128.
One who has his election
whether he will aﬂirm a contract, must
elect either to affirm or disafﬁrm it al
together.
He cannot adopt the part
which is for his own beneﬁt, and reject
If he elects to disaﬂirm on
the rest.
the ground of fraud, he must do so as soon
as the fraud is discovered,
and must
restore the other party, so far as it then
can be done, to the same condition he
would have been in if the contract had
been made: Jewett v. Petit, 4
never
Mich., 508; and see, Warren v. Cole,
15 Mich., 265; Hubbardston Lumber Co.
v. Bates, 31 Mich., 158.
A mere offer
to trade back is no rescission of the con
tract; the party aggrieved
must
do
what he can to place the other in the
condition in which he was before the
contract; and where the transaction was
a sale or exchange of property, he must
if possible return, or tender a return
of what he has received in exchange for

what he has given, and any unneces
sary delay in rescinding the contract will
cut oﬂ the right: Wilber v. Flood, 16
Mich., 45.
A party seeking to avoid a settlement
on the ground of fraud must return or
offer to return whatever he has received
under it.
And his failure to do so on
discovering the fraud will be deemed a
ratification of the settlement: Crippen
v. Hope, 38 Mich., 344.
If he sues upon the contract, he there
by aﬂirms it: Barker v. Cleveland, 19
Mich., 235; Hunt v. Lackett, 31 Mich.,
18.
If a vendor having a right to re
the contract of sale for fraud,
scind
brings indebitatus assumpsit for the
price of the goods, he thereby affirms the
contract; and if he elects to affirm it,
he is bound by it in all respects: Gallo
way v. Holmes, 1 Doug., 330; Jewett v.
Petit, 4 Mich., 508.
Vifhere, after dis
covering that they had been defrauded,
the plaintiffs made a compromise with
the defendants
and received
from them
securities to the amount agreed on, al
though compelled to consent by a strong
pressure of pecuniary diﬂlculty,
they
thereby waived their right to complain of
original
may be
the
fraud.
Fraud
waived and condoned, and a defrauded
party must act consistently in refusing
acquiescence
in order to keep his claim
in force: Craig v. Bradley, 26 Mich.,
353.

Vifhere

there

is

an

express

con

tract, none can be implied.
If there
fore, a party defrauded by an express
contract rescinds it, he cannot set up
an implied contract and sue upon that;
as,
purchased on
goods
where
were
credit by fraud, the vendor cannot, be
bring suit in
fore credit has expired,
assumpsit on an implied contract for
the value of the goods sold: Galloway v.
Holmes, 1 Doug. Mich., 330; but see.
Hunt v. Sackett, 31 Mich., 18.
13-Aldine Mfg. Co. v. Barnard, S-1
Mich., 632; 48 N. W., 280; and see,
anrc,
"Waiving
tort
§ 683 and notes,
and suing in assumpsit."
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-By the act of 1897,14 it is provided, “That in all
where, by the fraudulent representations or conduct of
any person, an injury has been or shall be produced, either to
the person, property or rights of another, for which an action
on the ease for fraud or deceit may by law be brought,ian
By

statute.

cases

action of assumpsit may be brought to recover damages for
such injury, and in all such cases a promise shall be implied
by law to pay all just damages arising from such fraud or
deceit, and may be so declared upon.” The following section
provides for the survival of such actions." This statute author
izes assumpsit to be brought to recover damages growing out

of fraud and deceit in all cases."
AS AFFECTED

BY STATUTE

OF FRAUDS.

The statute of frauds.—Agreements
required to be
§687.
in Writing'.—“In the following cases speciﬁed in this section,
every agreement, contract, and'promise shall be void, unless
such agreement, contract or promise, or some note or memo
randum thereof be in writing, and signed by the party to be
charged therewith, or by_ some person by him thereunto law
’
fully authorized," that is to say:
Every agreement that, by its terms, is not to be per
1.
formed in one year from the making thereof ;”18
Agreements which may by possibility be completed within
one year are not within the statute; it extends to such only
as by their express terms are not to be, and cannot be car
ried into full and complete execution until after the expiration
14-C.

L., §§ 10421, 10422.
it would be better prac
tice in declaring under this statute to
make reference
to it, it is not essential
that such reference be made: Haliett v.
Gordon,
128 Mich., 364; 87 N. W., 261.
16-1-Iallett v. Gordon, 128 Mich., 364;
87 N. W., 261.
17--The writing which will relieve
from the operation of the statute must
contain all the terms of the contract:
Baumann v. Manlstee S. & L. Co., 94
Mich., 365; 53 N. W., 1113: Ayres v.
Gallup. 44 Mich., 13; 5 N. W., 1072;
McElroy v. Buck, 35 Mich., 434. While
the contract controlled by the statute
is void, yet it the parties choose to treat
15-——While

45

it as valid, it will be so as to them:
Spaldlng v. Archibald, 52 Mich., 365;
17 N. W., 940; Fuller v. Rice, 52 Mich.,
435; 18 N. W., 204; see, also Miner v.
0‘Harrow, G0 Mich., 91; 26 N. W., 843;
Waldron v. Laird, 65 Mich., 237; 32
v. Wright,
N. W., 29‘. Dickinson
56
Mich., 46; 22 N. W., 312.
18—C. L., Q 9515 and notes.
It is
not essential to aver that the contract,
required by the law to be in writing,
actually was in writing.
The general
allegation of the making of the contract
is sufficient: Harris Photographic Co. v.
Fisher, 81 Mich., 136; 45 N. W., 661;
Stcarns v. Lake Shore & M. S. Ry. Co.,
112 Mich., 651; 71 N. W., 148.
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Although the agreement requires a
far executed, still it
is void, unless reduced to writing, if other stipulations remain
to be executed after the close of the year. When one party has
fully performed on his part within the year, he may maintain a
general indebitatus assumpsit against the party who refuses to
proceed further under the contract, ahd thus recover a com
a year, and is so

19—As to the agreements under this October, by which a party agreed to
Mr. Parsons says: It must be furnish timber and build a house before
certain, however, from the terms of the the close of the following year; held
contract, or be necessarily implied there
valid, since the house might be com
from, that the contract cannot be per
pleted within a year, the contract not
formed within a year, or it will not be providing that more than a year should
void because not in writing: 1 Parsons
for that purpose: Plimpton
be occupied
Where, by the ex
on Cont., 4 ed., 529.
v. Curtis, 15 Wend., 336; see, also Art
press agreement
of the parties, the per
cher v. Zeh, 5 Hill, 200; Moore v. Fox,
formance of a verbal agreement
is not
10 Johns., 24-1; Rogers v. Kneeland, 10
to be completed
within one year, it is Wend., 246; Linscott v. Mclntire,
15
clearly within the statute,
Maine, 201; Roberts v. Rockbottom Co.,
and
void.
Thus, a verbal contract, made on the
7 Metc., 47. So where defendant verbally
agreed to clear oﬂ a piece of land, and
27th of May, for a year's service,
to
complete
the work in a year from the
commence
on the 30th of June follow
Bracegirdle v. Heald, 1 following spring, and then plant a crop
ing, is void:
B. & Ald., 722; Davis v. Mich. Mut. Life thereon, which he was to have as pay
Ins. Co., 127 Mich., 559; 86 N. W., ment for the clearing, held void: Broad
1021; Bristol v. Sutton, 115 Mich., 365; well v. Getman, 2 Denio, 87; see, also,
73 N. W., 424; Nones v. Homer, 2 Hilt.,
Lower v. VVinters, 7 Cow., 263; Hinckley
116; Amburger v. Marvin, 4 E. D. v. Southgate, 11 Vt., 428; Shute v. Dorr,
Smith, 393, 422.
And such a contract, 5 Wend., 204; Drummond v. Burrell, 13
it seems, will not be valid because one Ibi<l., 307; Wilson v. Martin, 1 Denio,
of the parties may annul it within a 602; Spencer v. Halstead,'1'bt'd., 606;
year; thus, where one contracted ver
Lockwood v. Barnes, 3 Hill, 128; Lap
bally to carry the mail for four years on ham v. Whipple, 8 Metc., 59; Hill v.
Hooper, 1 Gray, 131.
a certain route, it was claimed not to
be within the statute, because the post
Where it is evident,
from the sub
master general might annul the contract ject matter of the contract, that the
parties had in contemplation a longer
at any time; but the court said this was
period than one year at the time of its
a contract which by its terms could not
performance, it will be invalid.
There
be performed in one year; it was to ex
fore, a verbal subscription or agreement
tend through four years, and was void:
Harris v. Porter, 2 Har. Del., 27; and to take and pay for the numbers of a
see, Birch v. Earl, ete., 9 B. & C., 392;
work as they should be issued, the pub
lication of which upon the plan then
Dobson v. Colles, 1 I-Iurlst. & Norm., 81.
But if it is merely optional with one proposed requiring more than a year for
of the parties, whether he shall perform its completion, was held void: Boydell
the contract within a year or take a v. Drummond, 11 East., 142.
Here
longer time, the contract is said not there was no express stipulation that
to be within the statute; thus, an agree
the publication and contract should not
ment that one party may cut certain
be completed
within a year;’but the
trees on the land of another at any court say, the whole scope of the under
time within ten years has been held
taking show
that it was not to be
good, because
performed within that time:
he might cut them
im
Ibid.
It
mediately: Kent v. Kent, 18 Plck., 569.
was well understood
that more than a
So where a verbal contract was made in
year's time should be employed in the
clause,
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pensation for what has been advanced and received upon it.‘
In England, it was held that a performance on one side within
the year was sui’ﬁcient.2
performance, and it was void: Herrin v.
Butters, 20 Maine, 119; Peters v. West
borough, 19 Pick., 364.
But verbal contracts, the performance
of which are made to depend upon some
contingency, which may or may not
happen within a year, are held not to be
Thus, an agree
void under the statute.
ment
to support a child five or six
years or so long as the child shall re
main chargeable to the town; held good,
because the child might not continue to
etc., longer than a year:
be chargeable,
So,
McLees v. Hale, 10 Wend., 426.
where defendant promised verbally that
he would not thereafter run stages on a
certain route; held good, because it was
a personal promise which would be fully
performed at defendant's death, which
might happen within a year: Lyon v.
King, 11 Metc., 411.
So a verbal agree
ment to support another during his life;
held good, as not being an agreement
which by its terms was not to be per
formed in a year, for, the party's death
might occur within that time, and then
the contract would be performed: Dres
ser v. Dresser, 35 Barb., 573; and see
Quackenbush v. Ehle, 5 Barb., 469-473;
Wells v. Horton, 4 Bing., 40; Blake v.
Cole, 22 Pick., 97; and see, Sword v.
Keith, 31 Mich., 249; Carr v. McCarthy,
70 Mich., 258; 38 N. W., 241; Durgin
v. Smith, 115 Mich., 239; 73 N. W.,
361; Smalley v. Mitchell, 110 Mich.,
650; 68 N. W., 978; Donovan v. Rich
mond, 61 Mich., 467; 28 N. W., 516;
Barton v. Gray, 57 Mich., 634; 24 N.
W., 638; De Land v. Hall,
Mich.,
1903);
(Sept.
——-, 96 N. W., 449,
Baldwin v. King, 132 Mich., 65; 92 N.
W., 774; Drew v. Billings, 132 Mich.,
65; 92 N. W., 774.
In New York, under a statute the
same as ours, it is held that if the con
tract is void for not being in writing, a
part performance of it within the year
will not render it valid, so as to give a
right of action for damages for a re
fusal to perform the residue
of the
Getman,
agreement:
Broadwill
v.
2

-i

Denio, 87, 90; Wilson v. Martin, 1
Denio, 603; Ibid. Spencer v. Halstead,
606; Drummond v. Burrell, 13 Wend.,
307; Shute v. Dorr, 5 Wend., 204.
And
if one party has fully performed the
agreement
on his part within the year,
that will not render the contract bind
ing on the other party: Lockwood v.
Barnes, 3 Hill, 128; Broadwell v. Get
man, 2 Denio, 87; Lower v. Winters,
263; Bartlett v. Wheeler, 44
7 Cow.,
Barb., 162; Whipple v. Parker, 29 Mich.,
374; but see, Donelan v. Read, 3 B. 8:
Ad., 899. Although the contract be void,
yet, if one party has performed it on his
part, or, has partially performed it and
is prevented
from fulﬁlling it by the
other party, he may recover
for the
value of what he has done: Nones v.
Homer, 2 Hilt., 116; Little v. Wilson, 4
E. D. Smith, 422; Broadwill v. Get
man, 2 Denio, 87; Lockwood v. Barnes,
3 Hill, 128.
But in such case it seems
that the declaration should not be on
the void agreement,
but on an implied
agreement
to pay what the services or
performance was worth: 2 Parsons on
Cont., 4 ed., 316, 320; Whipple v. Par
ker, 29 Mich., 374-5.
And the void
agreement
may be shown,
not for the
purpose of recovering upon it, but to as
sist in arriving at a just amount which
should recover upon the
the plaintiff
implied agreement: Ibid., 376.
Where a plaintiff sues upon a contract
not to be performed within a year from
the time it was made, it is incumbent
on him to show that the contract, or
memorandum thereof, was reduced
to
writing and signed by or on behalf of
And such memorandum,
the defendant.
when
the contract ls not written out,
must embrace all of its substantial terms
L.,
(except
the
conslderation——C.
§
9519), and cannot be aided by parol
essentially
evidence
when
defective:
Palmer v. Marquette & Pacific Rolling
Mills Co., 32 Mich., 274.
1—Broadwell v. Getman, 2 Denio, 87.
2—Donelan v. Read, 3 B. & Ad., 899;
see, Cherry v. Heming, 4 Exch. R., 631.
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“Every special promise to answer for the debt, default,

or misdoings of another person ;3
In order to ascertain whether a case is within this clause of
the statute, the principal question will be, whether the promise
be an original one or collateral merely, or in other words
whether the credit was not in fact given to the defendant, and

is,

not to the person for whom it is supposed he became surety; if
the former, the case of course is not within the statute; if the
and the promise must be in writing.‘ The general
latter, it

it

&

a

a

is

it

§

used,
3—C. L.,
9515.
Under this statute,
"collateral"
are
the former to
any agreement to pay the debt of an
mark the obligation of the principal debt
other is absolutely void, unless a note or or, the latter that of the surety or per
of
is made in writing,
son who undertakes to answer for such
memorandum
signed, etc.
Ibid., 303. “In marry cases the
And the whole agreement
debt:
No resort can be test whether a promise
or is not with
must be in writing.
to add to the
in the statute of frauds is to be found
had to parol evidence
writing, or to show any part of the in the fact that the original debtor does
the
or does not remain liable on his under
agreement
not
included therein;
If he is discharged by a new
writing need not show the consideration taking.
arrangement, made on
sufficient con
for the agreement, that may be proved
orally; Hall v. S_0ule, 11 Mich., 496, sideration with
third party, this third
party may be held on his promise,
497; Fuller Rice L.
Co.,
M.
v.
Houseman, 114 Mich., 275; 72 N. W., though not in writing; but if the original
187; Wenzel v. Johnston, 112 Mich., debtor remains liable, and the promise
243; 70 N. W., 549; Dean v. Ellis, 108 of the third party is only collateral to
his, it will, in strictness, be nothing
Mich., 240; 65 N. W., 971; Goodman
more than a promise to answer for an
v. Felcher, 116 Mich., 348; 74 N. W.,
other's debt.
But where the third party
511.
Nor can parol evidence be re
the beneﬁt
for
verbal is himself to receive
ceived
to show a subsequent
which his promise is exchanged,
it is
agreement
to change any of the terms
of the written agreement, as no part of not usually material whether the original
debtor remains liable or not"; Calkins
can rest in parol: Abell v. Munson,
v. Chandler, 36 Mich., 320; Perkins v.
18 Mich., 306; Ibid., Cook v. Bell, 393;
Hershey, 77 Mich., 504; 43 N. W., 1021.
see, Green v. Brookins, 23 Mich., 48;
A verbal promise to pay for such
see, Coon v. Spaulding, 47 Mich., 162;
goods as may be furnished to a third
10 N. W., 183; Brewster v. Potruff, 55
person,
Mich., 129; 20 N. W., 823.
is an original and not a col
and is based upon
4—Rogers v. Kneeland, 13 Wend., 114. lateral promise,
a
The plain, ordinary meaning of this sufficient consideration and is not within
the statute as a promise to pay the
clause of the statute indicates, that the
debt of another, and an action will lie
class of special promises required to be
in writing includes only such as are upon it for goods furnished in pur
secondary
or collateral to, or in aid of suance thereof to such third person, if
credit therefor is given to the person
the undertaking or liability of
some
promising and not all to the person re
other party whose obligation or debt, as
ceiving the goods:
Larson v. Jensen.
between
the promisor
or surety and
53 Mich., 427; 19 N. W., 130.
A verbal
or creditor, is the original
promisee
In other promise of a mortgagee to indemnify a
or primary debt or obligation.
words, the statute applies only to prom
third party from loss if he will become
security with the mortgagee
in a bond
ises which are in the nature of guar
given by the mortgagor in replevin of
antees for some other original or pri
obligation to be performed by the goods mortgaged
m'ary
from attacking
another: Gibbs v. Blanchard, 15 Mich., creditors is an original undertaking:
Boyer v. Soules, 105 Mich., 31; 62 N.
302, 303.
and
The words “original”
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if

that

in

is

a

is,

the person for whose use the goods
are furnished be liable at all, any promise by
third person to
writing,
within the statute, and must be
pay that debt
rule established

But where the
good consideration.
original debt still exists, and where the
creditor has relinquished no interest or
advantage
which has enured to the bene
ﬂt of the new promisor, it is not an
original contract, but still a promise to
pay the debt of another,
and must be
Cush.,
in writing:
Curtis v. Brown,
492; see, Cook v. Bell, 18 Mich., 393;
Brown v. Hazen, 11 Mich., 221; Hog
sett v. Ellis, 17 Mich., 351; Halsted v.
Francis,
Mich., 113; Calkins v.
31
Chandler, 36 Mich., 320; Welch v. Mar
vin, 36 Mich., 60;
Baker
v Inger
Thus,
soil, 39 Mich.,
where
158.
A released to his debtor
certain of
B's property which A held as security
tor the debt, upon the verbal promise of
to pay the debt in consideration of
such release; hold,
that the release
would have been a suﬂicient considera
tion for C's promise
had been in
writing.
But as the debt against B
was not extinguished, but still remained
an obligation against him, C's promise
was merely an agreement
to pay the
debt of another, and was void for not
being in writing.
A verbal promise of
a third person based upon a considera
tion passing only between the debtor and
creditor, but from which the third per
beneﬁt,
no pecuniary
son receives
is
within the statute.
Such a considera
tion will not take the promise of that
person to pay the debt, out of the stat
ute: Corkins v. Collins, 16 Mich., 478;
Mallory v. Gillett, 21 N. Y., 412; (nir
Cush., 491.
tis v. Brown,
A verbal promise to a. merchant to
pay or guarantee the account of a third
who is working for the prom
person,
isor, is within the statute:
Studley v.
Barth, 54 Mich., 6; 19 N. W., 568; But
Lumber Co. v. Vogel, 130
tars Salt
Mich., 33; 89 N. W., 560.
An agree
he will
ment of A with another that
third per
continue to furnish goods to
son, he, A, will see that they are paid for
Ramsdell v. Cit
is within the statute:
P. Co., 103 Mich., 89;
izens E. L.
See also Baker v. In
61 N. W., 275.
158;
Ingersoll v.
gersoll, 39 Mich.,
Baker, 41 Mich., 48;
N. W., 907;
N.
Preston v. Young, 46 Mich., 103;
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C

B

5

on

8

1

&

4

2

it

it

a

W., 1000. A verbal promise of a widow
to pay a debt due from her husband's
estate,
“if the creditors would there
her goods on credit,"
after furnish
which debt -was not discharged, is void:
Ruppe v. Peterson, 67 Mich., 437; 35 N.
W., 822; Gower v. Stuart, 40 Mich., 747.
But if the merchant sell the stove to
A and on his credit for the price, upon
B's promise to pay the debt if A does
not, the obligation of A is the original,
and the promise of B is collateral and
v.
void unless in writing: McKinnon
Bliss, 21 N. Y., 215; Hall v. Soule, 11
Mich., 496, 497; Huntington v. Welling
ton, 12 Mich., 12, 15; Welch v. Marvin,
So, where
sub-con
36 Mich., 59.
tractor, having abandoned the building
he was erecting, resumed work and did
extra labor on the verbal promise of a
third person to pay him, but still look
ing to the contractor—his original deb
tor and employer—for payment, and to
the third person only as guarantor, it
was held that the promise of the .third
person was within the statute, and void:
Bressler v. Pendell, 12 Mich., 224; see,
Dewey,
436.
And
Iln'd.,
Farwell
v.
where A, claiming an interest in certain
property held by his debtor, agreed not
to attach it in consideration of the
verbal promise of another creditor who
desired to attach, that he would pay the
debt owing to A, held, that this promise
was within the statute, and void: Waldo
v. Simonson,
18 Mich., 345.
But
seems that a verbal promise to
pay the debt of another in consideration
of the release and discharge of the debt
debtor,
is not
as against the original
In
within the statute,
and is valid.
such case the new promise is regarded
as an original promise by way of sub
stitution for the former promise, which
discharges, and not as collateral to
the former promise, which no longer
exists;
ed.,
Parsons on Contracts,
304; see, Mulcrone v. American Lum
ber Co., 55 Mich., 622; 22 N. W., 67.
When by the new promise the old debt is
extinguished, the promise is not within
the statute.
It is not then the promise
to pay the debt of another which has
accrued,
but it is an original contract
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The object of the statute was to reach every
of mere suretyship, whether the agreement of the surety
was collateral to a previous promise or liability on the part of
the original debtor, or only collateral to a promise or agree
ment made at the _same time with the promise of the surety to
otherwise not.

case

W., 706; Studiey v. Barth, 54 Mich.,
6; 19 N. W., 568; Pfaﬂ v. Cummings,
67 Mich., 143; 34 N. W., 281; Preston
v. Lekind, 84 Mich., 641; 48 N. W.,
180; Chappell v. Barkley, 90 Mich., 35;
51 N. W., 351.
,
But wherever the main purpose and
object of the promisor is not to answer
for another, but to subserve some pur
pose of his own, or is made in considera
tion of some beneﬁt to accrue to him
self, his promise is not within the
statute,
although it may be in form a
promise to pay the debt of another, and
though the performance of it may in
cidentally have the effect of extinguish
ing the liability of another:
2 Parsons
4 ed., 305, 306; Calkins v.
on Cont.,
Thus, a verbal
Chandler, 36 Mich., 325.
promise to pay the debt of another, if
made upon a new and good considera
tion passing to the promisor from either
So,
the debtor or the creditor, is valid.
also, is a verbal promise to pay the debt
of another in consideration of the release
by the creditor of a lien on the property
of the debtor, in which the promisor has
an interest, whereby the promisor is en
ablcd.to apply the property to his own
beneﬁt, so that the release enures to his
own advantage.
In such cases the per
formance of the promise, it is true,
will have the effect to release or dis
charge the debt of another; but that is
so incidentally and indirectly, it is not
the object
or end for which the new
promise was made; the agreement of the
promisor here, is a new and original
contract made for his own beneﬁt. and
upon a consideration passing to himself
for his own advantage.
It is the con
tract of the promisor made in his own
behalf, and not in behalf of the original
accruing to
debtor,
and any advantage
incidental, and is
the latter is merely
not the thing bargained for.
Such a
promise is, therefore, in no sense a
promise to answer for anything but the
promisor’s own responsibility, and need
Corkins v. Collins,
not be in writing:
16 Mich., 478, 482; Nelson v. Boynton,

396; Curtis v. Brown, 5 Cush.,
488; Mallory v. Gillet, 21 N. Y., 418.
419; Leonard v. Vredenburgh, 8 John.,
29; Farley v. Cleveland, 4 Cow., 432,
439; see, Calkins v. Chandler, as Mich.,
And upon this principle, if a
324-5.
party selling a note or other demand,
verbally guarantees its collection or pay
ment, or that the maker is responsible,
Here the
it is good without writing.
guaranty is collateral to the seller's own
contract of sale; it is a part of the
consideration he gives for the price he
receives for the note, and is not intended
for the debtor's advantage; it is merely
incidental to the principal contract made
by the guarantor himself on his own
account,
and is regarded as in effect a
promise to pay his own debt, and there
Hunting
fore need not be in writing:
ton v. Wellington,
12 Mich., 10, 15;
Collins,
Mich.,
482;
Corkins
v.
16
Thomas v. Dodge, 8 Mich., 51; Jones v.
Palmer; 1 Doug., 379.
So, a verbal
agreement by which a partner purchases
the interest of his co-partner, and agrees
to indemnify him against the outstanding
debts of the firm is good: Bonebright v.
Pease, 3 Mich., 318.
And generally a
promise to pay one‘s own debt to a
third person, as, where A owes B, and
promises at B's request
to pay the
amount to C in satisfaction of a like
amount owing by B to C, is not within
the statute, and need not be in writing;
Blunt v. Boyd, 3 Barb., 209; Barker v.
Bucklin, 2 Denio., 45; Wyman v. Smith.
land, 4 Cow., 432; and see, Huntington
v. Wellington, 12 Mich., 15; Calkins v.
Chandler, 36 Mich., 324.
And it has
been frequently decided
that where a
debtor sells property or delivers money
to a third person upon his verbal prom
ise to pay an agreed sum to the creditor
of such debtor, the promise is good, and
the creditor may collect upon it: Law
rence v. Fox, 20 N. Y., 268; Barker v.
Bucklin, 2 Denio, 45; Wyman v. Smith,
2 Sandf., 331; Cleveland v. Farley,
9
Cow., 639; Ellwood v. Monk, 5 Wend.,
235; Stilwell v. Otis, 2 Hilt., 148; Sea
3 Metc.,
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future default or liability of such princi

pal debtor.‘

Every agreement, promise or undertaking made upon
of marriage, except mutual promises to marry;
4.
Every special promise made by an executor or admin
istrator, to answer damages out of his own estate/’2
3.

consideration

Sales of goods for price of ﬁfty dollars or more.
sale of any goods, wares, or merchandise,
for the price of ﬁfty dollars or more, shall be valid, unless the
purchaser shall accept and receive part of the goodssold, or
shall give something in earnest, to bind the bargain or in part
payment, or unless some note or memorandum in writing of
the bargain be made, and signed by the party to be charged
thereby, or by some person thereunto by him lawfully author
ized.”3
The object of this statute was to guard against the fabrica
tion of evidence as to the existence or non-existence of eon
tracts, by requiring it to appear, before evidence of the oral
contract will be received, that something more than mere
spoken words furnish evidence of contract relation. This some
thing more, may be either (a) acceptance and receipt of part
of the goods sold; (b) something delivered in earnest of the
bargain or in part payment for the goods; or (c) some note
§688.

“No contract for the

man v. Hasbrouck, 35 Barb., 151.
But
such promise it seems must be made to
the creditor, in order to enable him to
collect upon it: Pipp v. Reynolds, 20
Mich., 88.
But even a written promise
to pay the debt of another will be in
valid unless founded upon a good con

sideration: Nelson v. Boynton, 3 Metc._,
Therefore, a verbal promise
399.
to
pay such debt being invalid, is not a
suﬂicient consideration for a subsequent
promise in writing to pay such debt:
Hall v. Soule, 11 Mich., 497.
It seems
that this statute applies only to promises
made to the person to whom another is
answerable,
and not to promises made
to a person
who is answerable to au
Thus, if A, for a valuable con
other.
sideration promise B, a debtor, to pay
the amount of the debt to B's creditor,
the promise need not be in writing, but
if the promise were made to the creditor
to pay him the debt owing to him by
B, it would be invalid unless in writ

ing:
Green v. Brookins, 23 Mich., 43,
52-3; see further, Barden v. Briscoe, 36
Mich., 254; Comstock v. Norton, Ibid.,
277.

While a verbal promise to pay the
debt of another is void when such prom
ise is made to the creditor, yet, if made
to the debtor for a consideration passing
from him, it is not within the statute,
and therefore is not void:
Pratt v.
Bates, 40 Mich., 37.
1—Rogers v. Kneeland, 13 Wend.,
114.
2——-C. L., § 9515. Mead v. Bowles, 123
Mich., 696; 82 N. W., 658, holding that
an administrator's

agreement

to be per

sonally

responsible for legal services
rendered in proceeding
instituted by him
on behalf of the estate, made before the
services

were

rendered

and

tion of their being rendered,
in the statute.
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or memorandum of the bargain signed by the party in default,
or his authorized agent. Proof of none of these things neces
sarily establishes the contract, though some evidence of the
existence of contract relations.
Such evidence does, however,
open the door for the introduction of the evidence of the
spoken words out of which the contract arises, which other
wise would be inadmissible.

,

The sa.le.—In case the price of goods sold does not
§689.
amoimt to ﬁfty dollars, the contract of sale becomes absolute
as between the parties, without actual payment or delivery,
whenever the terms of sale are agreed on, and the bargain is
struck, and everything that the other has to do with the goods
is complete. The vendee is entitled to the goods on payment
or tender of the price, and not otherwise, unless the goods are
sold upon credit, in which case the vendee is entitled to imme
diate possession.‘
The sale of a chattel, where the consideration is actually
paid, is valid, although there is at the time no actual delivery

of the chattel, or even if it is lost or withheld from the vendor
“The property passes by a sale without
by a wrong-doer.
delivery, as between the parties; payment of consideration
being made, third parties only can question the want of deliv
ery.” “I know of no principle of law that establishes that a
sale of personal goods is invalid because they are not in the
possession of‘the rightful owner, but are withheld by a wrong
doer. The sale is not, under such circumstances, the sale of a
right of action, but the sale of the thing itself, and is good to
pass the title against every person, not holding the same under
a bona ﬁde title, for a valuable consideration without notice;
and a fortiori,

against

a

wrong-doer.”5

-1-—2 Kent's Com. 492, 493.
5—Davis v. Ransom, 4 Mlch., 238.
A sale is a parting with one‘s interest in
a thing for a valuable consideration ; and
in every sale there is a transfer or
change of title from the vendor to the
vendee: Western Mass. Ins. Co. v. Rlker,
The words “goods, wares
10 Mich., 281.
and merchandise" in this section include
animate as well as inanimate personal
property: Weston v. McDowell, 20 Mlch.,
Contracts of barter are within the
353.
statute: Gorman v. Brossard, 120 Mich.,

G11; 79 N. W., 903. See for cases within
the statute: Foster v. Lumberman's Min
ing Co., 68 Mlch., 188; 36 N. VV., 171;

Kuppenheimer
Wertheimer,
v.
107
Mlch., 77; 64 N. W., 952; German v.
Brossard, 120 Mich., 611; 79 N. WE,
903; Hudson v. Emmons, 107 Mlch.,
549; 65 N. W., 542.
For cases not
within the statute see Turner v. Mason,
65 Mich., 662; 32 N. W., 846; Slesinger
v. Bresler, 110 Mich., 198; 68 N. W.,
128; Rasch v. Bissell, 52 Mlch., 455;
18 N. W., 216.
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order to satisfy the
§690. Delivery and acceptance.—In
statute as to delivery and acceptance, there must be a deliv
ery of goods by the vendor with an intention of vesting the
right of possession of the whole in the vendee; and there must
be an actual acceptance by the latter

with

an intention

of tak

ing possession as owner. The acceptance must be unequivoeal.°
The right of the vendor to retain possession, as a lien for the
price, and the absence of any fact showing the abandonment
of such lien, will, in general, lead to the conclusion that there
has been no sufficient acceptance to satisfy the statute.’
and part-payment.—After earnest given
upon the sale of goods, the vendor cannot sell them to another
without a default in the vendce. Earnest given upon a sale
of goods does not absolutely alter or bind the property of the

§691.. Of

08111651;

goods contracted for, but only binds the bargain, and entitles
the vendee to the goods, if not guilty of an express default in
subsequently refusing to pay for them.
To constitute a payment of earnest or a part payment, with
An order tor goods to the amount of part of the property, in pursuance of a
ﬂtty dollars or more, does not amount
verbal agreement of sale, will take the
although not
to a contract and is not binding until
case out of the statute,
accepted in writing or until some act ls. occurring until some months
after the
purchase: McKnight v. Dunlop, 5 N.
done on the faith ot it by the person to
Y., 537, and cases there cited.
whom it is given: Goodspeed v. Wiard
Where
Plow Co., 45 Mich., 322; 7 N. W., 902.
the case is not within the statute of
6—Chitty on Cont., 6 Am, ed.. 390
frauds, manual delivery of the article
Wend., sold is not essential to the passing of
Minor,
22
v.
7—Russell
sale
with de
659.
On
a. verbal
the title, unless made so by the under
livery oi’ a chattel at an agreed price, standing oi’ the parties: Whitcomb v.
Yvhitney, 24 Mich., 486, 490; see, Ling
to be paid on a certain day, but until
paid the title to remain in the seller the ham v. Eggieston, 27 Mich., 324, 327.
Where a carrier has been employed
title does not vest in the purchaser until
payment: Chltty on Cont., 6 Am. ed., and authorized as his agent to receive
(2), and cases there cited.
391, note
the goods purchased
by verbal bargain,
may be sum
The delivery required by this section,
the c,arrier'_s acceptance
where no payment is made or earnest
cient to bind the principal; but where
given, is not dispensed with by an agree
the delivery to the carrier is merely in
pursuance oi the same verbal contract
ment
at the time that the purchaser
should take the property where it then
under which the goods were purchased,
was, and that the vendor
need not be
and the carrier has no separate and in
troubled to make a delivery; unless the dependent authority to act for the pur
chaser; as, where upon the purchase it
acts oi
purchaser aiterwards exercised
ownership over it.
But his inquiry at
was understood
that the goods were to
be forwarded to the purchaser by a cer
terwards about the property would not
Aiderton
tain railroad, there being no other au
amount to acts oi ownership:
It seems not thority to the railroad company: held,
v. Buchoz, 3 Mich., 322.
necessary
that the acceptance should be that a delivery of the goods to the com
pany, and an acceptance by them to car
at the time oi! the purchase; therefore a
delivery and acceptance of a ry to the purchaser, was not such a de
subsequent
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an actual
be

ment.8

The memorandum.-A memorandum would be insuf
ﬁcient which did not mention the name of both the contracting
parties, or their agents, and the price agreed to be given if a
price was agreed on with a description of the thing sold. But
it is not necessary that the whole of the terms of the contract
§ 692.

should be comprised in one writing.“
The agent contemplated by the statute who is to bind a
defendant by his signature, must be a third person, and no_t
the contracting party.1°
The signing of the note or memorandum by one party only
is sufficient, provided it be the party sought to be charged."
Sales at a.uction.—“Whencver any goods shall be
§693.
sold at auction, and the auctioneer shall, at the time of sale,
enter in a. sale book, a memorandum specifying the nature and

price of the property sold, the terms of the sale, the name of
the purchaser, and the name of the person on whose account
the sale is made, such memorandum

shall be deemed a memo
randum of the contract of sale, within the meaning of the last
’
section. "2
livery to and acceptance
by the pur
chaser as would take the case out of
the statute:
Grimes v. Van Vechten, 20
Mlch., 410: Smith v. Brennan, 62 Mlch.,
349; 28 N. W., 892: Gatiss v. Cyr, —
Mlch., —-; 96 N. W., 28 (July, 1903).
8—The part payment need not to be
cotemporaneous
with the making of the
contract:
Dallavo v. Richardson, —
Mlch., —; 96 N. W., 20 (July, 1903).
396,
395,
9—Chit.
on Cont.,
398.
Where a contract of sale is cxecutory
the memorandum must contain all the
And, un
terms of a complete contract.
less the price is ﬂxcd distinctly accord
ing to some standard, either of amount.
or of market, or of reasonableness,
or
some other method ot ascertainment, the
contract is incomplete and the purchaser
is not bound.
Where the contract is
silent as to price, and there is evidence
as to price, then
of a parol agreement
there can be no recovery on a quantum
valebat, a contract is as necessary for
and
a reasonable price as any other,

proof that there was a parol agreement
of
as to price disproves the completeness
VVhen goods have
the memorandum.
been accepted, and nothing has been said
about

the

price, a reasonable price will
Muir, 33 Mlch.,
Buch,
v.
35

be intended: James v.
223; and see, McElroy

Mlch., 434. See, also Sherwood v. Wal
ker, 66 Mlch., 568: 33 N. W., 919.
10—Chitty on Cont., 403.
11—Russell v. Nichol, 3 'Wend., 112,
113.

12—C. L., § 9517. This section applies
only to the sales of personal property:
Champlin v. Parish, 11 Paige, 405; Coles
The memoran
v. Bowne, 10 Ibid., 526.
dum of the auctioneer must be made in
the sale hook at the time and place
of the sale; and it seems that a pencil
memorandum then made, but entered at
another time and place. is not sufht-icnt :
Hicks v. Whitmore, 12 Y\'end., 548. The
term goods includes both animate and
inanimate property: Weston v. McDow
ell, 20 Mich., 358.
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is not within the

statute."

A

Representations as to the credit of another.-“No
§694.
action shall be brought to charge any person, upon or by rea
son of any favorable representation or assurance, made con
cerning the character, conduct, credit, ability, trade or deal
ings of any other person, unless such representation or assur
ance be made in writing, and signed by the party to be charged
thereby, or by some person thereimto by him lawfully author
\

ized.”1‘

(I

§695. Writing need not express the consideration.-_ The
consideration of any contract, agreement or promise required
by this chapter to be in writing, need not be expressed in
the written contract, agreement or promise, or in any note
or memorandum

thereof,

but may be proved

by any other

legal evidence.”“‘
Leases for longer term than one year.—“Every con
§ 696.
tract for the leasing for a longer period than one year, or for
the sale of any lands, or any interest in lands, shall be void,
unless the contract, or some note or memorandum thereof, be
in writing, and signed by the party by whom the lease or sale
13—Crookshank v. Burrell, 18 Johns.,
This is more in the nature of a
contract for work and labor to be per
formed: Sewcll v. Fitch, 8 Cow., 215;
see, Downs v. Ross, 23 Wend., 270.
58.

14—C. L., § 9518 and note.
The ob
ject of this statute is to reach cases
where the plaintiff has given credit to
person commended
and done so on
It does
the faith of the commendation.
to
not apply to conspiracies
defraud
the

where the fraudulent representations are
made to enable the maker to profit by
them: Hess v. Culver, 77 Mich., 602;
v.
43 N. W., 994.
See also French
Fitch, 67 Mich., 492; 35 N. W., 258;
Daniel v. Robinson, 66 Mich., 2961 33
N. W., 497; Clark v. Hurd, 79 Mich.,
130; 44 N. W., 343. A verbal guaranty
made

upon

the

sale

of a note,

that

the

maker is responsible, is not within the
Huntington v.
statute,
is good:
and
Wellington, 12 Mich., 10. Where A was
-

to lndorse B's note, by the false
fraudulent representations made by
C (not in writing) that B was responsi
ble, and C afterwards purchased the note
B
and sued A upon his indorsement.
proving insolvent; held, that C's false
statements
in inducing the indorsement
were n good defence, and that the case
was not within the statute of frauds re
quiring representations as to the credit
of another to be in writing: Lenheim v.
Fay, 27 Mich., 70; see, Tozer’s estate,
46 Mich., 299: 9 N. W., -124.
Representations concerning the credit
of a corporation are within the statute
of frauds: Bush v. Sprague, 51 Mich.,
41; 16 Mich., 222.
induced
and

15-C. L., § 9519. See Whipple v.
Parker, 29 Mich., 372-3.
The memo
randum of the statute of frauds need
not it seems state the consideration:
Palmer'v. Marquette & P. R. M. Co., 32
Mich., 274.
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Essentials of a. promissory note.—A promissory note,
§ 697.
says Judge Story, may be deﬁned to be a written engagement
by one person to pay another person, therein named, absolutely
v. Armstrong, 1 Denio., 550; Mc
Gregor v. Brown, 6 Seiden, 114.
But
the decisions of the courts upon these
questions
are far trom being uniform.
See, Chitty on Contracts, 6 Am. ed., 299,
302, and notes.
A parol license to cut
is
trees for a fixed price for stumpage
not invalid, and is not covered by the
statute of frauds, either as a sale of an
interest in lands, or as a sale oi chat

This
16—C. L., § 9511 and notes.
relates to contracts for leasing.
An agreement for a lease is a different
thing from the lease itself: Tillman v.
Fuller, 13 Mich., 113.
A lease may be
made to take effect in the future; and
in such a case the estate does not be
gin with the contract but at the future
for
Hence, a verbal agreement
period.
a future term not exceeding one year,
is valid, and not within the statute.
Thus a verbal agreement made in April
for a year's tenancy from the beginning
of May following, is valid: Ibizl.,‘ Whit
ing v. Ohlert, 52 Mich., 482; 18 N. W.,

Green

section

219.

and the licensee is protected by it
in regard to all trees cut before revoca
Greeley v. Stilson, 27 Mich., 153.
tion:
giving the owner of a
An agreement
mill site the right for a stipulated an
nual compensation
to ﬂow the adjoining

The tender of a deed of lands pursu
to a written oifer to pay a specified
price therefor, does not make a writ
ten
memorandum which satisﬁes the
statute:
Kroil v. Diamond Match Co._,
An
113 Mich., 196; 71 N. W., 630.
oral agreement by the owner of lands
with one in possession that if the iat
ter would take care of the former’s
father she might continue to occupy the
land till she received therefrom suii:i
clent to pay for such care is invalid:
Smalley v. Mitchell, 110 Mich., 650; 68
N. W., 978.
A vendee in a parol contract for the
of land, who has made a par
purchase
tial payment and taken possession of the
land, cannot sue the vendor to recover
back
what he has paid without first
demanding its repayment nor even then
unless the defendant
refuses to perform
the agreement,
or has parted with his
title: Abbot v. Draper, 4 Denio, 51;
Battle v. Rochester City Bank, 3 Comst.,
88; Collier v. Coates, 17 Barb., 471;
Goeith v. White, 35 Ibid., 76. An agree
ment for the sale of growing trees, with
a right to enter on the land at n future
time and cut and take them away, is a
contract for the sale of an interest in
in writing:
the lands,
and must be

lands of another for an indeﬁnite‘ peridd,
creates
a tenancy
in such lands; the
agreement,
however,
is within the stat
ute of frauds, but that statute permit
ting parol leases for a year, and a parol
lease for more than a year under which
the lessee has been put in possession.
being good as a lease from year to year
until terminated by notice,
an
action
cannot be maintained against one in pos
session
under such an agreement,
cre
ated by paroi, except for the agreed com
pensation,
without notice to quit:
Mor
rill v. Mackman, 24 Mich., 279. A parol
agreement
to lease lands for one year
with the privilege of three is within
this statute:
Hand v. Osgood. 107
Mich., 55: 64 N. W., 867.
A written
contract for the sale of lands executed
by an agent whose authority rests
in
parol is controlled by this section: Bald
win v. Schiappacasse,
109 Mich., 170;
66 N. W., 1091.
See further under this
section: Ducett v. Wolf, 81 Mich., 311;
45 N. W., 829: McDonald v. Maltz, 78
Mich., 685: 44 N. W., 337: Carr v.
Leavitt, 54 Mich., 542; 20 N. W.. 576.
In a declara
2 Cow. Treat, 2 ed., 613.
tion in assumpsit, care should be taken
to set forth correctly the promise or
agreement,
the
consideration for the

ant

'

tels,
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and unconditionally, a certain sum of money at the time speci
'
ﬁed therein.‘
promise (unless the agreement be such
as to import a consideration on its face,
as a promissory note, or an agreement
of it, and
under seal), and the breach
to allege that plaintiff sustained dam
age thereby.
The declaration may be
setting forth speciﬁcally the
special,
alleged to have been broken;
agreement
or, in some cases it may be upon the
counts only; or, both classes
common
of counts may be joined in the same
Whenever the terms of a
declaration.
special agreement have been performed,
so as to leave a mere simple debt or
duty between the parties, the plaintiff
may proceed upon the common counts:
Saund., Pl. & Ev., 5 Am. ed., 180.
1-Story on Promissory Notes, § 1.
unconditional promise in
An absolute
writing to pay a certain speciﬁed sum
at a certain time, to the payee or bearer,
is a promissory note; and the statement
in the instrument of the consideration
upon which it
was given, does not
change
its nature:
Beardslee v. Hor
ton, 3 Mich., 560, 565; see, Preston v.
Whitney, 23 Mich., 260.
And if the
speciﬁed sum is made payable at a cer
tain place, “with current exchange on
New York, the instrument is still a
promissory note:
Smith v. Kendall, 9
Mich., 241; Johnson v. Frisbie, 15 Mich.,
286.
And an instrument promising to
pay M, "or heirs, the sum making $450,
1868," is
on the 1st day of January,
sufficiently certain as to the sum and
Knight
payee to be a promissory note:
An instru
v. Jones, 21 Mich., 161.
to
ment in which the maker promised
pay E or bearer $60 in two years, but
recited that E agreed to receive $50 in
full satisfactionif paid in one year, is
not a promissory note; it lacks certainty
Fralick v.
as to the amount to be paid:
Norton, 2 Mich., 130.
A stipulation in
of attorney's
the note for the payment
negotiability:
Strawberry
fees destroys
Point Bank v. Lee, 117 Mich., 122; 75
N. W., 444, and cases cited in the opin
Recitals in a promissory note of
ion.
the fact that title to the property which
is the consideration for it, is not to pass
till the note is paid and that the payee,
is not made at ma
in case payment
turity, may take possession does not de

stroy negotiability:
Choate v. Stevens,
116 Mich., 28; 74 N. W., 289.
The in-'
dorsement
on the back of a promissory
note of a statement by the maker as to

his ﬁnancial responsibility does not de
stroy ‘its negotiability:
Hudson v. Em
mons, 107 Mich., 549; 65 N. W., 542.
A clause attached to a promissory
note providing that the payee may in
deﬁnitely extend the time of payment,
destroys its negotiability and makes it
a simple contract:
Smith v. Van Blar
com, 45 Mich., 371; 8 N. W., 90, or a
stipulation that the maker shall pay all
taxes assessed against the lands mort
gaged to secure its payment:
Carmody
v. Crane, 110 Mich., 508; 68 N. W., 268.
Provisions which if found in the note
would destroy its negotiabiiity, will not
necessarily have that effect when found
in the mortgage securing its payment:
Wilson v. Campbell, 110 Mich., 580; 68
See, Cox v. Cayan, 117
N. W., 278.
Mich., 599: 76 N. W., 96.
promising
An
pay
instrument
to
a certain sum, on or before two years
from date with interest, with a mem
orandum attached thereto, providing that
if paid within one year there shall be
no interest, is not a negotiable promis
sory note:
Lamb v. Story, 45 Mich.,
488: 8 N. W., 87. Such an instrument
is not a promissory note, either negotia
ble or non-negotiable, but merely a sim
ple contract, and can only be transferred
by assignment; and although the payee
may assign it by indorslng it, he does
not thereby assume the character of an
indorser of commercial paper, nor there
by make himself liable for the amount
Story v. Lamb, 52 Mich.,
to be paid:
525; 18 N. W., 248.
The question of
whether negotiable, where a note is made
in one state payable in another, is to
by the law of the state
be determined
where payable: Barger v. Farnham, 130
Mich., 487; 90 N. W., 281.
A certiﬁcate of deposit, dated and
signed in the following form, viz.:
"H
C has deposited in this bank $500, pay
able to the order of R. C., with interest
if left three months on the return of
this certiﬁcate," is a promissory note;
and the indorser of such a certiﬁcate as
sumes the same liability as the indorser
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of a promissory note of like tenor: Cate
tiff need not to be the real or beneﬁcial
The
v. Patterson, 25 Mich., 191; Tripp v.
owner to entitle him to recover.
Curtenius, 36 Mich., 494; Beardsley v. owner may bring suit or allow it to be
Webber, 104 Mich., 88; 62 N. W., 173; brought in the name of any other per
If the plaintiffs
see, Birch v. Fisher, 51 Mich., 36; 16
sen with his assent.
right of action, whether as owner or
N. W., 220. A note signed by a person,
otherwise, existed at the commencement
who, if intoxicated, was yet aware of
what he was doing and was not de
of the suit, the ownership or title can
be inquired into, only for the purpose of
ceived as to the identity of the paper
letting in any defense or set-off the
he signed, is not void, and any defense
to it must rest on fraud and not on
maker would have had against a former
absolute incapacity.
Such a note would holder (when transferred after maturity
be valid in the hands
of an innocent
or with notice), or for the purpose of
holder for value:
Miller v. Finley, 26 showing that the plaintiffs possession
Mich., 249.
But
of the note is not in good faith.
A third person signing his name on a plaintiff cannot maintain an action on
the back of a note before delivery is a
a note, brought before his right of action
joint maker rather than an indorser:
accrued.
The state of facts authorizing
the suit to be brought in the name of
\\'eatherwax v. Paine, 2 Mich., 555;
Rothschild v. Grix, 31 Mich., 150; 18 a particular person must exist at the
Am. Rcp., 171; Dow Law Bank, v. God
time the suit is commenced in his name.
frey, 126 Mich., 521; Allison v. Judge And this would in ordinary cases be
of Washtenaw Circuit, 104 Mich., 141; presumed
i'rom- the production of the
But
62 N. W., 152. A promissory note signed
note by the plaintiﬁ on the trial.
by several but worded
in the singular
the defendant may rebut this presump
Dow Law
is several as well a's joint:
tion and defeat the action by showing
Bank, supra, 126 Mich., 521; 85 N. W.,
that the state of facts existing at the
1075, and cases cited in the opinion.
time of the commencement
of the suit,
Deliver;/.—The delivery of a promis
did not authorize the plaintiff to sue:
sory note by the maker is necessary
Hovey v. Sebring, 24 Mich., 232; Bat
to its validity.
The possession
of a tersbee v. Calkins, 128 Mich., 569; 87
promissory note by the payee or indorser N. W., 760; Hogan v. Dreifus, 121
is prima facie evidence
of a delivery. Mich., 453; 80 N. W., 254.
Non-own
But if it be shown that the note has ershlp of a promissory note at the time
never been actually delivered; and that,
when sued upon or action brought is
or negligence,
without any conﬁdence,
fatal: and may be shown under the gen
or fault on the part of the maker, but eral issue: Reynolds v. Kent, 38 Mich.,
246; Hovey v. Sebring, 24 Mich., 232.
by force or fraud, it was put in cir
culation, there can be no recovery on it, But in a case of a mere due bill, not
payable to bearer and not negotiable, a
even when in the hands of an innocent
holder. A note takes effect only from presumption of ownership and right to
delivery, and if this be subsequent
recover upon it does not arise from the
to
mere fact of possession,
the date, it takes effect from the de
and a judgment
livery, and not from the date.
upon such an instrument in favor of one
W'hen a
not the owner would not bar a subse
note payable to bearer, which has once
quent recovery by the true owner:
become operative by delivery, has been
Blackwood v. Brown, 32 Mich., 104; see,
lost or stolen from the owner, and has
Howry v. Eppinger, 34 Mich., 35.
come to the hands
of a
subsequently
In
a suit by A on a negotiable promissory
bona /lde holder for value, the latter
may recover against the maker and all note payable to the order of A & Co.,
indorsers on the paper when in the the possession
and production of the
hands of the loser, and he must sustain note by the plaintiff is not alone suffi
the loss:
Burson v. Huntington, 21 cient evidence of his title to entitle him
Mich., 415.
It is well settled as a gen
to recover.
The statute, C. L., § 10054,
permitting an assignee of a chose in
eral rule, that the possession of a prom
issory note payable to the bearer, by the action, “not negotiable
under existing
plaintiff producing it on the trial, is laws," to sue and recover in his own
primri fm-ic evidence of his title, o_r his name, does not apply to such a cage,
right to sue upon it, and that the plain
The statute expressly excepts all paper
'
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A
mond v. Stansbury, 24 Mich., 445.
declaration by an assignee upon a con
need not
ditional note not negotiable,
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127 Mich., 523; 86 N. W., 1044;

First National Bank

Draper v. Fletcher,
owner and holder:
26 Mich., 154.
Wlurn note taken subject to defenses
—A party who acquires a negotiable
promissory note without consideration,
or for consideration after it is due, or
who has notice when he receives it of
any defense that could be made to it
while in the hands of the person from
whom he obtains it, takes it subject to
all the defenses that could be made to
it in a suit by the person from whom he
obtains it, against the maker. On the
other hand, any want or failure of cou
sideration, whether partial or total, or
be
any fraud even, or other equities,
parties, will consti
antecedent
tween
tute no defense to a note or bill in the
of one who obtained it in good
hands
faith, for a valuable consideration, be
fore maturity and without notice of any
its validity:
circumstances impairing
Bostwick v. Dodge, 1 Doug. Mich., 413;
Gibson v. Miller, 29 Mich., 355; Wright
If the evidence
v. Irwin, 33 Mich., 32.
of
shows the bond void in the hands
holder the plaintiff has
the original
the burden of showing that he or some
former holder of the bond was a bona
Thompson v. Mecosta, 127
ﬁdc holder:
One who
Mich., 522; 86 N. W., 1044.
takes a promissory note as collateral se
curity is entitled to the protection ex
First Na
tended to a bona ﬁdc holder:
tional Bank v. Shue, 119 Mich., 560;
78 N. W., 647.
The purchaser of a past due note is
bound by any equities which bind the
original holder; and as between such
purchaser and an indorser, the latter
can show the consideration and the cir
as, that
of the indorsement,
cumstances
and
he indorsed only for accommodation,
Simons v.
therefore was only a surety:
Morris, 53 Mich., 155; 18 N. W., 625.
A person to whom a promissory note
has been indorsed in payment of a pre
existing ’debt, is a holder for value, and
is not affected by any equities between
antecedent parties, where he has received
it before due and without notice of
'.'=,u(:h equities:
v.
Por
Outhwaite
ter, 13 Mich., 533; Thompson v. Me

v. Houseknecht, 121
Mich., 313; 80 N. W., 13.
A person who pays value for a prom
issory note is to be regarded
as the
rightful holder, unless he is shown to
purchased with such knowledge
have
as would make him guilty of bad faith,
and the facts brought home to him must
be such as to show defects in title as
fraud
cannot be presumed
without
proof:
Miller v. Finley, 26 Mich., 249;
Howry v. Eppinger, 34 Mich., 30. No
tice to a proposed purchaser of a prom
issory note that it was given for a pat
ent right, is not enough to put him on
inquiry so as to preclude him from be
coming a bona ﬁdc purchaser; nor will
the fact that a vendor
of-a note in
dorses it "without recourse," have any
tendency
to show that the vendee
is
not a bona ﬁdc purchaser:
Borden v.
Clark, 26 Mich., 410.
And a defense
that the note was obtained
by duress
will not avail against a bond ﬁdc pur
chaser for value before the maturity of
the note:
Farmers’ Bank v. Butler, 48
Mich., 192; 12 N. W., 36.
When the plaintiff has purchased a
note before due and is a bona ﬂdc hold
er, any inquiry into the consideration of
the note is immaterial.
The defendant

cannot prevail against such a holder,
for a defect of consideration:
Polhemus
v. Ann Arbor Savings Bank, 27 Mich.,
44.
And where a plaintiff becomes a
maturity, evi
bona /idc holder before
dence of the amount paid for the note
by the person
of whom plaintiff pur
chased, is inadmissible:
See, Hunter v.
Parsons, 22 Mich., 96.
But where the
unwittingly signed an instru
defendant
ment in the form of a negotiable prom
issory note, relying upon false repre
sentations made to him at the time, that
the instrument he was signing was a
mere duplicate of a contract just pre
viously signed by him, making him an
agent for the sale of a certain article,
the signing beiirg under circumstances
devoid
of any negligence
on his part,
and where fraudulent means were taken
him from noticing the body
to prevent
duplicate, and he de
of such pretended
livered the same in ignorance of its
true character, believing it to be a mere
duplicate contract, held, that such in
strument was to be regarded as a forgery
even in the
and could not be enforced
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Gibbs
of a bona /idc purchaser.
Linabury, 22 Mich., 479; Beard v.
Hill, 131 Mich., 246; 90 N. W., 1065;
Huntington, 21 Mich.,
see, Burson
v.
And if a note is fraudulently al
415.
tered without the knowledge or consent
iof the maker, it is void, even in the
Holmes
hands of a bona ﬂde purchaser:
The gen
v. Trumper, 22 Mich., 427.
eral rule that a purchaser from a bona
ﬂde holder of negotiable paper, takes it
holder,
rights of such
with all the
whether he has notice of any inﬁrmity,
as between the original parties, or not,
that when
is subject to the exception,
the payee becomes such purchaser from
a bone. ﬂde holder, he takes it subject
originally
to all equities and defenses
existing against it between the maker
Kost v. Bender, 25 Mich.,
and himself:
One who has been privyto, and
515.
a participant in, the fraudulent procure
ment of an indorsement of a note, has
notice of the fraud, and cannot become a
bona ﬂde purchaser of the indorsed pa
per so as to entitle him to recover
Len
on the contract of indorsement:
heim v. Fay, 27 Mich., 70. Where there
is testimony showing fraud in the in
hands
v.

ception

of

the

note

the

burden

is

on

that he purchased
Little v. Mills, 98 Mich.,
in good faith:
423; 57 N. W., 266; Rice v. Rankans,
101 Mich., 385; 59 N. W., 660; Drov
ere’ Nat’l Bank v. Blue, 110 Mich., 31;
But
67 N. W., 1105; 64 Am. St., 327.
where plaintiff assumes to show his bona
it is incumbent upon defendant
/ides
to show mala /ides before he can give
Drovers’ Nat’l Bank
evidence of fraud:
v. Blue, supra; Shaw, Kendall & Co. v.
Brown, 128 Mich., 573; 87 N. W., 757.
A ﬁrm note given by one of the part
ners for his private debt, without the
authority of the copartners, cannot be
enforced by the original holder against
the ﬁrm:
Hotchin v. Kent, 8 Mich.,
528.
Where a member of a ﬁrm gives
name,
a note in the partnership
the
presumption is that it was given for
partnership purposes,
and the burden
of proof is upon the copartnership to
show the contrary if they claim that to
And a ﬁrm may defend
be the fact.
against a note given in the ﬁrm name,
by showing it was given by one of the
partners for his own private purposes
and without the knowledge
or consent
In declaring on a ﬁrm
of the ﬁrm.
the

plaintiff

to show
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CH.

XLII.

it is not necessary to allege the
capacity of the ﬁrm to make notes, or
to set forth such facts as imply such
capacity:
Carrier v. Cameron, 31 Mich.,
373.
When it is' made to appear that
paper signed in partnership name was
so signed by one partner and used for
his personal ends the burden is on the
plaintiif to show that he holds without
notice of the fact and for value:
Stev
ens v. McLachlan, 120 Mich., 285; 79
N. W., 627.
After dissolution of a partnership by
the death
of one of the members,
a
survivor
cannot without express
au
thority, bind a co-surivor, by a time
note given by him in the ﬁrm name for
a debt owing by the ﬁrm before
dis
solution:
Matterson v. Nathanson, 38
Mich., 377; see, Smith v. Sheldon,
35
Mich., 42.
If a partner purchases property for
his own use of the maker of a note
then held by the ﬁrm, agreeing that in
consideration of the property he will
take up and discharge the note held
by the ﬁrm, this will not release
the
maker from his liability on the note
without the consent of the ﬁrm to re
ceive the partner as their debtor in place
of the maker of the note:
Lewis v.
Westover, 29 Mich., 14. And as to the
power of a partner to bind the ﬁrm,
see, Smith v. Sheldon, 35 Mich., 42, and
Mills v. Bunce, 29 Mich., 364.
Alteration of note.-—The alteration of
a note, without the consent of the maker,
having the eifect to increase his lla
bility, renders the note void as against
the maker, even in the hands of a bone.
Thus the altera
ﬁde holder for value.
tion by the payee or subsequent holder
of a promissory note, by adding thereto
the words “at ten per cent.," after the
words,
"with interest," if made with
out the knowledge
or consent of the
maker, constitutes a valid defense in
favor of the maker, even against a bona
And in an action upon
/ide purchaser.
such an altered note, the maker can
not be held liable to pay the amount of
Holmes
the note as originally drawn:
See, Weid
v. Trumper, 22 Mich., 427.
man v. Symes, 120 Mich., 657; 79 N.
W., 894, holding that an alteration by
ﬁlling in blanks in a note made with
printed form, left vacant when deliv
ered, does not vitiate the paper in the
hands of a bona fide holder; this case is
note,
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to bearer or

_

A

promissory note must be in writing. It is not necessary,
however, that the writing should be in ink; it is suﬁicient if in

from the language used, the person

§

46

married
with
the like eﬂect as if she were unmar
ried.
But she has no general capacity
to contract.
She can only make such
contracts as relate to her own prop
erty.
She may purchase property and
bind herself for the purchase money.
But she cannot become personally lia
ble except upon her own matters,
and
cannot enter into an undertaking Joint
ly with her husband
merely as his
surety.
And she can never be held
without affirmative proof that the con
tract is her own and within her pow
ers.
A married woman who joins in a
promissory note with her husband for
the absolute payment of money does not,
by that act merely, create
charge upon
her separate property:
West v. Lara
way, 28 Mich., 464.
1—C. L.,
4867.
The addition of
seal to the signature of the maker of a
promissory note destroys its negotiabil
ity by converting it into an instrument
suable in covenant at any time within
ten years after the accruing of the cause
of action upon it, and withdraws
from
that class of paper declared by this
section of the statutes to be "negotiable
in like manner as inland bills of ex
change":
Rawson v. Davidson, 49
Mich., 607; 14 N. W., 565.
9; Brown
2—Story on Prom. Notes,
Hill,
v. Butchers’
Drovers’ Bank,
I
443; see notes to
178, ante.
50, clause 17.
3—C. L.,
notes.

Whatever

woman

may
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contracts
may

be

a

made

a

a

make,

it

§

6

§

:

it

a

distinguished from Holmes v. Trumper,
supra, where there was no blank space;
from Miller v. Finley, 26 Mich., 249,
where the alteration was by adding an
other signer and from Bradley v. Mann,
37 Mich., 1, where the rate of interest
See
was added at the end of the note.
also, Union Banking Co. v. Martin's Es
tate, 113 Mich., 521; 71 N. W., 867.
material part
An alteration made in
of a negotiable paper, by the holder
thereof, in the absence and without the
knowledge of the party liable thereon,
ought not to be maintained as a law
fu! alteration except on very clear proof
had the as
that when actually made
Swift
sent of the party to be charged:
v. Barber, 23 Mich., 503; and see, Hun
ter v. Parsons, 22 Mich., 96; Gibbs v.
Linabury, Ib1'd., 479; Jourdan v. Boyce,
33 Mich., 302; Ibid.; Goodenow v. Cur
tis, 506; Willett v. Shepard, 34 Mich.,
106; Anderson v. Walter, Ibid., 113;
Farmers‘ Bank of Grand Rapids v. But
ler, 48 Mich., 192.
Notes given by married women.—A
married woman is not liable upon her
promissory note given for the purpose
Em
of securing a debt of her husband
ery v. Lord, 26 Mich., 431.
Nor is she
liable when joining her husband in giv
ing a promissory note to secure a debt
owing by him alone, the engagement not
being made with reference to her own
property, and she receiving no consid
eration for signing:
DeVries v. Conk
ling, 22 Mich., 255; see, ante,
178 and

§

be sufﬁcient

&

it will

§

but

if,

pencil? “In writing,” and “written,” includes printing, en
graving and lithographing.-"'
It must be payable to another person. As a general rule, it
is necessary that the person to whom the note is payable
should be clearly expressed, and made known upon the face of
the note; for parol evidence is not admissible to show to whom
it is payable. But this rule must be understood with proper
limitations and qualiﬁcations.
It is not necessary that the
name of the payee should be stated on the face of the note;
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Thus, a note payable to the
can be certainly ascertained.
order of A; or to, A or bearer; or to bearer, is a promissory
note. So, a note in these words: “Received of B $50, which
promise to pay on demand," is a good promissory note; for

I

the promise will be interpreted to be a promise to pay B.‘ A
note issued with a blank left for the name of the payee may
be ﬁlled up by a bona ﬁde holder with his own name?
When
payable to a ﬁctitious person or order, it is in effect payable to
bearer, and may be declared on as such, in favor of a bona ﬁde
holder ignorant of the fact, against all parties knowing that
the payee was a ﬁctitious person.“
Notes made payable to the order of the maker thereof, or to
the order of a ﬁctitious person, shall, if negotiated by the
maker, have the same eﬂ‘ect,'and be of the same validity as
against the maker, and all persons having knowledge of the
facts, as if payable to bearer.’ A note payable “to A or B” is
not a promissory note. A due bill, payable at a speciﬁc time,
is a promissory

note.“

A promissory note must be payable absolutely, and not upon
any contingency, as to time or event.” It must be a ﬁxed period
of time, or some event which must inevitably happen. There
fore, a written promise to pay a certain sum of money at the
death of the party to the instrument, or at a limited time after
the death of such party, or of a third person, is a valid prom
issory note; because it must inevitably come due at some
future time. But a written promise to pay money, when the
maker or the payee shall come of age, will not be; for he may
not live to that period.1° A promise to pay “when certain
4—Story on Prom. Notes, §§ 35, 36.
5—Ibt'd., § 37; Chitty on Bills, 160,
177,

178.

3 Hill, 112;
6—Plets v. Johnson,
Story on P. Notes. § 39.
Shaw, Kendall &
7-——C. L., § 4870.
Co. v. Brown. 128 Mich., 573; 87 N. W.,
757.

8——Edwards on Bills and Notes, 132;
Kimball v. Huntington, 10 We-nd., 675;
Lequeer v. Presser, 1 Hill, 256.
If no
in it, it
time of payment is mentioned
Socket v. Spencer,
is due immediately:
29 Barb., 180.
9—Worden v. Dodge, 4 Denio, 159:
see, Preston v. Whitney, 23 Mich., 260.

In an action upon a promissory note,
it is not competent
to show an oral
‘contemporaneous

agreement

to

reduce

from an absolute and speciﬁc
undertaking, according to its terms and
legal import, to a deteasihle engage
ment: Hyde v. Tenwinkie, 26 Mich., 93.
A provision in a promissory note ior
the payment of an attorney's fee in case
of the non-payment of the note at ma
turity, or in case of proceedings taken
to collect the same, is nugatory and in
valid:
Bullock v. Taylor, 39 Mich.,
the

note

137.

A
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10—Story on Prom. Notes, §§ 27, 28.
promise to pay “on or before" a

CH.
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carriages are sold,”" or “provided the ship Mary arrives free
from capture or condemnation,”12 or “out of the net proceeds,
after paying costs and expenses of ore to be raised and sold
from the bed,” etc., is not a promissory note ;13 it is not a
promise to pay absolutely and at all events. In the latter

well

to be made

is

is

is

as the ﬁrst, the objection

is,

that the fund from
never be realized.
might
which the payment
only referred to as an absolute
Therefore, where the fund
existing fund, as the consideration of the promise, and on
to be paid, the instrument will
account of which the money
case, as

is

it

a

I

I

a

a

a

note promising to pay A
valid promissory note. Thus,
“being
of
have
sum
money,
money which
or
order,
B,
owe him for the
received on his account,” or “which
valid promissory note, as importing the
freight,” will be
given.“
consideration only, for which
be

It

v. Tracy,
v.

Ruggles,

Cow.,
15

151.

Mass.,

it

a 4

Denio, 159.
13—Worden v. Dodge,
requisite of
promissory
A necessary
note is, that
must be payable at atime
which must certainly arrive in the fu
ture, upon the happening of some event
or the completion of some period not
depending on the future volition of any

if

723

§

5

6

1

4

5

8

8

Smith v. Van Blarcom, 45 Mich., 371;
N. W., 90; Lamb v. Story, 45 Mich.,
488;
N. W., 87; Story v. Lamb, 52
Mich., 525: 18 N. W., 248.
26; Kel
14—Story on Prom. Notes,
Hill, 263.
ley v. Mayor, etc.,
Cow., 691.
15—Atkinson v. Manks,
182;
Mass.,
16——Young v. Adams,
Cow., 186; Story
Leiber v. Goodrich,
18; Edwards’ Bills
on Prom. Notes,
and Notes, 134, 135; but see, Keith v.
120; Buchanan v.
Jones,
Johns.,
144;
‘Curry,
Ibid.,
19
Swetland v.
Creigh, 15 Ohio, 118.
Where a draft
was drawn in Cincinnati on bankers in
Chicago, to "pay to the order of R,
$600,
‘current funds;"‘ held, that in
that anything
the absence of evidence
else than cash was treated
as current
funds in Chicago, the "current funds"
in which
was made payable should
it

11—DeForest
12-—Coolidge
387.

6

487.

not a good

one; snd
the time of payment cannot
be
made
certain by any attainable
means, the instrument cannot he regard
Brooks v.
ed as a promissory note:
Hargreaves, 21 Mich., 254, 260; see,

9

it

A

certain day named states the time with
certainty for the purpose of a
sufficient
promissory note: Mattison v. Owen, 31
Mich., 421.
But will not be due until
the day named:
Helmer v. Kralick, 36
Mich., 371.
note payable on demand is payable
at once, and without demand,
so that
the statute of limitations runs from its
delivery.
And this is the rule even
where from the form of the contract
is manifest that immediate
payment
is
not expected.
And a note payable thirty
days after demand
is within the same
principle:
Palmer v. Palmer, 36 Mich.,

is

bills or notes,” or “in current bank notes,”
promissory note."

it

if

must be for the amount of money in specie, and that
only." Therefore,
payable “in foreign bills,” or in “Penn
sylvania or New York paper currency, to be current in the
1’
or “in bills of country banks,” or ll bank
State of New York,
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none, therefore,

The sum to be paid, written in the body of the note, will con
if there is a variance between it and the sum expressed in
ﬁgures, on any other part of the paper.“ But a promissory
note expressed in the body of it to be for “thee hundred dol

trol,

if

the

a

be considered
such funds only as were
current by law; and that the draft
should be treated as a negotiable bill of
Phoenix
exchange
payable in money:
Ins. Co. v. Allen, 11 Mich., 501, 508;
and see, Phelps v. Town, 14 Mich., 37-1.
A note made and indorsed in Michigan
and payable in Canada, "in Canada cur
rency," ls payable in money, and is
therefore negotiable; such a phrase in
note made here means no more than that
it is payable in Canada money at the
Canadian standard, as it would have
been without such phrase if made pay
Black v. Ward, 27 Mich.,
able there:
191; see, Preston v. Whitney, 23 Mich.,
260.

5

5

1

'17—Bank of Troy v. Topping, 13
Wend., 557. Nor alleged in the declara
tion. nor proved on the trial, unless the
defendant
shows a want of considera
Ibid.
A note
tion. which he may do:
void for illegality of consideration is not
a suiﬁcient consideration for a new note
given instead
v.
thereof:
Comstock
Mich., 481.
Draper,
Yvhenever
the
consideration of a note between the orig
inal parties is illegal, especially if in
violation of a positive prohibition of
statute (as, where the consideration was
the price of spirituous liquors sold con
trary to law), proof of such illegality
throws upon the holder the burden of
proving that he got it bona ﬂdc, and
gave value for it.
The rule is the same
‘as to the burden
of proof where it is
by
shown that the paper was obtained
(fraud,
or duress, and when stolen, or
put in circulation by fraud:
Paton v.
Colt,
Mich., 505, 510.
In assumpsit,
illegality of consideration between the
original parties may be shown under
Myers v. Carr,
the general
issue:
Mich., 63.
Where a note is made to

maker,

when

he

signed

be discounted for the accommodation of
accordingly,
the payee, and is discounted
the fact that the maker received no con

sideration therefor is no defense to a
suit brought thereon by the indorsee
against the makerzi Thatcher v. West
River Nat‘l Bank, 19 Mich., 196.
A
note given for an interest in a patent
issued by the United States patent oﬂice,
cannot be regarded
as without consid
eration.
But evidence of the pecuniary
worthlessness of the patent is not ad
missible under the general issue, with
out notice; a defense based on fraud
must be specially set forth:
Miller v.
Finley, 26 Mich., 249.
A note given to
a bank in consideration of assurances
on the part of its oﬂicers that they
would sign a petition to the judge for
clemency towards a relative of the mak
er's who is under arrest for robbing the
bank, or that they would be more likely
to do so, or that in any manner they
would exercise,
or be more likely to
exercise, inﬂuence with the court to se
cure a lighter sentence,
is based on
considerations opposed to public policy,
and is void:
Buck v. First N. Bank,
etc., 27 Mich., ‘293; Snyder v. Willey,
33 Mich., 483.
A note given wholly
or partly in consideration of the dis
continuance of
criminal prosecution is
void:
Wisner v. Bardwell, 38 Mich.,
278.
So a promissory note given in con
sideration of a contract to clear a cit
izen from draft is without considera
tion, and cannot be enforced
by the
payee named
O'Hara v. Car
ther_ein:
penter, 23 Mich., 410.
As to considera
tion, see Campbell v. Skinner, 30 Mich.,
32.

18-—Saunders v. Piper,

5

dollars,

a

hundred

for

Bing. N. C.,

425.
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three

a good note

it,

lars,” and in ﬁgures in the margin “$300,” is

_
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intended “thee” for “three ;” and whether such was his inten
tion, is a question for the jury.”
§698. Action by payee against maker.—In the action by
the payee against the maker of a note, the plaintiff must pro
duce the note, and in case the execution of it is denied by
defendant’s plea, and on oath 2° the handwriting of the defend
ant must be proved.
If the note be attested by a. witness, the execution,
on oath, must be proved by him.”

if

denied

If

there be no subscribing witness, proof that the defendant
admitted the signature to be his, will be suﬂicient. But where
the witness stated that he called on the defendant with the
alleged note in his pocket, but which he did not exhibit, and
told him he had a note for that amount against him, given to
the plaintiff, which he wanted the payment of, for the plaintiﬁ,
to which the defendant replied that he had given such a note,
it was held that the proof was insufficient. “The identity of
19—Burnham

A promissory

v. Alien, 1 Gray, 496.
note payable to bearer,

or, if payable to order and indorsed
in blank, may he sued in the name of
an agent or person
who holds
it for
collection, even though he has no actual
Brigham v. Gurney, 1
interest in it:
Mich., 349, 351.
And it seems that
a wife may sue her husband
upon his
promissory note given by him to her
for money borrowed of her:
Markham
v. Markham, 4 Mich., 305, 307.
20%ee, ante, § 191.
In a suit
against one
of several makers of
a joint and several promissory notes,
it is not necessary to prove its execu
tion by the makers not sued: Chandler
v. Lawrence, 3 Mich., 261.
An affidavit
ﬂied with the plea to a declaration on
only
a promissory note, which denies
the delivery of the note, admits the gen
uineness
of the signature, and the pro
duction of the note, together with proof
of the indorsement by the payee, estab
lishes a prima facie case for the plain
tiff: ' Burson v. Huntington, 21 Mich.,
415.
The payee of a note cannot sue,
as a joint maker, one who has put his
name on the back of it if he himself has
afterwards indorsed
the note and put
his name before the other:
Greusei v.
Hubbard, 51 Mich., 95; 16 N. W., 248.

A stranger signing his

name

to a prom

issory note before delivery is held as a
joint maker:
Wetherwax v. Paine, 2
Grix, 31
Mich., 555; Rothschild
v.
Mich., 150; Sibley v. Muskegon Nat'i
Bank, 41 Mich., 196; 1 N. W., 930.
‘See, Barger v. Farnham,
130 Mich.,
487; 90 N. W., 281.
It makes no dif
ference that his indorsement follows
that of the payee: Peninsular Savings
Bank v. Hosie, 112 Mich., 351; 70 N.
indorsements,
W., 8‘90.
as
Successive
between the several indorsers, import s
and not a joint
several and successive
obligation, and
this whether the in
dorsements
be made for accommodation
or for value received.
It may be shown,
however,
that the undertaking of the
several indorsers is in fact joint: Har
rod v. Doherty, 111 Mich., 175; 69 N.
W., 242.
Pnrol evidence is competent
to show that one signing on the back
Barger v. Farnham,
is a joint maker:
supra.
So it is to show that one who
indorsed the note before delivery was
as between
himself and the maker a
surety:
Hitchcock v. Frackelton, 116
Mich., 708: 74 N. W., 720.
21—See,
386.
But
it
ante,
§
seems now, that by C. L., § 10199, proof
by the subscribing witness may be dis
pensed with.
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the note to which the confession of the defendant related is
not proved; the evidence does not tend to show that the
defendant admitted that he execcuted the note produced on
the trial. Evidence that the defendant had executed a note
answering the description of the note produced, without other
proof of identity, is not suﬁicient to submit to a jury to pass
upon the question whether the defendant executed the note
’

.
produced. "22
If the note was executed by a ﬁrm, their existence and sig
nature need not be proved, unless the execution is denied
under oath.” When the note is payable to a ﬁrm, proof is
required that the ﬁrm consists of the plaintiffs on the record.“
The note must correspond with the description of it in the
declaration; but the declaration may be amended.”
When the note is in the possession of the defendant, the
plaintiff must give notice to him to produce it on the trial;

upon proof of notice, the plaintiff, after proof of execution,
may give parol evidence of its contents.“

In case of note, lost or destroyed.—If the note has
§699.
been destroyed, parol evidence of its contents may be given,
after proof of its actual destruction,” unless the plaintiff delib
erately and voluntarily destroyed it.”
If the note has been lost, and was not negotiable, or, if nego
tiable, was not endorsed at the time it was lost, the plaintiff is
entitled to recover upon proof of the note and its loss.” But
when a note payable to bearer, or to order, and endorsed, is
22—Shaver v. Ehle, 16 Johns., 201.
23—See, ante, § 191.
But an am
dsvit by a part of the defendants who
are sued as joint makers of a promis
sory note purporting to he executed in
the name of the firm, denying, "each
for himself that he ever signed, execut
ed or delivered said note," etc., is not
sufficient
to put the plaintiff
to proof
of the execution
of the note.
Such an
affidavit might he made in every case of
a partnership note by each of the part
ners, except the one who actually signed
the partnership name and delivered the
instrument:
Mills v. Bunce, 29 Mich.,
364.
i24—I|>td.;

Wend., 475.

McGreg0r v. Cleveland, 5

25—See. ante, § 355.
26—See, ante, § 399.
27—See, ante, § 398.
28—Biade v. Noland, 12 Wend., 173;
see, ante,

§ 398,

note

25.

29—Rowley v. Ball, 3 Cow., 303, 312;
Plntard v. Tackington, 10 John., 104;
As to what is suffi
C. L., § 10183.
cient proof of loss, see, Higgins v. Wat
The fact that
son, 1 Mich., 431, 432.
the note is in the hands of the defend
nnt who declines to produce it does not
justify an action upon it as a lost note:
Page W. W. F. Co. v. Pool, 129 Mich.,
57; S7 N. W., 1043; distinguishing Mc
Kinney v. Hamilton, 53 Mich., 497; 19
N. W.. 263, where the note was in the
possession of a third person.
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No'r1-s.

is

it,

it,

or in respect
lost, no recovery can be had in an action upon
executed
of
a
of
to
the adverse
indemnity
bond
except
party.“ Proof of the destruction of the instrument does not,
always authorize the admission of secondary evi
dence.
If the destruction was accidental, and occurred with
out his agency or assent, or even
was voluntary, and his
own act, but yet done under a mistake, so as to rebut all idea

if

it

however,

be entitled to recover the amount due thereon, as

or bill

if

it

it

if

if

I

of contemplated fraud, inferior evidence will usually be
But a. party who, under no pretense of mistake or
allowed.
accident, voluntarily destroys primary evidence, to prevent its
being used against him, or to create an excuse for its non
production, to injure the opposite party, or for other fraudu
lent purposes, thereby excludes himself from the beneﬁt of
inferior evidence."
“In any suit founded on any negotiable promissory note or
produced, might be
bill of exchange, or in which such note,
allowed as a set-olf in the defense of any suit,
appear on
belonged to the
the trial that such note or bill was lost while
party claiming the amount due thereon, parol or other evidence
of the contents thereof may be given on such trial, and not
withstanding such bill or note was negotiable, such party shall
such note

had been produced.”32

Bond in

of lost not-e.—“But

case

a

§

to entitle a party to
bond to the adverse party, in
such recovery, he shall execute
a penalty at least double the amount of such note or bill, with
two sureties to be approved by the court in which the trial
700.

shall be had, conditioned to indemnify the adverse_party, his
heirs, and personal representatives, against all claims by any
other person on account of such note or bill, and against all
and expenses by reason of such claim:
Provided, That
in
not
recover
costs
such
shall
case, unless (before
such party
the commencement of such suit) he shall have executed and
tendered to such adverse party, or, in case of several defend
costs

a

bond conditioned as afore
ants, to one of such defendants,
said, with sureties as aforesaid, approved by the judge or clerk
§

10183; McKlnney
v.
32—C. L.,
Hamilton's Estate, 53 Mlch., 497; 19 N.
W.,263.

§

§

10184; see post
700.
31——Blade v. Noland, 12 Wend.. 173;
Clute v. Small, 17 Wend., 243; ante,
398. note 25.
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of such court, or the circuit court commissioner of the county
where such suit is brought, or, in actions brought before jus
tices of the peace, by such justice: And provided further,
That upon ﬁling such last mentioned bond with the clerk of
said court, or with such justice, at the time of the commence
ment of such suit, no other or further bond shall be necessary
to entitle such party to such recovery upon such note or bill,
with costs as a.foresaid.”33
In order to charge the endorser of a negotiable promissory
note, lost before due, the holder must tender an indemnity
both to him and the maker, at the time of demand and notice.“
In declaring on a note, it is usual to add the common counts
to the count on the note, to avoid a failure in supporting by
proof the count on the note.
A note, in an action by the payee against the maker, is evi
dence of money paid, money lent, money had and received,
and account stated.“ This, however, applies only to the prin
cipals; a person who becomes a. party to a note, as a mere
surety, is not liable under the common counts, if it appear on
the face of the note that he is surtey only.“ Where a. note is
properly given in evidence under the money counts, the defendi
ant cannot defeat the action by showing that it was not in
fact given for money as the consideration.“
Interest.—The plaintiif may, in most cases, recover
§701.
the principal sum due, and the interest thereon. The interest
will be calculated from the time speciﬁed in the note. A note
payable on demand not expressing on interest, carries no inter
est until a demand is made by suit or otherwise.”
33-——C. L., § 10184.
eral makers, the bond

If

there are sev
run to all
whether
all are served
the defendants,
Higgins v. Wat
with process or not:
son, 1 Mich., 428.
3-i—Smith v. Rockwell, 2 Hill. 482.
must

35—l

2 ed., 231, 232.
Cow. 'I‘rcat.,
general,
where a party has a right
to sue upon a bill or note, he may also
declare for the consideration for which
he received it; us, if he hnd sold goods
for it, done work and labor, or lent
money, he may join n claim or count in
goods, work
‘his declaration for such

In

or money; and recover

what is due to

him, either on proving such considers
tion, or upon proving the hill or note.
under that part of his declaration which
And the bill or note will,
sets it forth.
of itself, as between the immediate par
ties to it, be evidence not only of money
lent, but of money paid, or money had
and received: Ibid.
36—Butter v. Rnwson, 1 Denio, 105;
Vvelis v. Girling, 8 Tnunt, 737.
37—Hughes v. Vvheeler. 8 Cow., 77:
Smith v. Van Lonn, 16 “'end., 659.
38—Rensselaer, etc., v. Reid. 5 Cow.,
587.
Interest upon an obligation may
run from the beginning of suit, if the
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The interest of money is now at the rate of ﬁve per cent.,
unless otherwise stipulated in Writing, when it may not exceed
In actions against banks, on their bills, the
seven per cent.”
plaintiif may, in some cases, recover at the rate of ten per
cent., from the time

of refusal to

pay.4°

Interest is allowed upon all judgments for the recovery of
any sum of money, and upon all decrees in chancery for the
payment of money, and may be collected on execution at the
rate of six per cent., but when judgment is rendered on any
written instrument, having a diiferent rate, the interest shall
be computed at the rate speciﬁed in such instrument, not ex
ceeding eight per cent.“ Interest is to be computed and col

is

a

it,

lected from the time of entry of the judgment.“
So on all
contracts from the time when the principal ought to be paid.“
And it seems that interest is allowed—ﬁrst, upon a special
and this
agreement; second, upon an implied promise to pay
may arise from usage between the parties or usage of
partic
ular trade; third, where money
withheld against the will of

5

§

is

§

41—C. L.,
4865.
In all cases on
contracts, when any sum shall be found
tor a party by verdict, report of ret
erees or award of arbitrators, or other
according to law, unless
assessment
such verdict, report, award, etc., shall
,be set aside, interest shall be allowed
upon the amount so ascertained until
payment, or until judgment shall be ren
thereon,
dered
and if judgment
en
tered thereon,
the interest shall be in
cluded in the judgment:
C. L.,
4866.
For provisions as to the rate of interest
on contracts between
citizens of this
state and other states,
payable
out of
252; and as to
this state, see, ante,
interest, usury, etc., see, ante,
250,
§§

251

and

~i2—C.

it

notes.

L.,

10308.

Wend.,
43—Williams
v. Sherman,
109; Still v. Hall, 20 Wend., 51.

729

7

When a promissory note is payable
with annual interest, the expression
means with interest payable at the end
oi’ each year.
But the words "annual
interest," or "with interest payable an
nually," in a note made to fall due in
less than two years, does not require an
installment of interest to be paid at the
end of the ilrst year, but merely re
quires the whole interest to be paid with
at the maturity of the
the principal
has been held that an
note.
Hence
unauthorized addition oi the word “an
nually" to a note payable with interest

maturity of the note, and therefore did
not
invalidate the note:
Leonard v.
Phillips, 39 Mich., 182.
40——C. L.,
10470.

§

a

it

it

_A

§

by
39—C. L.,
as amended
4856.
provision
Pub. Acts, 1899, p. 324.
in a. promissory note drawing no inter
est,
paid at maturity, for the pay
not
ment ot interest from its date,
paid at maturity, may be enforced where
the note was given for property sold
terms:
Flanders v.
on these speciﬁc
The rate
Chamberlain, 24 Mich., 306.
note can be changed only
of interest in
by agreement in writing:
Swift v. Bar
ber, 28 Mich., 503.

at ten per cent. at a period more than
one and less than two years from date.
was not a material alteration, as it did
not make the interest payable before the

§

of a previous demand tor payment
is not shown:
Brion v. Kennedy, 47
Mich., 499; 11 N. W., 288.
date

rnomssonv
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the owner; fourth, by way of punishment for any illegal con
version or use of another’s property; ﬁfth, upon advances of

cash.“
a

a

is

a

is

a

a

is,

after
certain pc
A merchant whose uniform custom it
riod, to charge interest upon articles sold, may charge interest
accordingly, to those who are in the habit of dealing with him,
knowledge of such custom."
as they are presumed to have
So, after an account rendered and not objected to within a. rea
sonable time, or after demand of payment.“
given for
speciﬁed or for an indeﬁnite
When
credit
not
time, without express agreement as to interest, interest
allowable in the ﬁrst case until time of credit has expired, and
demand for payment.“ .
in the other, until

it

interest.—“When any installment
of
Compound
§702.
interest upon any note, bond, mortgage, or other written con
tract, shall have become due, and the same shall remain unpaid,
interest may be computed and collected on any such install
ment so due and unpaid, from the time at which
became due,
at the same rate as speciﬁed in any such note, bond, mortgage,

5

a

.

3

3

4

it

Inter
Davis v. Walker, 18 Mich., 25.
can never be allowed on an unset
tled or an uniiquidatcd account, with
out an agreement, express or clearly im
Sweeney v. Neely, 53 Mich., 421,
plied:
424; 19 N. W., 127.
suit for a balance due on
But in
for goods sold, par
8. running account
tial payments having been made in cash
from time to time by the defendant, but
or art-ounting had been
no settlement
had, nor balance agreed on by the pur
It is very
ties, the supreme court say:
common and is certainly just and equit
able, to allow interest on balances which
est

have been suffered to stand for more than
six months; and that if the justice had
included such interest in the Judgment,
such allowance would have been in ac
cordance with what is commonly ex
pected by creditors
by
and
conceded
debtors, and should be supported:
Hill
v. Robbins, 22 Mich., 478.
Mich.,
47—Beardslee v. Horton,
560.
Interest upon money withheld is
allowed either because there is an ex
press or implied
promise to pay it,
or as damages; but no promise can be
implied until the principal falls due. and
it is not allowable as damages if there
has been no ﬁnal understanding as to
how much is to be paid:
Lake Shore &
Michigan Southern Ry. Co. v. The Peo
ple, 46 Mich., 193, 211:
N. W., 249.
VVhen partial payments amounting to
less than the accrued interest are made,
interest is still to be computed
upon
the whole principal until such times as
all the payments
shall equal the ac
crued interest, and if the payments do
not amount to so much,
then
to the
time of ﬁnal payment of principal and
Payne v. Avery, 21 Mich.,
interest:
9

Cow., 436,
v. Renssalaer,
Ch. J.
Wend., 483.
45-——ZiicAllistcr v. Reab,
46—Rensselaer, etc., v. Reid,
Cow.,
But
seems that interest is not
587.
chargeable upon an open mutual ac
count; therefore, where parties account
ed together as to a part of their deal
ings, showing a balance due to one of
them, but other items of their accounts
were left unadjusted, hcld, that the ac
count stili remained open, and that in
terest was not chargeable on the bal
ance shown by the partial accounting:

44—Reid
per Savage,

524.
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or other written contract, not exceeding ten per cent.; and if
no rate of interest be speciﬁed in such instrument, then at
the rate of seven per centum per annum.”*8

Actions by indorsee against maker.-In an action by
§703.
indorsee
against the maker, the execution of the note by
an
the maker, if denied under oath, and the indorsement by the
The only additional proof in
indorser, must be proved.“
this action to what is required when the suit is brought by the
payee against the maker, is the indorsement.
§704. Actions by indorsee against indorser.-The plaintiff
must prove the endorsement of the defendant, if denied under
oath.5°
The handwriting of the maker, and of all endorse
ments. prior to the defendant’s,
L., § 4859.

This section took
As to whether this
act authorizes the compounding of inter
est upon instruments made before that
date, quere: see, Glens Falls Ins. Co. v.
Jackson Circuit Judge, 21 Mich., 579. As
to compounding interest all obligations
made before this statute (C. L., § 4859)
took effect—and as to when and how
see, ante,
interest may be compounded,
48—-C.

effect

July

4, 1869.

5 251 note 24.
Interest cannot

be

compounded

with

authority.
This statute
out statutory
the com
§ 4859, does not contemplate
pounding of interest in the ordinary
of interest
sense, but only the payment

what, being sums certain expressly
provided for by the written contract,
as separate
are allowed to be treated
debts for the purpose of interest; And
new interest accruing merely by lapse
of time, will not be converted into prin
cipal: Voigt v. Beller, 56 Mich., 140:
22 N. W., 270.
49—See, ante, § 191; see, HOWYY
An indorsee
v. Eppinger, 34 Mich., 30.
suing on a note must plead and prove
St. Johns T. Co., v.
his title thereto:
Brown, 126 Mich., 592: 85 N. W., 1124;
Hinkley v. Weatherwax. 35 <Mich., 510;
Hamilton v. Powers, 80 Mich., 313; 45
N. W., 580; Newton v. Principaal, 82
indorse
Mich., 271; 46 N. W., 234.
ment of a note for collection for the
holder, passes no title to the indorsee
Thus, where the
on his own account.
maker of a note deposited money with
on

is admitted

by his endorse

his banker to pay it and they credited
maker with the money
thc
and
holder of the note indorsed it to the
bank for collection and then forwarded
it to the bank, but the bank made no
application of the deposit to the pay
ment of the note and failed with the
note in its possession
and the deposit
still standing to the credit of the maker,
held,
that the
transaction
did not
amount to a payment of the note: Suth
erland v. First National Bank of Ypsi
lanti, 31 Mich., 230; Page W. W. F. Co.,
v. Pool, 133 Mich., 323; 94 N. W., 1053
(May, 1903).
An agent to whom negotiable paper
is lndorsed for collection may sue there
on in his own name.
And as the in
dorsement
for such purposes passes the
legal title in trust, the authority to col

the

lect

is not

revoked

by the death

of the

owner of the paper:
Moore v. Hall, 48
Mich., 143: 11 N. W., 844. The plain
tiff who sucs as indorsee is presumed
to be the owner,
and the defendant's
suﬁiciently
establishes
indorsement
plaintiff's right to sue, and the character
in which he sues: Wilson Sewing Ma
chine Co. v. Spears, 50 Mich., 534; 15
N. W., 894.
50—See, ante,
191.
But
need
§
not

be

proved

if

defendant

makes

no

objection to its admission in evidence
without proof, and plaintiff's title to the
Hyde v. Ten
note is not questioned:
wlnkle, 26 Mich., 93.
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it must

be proved.

Presentment for payment.—If no particular time is
§705.
ﬁxed for the payment of a note, as, if payable on demand, it
should be presented for payment in a reasonable time. \Vhat
is a reasonable time, is a question of law, and depends on the
facts of each particular case, and may vary according to the
51—By indorsing a promissory note,
indorser agrees to and with the in
holders—That
dnorsee and all subsequent
signatures
the note and the antecedent
are genuine; that the maker
thereon
will on due presentment of the note,
pay it at maturity, or when it is due;
it is
and that, if, when duly presented,
not paid by the maker, he, the indorser,
upon due and reasonable notice
\ will,
of the dishonor, pay the same to the
Story on
'lnd0rsee
or other holder:
Prom. Notes, § 135, 380; see, Atwood v.
Cornwall, 28 Mich., 336.
The obliga
tion incurred by indorsing a. note pay
able to order, or bearer, is the same:
Ibid., § 132; Sutherland v. First Nat.
So
Bank of Ypsilanti, 31 Mich., 230.
the indorsee of a certiﬁcate of deposit
the same liability as the in
assumes
dorsee of a promissory note of the like
tenor:
Cate
v. Patterson, 25 Mich.,
191.
Where a note is made payable
to the order of A, and the maker pro
cures B to indorse it upon the prom
by A, the
ise that it shall be indorsed
payee, before it is used, but in viola
negotiates the
tion of his agreement
with B's indorsement only-the
note
legal character of indorser does not
thereby attach to B, and this defect
being apparent from an inspection of
the instrument, the purchaser takes it
subject to B's defense that he never be
as
indorser:
Gibson
v.
came liable
Miller, 29 Mich., 355; but see, Roths
An in
child v. Grix, 31 Mich., 150.
dorsement
on a promissory note which
purports merely to transfer the right
and title of the indorser (thus, “I here
by transfer my right, title and interest
of the within note to S. A.") destroys
the negotiable character of the paper.
Such an indorsement gives the indorsee
no greater rights than the indorser had,
the paper in the hands of
and subjects
the indorsee
to the same defenses that
could have been made to it in the hands
the

I

Aniba v. Yeomans, 39
of the indorser:
Mich., 171.
Where the plaintiff has acquired the
equitable title to the note be sues upon
prior to the bringing of suit, the en
dorsement
of the same over to him by
his vendor is mere matter of form, and
may be made at the time of the trial:
Brown v. McHugh, 35 Mich., 50.
An indorsement is “in blank," when
made by writing simply the indorser’s
name on the back of the note; in such
case the note and indorsement are trans
ferable by delivery merely, the same as
An indorse
a note payable to bearer.
ment is “full," where the indorser writes
over his name an order to pay to the
person
in whose favor the indorsement
is made; thus, “Pay to A.. .. B.. ..,
In order to transfer a note
or order."
so indorsed, the indorsee must add his
own indorsement, which may be in full:
Story, § 138, 139.
A promissory note
made payable to C.. .. T.. .., Cashier,
or order, indicates that it was made to
him not as an individual but as a bank
officer, and that it was a contract with
the bank, and in a suit on it by the
bank, no indorsement by such cashier
to the admission of the
is necessary
Garton v. Union City
note in evidence:
Nat‘l Bank, 34 Mich., 279.
An indorser will be discharged from
liability by the payment of the note by
Story.
the maker or any prior indorser:
Or by the holder's neglect to
§ 372.
present the note to the maker for pay
Ibid., § 198.
Or to
ment when due:
give due notice of non-payment to the
Ibid., § 299.
Or by giving
indorser:
further time for payment to the maker
or any prior indorser, if done by a valid
agreement
founded on a good considera
tion, whcreby the holder will be pre
vented from taking legal proceedings to
collect until the expiration of the fur
But a mere delay or in
ther credit.
duigence
to the maker, or a promise

732
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But when a note
circumstances and situation of the parties}
is payable at a particular time, payment is demandable only
without

consideration to extend, or an
with the consent of the in
dorser, will not so operate: Story,-§ 413,
So, an indorser will be dis
ct seq.
charged by the release of the maker or
any prior indorser:
Ibid., § 422.
But
where
one of two joint makers of a
note obtains of the payee an extension
of time of payment and procures an ad
ditional signer to the note, this will not
release the other maker who was in fact
only a surety, the payee having no no
tice of such relation:
Gano v. Heath,
36 Mich., 441.
Where one person, by
false and fraudulent representations to
another as to the solvency of a third
party, induced him to indorse the note
of such third person, and afterwards
purchased the indorsed paper, held, that
he could not hold the indorser:
Len
helm v. Fay, 27 Mich., 70.
In order to hold an indorser upon the
obligation incurred by his indorsement,
it is necessary
to present the note to
the maker for payment on the day when
it becomes due, and at the place (if
Story, §§
any) named for payment:
201, 227.
And if payment is not made,
to the indorser or
to give due notice
indorsers sought to be held for payment:
Ibid., § 299. One who receives from his
debtor, as collateral, the negotiable note
by the
person,
indorsed
of a third
debtor,
releases
his debtor from this
indorsement if he neglects to protest the
And this rule
note for non-payment.
applies equally to drafts as well as
promissory notes.
And evidence in such
case that the maker was insolvent when
the note was given, and was still so,
and that the indorser suffered no injury
from the_ failure to protest, is incom
petent:
Whitten v. Wright, 34 Mich.,
extension

92.

But the rule requiring immediate no
of the non-payment of commercial
paper does not apply to a non-negotia
ble order drawn upon a debtor and taken
by a creditor of the maker, merely as
condiitonal payment to be applied in
case it is collectable.
Still one who re
ceives such an order on a third person
as conditional payment,
must
exercise
diligence to collect it: Briggs
reasonable
V. Parsons, 39 Mich.. 400.
A promis
sory note payable on demand with in
tice

is not a continuing security, on
which the indorsers will remain liable
until actual demand, however long de
layed, but on the contrary such a note
must be presented within a reasonable
time in order to hold indorsers, and a
delay of two and a half years where all
parties reside in same city is too long:
Home Savings Bank v. Hosie, 119 Mich.,
116; 77 N. W., 625.
To charge an indorser, several dis
tinct things are necessary,
no one of
which can be disregarded. These things
to be proved
are not only the making
of the contract of indorsement, but pre
sentment of the note at maturity for
payment,
a neglect or refusal to pay
when presented,
a notice giving a sum
cient description of the note and dis
tinctly showing its dishonor, and serv
ice of such
notice
within the proper
time personally, or at the residence or
place of business of the indorser, or by
mail when
it is properly
mailable.
These are all legal conditions, which,
unless waived, must be strictly complied
with, in order to charge the indorser
at all.
And proof of the performance
of any one or more of these conditions
has no tendency to prove a compliance
with the rest: Cicotte v. Morse, 8 Mich.,
428.
An indorser of a promissory note,
not notiﬁed of its dishonor, so as to
become liable upon it, may so act, how
ever, as to waive his defense
on that
ground. And when such indorser, with
full knowledge that he has been dis
charged from liability, for want of such
notice states to the holder of the note
that he expects to have to pay it, but
requests such holder to try and collect
it of the maker, he thereby recognizes
his liability to pay the same: Parsons
v. Dickinson, 23 Mich., 56.
An indorsement implies that it was
done for a valuable consideration.
The
indorser of a note for whose beneﬁt it
Q
was discounted, does not in consequence
fact,
liability
of that
incur any other
than that of his indorsement; and proof
that it was discounted for his beneﬁt is
therefore irrelevant in a suit against
Newberry
Trowbridge,
him:
v.
13
Mich., 263.
1—Sice v. Cunningham, 1 Cow., 397;
Mohawk Bank v. Broderick, 10 Wend.,
terest
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when that time has expired, and not before?
In the compu
tation of time upon notes, a month is a calendar month?
A
note dated on the ﬁrst day of January, payable ten days after
date, would, without days of grace, become due on the elev
enth day of the 1nonth;4 if dated on the tenth day, payable in
one month, without days of grace, it would be payable on the
tenth of February.“
To this time is to be added, except where the note is payable
on demand, and also when there is not an express stipulation
to the contrary, in the note, three days, called days of grace.
Qn all bills of exchange, payable at sight, or at a future day
certain, within this state, and on all negotiable promissory
notes, orders and drafts payable at a future day certain, within
this state, in which there is not an express stipulation to the
contrary, grace shall be allowed, except as provided in the fol
lowing section, in like manner as it is allowed by the custom of
merchants, on foreign bills of exchange, payable at the expira
tion of a certain period after date or sight.” 6 The provisions
of the last preceding section shall not extend to any bill of
exchange, note or draft payable on dema.nd.7
Since the enactment of the foregoing sections, it has been
provided that “All checks, bills of exchange, or drafts, appear
ing on their face to have been drawn upon any bank, or upon
any banking association or individual banker carrying on :1
banking business under the act to authorize the business of
304; Rice v. Wesson,
400;
11 Metc.,
Phmnix Ins. Co. v. Allen, 11 Mich.,
501, 508; see, Phceuix
Insur. Co. v.
Gray, 13 Mlch., 191.
As against the
maker of a note payable at a particular
and de
time and place, no presentment
mand

of payment

at the place

is neces

sary; still. it seems that the maker may
show in his defense that he was ready
to pay at the place, and thus avoid all
special damages, and the costs of the
suit.
And if any special loss has ac
of
crued to the maker by the neglect
presentment
and demand, his rights will
be protected:
Reeve v. Park, 6 Mich.,
240.
A note payable on demand will,
after a reasonable time, be considered
as overdue, so that an lndorsee or pur
chaser
from the payee will be consid
ered as taking it subject to any defenses

maker had against it at the
time of the transfer.
As to what that
reasonable
time is, is a question for the
determination of the court upon the
that the

facts of each particular case; two and a
half months seems to be about as short
a time as such a note will be considered
overdue,
while, on the other hand. ﬁve
months have been held not an unreason
able time.
Carll v. Brown, 2 Mich.,
401.

2—Story on Prom. Notes, § 200.
3—Ibid., § 211; C. L., § 50, clause

10.

4—Story on Prom. Notes,
day

of the

date

is not

The
§ 211.
counted in com

puting the time.

s_ma.,
s—c. L.,

7-0.

§ 211.
§ 4371.

L., § 4s72,
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banking, which are on their face payable on any speciﬁed day,
or in any number of days after the date or sight thereof, shall
be deemed due and payable on the day mentioned for the pay
ment of the same without any days of grace being allowed, and
it shall not be necessary to protest the same for non-aecept
ance.”

8

-

With the addition of the three days of grace, a note drawn on
the ﬁrst day of January, payable one month after date, would
be due on the fourth day of February, the days of grace com
mencing on the second of February; so a note drawn payable
thirty days after date, would be due on the thirty-third day
after date.” In the computation of these days, Sunday, unless
it should be the last day, is included; but when the third day
the note becomes due on the preceding day,
The same rule would apply in case the
that is, on Saturday.
last day of grace occurs on the fourth of July.1° If two holi
days should succeed each other, as Sunday on the second day
of grace, and the fourth of July on the third, the note would
be payable on the preceding Saturday."
comes on Sunday,

And it is now provided by statute that the ﬁrst day of Jan
uary, the twenty-second day of February, the thirtieth day of
May, commonly called decoration day, the fourth day of July,
the twenty-ﬁfth day of December, the ﬁrst Monday in Sep
tember; Saturdays from twelve o’elock noon and any day ap
pointed or recommended by the Governor of this State or the
President of the United States as a. day of fasting and prayer,
or thanksgiving, shall for all purposes whatsoever, as regards
the presenting for payment or acceptance, and of the pro
testing or giving notice of the dishonor of bills of exchange,
bank cheeks and promissory notes, made after this act shall
take eﬁect, be treated as the ﬁrst day of the week, commonly
called Sunday and as public holidays or half holidays, and

bills, checks and notes otherwise presentable for acceptance
or payment on any of the said days shall be deemed to be pay
able and presentable on the secular or business day next suc
ceeding:
Provided, That if any of said holidays shall fall
8—C. L., § 4877.

This

applies only

made since May 1st, 1867;
C. L., § 4878.
9—Story on Prom. Notes, § 217.
to

a paper

10-—Ibirl., § 220.
Or on any other
holiday:
Ransom v. Mack, 2 Hill, 587.
11—Story on Prom. Notes, § 220:
See, C. L., § 4880.
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upon Sunday, then the Monday following shall be considered
as the said holiday."
The maker has the whole of the last day of grace in which
to make payment; and an action cannot be brought against
him on that day.‘-"
As to the time of day when demand of payment shall be
made, it must be a reasonable time before the expiration of the
day when the note falls due. If the note is payable at a bank,
it should be presented at the bank during the hours to which
its business transactions are limited by the usage of the bank.
If a note is payable generally, and without any designation of
place, it may be presented at the usual place of business, or
counting house, or dwelling house, of the maker. If presented
at his place of business or counting house, it must be within
the hours during which such place of business or counting
house is usually kept open according to the custom or usage
of the town or city; or if there be no such custom or usage,
then, within the reasonable hours for transacting business
If presented at the dwelling house or
there, by the maker.

is,

domicile of the maker, then it must be within such reasonable
hours as that the family are up, and the maker may be pre
sumed to be ready to transact business there."
The general
rule
that the presentment for payment may be made to
the maker personally, or at his dwelling house, or .other place
of abode, or at his counting house, or place of business. A
presentment in either of these modes will be suﬂicient."

13—Osborne

§

v.

Moncure,

Wend.,

170.
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5

E

226;
14—Story on Prom. Notes,
Bank, 106
Xvieslnger v. First Nat‘l
Mich., 291: 64 N. W.. 59.
15—Story, Prom. Notes,
235; see,
4876; see, Pease v. \Varner, 29
C. L.,
Mich., 9.
Esp., 115;
16—Coose v. Callaway,
Bank of Utlca V. Smith, 18 Johns., 230.
1

§

4880, as amended by Pub.
12—C. L.,
Acts, 1903, p. 420.
Notes falling due
on Saturday are payable
on the next
secular or business day succeeding said
Saturday, which ls Monday unless that
be a legal holiday in which case they
are payable on Tuesday following;
and
notes maturing on Sunday are payable
on Monday also:
Hitchcock v. Hogan,
99 Mich., 124; 57 N. W., 1095.

3

is

a

By whom.—The presentment should, in general, be
§706.
made by the holder of the note, or some agent competent to
give
legal receipt for the money." A demand of payment,
by an agent having any parol authority as a notary, or the
mere possession of the paper,
suﬁicient; and such agent is
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competent to give notice of non-payment." Any person who,
by accident or otherwise, happens to be the holder at the time
a bill or note becomes-due, may and ought to demand pay
ment and give notice of the non-payment, although not bene

ﬁcially interested, and though liable to pay over the proceeds
The notice given
on demand to the person legally entitled."
by any party to the note, subsequent to the party on whom it
is served, is deemed the notice, and inures to the beneﬁt of
every party to the note, subsequent to the party served,
whether prior or subsequent to the party giving notice.”

At what place.-—In case the note is not payable at
§707.
any particular place, payment must be demanded of the maker
personally, or at his dwelling house, or other place of abode, or
To this rule
at his counting house, or place of business.”
1.
\Vhere the maker absconds
there are several exceptions:
2.
before the maturity of the note, and-cannot be found.“
Where the maker is a seaman on a voyage, and not having
a domicile in the state.” 3. Where the maker has no known
residence or place within the state at which the note can be
4.
presented for payment?“
Where the maker, before the
note is payable, removes from the state, and takes up his resi
But if the maker, at
dence in some other state or country.“
has
a
the
note
was
known
given,
time
residence in another
the
state, payment must be demanded there, the same as if his resi
dencc was in this state?“
When a note is payable at a particular place, it must be pre
sented for payment at such place, or the endorser will be dis
charged

from all liability?“

In

§708.

case

of two or more persons

liable.-If

made by two or more persons, not partners,

ment must be made
17-Shed
of

Utica.

of each,

v. Bret., 1 Pick., 401; Bank
Smith, 18 .Iohns.,
230;

v.

v. Warner. 29 Mich., 9.
18—Jones v. Foot, 9 B. & C., 764',
see, Story on Prom. Notes, § 247.
19—Wilson v. Swabey, 1 Starkle R.,
Pease

34.

20—Story on Prom. Notes, § 235; see,
Taylor v. Snyder, 3 Denio, 145.
21-—Putnam v. Sullivan, 4 Mass., 45;
47

a note is

a demand

or the endorser

of pay

will not

be

Widgery v. Munroe,
Mass., 449;
6
Blanchard v. Hilliard, 12 Ib£d., 86, 88.
22—Chitty on Bills, 354, note 1.
23—Story on Prom. Notes,
Q 237;
Anderson v. Drake, 14 Johns., 114.
Drake, 14 J0hn.,
2-1—Anderson
v.
114; Wheeler v. Field, 6 Metc., 290.
25—Tayior v. Snyder, 3 Deuio., 145;
Gilmore v. Spies, 1 Barb., 158.
26-—Story,
Prom. Notes, § 227.
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If

the maker be dead, it must be made upon the
if any has been appointed, and
executor or administrator,
his place of residence is known, or can, upon reasonable in
quiry, be ascertained; but if there be no executor or adminis
holden.‘-’-7

On a note by
trator, then at the house of the deceased.
partners, the demand must be at their place of business, or at
the dwelling house of either. If one be dead, demand must be
made of the survivors.”
§709.
becomes

Waiver of demand and notice.—If, before the note
the endorser, by an agreement to that eﬁect,
presentment of the note for payment and notice of

due,

waives a

non-payment,

neither are necessary.”

The notice to the indorser.—A notice in the follow
§710.
ing words: “Take notice, that a note drawn by Cornelius
Roosevelt, to the order of Daniel S. Mercier, for $466.62, dated
Sept. 7, 1837, at six months after date, this day due, endorsed
by said Daniel S. Mercier, and afterwards by you, has been pro
tested for non-payment, at the request of the bank of Pontiac,
and the holders look to you for payment of the same;” was
adjudged insuﬂicient, because it did not “assert the fact that
the note was presented at the proper time and place for pay
ment, and payment not obtained.”3°
5

Hill,

232.

partners:

But
Ibid.

on Prom. Notes, § 241.
29-—Coddington
v. Davis, 3 Denio,
16; see, Backus v. Shipherd, 11 Wend.,
28-—-Story

G29.

30-—Platt v. Drake, 1 Doug. Mich.,
296; aﬂlrmed in Newberry v. Traw
bridge, 4 Mich., 391. The ground of de
cisions in those cases was that the word
“pr0tested" used in the notice was with
out meaning as applied
to promissory
notes,
and therefore the use of that
word was not equivalent to saying that
the note was presented
at the proper
and that
time and place for payment,
payment
was refused; but in Burkham
v. Trowbridge, 9 Mich., 209, the court
say that promissory notes may be pro
tested, and that the statement
in the
notice
that the note was "protested"
saying that the note
was inferentially
was duly presented
at the proper time
for payment,
and place
and payment
refused; therefore the cuss in 1 Doug.

Mich., above cited, are at least
if not overruled, by the case
in 9th Mich., 209.
In the latter case
a notice to the lndorser, dated on the
day of the maturity of a. note, and stat
ing that it was on that day, by the no
tary who signed the notice. protested for
non-payment after due demand and re
fusal, and that the holder looked to the
party notiﬁed for payment, was held suf
ﬂeient.
But see Union National Bunk
v. Williams Milling Co., 117 Mich., 535:
76 N. W., 1, holding that it must ap
pear when, where, how, by whom and
to whom presentment was mode and that
a. general statement
that the note was
"duiy protested for non-payment" at a
particular time is insuﬂlclent.
A for
mal protest
of a promissory note, it
seems,
not necessary:
Platt v. Drake,
Doug., 296; Newberry v. Trowbridge,
Mich., 391; Burkham v. Trowbridge,
Mlch., 209.
But it may be done,
proper:
and is
Burkham
v.
Trow
Mich., 209.
bridge,
and 4th
doubted,

its

were
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When the notice, which was without date, stated that the
note had been “this day presented for payment,” it was held
insufﬁcientﬁ“
So where the notice stated that the demand was
made on the fourth of July, though in fact made on the third
day."

It- must

describe the note correctly, and must be
directed on its face to the indorser; it is not suﬁicient to have
it directed correctly on the outside.-*3 Upon some, if not all,
the preceding questions, directly contrary decisions have been
made.

When notice may be served by mai1.—“Whenever
§711.
the indorser or indorsers of any promissory
note, or the
drawer or indorser of any check, draft, or bill of exchange,
shall reside or have a place of business, "‘ " "
in the

'

or township where such promissory note,
draft, check, or bill of exchange is made payable, or may be
legally presented for payment or acceptance, all notices of the
non-payment or non-acceptance thereof may be served by de
positing such notices, with the postage prepaid, in the post
office in the city, township or village where such promissory
same

city,

village

note, draft, check, or bill of exchange is made payable, or may
be legally presented for payment or acceptance, properly di
rected to such drawer or indorser at such city, village or town
ship; and whenever any promissory note, check, or draft shall
not be made payable at any place, notices of non-payment or
non-acceptance may be served by depositing the same in the
post-office, prepaid, directed to the drawer or indorser at his re
puted place of post-ofﬁce delivery, such reputed place of busi
ness, residence, or post-oﬂice delivery to be ascertained by

31——Wynn v. Alden, 4 Denio, 163. So
held because the notice did not show
that the demand was made at the prop
er time:
Ibid.
v. Mack, 2 Hill,
587.
32——Ransom
The 4th being a holiday, a notice of a
demand
on that day was notice
of a
demand that could not legally be made:
Ibid.
33-—Remer
v. Downer, 23 Wend., 620.
The object of the notice is merely to in
form the indorser of the non-payment by
the maker, and that he is held liable for
the payment of the note. and if the no
tice accomplishes this object it is sui'i'l
clent, even though it misdescribe the

The question
in some particulars.
in such cases is, has the indorser been
misled by the notice: Snow v. Perkins,
2 Mich., 238, 243; see, Parsons v. Dick
inson, 23 Mich., 56. In such notice, no
technical phrases are necessary; but it
is only required that the terms used
be such as fairly and naturally lead the
mind of a person of ordinary intelligence
to the idea that the paper has been pre
and
sented at maturity and dishonored,
that the person notiﬁed is looked to for
payment: Burkham v. Trowbridge, 9
Mich., 210; see, Platt v. Drake, 1 Doug.,
note

296.

739

.\ssunrs1T-Uroixi

§712

PROMISSORY

NOTES.

C11.

XLII.

the best information that can be obtained by diligent inquiry
’
therefor. ’34

Guaranty of payment of
§ 712.
arise as to what is, and the effect
of a note.
The supreme court of
held that a guarantee of a note,

John Watson,” indorsed

note.—Questions frequently
of, a guaranty of payment
this state, in 1 l\Iich., 428,
guaranty
in the Words,

“I

on the back

of

a note, at the time

of

joint promissor

a

§

As to the essentials of such certiﬁ
ot protest ot promissory note see,
Union National Bank v. Williams Mill
ing Co., 117 Mlch., 535, 76 N. W., 1.
An oﬂer by the indorser to pay
the note in depreciated
bank bills, with
only
out explanation, can be regarded
as an otter to compromise, and cannot
operate
as a waiver ot notice:
New
berry v. Trowbridge, 13 Mlch., 263.
Mlch., 428.
35——Hlggins v. Watson,
Mlch., 188.
36—Tinker v. McCauiey,
This case held, that a negotiable prom
issory note and a. guarantee of its pay
ment at the same time indorsed there
on. are separate and distinct undertak
ings, creating distinct undertakings as
respects
the maker and guarantor.
And that such guaranty is not nego
tiable.
In Weatherwax v. Paine,
Mlch., 555,
was held that where two
indorse a note at its making and before
delivery to the payee, to enable the
maker to purchase with it certain prop
erty of the payee, they are to be con
sidered
as joint and several promisors
with the maker: see the ruling in this
case approved
and re-atiirmed in Roths
child v. Grix, 31 Mlch., 150.
It is not
necessary that the guaranty should name
the promisee,
or person in whose favor
is made.
The promisee becomes det
inite and fixed whenever any one takes
3 1

cate

_it

2

it

a

it

§

1,

it

received
and tiled with the plea;
and this though
the notary be dead at
the time oi’ the trial; Sexton v. Perrigo,
126 Mlch., 542; 85 N. W., 1096.
been

it

§

4876.
But this act does
34—C. L.,
apply to notes drawn previous to
May
A wit
1867: See, C. L.,
4878.
ness called to prove the dishonor of a
note, who only testiiies that he went
to ﬁnd the maker's last place of resi
dence, and that the note was not paid,
and that he then protested
it: but does
not testify whether he found the indorser
or not, or whether he made any demand,
nor concerning his knowledge of the
residence,
nor whether,
no personal
demand was made, there was any valid
reason tor the omission, does not suﬁl
ciently show such facts as amount to a
dishonor: Nevins v. Bank, etc., 10 Mlch.,
Where there is no direct evidence
547.
of notice to an indorser, a subsequent
recognition of liability by his presump
tive evidence, in the nature of an implied
admission, that the notice has been
plaintiff attempts
given.
But where
and only succeeds
to prove due notice,
in form and
in proving one detective
mode oi.’ service, this excludes the pre
proper and
sumption ot
sufiicient
notice; and a part payment by the in
dorser afterwards will not operate as an
unqualified acknowledgment ot liability
be shown that he knew at the
unless
time that the notice was defective.
2635, making the
Compiled Laws
certiﬁcate of a notary public presump
tive evidence of official acts done b_v
him excludes the certiﬁcate of a notary
of notice of non—pnyment where there
is an aiiidavlt that such notice has not
not

is

a

it

it,

made the guarantor a
with the
maker of the note, and liable as such to the bearer of the
note.“ This case was subsequently overruled, the court hold
ing that the negotiability of this description of guaranty could
not be sustained, either on the ground of the guarantor being
joint maker or otherwise.3“ But
now enacted by statute:

making
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<1

collection of
be negotiable, and shall
'thc

a

any promissory note shall hereafter
pass to the holder of the note, whether indorsed thereon or
written or printed on
separate paper; and the assignment,
indorsement, or transfer of any promissory note, the payment
or collection of which shall have been guaranteed,
shall
operate as, and be an assignment of, all guaranties of any
such note, and the holder of such note may maintain an ac
tion upon any and all such guaranties, in his own name, sub
ject to all equities existing between the guarantor and the
person to whom such guaranty was 1nade.”-'*"'

§

a

§

a a

a

party

guarantees the collection of a
or that
is collectible, the mean
ing of his undertaking ls, that if pro
ceedings
at law for its collection are
they shall result
diligently prosecuted,
in its collection.
It does not mean that
the maker of the‘ note is responsible,
or
shall remain so, but that the debt shall
if the proper steps are
be collected,
promptly taken for that purpose.
Hence
an action will not lie upon the guar
anty, until after a failure to obtain pay
ment by a suit at law duly taken and
prosecuted for its collection."
Proof that
the maker is insolvent or pecuniarily
irresponsible will not excuse the neglect
to proceed
at law for its collection:
Bosman v. Akeley, 39 Mich., 710.
The liability of a party who guaran
tees the collection of
note is estab
lished when the creditor sues the maker
is
in Justice's court and an execution
returned unsatisﬁed; a suit in a court
of record is not necessary: Thomas v.
Mich., 51, 5-1.
Dodge,
In an action
upon the guaranty of collection of the
person,
note
of
a
third
is
show,
incumbent on the plaintiﬂ
to
before he can recover, his inability, after
diligence, to collect the note
reasonable
of the maker,
and
there are several
makers of the note. this condition must
l;c made out as to each and all of them.
Proof of a prosecution seasonably com
against all of the principal
menced
debtors, and diligently and in good faith
carried on against all to final judgments
and execution
without avail, is suiti
cient to authorize the creditor to de
mand payment
of the guarantor of coi
lection: Aldrich v. Chubb, 35 Mich., 350.
But where one guarantees the collection

741

it

8

a

it

note,

if

&

§

a

it

8

the note and guaranty on the guarantor's
credit, and that party may sue on it:
Nevins v. Bank, etc., 10 Mich., 547;
Mich., 51; Comstock
Thomas v. Dodge,
v. Howd, 15 Mich., 243.
But such guar
anties are now made negotiable by
See, next note.
statute:
Nor is
necessary
when a party selling‘
note
it, that the guaranty should
guarantees
Huntington v. Welling
be in writing:
ton, 12 Mich., 10.
Where an agent of
another for the sale of property, who
has agreed not to sell for credit, except
to those who are good and responsible,
and to take no paper except good, first
class collectable paper, and such as he
is willing to guarantee, takes paper he
knows to be worthless and turns it over
to his employer who is ignorant of its
character, he makes himself liable as
a guarantor of the paper, and
is not
entitled to have the paper returned to
him as a condition precedent to judg
against him on such guaranty:
ment
Clark v. Roberts, 26 Mich., 506.
4879; and see Waldron
37—C. L.,
v. Harring, 28 Mich., 493.
A guaranty
of collection indorsed by the payee of a
note passes the title thereto; Russell
Co. v. Klink, 53 Mich., 161; 18 N. W.,
627.
A guaranty of payment indorsed
by the payee on
note payable to his
order is negotiable under this statute;
guaranty of pay
4879.
Such
C. L.,
upon
ment indorsed
note by. one to
whose
order it is payable,
is both a
guaranty and an indorsement,
and the
note will thereafter pass by mere de
livery.
And the indorser may be joined
as
defendant
in a suit against the
maker: See, C. L.,
10055.
Guaranty
a
of collection.—When

-
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decided that

been

it,

In New York, it has
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guaranty of the
given at the time

a

a

though
payment of a note, indorsed on
promissory note, but “a
the note was made, was not of itself
for
the debt, default, or miscarriage
special promise to answer

of another

-

person.”-"B

“I

it

guarantee the pay
Where the guaranty was in the words,
ment of the within,” the court said: “The undertaking of
the defendant was not conditioned, like that of an indorser,
It was an absolute
nor was
upon any condition whateyer.
agreement that the note should be paid by the maker at ma
a

turity. When the maker failed to pay, the defendant’s con
complete right of
tract was broken, and the plaintiff had
It was no part of the agreement that the plaintiﬂ’
action.
should give notice of the non-payment, nor that he should sue

a

is

a

the maker, or use any diligence to get the money. With us,
proceedings against the maker are only necessary when there
is
The point was decided long ago
guaranty of collection.
—that
guaranty of payment, like the one in question,
not conditional, but an absolute undertaking that the maker

will pay the note when due.” “It

is

a

is

is

general rule that where
one guarantees the note of another, though on condition, his
liability
commensurate with that of his principal, and he
no more entitled to notice of the default than the holder.”3°

if

a

a

S11retyship.—Questions as to the liability of sureties
§713.
of notes and when they are discharged frequently occur, and
these subjects will now be noticed.
Mere delay of
holder of
note to call on the principal
the
debtor for payment will not discharge the surety.“ But
holder of

a

is

note, who
requested by the surety to proceed
without delay and collect the money of the principal, who is
then solvent, neglects to proceed against the principal, who
insolvent, the surety will be discharged."

by a. collateral
mortgage referred to in it, and at the
same time assigns the mortgage
with
the note, he is not liable on his guar
anty until resort has been had to the
mortgage as well as to the note, for the
collection of the moneys secured: Bar
man v. Carhart, 10 Mich., 338.
Denio, 484.
38—Hall v. Farmer,
N. Y., 227.
39-Brown v. Curtiss,
2

5

oi’ a note which is secured

228; Allen v. Rlghtmere, 20 John, 365;
Peck v. Barney, 13 Vermont, 93; Farm
Mich.,
er's, etc., Bank v. Kercheval,
504; Roberts v. Hawkins,
70 Mich.,
566, 38 N. W., 575.
Johns. Ch. R.,
40-King, v. Baldwin.
554: same ease, 15 John., 384.
41—Palne v. Packard. 13 John.. 174;
King v. Baldwin, 17 Ibid., 384; Rem
25 N. Y., 552.
sen v. Beekman,
The
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2
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If the creditor, by express agreement with the principal,
waives the terms of the contract, by enlargingthe time of per
formance, without the assent of the surety, the latter is dis
charged." “If the creditor, by agreement with the principal
debtor, without the surety’s consent, has disabled himself from
suing, when he would otherwise have been entitled to sue,
under the original contract, or has deprived the surety on his
paying the debt from having immediate recourse to his
principal, the contract is varied to his prejudice, and he is
But a promise to indulge the
consequently discharged.”*3
principal, unsupported by a sufficient consideration, would
not be

a

defense to the surety, although actually carried into

doctrine of the case of Paine v. Pack
ard, is overruled in this State.
It is
here
that a joint maker of a
held
promissory note who writes after his sig
nature to the note, the word “surety."
does not thereby
limit or change the
nature of his liability to the holder, nor
make it any more the duty of the latter
to proceed against the other maker at
his request, than as it he had signed as
a principal
maker without adding the
word surety.
And it is no defense to
such a note by such a signer that the
holder had neglected at his request to
against the other maker for
proceed
payment when he was solvent, and that
since such request he had become in
The proper course for such a
solvent.
signer is to pay the note according to
the terms of the note, and then proceed
himself against the principal as it is his
right to do.
Inkster v. First N. Bank
of Marshall, 30 Mich., 143. See, Roths
child v. Grix, 31 Mich., 150. A creditor's
neglect
his demand against
to enforce
his debtor at the request of the surety
of the latter, does not release the surety
in this state.
The discharge of a surety
by an extension
of time on his princi
pal's debt results from the contract for
and not merely from delay to
extension
collect the debt or from a promise to
forbear collection: Michigan State Ins.
Co. v. Soule, 51 Mich., 312; 16 N. W.,
662.

When one has purchased a note over
due, the collection of which has been
guaranteed
by a prior owner thereof,
refuses to receive the money when ot
tcred to him by the maker, and delays
the collection of the note,
until the

makers have tailed, such guarantor
be discharged.
Sears v. Van Dusen,
Mich., 351.

25

42—King v. Baldwin, 2 John. Ch.,
554; F. & M. Bank v. Kercheval, 2
Mich., 50-1; Porter v. Hodenpuyl, 9
Mich., 11.
But not when the holder of
the note extends the time to the prin
cipal debtor
without notice that the
other signer is only a surety: Gano v.
Heath, .36_Mich., 441.
See, Smith v.
Shelden,
35 Mich., 43.
2 John. Ch.
43——King
v. Baldwin,
554.
But a surety who, after time given
to pay the
promises
to the principal,
of the facts,
debt with full knowledge
is liable without any new consideration
I01: the ,promise.
The action in such
case is upon the original contract, and
not upon the new promise: Porter v.
Hodenpuyl, 9 Mich., 11. See People v.
Grant,
Mich., —-—; 100 N. W..
1006; (0ct., 1904), holding that accept
ing a note payable beyond the time when
an account is due releases a surety for
the payment of such account.
A surety only engages to make good
a deﬁciency; an arrangement between
his principal and the creditor, without
his privlty, whereby the principal is‘.not
to be sued by the creditor, is a sub
stantial alteration of the contract of
suretyship to the surety's prejudice;
Farnsworth
v. Coots,
46 Mich., 117;
.8 N. W., 705.
A creditor who knows
that his debtor is only a surety is bound
to take no steps which will change the
principal’s liability without the surety's
consent: Canadian Bk. v. Coumbe, 47
Mich., 358; 11 N. W., 196.
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The promise in such a.
by the creditor.“
,case
would not preclude the holder of the note from suing the
principal debtor, if he should be required so to do by the

execution

surety.

'

A surety will

_

if

the holder of the note sur
render a collateral security for the debt. “It is a well settled
principle of equity, that a creditor who has the personal con
be discharged

tract of his debtor, with a surety, and has also, or takes after
wards, property from the principal as a pledge or security for
his debt, is to hold the property fairly and impartially for the
beneﬁt of the surety, as well as himself; and if he parts with it
without the knowledge o'r against the will of the surety, he
shall lose his claim against the surety to the amount of the
property

so surrendered.”*5
The neglect of the creditor to record a bill of sale of a
vessel given l1lIlL as security by the principal, in consequence
of which she was taken possession of by a subsequent pur

chaser, was held to have discharged the surety to the full
extent of her value.“
A withdrawal by the creditor of an
execution levied on the goods of the principal, under a judg
ment obtained on a warrant of attorney given by the latter,

would discharge the surety, whether he knew of the existence
of the warrant and judgment or not." But it seems that a
direction to the sheriff not to proceed with an execution be
fore actual levy, will not operate as a discharge of the surety,
even when it has resulted in the loss of all means of collect
ing the debt from the principal.“
The mere delay of a.
creditor in enforcing the collection of a bond and judgment,
which had been transferred to him as collateral security for
a debt, was held to discharge the estate of the debtor, for all
that the creditor might have received, but for his wilful de
i

fault.“

4-i—Pi-esident, ete., v. French,
21
Plck., 486.
And it is said that a cred
itor may extend the time tor his debtor
in, without
pay
to
discharging
the
surety. it he, by the same agreement,
expressly reserves
his remedy against
them, and the right to sue tor the debt
at any time, notwithstanding the exten
sion: Bailey v. Gould, Walker's Mich.,
Ch. 478, 482.
45-———Baker v.
‘

Briggs,

8

Plck.,

122;

and see, Ives v.
12 Mich., 361.

46—Walton

Bank

v.

Lansingburg,

of

Johnson,

2

Simmons,

457.

47—Mayhew v. Crickett, 2 Swsnston,
193; Farmers‘ Bank of Canton v. Ray
nolds,

13 Ohio,

48—Ibid.,

84.

Lenox v. Prout, 3 Wheaten,

520.
49—_V\'illlz1ms v. Price.
v. Lyell, 5

581: Nexsen
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A declaration, by the holder of

a promisory note, that he
for
will look solely to the principal
payment, in consequence
of which the surety omits to obtain security for his indemni
ﬁcation, is a defense to an action on the note against him.“
It is a good defense to an action of debt on a judgment
against the survivor of two judgment debtors, to show that the
the other debtor, in the original ob
defendant was surety for
i
ligation on which the judgment was obtained; and that he
gave up a security which he held for the debt on being told by
the plaintiff that the judgment was paid. Such a defense is
good even where there was no actual fraud or intention to de
ceive on the part of the creditor.“
USE OF THE COMMON COUNTS IN ASSUMPSIT—IN GENERAL.

Though there is no special eount.—The common
§714.
counts in assumpsit are frequently suﬂicient without any spe
cial count; and even where the declaration contains a special
count, it is often advisable to insert one or more of the com
mon counts. The plaintiff is at liberty to insert in his declara
think advisable, so as to be
prepared for any complexion which the case may assume on
the trial. Though, as a general rule, when there is an express
contract, the plaintiff cannot resort to an implied one, yet he
tion

as many counts as he shall

may, in many cases, recover on the common count, though
there was a special agreement."
Thus where a contract has
been fully performed by plaintiff and all that remains to be
done is the payment of money by defendant it may be re
The breach
covered under the appropriate common count.“
v. Brooks, 21 Pick., 195.
51—Carpenter v. King, 9 Metc., 511.
52—But so long as an express con
tract remains in force, none can be im
plied covering the same subject
mat
ter:
Hunt v. Sackett,
31 Mich., 19.
An action on the common counts will not
lie where proof ot a contract and the
breach of it is necessary to a recovery;
Phippen v. Morehouse,
50 Mich., 537;
15 N. W., 895; Tate v. Torcoutt, 100
Mich., 308; 58 N. W., 993._
But where n special contract has been
of the parties, a
modiﬁed by agreement
recovery may be bad under the common
counts for whatever has been done under
50——Harris

the contract as modiﬁed:
der, 33 Mich., 566.

Moon

v. Har

Bush
and
v.
labor).
53-—(Work
Brooks, 70 Mich., 446; 38 N. W., 562;
Thomas v. Cauikett, 57 Mich., 392; 24
N. W., 154: Strome v. Lyon, 110 Mich.,
680; 68 N. \V., 893; Nicol v. Fitch,
115 Mich., 15; 72 N. W., 988: (Money
had and received), Phippen v. Moore
house, 50 Mich.,_ 537; 15 N. W., 895;
White v. Taylor, 113 Mich., 543; 71 N.
sold),
W., 871:
McGraw v.
(Goods
Sturgeon, 29 Mich., -126; Richards v.
Burroughs, 62 Mich., 117; 28 N. W.,
755; Flint & P. M. Ry. Co. v. Donovan,
108 Mich., S0; 65 N. W., 583; Burt v.
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of an express contract cannot be shown as a basis of recovery
under the common counts.“ The common counts will not sus
tain an action to recover damages for the breach of an execu
Again, where plaintiff has failed to perform
tory contract.“-"
his contract fully, or in the manner provided, yet has furnished
something, or done something, of value to the defendant,
assumpsit
which the defendant has accepted, an implied
arises to make reasonable compensation therefor, which may
common count.“
be enforced under the appropriate
In framing a declaration, the plaintiff will insert one or
more of these counts, as the nature of his demand may re

quire.“
IYSE OF

THE COMMON COUNTS IN

CASE

OF

GOODS BARGAINED

AND

SOLD.

What circumstances justify their use.—This count
§715.
can be adopted only in cases where the. property in the goods
wholly vests in the defendant, so that he may maintain trover
for them against any person but the plaintiff, and against
the plaintiff were it not for his lien upon them for the price."

It

can only be maintained

where the property

125 Mich., 328; 84 N. W., 317;
insurance loss), Granger
(An adjusted
v. Manchester Fire A. Assn., 119 Mich.,
177; 77 N. W., 693.
5-i—Flint & P. M. Ry. Co. v. Dono
van, 108 Mich., 80; 65 N. W., 583;
Loranger v. Davidson, 110 Mich., 605;
68 N. W., 426; Bullock v. Neberroth.
121 Mich., 293: 80 N. W., 39.
55-Wigent v. Marrs, 130 Mich., 609;
90 N. “K, 423.
5G—Allen v. Mt-Kibben, 5 Mich., 449:
Wildey v. Paw Paw S. D., 25 Mich.,
419; Wilson v. Wager, 26 Mich., 452;
Howell v. Medler, 41 Mich., G41: 2 N.
W., 911: Gage v. Meyers,
59 Mich.,
300; 26 N. W., 522.
57—A declaration in assumpsit, on
the common counts, which alter stating
the several causes of action, omits to
allege an express promise to pay, is bad
special demurrer;
but is cured
on
by judgment: Hoard v. Little, 7 Mich.,
468.
A demurrer to an entire declara
tion containing the common counts prop
erly pleaded,
oi’ defects
in
because
Greene,

in the goods

special counts, will not be sustained:
Weston v. County of Luce. 102 Mich.,
528; 61 N. W., 15.
The common
counts are as applicable in case oi.’ writ
ten as of oral contracts:
Record Pub.
Co. v. Merwin, 115 Mich., 10; T2 N. W.,
998.

Stipulated damages for the breach of
contract, cannot be recovered
common
counts: Butterﬂeld
v. Sellgman, 17 Mich., 95.
58—1 Art-hibold‘s N. P., 159;
1
Chitty’s PL, 10 Am. ed., 347. This is a
proper action to recover the price oi’
goods and chattels sold by plaintiﬂ to
defendant by a valid bargain which vests
the title of the goods in the defendant,
and
which goods, etc., the defendant
refuses to take; or which the plaintiﬂ
has a right to retain until paid for.
It
does not lie where the goods, etc., have
been delivered to the purchaser; in that
case the action should be for goods sold
and delivered: Ib1‘.d.,' Chitty’s Pl., 347:
1 Cow. 'l‘reat.,
2 ed.. 98.
See, ante, §
an express
under the

688 et seq.
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has passed from the plaintiif to the defendant.” Unless the
property has passed, the plaintiﬂ' must bring an action upon
the agreement to purchase, for not accepting the goods and
paying for them. The contract must be for a speciﬁc article
or articles, a speciﬁc price must be agreed upon, and every
thing must be done, such as weighing and measuring, or the
like, which is necessary to the speciﬁc appropriation of the
It must also appear that the de
goods to the defendant.”
The property must be
fendant assented to take the articles.

“There cannot be
changed to make the action maintainable.
any sale unless there is an assent by the defendant to take
must be complete, ready for
delivery, when the assent is given.”“2
By the common law, when the terms of sale are agreed on,
and the bargain is struck, and everything that the seller has
to do with the goods is complete, the contract of sale becomes
absolute as between the parties, without actual payment or dc

the.articles.””1

“The articles

livery, and the property and the risk of accident to the goods
He is entitled to the goods on payment or
When the price is ﬁfty dollars or up
tender of the price.“-'*
wards, the statute governs and the contract is not binding,
unless the purchaser shall accept and receive part of the goods
sold, or shall give something in earnest to bind the bargain,
or in part payment, or unless some note or memorandum in
writing of the bargain be made signed by the party to be
charged or some one by him lawfully authorized.“ The pro
rests in the buyer.

v. Pybus, 10 Bing., 512;
59—Eiiiott
v. Sutter, 37 Mich., 526.
Swift, 5 B. & C.,
v.
60——Simmons
S57; Downer v. Thompson, 2 Hill, 137;
Lingham v. Eggieston, 27 Mivh.. 324:
Ins. Co., 68
Foster v. Lurnbern1an's
Mich., 188; 36 N. W., 171; Wagar v.
Farrin, 71 Mich., 370: 38 N. W.. 865.
Though something still remains to be
done in order to ascertain the price to
be paid, still this is but presumptive evi
dence that title has not passed: the
parties may have agreed that notwith
standing the price has not actually been
iixed,
yet nevertheless the title shall
pass, and such agreement
is valid.
It
is a question oi interest to be determined
from ail the surrounding circumstances:
Byles v. Collier, 54 Mlch., 1; 19 N. W.,
Scotten

See, on the proposition that the
565.
oi whether title has passed is
question
it
one of whether the parties intended
should,
from
their
to be ascertained

contract, the situation oi the thing sold
and the circumstances surrounding the
sales: Lingham v. Eggleston, 27 Mich.,
324; Bonn v. Haire. 40 Mich., 404;
Brewer v. Michigan Salt Assn., 47 Mich.,
526; 11 N. W., 370; Whitcomb v. Whit
ney, 24 Mich., 486.
v. Bell, 8 B. & C., 277.
61-—-Atkinson
62»-Hague v. Porter, 3 Hill, 141.
63—1 Cow. Treat, 2 ed., 101; Davis
v. Ransom, 4 Mich., 241; Conway v.
Bush, 4 Barb., 564; Kling v. Fries, 33
Mich., 275; Bonn v. Haire, 40 Mich.,
404.
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visions of this statute require, when ﬁfty dollars or more are
involved, that before the oral contract can be shown, tliere
shall be given some evidence of contract relations which is
not found in spoken words. This preliminary evidence is the
key which unlocks the door of the court to evidence of the
parol contract. It may consist of an acceptance and receipt of
goods, of a part payment for goods, of something given in ear
nest, or of a note or memorandum signed as stated above. Nei
ther this note or memorandum nor any of the other things is
the contract; they are but evidences of contract relations.
The
contract is in the spoken words. Delivery and acceptance of
part of the goods takes the contract out of the operation of the
statute.“
Under the rule in England the earnest is some
thing outside the contract while part payment was, as the
term indicates, a payment of a part of the consideration. This
distinction seems not to be imiformly regarded in this coun
try. As a practical question it is of little importance as to
what may be the correct view for the earnest of the old law
is practically obsolete with us. The language of the statute
however retains the term and it seems to be regarded as having
a diiferent meaning from the term part-payment.“ The part
payment may consist in money, property or the discharge in
whole or in part of an existing debt, if the parties have so
agreed. An agreement to discharge without actually discharg
ing the indebtedness is not suiﬁcient." The memorandum must
contain all the terms of the contract."
65—Gartield v. Paris, 96 U. S., 557;
Alderton v. Buchoz, 3 Mich., 322', Rich
ards v. Burroughs, 62 Mich., 117; 28
N. W., 755.
Constructive delivery will
be suﬂicient, as where the property is
ponderous
and the purchaser exercises
acts oi ownership over it: Alderton v.
Buchoz, 3 Mir-h., 322.
Reception by a
carrier to transport to the vendee will
not in the absence oi an understanding
that he may accept for the vendee,
within the re
amount
to acceptance
quirement ot the statute: Rindskopp v.
DeRuyter, 39 Mich., 1; Grimes v. Van

Vechten, 20 Mich., 410: Webber v.
Howe, 36 Mich., 150; Smith v. Brennan,
62 Mich., 349; 28 N. W., 892.
66—See,
Burhans v. Carey, 17 Mich.,
282.

67—Brabln v. Hyde, 32 N. Y., 519.
68—Gault v. Stormont. 51 Mich., 636:
17 N. W., 214; Banman v. Manlstee
S. & L. Co., 94 Mich., 365; 53 N. W.,
1113; Hall v. Soule, 11 Mich., 494:
VVebster v. Brown, 67 Mich., 331; 34
N. W., 676: Messmore v. Cunningham,
78 Mich., 623; 44 N. W., 145.
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When appr0priate.—The price of goods sold may
§716.
be recovered under this count, if they have been actually dc
livered, and the contract were to pay in money, and the time
of credit has expired.
This action may, in some cases, be
maintained, even although there was a special agreement be
tween the parties. Thus, where there wa's a special agreement
for goods to be delivered by the plaintiff, and for work to
be done by the plaintiif in relation to the goods, and after
delivery the defendant refused to suﬂ"er the plaintiff to do the
work, it was held that the plaintiff might abandon the agree
ment, and bring his action for goods sold and delivered.”
But if such goods are sold on a. credit, the vendor cannot, be
fore the credit has expired, maintain this action, even though
he can prove that the vendec induced him to sell the goods
by fraud. The vendor, in such a case, may disaﬁirm the con

tract

a.nd

sue

in trover,

unless the goods have passed into

count tor
69-—-For form of common
goods sold and delivered, see, Weston
Upon the
v. McDowell, 20 Mich., 353.
general
question
of the sale of goods,
wares and merchandise, see, ante, § 688
ct seq.

70—Llnningdale
10
v. Livinytone,
J0hns., 36.
Where a contract for the sale and de
livery of goods has been tuily carried
out by the seller, and the property in
the goods has passed and nothing re
mains but the duty of the buyer to make
payment ot the price in money, the
amount may be recovered under the com
mon count, or on a special count on the
The general count may also
contract.
be used where the contract has not been
so performed,
it the vendee has actually
and appropriated the goods or
received
any part of them: Beagle v. McKenzie,
26 Mich., 470; McGrnw v. Sturgeon, 29
Mich., 426.
As to plaintii'i"s damages
where the vendec has received a part of
the
the

goods sold and refuses
see, Wilson v.
balance,

to

receive

Wngar,

26

Mich., 452.
On a contract to sell and
deliver goods where the delivery is to
be cn notice from the purchaser. such

notice

wick

is essential to a recovery:

The

Chad

28 Mich., 349—as to
of damages,
see same
case.
vendor oi! goods delivered upon

v.
measure

Butter,

a contract which he has tailed to com
plete in full is still entitled to recover
under the common count for such part
of the goods as have been actually ac
cepted by the purchaser: but his recov

ery in such case is not based upon the
contract, but upon the beneﬁt which the
purchaser has received from the goods
delivered and accepted;
still he cannot
recover any more than the contract
price, nor more than the actual value of
the goods at the time and place of de
livery: Chapman v. Dease, 34 Mich.,
375.

In an

action on the common counts
oi a demand for goods
sold and delivered, the assignment
of the
account is admissible in evidence, as the
might obtain all needful in
defendant
formation of the nature of the demand
sued on by calling for a bill of par
ticulars—and ii’ an allegation of an as
signment were needcd it might be added
by amendment: Kelley v. Waters, 31
Mich., -104.
by
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the hands of a bona ﬁde purchaser}
But if the vendor bring
assumpsit, he aiﬁrms the contract?
S0, where goods were
sold upon these terms: seven and one-half per cent. discount,
bill at three months; ten per cent. discount, cash in fourteen
days; held, that the vendor could not sue for goods sold and

within the fourteen days, even if the sale had been
by fraud on the part of the vendee.“
One who has
been induced, by the fraudulent representations of another,
on dis
to enter into a contract, may aﬂirm or disaﬂirm
covery of the fraud, but he cannot do both, and he must
aﬂirm or disafﬁrm altogether; and,
the latter, must do so
delivered

if

it,

eﬂ'ected

fraud
discovered.
He cannot adopt that
for his own interest, and reject the residue.‘
A contract which, in the ﬁrst instance, was not sale, but
might become so upon the happening of particular event, may
upon the happening of that event be declared upon as such,
and the price be recovered in this action. Thus, plaintiff agreed
to let (or lend) the defendant
musical snuff-box, on an under
it,

a

a

a

is

is

as soon as the

part which

it

it

if

was damaged the defendant was to have
standing that
and £3 10s. was to be taken as its value.
The box was re
ceived by defendant, and damaged while in his possession.
Held, that the plaintiff was entitled to maintain this action,
and that
was not necessary to declare specially.“

is

if

If the goods are to be paid for, partly in money and partly
in goods, to be delivered, the vendor must declare specially.“
But
the goods have been delivered, and the breach com
plained of be the non-payment of the money only, this action
proper.’

is

a

is

it

When the whole credit has not expired,
necessary to de
clare specially; as where goods are to be paid for by
bill or
note at three months, or other time, the credit will not expire
not given) until the expiration of
(although the bill or note
three months, or other time, and imtil then the plaintiﬂ can
not declare in this form, but may at the expiration of the
C.,

1

Doug.
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&

3 &

R., 312;
C., 59.

3

1

1
& 8:

9

1

2—Gallowsy
Holmes,
v.
Mich., 330.
C. M.
3—Strutt v. Smith,
Ferguson v. Carrington,
B.

'

Mich., 508.
4-—Jewett v. Petit,
W., 545.
M.
5—Blnnchi v. Nash,
6—Talvert v. West, Holt, N. P., 179;
Barbe v. Parker,
H. BL, 287.
C., 420.
7—Sheldon v. Cox.
B.
W.,
8—Webb v. Fsirmainer,
M.
&

B

59.

4

v. Currington,

9

1—Ferguson

8:

time.“
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What plaintiﬂ‘ must pro-ve.—Unde1' the general issue,
§ 717.
the plaintiﬂ’ must prove the sale of the goods, the delivery,
and the value of them, or the price agreed to be paid for
them.

A

in all cases, from evidence of the de
livery of the goods to, andreception of them by, the vendee.
If there was a written contract, it must be produced, if the
plaintiff wishes to recover according to its terms; and must be,
in case it appears from the witness’ testimony that the con
tract was in writing.
_
A delivery to the defendant, or to some person authorized
by him to receive, must be proved.” A delivery to a carrier,
by order of the vendee, though he do not name‘ him, will be a
constructive delivery to the vendee, and be suﬁlcient.
But a
delivery to a carrier, without the consent of the vendee, either
express or implied, will not enure as a delivery to the latter.1°
Where the goods are in the hands of a wharﬁnger or ware
houseman, and a delivery order is given by the seller to the
buyer, and the goods are accordingly transferred to the buyer’s
name in the books of the wharﬁnger or warehouseman, yet if
anything still remains to be done towards the completion of
sale may be implied,

the contract, such as weighing, measuring, or the like, the de
livery is not complete, so as to vest the property in the buyer;
but after the goods have been weighed, etc., or if the quantity

in bulk so as not to require weighing, etc., then the
property in the goods will be vested in the buyer by the de
livery order and transfer."
be sold

If

a person send an order to a merchant

to send him a cer
tain quantity of goods on a certain credit, and the merchant
sends a smaller quantity, at a shorter credit, no agreement ex
ists between the parties, until the former assent to receive
them; and
473;

if

the goods be lost on the way, there is no implied

Swancott v. Westgarth, 4 Eash,
Where there is a sale oi goods on
credit. to be paid tor by bill or note,
which is not given, it is well settled
that, while the credit or period for which
the bill or note was to run is yet un
expired, the declaration must be special
for refusing to give the paper; yet after
the period tor which the note was to
run, the plalntlﬂ‘ may recover on the
75.

counts for the goods sold and
delivered: Gibbs v. Blanchard, 15 Mich.,
common
305.

9-2

Ssund. Pl. & Ev., 5 Am. ed., 94.
10—I-Iague v. Porter, 3 Iiill, 141; see,
Meredith v. Melgh, 2 Eli. & B., 364.
11——Swanwick
v. Sothern, 9 Ad.
&
Eli., 895; see, 2 Saund. Pl. & Ev., 97:
Downer v. Thompson, 2 lllll, 137.
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assumpsit to pay for them." So, if a merchant send a larger
quantity than was ordered.”
The delivery must be shown to have been at usual and con
venient hours; therefore, an offer to, deliver several tons of
oil at an unreasonable hour of the night, was held not to
satisfy a contract to deliver generally within a certain num

sum."

'

a

a

a

is

it,

ber of days."
Where there is an express contract, and the price of the
proof of the contract proves the price. If
goods is stated in
not mentioned in the contract, but
the price, however,
merely implied from the delivery of the goods to and accept
ance by the defendant, then the law implied that the parties
intended that
reasonable price should be paid for them; and
the plaintiff must call
witness, or witnesses, who know the
nature of such goods, and their value, and can swear that
certain price or
they believe them reasonably to be worth

a

a

the general issue, the defendant
§718. Defenses.—Under
may prove any matter which shows that the plaintiff never
had
cause of action, and also most matters in discharge of
the action."
He may show that the action was commenced
too soon, that the goods were sold at
certain credit, and that
the credit had not expired at the time the action was com
menced."~

The damages.—-In diminution of the damages, how
§719.
ever, the defendant, even in an action on an express contract
for
certain price, may prove that the goods are inferior in
quality to what he had contracted for, and the plaintiff can
then only recover on
quantum meruit."
And where the
defendant proved that
for
the price of which the
machine,
action was brought, was made by the plaintiﬁ under a con
a

a

a

ante:

157'

541.

East,

~'|
Q7!

17-—Galloway v. Holmes,
Doug.
Mich., 330.
But
is no defense to an
action for the price oi goods sold and
1

18—Cousins v. Paddeu,
C. M.
R..
But it has been held um
there
was a speciﬁc price agreed on. the de
iendant should give notice of his in
tended
defense: Bnsten v. Butter,
&

,

192-

P"‘“"

7

1-6—Se°»

N13‘

ii’

V

A"°m’°'d

B

15

§

(3., 395.

to show that plaintiﬂ
made
sale with intent to cheat and de
fraud some third person: Cool v. Snover.
38 Mich., 562.

delivered

the

2

2

&

2

3

Johns., 634.
12—Bruce v. Pearson,
Hill, 137.
13—Downer v. Thompson,
1-i—Startup v. McDonald,
Man.

it

\

1

\

479.

0

—

\
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tract that if it did not work, nothing should be paid for it;
and that in fact it could not be made to work, and was
wholly useless to him; this was holden to be a good defense
to the action, altogether, although the engine had not been
returned; and it was holden that the plaintiff was not entitled
to damages upon a quantum meruit, without showing some
implied contract resulting from the defendant’s conduct or
dealing with the goods." So, where cinq foin seed was sold,
warranted to be new growing seed, and in an action for the
price the defendant proved that he had sown part, and sold
the remainder; and that the whole proved unproductive, and
not worth anything, and that those to whom he sold it refused
to pay for it; the court held this to» be a good defense to the
action altogether, although it appeared that the defendant, be
fore he sowed or sold the seed, was told by a third person
that it was not good new growing seed, and did not answer
the warranty, and the defendant did not inform the plaintiﬂ
or oﬁer to return the said seed.”
war
So, in all actions for goods sold and delivered with
ranty, as well as for goods agreed to be supplied according
contract,
to
competent for the defendant to show how
much less the subject of the contract was worth by reason of
is

a

it

a

it,

of

breach of the contract
The question whether

a

a

a

by the plaintiif.
party, who has contracted to deliver
certain quantity of any article, can, where the whole has not
been delivered, maintain an action for the part delivered, has

decided both for and against maintaining the action, in
the state courts. In England, the cases are in favor of main
taining the action, although the contract has not been per
formed by a delivery of all the property which was contracted
The courts have held that the plaintiif can
to be delivered.

been

a

is

not bring an action until the whole quantity has been de
livered, or until the time for the delivery of the whole has
large
an entire contract to deliver
arrived.” When there

21——Waddlngton

P. N. R., 61.
v. Lattlmore,

B.

C.,

259.

48

753

v.

Oliver,

Bos.

&

W.,

2

M.

&

Lamb,

&

20-——Poulton

v.

9

19-—-Grundsel
352.

1

a

quantity of goods, within
speciﬁed time, and the seller de
livers part,‘ he cannot, before the expiration of that time, bring

§720
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an action to recover the price of that part delivered, because
the purchaser may, if the vendor fail to complete his con
But if he retain the part
tract, return the part delivered.
delivered, after the seller has failed in performing his con
tract, the latter inay recover the value of the goods which
he has so delivered.”
The supreme court of this state, in ac
cordance with these cases, held that although a contract for
the sale of goods be entire, and the seller deliver only a part
of the goods bargained for, yet if the vendee retain such part,
the vendor may recover the value of the part retained in an
action for goods sold and delivered.” In all such cases, the
declaration must be on the common counts, and not on the
The defendant may reduce the plaintiﬁ’s
special contract.
claim by showing any damages he may have sustained by the
plaintiﬂ"s failure to fulﬁll his contract, and thus substantial
may be done without subjecting
necessity of bringing a cross action.“
justice

§720.

Husband’s

the defendant

to the

liability for goods furnished to wife.—

Under this count,

a recovery is sometimes sought against a
husband or father, for goods furnished to a wife or child. The
liability of a husband for the contracts or acts of his wife, and

of a father for those of his child, except as governed by
statute, are determined upon the principles of agency. If the
circumstances are such as to fairly indicate that the husband
has authorized the wife to purchase goods on his account the
husband will be liable to pay therefor?“
The husband, by common law, was liable for the debts of
the wife contracted by her before marriage, and therefore
for goods sold and delivered to her before marriage; but this
is changed by statute.“ The liability of a husband for goods
supplied to his wife depends upon whether she is his agent
for the purpose of binding by contracts for goods supplied
to her, which is a question for the jury to determine upon the
facts of the case; and in determining that question, the ex
travagant

nature of her orders is a matter to be taken into

22—Oxendale v. Wetherel, 9 B. & C.,
386; Keegan v. Smith, 5 Ibid., 378.
23——Clark v. Moore, 3 Mich., 55; Wilson v. Wager, 26 Mich., 452.
24—Bowker v. Hoyt., 18 Pick., 555.

25—C. L., § 4487 makes parent and
child, being of suﬂk-ient
ability. each
liable for support of the other when that
other is unable to maintain himseli.
26—C. L., §§ 8690-8693.
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that she had no such authority?"
to a married woman, the
jury
to
leave
the
not simply whether
to
proper question
the goods were necessaries suitable to the station in life of
the party but whether upon the facts proved the wife had
authority, express or implied, to bind the husband by her
as showing

for goods supplied

is,

consideration,
In an action

contracts.”

a

is,

The general rule
that the wife cannot bind her husband
by her contract except as his agent. There are, however, cases
in which
jury may infer such agency. In the cases of orders

is
a

if,

is

if

is

if

given by the wife in those departments of her husband’s
household which she has under her control, the jury may infer
that the wife was the agent of her husband, till the contrary
appear.
So, for such articles as are necessary for the wife
such as clothes,
the order
given by the wife, and she
living with her husband and nothing appears to the contrary,
the order
the jury do right by inferring the agency; but
excessive in point of extent, or
when the husband has
small income, the wife give extravagant orders, these are cir
eumstances from which the jury would infer that there was no
v. Ironmonger,

13 M.

W.,

6

5

368.
Bing., 28,
28—Sea.ton
v. Benedict.
The wife is prima faric the agent
30.
of the husband in managing the affairs
of his household,
and in doing those
things necessary to the comfort of mar
ried and domestic life. as to hire serv
ants and to purchase those articles neces
sary for the use and convenience of the
family in accordance with the husband's
v.
means and station in life: Snyder
People, 26 Mich., 106, 109 :1 Parsons on
Cont.,
288; Pickering v. Pickering.
N. l-I., 124; Felker v. Emerson, 16 Vt.,

5

&

&

5

9

653.
P.,
C.
v. Butcher,
29-—Freestone
643, 647.
A wife is not permitted to
nor is a tradesman authorized
purchase,
to furnish articles to the wife, on the
credit of the husband, which are above
the means of the husband; .or his situa
tion in life.
If such articles are fur
nished
to her without his consent
or
he will not be liable to pay
knowledge,
B.
for them: Montague v. Benedict,
Bing., 28.
C., 631; Seaton v. Benedict,

A tradesman supplies goods to the wife
is guilty
at his peril when the husband
of no neglect of duty in the premises,
and when there can be no necessity for
her purchasing on his credit at ail.
And a husband
who suitably supplies
his wife with necessaries or with money
to purchase them, will not be held liabio
under a presumption of authority or of
an implied agency, for goods purchased
by her on his credit, without his knowi
edge or consent,
of one with whom he
previous dealings, although the
had
goods
be of the character of neces
saries.
In proving what is
reason
able expenditure for one's family, the
income and capacity of the husband
to
earn and produce is as important a sub
ject of inquiry as the amount cf p"nj>
erty possessed.
In determining wh:
are necessaries
for the wife, evid:-ii.-e
of the style of living and expenditur\
of the circle in which he introduces h~r
and where he experts
her to ﬁnd hr?
associates,
is pertinent:
Clark \'. Cox.
32 Mich., 204. Necessarles, besides board
and lodging, are such articles as com

755

a

27—Lane

&

agency.”
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The objection that credit was given to the wife alone means
of her husband’s lia
that it was given to her to the
exchlsion
biiity, and the circumstance that-the goods were booked to her
alone, but in her marriage name as the dcfendant’s wife, is
not sufficient to show this; on the contrary, the fact that she
was known by the plaintiff to be a married woman and sup
posed to be the defendant ’s wife, is rather prima facie evi
dence

that credit was given to her husband?"

It

is clear that a husband is obliged to maintain his wife, and
may by law be compelled to ﬁnd her necessaries, as meat,
drink, clothes, physio, etc., suitable to the husband’s degree,
estate or circumstances.31
port

with the wife's situation in life
are
her husband's fortune,
and
usually worn or possessed by persons in
similar conditions of life: 2 Bright on
The law is, that
Husband and Wife, 7.
is bound
to provide his
the husband
wife with necessaries suitable to her sit
uation and condition in life; and if she
contracts debts due for them during co
habitation, he is obliged to pay those
debts, but for anything beyond
neces
He is
saries he is not chargeable.
ordinary
for
bound by her contracts
on
from a presumed
assent
purchases
his part.
But if his dissent be pre
viously made known, the presumption of
He may still be
his assent is rebutted.
liable, though the seller would be obliged
of the
to show, at least, the necessity
purchases for her comfort: 2 Kent's
Com., 9 ed., 146: Ogden v. Prentice. 33
Barb., 164.
And that the husband neg
lected or refused to furnish them: Keller
v. Phillips. 40 Barb., 390; Theriott v.
Hagioli, 9 Bosw., 578.
I?.0—Jewsburg v. Newbold,
40 Eng.
Law & Eq.. 518.
If the wife has a
separate
estate
or income,
and
the
tradesman furnished goods to her on her
credit, he cannot subsequently
separate
charge
with the articles
the husband
and
the price of him, even
recover
though they may be necessaries, and the
wife be living with her husband: Bent
ly v. Griﬁln, 5 'l‘aunt., 356; Stammers v.
Maromb. 2 Wend., 45-l: Leggat, v. Reed,
2 (‘. & l’., 16; Tillman v. Shackleton, l5
A creditor for necessaries
lVll('ll.. 453.
furnished to the wife can only sue the

and

in her right, and can he in no
husband
better condition to complain of him than
she ls: Crittenden v. Schermerhorn, 39
Mich., 661.
A party who without au
thority from the husband loans money
to the wife, knowing it to be for her
private use, and concealing the fact at
her request from her husband, cannot
recover the money of him. A wife can
borrow money
on
her husband's
not
credit or secretly on his account with an
understanding that the transaction shall
be concealed
from him:
Franklin v.
Foster, 2 Mich., 75. And where a wife
carries on a boarding house of which
she

has

the

sole

management,

and

ex

clusively on her own account, although
with the knowledge and assent of her
husband,
it seems that she alone and
not her husband is liable for supplies
purchased by her on credit for the use
of her house, the purchases being on
her credit:
Tillman v. Schackieton, 15
Mich., 447.
But where a woman pur
chasing in a store of one who knows that
she is a married woman and living with
goods
her husband,
suitable for the
ordinary family use, does not affirma
tively claim to be buying upon her own
account,
the natural inference would be
that she was buying on her husband's
account,
and for the use of the family.
and in the absence of any express agree
ment shc would not thereby render her
self individually liable for them: Powers
V. Russell, 26 Mich.. 179.
31-—Iiowe v. North. 69 Mich., 272
37 N. \V., 213.

756

CH.

XLII.

.issu.\1rsIT—<;oor>s sou) AXD DELIVERED.

§721

Eﬁect of separation between husband and wife.-—
Adultery of the wife during cohabitation will not destroy the
presumption of the law of his assent to all contracts made by
the wife for necessaries,”
But if the husband turn away his
wife on account of her having committed adultery, he will
not be liable for necessaries furnished her.”
'
In all actions for necessaries furnished the wife in cases of
separation, the plaintiif must show affirmatively that the sep
aration took place in consequence of his misconduct. It is not
enough that it appear that there were quarrels and personal
conﬂicts between them, unless it be shown that the husband
was the oﬁending party.“
§721.

Eﬂect of d.iv0rce.—After a sentence of divorce ab
§722.
initio, the liability of a husband for the debts of his wife does
not continue.“ But a husband separated from his wife by
a divorce a mensa et thoro, for adultery on his part, with a
decree for alimony, is liable for necessaries supplied to his
wife, if he omit to pay the alimony, or maintenance under a
separation deed, etc.“
And when a wife dies, although living separate from her hus
band, he is bound to provide her with a funeral at a reasonable
expense; and if he does not do so, any person who voluntarily
employs an undertaker and pays him for performing such a
funeral, is entitled to recover the sum so expended from her
husband, in an action for money paid.“
In this connection it may be noticed that in relation to the
liability of the husband for the torts of the wife, it is now
provided by statute that “Executions issued upon judgments
rendered against husband and wife in any suit brought against
them to recover damages for any tort or Wrong committed by

4

46.

&

2

5

35—Anstey v. Manners, Gow., 10.
Blng.,
36—Hunt v. Deillaquiere,
P., N. R.,
550; Nurse v. Craig,
B.

148.

37—Sears v. Giddey, 41 Mich., 590;
N. W.. 917; Gallaway v. McPherson’s
Estate, 67 Mich., 546; 35 N. W., 114;
Ambrose v. Kerrison,
J. Scott, 776.

757

1

\/.

guilty 0! such misconduct as would jus
tify her in leaving: Randall v. Randall,
Schermer
37 Mich., 563; Crittenden
horn, 39 Mich., 661; Page v. Page, 51
Mich., 89; 16 N. W., 245; MeCutcheon

v. McGahay,11 Johns., 281; Blowers v.
Sturtevant, 4 Denio, 48; Hancock v.
Merrick, 10 Cush., 41.
Denio,
34—Blowers v. Sturtevant,

2

32—1 Selw. N. P., 230.
That is, it
he continues to cohabit with her.
33—Ibid., 278; Hardie v. Grant, 8 C.
Sands,
& P., 512; Manwairing
v.
1
Strange, 706; Harris v. Morris, 4 Esp,
41. A husband's obligation to support a
wife apart from him can only arise from
his turning her out oi’ his home, or being
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the wife, shall be levied on and satisﬁed from the property of
the wife only, nor shall the property of the husband be taken
in satisfaction of any such judgment or execution; nor shall

for the payment of any such judgment.”38
And
another section provides that “No husband who shall be joined
as defendant with his wife in any suit or action to recover
he be liable

damages,,for any tort or wrong committed by the wife, shall
be arrested or imprisoned upon any process issued in such
cause, or upon any execution or ﬁnal process issued upon any
judgment in any such cause, or on any process or proceed

ing founded

upon any such judgment.”1‘°

Cohabitation, though without ma.rriage—eﬁ‘ect of.
§723.
a man allows a woman to use his name, and pass for his
wife, he will be bound to pay for goods furnished to her, even

If

by a man who knew that the parties were not married.“
But although a man is conclusively liable for necessaries sup
plied to a woman while he is living with her as his wife, yet
where they have separated, he is not liable for necessaries
supplied to her on the ground that he has lived with her, and
represented her as his wife, if he can show that in point of fact
they were not married.“
Where a man who had for some years cohabited with a
woman who passed for his wife, went abroad, leaving her and
her family at his residence in the country, and died abroad,
it was held that the woman might have the same authority to

bind him by her contracts for necessaries as if she had been
hi Wife; but that his executor was not bound to pay for any
goods supplied to her after his death, but before notice of it
had been received.42'
§724.

child.-A

Liability of parent for goods furnished to infant
husband

is not bound to maintain

38—C. L., § 10352.
A husband is not
responsible for his wife's carelessness or
negligence,
unless she was acting under
his direction, or with his knowledge and
assent; Ricci v. Mueller, 41 Mich., 214;
2 N. W., 23.
And there is no occasion
for joining him in an action for her
tort.
Still such joinder can do no harm
and is not error.
Weber v. Weber, 47
Mich., 571; 11 N. W., 389; Burt v.
M\'Baln, 29 Mich., 262-3.

his wife's chil

39—C. L., § 10552.

29 Mich.,

Burt v. McBaln.

260.

40—Watson v. Trekeld, 2 Esp., 637;
Ryan v. Sams, 12 Q. B., 460.

41-Munro v. DeChemant, 4 Ca.mp.,
215; but see, Ryan v. Sams, 12 Ad. &
E., N. S., 460.
42—Blades v. Free, 9 Barn. & C..
167; Blades v. Free, 4 M. &- R., 282.
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dren by a former husband.“ Nor would the child be liable
on an express or implied promise, made during minority, to
pay for necessaries furnished by his stepfather.“ No promise
will be implied against the stepfather to pay for the services

of the stepchildﬁ-" While it is true that there are many au
thorities to the eifect that this infant child cannot, without
his authority, bind the father even for necessaries,“ still the
rule as generally enforced in this country does hold the father
responsible for “necessaries” furnished the child and which
the father has not, andi does not stand ready to furnish."
The moral‘ obligation which a. father is under to provide for
his child imposes on him no liability to pay the general debts
incurred by the child; and he is not so liable unless he has
given the child authority to incur them, or has contracted to
pay them.
\Vhere a minor leaves his father's house voluntarily, for the
purpose of making his fortune in the world, or to avoid
domestic discipline and restraint, thei father is under no ob
ligation to pay for his support.“
USE OF COMMON COUNTS IN ACTIONS
MATERIALS.

WORK, LABOR AND

FOR

In genera.l.—If a plaintiff, declaring on the common
§725.
count for work and labor, has also a demand for materials
furnished for the same for the defendant, a claim for such ma
terials should be made in the count.‘
43—'I‘ubb v. Harrison, 4 Term. R., 118;
Cooper v. Martin, 4 East., 76. See, Staal
v. Grand Rapids & I. Ry. Co., 57 Mich.,
240; 23 N. W., 795.
The statute, C.,
L. § 4487 extends only to relatives by
blood: Gay v. Baliou, 4 Wei1d., 403.
See, Clinton v. Lanning, 61 Mich., 359;
28 N. W., 125.
44—Sharp v. Cropsy, 11 Barb., 224.
45—Sword v. Keith, 31 Mich., 247.
See also, Thorp v. Batemsn, 37 Mich.,

47—'i‘yler v. Arnold, 47 Mich., 564;
See, also, Rumney v.
11 N. W., 387.
Keyes,
7 N. I-I., 571; Stanton v. Will
son, 3 Day 37; Pidgin v. Cram, 8 N. H.,
350; Swain v. Tyler, 26 Vt., 9: Thayer
White, 12 lVietc., 343; Edwards v.
Davis, 16 Johns.,
284; Wheeler v.
Brinckerhofi,
480; in re
13 Johns.,
Ryder, 11 Paige, 187; Poock v. Miller,

v.

1

Hilt.,

108.

48—Angell

68.

1—-Andre

46—Mortimer v. Wright, 6 M. & W.
482; Shelton v. Springelt, 20 Eng. L.
& E., 281; Gordon v. Potter, 17 Vt.,
350; Hunt v. Thompson, 3 Scam., 180;
Finch v. Finch, 22 Conn., 411. See, also,
10 Barb., 483;
1 Raymond v. Loyl,
Chiicott v. Trimble, 13 Barb., 502.

v

v. Mcbeilan, 16 Mass, 28.
Harden, 32 Mich., 324.

Where a party performs labor and serv
i('€S for another without his knowledge
or request, there is, oi’ course, no ex
press promise to pay therefor, and none
can be implied, and he cannot
recover
therefor, even though the other may be
by such
beneﬁted
services: Fitch v.
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for materials found‘, be not mentioned in the dec
“If you em
laration, the plaintiﬁ cannot recover for them.”
ploy a man to build a house on your lands, or to make a chattel
with your materials, the party who does the work has no
power to appropriate the product of his labor and your ma
terials to any other person; he bestowed his labor, at your
request, on your materials; he may maintain an action against
you for work and labor; but if you employ another to work
up his own materials in making a chattel, then he may ap
propriate the product of that labor and materials to any other
person. The right to maintain an action rests in him during
the progress of his work; but when the chattel has assumed
the character bargained for, and he has completed
the party
employed may maintain an action for goods sold and deliv
it,

a claim

special action on the
case for such refusal; but he cannot maintain an action for

or

(if the employee refuse it)

a

ered,

is

it

if

work and labor, because the labor was bestowed on his own
material and for himself, and not for the person who employed
him.”3
the work has been performed upon materials
But
still in the possession of the _workman,
not necessary

it,

a

that he should ﬁrst deliver them to his employer, before he
commences an action for the work and materials; but after
he has given his employer
full opportunity to inspect
and examine the work, he may sue for the amount of
and

it

still retain the thing on which the work has been performed,
until payment,‘ even although
be in fact the property of his
employer.“

in such

The obligation

to deliver

cases are, as to performance,

and to make payment

cotemporaneous.

is

is

it

is

When the claim
for fees, wages, or work and labor in a
particular profession or business, etc.,
usual to state the
nature of the work done, and the materials used, yet this
not

v.

Freeland,

M.

&

2—Heath

1

ance, and that the law would not imply
any agreement to pny him:
Lange v.
Kaiser, 34 Mich., 317.

W.,

760

C., 283:
B.
Mich., 294.
&

3—Atkinson v. Bell,
see, Hosmer v. Wilson,

7 B

543.

&

8

Bing.. 14.
4—Pianche v. Coiburn,
W., 183.
5—Hughes v. Tenny,
M.
5

1

Newberry,
Doug. Mich., 17; and see,
Denberg,
St. Jude's
Church v. Van
31 Mich., 287. And where plaintiff agreed
to manufacture certain articles for de
fendant out of materials belonging to de
fendant, and without any request from
plaintiff or undertanding
that he was
to be paid for his labor, assisted plaintiﬂ
in the manufacture, held, that defendant
could not cialm- payment for his assist

Ca.
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necessary, and the common count for work and labor, and ma
terials for the same is sufficient.“

a

it,

In case contract not fully performed.—When a per
§ 726.
son is hired to labor for a ﬁxed time, and leaves the service
before the end of
without reasonable excuse, and Without
the agreement of the other party, he loses his right to sue
“Where
upon the contract for the time he may have worked.
party fails to comply substantially with an agreement, un
is

it

is

it

well settled that he cannot
apportionable, the rule
sue upon the agreement, or recover upon
at all. And under
strict common law rules he was remediless. But the doctrine
less

has now grown up, based upon equitable principles, that where
anything has been done from which the other party has re

is

a

a

ceived substantial beneﬁt, and which he has appropriated,
recovery may be had, upon
quantum meruit, based upon
that beneﬁt. And the basis of this recovery
not the original

a

but

a

new implied agreement, deducible from the
delivery and acceptance of some valuable service or thing.”"
The employer cannot, by his misconduct, compel
laborer to
quit him before the expiration of the term of service, or dis
contract,

a

miss him without sufﬁcient cause, and then refuse to pay him.
A person prevented from performing labor contract by the

is

wrongful act of the employer may recover on the quantum
meruit what his services were reasonably worth so far as
If the
rendered, although in excess of the contract price.“
contract
terminated by the employer wrongfully, and the
contractor desires to recover for proﬁts he might have earned

Mumford,

Camp.,

37.

recover on his common count: Wyman
v. Crowley, 34 Mich., 84.
Suit on the
quantum meruét lies where the mode of

performing

an unapportionabie contract
is so changed that the contract price for

9

what has been done cannot be deter
mined: Boyce v. Martin, 46 Mich., 239;
N. W., 265.

Mich., 449;
7—Allen v. lVicKibben,
Eaton v. Gladweii, 121 Mich., 444; 80
N. W., 292.
8—Hemmlnger v. Western Assurance
Co., 95 Mich., 355; 54 N. W., 949;
Wlldey v. School District, 25 Mich., 419:
Howell v. Medler, 41 Mich., 641;
N.
W., 911.
See, also, Mooney
v. York
Iron Co., 82 Mich., 263; 46 N. W., 376;
Cadman v. Markle, 76 Mich., 448; 43
N. W., 315.
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2

v.

who has annexed the common
counts to a special count upon a con
may at the trial
tract of employment,
abandon
his special count and seek to

5

6—Clark

A plaintiff

3

if

on his contract he must declare specially on the contract. ‘But
he elect to bring his action for work and labor generally, he
cannot recover for proﬁts upon the executed part of the work.

'\
3 *1[OC3

AND LABOR.
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In such cases, the rule of damages is the actual value of what
has been done under the contract.”
Where the plaintiffs declared on a contract by which they
had engaged to transport a number of horses for the defend
9—Clark v. The Mayor, etc., 4 Comst.,
338. 343; see Kearney v. Doyle, 22
Mich., 294; McQueen
33
v. Gamble,
Mich., 344; Burrell v. New York &
In the case
8. S. S. Co., 14 Mich., 34.
of a contract for a certain amount of
labor, or for work for a speciﬁed
period, when the labor is to be performed
on the material or property, or in carry
ing on the business of the defendant,
or when the defendant has otherwise ac
cepted or appropriated the labor per
formed,
if the defendant prevent the
plaintiﬁ from performing the whole, or
discharge him from his
wrongfully
or order him to stop the
employment,
work, or refuse
pay
to
as he had
become due in the
agreed as payments
of the work, or disable him
progress
self from performing, or unqualiﬁedly re
fuse to perform his part of the contract,
the plaintiff may, without further per
formance,
elect to sue upon the contract
and recover damages for the breach, or
treat the contract as at an end, and sue
assumpsit for the work and
in general
And in such
labor actually performed.
cases he may, it would seem, under the
indcbitatus count, recover the
common
contract price, where the case is such
that the labor done can be measured or
apportioned by the contract rate; or
whether it can be so apportioned or not
he may under the quantum mcruit re
But
cover what it is reasonably worth.
having
in all such cases, the defendant
appropriated and received the beneﬁt of
the labor (or, what is equivalent, having
induced the plaintiff to expend his labor
for him, and, if properly performed ac
cording to his desire, the defendant be
ing estopped to deny the beneﬁt), a duty
is imposed upon the defendant to pay for
This duty the
the labor thus performed.
law enforces under the ﬁction of an im
plied contract, growing out of the recep
tion or appropriation of the plaintiff's
But where in such cases the
labor.
value of the work could not be appor
tioned or measured by the contract price,
the fair value of the work would neces
sarily constitute the true measure of

\
Sec,
damages:
46
Boyce
v. Martin,
Mich., 239; 9 N. W., 265.
Similar rules would apply to contracts
for furnishing
materials, and for the
sale and delivery of personal property,
when,
after part of the materials or
property has been received and appro
priated by and vested in the defendant,
he has prevented
the plaintiff from per
forming, or authorized him to treat the
contract as at an end, on any of the
grounds above mentioned.
But where the defendant has em
to perform
labor
ployed
the plaintiif
upon materials to be furnished by the
plaintiff; as, to construct and deliver
an engine to defendant at a stipulated
price for the engine when completed;
and before the completion and delivery
of the article the defendant refuses to
proceed with the contract, and notiﬁes
the plaintiff that he will not accept the
article, the plaintiff cannot recover for
his labor on the common count; in such
case the plaintiff's
labor and material
are all his own, and in no sense belong
to the defendant before delivery.
Here.
remedy
the plaintiff's
is to declare on
the special agreement,
and claim dam
ages for the breach of it, or for being
wrongfully prevented from performing it.
And he will be entitled to recover the
actual damages which he has suffered
by defendant's refusal to accept; or, in
consequence of being prevented from pro
cecding
with the contract; and these
damages may be more or less than the
value of the labor.
In such cases de
fcndant‘s refusal
authorizes
an
im
mediate
action by plaintiff on the con
tract; he is not required to complete the
work and tender the article to defen
So, a refusal
dant before suing.
to
make any payment,
which by the con
tract is to be made during the progress
of the work, has the same effect: Hos
mer v. Wilson, 7 Mich., 294.
But one
who by his contract is to receive pay
ments
in something else than
money,
cannot,
where he has broken his con
tract, sue upon the quantum meruit and
recover the value of the labor performed
'
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ants in

a canal boat to Albany for ﬁfty-ﬁve dollars; the horses
were so restive after being put on the boat that it was impos
sible to keep them on board, and they were taken oﬂt'.
The
justice charged that the plaintiffs having shown a readiness
and offer to perform the contract, were entitled to recover
the contract price.’ The court held the rule of damages to be
the loss or injury sustained by the party ready and willing to

perform, and not the price engaged to be paid on actual per
formance.
“Here we have a contract to sell labor and ser
vices. On the vendee declining them, the vendor sells them
to another, or converts them to his own use; in other words,
he goes about his business in another direction, which fetches
him the same or more, perhaps, than the agreed‘ price, which
has failed.

This

labor

to be idle

so, unless the vendor

is necessarily

of the

for the supposed length of time which
performance would have demanded. But that he had no right
to do. A mason is engaged to work for a month, and tenders
himself and offers to perform, but his hirer declines the service.
choose

The next day the mason is employed at equal wages elsewhere
for a month. Clearly his loss is but one day; and it is his duty
to seek other employment.
Idleness is in itself a breach of

But if he continue idle for the purpose of
charging another, he superadds a fraud, which the law would
rather punish than countenance.”1°
moral obligation.

USE

OF

THE COMMON COUNTS IN ACTIONS

FOR

MONEY

LENT.

it,

In genera1.—Where a person lends money to the de
§727.
or
to another on his account, and at his request, the
fendant,
law presumes an undertaking on his part to repay
and

11—Lamine v. Dorrell,
make

recover
mond
525.

457

763

lends

Lord Raym..

money

to be used

in wheat
a “corner"
cannot
by any legal measures: Ray

v. Leavitt, 46 Mich., 447;

12—Buli

v. Sibbs,

8

to

One who

9

1216.

it

under the contract, and thereby convert
into cash payment what, according to
his own agreement, is payable in some
thing else: the express contract is not
to be disregarded in such a case: Rob
erts v. Wilkinson, 34 Mich., 129.
10—Shannon v. Comstock, 21 Wend.,

2

a

assumpsit or debt will lie against him for the amount." Money
lent to the defendant himself may be recovered under this
count, though delivered to
third person at the defendant’s
request." But when the plaintiﬁf declared for money lent

N..W.,

Term. R., 328.
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request, the
by him to a third person at the defendant's
was
judgment
and
the
arrested;
bad,
declaration was held
for the word “lent” was a technical term, and implied a loan
to the third person, and he alone was the debtor." A declara
tion against the husband for money lent to his wife, at his re
quest, is good.“
In general, there must have been a loan of money to sup

port this count."

A

lender who has received goods as a security for the re
payment of a loan, may recover in this action, without prov
ing that he has returned or tendered the goods."

If

borrow money of his debtor, he will not be pre
vented from setting oif the debt due to himself, even though he
expressly promise to pay the sum lent to him by his debtor."
a creditor

USE OF COMMON COUNTS IN ACTION

FOR

MONEY

PAID.

is

it

it,

In genera1.—This action is maintainable in any case
§728.
in which the plaintiff has paid money to a third person at the
request, express or implied, of the defendant, with an under
and
standing, express or implied, to repay
not neces

of money.”

is

it

a

lia
sary that the defendant should have been relieved from
bility by the payment." Money advanced by one man for
another, without an express or implied authority, from the
latter, or his sanction after
advanced, will not render the
latter liable." In general, there must be an actual payment

If

is

a

is

22—Maxwell

v. Jameson,

8

Hackley,

B.

Johns,
&

&

W.,
18-—Brlttain v. Lloyd, 14 M.
And the omission of the words,
“to the use of," in the common count for
money paid to the use of the defendant,
is a mere clerical error which may be

v.

2

625.

21——Cumming
202.

A.,

51.

23—Cumming

v.

Hackley,

8

2

2

Stak., 73.
16—Lawton v. Newland,
Esp.,
17—Levhrnere v. Hawkins,

762.

5

8

228.

corrected on trial: Brown v. Mcﬂugh.
35 Mlch., 50.
Rensselaer v. Reid,
Cow., 587.
20—Power v. Butcher, 10 B.
C..
329; Cunning v. Hackley,
Johns., 202.
6:

5

3 2

2

Wills, 141.
13—Marrlot v. Lister,
W. I31. R.,
14—Stevenson v. Hardie,
\Vlls., 388.
827; Stephenson v. Hardy,
15—Ilarrington
Taunt.,
v. McMorris,

Johns.,

202.

764

24—Barclay
-

v. Gooch,

2

it

a

a

it

it

a

the plaintiff has given
bond for the debt of
the defendant,
not suﬁicient,” unless money has been
before the commencement of the suit." But giving
paid on
negotiable note may be equivalent to
payment of money,”
received in payment ;2* so payment of
as when
money

Esp., 571.

CH.
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debt as surety or endorser, by conveying land, which is re
ceived at the time of payment, will support the count for
money paid.“ When A, being in want of some goods, went to

it

it,

B, accompanied by C, and ordered them, C saying in A’s pres
ence that he would pay the money if A did not, it was held
that C thereby acquired no authority to pay the money on
the default of A, although the agreement was void by the
statute of frauds; and that having paid
he was entitled to
A,
authority
back
from
to
not being shown
the
pay
recover

have been countermanded.
It was precisely the.same as
had requested
to pay the money?“
So when
hus
in
band goes abroad and leaves his wife who dies
his absence,

A

a

C

if

to

a

it

a

a third person who voluntarily pays the expenses of her
flmeral may recover from the husband the money so paid,
as the law will imply
request.” So the common money
counts are sufficient in an action by the county to recover for
money paid out for maintenance of poor or insane persons, as
provided in Comp. Laws 1897, .§§ 1921 and 4494.23 Whenever
one person pays money to protect his own interests, yet which
was the duty of another to pay instead,
request to make
such payment will be implied.”

a

Payment by sureties.-A surety who pays the whole
§729.
sum for which he was jointly liable, may recover the whole
against the principal, or
proportionate part against his joint
surety.“ A surety may recover contributions from his co
sureties, according to the number of them, without reference
to the number of the principals!"
But he cannot sue his co
surety until he has paid, on account of the principal debt, a
sum greater than he would be obliged to when the entire lia
bility should be fairly apportioned among them/. The calcula

622.
&

M.

W.,

Mlch., 291; Crane v. Grossman, 27
Mlch., 443; Brown v. Mel-iugh, 35 Mlch.,
50.

765

2

30——Toussaint
v. Martinant,
Term
R., 105. Payment of money by a surety
for his principal,
raises an implied
promise to refund
on demand: Lce v.
Wisner,
86;
Mlch.,
38
Mitchell
v.
Chambers, 43 Mlch., 150;
N. W., 57.
31-Kemp v. Finden, 12 M.
W., 421.
5

&

&

1

H. Bla., 30.
28—-Superintendent of the Poor v.
Rabbitt, 99 Mlch., 60; 57 N. W., 1084.
29—Bates v. Lane, 62 Mlch., 132; 28
N. W., 753.
See Bay City Bank v.
Lindsay, 94 Mlch., 176; 54 N. W., 42;
P. M. Ry. Co., 32
Curtis v. Flint
v. Tucker,

it

511.
. 27—Jenkins

Cow.,

1

25—Ainslee v. Wilson,
26—Aiexander v. Vane,

7

if

is

made upon the aliquot share in reference to the num
tion
bcr of sureties, although one be insolvent; so
there be three

’

P‘

§ :30

ASSUMPSIT

mourn v

11.11)

.
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sureties for a debt of three hundred dollars, and one pay the
whole, he can recover only one hundred dollars from his co
When
surety, although the third be unable to contribute.-"2
there are several co-sureties, one of them _who has taken from
the principal a collateral security, will still be entitled to sue
'
his co-sureties on paying more than his proportion.”

Contribution in case of torts.—This action will not
lie for contribution or indemnity against a person jointly en
gaged with the plaintiff in doing an illegal act by which the
But this rule does not apply to a
plaintiff‘ is put to expense.“
case where the party seeking contribution or indemnity was
a tort feasor only by inference of law, but is conﬁned to cases
where it must be presumed that the party knew that he was
committing an unlawful act; or the act is obviously of an
A promise to indemnify against a tres
illegal character.
§730.

pass is valid, unless the promisor show. that the promisee knew
the act to be a trespass, or illegal."
USE

OF

COMMON

COUNTS

ACTIONS

l.\'

FOR

MONEY

HAD

AND

RECEIVED.

In genera.l.—When a defendant receives money
§ 731.
which belongs to the plaintiff, or which, in equity or justice, he
should not retain, and which ought to be paid to the plaintiff,
this action may be brought against him for the amoimt of it.“
32—lb1'd.,
C.,

and Brown v. Levy, 6 B. &

33—Done v. Wailey, 2 Exch. R., 198.
34—Merryweather v. Nixan, 8 Term
R., 186.
35—Stone v. Hooker, 9 Cow., 154 ; see,
Avery v. Halsey, 14 Pick., 174.
36—Stranton v. Rastail, 2 Term R.,
370; Blackwood v. Brown, 34 Mlch., 4.
When one man has in his hands money
which. according to the rules of equity
and

good

liminary agreement,

but upon the receipt
which he is bound to
pay to another: Spencer v. Towles, 18
Mlch., 11.
It is essentially an equit
able action, founded upon all the equit
able circumstances of the case between
the parties; and if it appear, from the
whole case, that the defendant has in his
which, according to the
money
hands
rules of equity and good conscience, be
longs or ought to be paid to the plaintiff,
he is entitled to recover: Moore v. Man
Thus, where an
dlebaum. 8 Mlch., 448.
agent to scll property purchased it of
principal,
concealing
important
his
facts, so that the transaction amounted
to a fraud upon the principal, and after
wards sold the property at a higher
price, it was held that the principal
might recover from him in this action
the difference
between the price paid by
of money

697.

conscience,

belongs

to

and

ought to be paid to another. an action
for money had and received is the proper
It is not nec
remedy for its recovery.
essary that there should bc any privity
parties or any express
the
between
promise to pay, for the law implies n
promise where justice imposes a duty;
Beardslee v. Horton, 3 Mlch., 563. 564.
This action does not depend on any pre
_

766
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In general, to sustain this action, it must appear that money
was received, and, therefore, evidence of a transfer of stock
A bill of exchange or
merely will not maintain this coimt.
negotiable note of a third person, given and received in satis
draft, will support this count.“ But, as between
the maker and payee, the giving of a note is not a payment
authorizing a recovery in this action on failure of considera
faction of

a

tion," unless given by

a surety and received as payment?"

It

must appear that it was received by the defendant on his own
account, and not as the agent or servant of another, by whom
he was employed to receive it; and that it was received for the
use of the plaintiff, or such facts must be proved as show that
the receipt by the defendant was in law a receipt to the use of
the

plaintiff."

'

There need be no privity of contract.“ Money paid by mis
take is recoverable under this count.“ A creditor receiving
from his debtor money known by him to be the property of a
third person is liable to such third person under this count,“

Money received from the plaintiff.-If a person give
§732.
money to another, to apply to a particular purpose for him,
the

agent

and

sold it: Ibid.
money
ceives

the price at which he
So, where_ an agent re
from
which he conceals
v. Weinberg, 18
I-Ielmbach

the principal:
Mich., 48.
So where a party receives
the plaintiffs money on a void contract,
to sell land to
as on an oral agreement

plaintiff, the plaintiff may recover back
the money:
Scott v. Bush, 29 Mich.,
"This action is peculiarly equit
523.
able in its nature and lies whenever
an express or implied trust to pay over
Catlin v.
money has been violated“:
Birchard. 13 Mich., 110; Collar v. Col
lar, 75 Mich., 414; 42 N. W., 847;
Tanner v. Page, 106 Mich., 156: 63 N.
W., 993.
had and re
. The count for money
clearly includes any dealings
ceived
whereby money due to the plaintiff came
into the hands of the defendant: Freeh
ling v. Ketchum, 39 Mich., 299.
An action for money had and received
will lie against an employer for moneys
retained by him out of the wages of
by
his workmen under an agreement

which he was to so retain and pay the
same to plaintiff in satisfaction of debts
owing by the workmen to plaintiff: Don
kersly v. Levy, 38 Mich., 54.
37—Rew v. Barber, 3 Cow., 272.
38—Van Ostrand v. Reed, 1 Wend.,
424.

39-—Cumming v. Hackley,

8

Johns.,

202.

-l0—Archbold's N. P., 2d ed.. 175;
Colea v. Wright, 4 'l‘aunt., 198; see the
cases, Nickodemus v. East Saginaw, 25
Mich., 456; Scott v. Bush, 26 Mich.,
418; Barnum v. Stone, 27 Mich., 335-6.
41—Walker v. Conant, 65 Mich., 198;
31 N. W., 786.
.
42—Lane v. Boom Co., 62 Mich., G3;
28 N. W., 786: McKay v. Coleman, 85
Mich., 60', 48 N. \V., 203; Kennedy v.
Murphy Iron Works, 91 Mich., 500; 61
N. W., 1120.
See further, Wheeler v.
Hatheway, 58 Mich., 77; 24 N. W.,
780; Walker v. Conant, 65 Mich., 198;
31 N. W., 786.
43-—Bearce
v. Fahrnow,
109 Mich.,
315: 67 N. W., 318.
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recover the amount from him in this actionl
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the owner may

a

it

if

Money received on p1a.intiﬂ"s account.—If an agent
§733.
receives money for his principal, the latter may recover the
an oﬁiccr levy money under an
amount in this action. As
over to
plaintiff or person enti
execution, and do not pay

it.“
An action for money had and received will not lie by

a

tled to

is

a

a

against

a

third person, in whose hands funds have
debtor, with directions to pay them over
been deposited by
to the creditor in extinguishment of
debt, unless there be an
agreement, either express or to be implied from the circum
stances of the case, by which the funds become the property
of the creditor, so that the debtor loses all control over them,
and
disabled from giving them another direction; imless the
money be deposited with the concurrence of the creditor, ex
pressed previous to its receipt by the agent.“
creditor

it,

'1‘,

it

’s

it

it, it

it

it

L,

a

T,

it

it,

a

Money received for property of the plaintiﬁi-If
§734.
person take the property of another, in any manner not amount
receive the money for
and do not
ing to felony, and sell
over to the owner, the latter may waive the trespass
pay
or tort, and bring this action, to recover the money derived
from the sale.“ Where
the owner of
certiﬁcate of deposit
in the bank of
to be endorsed
payable to order, caused
payable to W, and then transmitted
W,
to
by mail witho_ut
his knowledge or request, and
was stolen on the way, and
the name of W forged upon
came to the
after which
defendant
hands, who collected the money,
was held he was
liable to
in this action for the amount."

260.

768

5

5

370;
Denio,
48—Osborn v. Bell,
Fick.,
285.
One
Jones v. Hoar,
whose timber has been taken and sold
trespnsser may recover the pro
by
ceeds in an action on the common count
tor money had and received: Nelson v.
Kiibride, 113 Mich., 637; 71 N. W..
1089; see, ante,
683.
47—'l‘albot v. Bank of Rochester,

1

it

a

with authority to collect interest which
he does collect,
an action on the com
mon count tor money had and received
will lie to recover the amount so col
lected: Liesemer v. Burg, 106 Mich.,
Again where de
124: 63 N. W., 999.
fendant has money in his hands as the
result of the execution oi’
trust which
trust has been fully executed except the
paying ovcr oi the nioney,
may be

§

has possession
of the note
person belonging to plalntiﬂ,

.

defcndnni
of s third

recovered
under the count for money
had and received:
Tanner v. Page. 106
Mich., 155; 63 N. W., 993.
24 Wend.,
45—Seaman v. Vlfhitney,

a

2

44--Peabody v. Tarbell,
Cush., 226;
Blnckwood v. Brown, 34 Mich., 4. Where

C11.
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Money received by a. stakeholder-lost at gaming.
If the loser of money deposited with a stakeholder on an
unlawful wager claim his deposit before it has been actually
paid over to the winner, though it be after the wager has been
decided, the stakeholder is bound to return it to him; and if
he refuse to do so, the loser may maintain an action for money
§ 735.

had and received, against him, to recover it.“
And by statute it is provided that: “Any person that shall
lose any sum of money, or any goods or articles of value, by
playing or betting on cards, or by any other device in the

nature of such playing and betting, and shall pay or deliver
the same or any_part thereof to the winner, the person so pay
ing or delivering the same may sue for and recover such money
in an action for money had and received, to the use of the
plaintiff; and such goods or other articles of value in an
action of replevin, or the value thereof in an action of trover.
or in a special action on the case.”*°

Money received under a void a.uthority.—If a person
receives money under an authority which afterwards turns out
to be void, the party really entitled to the money may recover
it from him in this action. If an administrator or executor
receive money due to his intestate or testator, and it appears
§ 736.

v. Bank of Al
lbid., 287.
For other cases ii
lustrating the use of this count see,
Martin v. Sheridan, 46 Mich., 93; 8 N.
W., 722; Muicrone v. American Lum
ber- Co., 55 Mich., 622; 22 N. W., 67;
Blackwood v. Brown, 34 Mich., 4;
Davis v. Gerber, 69 Mich., 246; 37 N.
W., 281; Wood v. Kaufman, — Mich.,
——; 97 N. W., 47 (Nov., 1903); Morin
v. Robarge, 132 Mich., 837; 93 N. W.,
886 (Man, 1903).
48—VVhitewell v. Carter, 4 Mich., 329,
331: sec, Lewis v. Miner, 3 Denio, 103.
49—C. L., § 5929, see note to this sec
Plaintiff deposited his negotiable
tion.
promissory note for the amount of his
bet with a stakeholder, who afterwards
delivered it to the winner, the defend
ant, and he transferred it before due for
value to another party, and the loser
sued the winner for the amount of the
note in an at-tion for money had and

Hill. 295; Canal Bank
bany,

received,

trial

and

produced

as evidence
49

the

note

that he had

on the

held, that the plaintiffs posses
of the note was not sufﬂcient evi
dence alone that he had paid the note,
and that he could not recover
on that
Buckley v. Saxe, 10
evidence
alone:
Mich., 328. The furnishing of money to
another to use in betting on an election
is a gaming transaction and an action
for the winnings cannot be maintained:
iieiber v. Schantz, 109 Mich., 669; 67
N. W., 913.
This statute has no ap
plication to money lost in betting upon
elections and such money cannot be re
covered:
Lassen v. Karrer, 117 Mich.,
512; 76 N. W., 73. But it seems that
money lost in betting on any game of
may be so recovered.
Las
chance
For a deﬁni
sen v. Karrer, supra.
tion of "betting" see, Shaw v. Clark,
For a
49 Mich., 388; 13 N. W.. 786.
deﬁnition oi‘ “gaming" see, People v.
Weithotf, 51 Mich., 203; 16 N. W.,
442; People v. Weithoﬂ, 93 Mich., 634;
53 N. W., 784.

note:
sion

paid the
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that the supposed testator or intestate is still alive, the money
may be recovered back; because the executor or administrator
can have no authority whatever during the lifetime of the

a

it,
it

S0 if a judgment be reversed, after payment of it or of
party.-"°
may be recovered back in this action.“
the execution upon
And the action lies against the real parties plaintiffs, where
nominal plaintiﬂ'.°2
the suit was prosecuted in the name of

forged instrument.
Money paid by plaintiﬁ upon
If person discount bill or note, and turns out to be for
gery, he may recover the amount of the money he paid upon
in this action, against the person to whom he paid it." But
the man whose name
forged take up the bill or note, he
cannot recover the money back from the party ‘to whom he
that party being an innocent holder for valuable con
paid
the drawee of
forged bill accept it, and
sideration.
So,
he cannot recover back the sum from the person to
pay
bill be made payable at banker’s,
whom he paid it.“ So,
and he, imagining the acceptance to be the genuine signature of
a

it,

a

if

it,

a

if

it,

is

if it,

a

it a

a

a §

737.

he cannot recover back the money from
the customer, pay
‘the person to whom he paid it.“

it

Where a banking company paid notes, on which the name of
the president had been forged, and neglected for ﬁfteen days
was held that they had lost their remedy
to return them,

it

is

a

if

a

against the person from whom the notes had been received.“
The supreme court of the United States went beyond this, and
bank receive, as genuine, forged notes, purport
held that
ing to be its own, and pass them to the credit of
depositor
bound by the credit thus given, and
who acts in good faith,
a

man,
Money paid by plaintiff through mista.ke.—If
mistake, pay money which there was no ground to
v.

Burr, 1364;
Union Bank,
Goddard v. Merchants‘
Neal,

oi’ Commerce

v.

234;
Bank,
1ln'd., 147.
Taunt., 76.
55—Smltl1 v, Mercer,
56—Presldent, ete., v. Salem Bank,
17 Mass, 33.
57—United States Bank v. Bank of
Georgia, 10 Wheat, 340.

1

6

4

Comst.,

7

1

& &

3

5

G

;

Bank

3

54—Pri<-e

3

50—See, Allen v. Dundas,
Term i R.
125; Scott v. Bush, 29 Mich., 523.
51—Sturgis v. Allis, 10 Wend., 354
Cow., 297.
Clark v. Plnney,
52—Magee v. Kellogg, 2-i “Wend., 32
Taunt., 488
53-Jones v. Ryde,
M., 49
see, Fuller v. Smith, Ry.
C., 428
B.
Wilkinson v. Johnson,
see, Canal Bunk v. Bank of Albans,
Hill, 287, 292; Little v. Derby,
Mich.

3

738.

under

a

§

the notes are to be treated as cash.“

325.
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claim in conscience, and it be a mistake in fact, and not merely
of law; he may recover it in this form of action, from the per
son to whom he paid it.“ S0, money paid, with full means of
knowledge, but under a forgetfulness of facts at the time of
payment which implies absence of knowledge at that time,

But if a person, with a
may be recovered in this action.“
knowledge of all the facts, pay over money to another, he
cannot recover it back, because he paid it in ignorance of the

law, or a misconception

of

it.‘*°

_

Money paid by plaintiﬁ and failure of considera
§739.
tion.—When money is paid for a certain consideration, if the
consideration afterwards fail, the party who paid the money
may recover it back, in this action!" Thus, if money be paid
for a thing, and the thing contracted for be not afterwards
delivered, the money may be recovered back in this action;"’=
or if the title fail.“-3 So, money paid on account of services to
be performed, may be recovered back in this action, in case of
So, this action lies to recover back money
non-performance.“
paid on a contract which has been rescinded.“ -S0, to recover
back part of the consideration money paid on a contract for
the purchase, after the purchase money has been tendered, and
a deed demanded, so as to put the vendor in default.“
Where
one agrees to convey land on the payment of money, the vendee
must not only tender or pay the money, but he must demand a

69, 74.

60—Mewat v. Wright, 1 Wend., 360;
Champlin v. Laytin,
18 Wend., 407,
423; see, Cooke v. Nathan, 16 Barb.,
342.
in
The true ground of recovery,

case of money paid by mistake, is that
money was paid without considera

the

tion:
Little v. Derby, 7 Mich., 325.
61—Chiid v. Pierce, 37 Mich.. 155;
Wright v. Dickinson, 67 Mich., 580; 35
N. W., 164; Campau v. Shaw, 15 Mich.,
226.
3,01

62——2 Saund.
Pi. & Ev.
380; Nockels v. Crosby, 3 B.
Kempson v. Saunders, 4 Blng.,
ray v. Richards, 1 Wend., 58.

ed.,
mob
_._

58—Burr v. Veeder, 3 Wend., 412;
Walker v. Conant, 65 Mich., 194; 31
N. W., 786; Byrnes v. Martin, 67 Mich.,
399; 34 N. W., 688: Lane v. Pare
Marquette Boom Co., 62 Mich., 63; 28
N. W., 786; McKay
v. Coleman, 85
Mich., 60; 48 N. W., 203; Kennedy
v. Murphy Iron Works, 91 Mich., 500;
51 N. W., 1120.
But where one pays
money
after investigation on a claim
it
made in good faith cannot recover
back:
McArthur
v. Luce, 43 Mich.,
435; 5 N. W., 451; Wheeler v. Hath
eway, 58 Mich., 77; 24 N. W., 780.
59—-Kelly v. Soiari, 9 M. & W., 54;
Franklin Bank v. Raymond, 3 Wend.,

63—Fitzpatrick
Hoffman,
v.
Mich., 228; 62 N. W., 349.

814;
Mur
104

Board, 12 Johns.,
64-——Wi1eeler v.
363; Briggs v. Vanderbilt, 19 Barb.,
222; Garrison v. Akin, 2 1bid., 26.
65-—Raymond
v. Bearnard, 12 Johns.,
274; Davis v. Strobridge, 44 Mich., 157;
6 N. W., 205.
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conveyance, and after waiting a reasonabletime for it to be
made out, must present himself to receive it.“
But this action will not lie, if the plaintiff have received any
beneﬁt from the contract under which it was paid.“ The only
remedy is by an action upon the contract.
§740. Money obtained by misrepresentation or fra.ud.—If
money be obtained from a man by misrepresentation or fraud,
Where property was
he may recover it back in this action.”
sold at auction under a description which was untrue, and
calculated to entrap persons coming into the auction room, the
sale was held void, and that the purchaser might recover back

But the representation must be fraudulent as
well as incorrect to enable the plaintiff to recover." So, money
obtained by a fraudulent trick or artiﬁce may be recovered
back.”
his deposit."

Money paid by plaintiﬂ‘ under oompulsion.—If a man
be obliged to pay money wrongfully by compulsion, he may in
W'here a railway com
general recover it back in this action.‘
pany, bound by their act to charge for carriage along their
line to all persons alike, made an allowance to carriers of ten
per cent., for loading and unloading, except to . L., whom they
charged and obliged to pay the full amount, it was holden that
. L. might maintain this action against the company, to recover
§ 741.

J

J

as

a

a

is

he had defended

the action,

he would not have been compelled to pay the money.

72—l3llling

v. Ries,

9

v. Garrett,

1

71—Early

B.
C.

928.

M.,

26;

772

&

&

C.,

469.

a

1

8
&

P.,

C.

&

v. Musgrove.

8:

9

8

Mich.,
G9—Moore v. Mandiebaum.
433; Cornell v. Crane, 113 Mich., 460;
126
71 N. W., 878; Hicks v. Steel,
Mich., 408; 85 N. W., 1121: Ripley v.
Case, 78 Mich., 129; 43 N. W., 10972
Schmemann
v. Rotbtus, 46 Mich., 458;
N. W., 489.

70-Robinson

Abbotts v. Barry,
Brod.
B.. 369;
Archer v. Champneys,
Ibid., 289.
1—A Payment of money to a public
officer in compliance with a demand ac
companied
by
threat of immediate
enforcement is compulsory, and in no
sense a voluntary payment: and when
the claim is unlawful and made under
color oi’ oiﬂce, an action Hes for its re
covery: First National Bank ot Sturgls
v. Watkins. 21 Mich., 483; McKee v_
Campbell, 27 1\lirb.. 497.
2—Pai-ker v. G. W. R. Co.,
Man.
0., 253.
2

6

Cow., 13.
67—Fu1ler v. Hubbard,
68—1 Chltty's Pl., 10 Am. ed., 855.

The rule

7

pulsory payment, inasmuch

if

it

it

it,

from them the ten per cent. he was compelled to pay more
than carriers.’ But, if a man pay an illegal or unfounded
he cannot recover
demand, under a threat of being sued for
back in this form of action: for
voluntary, not
com

CH.
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of law, in such cases, is said to be, that if a party, with a full
knowledge of the facts, voluntarily pays a demand urgently
made on him, and attempted to be enforced by legal proceed
ings, he cannot recover back the money, as paid by compulsion,
unless there be fraud in the party enforcing the claim, and a
knowledge than the claim is unjust, and the case is not altered
by the fact that the party so paying protests that he is not
answerable, and gives notice that he shall bring an action to
recover the money back?
§ 742. _Money due on a contract fully performed by plain
tiﬂ'.—Where the plaintiff has fully performed a contract on
his part so that all that remains to be done is the payment of
money by the defendant it may be recovered under this count.‘

§743. Money paid under a moral obligation.-If a man
pays what the law would not have compelled him to pay, but
what in equity and good conscience he ought to pay, he cannot
recover it back.
So, where a man has paid a debt which
would otherwise have been barred by the statute of limitations;
or a debt contracted during his infancy which in justice he
ought to discharge, though the law would not have compelled
the payment, yet the money being paid, it will not oblige the
payee to refund it.5
USE OF THE COMMON COUNTS IN ACTIONS UPON ACCOUNTS STATED.

§744. In genera.l.—An' admission of a balance or acknowl
edgment made by one party to another, that a sum of money
is due to the latter, is sufficient prima facie evidence to entitle
the plaintiff to recover that sum on an account stated.“ But
3—Benson v. Munro, 7 Cush., 125.
For illustrative cases upon what
constitutes an involuntary payment such
Cong
as that it may be recovered see:
don v. Preston, 49 Mich., 204; 13 N. W.,
516; McCabe v. Shaver, 69 Mich., 25;
36 N. W., 800.
4—'l‘homas v. Cauikett, 57 Mich.,
392; 24 N. W., 154.
5—Rize v. Dickinson, 1 Term R.,
286; Munt v. Stokes, 4 Ib1'd.. 561.
6-Truman v. Hurst, 1 Term. R., 42.
open account
The conversion of an
is an opera
stated
into an account
tion by which the parties assent

a sum as the correct balance due from
White v. Camp
one to the other:
bell, 25 Mich., 468.
Evidence tend
parties met
ing to show
that the
up,
and
that a balance
and settled
was struck and agreed upon, is admis

131.

7
3

to?

In an
sible to prove an account stated.
action upon an account stated only, the
nature ot the original transaction out
of which the acknowledgment of indebt
edness grew. is immaterial:
Albrecht v.
Gies, 33 Mich., 389.
An account stated
need not cover all the dealings between
the parties. or dealing on both sides:
The
Graham v. Chubb, 39 Mich., 417.

§744
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an acknowledgment by the defendant after action brought of
money being due the plaintiff, where there is no evidence of a
debt or account between them having existed before the bring
ing of the action, is not evidence in support of this count.’ To
of a
support this count, there must be an acknowledgment
subsisting debt; therefore an admission by the defendant that
he had received a sum of money on account of the bankrupt,
after an act of bankruptcy, but not that it was a subsisting
debt, is not evidence to support this count.“ If the admission
be merely that the defendant is indebted to the plaintiff, or
indebted in some amount, without stating the sum particularly,
it will not be suﬂicient even to recover nominal damages.“ The
admission must be clear and unqualiﬁed."
“It is not necessary in support of an account stated to show
the nature of an original transaction or indebtedness or to
It is suﬁicient to
give the items constituting the account.
prove some existing antecedent debt or demand between the
Any admis
parties, respecting which a balance was struck.
sion of a balance or acknowledgment made by one party to
another that a sum of money is due to the latter is suﬂicient
prima faeic evidence to entitle the plaintiif to recover under
this count.’ ’"
of a debtor to object within a
time to monthly statements
reasonable
to an admis
rendered to him amounts
is cor
sion by him that the account
rectly stated:
Pabst Brewing Co. v.

fnilure

Lueders, 107 Mich., 41; 64 N. W., 872.
See Raub v. Nisbett, 118 Mich., 248;
76 N. W., 393.
An account stated need
Watkins v. Ford,
not be in-writing:
A
69 Mich., 357; 37 N. W., 300.
is not, in law, an account
statement
stated,
if neither party agrees to it:
Raymond v. Leavitt, 46 Mich., 447; 9
N. W., 525.
There must be a lawful
consideration to support an agreement
which will support an action as upon
Miner v. O’Harrow,
an account stated:
Matters
60 Mich., 91; 26 N. W., 843.
entering into an account stated may be
Stev
impeached for fraud or mistake:
ens v. Saginaw Supervisors, 62 Mich.,
579: 29 N. W., 492.
7—Allen v. Cook, 2 Dowl. P. C.. 544,

A

8—'l‘ucker v. Barron, 7 B. d C.. 623.
stated
declaration upon an account

may

be supported

whenever,

as the re
the par
ties, in respect
to debts on accounts,
a balance
has been struck;
and any
admission by one of a balance, or an

sult of an accounting between

acknowledgment that a sum of money
is due to the other, is suiiicient to
support such a count. And so an amount
found due by the award of arbiters may
be regarded
as evidence
of an account
stated: but a foreign judgment is not
admissible in evidence
under such a
count.
When there is no acknowledg
ment of a debt. nor any promise to pay
proven,
the count
is
not
sustained:
Gooding v. Hlngston, 20 Mich., 439.
9—Evans v. Verity, 1 R. & M., 239;
Kirton v. Wood, 1 M. Q Rob., 253.
10—Green v. Davis. 4 B. & C.. 235 I
Calvert v. Baker, 4 M. & W., 417.
11—Stevens v. Tuller, 4 Mich., 387.

546.
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As Lord Mansﬁeld says: “It is an agreement by both par
ties that all the articles are true.” It is not necessary, how
ever, that there should have existed mutual‘ accounts between
it may relate to a single debt or transaction.
the parties;
Neither does the nature of the original transaction, out of
which the acknowledgement of indebtedness grew, appear to

It may have been for the sale of land as in this
well as for the sale of other property, or for personal
services.
But the admission of indebtedness must be clear
and unqualiﬁed."
A promissory note, in an action by the payee against the
maker, is evidence on this count." But an admission by the
defendant in a conversation with a third person, not an agent,
that he was indebted to the plaintiff in a named sum, is not
evidence of’ an account stated.“ The subject matter of the
account must have been for money, and a debt." Proof of one
item is suﬁicient."
be material.

case, as

Defenses.—The defendant may show that there was
§745.
a great error or mistake in the accounts, or that the admission
was made under a misapprehension of the facts, for the account
stated is not conclusive evidence against him." He may deny
that any action was stated, or may deny the facts from which
the plaintiff wishes it implied; or he may prove additional facts
to'show that the case is one in which an action on account

will not lie." A settlement of accounts is prima facie
settlement of all aeciounts; whether so or not, is a question for
stated
the

jury."

USE

OF

COMMON

COUNTS IN ACTIONS

FOR

USE AND OCCUPATION.

Form of remedy.—“Every person in possession of
§746.
land, out of which any rent is due, whether it was originally
demised in fee, or for any other estate of freehold, or for any
term of years, shall be liable for the amount or proportion of
Primrose,

105,

116.

5

M.

W.,
17—-Thomas
v. Hawks,
M.
140; Stevens v. Saginaw Supervisors, 62
Mich., 579; 29 N. W., 492.
18-1 Archbold‘s Nisi Prius, 195.
Mich., 336.
19—Bourke v. James,
4

5

&

4

1

&

E.,
Ad.
14—Breekon v. Smith,
488; Calvert v. Baker,
W., 417.
M.
15—See, Whitehead v. Howard,
Moore.

v.

65.
8

360.

16—Highmore
S.,

775

&

&

5

12—Stevens v. Tuiler, 4 Mich., 387.
13—Clayton v. Gosling,
C.,
B.

8.»

rent due from the land in his possession, although it be only a

§747

asp
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part of what was originally demised.”2° Covenant or debt
was, at common law, the only remedy for rent due on a lease
under seal, but by statute “Such rent may be recovered in
an action of debt or assumpsit, and the deed or demise or other
instrument in writing, if there be any showing the provisions
of the lease, may be used in evidence by either party to prove
“Nothing contained
the amount due from the defendant.”21
in the preceding sections shall deprive landlords of any legal
remedy for the recovery of their rents, whether secured to
them by their leases, or provided by laW.”22
action must be
§747. Must be founded in contract.—The
founded on contract, and cannot be supported unless there
And
be a contract, express or implied, between the pa.rtics.'-’3
in cases where the possession is adverse, assumpsit cannot be
supported,“ but the plaintiff must declare in trespass or eject
20—C. L., § 9254; see notes thereto.
21—C. L., § 9255; see notes thereto.
22——C. L., § 9256; Hogsett v. Ellis,
See Heyer
17 Mich., 367, and notes.
Use
man v. Kanter, 36 Mich., 316.
may be sued tor gen
and occupation
erally
specially
refer
or
without
ence to the form of the lease under
whlch they are enjoyed. In an action
counts
tor use and
upon the common
the tenant can, under the
occupation
general issue, set up a new agreement;
can, on giv
and by way oi’ recoupment
ing notice, show dainagcs to goods on
Conkling v. Tittle, 52
the premises:
Mich., 630: 18 N. W., 391.
23—Birch v. Viright, 1 Term R., 378.
upon a
The action must be founded
contract, express or implied, creating
the relation_oI landlord and tenant, and
imposing upon the defendant the obli
gation to pay tor the use oi’ the prem
Dwight v. Cutler, 3 Mich., 571,
ises:
Therefore, a tenant in common
572.
oi’ lands, cannot recover of his cotcnant
for the use and occupation oi’ the latter
of the lands claimed in common, in the
absence of any express promises
to pay
The right of each to occupy is one
rent.
of the legal incidents oi’ such a tenancy,
and it pervades the whole land, and one
by the failure of the
is not excluded
other to occupy, but whatever he occu
pies in such case he occupies
in his
own right and not as tenant of the

other cotenant:
Evert v. Beach, 31
Mich., 136. And the claim that the co
tenant occupying was holding adversely
it
to the other would not avail——since
he held adversely there could be no re
lation of landlord and tenant, and that
would equally preclude the recovery ot
rent:
Wilniarth v. Palmer, 34 Mich.,
347.
The substantial distinction be
tween an action on the lease and one for
use and occupation is, that in one the
declaration is special and in the other
it is general:
Dalton v. Landahn, 30
Mich., 349.
A speciﬁed yearly rental
be recovered
under a declara
cannot
money
the
tion contalning
common
counts but none for use and occupa
Heyerman v. Kanter. 36 Mich.,
tion:
316.
Use and occupation may be sued
for generally or specially without ret
ercnce to the form or the lease:
C0nk
lin'g v. Tuttle, 52 Mich., 630; 18 N. W.,
391.
2-l—"'l‘ew v. Jones, 13 M. & W., 12;
Croswell v. Crane, 7 Barb., 192; Hurd
v. Miller, 2 Hllt, 540.
The action can
not be maintained where the relation of
landlord and tenant did not exist dur
ing the occupancy,
or where the hold
ing has been adverse to the owner: Hog
sett v. Ellis, 17 Mich., 367; Dalton v.

Landahn, 30 Mich., 349; Marquette. H.
& O. Ry. Co. v. Harlow, 37 Mich., 554:
Lockwood v. Thunder Bay R. B. Co.,
42 Mich., 536; -i N. W., 292: Bates v.
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ment, as the court will not, in such case, imply a contract.“
A tenant at suiferance is chargeable for use and occupation
after notice to quit and demand of possession?“ A tenant at
will is bound to pay for use and occupation until his tenancy
is terminated

,

by notice.”

The notice to determine an estate at will or by sufferance,
must be a three months’ notice. If a lease provides for the
payment of rent at periods of less than three months a notice
will be sufficient which is equal to the interval between the
'

times of payment.23

Defendant’s occupa.tion.—Proof
of an actual occu
§748.
pation by the defendant is not essential; proof of the contract
or tenancy is sufficient, and the plaintiff need not prove that
the defendant, in fact, entered and occupied the premises; it is
Phlnney, 45 Mlch., 388; 8 N. W., 88;
see, Ward v. Warner, 8 Mlch., 508.
But
where the relation exists, and the oc
cupancy has been beneﬁcial to the de
fendant, the
pay

a

there

law implies

a

promise to

compensation,
reasonable
unless
be an express
contract or other

circumstances inconsistent with the no
tion of such promise, or with the duty
or obligation to pay:
Ibid., Hogsett v.
Ellis, 17 Mich., 351.
A tenant is not permitted to deny his
landlord's title: Lee v. Payne, 4 Mich.,
106.
But where the lessee is evicted by
one having a title paramount to that of
the landlord, so that his beneﬁcial en—
joyment of the premises is interfered
with, he will not thereafter be liable to
the landlord for rent:
Marsh v. But
terworth, 4 Mich., 575.
And where a
landlord, during the continuance of the
lease, without the consent of the tenant,
enters
though

upon

the

they may

demised
have

premises,

been vacated

al
by

tenant and the entry is followed by
continuous possession inconsistent with
the rights given to the tenant by the
the

lease,

such

possession

amounts

to

an

eviction, and precludes the recovery of
rent while it continues; and this is so
whether the entry be for condition brok-il
en or not.
If for condition broken, it
signiﬁes an intention to terminate the
lease entirely; while if the landlord re
gard the lease as still continuing, the
right to rent is suspended during his

occupancy:

Day v. Watson,

8

Mlch.,

555.

It is said that at common law a ten
ant at sufferance is not liable for rent.
This is so as to rent, strictly so called,
which always grows out of an express
contract, and is ﬁxed and definite
in
amount.
The contract being terminated
before the tenancy
at suﬂerance com
mences,
there is nothing from which
rent, as such, can arise, but if the ten
ant at sufferance remains in possession
after notice to quit and a demand of
possession
by the landlord, the law will
imply a promise to pay a reasonable
compensation
for the use and occupation
Hogsett
after such demand and notice:
v. Ellis, 17 Mlch., 368, 371.
25—-Birch v. Wright, 1 Term R., 386;
Dwight v. Cutter, 3 Mlch., 566; Ward v.
Warner, 8 Mlch., 508; Wilmarth
v.
Palmer, 34 Mlch., 347; Marquette, H. &
O. Ry. Co. v. riarlow, 37 Mlch., 554;
Lockwood v. Thunder Bay R. B. Co., 42
Mlch., 536; 4 N. W., 292; Henderson
v. Detroit, 61 Mlch., 378; 28 N. W.,
133.

26—Hogsett v. Ellis, 17 Mlch., 371.
Parkhurst,
27—I-Iuntington
v.
87
Mich., 38; 49 N. W., 597; Mclntosh
v. Hodges,
110 Mlch., 319; 70 N. W.,
550.
28——C L.,
13

Mir-h..

Mlch., 187.
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sufficient if the defendant might have done so
and was not prevented by the plaintiif.”

if

XLII.

he pleased,

If A agrees to let premises to B, who permits C to occupy
them, B may be sued for the rent,3° and when a house is de
mised by a written agreement, rent may be recovered, after the
house has been burnt down,“ unless there be an express agree
ment to the contrary,32 and it is recoverable, also, although the
A tenant who has left
defendant has deserted the premises.”
the premises, in pursuance of a parol license from his landlord,
without having given a regular notice to quit, remains liable
for the rent.“
for defendant.—'l‘he defendant may prove
of the rent to his lessor before notice of the assign
ment of the whole to the plaintiﬂ’, who is an assignee of the
reversion.“ He may show that he entered under a contract
for the purchase of the premises,“ or as a trespasser. Where
a party is let into possession of land under a contract to pur
chase, which afterwards goes oﬂ’, he is liable to an action for
use and occupation, at the suit of the vendor, for the period
during which he continues in possession after the contract
§749.

Evidence

a payment

went

oﬁ.“

Damages.—If there has been a stipulated rent, the
§750.
plaintiff will be entitled to recover to'that amount, though thc
lease be void.”
In other cases he must prove the value of the
Where the plaintiff is not the person who orig
p1'emises.39
inally let the premises to the defendant, he can only recover
rent from the time he had the legal title in him.4°

32——Packer

v. Gibbons,

1 pm

P}.

421.

4

&

8

2

5

1

35—Blrch v. Wright,
Term R., 378;
Bing.. 410.
Bridges v. Smyth,
Ev.,
36—2 Saund. Pl.
Am. ed..
1178; Sylvester v. Ralston, 31
1173,
Barb., 286.
W., 118.
37——Howard v. Shaw,
M.
38—De Medina v. Poison, Holt. 47:
lsee, VVilliams v. Sherman,
Wend., 109.
Sec, liiclnlosh
v. Hodges,
110 Mich.,
319; 70 N. W., 550.
B.,
39——'I‘omlinson v. Day,
Brod.
5

&

8

680.
~i0—Gregory
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v. Doidge,

&

7

2

30—Bull v. Sibbs, 8 Term R., 327;
Conolly v. Baxter, 2 Stark, 527.
31-—Baker v. Hoitpzoﬂel, 4 Tnuni, 45;
Izon v. Gorton, 5 Bing. N. C.. 501;
Ihbs v. Richardson, 9 Ad. &
S-i9.

C., 922.

3

87.

Camp., 103.
33—Mollet v. Brayne,
Taunt.,
34—Matthews v. Sawell,
B.
270: Johnstone v. I-Iaddlestone,

&

29—Harland
v. Bromley, 1 Stark,
453; Pinero v. Judson, 6 Bing., 206;
Woolley v. Watling, 7 C. & P., 610.
But it has been held that where a ten
ant hired the premises
for a year, but
did not at any time go into possession,
either in person or by agent, or under
tenant,
that this action could not be
maintained, but that the remedy was
on the lease:
Wood v. Wilcox, 1 Denio,

Bing., -174.
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of tenancy by assignment or surren
der.—By statute,“ “no estate or interest in lands, other than
"
“‘
cases for a term not exceeding one year,
shall here
after be created, granted, assigned, surrendered or declared,
unless by act or operation of law, or by a deed or conveyance
in writing, etc.” By this statute, a parol assignment or license
to quit will be suﬁicient,“ even although the defendant has left
§751.

Determination

'

the premises,“
be canceled.“

or, though the agreement between the parties

The assignment

or surrender

may, however, by the words
of the statute, be eﬁectual by “act or operation of law,"
though not made in writing. If a landlord in the middle of a
quarter accept from his tenant the key of the house demised,
under a parol agreement that upon her then giving up the
possession the rent shall cease, and she never afterwards occu
pies the premises, he eannot recover in an action for the use
and occupation of the house for the time subsequent to his
It must, however, be clearly established
accepting the key.“
that it was the landlord’s intention to determine the tenancy by
accepting the key of the house, as it would be insuﬂicient to
show merely that the key was left at plaintiﬂ"’s house, or deliv
ered to his servant.“

Upon a tenancy from year to year,
quarter’s notice, if the lessor licenses the
tenant to quit in the middle of a quarter, and the tenant quits,
and the lessor accepts possession, it is a surrender by operation
of law, destroying the right to rent for the whole or any part
determinable

at

a

of the current quarter." In all these eases the consent of all
the parties to the change of the tenancy is necessary."
.\SSl')ll’Sl'l‘

\VARR.\NTY.

ON

What constitutes a. wa.rra.nty.—The undertaking by
§752.
way of warranty being a contract obligation, the remedy for
41——C. L., § 9509', see notes to same.
42—Botting v. Marten, 1 Camp., 318.
43——-Mollet v. Brayne, 2 Camp., 103;

Matthews v. Sawell, 8 Taunt., 270.
44—Roe,d, Berkeleytv. York, 6 Esst.,
86; Johnstone v. Huddlestone, 4 B. &
C., 922; Johnstone v. Huddlestone, 7
1), & R,, 411,

v. Clifford,

45—Whitehead

5 Taunt.,

518.

46—Horland

v.

Broniley,

1

Sturk.,

455.
47——Glmmam
324.

v.

Legge.

8

B.

&

C.,

v. Cook, 2 B. & A., 119;
48-—'l‘homas
Morrison v. Chadwick, 7 C. B., 284.
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its breach is in assumpsit.‘9
No particular words are pre
cribed by law to constitute a warranty; but it is essential that
the afﬁrmation should be made at the time of sale and be
intended by the parties as a warranty.“
It is not necessary

if

the words used
should be used
of
soundness,
etc., of a
are intended as
the
representation
horse, and the plaintiff relied upon them as such, they will be
warranty. It would be otherwise
considered as amounting to
what was said was
mere expression of an opinion of the
defendant.“ An affirmation that horse was not lame, made
a

a

if

a

a

that the word “Warrant”

49—And this is true though the dam
resulting from such breach
are
consequential in their nature:
Tatro v.
Brower, 118 Mich., 615; 77 N. W., 274.

will seek to enhance his wares, and
of
disregard
statements
his
must
reposes
Every
person
their
value.
opinions
of
peril
on
the
at his

50—Sweet v. Colgate, 20 Johns., 203.
be an absolute and positive as
seﬁion, and one on which the purchaser
relies as a warranty, and not merely
Oneida
the expression of an opinion:
440;
Cow.,
Mfg. Soc. v. Lawrence,
Mfg. Co., 59
Switzer v. Pinconning
Mich., 488; 26 N. W., 762. As to what
is essential to a warranty see Linn v.
Gunn, 56 Mich., 447; 23 N. W., 84.

others,

to
so

4

a

a

&

by both parties.
A warranty
understood
must be accepted by the purchaser as
well as offered by the seller; and in
determining the mutual understanding,
the situation and conduct of the parties
at the time and afterwards, is open to
Austin Mfg.
Kimball
consideration:
What a
Co. v. Vroman, 35 Mich.,‘ 331.
vendor says in mere praise of the prop
erty he is selling is not a warranty.
Therefore, held, that when the vendor
threshing machine said at the time
of
very good
of the sale, “that it was
machine and would do very nice work,"
falls far short of amounting to a war
ranty:
Worth v. McConnell, 42 Mich.,
473-6;
N. W., 198.
2

51—Chapman v. Murch,
290; Roberts v. Morgan,

19 Johns.,
Cow., -138.

52—VVhitney v. Sutton. 10 Wend.,
A mere assertion of value
413.
made by the seller, where no warranty
is no ground of relief to
is intended,
the purchaser, because the assertion is
matter of opinion, which does not imply
A
knowledge,
and in which men diﬂer.
purchaser must expect that a vendor
411,

an

equal

op

1 6

not
amount
intended,
and

has

780

&

do
so

he

4

Representations
warranties unless

when

portunity to form and exercise his own
judgment.
But this rule applies only
when the vendor and vendee rely upon
their own judgment. When the vendee
expressly relies upon the knowledge of
as to quality or value of
the vendor,
the article of sale, the vendor is bound
to act honorably and deal fairly with
the vendee.
When conﬁdence is reposed
in the vendor he is bound not to abuse
it, and the rule that the purchaser must
Picard v. Mc
beware, does not apply:
Cormick, 11 Mich., 68; see, Wilbur v.
Cartright, 44 Barb., 536; Clark v. Ran
kin, 46 Barb., 570.
But to constitute
a warranty on the part of the vendor,
he must make an assertion which he
intends the vendee shall rely upon as
true,
in relation to the property of
which he speaks: Carley v. Wilkins,
Barb., 557; Blakeman v. Mackay,
Hilt., 266; Hotchkiss v. Gage, 26 ‘Barb,
1-11; Rogers v. Ackerman, 22 Ibid., 13-i.
A representation that a machine is a.
very
good machine and will do nice
Worth v. Mc
work is not a warranty:
Connell, 42 Mich., 473;
N. W., 198.
But a representation, made to plaintiff
to induce him to order a machine that
is well made and of good material,
warranty:
Aultman, M.
Co., v.
is
Knapp, 105 Mich., 205; 63 N. W., 66.
The rule that a vendor has a right to
praise his goods in order to make a sale
of fact
does not apply to statements
which the vendor knows to be fal.-rc and
upon which the vendee, who is ignorant
on the subject, relies: Peck v. Jennison.
Where
99 Mich., 326; 58 N. W., 312.

it

4

It must

a

ages
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at the time of sale, or previous, by the defendant, and that he
would not be afraid to warrant that the same was sound every
Way as far as he knew, was held to amount to a warranty.‘
Whether what was said was intended as a warranty or not, is
a question of fact to be decided by the jury? When the seller,
in the course of the conversation at the time of the sale, said

a

a

a

it

is

it,

to the person who was about to purchase‘the horse, “You may
the horse
depend upon
perfectly quiet and free from
vice,”
was holden to be
warranty.“
The term “sound,” in
warranty of horse or other animal,
implies the absence of any disease or seeds of disease in the
animal at any time, which actually diminishes, or in its prog
ress will diminish, his natural usefulness in the work to which
he would properly and ordinarily be applied.‘
is

is

Implied Wa1'ra.nties.—A warranty of title
implied
§753.
an express war
on the sale of a chattel.-'5' But where there

,
13 Wend., 277.

soundness
in the
extends to every kind

of a horse,
known and unknown to
of unsoundness
the seller; and if at the time of sale the
animal has any infirmity upon it which
renders it less ﬁt for present service,
VanHoesen v.
the warranty is broken:
Cameron, 5-1 Mich., 609; 20 N. W., 609.
In a suit upon a warranty of soundness
of a. horse, it can be shown by a former
owner that the horse was diseased while
it,
he owned
the disease
was one
which might have resulted in the un
complained of: Ibid.
But a
soundness
temporary and curable injury, although
existing at the time of sale, if
does
not injure the animal for present ser
vice, is not an unsoundness; but
seems
that, whether the injury be permanent
it

it

if

sale

it

1

it

1

&

W.,

A warranty of

Johns,
5—Defrecze v. Trumper,
274; Hunt v. Sackett, 31 Mich., 18.
The possession of chattels by the vendor
at the time of sale is said to be equiv
alent to an affirmation that he has title,
and in such case the vendor
is to be
held to an implied warranty of title,
though nothing be said on the subject
McCoy v. Artcher,
between the parties:
Barb., 323; Coolidge v. Brigham,
Met., 551.
And if there is an aiilrma
tlon of title where the vendor is not in
possession,
the same warranty of title
will be implied as
he were in posses
Barb., 323.
McCoy v. Artcher,
sion:
So, on
sale of personal property in
of the vendor, there will
the possession
be an implied warranty that the prop
erty is free from prior liens and incum
Barb.,
brances: Dresser v. Ainsworth,
619.
And one who sells a chose in ac
tion impliedly warrants that there is no

781

1

M.

320.

9

Burnard,

Moody

8

v.

Robb,

&

4-Kiddell
668.

v.

9

3—Scholefield
Robinson, 210.

2

484.

if

v. Mosely,

2—VVhitney v. Sutton, 10 Wend., 411,
413; Chapman v. Murch, 19 Johns., 290,

a

1—-Cook

3

921.

or temporary, curable or incurable, if
render the animal less ﬁt for present
usefulness and convenience,
is an un
soundness:
Roberts v. Jenkins,
Fos
ter N. H., 116.
Parol proof of a war
ranty cannot be received to modify an
unambiguous written contract for sale;
Hallett v. Gordon, 122 Mich., 567; 81
N. W., 556; 82 N. W., 827; I-iallwood
Cash Reg. Co. v. Millard, 127 Mich.,
816; 86 N. W., 833; McCray R. Co. v.
Zent, 99 Mich., 269; 58 N. W.,
Woods
&

knows'that the vendee is igno
rant of the value of property and is re
lying on his representation as to value
which is in the nature of a statement
of fact rather than opinion, the rule of
Maxted
caveat cmptor is inapplicable:
v. Fowler, 94 Mich., 106; 33 N. W.,
a vendor

I
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ranty covering the same matter none will ,be implied.“
In
general there is no implied warranty of quality, but if the cir
cumstances are such as naturally to give rise to such an under
taking one may be implied; as where one buys a machine of a
dealer there is an implied warranty that it is not second hand
or under certain circumstances, that goods shall be merchant
ble;3 or under others that they shall be ﬁt for a particular
use
and again, that they shall correspond to sample.”

Mich.,

8

a

F.

&

a

4

6

a

782

2

2

it

6

it

4

6

7—Grieb v. Cole, 60 Mich., 397; 27
N. W., 579
8—ln every contract to furnish man
ufactured goods, there is an implied
warranty that the goods shall be mer
Taunt.,
chantable: Laing v. Fidgeon,
Camp.,
169.
108: Laing v. Fidgeon,
And. if a thing be ordered of the man
is
ufacturer forla special purpose, and
to be supplied and sold for that purpose,
there is an implied warranty that it is

&

35

&

Fletcher,

4 it

v.

104.

&

182.

6—McGraw

A

Mus8.,

2

7
6

3

The following principles relating to
implied warranties may be noticed:
Every vendor of securities for money
impliedly warrants that he has a title
enabling him to sell:
Ritchie v. Sum
531; Richards v. Kil
mers,
Yeates,
lam, 10 Mass, 2-15.
Every one negotiating a promissory
note, or bill of value, impliedly warrants
that it is genuine: Herrick v. \Vhitney,
240; Young v. Adams,
15 Johns.,

4

3

of

it

655.

fit for that purpose: Beals v. Olmstead,
Blackf.,
24 Vt., 114; Brenton v. Davis,
317; see, McGraw v. Fletcher, 35 Mich.,
104; Kimball Mfg. Co. v. Vromar_i, Ibid.,
310; West Michigan
Co. v. Diamond
Glue_Co., 127 Mich., 651; 87 N. W., 92.
dealer who sells a piano by
So
written contract which speaks nothing
as to a warranty, is bound by an im
plied warranty that the instrument is
properly constructed:
Little v. G. E.
Co., 115 Mich., 480; 73
Van Syckle
N. W., 554.
Upon a written contract of sale of
goods of a. particular description, which
the purchaser has no opportunity of in
specting, the law implies a warranty of
saleable articles answering the descrip
Hastings v. Lov
tion in the contract:
Pick., 220; Gardiner v. Gray,
ering,
Camp., 144.
But no warranty can be
implied from the fact that the goods
Wright V.
were sold for a sound price:
Hart, 18 Wend., 455; Holden v. Dakin,
Johns" 421.
Where goods are sold without any op
portunity for the purchaser to examine
them, there ‘is an implied warranty that
they are saleable:
Gardiner v. Gray,
Camp., 144; Laing v. Fidgeon, {bid 169:
Laing v. Fidgeon,
'l‘aunt., 108.
9—0n
sale of a commodity
for a
particular purpose, there is an implied
warranty that
is fit for that purpose:
Gray v. Cox,
C., 114; Gray v.
B.
Cox,
R., 200. Thus, if one sells
D.
a horse for a carriage horse,
he im
pliedly undertakes that
is suitable for
that purpose; or if he undertakes to fur
nish a rope to raise certain heavy ar
ticles, he impliedly warrants that it is
suﬁicient for that purpose:
Hilliard on
Sales, 257; Brown v. Edington,
M.
G., 279; Getty v. Rouncltree,
Chand.,
28; Beers v. Williams, 16 lll., 69.
declaration on the sale of an ar
ticle that it ls good, and such as the

4

6

it

legal defense to its collection arising
out of his connection
with the origin
of the claim:
Delaware Bk. v. Jarvis,
E. P’. Smith, 226.
And
is held
that where one sells a judgment, he im
pliedly warrants that the whole is due
and unpaid:
Furniss v. Ferguson,
But,
Tii‘i'., N. Y., 485.
ifithe property
sold be at the time in the hands of a
third person, and there be no aliirma
tion or assertion of ownership, no war
ranty
McCoy
title will be implied:
Barb., 323.
v. Artcher,
On sale of
property without distinct warranty that
should be of the kind and quality or
dered, there is no implied warranty to
that effect which may be enforced after
acceptance
with opportunity for inspec
tion:
Williams v. Robb, 104 Mich.,
242, 62 N. W., 352.
See, Talbot P. Co.
v. Gorman, 103 Mich., 403; 61 N. W.,
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Where one farmer bought of another the carcass of a dead
pig for food, which turned out to be unsound and unﬁt for
human consumption, it Washeld that no warranty of soundness
was implied. by law."
A general warranty will not extend to protect against plain
and obvious defects, as where a horse is warranted perfect, and
wants an ear or a tail, etc. It is said that defects apparent at
the time of the bargain are not included in a general war
ranty." If the buyer examined the property at the time of
seller can
warranty:

warrant, raises a suiiicient
Prosser v. Hooper, 1 Moore,

109.

But where a purchaser inspects the
articles which he purchases, and there
is not a. clear and express warranty or
fraud on the part of the vendor, no
action will lie for a defect in the qual
ity of the article sold:
Hotchkiss v.
Gage,
Barb., 141; Deifendorf v.
26
Gage, 7 Barb., 18.
If a purchaser takes a written war
ranty, all representations made in the
negotiations for the sale are merged in
the writing,
and the purchaser must
rely on the writing alone unless there
was fraud in the sale:
Horner v. Fel
lows, 1 Doug. Mich., 54.
“There there
is an express warranty none can be im
plied:
McGraw v. Fletcher, 35 Mich.,
104.

10—In a sale by sample, there is an
implied warranty that the commodity
shall correspond with the sample: Par
ker v. Palmer, 4 B. & Ald., 387; Hib
bert v. Shee, 1 Camp., 113; Bradford
v. Manly, 13 Mass., 139; Lorymer v.
Smith, 1 B. & C., 1; Beirne v. Dord, 1
Selden,

98, 99.

11-Burnby

v. Bollet, 16 M. & W.,
Emerson v. Brigham, 10 Mass.,
197.
But in this state it is held that
when articles of food are sold for do
mestic consumption, the law implies a
warranty that they are ﬁt for that pur
pose. The supreme court says that when
articles of food are bought for con
sumption, and the vendor sells them for
that express purpose, the consequences
dangerous to
of unsoundness
so
are
health and life, and the failure of con
sideration is so complete, that we think
the rule which has often been recog
nized,
that such sales are warranted.

644;

is not only reasonable,
but essential to
public safety:
Hoover v. Peters, 18
Mich., 51, 55; see also, Van Bracklin v.
Fonda, 12 Johns., 468; Moses v. Mead,
But, it is held that where
1 Denio, 378.
provisions are sold, not for immediate
use, but as
consumption, or domestic
merchandise to be sold again, and are
in a situation to be examined, and are
examined
as fully as the buyer deems
necessary, there is no implied warranty
of soundness: Moses v. Mead, 5 Denio,
617; Moses v. Mead, 1 Ib1'd., 378: 1
Parsons on Cont., 4 ed., 470, note w,
and Hurlst. & Norm., 586.
There is an
implied warranty in the sale of bread
to one who purchases it for sale and de
livery to others for consumption:
Sin
clair v. Hathaway, 57 Mich., 60'; 23
N. W., 459.
12-—Schuyler v. Russ, 2 Caines, 202.
But to prevent a. recovery for a. breach
of warranty upon the sale of a. horse, 9
on the ground that the defects existed
and were visible at the time of sale, it
must be shown that the defects
were
such as could be discerned by an ordi
nary observer examining the property
with a view of trading for it, or of pur
chasing it, and were not such as to re
quire skill to detect them: Birdseye v.
Frost, '34 Barb., 367. It is said that a.
vendor may warrant against an obvious
defect, as well as against any other.
A
warranty
general
that a horse was
sound, would, in our judgment, be brok
en, if one eye was so badly injured, or
so malformed, as to be entirely useless,
might have
and although this defect
by the purchaser at the
been noticed
time of the sale.
He may choose to
rely on the warranty of the vendor,
rather than upon his own judgment,
and we see no reason
why he should

783
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the sale, and it is perfectly apparent that it has some partic
ular defect, which can be discerned without requiring any
particular skill in the qualities of the property, as the loss of
the ears or tail, it will be presumed that the parties did not
include such defect in the warranty. But if the property, has
a defect which is not plain and obvious, except to those who
are skilled in the quality of the particular article, the defend
ant cannot say that the defect was too obvious to come within
the attention of the purchaser is called to
the warranty.

If

the defect at the time of sale, it will not be included within
the warranty," unless the warranty take the form of an under
taking that the.defect will not diminish the ordinary useful
ness of the property for the purposes for which it would ordi
narily be used: as that a splint will not make a horse lame."
It is not necessary for the plaintiff to prove that the defend
ant knew that the property was defective, or in anywise did
not answer the warranty; even if the declaration contain such
In other words, one may warrant against
an allegation."
unknown, as well as known, defects and a general warranty is
against unknown as well as known defects." A breach of war
ranty may be shown in defense without returning the prop

erty."
Measure of c1a.mages.—If the property has been rc
§754.
turned, the measure of damages will be the full price paid for
it; if it has not been returned the damages will be the differ
ence between the value of the property, at the time of sale,
if it had been as warranted, and its actual value at that time.

If, after notice to the seller, the property is sold by the plain
he will recover the difference between the net sum pro

tiif,

duced by the sale, and the price he paid the defendant for
be permitted
to do so. 'A warranty
that a horse ls sound is broken it he
cannot see with one eye:
House v.
Fort, 4 Blackf.,'29-i.
13—lViargetson
v. Wright,
7 Bing.,
not

»

G03.

Margetson v. Wright,
14—Ibid.,
8
Bing., 454.
15—See, Carley v. Wilkins. 6 Barb.,
557.
16-—-Van

Hoesen

v.

Cameron,

54

Mich., 609; 20 N. W., 609; Connell v.
McNett, 109 Mich., 329; 67 N. W., 344.

it.“

17-—Huil v. Beiknap. 37 Mich., 179;
Boltwood v. Miller, 112 Mich., 657; 71
N. W., 506.
18—-Casweil v. Core, 1 Taunt., 566.
of dam
The rule as to the measure
oi’ warranty, as now
ages for a breach
seems to be the difference
established.
the value which
the
article
between
would have possessed had it conformed
to the warranty, and its actual value
with the taults or detects complained
of. and which were warranted against:
Sedgwick on Da.m., 3 ed., 287; Hilliard
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Where the plaintiﬁ was induced by the defendant’s war
ranty to warrant the horse as sound to a person to whom he
and the horse proving unsound; the second purchaser
sold
brought an action _against the plaintiff upon his warranty, of
which the plaintiff gave the defendant, his vendor, notice, and

it

was fraud
agreement

& 2

3

4

2

1

that the article might be returned if
found not to be as warranted, the pur
chaser cannot rescind the sale and re
turn the artlcle- for a mere breach of
warranty, but must rely on an action
Sedgwick on Dam.,
on the warranty:
475;
286, 287;
Parsons on Cont.,
Hill, 288; Cary v.
Voorhees v. Earl,
Gruman,
1bt'd., 625; West v. Cutting,
Barb.,
19 Vt. 536; Freeman v. Clute,
424; Rowley v. Bigelow, 12 Pick., 307.
But where the contract of purchase is
executory, as where an article is or
dered from a manufacturer for a special
purpose,
and upon
its arrival, to the
vendee, it is found not to comply with
the warranty, the vendee may without
doubt rescind and return the article,
though there be no fraud: See Hilliard
ed., 316, 317; Street v.
on Sales,
Blay,
Ad., 460; Mallow v. Hinde,
B.
12 Wheat, 193; Toulmin v. Hedley,
C. &' K., 157; see, Shields v. Pettee,
Sandf., 262; People v. Bancker,
N.
Y., 122. Breach of warranty may be set
up as a defense without returning the
goods unless the contract of sale re
quires their return; the omission to re
turn them only affects the amount of
damages
recoverable: Hull v. Belknap,
37 Mich., 179; see, Kimball, etc., Mfg.
Co. v. Vroman, 35 Mich., 310.
The
person injured by a breach of warranty
of such a nature as would justify a re
turn of the property, cannot be com
pelled
to elect between
a return and
damages,
but may be entitled to both;
a recovery of the purchase price paid,
may not compensate him for all his loss,
and the retention of the property which
may be unﬁt for use may be ruinous:
The K.
A. Mfg. Co. v. Vroman, 35
Mich., 310.
If a party sue for or de
fend on account of a breach
of war
ranty, he thereby aiiirms the contract
of sale: Barker v. Cleveland, 19 Mich.,

2 2

5

&

a

&

7 2

&

4

1

4

if

4

7

2

50

seems to be that unless there
or deceit in the sale, or an

2

Sales,
ed., 291; Barker v. Cleve
land, 19 Mich., 230, 237; Reggio v.
166;
Braggiotti,
Cush.,
Jackson
Sleigh C0. v. Holmes, 129 Mich., 370;
Gray,
88 N. W., 895; Tuttle v. Brown,
457; Sharon v. Mosher, 17 Barb., 518.
And this, without regard to the price
given the warrantor, or obtained on a
re-ale: Hilliard on Sales, 291. Where
fruit trees are sold represented to be of
certain varieties, and they are found
to be of inferior varieties the measure
is the value that would
of damages
if,
to the premises
have
been added
they had been of the varieties contract
Heilman'v. Pruyn, 122 Mich.,
ed for:
301; 81 N. W., 97. This measure can
not be reduced by a showing that many
Hellman
winter killed:
of the,trees
v. Pruyn, supra; Angeli v. Pruyn, 126
Mich., 16; 85 N. W., 258.
And it is said tuat if the article does
not comply with the warranty, the pur
chaser may return it forthwith, and
he does so without unreasonable delay,
this will be a rescission of the sale, and
he may sue for the price if he has
paid it, or defend against an action for
the price, if one be brought by the
seller. But if he has sold a part before
his discovery of the breach, and there
fore cannot return the whole, he may
still rescind the sale, and will be lia
ble for the market value of what he does
ed.,
not return:
Parsons on Cont.,
Comst.,
174; Shields v. Pettie,
122.
In case of a rescission the title in the
goods revests
and the
in the vendor,
plaintiff would be entitled to recover as
the amount paid the vendor,
damages
sum for the costs and
and a reasonable
of keeping the article:
Mc
expenses
M., 436; Ches
Kenzie v. Hancock, R.
12., 129; El
Ad.
teirman v. Lamb,
P., 169.
C.
But
lis v. Chinnock,
would seem that unless
in such case,
there was an agreement that the article
might be returned, the action or de
fense should not be on the warranty but
opinion
for deceit.
And the better
on

230.
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the option of defending the action, and his vendor not inter
fering, the plaintiff defended it and failed, it was held the
plaintiﬂf was entitled to recover the costs he had to pay in the
action against him}
The buyer may maintain an action on the warranty against
the seller, even though the horse or other warranted article has
not been returned, or although the buyer has allowed several
months to elapse before he complained of the unsoundness. It
is not necessary to return the article previous to bringing a
suit, nor to give notice of the defect to the seller,” unless the
contract of sale contain a stipulation to that effect.“

In an action upon

a

warranty of title, there must, in general,
claiming title, against the vendee,

be a recovery by the person

The vendee cannot dis
before the action can be maintained.‘
pute the titlc of vendor, unless he has been charged at the suit
of another person, who has, after contestation, shown a better
title.-"

If

the vendee has fully notiﬁed his vendor of the pendency
of the suit, a recovery against the vendee will be conclusive
evidence against the vendor.“
One notice is suﬁiicient; the
vendor is bound to know all the subsequent proceedings in the
cause

without further notice.’

The measure of damages in an action for a breach of an
implied warranty of title in the sale of chattels, in case of a
suit by the owner and notice to the vendor is the price paid,
the interest thereon, and the cost recovered against the pur
chaser or his vendee; the costs of the defense are not recover
able.3
The declaration must count specially on the warranty
and set up the breach.”
1—Lewis v. Peake, 7 Tnunt., 153.
2—Fielder v. Sturkim, 1 H. Bi., 17;
Patesholl v. Tranter, 3 Ad. & E., 103;
Kellogg v. Denslow,
411;
14 Conn..
Hills v. Bannister, 8 Cow., 31; Hunt v.
Sackett, 31 Mich., 18.
3--Adam v. Rir-lmrds, 2 H. Bl., 573;
Hills v. Bannister, 8 Cow., 31; see,
Horner v. Fellows, 1 Doug. Mich., 51.
4—Case v. Hall, 24 Wend., 102; Del
aware Bank v. Jarvis, 6 E. P. Smith.
230.
But it has been held that the
yield up the
vendee may voluntarily

property to the rightful owner, and re
against the vendor, on his im
cover
plied warranty ct title, provided he can
show that such claimant had a para
authority:
mount
Sweetman
v. Prince,
26 N. Y., 224.
5——Vibbard v. Johnson, 59 Johns., 77.
But see previous note.
6—Barney v. Dewey, 13 Johns., 224.
Babcock,
7—Blasdale
v.
1 Johns.,
517,
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v. Percy, 5 Wend., 535.
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A count for money had and received may be added to the
special count. If the property has been actually returned, the
plaintiﬁ may recover on this count the price he paid for it;
but merely making a. tender of the property would not be
suiﬁcient.1°
10-—Payne v. Whale, 7 East., 274;
Gompertz v. Denton, 1 Cr. & M., 207;
see Kimball, etc., Mtg. Co. v. Vroman,
35 Mich., 310.
A declaration upon a warranty, in
the nature
_1ustice’s court must state
and the
and terms of the warranty,
Thus, a declaration in the
breach.
following terms: "The plaintiﬂ! declares
in assumpsit specially for damages tor
breach of warranty on a pair ot horses
purchased
ot the defendant,
and claims
damages of $200." was held insuiﬂclent
as not stating any
cause
of action:
Smith v. Hobart, 43 Mich., 46515 N.
W., 666.

And it seems that a plaintiﬂ may at
his option, declare in assumpsit i’or a
breach of warranty, or sue in case tor
the

damages

caused

by the

deceit

of

a

44
Carter v. Glass,
false warranty:
Mich., 154; see, Beebe v. Knapp, 28
Mich., 53; and Hopkins v. O'Neil, 46
Mich., 403; 9 N. W., 448.
In an action to recover damages tor
a breach of warranty the court has not
power to order defendant
to permit an
inspection ot the property on his prem
ises: Martin v. Elliott, 106 Mich., 130;
63 N. W., 998.

\
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§764. For keeping dangerous animals
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The declaration for negligence.

5765. Against
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§766. Liability of common carriers.
§767. For negligent driving.
_
§768. Statutory duty of persons driving
on the highway.

common

carriers—who
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out of baiiments.

§760. For fraud or deceit.
§761. The declaration for fraud or de
ceit.

In genaral.—The action on the case, at the present
§755.
time, may be understood to comprise all actions for torts or
injuries effected without force, and for torts and injuries aris
ing from the forcible or violent act of another, when the tort or
injury is not the immediate effect of the force, but merely a
it

is

it

is

and being for torts only,
technically
of trespass on the case.‘
Notwithstanding
the act be immediate, if
be not wilful, but occasioned by the
carelessness and negligence of the defendant, the plaintiﬁ
at liberty to bring an action on the case? And although by
it,

consequence of
called an action

1—Archbold's Nisi Prius, 402.
2—Wliliams
v. Holland,
10 Bing.,
112.
An owner of land made an exca
vation therein, within a foot or two of
a public street, and used no precaution
against the danger of falling into it;
a person passing in the night-time fell
into the excavation, and was injured.
Held, that the owner of the land was
not liable to an action for the injury
thus caused.
l-lowland v. Vincent, 10
Metc., 37. ln this case, the court say that
the defendant was lawfully entitled to
excavate and use his own land up to the
line of the street, nor did the law re
quire him to erect any barrier or fence
between
his excavation and the street,
consequently defendant
was not guilty
in the manner in which
of negligence

he used his premises;
on
hand,
plaintiff
in passing

the

along

other
the

street had no right to go outside of it
on to defendant's premises.
and
had
she not done so no accident would have
occurred, and, although she were guilty
of no negligence
in passing beyond the
line of the street, yet she cannot re
cover.
Owners of private property are
not liable for injuries caused by leav
ing a dangerous place unguarded, when
the person injured was upon the prem
ises
without permission and not on
business or other lawful occasion,
and
had no right to be there: Hargreaves v.
Deacon, 25 Mich., 1; see, 33 Mich., 232.
This rule that the owner of lands is not
liable to trespassers for injuries sus
tained hy them on the lands has no ex
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the common law trespass and not case must be brought, where
the act was willful, this rule is very much changed by statute,
and it is now in general immaterial, so far as regards the form
of action, whether the action was willful or not. “Where, by
the wrongful act of any person, an injury is produced, either
to the person, personal property, or rights of another, or to
his servant, child, or wife, for which an action of trespass may
by law be brought, an action of trespass on the case may be
brought to recover damages for such injury, whether it was

willful or accompanied by force or not; and whether such
injury was a direct and immediate consequence from such
wrongful act, or whether it was consequential and indirect.”3
Actions for negligcnce.—Where the injury of which
§756.
the plaintiff complains has resulted from the negligence of both
parties, without any intentional wrong on the part of the de
No man can, in
fendant, the action cannot be maintained.‘
in favor of children: Ryan v.
Tower, 128 Mich., 463; 87 N. W., 644;
Formail v. Standard Oil Co., 12'.‘ Mich.,
496; 86 N. W., 946; Peninsular Trust
Co. v. Grand Rapids, 131 Mich., 571;
92 N. W., 38; Frost v. Eastern Ry., 64
N. H., 220, 9 Atl. 790, 10 Am. St., 396.
What is known as the. doctrine of the
“Turntable cases," the ﬁrst of which was
Railroad Co. v. Stout, 17 Wal1., 657, is
disapproved in Ryan v. Towar, supra.
'lhere is a liability, however,
even to
trespassers, for injuries resulting from
wanton or willful conduct of the owner:
Bird v. Holbrook, 4 Bing., 628; McCa
hiil v. Railway Co., 96 Mich., 156; 55
N. W., 668. W, who prepared drugs for
the market, by his servant, labeled a jar
extract, as
of belladonna, a poisonous
dandelion, a harmless medicine,
and
sold it; and, after it had passed through
several hands, a portion oi the contents
of the jar was sold and administered as
dandelion, and seriously injured the pa
tient; it was held that W was liable to
an action tor the damages.
Thomas V.
Winchester, 6 N. Y., 397.
3——C. L., 5 10400.
This statute has
no reference to trespass on lands: Wood
v. Michigan A. L. Ry. Co., 81 Mich.,
358; 45 N. W., 980: Haines v. Beach,
90 Mich., 563; 51 N. W., 644.
This
statute authorizes the joinder of counts
in trespass and case: Bellant v. Brown.
ception

The
78 Mich., 294; 44 N. W., 326.
object of this statute was to “obviate the
technical rules of pleading which had
of the
grown up under the decision
courts and to enable parties to bring
into one
as many claims as possible
suit" and "with this object in view the
statute should be liberally construed":
Beilant v. Brown, supra. One who, be
ing allowed to remain on land under a
keeps animals on it that
mere license,
have an infectious disease, in consequence
of which the animals of the owner, after
wards brought upon the land in ignor
ance of the danger, become infected and
damaged,
will he liable to an action
for such consequential injury: Eaton v.
Injury alone
Winne, 20 Mich., 156.
will not support an action on the case.
There must be a concurrence of injury
and wrong; and it the act be not un
lawful in itself, then unless done in a
manner, and at a time, or under cir
which render it wrongful, or
cumstances
lacking in due regard to the rights of
others, there can be no liability for any
injury that may result: Macomber
v.
Nichols, 34 Mich., 213.
4—Brow1ell v. Fiagler, 5 Hill, 282;
cited, and Underwood
v.
33 Mich., 232. Negligence can
not be presumed without proof of actual
negligence: Grand Rapids 8: Indiana
Ry. Co. v. Huntley, 38 Mich., 541.
and cases there

ivaldron,
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any case, be allowed to recover damages resulting from his own
A plaintiﬁ’ suing for negligence,
misconduct or negligence.
must himself be without fault?
5—Brown v. Maxwell, 6 Hill, 592;
v. Hendrie, 26 Mich., 255.
Thus
in case of a collision, the burden of
proof is on the plaintiff not only to
show negligence
on the part of the de
fendant, but ordinary care on his own
part: Drew v. Steamboat Chesapeake,
2 Doug. Mich., 36; see, McWilliams
v.
Detroit Central Mills Co., 31 Mich., 274.
One who is guilty of contributory neg
iigence
cannot recover for a negligent
injury: Joslin v. LeBarron, 44 Mich.,
1.60; 6 N. W., 214; Lake Shore & Mich
igan Southern Ry. v. Bangs, 47 Mich.,
\
470; 11 N. W., 276.
For cases illus
trating the doctrine that negligence
of
the plaintiﬂ contributing to the injury
complained of defeats a recovery,
see,
Goodaie v. Portage L. B. Co., 55 Mich.,
413; 21 N.
866; Van Auken v.
Chicago & W. M. Ry. Co., 96 Mich.,
307; 55 N. W., 971; Smith v. Jackson,
106 Mich., 136; 63 N. W., 982; Ban
nister v. Lake Shore & M. S. Ry. Co.,
113 Mich., 530; 71 N. W., 861; Smith
v. Township of Walker, 117 Mich., 14;
75 N. W., 141; Howey v. Fisher, 122
Mich., 43; 80 N. W., 1004; Benedict v.
Port Huron, 124 Mich., 600; 83 N. W.,
614; Merritt v. Foote, 128 Mich., 367;
87 N. W., 262; Freeman v. Pere Mar
quette Ry. Co., 131 Mich., 544; 91 N.
W., 1021; Oesterreich v. Detroit, ———
Mich., ——; 100 N. W., 466; (July,
1904); Kupkopski v. John S. Spiegel
Co., —— Mich., ——-; 97 N. W., 48;
(Nov., 1903); Smith v. Detroit & M.
Ry. Co., —— Mich.,
; 99 N. W.,
15; (April, 1904);
Proper v. Lake
Shore & M. S. Ry. Co., ——- Mich.,
-——; 99 N. W., 283; (April, 1904).
Contributory negligence in order to con
stitute a defense must have been negli
gence contributing to the injury itself
If it
for which the action is brought.
was subsequent negligence and only con
tributed to increase the injurious con
sequences, it goes to the amount of the
recovery only: Brown v. Marshall, 47
Mich., 576; 11 N. W., 392. A plaintiff
notwithstanding
may recover
he
was
negligent if the conduct of defendant
was wanton or wilful and except for it

Kelly

injury would not have been re
ceived: Tyler v. Nelson, 109 Mich., 37;
66 N. W., 671.
Where an injury of which the plain
tiif complains has resulted from the
fault or negligence of himself, or where
it has resulted from the fault or negli
gence of both parties, without any in
tentional wrong on the part of the de
fendant, an action cannot be maintained :
Williams v. Michigan Central Ry. Co.,
Thus, where a per
2 Mich., 259, 265.
son permitted his horse to run at large
in the highway, and it went upon de
i'endant's
railroad track and was killed
by a passing train in a dark night,
the engineer not appearing to have been
in fault, held, he could not recover:
Ibid., see, Michigan Central R. R. Co., v.
Leahey, 10 Mich., 193; Detroit & Mil
waukee R. R. Co. v. Van Steinburg, 17
Mich., 99.
against a
So in an action
railroad company, for injuries received
by the plaintiiff, in a collision between a
on which
locomotive
and
the wagon
plaintiﬂ was riding, negligence
on the
part of the driver of the team affects
right to recover equally
the plaintiff's
with her own negligence.
The plaintiif
cannot recover in such an action if her
directly or proximately,
own negligence,
contributed to produce the injury, al
though the defendant's negligence may
also have contributed to produce
the
result.
In such an action the plaintiff
must show that she acted with due care,
or that her own negligence did not con
tribute to the injury, as well as that
the defendant was guilty of such negli
gence.
The reasonable care which the
plaintiff and the driver of the vehicle
in which she is riding are required to
exercise
in such a case, is not limited
or affected by their situation or condi
tion in life; neither their station in life
nor any personal peculiarity of either of
them has anything to do with the ques
tion.
And it is no excuse to plaintiff
seeking to recover for injuries received
under such circumstances, that shc was
absent-minded,
and did not look to see or
And the de
stop to hear the cars.
grce of the defendant's negligence
seems
the
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to be entirely immaterial so long as it
appears that the plaintiff's negligence
contributed to the injury of which she
complains:
Lake
Shore & Michigan
Southern Ry. Co. v. Miller, 25 Mich.,
274. For cases illustrating
the rule of
imputed negligence,
as where the negli
gence of the driver of a vehicle is im
puted to one riding with him: see, Hilts
v. Foote, 125 Mich., 241; 84 N. W., 139;
Mullen v. Owosso, 100 Mich., 103; 58 N.
W., 663; 23 L. R. A. 693; 48 Am. St.,
436.
The principle involved is that of
agency and therefore negligence
cannot
be imputed to an infant, he not having
capacity to employ an agent: Hampel
v. Detroit G. R. & W. Ry. Co., -—
Mich., ——; 100 N. W., 1002; (Oct.,
1904); overruling, Apsey v. Detroit L.
& N. Ry. Co., 83 Mich., 432; 47 N. W.,
319.
To the same effect see Shippy v.
Au Sable, 85 Mich., 280; 48 N. W.,
584; Mullen v. Owosso, 100 Mich., 103;
58 N. W., 663; 23 L. R. A., 693; 43
Am. St., 436. In order that a plaintiff
may recover for injuries resulting from
the wrong or negligence
of another he
must show in all cases that the defendant
is entirely responsible for the grievance
complained of.
It must appear from
this showing that all the material neg
ligence that led to the injury was on the
part of the defendant or his agents, and
that the plaintiff did not contribute to
wards it.
Plaintiff must establish com
pletely whose fault it was, and explain
the whole transaction: Michigan Central
Ry. Co. v. Colman, 28 Mich., 441, 447;
and see, Daniels v. Clegg, 28 Mich., 32.
Negligence consists in the failure to
observe that degree of care which the
law requires for the protection of the
interest likely to be injuriously affected
by the want of it.
In making out neg
ligence,
the first requisite is to show
the existence
of the duty, which has
been neglected.
That duty must be set
out in the declaration, and the neglect
averred, and a failure to prove it is a
failure to make out the plaintiff's case:
Flint & Pere Marquette Ry. Co. v. Stark,
38 Mich., 714, 717; Thurston v. Detroit
Mich.,
U. Ry. Co.,
100 N.
W., 395; (July, 1904).
The degree of care required of a.
party in any business must, however, be
proportionate to its nature and risk.
But the law does not require business

i

-i;
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upon any unusual basis,
although it be one of great risk and re
quiring great caution; all rules applied
in such matters must be reasonable, and
must be applied with reference to the
ordinary conduct of affairs: Ibid. And
it seems that in considering whether
plaintiff's negligence has contributed to
an injury of which he complains, regard
will sometimes be had to his age, con
dition, capacity and degree of under
standing.
Thus, where plaintiffs car
riage, while driven by his daughter,
was injured by collision in a highway,
while ‘it was held that an injury to
plaintiﬂ’s horses and vehicle resulting
from defendant's negligence
in driving
on a highway, will not entitle plaintiff
to recover, if by ordinary care he might
have avoided the collision notwithstand
ing the defendant's failure to turn out
to the right, yet the court say, on the
question
plaintiff's
of
whether the
daughter, (who alone was driving his
horse when the collision occurred,) was
guilty of negligence,
it is proper that
her age, and the fact that she was a
woman,
by the
should be considered
jury; and the degree of care and skill
to which she should be held is that only
of a person of her age and sex, and not
necessarily the same that would be re»
quired of plaintiff himself if he had
been driving at the time: Daniels, v.
Clegg, 28 Mich., 32; East Saginaw C.
R. Co. v. Bohn, 27 Mich., 503; Swo
boda v. Ward, 40 Mich., 420; Young
v. Detroit G. H. & M. R. Co., 56 Mich.,
430; 23 N. W., 67; Powers v. Harlow,
53 Mich., 507; 19 N. W., 257; Cooper
v. Lake Shore & M. S. Ry. Co., 66 Mich.,
261; 33 N. W., 306; Baker v. Flint 8:
P. M. Ry. Co., 68 Mich., 90; 35 N. W..
to be conducted

836.

In judging of negligence all the at
tendant circumstances are to be taken
into consideration, and among others the
injured, so
age and sex of the person
far as these are important; but it can
not be laid down as a rule of law that
a less degree of care is required of a.
woman than of a man.
Sex is no ex
cuse for negligence: Hassenyer v. Mich
igan Central Ry., 48 Mich., 205; 12
N. W., 155.
Where the driver of a street car per
mitted a child under the age of discre
tion to sit upon the front platform of
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As between the employer and his employee.—It is
§757.
the duty of the employer to select such persons for his service
as possess in a reasonable degree the skill, knowledge and
habit of carefulness essential to the discharge of the duties
incident to the service. And while his employees are engaged
in his service and doing those things within the general scope
of their employment they are acting for the employer, and
he is answerable for any failure to exercise a reasonable degree
of care and skill, resulting in injury to third persons.“
the car from which he fell and was in
jured, held, that it was the duty of the

Street Railway Co. to provide vehicles
which give security to their passen
gers, and not to suifer them to occupy
But
unsafe places upon such vehicles.
if this duty is neglected and a passenger
is injured he cannot recover damages if
his own neglect of the duty of self
preservation contributed to the injury;
but duty can only be predicated of one
who has capacity to understand and
ability to perform it; and therefore a
child not of an age or discretion to un
derstand the ‘danger of riding on the
front platform of a street car, cannot be
in so doing:
charged
with negligence
East Saginaw City R. Co. v. Bohn, 27
Mlch., 503. But where a statute creates
for injuries
a duty and gives damages
resulting from a neglect of that duty,
as in case of sec. 36 of the general
railroad act (see C. L., 5 6294), re
quiring every railrond company to fence
their track, etc., and in default thereof
making them liable for all damages done
it is no defense
to cattle, etc., thereon,
to a company failing to fence, etc., and
thereby injuring plaintiffs cattle, that
plaintiff's own negligence contributed to
the injury: Flint & Pere Marquette Ry.
Co. v. Lull, 28 Mlch., 510; Neversorry
v. Duluth S. S. & A. Ry. Co., 115 Mlch.,
146; 73 N. W., 125; Grand Rapids &
I. Ry. Co., v. Cameron, 45 Mlch., 452;
8 N’. W., 99.
A similar doctrine obtains
under the statute, C. L., § 6295, making
railway companies
liable for injuries
from ﬁres set along their right of way
under certain circumstances: Peter v.
Chicago & W. M. Ry. Co., 121 Mlch.,
324; 80 N. W., 295, and cases cited
in the opinion.
one
But where
as
sumes to have a knowledge upon a sub

ject of which another may well be
ignorant. and knowingly makes
false
statements
in regard to it, upon which
the other relies, to his injury, it does
not lie with him to say that the party
who took his word and relied upon it
as that of an honest and truthful man,
was guilty of negligence
in so doing, so
as to be precluded from recovering com
pensation for the injury which was in
fiictcd upon him under cover of the
falsehood.
If a party's own wrongful
act has brought another into peril, he is
not
at liberty
to impute the
conse
quences of his act to a want
of vigil
ance in the injured party, when
his
own conduct
and untruthfui
assertions
have thrown the other oi! his guard,
and produced
a false sense of security:
Eaton v. \Vinne, 20 Mlch., 156, 166;
see, Plcard v. McCormick, 11 Mlch., 68.
Hassenyer
v. Michigan Central Ry. Co.,
48 Mlch., 209; 12 N. W. 155.
6—L1'ability 0/ employer for negli
gence of employc.—As
a general rule
of law. the party who receives an in
jury must seek his damages of the party
by whom it was occasioned.
The ex
ception to this rule is in the case of
master and servant, for the reason that
the master,
in selecting his servant,
should see to it that he does not make
choice
of an unskillful,
careless,
or
vicious person.
His obligation is to use
“such care [in the
selection
of his
servants] as, in view of the conse
quence that may result from negligence
on the part of employees, is fairly com
mensurate
with the perils or dangers
likely to be encountered."
tvalkowskl
v. Penokee & G. C. .\i., 115 Mlch., 629;
73 N. W., 895; and when he has exer
cised such care he may rely upon the
preumption of competency until he has
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notice or knowledge to the contrary:
M.,
v. Penokee
& G. C.
Walkowski
supra.
If he neglects his duty in this respect,
it is not unreasonable that he should
be held responsible for any injury re
sulting from the want of skill or from
Thus, if a
want of care of his servant.
drover who is engaged in the business
of driving cattle employs a servant to
assist him, through whose carelessness
injury is done, the
negligence
and
But where the em
drover is liable.
is in the exercise of an inde
ployee
and
pendent
and distinct employment,
not under the immediate control, direc
tion, or supervision of the employer,
the
for
the latter is not responsible
negligence or misdoings
of the
em
Thus, where a merchant em
ployee.
ployed a licensed drayman to cart goods
from a warehouse to his store at a
given price, and the drayman, while
performing the duty, negligently per
mitted a barrel of the goods to roll
against and injure another person in
the street, held, that the employer was
not responsible: DeForest v. Wright, 2
Mich., 368: and see, Moore v. Sanborn,
2 Mich., 519; Davis v. Detroit & Mil
waukee R. R. Co., 20 Mich., 105. Where
one hires a contractor to do certain
work and has no immediate control, di
rection or supervision of the servants
of such contractor, he is not answerable
or
carelessness:
for their negligence
Riedel v. Moran F. & Co., 103 Mich.,
262; 61 N. W., 509; Reler v. Detroit
S. & S. W., 109 Mich., 244; 67 N. W.,
120.
Men employed by owner's agent
and on owner's credit are the servants
of the owner: Smaltz v. Boyce, 109
Mich., 383; 69, N. W., 21.
Where
is informed by defendant's
plaintiff
foreman under whom he was working
that the place or machine was a safe
one and he relies upon such information
not knowing to the contrary he is re
from the general rule that he
lieved
assumes the risk; Burnside v. Novelty
Mfg. Co., 121 Mich. 115; 79 N. W.,
1108; Shadford v. Ann Arbor S. R. Co.,
121 Mich., 224; 80 N. W., 30.
In any case, to render an employer
liable for the fault or negligence of his
employee, the injury complained of must
arise in the course of the execution of
some service lawful in itself, but negli
gently or unskillfully performed; for
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a wanton violation of
ant, although occupied

law by a
about the
ness of his employer, the servant
is liable: Moore v. Sanborn, 2
519,

529.

A master is liable for

an

serv
busi
alone
Mich.,

injury

done

his servant when acting within the
when
scope of the master's employment,
the servant acted carelessly and reck
lessly andpin negligent disregard of his
master's instructions, but not if the in
jury was by the wanton, wilful and in
And to
tentional act of the servant.
escape responsibility for such an injury
the burden would be upon the master
to show that the servant was not at
in the course of his
the time engaged
employment.
Recklessness is only a.
high degree of negligence, and the mas
ter’s responsibility does not depend upon
45
the degree: Cleveland v. Newsom,
Mich., 62; 7 N. W. 222. But see, Ran
dall v. Chicago & G. T. Ry. Co., 113
Mich., 115: 71 N. W., 450; holding that
the plaintiﬂf has the burden of showing
that the act complained of was within
the scope of the servant's employment
and this would seem to be the general
rule. A rule promulgated for the control
of the employment cannot be invoked by
the master where it is customarily vio
under circumstances from which
lated
knowledge by the master was to be pre
sumed. Such conditions amount to a vir
tual abrogation of the rule: Fluhrer v.
Lake Shore & biw S. Ry. Co., 121 Mich.,
212; 80 N. W., 23; Nichols v. Chicago
& W. M. Ry. Co., 125 Mich., 394; 84
N. W., 470. And so a master is respon
sible for the negligent driving of his
servant even while the latter is acting
temporarily_ for a third person who has
hired the team and driver from the
master; Joslin v. Grand Rapids Ice Co.,
Mich., 516; 15 N. W., 887; see,
50
Broderick v. Detroit Union R. R. Sta. 8:
Depot Co., 56 Mich., 261; 22 N. W.
Reporter, 802. Conduct outside the em
ployment does not render the master
liable: Schulwitz v. Delta Lumber Co.,
126 Mich., 559: 85 N. W., 1075. (Child
permitted to ride on wagon used by
servant): Formall v. Standard Oil Co.,
127 Mich., 496; 86 N. W., 946; Mahler
v. Stott, 129 Mich., 614; 89 N. W., 340.
By statute, C. L., § 4297, it is pro
vided that the owners of carriages car
rying passengers on the public highway
for hire shall be liable to persons in
by
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Because one is held to assume the risks naturally incident to
his employment, among which is the negligence of other serv
ants engaged in the same employment, there is no liability of
the master to servants injured by the carelessness or negligence
of their fellow servants.’
It is the duty of the employer to furnish a reasonably safe
place in which the employee may do his work. This does not
Many occupa
require the employer to elminate all danger.
tions are necessarily dangerous, The place, the machinery, the
tools, in which, or with which, the employee is required to ren
der his serviee, must be reasonably safe having in view the
general character
jured
sioned

by
by

such
the

carriage

willful

of the employment.“
though
conduct

ness he might have known by the exer
cise of due diligence or ordinary care,

occa

of

the

driver.
In trespass against an employer for
an injury caused by the act of his serv
ant, it is for the jury to decide whether
the act was willful or careless; if it was
willful the employer would not be an
Wood v. Detroit City R. Co.,
swerable:
52 Mich., 402; 18 N. W., 124.
7—Employer not liable to his serv
ant, for the negligence of a fellow-serw
ant.—Where one man enters into the
service of another to perform a par
ticular kind of work, he is very prop
erly held, us between himself and his
employer, to assume the natural and
ordinary risks incident to such service,
arising from the negligence
and mis
conduct of his fellow servants, as well
as other risks not arising from the fault
And if the employer
of the employer.
has acted in good faith and with ordin
ary care and prudence in the selection
of tit and competent
and employment
servants, he should not be liable to one
of them for an injury arising from the
negligence of his fellow-servant: because
it is fair to presume that the compensa
to such
tion was ﬁxed with reference
risk: per Christiancy, J., in Michigan
Central Ry. Co. v. beshy, 10 Mich., 203;
Davis v. Detroit & Milwaukee R. R. Co.,
20 Mich., 105; and see, Michigan Cen
tral R. R. Co. v. Dolan, 32 Mich., 510.
But where a master retains an in
competent
servant in his employment‘
after knowledge comes to him of the un
titness of the servant for the service in
which he is engaged, or of whose unﬁt

is liable to another servant for injuries
by the negligence
of the incom
servant: Hilts v. Chicago, et('.,
Ry. Co., 55 Mich., 437; 21 N. W., 878.

caused
petent

having knowl
railroad employee
of the unﬂtness of another em
ployee of the same company,
and who
does not give information to the com
pany of such uniltness, takes upon him
self all the risks of injury from such
unﬂtness
while engaged in the ordinary
performance of his duties, as much as
if he had expressly contracted with ref
erence
to possible injuries
from that
cause: Davis v. Detroit Q Milwaukee
Ry. Co., 20 Mich., 105.
Employees en
gaged ln the operation oi’ freight trains
fellow servants: Stanley v. Chi
are
cago & N. W. Ry. Co., 101 Mich., 202;
59 N’. W., 393; (conductor, engineer,
so are a locomotive
ﬁre
brakeman):
man and section
track repairers and
Loranger
v.
Lake
train hrakeman:
Shore & M. S. Ry. Co., 104 Mich., 80;
62 N. W., 137.
A

edge

8—Duty of cmploycr to furnish
a
so/c place to work.——As to liability of
employer,
for injuries resulting to em
ployee in the prosecution of the employ
ment: See. Fort Wayne. J. & S. R. R.
Co. v. Glldersleeve, 33 Mich., 133.
A master is only bound to use ordi
nary care in protecting iris servants
from dangers that are not within their
knowledge
or observation.
The servant
is supposed to understand and assume
the ordinary risks of his service. Hence,
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'I'he declaration
in actions for negligence.—The
§758.
declaration should allege that he, the plaintiff, at the time
of the injury complained of was in the exercise of ordinary
care and was not guilty of any negligent
employers may use such machinery as
they choose, provided it is sound, well
made and kept in repair, and in an
action by the servant for injuries caused
by its use, the question as to whether
a diﬂerent kind of machinery would
afer, cannot be con
not have been
sidered.
Masters do not impliedly war
rant the machinery and appliances used
by their servants, to be safe beyond
contingency, or even to be safe as those
of other employers.
And a servant who
continues to use machinery which has
proved to be unsafe,
assumes the risk
and cannot recover for injuries which
he receives in doing so.’
Accidental injuries to servants will
not sustain an action against the mas
ter where they arise from the servant's
voluntary use of machinery which they
understand, and to which no objection
has been made as being particularly
unsafe: Richards v. Rough, 53 Mich.,
213; 18 N. W. 785. But see Broderick
v. Detroit Union S. & D. Co., 56 Mich.,
261; 22 N. W., 802. The obligation of
the employer is not to make his prem
ises and machinery perfectly safe or to
appliances but
have the most approved
to have his premises reasonably safe and
his machinery reasonably well suited for
the purpose
for which it is used: La
motte v. Boyce, 105 Mich., 545; 63 N.
W., 517.
It is sufficient if the master
furnishes appliances which are in com
mon use in the same or similar lines
of work: Shadford v. Ann Arbor S. Ry.
Co., 111 Mich., 390; 69 N. W., 661.
Where the danger is apparent to one of
ordinary comprehension the master is
not liable though the place is not safe:
Berlin v. Mershon, 132 Mich., 183; 93
Murshinsky
N. W., 248;
v. Vincent,
——— Mich., —-—; 97 N. W., 43; (Nov.,
The master cannot delegate
1903).
the duty to furnish a safe place so as
to relieve himself from responsibility
and persons engaged in work of making
the place safe are held, in Balhoff v.
Michigan C. Ry. Co., 106 Mich., 606;
65 N. W., 592, not within
the fel
low servant rule; See cases cited in
the opinion in last named case and

conduct

contribu

Anderson v. Michigan C. Ry. Co., 107
Mich., 591; 65 N. W., 585.
This duty
is a continuing one and is not satis
ﬂed _by once furnishing such conditions,
but requires the master to provide rea
sonably for inspection and repair: An
derson v. Michigan C. Ry. Co., supra;
McDonald v. Michigan C. Ry. Co., 108
Mich., 7; 65 N. W., 597.
Duty of in
spection is not discharged by delegating
to a fellow servant: McDonald v. Michi
gan C. Ry. Co., supra.
This duty of in
spection
does not extend to the small
and common tools in everyday use, of
the ﬁtness
for use of which the em
ployees
using them may reasonably be
supposed to be competent judges: Wach
smith v. Shaw Electric C. Co., 118
Mich., 275; 76 N. W., 497.
Nor will an employer be held liable
for negligence
in omitting to guard
against accidents that are not likely to
happen,
or such as no one would be
likely to foresee: Sjogren v. Hall, 53
Mich., 274; 18 N. W. 812.
as

hires out for any service,
risk ordinarily incident to it.
And a railroad company_ is not negli
gent in omitting to clear snow and ice
from the ground alongside of its track
in the neighborhood of its depot plat
forms; and a brakeman who is in
jured by slipping on it has no remedy
against the company: Piquegno v. Chi
cago & Grand Trunk Ry. Co., 52 Mich.,
40; 17 N. W. 232.
Where a dan
ger
incident to a particular
employ
ment is apparent to the ordinary per
Whoever

takes

son

the

the

Manning

employee

assumes

the

risk:

Chicago & W. M.
Ry.
260;
W.,
Co.,
105 Mich.,
63
N.
312; Gavigan v. Lake Shore & M. S.
Ry. Co., 110 Mich., 71; 67 N. W., 1097;
Journeaux v. E. H. Stafford Co., 122
Mich., 396; 81 N. W., 259; Shanke v.
United States H. Co., 125 Mich., 346;
84 N. W., 283; Ertz V. Pierson, 130
Mich., 160; 89 N. W., 680.
The em
ployer is not bound to warn against
dangers of every possible kind;
not
against one not to be expected: Nowak
owski v. Detroit S. W., 130 Mich., 308;

~1
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ting to the injury ;‘ that defendant owed to him, the plain
tiff, _a particular duty the failure to perform which is the
occasion of this action;2 that the defendant was guilty of
such conduct, speciﬁcally alleging the same in detail, as shows
a failure to discharge the duty he owed to plaintiff by reason
of which failure the plaintiﬁ' was injured ;3 there should also
be an allegation as to the nature and extent of the injury
received.‘

Actions on the case growing out of bailment rela
§759.
ti0ns.—A bailment consists in the delivery of personal chat
tels from one person, entitled to control their possession, to
another for the accomplishment of some particular purpose,
and under an obligation to return, or deliver over to a. par
ticular custody agreed upon, when the bailment purpose is
accomplished.
Bailments are of three general classes; those for the sole
beneﬁt of the bailor; those for the sole beneﬁt of the bailee;
and those for the mutual beneﬁt of bailor and bailee. These
three classes, naturally as well as by requirement of law, call
for diiferent rules for measuring the care and responsibility
of the bailee for the property which is the subject of the
If the bailor alone is beneﬁted by the bailment,
bailment.
while the bailee should not be excused from an obligation to
exercise some degree of care in connection with the bailment,
still he should not be required to exercise such a high degree
of care as if the bailment were for his sole beneﬁt or even for
89 N. W., 956.
It the work is in the
line ot his employment
and the danger
known by the employee, the fact that
the place is one of especial danger will
render masterlliable
for injury re
ceived: Middaugh v. Mitchell, 120 Mich.,
581; 79 N. W., 806.
1—Thompson v. Flint 81 P. M. Ry.
Co., 57 Mich., 307; 23 N. W., 820;
Denman
v. Johnston,
85 Mich., 387:
48 N. W., 565; Pratt v. Montcalm Cir
cuit Judge, 105 Mich., 501; 63 N. W.,
soc; McKormick v. vvesz Bay‘ City, 110
Mich., 265; 68 N. W., 148.
2—Buckley
Ry.
v.
Great ivestern
Co., 18 Mich., 121; Thompson v. Flint
& P. M. Ry. Co., 57 Mich., 307; 23 N.
W., 820; Thorsen v. Babcock, 68 Mich.,
626; 36 N. W., 723; Schindler v. Mil
not

waukee L. S. & W. Ry. Co., 77 Mich.,
136: 43 N. W., 911.
3-—'i‘hompson
v. Flint & P. M. Ry.
Co., 57 Mich., 307; 23 N. W., 820;
Lucas v. Wattles, 49 Mich., 382; 13
N. W., 782; O'Neil v. Duluth S. S. &
A. Hy. Co., 101 Mich., 437; 59 N. W.,
836; Elia v. Boyce, 112 Mich., 552;
70 N. W., 1106.
' 4—For cases illustrating
necessity
tor, and suﬂiciency of allegations oi’
special damages: Shadock v. Alpine P.
Co., 79 Mich., 11; 44 N. W.. 158:
Fuller v. Jackson, 92 Mich., 199; 52;
N. VV., 1075; McKor|nick v. West Bay
City, 110 Mich., 265; 68 N. W., 148;
Snyder v. Albion, 113 Mich., 279; 71
N. W., 475; Fye v.'Chapin, 121 Mich.,
675; 80 N. W., 797.
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the mutual beneﬁt of both. On the other hand if the bailee
alone is beneﬁtted by the bailment he -should be held to a
much higher degree of care than as if he had no beneﬁt from

if he proﬁted equally with the bailor.
Again if bailor and bailee are both beneﬁtted by the bailment
relation a diﬁerent measure of care isexacted than in either
of the others; a measure of care lying between that required
in the other two. The law designates this measure of care
required in the case of the mutual beneﬁt bailment as “or
dinary” care, and, without more definitness, designates that
required in the bailment for the sole. beneﬁt of the bailor as
something less than ordinary care, and that required in the
bailment for the sole beneﬁt of the bailee as something more
than ordinary care. An illustration of the mutual beneﬁt bail
ment is the hiring of a horse from a livery stable keeper to
the bailment or than as

make a desired drive. The stable keeper is beneﬁtted through
receiving his hire and the other, the bailee through being able
to make his desired drive. An illustration of the bailment for
the sole beneﬁt of the bailor is the taking by his neighbor and
friend of his silver to care for while he is absent from home

with no thought of compensation but as a neighborly act.
An illustration of the bailment for the sole beneﬁt of the bailee
is where the bailor as a neighborly kindness and with no
the bailee to take
thought of receiving compensationiallows
his horse to drive to a neighboring town.
To state the rules of law applicable, from the point of view
of responsibility for failure to exercise the required degree of
care, the bailee in the mutual beneﬁt bailment is answerable

for failure to exercise ordinary care,“ the bailee in the bail
ment for the sole beneﬁt of the bailor is answerable for gross
negligence only,“ and the bailee in the bailment for the sole
5—Hoier v. Hodge, 52 Mich., 372;
N. W., 112; Ruggies v. Fay, 31
Mich., 141; Eastman v. Sanborn, 3 Al
len, 594; Cross v. Brown, 41 N. H.,
283; Harrington
v. Snyder,
3 Barb.,
380; Ray v. Tubbs, 50 Vt., 688; Knights
v. Pielia, 111 Mich., 9; 69 N. W., 92.
See, State Savings Bank v. Buhl, 129
Mich., 193; 88 N. W., 471; Taylor v.
Downey. 104 Mich., 532; 62 N. W.,
716.
The burden is upon the bailor to
show want of the care required: Knights
18

Pielia, supra;
Dennis v. Huyck, 48
Mich., 620; 12 N. W.. 878.
One who
uses the property in a way not within
the
bailment purpose,
is answerable
absolutely tor loss or injury occurring
while so being used: Fisher v. Kyles,
27 Mich., 454.
6—Coggs v. Bernard, 2 Ld. Raym.,
909; Foster v. Essex Bank, 17 Mass.,
479; 9 Am. Dec. 168; Edson v. Weston,
7 Cow.,
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beneﬁt of the bailee is answerable for even slight negligence."

Action for fraud or deceit.-When

§760.

tation of

who

thing,

a false represen

a fact is made, to induce another to do a

particular

it accordingly,

and thereby sustains
in an action on the case.“

does

dam

it may be recovered
If A
fraudulently makes a representation which is false to B, mean
and B, believing
ing that B shall act upon
to be true,
it,

it

it,

age,

act upon
and thereby suffers damage, he may sus
tain an action on the case against A for the deceit; there
being here the conjunction of wrong and loss, entitling the
injured and suffering party to
compensation in damages.”
Where the plaintiff employed the defendant to obtain
lease of
a

a

does

for him, and the defendant falsely pretended that
for
and obtained that amount from the
was holden
plaintiff, whereas in fact he had only paid £100,
than an action on the case would lie for this deceit.”
it,

some premises

it

he paid £150 premium

In

a

is

for deceit in the sale of
horse where proof
that
the
defendant
made
false representations
given
knowingly
to the plaintiff concerning the horse, at the time of the sale,
an action

and that the plainiﬁ was induced by those representations to
buy the horse, and eonﬁding in them, did buy him, the jury
are authorized and required to ﬁnd that the defendant made
the representations with the intent thereby to induce the plain

tiff to buy the horse, and the plaintiif cannot legally

be re

quired to give further proof of such intent of the defendant."

if

a

is

If man do anything in the name of another, by which he
a man bring an action in the name
deceived and injured, as,
of another, and then suffers a nonsuit, whereby the plaintiff be

7

6

3

8—Pasley v. Freeman,
Term. R.,
51; Picard v. McCormick, 11 Mich., 68;
xnd Beebe v. Knapp, 28 Mich., 53; Car
N. W.,
ter v. Glass, 44 Mich., 156;

6

a

6

200.

ignorance of their falsity, he must be
responsible for
legal fraud: Con
verse v. Blumrich, 14 Mich., 109; Cur
N. W.,
ter v. Glass, 44 Mich., 156;
200; Hopkins v. O'Neil, 46 Mich., 403;
N. W., 448; see, Beebe v. Young, 14
Smith, 20
Mich., 136; Comstoek
v.
Mich., 338: see, Stone v. Covell, 29
Mich., 360.
‘1‘aunt.,
10—Pewtress
v. Austin,
held

9

7-—Carpenter v. Branch, 13 Vt., 129;
v. Richard
37 Am. Dec. 586: Beardslee
son, 11 Wend., 25; 25 Am. Dec. 596;
see, Beller v. Schultz, 44 Mich., 529:
N. W., 225.

&

522.

11—Collins

3

2

BL, 476,
El.
9—Gerhsrd v. Bates,
Selden,
488; White v. Merritt,
352.
It one obtains property of another by
though in
means oi untrue statements.

549.
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comes liable to costs, the

latter may maintain an action on the

him."

case against

If

§76O

in selling

If, upon

is,

it,

it

a

is

it

is

it really

is,

a house, allege the cost of it to be more
whereby the vendee
induced to give a
higher price for it; or if, in selling a public house, the vendor
allege the business done‘ in
to be more than
by
really
which the vendee
induced to give
this
higher price for
action lies."
a man,

than

reference to

a

a

man, with respect to the solvency
him as ﬁt to be trusted, when he
knows he
not so, this action lies,
any injury arise to the
party from having given credit upon his representation."
But by statute, “No action shall be brought to charge any per
son, upon or by reason of any favorable representation or as
the character, conduct, credit,
surance, made concerning
ability, trade or dealings of any other person, l111l6SS such rep
resentation or assurance be made in writing, and signed by the
party to be charged thereby, or by some person thereunto by
him lawfully authorized/"~"

if

he represent

is

of another,

is

a

is

it

is

The doctrine of fraud includes not only the expression of that
false, but also the suppression of that which
which
true.
Where
made to appear that a vendor has been guilty of
fraudulent concealment of material facts, to the injury of the
vendee, an action at law can be maintained to recover the dam
ages?“ Where a father by letter recommended his minor son
as worthy of credit, but did not state that he was a minor, and

if

if

a

it

trusted the son for goods to
the plaintiff on the strength of
large amount, the court held that the direction to the jury,
that
the father concealed the fact of the minority of the son,
with the view of giving him credit, knowing or believing that
that fact had been stated, he would not have obtained the

N. P., 30.
Bing., N. C.,
13—Plilmore v. Hood,
97; Taylor v. Green,
P., 316.
C.
Bing., 35;
14—Corhet v. Brown,
EL, 86.
Ad.
15—C. L_,
9518 and notes.
This
statute is not applicable where
the
representations form part of a. con
tract:
Huntington
Wellington,
v.
12
Mich., 10; nor where the representation

7

§

&

8

8

&

5

12——Buiier's

is made to enable the party making it
to proﬁt by it: Hess v. Culver, 77 Mlch.,
602; 43 N. W., 994; Clark v. Hurd, 79
Mich., 130; 44 N. W., 343.
This
statute applies though the representation
is made in another state where there is
no such statute: Third National Bank v.
Steel, 129 Mich., 434; 88 N. W., 1050.
16-—Flemlng v. Slocum,
18 Johns.,
403.

I
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credit, he was liable in law for the damage the plaintiff sus
tained, was correct."

But the vendor of merchandise is not bound to communi
of extrinsic circumstances,
cate to the vendee intelligence
exclusively within the knowledge of the vendor, which may
aﬁect the price of the merchandise.
But at the same time
each party must take care not to say anything tending to im
pose upon the other."
The declaration in actions for fraud or deceit.-It
§761.
should, by a general allegation of the circumstances show that
the plaintilf was justiﬁed in relying on the representations of
defendant, and speciﬁcally what the representations were;1°
facts showing that they were material; that they were relied
upon and induced plaintiﬁf to do the thing, the doing of which
resulted in his injury; that the representations were false ;2°
that plaintiff was injured and the character of the injury and
'
an allegation of damages.

For keeping dangerous instruments.-If a man have
§762.
dangerous instruments, which are in a state to do mischief, he
must take the utmost care that they are kept in such a way
that they may not occasion an injury to another. Where the
L, which he knew
defendant, having a gun at the house of
to be loaded with powder and shot, sent a. very young girl for
to take out the priming, before he
with
message to
accordingly took out the priming, and gave
sent it;
at the child of the plain
to the girl, who, in play, presented
unfortunately went off and wounded him; the court
tiﬁ, and
held that the plaintiff might maintain an action against the de
fendant for the injury; the latter, no doubt, intended to have
taken suﬁicient precaution by directing the priming to be taken
was not suﬂicient;
was incumbent
out, but unfortunately
upon him who, by charging the gun, had made
capable of
safe and innocuous before
doing mischief, to render
was
messenger.‘-’1 Where the defendant, for the
entrusted to such
L,

J

19—Parker v. Armstrong, 55 Mich.,
179; 20 N. W., 892; Pforzhelmer v.

800

&

178.

Selkirk, 71 Mich., 607; 40 N. W., 12.
Marker,
20—Stoﬂet
Mich.,
v.
34
315; and see cases cited in last note.
‘2l—Dlxon v. Bell,
M.
S., 198;
Starla, 287.
Dixon v. Bell,
5

252.

Wheaten,

1

Metc.,

2

17—Kldney V. Stoddart,
18—Laldiaw
v. Organ,

7

a

it

it

it

it

it

it

it

J

it

L

a

it,

J
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of his property, some of which had been stolen, set
spring gun, without notice, in a garden completely walled
around, and at a distance from his house, and the plaintiff,
who had climbed over the wall in pursuit of a strayed fowl,
protection
a

was shot, the judges held that an action was maintainable
In that case, it was
and the defendant liable in da.magcs.22
evident from notice not being put up, and also from the

of the defendant, that

declarations

he intended

to inﬂict an

land.” So, if
dangerous traps, baited with ﬂesh, in his own
ground, so near a highway or the premises of another that
dogs passing along the highway, or kept in his neighbor’s
premises, must probably be attracted by their instinct into a
trap, and in consequence of such act his neighbor ’s dogs be

injury

on any person who should trespass on the

a man place

so attracted.

§ 763. For keeping dangerous animals--at common law.-At
the common law, and in the absence of statute, the owner
of domestic or other animals, not naturally inclined to commit
mischief, as dogs, horses and cattle, is not liable for any injury
committed by them to the person or personal property, unless
it can be shown that he previously had not-ice of the animal ’s

propensity; it being, in general, necessary in an
action for any injury committed by such animals, to allege
malicious

and prove that the owner knew that the animal was wont to
If a man keeps a. vicious animal, knowing it to
do mischief.“
be so, and do not take suﬁicient measures to prevent its doing
mischief, he will be answerable for any injury it may commit to
the property or person of another; as, if a man knowingly keep
a vicious bull,” or a dog accustomed to bite cattle or sheep,"
or a dog accustomed to bite mankind," whether the animal
be his own property or not." In relation to animals naturally

wild, such
22——Bird
644.

23—The
the

makes

v.

as bears, etc., the keeper
Hoibrook,

4 Bing.,

628,

L.,
statute,
C.
Q 11515,
setting of a spring gun, or

exother like device, a misdemeanor,
prescept it be left in the immediate
ence

of

24-1

some

competent

person.

Chitty‘s Pi., 10 Am. ed., 82.

51

of them is accountable for

v. Simmons,
25—Biackman
3 C. &
P., 138.
26—I-Iartley v. Harrlman, 1 B. & A.,
620.

27—Judge v. Cox, 1 Cox. 285; Cur
tis v. Mills, 5 C. & P., 489; Hogan v.
Sharpe, 7 Ibid., 755.
28—McKone v. Wood, 5 C. & P., 1.
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the mischief they do, whether he have notice or not of their
vicious disposition?”

If

a man keep a dog, accustomed to bite, upon his premises
for their protection, and another person incautiously come upon
the premises in, the night, and be bitten by the dog, he is in that
case injured by his own fault, and the owner of the dog is not
responsible.3°. A person has a right to keep a ﬁerce dog to
protect his property; but not to place it in or on the ap
proaches to his house, so as to injure persons exercising a law
ful purpose, in going along those paths to the house."
To establish the seienter of the owner of the animal, it will
be sutﬁcient to prove that the owner had notice of a similar
having been committed (as, if a dog had bitten
and afterwards bite a horse), for the owner ought to
have killed him when he had notice of the ﬁrst mischief."
mischief
sheep,

By sta.tute.—“Any person may kill any dog that he
§764.
may see chasing, worrying, wounding, or killing any sheep,
lambs, swine, cattle, or other domestic animal, out of the en
closure or immediate care of the owner or keeper, unless the
same be done by the direction or permission of such owner or
keeper; or any dog that may suddenly assault him while he
is peaceably walking or riding anywhere out of the enclosure
or keeper of such dog.”3“
“If any dog shall have killed, or assisted in killing, wound
ing or worrying any sheep, lamb, swine, cattle, or other do
mestic animal, or that shall assault or bite, or otherwise injure
any person while traveling the highway or out of the enclosure
of the owner or keeper of such dog, such owner or keeper shall
be liable to the owner of such property or person injured in
double the amount of damages sustained, to be recovered in
an action of trespass, or on the case, and it shall not be neces

of

the owner

sary, in order to sustain an action, to prove that the owner
or keeper knew that such dog was accustomed to do such dam
29—Rex v. Higgins, Lord Raymond,
1583; 1 Chitty's P1., 82.
Moody
8:
30—Sarch v. Blackburn,
Mall., 505.
31——Tennnnt
v. Strachan, 19 Eng.
Com. Law R. 394.
32—Cnux v. Lowther, Lord Raym.,
600, G07; sec, 1 Chitty's Pl., S2, notes.

L., § 5592.
33—C.
For a con
struction of this statute see:
Hubbard
v. Preston, 90 Mich., 221; 51 N. W..
209; Bowers v. Horen, 93 Mich., 420;
53 N. W., 535; Ten Hopen v. Walker,
96 Mich., 236: 55 N. W., 657; Throne
v. Mead,
122 Mich., 273; 80 N. W..
1080.
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or mischief; and upon the trial of any cause ‘mentioned
in this section, the plaintiff and defendant may be examined
under oath touching the matter at issue, and evidence may be
age

given as in other cases; and if it shall appear to the satisfac
tion of the court by the evidence, that the defendant is justly
liable for the damages complained of under the provisions of
this act, the court shall render judgment against such defend
ant for double the amount of damages proved, and costs of

suit; but in no
dollars costs.”3‘*

plaintiff recover more than ﬁve

case shall the

Against common carriers, who are-Common car
§765.
riers undertake, generally, and not as a casual operation, and
for all people, indiﬁ'e1'ently, to carry goods, and deliver them
at a place appointed, for hire, as a business, and with or with
out a special agreement as to time. They include the owners
of stage wagons and coaches, and railroad cars, who carry
goods as well as pasengers for hire, wagoners, teamsters, cart
men, porters, the masters and owners of ships, vessels, and all
water craft, including steam vessels and steam tow-boats, be
longing to_internai as well as coasting and foreign navigation,
To
lightermen, barge owners, canal boatmen, and ferrymen.*"-"
of
a
common
carrier, he
bring a person within the description
must exercise it as a public employment; he must undertake
to carry goods for persons generally, and he must hold himself
34——C. L-. § 5593.
and
see notes
T1118 statute does not super
theretm
It was
sede ' common
law actions.
intended to give a liberal remedy in a
cases, and to authorize a
few special
It does
recovery
in its nature penal.
in the
not require proof oi’ knowledge
defendant of the dog's habit to “do such
damage or mischief," and the right of
action cannot be extended by construc
Monroe v. Rose, 38 Mich., 347:
tion:
Newton \. Gordon, 72 Mich., 642; 40 N.

W., 921.
Although the plaintiff's right to re
cover under this statute does not de
pend on the fact as to whether defend
ant knew that his dog was vicious and
inclined to bite, yet the fact of knowl
edge in the owner of the vicious dis
position of his dog is a proper sub

iect

to be

weighed

by

taken

into

account

jury in estimating

and

the
oi’ such knowl
evidence
edge is therefore competent.
Reckless
ness of conduct, or the want of due and
care,
reasonable
is an important ele
damages,

ment

in

the

and

estimating

the

damages

in

a case as in most cases of tort:
Swift v. Applebone,
23 Mich. 252. As
to the pleadings, see, Monroe v. Rose,
such

38 Mich. 347; Snow v. McCracken, 107
Mich. 49; 64 N. W. 866.
See ante §
474.

Telegraph
of statute,
under the
rule as declared in this state:
Birkett
v. Western Union T. Co., 103 Mlch.,
361; 61 N. W., 645.
35—2 Kent's

Com.,

598.

in the absence
companies,
carriers
are not common
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out-as ready to engage in the transportation of goods for hire,

occupation."

as a business, and not as a casual

is,

is

to be understood, natural acci
ceptions. By the act of God
dents, such as lightning, storms, tempests, and the like, which
could not happen by any human intervention; unusual force,
though ever so great and irresistible, does not excuse."
Questions frequently have arisen in respect to the validity of
notices by common carriers restricting their common law liabil
ity. In England, the cases recognized the validity of these no
tices until little responsibility attached to carriers, when par
a

liament interposed, and by statutory provisions rendered car
riers liable, in
great measure, to the same extent as by the
common law.
The courts

a

in this country have, however, generally held
notice to that eifcct, absolve
that the carriers could not, by
which
themselves from the responsibility
attached to them

to

per

2

§

0

&

&

company

the

liability

oi’ the

express

company

as

carrier terminates on the
safe carriage oi the goods to their des
tination, the giving of reasonable no
tice to the consignee
of their arrival
payment
and oﬂer to deliver
of
on
amount charged against them.
If they
nre no] taken within
reasonable
time
alter such notice the liability oi’ the
express
company
is that of a ware
hnuseman:
Hasse v. American
Ex
Co., 94 Mich., 133; 53 N. W..
press
918.
An express company
in general
is under obligation to make free de
livery, but
may
estnblisb distance
limitations from its oﬂico in the city
or town beyond which
will charge
i'or making personal delivery:
Bullard
Express Co., 107 Mich.,
v. American
695; 65 N. W., 551.
a

804

common

a

express

it

an

upon
it by
form the duties imposed
law with reference to the receiving and
Attorney Gen'i,
forwarding oi’ goods:
ea: rel, Moore v. American Express Co.,
While
118 Mich., 682; 77 N. W., 317.
common carriers under the rule oi the
common
law must carry tor all per
this duty is em
sons indiscriminately
6235,
phssized by the statute, C. L.,
providing a penalty for tailing to do
so.
This penalty cannot, however.
be
carrier
by another common
recovered
to be
to whom goods were consigned
Crosby v.
carried to their destination:
Pere Marquette Ry. Co., 131 Mich.,
'
'
288: 91 N. W., 124.
_
v. Nowlen, 19 Wend.,
37—Hoiiister
247, 251; Michigan Central R. R. Co.
Mich., 257;
Kent's Com.,
v. Hale,
Contrary to the rule obtaining
852.
generally in this country, a common
carrier docs not, in Michigan, curry
live stock under the general rule oi’
the common law as to liability, but is

it

to compel

answerable only for failure to ex
Michigan, S.
ercise ordinary care:
Ry. Co. v. McDonough, 21 Mich.,
N.
G. T. Ry. Co.,
165: Heller v. Chicago
109 Mich., 53: 66 N. W., 667; see,
Smith v. Michigan Central Ry. Co., 100
Mich. 148; 58 N. W-. 651.
Where goods are expressed C. 0. D.
held

I.

§

36—Story on Baiiments,
495. Man
damus will lie by the attorney general
on the relation oi a private individual,

6

-

Liability of common carriers.—A common carrier is,
§766.
by the common law, in the nature of an insurer.
This makes
him liable for everything except the act of God, and the public
enemy, that
even for inevitable accidents, with these ex

C11.
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A

common carrier may limit its com
mon law liability by such express agreement with the shipper
as is reasonable and not inconsistent with sound public policy.
A receipt or bill of lading limiting the liability by its terms,
to an amount not exceeding $50, received by the shipper with
out objection, and without insisting on the common law lia
bility for the carrier, operates as a limitation upon the common
law liability. So of the provision therein limiting liability to

or injuries occurring on its own line of transportation;
so of a provision therein exempting from loss by ﬁre, all of
which provisions were held reasonable.”
The terms of a bill
of lading handed to a shipper’s clerk, and never brought to
the shipper’s attention, will not prevail as against an oral
contract of shipment previously made by the shipper with the
carrier’s authorized agent.” But such circumstances in the
losses

Heath, 6 Howard, 244.
Nelson J., in relation to
admitting
notices
said:
"That
the
right thus to restrict his (the car
rier's) obligation, it by no means fol
lows that he can do so, by any act
of his own.
He is in the exercise of a
sort of public oiﬂce, and has public
duties to perform, from which he shall
not be permitted to exonerate
himself
without the assent of the parties con
cerned.
And this is not to be implied
or inferred from a general notice to
public,
limiting
the
his obligation,
which may or may not be assented to.
He is bound to receive and carry all
goods
the
offered
for transportation,
subject
responsibilities
to
all
in
cident
to
his
employment,
and
is liable to an action in the case
of refusal.
And we agree with the
court in the case of Hollister v. Now
len, that if any implication is to be in
dulged
from the delivery of the goods
under the general notice, it is as strong
that the owner intended to insist upon
his rights, and the duties of the car
rier, as it is that he assented to their
qualiﬁcation."
Hollister v. Nowlen, 19
234; Jones
Wend.,
v.
Voorhees,
10
38—Bein

In this

Ohio,

v.

case

145.

carriers cannot themselves
restrict in any manner their common
law liability as such carriers.
They
cannot limit their liability by a mere
published or posted, or other
notice
wise brought to the knowledge of the
Common

consignor.
But a carrier may by spe
cial agreement with an individual con
tract for a limited liability, that is the
consignor may release the carrier by
express
contract from any portion of
his common law liability.
The carrier
is bound to transport property entrust
law lia
ed to him under his common
bility, if it be not waived or changed
by contract; and he cannot refuse to
property for transportation un
receive
less the consignor will agree to enter
into a special contract therefor, or re
lease him from any of his common law
Michigan
obligations as a carrier:
Central Ry. Co. v. Hale, 6 Mlch., 2-13:
Michigan
Southern
&
v.
McMillan
Northern Indiana Ry. Co., 16 Mich., 79;
5
see, American Trans. Co. v. Moore,
Mlch., 368; Sisson v. Cleveland & To
ledo R. R. Co., 14 Mlch., 489; Haw
kins v. Great Western Ry., 17 Mich..
57; Great Western Ry. v. Hawkins, 18
Mlch., 427. A common carrier is bound
to receive
and carry goods only when
offered
for carriage by the owner or
his authorized agent; and then only
upon payment
of freight in advance if
required:
Fitch v. Newberry, 1 Doug.
Mich., 1.
39-—Smith v. American Express Co.,
108 Mlch., 572; 66 N. W., 479; Hope
v. Delaware & H. C. Co., 111 Mlch.,
209; 69 N. W., 487.
Ogdensburg Transit
40—Rudell
v.
Co., 117 Mlch., 568; 76 N. W., 380.
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of any special oral agreement will operate as a con
and the shipper cannot avoid it by
showing that he received it in haste and without reading.“
The burden of showing that the carriage was under a contract
for a limited liability is upon the carrier."
absence

tract limiting liability

A common carrier is responsible for the loss of

a box

or par

of goods, though he be ignorant of the contents, or though
those contents be ever so valuable, unless he made a special
acceptance. But the rule is subject to a reasonable qualiﬁca
tion, and if the owner be guilty of fraud or imposition in re
spect to the carrier, as by concealing the value or nature of
the article, or dcludes him by his own carelessness in treating
the parcel as a thing of no value, he cannot hold him liable for
the loss of the goods.“ If any means are used to conceal the
nature of the article, and therebyv the owner avoids paying a
reasonable compensation for the risk, this unfairness, and its
consequence to the carrier, upon the principle of common jus
tice will exempt him from responsibility, for such a result is
alike due to the carrier, who has received no reward for the
risk, and to the party who has been the cause of it.“ These
cases seem not to be obnoxious to the objection that the car
rier cannot limit his liability by a printed notice. So long,
says Cowen, J., as the printed notice of a common carrier is
conﬁned to the purposes which I have enumerated, and others
calculated to save himself, without mischief to his customers,
or for the beneﬁt of the latter, I see no objection in principle
When there is no notice, if there are no
to give it full eﬁ:'ect.‘-"
improper means or artiﬁce adopted by the person who sends
the goods to conceal the nature and value of the contents of
the box, parcel, or package, to mislead or deceive the carrier,
the person sending the goods is not bound to make the dis
closure, unless inquiry is made of him on the subject, although
the carrier has the right to make the inquiry, and to have a
true answer, and if a false answer is given, he will not be re
cel

sponsible.“
41-Hengstier

v. Flint 8: P. M. Ry.
530; 84 N. W., 1067.
42—Bonﬂglio v. Lake Shore & M. S.
Ry. Co., 125 Mich., 476; 84 N. W., 722.
43—Kent's Com., 603.
44—0range Co. Bank v. Brown, 9
Drew, 25
Cow.,
v.
85, 116; Pardee
Co.,

125 Mich.,

Wend., 459; Bradley v. Waterhouse, 3
C. & P., 318.
45—Cole v. Goodwin, 19 Wend., 251.
335,
-i6—S¢-wal
v. Allen, 6 YVcnd.,
349; Phillips v. Earle, 8 Pick., 182;
Walker v. Jackson, 10 M. & W., 168;
Batson v. Donovan, 4 B. & Ald., 21.
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To render the defendant liable, the property must be deliv
ered to him or to some one authorized by him to receive it.
When the plaintiﬁ, intending to take passage in a steamboat
of the defendants, deposited his trunk on board, in the usual
place for baggage, but without putting it in charge of any per
son, or notifying any person employed on the boat of such de
posit, or of his intention to take passage, and while temporarily
absent from the boat she started on her trip and he was left;
the supreme court of this state held that there was not a con
structive delivery and acceptance of the trunk as the baggage
of a passenger, by which the defendants could be heldliable
for its loss.“ In order that the carrier shall be held to answer
under the rule of the common law for loss of baggage checked
it must be accompanied by a bona ﬁde passenger. It is not
enough that a ticket is purchased.“

Actions for negligently driving on the highwa.y.—If
§767.
by ‘reason of the carelessness or negligence or want of skill
of one driving on the public highway another is injured in
his person or property, an action on the case will lie to re
cover damages for such in_]'ury.“’
This action will lie against
the driver, and, in case he is a servant or agent engaged in
the business of the master or principal, against the master
also.5°
The master is not liable for the willful act of the
48—Marshall v. Pontiac, 0. & N. Ry.
Co., 126 Mich., 45; 85 N. W., 242.
49—Moreton v. Harden, 4 B. & C.,
223.
All the surrounding circum
including age and sex of the
stances,
injured, are to be taken into
person
consideration upon the question of neg
ligence; but it cannot be laid down
-as a rule of law that a less degree oi
care is required ot a woman than of a
Hassenyer v. Michigan Central
man:
Ry. Co., 48 Mich., 205; 12 N. W., 155.
50—Moore v. Sanborn, 2 Mich., 519;
Sutherland v. Ingalls, 63 Mich., 620;
30 N. W., 342; Wood v. Detroit City
S. Ry. Co., 52 Mich., 402; 18 N. W.,
It, however, such driver is not at
124.
the time engaged in the business oi the
master, or it as to the particular mis
willfully,
conduct
the
servant
acts
maliciously or in wanton violation of
law, he alone is liable:
Moore v. San
born, 2 Mich., 519; Chicago & N. W.

"1:
'3
-1

47—Wright v. Caldwell, 3 Mich., 51.
Where a plaintiﬂ counts upon the com
mon law liability
of common
carriers
to carry safely, he must prove all the
to create
the
circumstances necessary
liability, and if he tail to show that
the property was delivered to or accept
ed by the company
under circumstances
which rhsde it their duty to assume the
care and custody of the property, in
Its rec:-ption, transportation and deliv
ery, he fails to prove the liability al
Michigan Southern & Northern
leged:
Indiana Ry. Co.
v.i._ McDonough, 21
Mich., 165. A common carrier becomes
immediately responsible as such, where
goods are properly marked and placed
inside its freight depot for shipment
at once, and the agent said they would
be shipped
the next morning, and this
though no shipping bill is taken:
Meloche v. Chicago. M. & St. P. Ry. Co.,
116 Mich., 69; 74 N. W., 301.
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servant except the driver be engaged by the master in driv
ing of the vehicles for hire, in which case both master and
servant are liable.-"1

Statutory duty of persons driving on the highway.
“Whenever any person shall meet each other on any bridge
or road traveling with carriages, wagons, carts, sleds, sleighs
or other vehicles, each person shall seasonabiy drive his car
riage or other vehicle to the right of the middle of the traveled
part of such bridge or road, so that the respective carriages,
or other vehicles aforesaid may pass each other without in
“Every per
The following section provides:
terferencc.”52
son oifending against the provisions of the preceding section,
shall, for each offense forfeit a sum not exceeding twenty dol
lars, and shall also be liable to the party injured for all (lam
ages sustained by reason of such oifense; Provided, That pro
ceedings shall be commenced for the recovery of such for
feiture within three months after the offense shall have been
commited, and any action for such damages shall be com
menced within one year after the cause of action shall have
§ 768.

accrued.

’ ’-"*3

Ry. Co. v. Hayﬁeld, 37 Mich., 205;
Sutherland v. lngalls, 63 Mich., 620;
30 N. W., 342; Great Western Ry. Co.
See, Smith
v. Miller, 19 Mich., 305.
v. Webster, 23 Mich., 298, and Scripps
10; Mahler V.
Reilly,
38 Mich.,
v.
Stott, 129 Mich., 614'. 89 N. W., 340;
Formaii v. Standard Oil Co., 127 Mich.,
496; 86 N. W., 946; Schulwitz v. Delta
Lumber Co., 126 Mich., 559; 85 N. W.,
1075.

51-C. L., § 4297.
52—C. L., § 4291. The traveled part
of the highway means that part worked

for travel and is not lim
most traveled wheel track:
Daniels v. Ciegg, 28 Mich., 42.
One
may recover
for an injury received in
a collision on the highway though he
was negligent himself, and failed to ob
serve the "law of the road," if not
withstanding such negligence the in
jury would not have been received but
for the wanton and wilful conduct of
the defendant:
Tyler v. Nelson, 109
Mich., 37; 66 N. \\'., 671.
53—C. L., § 4292; Daniels v. Clegg,
28 Mich., 42.
and

prepared

ited

to
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A.

P‘C)Rl\/IS.
IN PROCEEDINGS BY SUMMONS.
No.
lime,

1-Form

of Summons.

c. L.,

§§ 19, 21.

§§ 712, 715,

718, 719.

STATE OF MICHIGAN, lss '
COUNTY or . . . . . . . . . . .. f
To any Constable of said County:
In the name of the People of the State of Michigan, you are hereby
commanded to summon C.... D...., if he shall he found in your
county, to appear before me at my oﬁlce in the township (city or vil
day of
19.., at
lage) of
in said county on the
.noon to answer unto A. B. in a plea of . . .. to the
o'clock in the
damage of the said A. . .. B. . .. of one (or three) hundred dollars or
under. I-Iereof fail not, and have you then and there this precept.
Given under my hand at

M....

19. .

in said county the

L. . ..

M.

. . .,

Justice of

day of
the

Peace.

No. 2—Return of Summons Personally Served.
Ante, §§

40,

47.

0. L., §§ 716,

743.

I hereby certify, that I have personally served the within summons
on the within named defendant, by delivering/CS him a copy thereof
on the . . . . .. day of . . . . .. A. D.19..,at . . . . ..,in the county of....
0.... S. . . ., Constable.
Amount of my fees, $. . . .
Dated . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .., 19..

II’

No. 3—Return of Summons not Personally Served.
Ante, §§

40,

47.

c. L., §§ 716,

743.

I hereby certify, and return, that after diligent inquiry I have been
unable to ﬁnd the within named defendant within the county of . . . .
and that I have served the within summons on him by leaving a copy
day of
thereof at his last place of abode in said county, on the
...., 19. ., in the presence of G.... H. . . ., a member of his family of
years or more, who was
reasonable discretion and of the age of
informed of its contents by me.
Amount of my fees, $---o.,..
Constable.
Dated . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .., 19..
809

~’
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No.

4-Return of Summons Against Several Persons.
Ante, §§

I

wannam.

BY

47, 48.

.. ., 19. ., I served the
one of the within named
defendants, by delivering to him a copy thereof at . . . . .., in this
county of . . . . ..; and that after diligent inquiry I am unable to iind
in said county; and that I
the within named defendant
served the within summons on him by leaving a copy thereof at his
19.., in
day of
last place of abode in said county, on the
the presence of G.... H...., a member of his family of reasonable
years or more, who was informed
discretion, and of the age of
of its contents by me.
0. . . . S. . . ., Constable.
Amount of my fees, $. . .
Dated . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .., 19..
hereby certify, that on the

within summons personally

day of

.

on C.

.

D.

. . .

. . .,

No. 5—Return of Service of Summons on
Ante, §§

43,

47.

C. L. §§ 743, 754
101.

as amended

a.

Corporation.

by Pub. Acts 1901, p.

10022.

I hereby certify, that on the . . .. day of . . . . .., 19. ., I served the
within summons on the L. . .. Company, the defendant within named.
by delivering a copy thereof to G. . .. H...., who is the secretary of
said company (or to any other of the oﬂtcers named in the statute.
Act 68 of Public Acts 1901), at . . . ., in this county of . . ..
Amount
Dated

of my fees,

$....

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

..,

0.... S....,

Constable.

19..

IN PROCEEDINGS BY WARRANT.
for Warrant Against

No. 6—Aﬁda.v'it

a.

Public Officer for

Money Collected.
Ante, §§

STATE OF MICHIGAN,
OOUNTY

on . . . . . . . .

}

50,

51.

c. L.,

9

5 722.

88 '

of
in said county, being duly sworn,
A.... B..... of the
says that he has, as he has good reason to believe, a demand not ex
dollars, founded upon contract, agalnst C.... D....,
ceeding
against whom deponent applies for process by warrant.
And the said
as a con
demand is for money collected by the said C....
stable, for him, the said A.... B.... And that the facts and circum
stances constituting the grounds of said applicaion are
(state
the facts and circu.m.stan.ces in detail and in full.)

A

Subscribed and sworn to before me,
A. D. 19.. }
this
daylof

L....

Justice of the

Peace.
I

~i*—

FORMS—IN
No.

raooaamnos

WARRANT.

811

7-Aﬂidavit for Warrant in Case of Fraud, Etc.
Ante, §§ so,

STATE OF MICHIGAN,
COUNTY

BY

or

. . . . . .

i

..

c. L.,

51.

§ 722.

88 '

A.... B...., of the
of ...., in said county, being duly sworn,
says that he has, as he has good reason to believe, a cause of action
for damages not exceeding . . .. dollars, arising out of contract, against
C.... D... ., against whom deponent applies for process by warrant,
for a fraud committed by the said C. . .. D. . . . against this deponent;
and that the facts and circumstances within the knowledge of this
deponent constituting the grounds of said application, are, that
(state the facts and circumstances constituting the fraud in detail.)
-

Subscribed and sworn to before me,
day oi‘.
A. D. 19..
this
}
L. . .. M. . _ ., Justice of the Peace.

No.

8-Aﬂidavit in
Ante,

STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Counry or

. . . . . .. .

}

§ 52.

Case

A. . ..

B...

.

of Tort.

C. L., § 723.

88 '

of
A.... B...., of the
in said county, being duly sworn,
says that he has, as he has good reason to believe, a just cause of
of . . . ., in said county, against
action against C. . .. D. . . ., of the
whom he applies for process by warrant, for wrongfully converting
and disposing of one ox, of the value of one hundred dollars or under,
of the goods and chattels of this deponent.
And deponent further
says, that the facts and circumstances constituting the ground of this
application for said warrant, are
(state the facts and circum
stances constituting the wrong complained of, in detail.)
'

Subscribed and sworn to before
day of
me,}
this
A. D. 19..

L.... M....,
No.

Justice of

A.

. . .

B.

.. .

the Peace,

9-Form of Warrant.

Ante

STATE OF MICHIGAN,
COUNTY 01-". . . . . . . . . . . . }

§ 55.

c. L.,

§

125.

88 ‘

To any Constable of said County:
In the name of the People of the State of Michigan, you are hereby
of
in said county,
commanded to take C.... D...., of the
and have him forthwith before me, one of the Justices of the Peace
., then and there to answer
in and for said county, at my office in
And
to his damage
to A.... B...., in a plea oi!
dollars.

FoRMs—1N
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after such arrest you are to notify the plaintiff thereof. Hereof fail
not, but of this writ, with your doings, make due return according to
law.
Given under my hand at ...., this ....da.y of ...., 19....
L. . .. M. . . ., Justice of the Peace.

No.

10-Return to Warrant.

Ante, §§

64-66.

c. L.,

§

743.

I have this day, in the county of ...., arrested the within named
defendant, and have him before the court in custody; plaintiif notiﬁed
on

the....dayof

. . . .

..19..

Amount of my fees, $.
Dated . . . . . . . . . . . . . ., 19.

O.

. . .

S...

., Constable.

.

N 0. 11-Return to Warrant Where Justice Issuing the Warrant

Is Absent.
Ante,

§

66.

C. L.,

§

726.

By virtue of the within warrant I have this day, in the county of
arrested the within named defendant; and further return that
L. . .. M. . . ., the Justice of the Peace of the township of M. . .. within
named, by whom said warrant was issued, is absent from said town
ship, therefore, I have the said defendant in custody before
N. . . ., another Justice of the Peace of said township, as required by
law; plaintiﬂ notiﬁed on the
. day of . . . ., 19..
0.... S...., Constable.
Amount of my fees, $....
Dated . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 19. .

J....

No. 12—Form of Aﬂidavit on the Return of a. Warrant, that
the Justice Is a Material Witness.
Ante, §

68.

C.

L.

§ 335.

IN Jusr1cs's Comrr:

A--~ B--~

Before n.... M.....aJustice of the
Peace in and for the County of. . . .

vi‘)

C

Covxrv 01-" ...., ss.—C.... D...., the defendant in this cause,
Esquire, the Justice of the
being duly sworn, says that L. . .
Peace by whom the warrant in the said cause was issued, is a material
witness in behalf of this deponent on the trial of said cause, and that
he cannot safely proceed to the trial of said cause without the testi
mony of said
Subscribed and sworn to before me,
this . . . .. day of . . . .. 19..
., Justice of the Peace.
L....

Q

}

.

.

C....D....

PROCEEDINGS BY ATTACHMENT.
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IN PROCEEDINGS BY ATTACHMENT.
N0. 13—Form of Aﬂidavit to Obtain an Attachment.
Ante, §§ 69-75.

STATE OF MICHIGAN,
COUNTY

or .

C. L., §§ 721,

11207, 11208.

SS‘

. . . . . . . . . . .

of the township of ...., in said county, being duly
that there is justly due to this deponent, from C....
D. . . ., of said county, upon express contract, the sum of
dollars,
as near as this deponent can estimate the same, over and above all
legal set oi‘.Es; and this deponent further says, that he has good reason
to believe, and does believe, that the said C.... D.... is about to
remove his property from the said county of . . . . in which he resides,
with intent to defraud his creditors.
This deponent therefore applies for an attachment against the goods
and chattels of the said C... . D. . . ., and further this deponent saith
not.
Subscribed and sworn to before
day of
A. D. 19..me,}
this

A....

sworn,

says

A....B....

A.

No.

. . .

B.

. . .,

Justice of

the Peace.

14-Form of Bond in Attachment.

Ante, §§ 10-vs.

c. L.,

§§ 72s, 10409, 10410,

10417.

Know all men by these presents, that we, A. . .. B. . . ., as principal,
and
as sureties, of ...., are held and
and G....
ﬁrmly bound unto C.... D...., in the sum of two hundred dollars
(or, if plaintiff's demand exceed $100 then in double the amount of
or to his certain
the demand), to be paid to the said (3....
attorney, executors, administrators, or assigns; to which payment well
and truly to be made, we bind ourselves, our heirs, executors and
administrators, jointly and severally, ﬁrmly by these presents.
day of ...., 19..
Sealed with our seals.
Dated_the
Wm-zssas. application has been made by the above bounden A....
B...., to L.... M...., Esq., aJustice of the Peace of the
of
in the county of ...., for an attachment against the goods and
B....;
chattels oi! the said C.... D... ., in favor of the said A.
Now THEREFORE the condition of this obligation is such, that it the
said A.... B.... shall pay to the said C.... D.... all damages and
may sustain by reason of the issuing
costs, he, the said C....
of said attachment, if the said A. . .. B. . .. shall fail to recover judg
ment in said suit, then this obligation to be void, otherwise of force.

A.... B....
G....

[L. S.]
[L. S.]
[L. S.]

814
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I approve of
going bond.
Dated .

No.

L...

..,

.

19..

Ante

STATE OF MICHIGAN,
or .

as sureties

M. .. ., Justice of

in the fore
the Peace.

15-Form of Writ of Attachment.

'

COUNTY

G....

and

. . .. . . . . . . .

BY ATTACHMENT.

. . . . . . . . . . . . .

i

§

'19.

0. L., §

729.

88'

To any Constable of said County, greeting:
Whereas, application

has

to me,

been made

of the Peace of the

I.... M....,

a.

Justice

of
in said county, for an attachment in
favor of A.... B.... against the goods and chattels of C.... D....,
dollars, due to the said A. . .. B... . upon express
for the sum of
contract from the said C. . . . D. . . ., being the amount claimed by the
said A.
B... ., and the requisite affidavit having been made and
ﬂied with me, and a. bond with sufficient sureties having been made
and executed, and ﬁled with me:
Therfore in the name of the People of the State of Michigan, you
are commanded to attach so much of the goods and chattels of the
said C.... D.... (excepting such as are exempt by law from execu
tion) as will be sufficient to satisfy said demand; and safely keep
the same to satisfy any judgment that may be recovered by the said
A.... B.... And do you return this attachment to me, the said
in said county, on the
justice, at my oﬂice in the
of
day of
o'clock in the ....noon.
at
aforesaid, the . . .. day of
of
Given under my hand at the
. . . . . .,

No.

19. .

L. . ..

M.

. . .,

Justice of the

Peace.

16-Form of Docket Entry—Successive Attachments.
Ante

§

as.

o. L., §§ 131,

738.

Attachments having been issued and served on the goods and cliat~
tels of the defendant, at the times, in favor of the parties, and in the
order following:
PARTIES.
A. Tl. v. C. D
E. F. v. C. D

AMOUNT

or Jvncmrzxr

AND

Cosrs. WHEN ATTACHMENT Ssnvsv.

$46 O0
36 O0

November 1st, 19%.
November 4th, 1905.

I, L. . . . M. . . ., the Justice of the Peace who issued the attachment
having the priority of lien,‘ do ﬁnd that the priorities exist, and said
judgments are entitled to be satiﬂsed out of the property attached
by said attachments, in the order above set forth.

—i

_
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No. 17—Form of Gopy of Inventory to Return with
Attachment.
,
Ante

§

92,

C.

L

§

744.

Copy of an inventory of goods and chattels this day seized by me
by virtue of the annexed attachment,
One black horse.
One red cow.
Two Berkshire hogs.
One axe.
Dated . . . . . . . . . . . . .., 19..
0....
Constable.

No. 18—Bond

to Prevent the Removal
Ante, §

88.

c. L., §

of Property Attached.
732.

presents, that we, 0.... D. . . ., as principal,
surety, are held and ﬁrmly bound unto 0....
S.... (the oiﬁcer-‘s name), in the sum of (at least double the sum
stated in the attachment to have been sworn to) dollars, to be paid
to said O. . . . S. . .. (the oﬂlcer), or to his certain attorney, executors,
or assigns; to which payment well and truly to be
administrators
made, we bind ourselves, our heirs, executors and administrators,
jointly and severally, ﬁrmly by these presents.
Dated the .. .. day of .. . ., 19. .
Sealed with our seals.
The condition of this obligation is such, that it certain goods and
chattels, to-wit:
(enumerate all the articles attached) which have
been seized by the above named O. . . . 'S. . . ., a constable of the town
ship of ...., in the county of .. . ., by virtue of an attachment issued
by L.... M...., Esq., Justice of the Peace of the township ot ....,
in favor of A.... B...., against ...., the
in the county ot
D....,
shall be produced to satisfy any execu
above bounden (1....
may
upon
any judgment that shall be recovered
that
be
issued
tion
by the plaintiff upon the said attachment, then this obligation to be
void, otherwise of force.

Know all

and

men by these

F....,

as

C.... D.... [L.

S.]

[L. S.]

I approve of E. . .. F... . as surety in the within bond.
0.... S...., Constable.
Dated . . . . . . . . . . . . .., 19..

by Claimant

No. 19—B0nd

Ante

§ 90.

of Property Attached.

0. L., §

733.

presents, that we, N. . .. O. . . ., as principal,
as sureties, are held and ﬁrmly bound
unto A.... B.... (the plaintiff), in the sum of (double the value of
the property attached) dollars, to be paid to the said A. . .. B. . . ., or
or assigns; to which
to hiscertain attorney, executors, administrators
truly
ourselves,
be
we
bind
our heirs,
and
to
made,
payment well

Know all

E. . ..

men by these

and G.

.

..

H....,

FORMS—IN
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jointly and severally, ﬁrmly by these
executors and administrators,
presents.
,
day of ...., 19..
Sealed with our seals.
Dated the
Wnnnms certain goods, to-wit: (enumerate all the articles at
tached), were, on the
day of ...., 19.., seized by 0....
constable, by virtue of an attachment issued by L.... M...., lkq" a
in the county of . . . ..
Justice of the Peace of the township of
in favor of the above named A.... BQ... against C.... D.... And
whereas, the above bounden N. .. . 0.... claims the said goods as his
property:
Now, THEREFORE, the condition of this obligation is such, that if, in
a suit to be brought on this obligation within three months from the
date hereof, the said N.... 0.... shall establish that he was the
owner of the said goods at the time of the said seizure; and in case
of his failure to do so, if the said N. .. . 0.... shall pay the value of
the said goods and chattels, with interest, to the said plaintitf, then
this obligation to be void, otherwise of force.

?

[approve of
(or, within) bond.
Dated

. . . .,

F....

o

[L. s.]
[n s.]

c-....
and G.

.

0....

19. .

..
S.

as sureties
. . .,

[L.S.]

in the

Constable, above

above

named.

No. 20—Form of Return of an Atta.chment—Persona.1 Service.
Ante

§ 92.

c. L., §§ 743,

744.

By virtue of the within attachment, I, at . . . . . . .. on the . . . . . . ..
day of . . . . . . .., 19. ., seized the goods and chattels of the defendant
mentioned in the inventory, of which the annexed is a copy, and on
the same day I served upon the defendant personally, a copy of the
within attachment, and of the said inventory, duly certified by me, all
in said county of... .
0.... S. . . ., Constable.
Amount of my fees, $. . . .

No. 21—Form of Return Where Bond is Given.
Ante

§ 92.

C. L., §§ 743, 744.

of the within attachment, I, on the . . . . . . . . .. day of
seized the goods and
at
in the county of
chattels of the defendant mentioned in the inventory, of which the
annexed is a copy, and on the same day I served upon the defendant,
personally, a copy of the within attachment, and of the said inven
tory, duly certiﬁed by me; but the said goods and chattels were deliv
the
ered up to C.... D...., the defendant, (or, to
upon receiving
the bond herewith
claimant
of said property),
By virtue

. . . .

.., 19..,

returned.
Amount of my fees, $.
1

. . .

O.

. . .

S.

. .

., Constable.

FORMS—IN PROCEEDINGS BY ATTACHMENT.
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No. 22—Form of Ret1u'n—Defemda.nt not Found.
Ante, §§

86,

92.

C. L., § 731, 743,

744.

of the within writ of attachment, I, on the . . . . .. day
19.., at . . . . .., in the county of . . . . .., seized the goods
and chattels of the defendant C.... D...., within named, which are
mentioned in an inventory of which the annexed is a copy, and I
hereby certify that I have made diligent search and inquiry, and am
unable to ﬁnd the said C.... D.... within said county; and, there
day of ...., 19.., because the said defendant could
fore, on the
not be found, I left a copy of the within attachment and of the said
inventory, duly certiﬁed by me, at the last place of residence of said
F. ..., a person of suit
defendant in said county of ...., with
able age and discretion (or, with G. .. . M. . . ., in whose possession
certify that said defendant
found the said goods and chattels, and
has no last place of residence within said county. If the property is
released
because a bond is given that fact should be stated and the
'
bond returned.)
0.... S... ., Constable.
Amount of my fees, $. . ..
By virtue

of

. . . .

..,

I

I

No. 23—Form of Order of Sale.
94.

by Pub. Acts, 1901, p. 90.

Cover:
' ‘ '

Before L. . .. M. . . .a Justice
of the Peace in and for the county of

In attachment:

C

Ix Josrrcn
A‘ ' ' '

C. L., §§ 10360, 10361, as amended

_UB'

Ante, §

.

To A.... B...., one of the Constables of said County:
It appear
ing from your return to the writ herein that you have levied upon
perishable property, to-wit: one hundred pounds of dressed beef;
and it further appearing that notice has been given the defendant
that this court would, at this time and place, consider the advisability
of making an order for the sale of said property; now, therefore, you
on the
are commanded to make sale of said property at
day of
o’clock in the ....noon, in the manner required
at
for sales upon execution. And do you make return of your action
day of
., 19. .
under this order on the
day of
19..
Witness my hand this
L. . .. M. . ., Justice of the Peace.

Ante,

0.

1..,

742.

presents, that we, C. . . D. . . ., as principal,
and ﬁrmly bound unto A....
dollars (double the amount claimed by the
B.
in the sum of
plaintiff), to be paid to the said A... . B. .. ., or to his certain attor
and

G....
52

men by these

as surety, are held

.

Know all

95,

§

24-Bond to Pay Judgment.
§

No.

FOiiMS—I.\'
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executors, administrators or assigns; to which payment well and
to be made, we bind ourselves, our heirs, executors and acknin
istrators, jointly and severally, ﬁrmly by these presents.
day of ...., 19..
Dated the
Sealed with our seals.
by attachment oz. the . . ..
WHEREAS, a certain suit was commenced
..., Esq., a Justice of the Peace in
last, before L.
day of
the township of . . . ., in the county of ...., against the above bounden
C.... D...., in favor of the above named A.... B...., in a plea of
and
. .. .; and, whereas, the above bounden C. .. . D. . . . has appeared
answered to said action;
Now, 'rm:nr-zrom-:, the condition of this obligation is such, that if the
A....
above bounden C.... D.... shall pay to the above named
B.... any judgment the said A.... B.... may recover against him,
the said C. . .. D. .. ., in the said action, within thirty days after the
rendition thereof, then this obligation to be void, otherwise of force.
ney,

truly

I approve of G. ..
Dated .

. . . . .,

.

C..;. D.... [L.
G....
[L.

H...

. as

19..

S.]

S.]
surety in the within bond.
L. . .. M. . . ., Justice of the Peace.

No. 25—Form of Order of Discharge.
Ante, § 95.
c. L. § 742.
IN JUSTICE Comrr:

A- - -- 3- - --

In attachment:

U‘

Peace

Before L. . . . M. . . ., a Justice of the
in and for the County of....

D
C
To A. . .. B. . . ., a Constable of the Township of . . . . County of. . . .
The defendant in this cause having appeared and answered to said
action, and given bond as required by law, conditioned for the pay
ment of any judgment the plaintiff may recover against him in the
action, within thirty days after the rendition thereof, I do hereby
discharge the property, attached by you, from the attachment in said
cause, and you are hereby ordered to restore the same to the said
defendant.
Dated......, 19..
L.... M...., Justice of the Peace.

IN PROCEEDINGS IN REPLEVIN.
No. 26—Form of

STATE OF MICHIGAN,
COUNTY or. . . .
A. . .. B. . . ., of

§§

101,

Aﬁdavit in Replevin.
102.

C. L.

§

748.

}8s

Ante

. . . ., in said county, being duly sworn, doth depose
and say, that (one bay mare), of the value of ninety dollars, and not
exceeding in value one hundred dollars, of the proper goods and
is unlawfully detained from the posses
chattels of this deponent,
sion of said deponent, the said A.... B...., at the township of ....,

PROCEEDINGS IN REPLEVIN.
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in said county of . . . ., by C. . .. D. . . ., and that said deponent is now
lawfully entitled to the possession of said goods and chattels.
And this deponent further deposing, says that the said above men
tioned goods and chattels have not been taken for any tax, assess
ment or ﬁne levied by any law of this state, nor seized under any
execution or attachment agaiﬂst the goods and chattels of the said
deponent liable to execution; and that said deponent, the said A....
B...., claims one hundred dollars damages for the said taking and
detaining said goods and chattels.
And further this deponent says

A.... B....,

not.

Subscribed and sworn to before me,
day of ...., A. D. 19..
this
}
L. . .. M. . . ., Justice of the Peace,

No.

27-Form of Bond in Replevin.
Ante, §§ 101, 103.
C. L. §
these presents, that we,

748.

A.... B...., as prin
cipal, and
and G.... H...., as sureties, of the town
ship of ...., county of
and state of Michigan, are held and
ﬁrmly bound unto C.... D...., of the township of ...., in said
county of ...., in the sum of . . .. (not less than one hundred dol
lars, and twice the amount of the value of the property as sworn to in
dollars, lawful money of the United States, to be paid
the aﬂida/vit)
to the said C. . . . D. . . ., aforesaid, or to his assigns; to which payment
well and truly to be made, we bind ourselves, our and each of our
heirs, executors and administrators, jointly and severally, ﬁrmly by
'
'
these presents.
.
_
....,
Sealed with our seals, and dated this . . . . day of
19. .
The condition of the foregoing obligation is such, that if the above
bounden A.... B.... shall prosecute the suit to effect which he
before L.... M...., Esq., one of the Justices of the
has commenced
in said county, against C....
of
the
Peace of the
defendant, for the unlawful detention of the following goods and
chattels, to wit: (here specify the property described in the ajﬁd-avit
and writ) which writ is returnable before said justice, on the
day of
of
in said
A. D. 19.., at his oﬂice, in the
noon, and that if the defendant
county, at
o'clock in the
recover judgment in the said action, he will return the said prop
erty, if return thereof be adjudged, and will pay to the said defend
ant all such sums of money as may be recovered by the said defend
ant against him in the said action, then the above obligation to be
void, otherwise to remain in full force and virture.
Know all

men

by

A.... B.... [L
G....

STATE OF MICHIGAN,
COUNTY

or .

.. . . . . . . . . .

F....

and

..

G....

}

S.]

[L. S.]
[L. S.]

ss '

the sureties who executed

- t-—-+~
- -4

--

-

the fore

_~ -in-in

—.-

-

____l_

820
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going (or within) bond, being severally duly sworn, each for himself,
deposes and says that he owns property situated in the state of Mich
igan, and subject to execution, of the value, above exemptions ai
lowed by law, of the penalty in said bond.
Subscribed and sworn to before me,
this . . . . .. day of . . . . .., 19.. }
L.... M...., Justice of the Peace.

I approve of
going bond.
Dated
19..

and

or .

as sureties

L....

Writ of Replevin.

Ante, §§ 101,

C. L. § 748, 749.

. . . . . . .

..

104.

in the fore

Justice of the Peace.

No. 28-—Form of

STATE OF MICHIGAN,
COUNTY

G....

.

la‘

To any Constable of said County:
In the name of the People of the State of Michigan you are hereby
commanded that you take into your custody the following goods and
chattels, to wit:
(here describe the goods and chattels to be replev
ied), and deliver the same to A.... B...., plaintiff herein, he hav
ing given security as required by law, to prosecute to effect this
writ against C. . .. D...., defendant herein, and to return the afore
said goods and chattels, if return thereof shall be adjudged, and to
pay all such sums of money as may be recovered against him here
upon; and also that you summon the said C.... D.... to appear
before‘ the undersigned, a. Justice of the Peace of . . .. in said county.
19.., at
day of
on the
at
o'clock in the
noon, then and there to answer the said A.... B.... concerning the
unlawful detention of the said goods and chattels. And have you then
there this writ with your doings hereon.
of
in the county aforesaid.
Given under my hand at the
day of ....,19..
the
M. . . ., Justice of the Peace.

No. 29—Ret1u-n to

Writ of Replevin, Goods Found, and De
fendant Summoned.
Ante, §

106.

C. L. § 10661.

By virtue of the within writ, I have this day replevied and deliv
plaintiff within named, the goods and chattels speciﬁed, as
I am within commanded, and I have also this day summoned the
within defendant to appear according to the exigency of said writ.

ered to the

by delivering -to said defendant
writ.
19..
Dated . . . . . .
Amount of my fees, 3...

personally

a certiﬁed

0.... S....,

copy of said
Constable.

r0n.\1s—1x
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No. 30-Ret1u'n, Goods not Fotmd-Defendant
Ante,

§§

105,

C.

107.

L

§-10655, 10659,

I do certify and return to the within writ, that no
were and part were not found, so state, speciﬁcally
found) of the goods and chattels therein mentioned
by me so as to make replevin and delivery thereof
And further return that I have this
commanded.
the within named defendant to appear according to
said writ, by delivering to said defendant personally
writ.

Summoned.
10661.

part (or if part
describing those
could be found
as

$....

No. 31—Return,

Goods

I

am

within

summoned
the exigency of
a copy of said
day

0.... S....,

19.
Dated . . . . . .
Amount of my fees,

Ante, §§ 105,

821

Constable.

Found-Defendant not Found.
0. L. § 10655, 10659,

101.

10661.

By virtue of the within writ, I did, on the . . .. day of ...., 19. .,
the county of ...., replevy and deliver to the plaintiff
within named, the goods and chattels speciﬂedin the within writ as
I am therein commanded: and I further return, that I have made
diligent search and inquiry to ﬂnd said defendant, and that I am
unable to ﬁnd him in said county whereon to make personal service
of said writ, and because I am unable to ﬂnd him, I did, on the
day of
19. ., leave a certiﬁed copy of said writ of replevin
at the defendant's usual place of abode in said county, with his wife,
years or more and of reasonable dis
wh'o is a person of the age of
cretion.
0.... S...., Constable.
Dated . . . . . . .., 19..
Amount of my fees, $. . ..

a.t...., in

No. 32—Form of Summons in Replevin

After Return of “Not

Found.”

COUNTY

}8s

Ante, § 107.

STATE OF MICHIGAN,

'

To any Constable of said County:
In the name of the People of the State of Michigan. Whereas, by a
writ of replevin to you lately directed and delivered, we commanded you
that you forthwith take into your custody (Describe the property as in
And, whereas, 0.... S...., one of the con
the writ of replevin).
stables of said county, at that day made return to said writ that

K

.

(same as in No. 31). Now, therefore, you are commanded as you were
before commanded, that you summon the said 0.... D. . .. to appear
before (following the writ No. 28 after the ").
L. . . M.
Justice of the Peace.

raocannmos

roa11s—1n
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IN GABNISHMENT.

IN PROCEEDINGS IN GARNISHIVIENT.
No. 33—Form of Affidavit in Garnishment.
Ante, §§

c.

110.

109.

STATE OF MICHIGAN,
COUNTY

}

1..

§

990,

Pub. Acts,

1901,

p.

25-3.

88 '

A... . B... ., of . . . ., in said county, being duly sworn, deposes and
says that
D. . . ., of . . . ., is justly indebted to this deponent in
dollars, or thereabouts, upon express contract (or,
the sum of
upon a. judgment rendered by L. . .. M. . . ., a Justice of the Peace in
dollars damages and costs), and that for the
said county, for
recovery of said demand this deponent has commenced a suit before
L. . .. M. . . ., one of the Justices of the Peace in and for said county.
And this deponent further says, that he has good reason to believe,
and does believe, that N.... O...., of the township of ...., in said
county, has property, money and effects in his hands, or under his
control, belonging to said C. .. . D. .. ., and that the said N. . .. O. . ..
. . . D. .-. ., and further says not.
is indebted to the said

A....B....

Subscribed

this

. . . .

and sworn to before me,
19..
.. day of . . . .
}
L.... M...., Justice of the Peace

‘

No. 34—Form of Summons in Garnishment.

STATE OF MICHIGAN,
or .

. . . . . . .

.

COUNTY

.

109,

111.

c.

1..

§§ 990,

1015.

}ss

Ante, §§

'

To any Constable of said County:

.

In the name of the People of the State of Michigan, you are hereby
commanded to summon N. . . . 0.... to appear before me at my office,
in said county, on the
in the (city, village or township) of
. . . . .. day of
19.., at
o’clock in the
noon. to
answer under oath, all questions put to him touching his indebted
principal
defendant at the suit of
ness to
B...., plaintiff herein, and the property, money and effects of the
said C.... D.... in his possession, within his knowledge, or under
his control, according to the allegations contained in the atlidavit of
F...., agent of said 11.... B....), duly
said A.... B.... (or,
suit.
made and ﬁled in this
Hereof fail not, and have you then there this precept.
Given under my hand at M...., in said county of
this
day of
19...
L. .. M. . . ., Justice of the Peace.

I

FORMS—IN PROCEEDINGS IN GARNISHMENT.
1
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No. 35—Form of Return of Summons in Garnishment.
Ante, §

112,

C.

L.

§ 990,

Pub. Acts,

1901,

p. 253.

I

hereby certify, that I personally served the within summons on
O. . . ., the garnishee within named, on the . . .. day of . . .. 19. .,
at. .. ., in the county of. . . ., by delivering a copy thereof to him, and
at the same time I paid to him the sum of. . . .for his fees for traveling
to the place named in the within summons and for his attendance
thereat.
0.... S...., Constable.
Dated ...., 19....
Amount of my fees, $. . . .

N.

. . .

No. 36—Wa.rrant
Ante,

§

114.

or

c. L. §§ 992, 993.
'

STATE OF MICHIGAN,
CBUNTY

Against Garnishee.

. . . . . . . . . . . . }‘ss'

‘
To any Constable of said County, greeting:
day of ...., by me,
Whereas, a summons was issued on the
L.
M. . . ., one of the Justices of the Peace of said county, against
day of
N.... O...., in favor of A.... B.... returnable on the
. at .. .. o'clock in the afternoon, at my oﬂice, in the township of
. . . .in said county, upon the aﬂidavit of the said A. . . . B. . . . made and
ﬁled with me, who made oath that C. . . . D. . . . was justly indebted (set
forth the facts as stated in the aﬂtdavtt); and, whereas, 0.... S....,
day of
one of the constables of said county, on said
made
return to me of said summons, that he served the same personally on
day of ...., and at the same time
the said N.... O...., on the
paid (or, tendered) to him the sum of .. . ., for his fees for traveling
to the place named in said summons, and for his attendance thereat;
and, whereas, the said N.... 0.... neglected (or, refused) to appear
before me at the time and place mentioned in said summons and
answer as aforesaid; therefore,
In the name of the People of the State of Michigan, you are hereby
commanded forthwith to take the body _of the said N.... 0.... and
bring him before me, at my oﬂice, in the township of . . . ., in the said
noon, to
day of ...., at
o'clock in the
county, on the
answer, under oath, all questions (as in summons No. 34); and after
you shall have arrested the said N.... 0...., do you notify the said
A. . .. B. . .. thereof. And have you then there this precept.
., 19..
Given under my hand and seal, the . . .. day of
L.... M. ..., Justice of the Peace.

,,

\
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FORMS RELATING

MISCELLANEOUS

No.

TO PROCESS.

37-Return to the Wa.n'ant.

Ante,

§

c. 1. §§

114.

992,

999.

I have this day arrested N. .. . 0. .. ., the garnishee within named,
and have him before the court in custody; and I have this day notiﬁed
A. . . . B. . . ., the plaintiff, of such arrest.
S...., Constable.
Dated...., 19..
0....
'
Amount of my fees, 3. .. .

MISCELLANEOUS

FORMS RELATING TO PROCESS.

No. 38—Form of Deputation of Process.
Ante,

5 137.

c. L.

§§ 978, 979.

On the request of the within named plaintiff, and deeming it expe
K...., who is a person of
dient so to do, I hereby empower
lawful age, and not a party or interested in the suit, to be commenced
by the service of the within process, to execute the same.
L.... M....,Justice of the Peace.
June ...., 19..

J....

No.

39-Security for Costs by Non-residents-Before

Suit, to

Be Entered on the Docket.
Ante, §§

140,

141.

C. L_ §§ 713, 11233.

Ooonrr or . . . . . . . . . ., ss. A. . . . B... ., a non-resident of said
county, having applied to L. . . . M. .. ., Esq., a Justice of the Peace of
D...., there
said county, for a summons in his favor against C.
fore I, E. . . . F. . . ., do hereby become security that said A. . . . B. . ..
shall pay the said C.... D....,- any costs which may be adjudged
against him, the said A. . . . B. . . ., in the suit to be commenced against
C. . . . D. . . . by said summons.

Da.ted....,19..

No.

40—Form of Security After Suit Commenced,
Entered on the Docket.
Ante, §§

140,

141.

o. 1. §§

713,

to

Be

11283.

Whereas, A... . B... ., the plaintiff in the above entitled cause, has
required by L.... M. ..., the Justice of the Peace before whom
said cause is pending, for good reasons shown, to give security for
F...., do hereby become security that the
costs, therefore, I,
pay
the defendant, C.... D. . . ., any costs that
.
..
B....
shall
said A.
may be adjudged against the said A.... B.... in said cause.

been

Dated....,19..

ii-é

MISCELLANEOUS

FORMS RELATING

T0 PROCESS.
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No. 41—Security-Plaintiﬁ‘

Having Removed From the County
After Suit Commenced.

Ante, §§

140,

c. L. §§

141.

11283.

713,

A. . . . B. . . ., the plaintiff in the above entitled cause, having removed
from this county of . . . ., after the commencement of this suit, and he
having been required by L... . M. .. ., the justice of the peace before
whom the said cause is pending, to give security for costs, therefore,
F...., do hereby become security that the said A.... B....
I,
shall pay the defendant, C. . .. D. . . ., any costs that may be adjudged
against the said A.... B.... in said cause.

Dated....,19..

No.

42-Form of Consent and Appointment of Next Friend for
an Infant Plaintiff.
Ante,

I consent
in

a suit

147.

c, L. §§

to be the next friend

to

C....

against

Da.ted....,19..

The said R....
Dated . . ..,_19. .

No.

§

R....

A...

756,
.

760.

757,

B...

., an infant, as plaintiff,

R....R....
is accordingly

appointed.

L. . .. M.

. . .,

Justice of

the Peace.

43--Consent and Appointment of Next Friend-Issue
Joined Without Process.

Ante, §
[N JUSTICE'S Cousr:

147.

c. L. §§

756,

757,

760.

A....

Before L.... M...., Esq., a Justice of the Peace,
v.
in and for the County of . . . . . . ..
C. .. . D. .. ..
I hereby consent to be the next friend of A.... B...., the above
named plaintiff, an infant, in the above cause.

Dated....,19..

The said R....
Dated ....,19..

R....

is accordingly

L....

appointed

M.

. . .,

R....R....

Justice of

the Peace.

No. 44—Form of Consent and Appointment of Guardian for
~
Infant Defendant.
Ante,

IN JUSTICE Cousrz
A. . .. B. . . .,

C....

1:.

above

C.

L.

§§ 758,

759,

760.

guardian
entitled cause.

of

A.... B....,

.

Peace,

an infant,

in and

defendant

R....R....

Dated....,19..

The said R. . .. R
Dated ....,19..

_

L. . . . M. . . ., a Justice of the
for the County of . . . . . . ..

Before

}
consent to be the

I
in the

§ 148.

.. is accordingly appointed.

L.... M....,Justice

of the Peace.

FORMS——-FOR TRANSFER
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or cause.

FOR TRANSFER OF CAUSE.
No. 45—Form of Aﬁidavit to Transfer a Cause Because the
Justice is a. Material Witness.
Ante, §§ 151.

In

o. L.

§ s35.

Cormr:

JUs'r-rc|~:’s

A""

Before L. M., Justice of the Peace
for the County of

C

in and

COUNTY or ...., es. C. . . . D. . . ., the defendant in this cause, being
duly sworn, says L. . .. M. . . ., the Justice before whom this cause is
pending, is a material witness for him, this defendant in this cause, and
without whose testimony he cannot safely proceed to the trial thereof;
and deponent further says, that he expects to prove by said Justice, on
such trial, the following facts, to-wit: (set forth facts expected to be
proved); and deponent further says, that the said facts which he ex
pects Ito prove by said Justice, as aforesaid, will be material to the
issue upon such trial, as he verily believes.
C. . . . D . . .
Subscribed and sworn to before
day of ...., 19...
me, this
}
L.... M...., Justice of the Peace.

IN PLEADINGS.
No. 46—Genera.l Form of Declaration.
Ante. §§
IN

JU$TICE'S
A""
C.

. . .

. . .,

D....,

159, 160.

C. L. §§ 766, 767.

Courrr:
'

D.

. . ..

}Before

L. M. Justice of the Peace in and
for the county of . . . . ..

ss. A.... B...., plaintiﬂ in this suit, by N....
his attorney (or, in his own proper person), complains of C. . . .

COUNTY

O.

155,

or

....,

the defendant herein, who has been summoned to answer the
said plaintiﬂ! in a plea of trespass on the case upon promises (or as
the case may be)'.
For that whereas (state the cause of action and conclude thus), to
the damage of the plaintiff of three hundred dollars (or if the action is
in tort, one hundred
dollars) and therefore he brings suit.
'

A.... B....,

_

'T~
i

Plaintiff.

—'_

*

‘I

_I

FORMS—IN PLEADINGS.
No. 47—P1ea in Abatement

for Nonjoinder of

Ante, §§ 172,

827
a.

Co-contractor.

180.

Counrz

IN Jnsrlci-:'s

A....

Before L. . . . M... ., a Justice of the Peace, in and
for the County of . . . . . . ..
_
And the defendant in person prays judgment of the said summons
and declaration; because he says that the said promise (several prom
ises. if more than one is alleged) in the said declaration mentioned, if
any such was made (were and each of them were if more than one
jointly with the defendant, and
alleged) was made by
which said E. . .. F. . . . is still alive, wherefore, because the said E. . . .
is not named in the said summons and declaration, he prays
be
judgment of the summons and declaration. and that the same may
V

C....

1:.

}

quashed.

C. ... D. . . ., Defendant.
in this cause, being
.,
D.
.
.
the
defendant
C.
.
.
.
COUNTY or
duly sworn, says that the above plea (or, the plea hereto annexed) is
~
true in substance and matter of fact.
. . . ., ss.

C.... D....

Sworn to and subscribed before me,

thls....dayof....,19...
L.

M. ..

.,

}

Justice of the Peace.

No. 48-Replication
Ante, §§

In JL's'r1cn's

A....

Denying the Plea.
180,

181.

COURT!

Before L. . .. M. . . ., a Justice of the Peace, in and
for the County of . . . . . . ..
D._....
And the plaintiff says that the said summons and declaration, by
reason of any thing above by the said defendant in his said plea
alleged, ought not to be quashed, because he says that the said promise
(several promises. if more than one is alleged) was not made by the
F. .. ., in manner
defendant jointly and together with the said E.
and form as the defendant hath above in his said plea in that behalf
alleged; and this the plaintiff prays may be inquired of by the coun
try.
A. . .. B. . . ., Plaintiff.

0....

11.

No. 49—Plea in Abatement—Pendency of Another Action.

In

JUs'rIcE's Couarz

A.

. . .

B.

. . .,

Ante, §

184.

Before L. . . . M. . . ., a Justice of the Peace, in and
for the County of . . . . . . ..
And the defendant in person prays judgment of the said summons
and declaration, because he says that before the issuing of the said
summons, or the plaintift declaring thereupon, to-wit: on the

0....

v.

l»
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FORMS-—I.\‘

1>m:.u>1.\'os.

....,

the said plaintiff issued a summons, out of the court of
., Esq., one of the Justices of the Peace of said county of. . . .
and declared therein against him in a certain plea of promises upon
the same identical promises and undertakings in the said declaration
in this present suit mentioned, as‘ by the record and proceedings
thereof remaining in the said court, before the said justice, more fully
appears; and the defendant further saith, that the parties in this and
the said former suit are the same, and not other or different persons.
and that the supposed causes of action in this and the said former suit
are, and each and every one of them is and are the same, and not other
or different causes of action, and that the said former suit, so brought
and prosecuted against him, the defendant, by the plaintiff as aforesaid,
is still depending in the court of the said Justice of the Peace as afore
said, and this the defendant is ready to verify. Wherefore he prays
judgment of the said summons and declaration in the suit, and that
the same may be quashed.
0....
Defendant.
N0te.—Add veriﬁcation as in No. 47'.
day of

N. . .. 0.

. .

No. 50-Replication

In

Denying Plea.

Jns-r1cs's Comrr:

'

A.... B....,

Before L. . . . M. . . ., a Justice of the Peace, in and
for the County of . . . . . . ..
And the said plaintiff says that his said summons and declaration
ought not to be quashed; because he says that said former suit, in the
said plea mentioned, was not pending at the time of the commence
ment of this suit in manner and form as the said defendant hath above,
in his said plea in that behalf alleged; and this the said plaintiff prays
may be inquired of by the country.
A. . .. B. .'. ., Plaintiff.

C....

v.

}

No. 51—Genera.1

Form of Plea of General Issue and Notice of
Defense.

Ante,
IN JUSTICI-2'8 Comm‘:

§ 188.
'

0.

1...

§§ 701,

10071-10073.

A.... B....,

Before L. . .. M. . . ., a. Justice of the Peace, in and
for the County of . . . . . . ..
And the said defendant demands a trial of the matters set forth in
plaintiffs declaration.
C. . .. D. . . ., Defendant.
To the above named plaintiff: Please take notice that on the trial
of the above cause the defendant will give in evidence in his defense
that (here set forth the matters of defense intended to be proved).
Yours, etc.,
Dated . . . ., 19. .
C. .. . D. . . ., Defendant.

C....

1;.

Q

FORl\IS—IN

PLEADINGS.

No. 52-—Notice that Cause of Action did not Accrue
Six Years, to be Attached to the Plea of the
'
General Issue.
Ante,

§ 223.

Within

C. L., § 9728.

above named plaintiﬂ:
Take notice, that upon the trial of this cause, the defendant will
show in his defense, under the general issue above pleaded, that the
said several supposed causes of action did not, nor did any or either
of them, accrue to the said plaintiff at any time within six years
before the commencement of this suit, in manner and form as the said
plaintiff has above thereof complained against him.
C. . .. D. . . ., Defendant.

To the

No. 53—Form of Notice of Set-off, to Be Attached to the Plea
of the General Issue.
Ante, §§ 255-266.

c. L., §§

776,

777.

.
To the above named Plaintiff:
Take notice that the said defendant will, on the trial of this cause,
give in evidence, and insist, that before and at the time of the com
day of
he, thesaid
mencement of this suit, to-wit, on the
plaintiff was, and still is, indebted to the said defendant in the sum
of one hundred dollars, for the work, labor and services of the said
defendant before then done for the said plaintiff, and for divers mate
rials and other necessary things used and employed in and about the
same; and for divers goods, wares and merchandise before then bar
gained and sold, and sold and delivered by the said defendant to the
said plaintiff; and for money before then lent by the said defendant to
the said piaintiﬂf, and for other money before then paid, laid out and
expended by the said defendant, to and for the use of the said plain
tiff, all at his request.
Which several claims the said defendant will
set off and allow to the said plaintiff against any claim or claims to
be proved by him on said trial.
Yours, etc.,
C . .. D. . . ., Defendant.
|
Dated
19..

N o. 54—Form of Notice of Recoupment, to Be Attached to the
Plea of the General Issue.
‘

Ante, §§

276,

(On breach of warranty

278.

in sale of goods.)

To the Plaintiff:
Take notice, that the defendant will show on the trial of this cause
defense under the general issue above pleaded, that the said
goods mentioned in plalntiﬂ's declaration (or, mentioned in the plain

in his

830

ros1s1s—1:<

PLE.-\DI.\'G8.

tifrs bill of particulars ﬂied in this cause) were sold and delivered by
plaintiff to this defendant, in the package, and without any opportunity
for the defendant to examine the same; and that at the time of such
the plaintiff, in consideration that defendant would purchase the
represented and agreed that said goods were free from defect
or injury, whereas in fact a portion of said goods were then defective
and injured, and moth-eaten, and worthless, which was unknown to
the defendant at the time of said sale and delivery, and that by reason
thereof the defendant has sustained damages to a large amount, to-wit,
one hundred dollars, which said damages the defendant will recoup
against any claim that may be proved against him by the plaintiff on
said trial, and will apply the same, or so much thereof as may be
necessary, to the satisfaction of such claim, if any, as the plaintiff may
prove as aforesaid, and will have the balance certified in his favor.
Yours, etc.,
C.... D...., Defendant.
Dated ...., 19..
sale,

same,

No. 55—Form of General Demurrer.
Ante,
IN Jus'rrcs's

A‘

‘ ‘ ‘

C. L., 767.

§ 280.

COURT!

B‘

' '

"

Before

C

L. . . . M. . . ., Justice of the Peace in
and for the County of. .. .

And the said C.... D....
declaration (or, the said
sufficient in law.

and says that the plaintiffs said
count of the said declaration) is not

comes

C.

No. 56—Form of

J oinder

Ante,
IN JUs'r1cr-:‘s Cover:

A""

CH“

iBefore
J’

§

.

..

D.

. . .,

in Demurrer.

280.

L.... M....,

a

and for the county

Justice of the Peace in

of....

And the said A. . .. B... ., the said plaintiff,
laration herein is sufﬁcient in law.

says that the said dec

A. . .. B.

No. 57—Notioe

'vB'

. . .,

Plaintiff.

of Defense in Bar, puis darrein continuance.

IN JUBTICE'S Counrz
A" ' '
"' '
C____

Defendant.

Ante, §§ 282,

283.

Before L. . .. M. . . ., a Justice of the Peace in
and for the county of....

To the Piaintiﬂ:
day of ...., until which day the plea aforesaid
And now, on this
was last continued, comes the said defendant, and now here gives
notice to the said plaintiff. that after the last continuance of this

_____

_

ron ADJOURNMENT.

FORMS—APPLICATION

831

day of
and before this day, to-wit: on the
at
the matter of defense as in ordinary cases); all of which
the defendant will give in evidence in his defense on the trial of this
cause, under the general issue by him heretofore pleaded, and insist
upon the same as a bar to the further maintaining of the aforesaid
action by the said plaintiff against said defendant.
C. . .. D. . . ., Defendant.
County of ...., ss. C. . .. D. . . ., the above named defendant, being
duly sworn, says that the above notice is true in substance and mat
ter of fact.
cause,

(here state

C.... D....

Subscribed and sworn to before me,
day of
19...
this
}

L. . .. M...

.,

Justice of

No. 58—Form of

the Peace.

Bill of Particulars.

Ante, §§ 284-288.

c. L., §§

7'12-714.

IN Jus'r1ca’s COURT:

A""vB‘

a Justice of the Peace in
Before L....
and for the county of. . ..

' ' '

C

To the defendant:

S1a—Please take notice that the following is a bill of the particulars
of the plaintiff's demand in this cause, and for the recovery of which
this action is brought, to-wit:
., -May 1-Money lent to defendant, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..$30 00
19."
“ 5-Money paid
. .. D. . . ., for defendant. 30 00
to
“
" 8—One ton of hay sold defendant . . . . . . . . .. 10 00
(And so throughout, giving the dates, items and sums, with as much
'
particularity as possible.)
Yours, etc.,
Dated. . . . 19. .

J.

A.

ON

. . .

B.

. . .,

Plaintiff.

APPLICATION FOR ADJOURNMENT.

No. 59—Form of Oath to be Administered by the Justice on

Oral Showing for Adjournment.
Ante, §§ 2s9-29s.

c. L., §§ 791-795.

You do solemnly swear, that you will true answers make to such
questions as may be put to you, in relation to the necessity for an
adjournment, in the case of A. . .. B... ., plaintiff, against C. . .. D. . . .,
defendant, now pending before me.

832

FOR.\iS—API’LlC.-\Tl0I\'

roa ADJOURNMENT.

No. 60—Form of Bond on Adjommnent in Suit Commenced by

Warrant.
Ante,

§ 293.

C. L., § 793.

Know all men by these presents, that we, C. . . . D. . . ., as principal,
F...., as surety, of ...., in the county of ...., are held
and ﬁrmly bound unto A. . .. B. . . . in the sum of two hundred dollars,
to be paid to the said A. . . . B. . . . or to his certain attorney, executors,
or administrators, or assigns; to which payment well and truly to be
made, we bind ourselves, our heirs, executors and administrators,
jointly and severally, ﬁrmly by these presents.
Dated the
. day of . .. ., 19. .
Sealed with our seals.
by warrant, before L....
_WIiEREAS,
a. suit has been commenced
M. . . ., Esq., one of the Justices of the Peace of the township of
.,
in said county of . .. ., by the said A... . B. . . ., plaintiff, against the
in a plea of trespass on the
above bounden C.... D...., defendant,
case, and now, upon the application of the above named defendant, the
day of
19.., at
trial of said cause is adjourned until the
. . . . o'clock in the afternoon, at the . . . . of the said Justice, in the said
township.
Now, THEREFORE, the condition of this obligation is such, that if the
above bounden C. . .. D. . .. shall render himself in execution, in case
judgment shall be rendered against him in said suit, and if no part of
the property of the said C.... D.... liable to execution shall be
of, except for the necessary
removed, secreted, assigned or disposed
support of himself and family, until any judgment the said plaintiff
may obtain against him shall be satisfied, or until the expiration of
ten days after the said plaintiff shall be entitled to execution thereon,
then this obligation to be void, otherwise of force.
Signed, sealed and delivered
C.... D.... [L. S.]
E. . . . F... . [L. S.]
in presence of . . . . . . . . . . . . .. }
as surety in the foregoing bond.
I approve of
day of ...., 19..
Dated this
L. . . . M. . . ., Justice of the Peace.
and

No.

61-Form of the Oath to Surety.

You do [solemnly swear—'or aﬂlrm] that you will true answers make
to such questions as shall be put to you, touching your competency
as surety for C. .. . D.... on his application to adjourn this cause.

:~

—

—

—-
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RELATING T0 WITNESSES.
No. 62'—Form of Subpoena.
Ante, §

299.

c. L.,

§

s01.

STATE OF MICHIGAN,
COUNTY

or .

. . . . . . .

..

}s3'
and N.... O...., greeting:
name of the People of the State of Michigan, you are com
manded to appear personally before me, the undersigned, a Justice of
., in said county, at my oﬂice, in ...., on the
day
the Peace of
of . . . . .., 19.., at
o'clock in the . . . . .. noon of that day, to
testify the truth according to your knowledge, in an action now pend
ing before me, the said Justice, and then and there to be tried between
A’. . .. B. . . ., plalntiﬂ, and C. .. . D. . . ., defendant, on the part of the
Hereof fail not at your peril.
. . . ., in a. plea of .. ..
aforesaid, the
day of
Given under my hand, at the . . . . of
....,19..
L.... M....,Justice of thePeace.

To J....
In the

No. 63—Form of Subpoena,
Ante.

STATE OF MICHIGAN,
COUNTY

J....

or

. . . . . . . .

..

}

duoes tecum.

§ 300.

SS ‘

N.... O....,

greeting:
People of the State of Michigan, you are com
manded to appear personally before me, the undersigned, a Justice of
the Peace of ...., in said county, at my oﬂlce, in ...., on the
o'clock in the
noon of that day,
day of ...., A. D.19.., at
to testify the truth according to your knowledge, in an action now
pending before me, the said Justice, and then and there to be tried
between A. . .. B. . . ., plaintiff, and C. . .. D. . . ., defendant, on the part
K...., are
And you, the said
of the ...., in a plea of
bring
you,
produce in
with
and
then
and
to
there
further commanded
day of . .. ., and written and
evidence, a certain letter dated the
sent by the said C.... D.... from D.... to one R.... S.... (give
such aldescription of the paper wanted that the witness may clearly
Hereof fail not at your peril.
Icnow what one is intended).
aforesaid, this .. .. day of
hand,
my
. . . . of
at
the
Given under
M...., Justice of the Peace.
..., 19..

To

and

In the name of

the

J....

L....
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TO WITNESSES.

No. 64—Subpo.=.na Before
Ante,

STATE OF

301.

§

Arbitrators.

C. L., § 10929.

88

'
. . . . . . . . ..
Counrr orMICHIGAN”
and N.... O....,greeting:
To J....
In the name of the People of the State of Michigan, you and each
of you are commanded personally to appear and attend, at the ....,
in the township of
in the county of
on the
day of
next, at
. o’cl0ck in the . .. . noon of that day, before E. . .. F... .

and G.... H....,
tween A.... B....
witness in relation
said C.
D. . ..
Given under my

..,19..

arbitrators chosen to determine a controversy be
and C.... D...., then and there to testify as a
thereto, before said arbitrators, on the part. of the
Hereof fail not at your peril.
hand, at the township aforesaid, this
day of
L.... M....,.lustice of the Peace.

303.

§

L.,

s02.

§

Ante,

c.)

No. 65—Form of Return of Service of Subpoena.

I

I

day of ...., 19..,
hereby certify that on the
served the
K. . .. and
within subpoena personally upon the within named
N. . . 0. .. ., in the township of ...., in the county of. . ., by reading
the same to each of them (or by stating the contents thereof to cach
paid to them . . . . . . . each, as fees
of them), and at the same time
for . . . . . .. miles travel, and for attendance before the within named
Justice.
0....
Dated ...., 19..
Constable.
.

304.

c. L.,

§

Ante,

§

No. 66—Oa.th to Party Proving Cause for an Attachment
Defaulting Witness.

for

a

.

.

I

.

J....

803.

.

.

a

a

You do solemnly swear that you will true answers make to all
such questions as may be put to you, in relation to the service of
witness in the cause now pending
subpoena upon N.... 0...., as
before me, wherein A. . .. B. . . is plaintiff and C. . . D. . .. is defend
ant, and as to the materiality of his testimony for the plaintiff, and as
to the cause of his neglect or refusal to attend as such witness.

STATE OF MICHIGAN
. . .. .

A.... B....,

.
.

COUNT! or .

the

. .

c. L.,

§

304.

soa.

}_"

Ante,

§

No. 67—AﬂEldavit for Attachment for Defaulting Witness to
Be Annexed to Subpoena.

‘

plaintiif named in the annexed

duly sworn, says that he did, on the

day

of

being
instant, at the

subpazna.

FORMS—IlELATING
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TO WITNESSES.

township of
in said county, serve the annexed subpcena on N. . . .
O...., a witness therein named, by reading the same (or, by stating
the contents thereof) to him and at the same time paying (or tender
And this deponent further
as his fees.
ing) to him the sum of
says, that the testimony of the said N. . . . 0. . . ., as this deponent verily
believes, is material and necessary to this deponent upon the trial of
the cause mentioned in the said subpoena; and further, that the said
N. . .. 0.... refuses (or, has neglected) to attend the trial of the said
cause as he was commanded to do in and by the said subpoena.

A.
Subscribed and sworn to before me,
day.of
19.-.
this

L. . .. M...

No.

B.

. . .,

Plaintiﬂ‘.

}

Justice of

the Peace

68-Form of Attachment for Defaulting Witness.
Ante,

STATE OF MICHIGAN:
COUNTY

.,

. . .

or .

. . . . . . .

..

}

§ 304.

C. L., § 803.

88 '

To any Constable of said County, Greeting:
In the name of the People of the State of Michigan, you are hereby
commanded to attach
0.... and bring him before me, the un
dersigned, a Justice of the Peace in and for said county, at my oﬂice,
in the township of
. in said county, forthwith (or, on the .. .. day
instant, at
o'clock in the ....noon,)
to testify
those
of
things which he knows, in an action now pending before me, the said
justice, between A....
plaintiff, and C.... D...., defendant,
on the part of the . . . ., and also to answer all such matters as shall be
objected against him, for that the said N. . . . 0. . . ., having been duly
subpoenaed to appear at the trial of said action, has refused (or neg
lected) to attend in conformity with such subpaena; and have you
then there this precept.
Given under my hand, at the township aforesaid, the . . . . . . day of
. . . .

..,

N0.

19. ..

L. . .. M.

. . .,

Justice of

the Peace.

69-Return to the Attachment for Defaulting Witness.
Ante,

§ 305.

c. L.,

§ 804.

By virtue of the within attachment, I have attached N.... 0....,
within commanded, and I have his body, together with the within
writ, before the within named Justice, as by said writ directed.
Dated . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
0. . . . S. . . ., Constable.
Amount of my fees, $. . . .

as
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No. 70—Minute of Conviction for'Defaulting
Ante,

§ 306.

Witness.

C. L., §§ 805-808.

ss.—Be it remembered, that on this
. day of . . ..
is convicted before me, and ﬁned the sum of
dollars, besides
dollars costs, for non-attendance as a witness to
give evidence before me, at my office in the township of ...., on the
da_v of ...., in a certain cause then and there depending before
me, in which A. . . . B. . . . was plaintiff, and C. . . . D. . . . defendant,
in disobedience of the command of the subpoena duly served upon him.
L. . . . M. . . ., Justice of the Peace.
County of

19. .,

No.

. . . .,

N.... 0....

71-Form of Execution Against Defaulting Witness for
Fine and Costs.
§ 306.

COUNTY

or .

. . . . . . . . . .

c. L., §§ 807-808.

}8s

Ante,

STATE OF MICHIGAN,

'

To any Constable of said County, Greeting:

.

a

.

Wnansss, N.... 0.... was, on the
day of ...., 19...., con
victed and ﬁned by me, the undersigned, a Justice of the Peace of the
township of . . .. in said county, the sum of . . . dollars, besides
.
dollars costs, for non-attendance as
witness to give evidence before
me, at ...., in the township of ...., in said county, on the
day
instant, in a certain cause then and there depending before
of
me, in which A.... B.... was plaintiff and C.... D.... defendant;
a record of which conviction, and of the cause thereof, has been duly
made up and entered in my docket; and, whereas, the said N....
0. . . . has neglected to pay the said ﬁne and costs, therefore,
In the name of the People of the State of Michigan, you are hereby
commanded to levy the said ﬁne and costs of the goods and chattels of
the said N. . .. O. . . ., and for the want thereof to take and convey the
said N.... 0.... to the jail of said county, there to remain until he
shall pay the said ﬂne and costs; and the keeper thereof is required to
keep the said N. . .. 0.... in close custody, in said jail, until the ﬁne
and costs aforesaid be paid, or until thirty days after the conmence
ment of his imprisonment.
Given under my hand, at the township aforesaid, the . . . day of . . . .
19..
L. . . . M. . . ., Justice of the Peace.

304. C. L.,

§

Ante,

§

No. 72—Form of 0ath—Materiality

of Witness.

S03.

.

You do solemnly swear (or affirm) that you will true answers
make to such questions as shall be put to you touching the materiality
of the testimony of
a witness in the cause here on trial before me,
between A. . . B. . . ., plaintiff, and C. . . . D. . . ., defendant.

I
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No. 73—Form of Commitment
Ante,

§ 306.

STATE OF MICHIGAN,
COUNTY

or .

. . . . . . . .

..

}

837

TO w1T.\*EssEs.

of

a

Witnws.

C. L., §§ 805-807.

88 '

To any constable of said county, and to the keeper of the common
jail of said county, greeting:
WHEREAS,
one of the
on the trial of a cause before L....
justices of the peace in the township of ...., in said county, this day,
between
A.... B...., plaintiff, and 0.... D...., defendant,
O. .. ., being called as a witness on the part of the said plaintiff, and
being present, refused to be sworn as such witness, in the form pre
scribed by law (or N. . .. 0.... was called and sworn as a witness on
the part of the said plaintiff, and on his examination as such witness
the said N... . O. . . . was asked, by the said plaintiff, the pertinent and
proper question, “whether he was acquainted with the handwriting
of the defendant," to which question the said N.... 0.... refused
to answer), (if the witness refuse to be sworn add) and, it being proved
to me by the oath of said plaintiff (or, by the return of 0.... S. . ..
one of the constables of said county), that the said N. . .. 0.... was
duly subpcenaed to attend the said trial, as a witness on the part of
said plaintiff, therefore,
In the name of the People of the State of Michigan, you, the said
constable, are commanded forthwith to convey and deliver the said
N.... 0.... into the custody of the said keeper of the said jail, and
you, the said keeper, are hereby required to receive the said N....
0. . .. into your custody in the said jail, and him there safely to keep
until he shall submit to answer the said question so put to him by the
said plaintiff (or, until he shall submit to be sworn and to testify as
such witness), and shall be discharged by due course of law. An-.l
hereof fail not.
day of . . . ., 19..
Given under my hand, the

L. . .. M...

No.

.,

Justice of

the P8611‘-’.

74-Form of Oath, or Aﬁlrmat-ion to Witness.
Ante,

§

311.

0. L., §§

830,

10204, 10206.

Os'r11.—You do solemnly swear, that the evidence you shall give rc
to the issue in this case now on trial between A.... B. . . .,
plaintiff, and C.... D...., defendant, shall be the truth, the whole
truth, and nothing but the truth.
do solemnly and sincerely aﬁlrm, that the evi
AFFIB.MA'I'ION.—Y011
dence you shall give relating to the issues in this case now on trial
between A... . B. . . ., plaintiff, and C. . .. D. . . ., defendant, shall be
the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, and this you do
under the pains and penalties of perjury.

lating

1
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RELATING T0 THE TRIAL.
No. 75—Form of Oath to Constable Before Selecting
Ante,

§§

315,

0. L., §§

319.

815,

Jury.

816.

You do solemnly swear, that in the suit now pending before me,
wherein A. . , . B. . .. is plaintiff and C. . . . D. . .. is defendant, you will
select, according to your best judgment, and without favor or par
tiality to either party, the names of eighteen inhabitants of this
county who~are qualiﬁed to serve as jurors in the courts of record,
and in nowise of kin to the plaintiff or defendant, nor interested in
said suit, from whom to form a jury for the trial of said cause.

No. 76—Form of Venire.
Ante,

§ 319.

C. L., § 817.

STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Counrr or . . . . . . . . . .. } 88 '
To any Constable of said County, Greeting:
In the name of the People of the State of Michigan, you are hereby
required to summon (insert the names of the jurors), to appear be
fore the undersigned, one of the Justices of the Peace of the township of
...., in said county, at ...., in said township of
on the
.noon, to make a jury for
day of
. instant, at
o'clock in the
the trial of an action of (trespass or, assumpsit, or, as the case may

be) between A.... B...., plaintiff, and C.... D...., defendant. And
have you then and there this precept.
day of
Given under my hand, at the township aforesaid, the

19"

L. . ..
No.

Justice of

77-Form of Return to
Ante, §§

319,

321.

c. L.,

a.

the Peace.

Venire.

§ 817.

I certify, that by virtue of the within precept I have personally sum
moned each of the several persons therein named (if unable to ﬁnd one
or more of the persons named, let the return show who was not served),
to appear at the time and place within mentioned.

0....

Dated....,19..

No.

S....,C'onstable.

78-Oath to Juror on Challenge.

Ante, §§

327,

329, 322.

c. L.,

§§ 348, 10238.

You do solemnly swear that you will true answers make to all such
questions as may be put to you touching your competency to -sit as a
juror, in the trial of this action between A.... B...., plaiutiﬂ, and
C. . .. D. . . ., defendant.

T0 THE TRIAL.

FOR.MS—RELATING

No. 79—Oath to Witness on
Ante,

§

839

Trial of Challenge.

332.

You do solemnly swear that you will true answers make to all such
questions as shall be put to you in relation to the challenge of M. . ..
N... ., now depending and on trial.

No. 80-'-Form of Oath to
Ante,

§

You do solemnly swear

334.

Jurors for the Trial.

0. L., §§

821,

10204.

(or, sincerely declare and afﬁrm), that you

will well and truly try the matter in diﬂerence between A... . B. . . .,
plaintiff, and C. . . . D. . . ., defendant; and, unless discharged by me, a
true verdict give, according to law and evidence (and, if the juror
affirms, add, and this
do under the pains and penalties of perjury).
1/_ou
No. 81—Form of Oath to Constable in Charge of
Ante,

§ 345.

Jury.

C. L., § 831.

You do solemnly swear that you will, to the utmost of your ability,
the persons sworn as jurors on this trial, in some private and
convenient place, without meat or drink, except such as shall be or
dered by me; that you will not suffer any communication, orally or
otherwise, to be made to them; that you will not communicate with
them yourself, orally or otherwise, unless by my order, or to ask them
it they have agreed on their verdict, until they shall be discharged; and
that you will not, before they render their verdict, communicate to any
person the state of their deliberations, or the verdict they have agreed
keep

on.

No. 82—Form of Oath to Interpreter.
Ante,

§ 450.

swear that you will accurately and truly interpret
the court, the jury, the attorneys and the witness, N....
0... ., in this action, between A.... B...., plaintiﬂf, and C.... D.. ,
defendant.

You

between

do solemnly

<

I
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83-Stipulation to Take Testimony de

No.

bene

esse on

Oral

Interrogatories.
Ante,

A.

. . .

B.

C....D....

C. L., § 10141.

Before L. . .. M. . . ., one of the
justices of the peace in and for the county of

In Justice's court.

. . .

1:.

It

§ 432.

}

is hereby stipulated and agreed by and between the parties to the
above entitled cause that the deposition of E. . . . F. . . ., a witness ma
terial to the plaintiff on the trial thereof, may be taken on oral inter
rogatories at
in the
of
in thestate of ...., at
o'clock
19.., before R.... S...., and
day of
in the
noon of the
that the deposition so taken, when properly returned, may be read upon
the trial of said cause in the same manner and subject to the same con
ditions as if taken upon notice, as provided in chapter 282 of the com
piled laws of 1897.
Dated . . . . . . . . . . . .
19..
A....
Plaintiff.
C. . . . D. . . ., Defendant.
Note.

No. 84—Stipu1ation

to Take Testimony de bene esse on
ten Interrogatories.
Ante,

A. . .. B. . ..

C....D....

432.

C. L., § 10141.

Before L. . .. M. . . ., one of the
justices of the peace in and for the county of

In Justice's court.

v.

It

§

Writ

}

is hereby stipulated and agreed by and between the parties to
the above entitled cause that the deposition of E. . . . F... :, a witness
material to the plaintiff on the trial thereof, may be taken on the
annexed interrogatories, and upon them only. Such deposition shall be
taken before R. . . . S. . . ., who is duly authorized to administer oaths.
in the state of . . . .
in
at
at
of
o'clock in the
. . . .noon of the . . .. day of
. 19. ., and shall be returned as the law
requires. When so taken and returned it may be read upon the trial
of said cause in all respects as if taken upon notice as provided by
chapter 282 of the compiled laws of 1897.
Dated . . . . . . . . . . . . .., 19..
A....
Plaintiff.

C.... D....,Defendant.

I

DEPOSITION FORMS.

No.

85-Notice of Taking Deposition

841

de bene esse

Without a

Commission.
Ante,

§ 426.

C. L., 5 10136.

Before L. . .. M. . . ., one of the
Justices of the Peace in and for the County
of . . . . . . ..
To" the above named defendant:
Take notice that the deposition, de bene esse, of N.... 0...., a
witness for the above named plaintiff, in this cause, will be taken
before R.... S...., a notary public (or other oiﬁcer named in the
statute) at his oiiice at No. . . . . . . .. street, in the city ot .. . ., in the
day ot . . ., 19. ., The
o'clock
m. on the
state of Michigan, at
reason for the taking of such deposition is that such witness resides
more than ﬁfty miles from the place of trial of said cause (or other
cause mentioned in the statute).
A....B....,Plainti;T.
Dated . . . . . . . . . . . . ..,19..

A.

. . .

B.

. . .

In Justice’s court.

v.

C....D....

No. 86—Gertiﬁcate of Oﬁicer Taking the Deposition,
Time, Place and Manner of Taking.
Ante,

§ 430.

of the

C. L., § 10139.

a notary public tor the county of ...., in the state
oi.’ . . . ., qualiﬁed under the laws thereof to administer oaths, do here
day of ...., 19.., at
by certify that on the
o'clock in the
.noon, at my oﬂice in the
of
. in state of ...., I did take the
F...., the witness named in the annexed notice
deposition of
(or stipulation). Upon the taking of such deposition I was attended
as attorney tor C....
by A.... B.... in person and»by G....
D. . . . The witness was by me ﬁrst sworn to tell the truth, the whole
truth and nothing but the truth in said cause, and was then examined
by A.... B.... and cross-examined by G....
tor C....
The questions as put and the answers as given were correctly writ
ten down by me (or under my direction or were taken stenographically
and transcribed under my direction), were then read over to the wit
ness and pronounced correct and were then signed by the witness. I
do further certify that the annexed writings, marked respectively Ex
hibits A, B and C, were the writings used by the witness and referred to
in his deposition. And further that I am not interested in the event of
said cause nor attorney or of counsel for either party.
Witness my hand and seal this__. . .. day of . . . ., 19..
R... . S. . . ., Notary Public.
[Seal.]
The amount of my fees is:
For taking, sealing, certifying and returning deposition, $. ..
For writing . . .. words contained in said deposition, . . ..

I, R.

Total

S....,

fees,

. . . .

R. . . . S.
Note.-—If the deposition is taken upon written
above form should be modiﬁed accordingly.

Notary Public.
interrogatories the

. . .,

DEPOSITION FORMS.

842

No.

87-Clerk’s Certiﬁcate to Be Attached to the Certiﬁcate
of the Oﬂicer Taking the Deposition Where He
Has no Oﬁicial
Ante,

\

§

426.

Seal.

C. L., § 10136.

J....

S...., as clerk of the
court for the county of
in
I,
the state of . . . ., the same being a court of record, do hereby certify
that R. . . . S. . . ., the officer before whom the annexed deposition was
taken, was at the time of the taking thereof a notary public in and
for said county, and qualiﬁed under the laws of this state to admin
ister oaths.
I do further certify that I am acquainted with the signature of the
said R....
and believe the signature to the certiﬁcate of the
taking of said deposition is his genuine signature.
day
Witness my hand and the oﬂicial seal of said court this

of....,19..

J....S....

'

Clerk of said Court.

[Seal.]

No. 88—Aﬁidavit for

a.

bene

_

Ante, §§

A,

Commission
427.

esse.
C. L., §§ 10136, 10137.

Before L. . .. M. . . ., one of the
justices of the peace in and for the county of

In Justice's court.

_, , B. _ _ .
v.

C....D....

426,

to Take Testimony de

}

County of ...., ss: A. . .. B. . . ., being ﬁrst duly sworn, deposes and
says that N.... 0.... is a material witness for this plaintiff on the
trial of this cause. That said witness resides at
in the state of
Michigan and more than ﬁfty miles from ...., the place of the trial
of this cause.
And further deponent says that R.... S...., of ...., in this state,
is a person without interest in this cause, and is not attorney or
counsel for either party hereto, and is a suitable person to take the
testimony of said witness by commission.
Subscribed and sworn
A. . . . B. . . .
to before me this the
19.. }
day of
L. . .. M. . . ., Justice of the Peace.

No. 89—Commission
Ante. §§

A. . .. B. . ..
12.

C....D....
R.... S....:

To

426,

to Take Testimony

de bene esse.

427. C. L., §§ 10136, 10137, 10140.

Before L. . .. M. . . ., one of
the justices of the peace in and for the county

In Justice's court.

of....

Pursuant to the provisions of chapter 282 of the
Compiled Laws of 1897, and for the reasons set forth in the annexed
affidavit, you are hereby commissioned and empowered to take the
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deposition de bene esse of N.... O...., a witness for the plaintiﬂ
herein, at . . . . in the . . . . of . . . . in this state, beginning at . . . o'clock
in the . . . .noon of the .. . . day of
. 19. . In taking such deposition
and making return thereof y‘o_u will follow the procedure as pointed
out in section four of said chapter, a copy of which is printed on this
commission. You will put such written interrogatories to said wit
ness as are attached hereto and as may be furnished by the parties
hereto.

Dated..........

Justice of

the Peace.

of Taking Deposition by Commission.

No. 90—Notice

Ante,

427.

§

c. L.,

§

10137.

In Justice's court. Before L....
one of
the Justices of the Peace in and for the County,

A.... B....
v.

D.

L.... M....,

..,19..

of . . . . . . . .
named defendant:
Take notice that the deposition, de bene esse, of N.... O...., a
material witness for this plaintiff, will be taken by commission be
tore R.... S...., a commissioner duly appointed by L.... M...., the
above named Justice, for that purpose, at the oﬂice of the said R.
S....., at No.
street, in the city of
in the state ot
dayot
at
o'clock lnthe ....noon.
on the
Attached hereto are true copies of the commission issued to the
said R. . .. S. . . ., of the aﬂidavit upon which such commission issued,
and ot the written interrogatories of this plaintiff attached to said
commission.
You will promptly furnish such cross-interrogatories, it any, as you
desire to have put to such witness.
C.

. . .

To the

. . . }

above

A.... B....,

No.

of Commissioner

91—Certiﬁca.te

Plaintiff.

of the Taking of the

Deposition.
Ante, §§

Stateof.........

County of .

I, R. . ..

. . . . .

426,

..

. . . . . . . . . . .. .

}

427.

0. L., §§ 10137,

10139.

88.

S. . . ., the commissioner in the annexed
commission
named, do hereby certify that the annexed deposition of the witness,
in the
of
in the state of ....,
N.... O....,was taken at
day of ...., 19.., at
beginning on the
o'clock in the
. . . .noon.
The said witness was by me ﬁrst duly sworn to testify the truth,
the whole truth andnothing but the truth in said cause, and then the
several direct and cross and redirect interrogatories annexed to the
commission herein were by me read to the said witness, and his an
swers thereto respectlvely, were by me (or, under my direction) cor
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rectly written down, were then read over to the said witness and pr0~
nounced by said witness to be correct. The said witness then signed, in
my presence, such deposition so taken.
I do further certify that the annexed writings marked, respectively,
exhibits A, B and C, are the writings referred to by said witness in
his deposition.
And further I do certify that I am not interested in the event of
the suit in which such deposition is taken, nor am I attorney or oi.’
counsel for either party.
day of .
Witness my hand this
19. .
R. . .. S. . . ., Commissioner.
The amount of my fees is:
For taking, certifying, sealing and forwarding deposition. . .. $ . . . . ..
. . . . . .
For writing
. words . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Total

fees

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

R.
No. 92—Indorsement

and Address

Ante,

A.

B. . ..
}

. . . .

S.

. . .,

. . . .

..

Commissioner.

for Return of Depositions.

C. L., § 10139.

In Justice's court.
Justices of the

v.

C....D....

§ 430.

. . .

Before L. . .. M. . . ., one of the
in and for the County of

Peace

..,Stateof..-....

of N. . .. 0. . . ., taken in said cause, and sealed up by
me to be sent, as hereon addressed, by mail.
'
R. . .. S. . . ., Notary Public.
(or as the case may be )
of .. ,
To L.... M...., Justice of the Peace in and for the
Postoiiicc . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Michigan.
County of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
State of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Depositions

No. 93—Notice
Ante,

of Filing of Depositions.

5 430.

C.

L,

§

10139.

L....
one of the
of the Peace in and for the County of
. . . . .., State of . . . . ..
C....D....
To A. . . . B. . . ., the above named -plaintiff:
You are hereby notified that the deposition of N. . .. 0.... taken in
said cause has been ﬂied therein.
L. . .. M. . . ., Justice 0] the Peace.
to the defendant.
be
sent
A
should
notice
like
Note.
A.... B....
v.

In Justice's court. Before
Justices

DEPOSITION FORMS.
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No. 94—0bjections to the Notice for Taking, the Manner of
Taking or of Certifying and Returning Deposition.
Ante,

A.

B...

C. L., § 10139.

§ 430.

Before L. . .. M. . . ., one of the
of the Peace in and for the County of
. . . . .., State of Michigan.
C.... D....
and objects to the deposition of N.
comes
defendant
This
0....
ﬁled in said cause and moves the suppression of the same for the fol
lowing reasons: (Set out reasons in full.)
This motion is based upon the aﬂldavlts of E. . . . F. .. . and G. . ..
H. . .. ﬁled herewith and upon the ﬁles and records in said cause.
C. . . . D. . . ., Defendant.

To

. . .
11.

in Justice's court.

.

Justices

A.... B....:

You will take notice that an objection and motion, of which the
foregoing are true copies, have been entered and made in said cause.
Copies of the aﬂidavits referred to therein are hereto attached.
You will further take notice that said objections and motion will be
heard on the next adjourned day of said cause or as said court may
direct.
Dated . . . . . . . . . . . .

No.

C.... D....,

..,19..

95-Form of Confession of Judgment.
Ante,

To L.
of

. . .

M.
.:

C. L., § 705.

§ 482.

. . ., Esquire, one of the Justices

of the Peace of the County

. . . . .

I hereby confess that I
in the sum of . . .. dollars,

am

B....

indebted to A.

damages,

costs, and

costs.

Dated . . . . . . . . . . . . ..,19..
Signed in my presence, in open court.
L.... M. ..., Justice of the Peace.

A

upon contract

I hereby author
in his favor, for that sum, with

besides

ize you to enter judgment against me

No.

Defendant.

C....D....

96--Entry of Judgment by Confession.

B

..,}

C. . . . D. . . .
day of ...., 19.., the above named parties personally
On this
before me in open court. The defendant, 0.... D...., con
appeared
fesses in writing signed by him, in my presence, that he is indebted
to A... . B... ., the plaintiff, upon contract, in the sum of ﬁfty dollars
damages, besides costs, and thereupon, by the consent of the plaintiff,
judgment is rendered against said defendant for ﬁfty dollars damages
and sixty-three cents costs of suit.

L.

M...

.,

Justice of

the Peace.
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RELATING TO TRANSCRIPTS.
No. 97 —Form of Aﬂidavit for a Transcript.
Ame,

Is

JL's1'1cs‘s

§§ 496-499.

c. L.,

§§ 845-851.

Court:
Before

'

Peace

L.... M..'..,

one

of the Justices of the

in and for the County of

. . . .

..

C. . . . D. . . .
County of . . . . .., ss. A.... B...., the above named plaintiff, being
duly sworn, says that there is now due and remaining unpaid upon
., 19. ., rendered in the
the judgment heretofore, on the . . .. day of
above entitled cause by the above named Justice, in favor of this de~
ponent against the above named defendant, the sum of (state the
sum, which must not be less than twenty dollars), exclusive of costs,
and that there is now due to this deponent for the costs taxed in said
cause by said Justice upon the rendition of said judgment, the further
sum of ...., and that execution may be now issued upon said judg
ment for the collection thereof. And deponent further says that he
has good reason to believe, and does believe, that there is not suﬂicient
goods and chattels liable to execution to satisfy said judgment within
the county of ...., where said judgment was rendered, belonging to
the said C. . . . D. . .. (or to any person or persons against whom such
execution may issue).
And further says not.
Subscribed and sworn to before me,
day of ...., 19..
this
}
L. . . . M. . . ., Justice of the Peace.

A. . . . B.

. . .

No. 98—Form of Certiﬁcate to Be Attached to Transcript.
Ante,
IN Jus"r1cr:'s

A.

§ 496.

c. L.,

§ s45.

Cousrz

. . . B. . . .
v.
. . . D. . . .

Before L.... M...., one of the Justices of the
C.
Peace in and for the County of . . . . ..
I»
County of
ss. I, L. . . . M. . . ., one of the.Justices of the Peace
in said county, do hereby certify that the
of the township of
foregoing (or annexed) is a correct transcript from my docket, of the
judgment rendered by me in the above entitled cause and remaining in
my control, and of my docket, and of the whole thereof, and of all
entries made therein of the proceedings had by and before me in said
cause, so far as they appear upon said docket, together with (if there
was security for stay of crccution. ﬁled with the justice, add, “the
original security for stay of execution upon said judgment, and") the
original affidavit delivered to me upon the application for said tran
script.
Dated.............., 19..
L.... M...., Justice of the Peace.

FOlLMS—RI-,‘LA'1‘lNG

No. 99-—Certiﬁoa.te

TO EXI-ICUTIONS.

to Transcript Where Judgment Was Ren
dered by Another Justice.
Ante,

§ 499.

C. L., §§ 848-851.
-

IN Jusricl.-:'s Connr:
Before
Peace

L.... M....,

one of the Justices
in and for the County of . . . . ..

of the

C
I, L. . .. M. . . ., one of the Justices of the Peace
County of
., ss.
of the township of . . . ., in said county, do hereby certify that the fore
going (or, annexed) is a correct transcript from the docket of M. . ..
N...., late a Justice of the Peace of the township of ...., in said
county, of the judgment rendered by him in the above entitled cause,
and of his docket, and the whole thereof, and of all entries made
therein of the proceedings had by and before him in said cause, so far
as they appear upon said docket, which is in my possession, and of
which said docket and said judgment I have control, together with
(if there was a stay of execution ﬁled with the justice, add, “the orig
inal security for stay of execution upon said judgment. and”) the
original aﬁidavit delivered to me upon the application for said tran
script.
Dated . . . .
. . . . . ..,19..
L.... M...., Justice of the Peace.

RELATING TO EXEGUTIONS.
100-Form of Execution.

No.

STATE OF MICHIGAN,
or .

. . . . . . . . .

.

COUNTY

C. L., §§ 852, 853.

}s8

Ante, §§ 500, 504.
‘

. . .

.

.

.

.

.

a

,
To any Constable of said County:
Whereas, judgment against C. .. . D. .. ., defendant, for the sum of
cents, costs, in favor
dollars, damages, and
dollars and
of A.... B...., plaintiff, was rendered by and before me, the under
signed,
justice of the peace of the township of
in said county,
. . .. day of . . . . .., 19.., at the township
on the
aforesaid.
You
are therefore commanded, in the name of the People of the state of
day
Michigan, to levy the said damages, with interest from said
of ...., 19.., and costs, of the goods and chattels of the said C....
D. .. (excepting such goods and chattels as are by law exempted from
execution), and to bring the money before me, at my oﬂlce, in said
township, in sixty days from the date hereof, to render to the said
A.... B...., the said plaintiff. And have you then and there this
writ.
., this
day of
Given under my hand, at the said township of

., 19. .

L. ..

.

M.

. . .,

Justice of

the Peace.
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101-Form of Endorsement

on the Execution,

Where

a

Surety is Defendant.
It

appeared

or. the

F....

trial of the within

cause,

named

that the within

C.... D....,

was surety for his codefendant,
within named, who was the principal debtor.
named

L.... M....,

Peace,

of Execution Against the Body.

No. 102—Form
Ante, §§

Justice of the

505,

506.

c. L., §§

854,

860,

10342.

STATE OF MICHIGAN,

88 '
COUNTY or . . . . . . . . .
To any Constable of said County:

Whereas, judgment against C. .. . D. . . ., defendant, for the sum of
cents, costs, in favor
dollars and
dollars damages, and
of A.... B...., plaintiff, was rendered by and before me, the under
signed, a Justice of the Peace of the township of . .. ., in said county,
day of ...., A. D. 19. ., at the township aforesaid. You
on the
in the name of the People of the State of
are therefore commanded,
Michigan, to levy the said damages, with interest from said .. .. day
of ...., 19. ., and costs, of the goods and chattels of the said C....
D.... (excepting such goods and chattels as are by law exempted
from execution), and to bring the money before me, at my oﬂice, in
said township, in sixty days from the date hereof, to render to the said
A. . .. B... ., the said plaintitf. And if no such goods or chattels can
be found, or not sumcient to satisfy this execution, you are further
commanded,
in the name of said people, to take the body of the said
C.... D.... and convey him to the common jail of the said county,
there to remain until this execution shall be paid and satisﬁed, or the
said C.... D.... shall be discharged by due course of law. Hereof
fail not, and have you then and there this writ.
day of ..
,
Given under my hand, at said township, this
19 . .

L.

No. 103—Form

Ante,

or .

M.

. .

., Justice of the Peace.

of Execution Against Principal and Surety for
a Stay of Execution.

STATE OF MICHIGAN,
COUNTY

. . .

. . . . . . . . . . }

§ 508.

C. L., § 855.

88‘

To any Constable of said County:
Whereas, judgment against C. . . . D. . . ., defendant,
dollars damages, and
cents,
dollars and
of A.... B...., plaintiff, was rendered by and before
signed, a Justice of the Peace of the township of . . . .,

_i

for the sum of
costs,

in favor

me. the under

in said county,
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.

on the . . . . .. day of . . . .
19..,
the township aforesaid; and
F...., on the
whereas,
day of ...., 19. ., became surety
for the payment of said damages, with interest and the costs afore
said, at or before the expiration of
months from the commence
ment of suit, agreeably to law; and whereas, the said damages, with
interest and costs, have not been paid. You are therefore commanded,
in the name of the People of the State of Michigan, to levy the said
damages, with interest, from said .. .. day of
., at the rate of .. .
per cent., and said costs, of the goods and chattels of the said C. ..
D. . .. and E. . .. F.
(excepting such goods and chattels as are by
law exempted from execution), and to bring the money before me, at
my oﬂlce, in said township, in sixty days from the date hereof, to
render to the said A. . .. B. .. .. Hereof fail not.
day of ....,
Given under my hand, at said township, this
19. .

L. . .. M...

Justice of the

Peace.

§

of Intention to Apply for Execution.
Ante,
511.
c. L
864.
§

No. 104—Notice

.,

IN JUSTICE Comm":

A.

. . .

B.

. . .

Before L.... M...., one of the Justices of the
Peace in and for the County of . . . . ..
To the above named defendant:
Take notice that
intend to apply to L.... M...., Esq., the above
on
named Justice of the Peace, at his oﬁice, in the township of
instant, at
noon, for an
day of
o'clock in the
the
immediate execution on the judgment in this cause.
A.... B...., Plaintiﬂ’.
Dated . . . . . . . . . . . . ..,19..

I

C.... D....

}

11.

No.

105-Form of Aﬂidavit of Service of Notice of Application
511.

C. L.,

§

Ante,

864.

USTICE Comer:

J

IN

§

for Execution.

A.

. .

B.

. . .

.

one of the Justices of the
Before L....
Peace in and for the County of . . . . . .
C. .. . D. . . .
in said
County of ...., ss. A.... B...., of the township of
day of
county, being duly sworn, deposes and says that on the
instant, he served upon C. . . D. . . ., the above named defendant,
a notice, of which the annexed is a copy, by delivering the same to
him personally (or, in case he cannot be found, by delivering the same
to the wife of the defendant or to some member of his family of suitable
age and discretion, at the dwelling house of the said defendant, at . . . .
in ...., he being absent therefrom).
A. . .. B. . . ., Plaintiff
Subscribed and sworn to before me,
day of ...., 19..
this
L.... M. . ., Justice of the Peace.
54

'

.

}

.

1»

v.
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of Oath on Application for Immediate Issuing
of Execution.

No. 106—Form

You do solemnly swear (or
to such questions as shall be
immediate execution upon the
A. . .. B. . . ., plaintiff, and C.

aﬂirm) that you will true answers make
put to you, touching the necessity of an
judgment rendered in this cause, between
. .. D. . . ., defendant.

for Stay of Execution to
Justice.

No. 107—Security

Ante, §§ 512, 514.

be ﬁled

with the

C. L., §§ 865-867.

In Jus-rrcs CoUs'r:
A. . . . B. . . .

Before L.... M...., one of the Justices of the
Peace in and for the County of . . . . ..
County of ...., ss. Whereas, judgment was rendered, in the above
entitled cause, on the . . . . .. day of . . . . .., 19. ., by the above named
L. .. . M. .. ., one of the justices of the peace, in and for said county,
in favor of A.... B...., the above named plaintiff, against C....
D. . . ., the above named defendant, for the sum of .'. . ., damages, and
Therefore, I do acknowledge myself surety for the
. . .. costs of suit.
stay of execution on said judgment, and for payment by said defend
ant to the plaintiff of said damages, with interest, and said costs at or
months from the commencement of said
before the expiration of
suit, and do agree to pay the same to said plaintiff, at or before the
expiration of the time aforesaid.
day of
., 19. .
Witness my hand this
Signed, acknowledged and delivered
E. . .. F... .
in presence of
}
v.

C.... D....

}

L.... M....,

I approve of

.

F.

Justice of

said.

No. 108—Form

the Peace.

as surety for the stay of execution

L. . .. M...

.,

Justice of the

afore

Peace.

of Stay of Execution When Entered on the
Docket.
Ante.

§ 514.

0. L.,

5

ssr.

F...., hereby acknowledge myself
I,
County of ...., ss.
by the defendant of the above
plaintiff
surety for the payment to the
judgment. with interest and costs thereon, at or before the expiration
l
of
months from the commencement of said suit.
Dated the....dayof....,19..
I approve of E. . .. F. . . . as surety as aforesaid.
L....
Justice of the Peace.
Dated . . . . . . . . . . . . ..,19..
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of Order Recalling Execution When Security
for Stay is Given.

No. 109—Form

Ante,

c. L.,

§ 515.

IN JUsTicE's Cousrz

A.... B....

Before

v.

0.... D. . ..
To 0.... S....,
of

}
a.

§ 869.

‘

Peace

L.... M....,
in and for

one of the
the County of

Constable of the township

of

....,

Justices of
. . . . ..

the

in said county

. . . .

You are hereby required to return to me the execution in your hands
issued by me in the above entitled cause, the defendant therein hav
ing given to the plaintiff and ﬂied with me, security in writing for
staying execution on the judgment therein.
L. . .. M. . . ., Justice of the Peace.
Dated . . . . . . . . . . . . . ., 19. .

110-Form of Aﬂidavit by Surety for Stay, on Application

No.

for Execution.

J

Ante,

§

C. L., § 871.

516.

In usrrcrfs COURT:

A.... B....

one of the Justices of the
Before L....
Peace in and for the County of . . . . ..
County of ...., ss.
F. . . ., the surety for the stay of execu
tion on the judgment in the above entitled cause, being duly sworn,
says that he has become, and is apprehensive that by delaying execu
tion until the full time of said stay, he may and will be compelled to
pay said judgment.
Subscribed and sworn to before me,
E.
_
day of ....,19..
this
}
v.

C.... D....

}

L.... M....,

No.

Justice of

the Peace.

on Execution Against Joint Debtor
Where One Not Served.

111—Endorsement

Ante.

§ 520.

C. L., § 875.

The within named defendant, G....
and did not appear in the suit.

H....,

was not served

M:

Justice of

with

process,

L.

. . .

. . .,

the Peace.

No. 112—Form of Inventory in Case Where Levy Is Made
Upon a Class of Property Exempt to a Speciﬁed Amount.
Ante,

An inventory

§

528.

c. L., §§ 10325, 10326.

of property exempt by law from execution to a
specified amount or value, levied upon by the undersigned, a constable
Of the township of
., in the county of
., by virtue of an execu

I-‘OR1\IS—BELATING T0 EXECUTIONS.
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tion issued by L. . . . M. . . ., esquire, a Justice of the Peace of the town
ship ot . . .. in said county, in favor of A... . B. . . ., plaintiﬂf, against
day of
.,
C.. .. D. . . ., defendant, made by said constable, this
19. .,

to-wit:
One two-horse lumber wagon.
0.... S. ..., Constable.

One pair of bay horses.

No. 113—Oath by Constable to Appraisers, to Be Endorsed on

Inventory.
Ante,

§ 528.

C. L., § 10325.

G.... L.... and P.... T...., disinterested
COUNTY or ...., ss.
freeholders of the township of ...., in said county, being sworn, do,
and each for himself doth say, that he will well and truly appraise
the property mentioned in the within inventory, at its cash value,
according to the best of his understanding.
G.... L....
Subscribed and sworn to the
o£....,19..,beforeme.
day}
P....'l‘....
0.... S...., Constable.
No. 114—Appraisal to Be Endorsed on the Inventory.
Ante,

§ 528.

c. L.,

§ 10325.

We, the above named G. . .. L. . .. and P... . T. .. ., disinterested
lreeholders of the township of ...., in the county of ...., being duly
S...., the constable above named, well and truly to
sworn by O.
appraise the property mentioned in the within inventory (said prop
erty now being in the said township of ....) at its cash value, accord
ing to the best of our understanding, and having viewed said property,
do appraise the same as follows:
One pair of bay horses, valued at $150 each . . . . . . . . . . . .5300 00
One two-horse lumber wagon, appraised at . . . . . . . . . . ..
60 00
Witness our hands this .' . .. day of ...., 19..

c-....1.....
1=....

No. 115—Form

T.... }'*PP"“"'=

of Bond of Indemnity to the Oﬂicer Levying an
Execution.
Ante,

§

539.

C. L., § 10349.

Know all men by these presents, that we, A... . B. . . ., as principal,
and
as surety, are held and ﬁrmly bounden unto 0....
county of
., in the sum
.,
a
constable
of the township of
S. . .
dollars, to be paid to the said 0....
of
his executors, ad
ministrators, or assigns, to which payment well and truly to be made
we jointly and severally bind ourselves, our heirs, executors, and ad
ministrators, ﬂrmly by these presents.
day of ...., 19..
Sealed with our seals.
Dated the
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Whereas, the said O. . . . S. . . ., as constable as aforesaid, by virtue
a certain execution issued against C.... D.... by L.... M....,
esquire, one of the Justices of the Peace of the township of ...., in
said county of ...., is about to seize and levy on (specify the prop
erty) alleged by the said A.... B.... to belong to the said C....
D. . . . with intent to sell the same upon said execution:
Now, therefore, the condition of this obligation is such, that if the
said A.... B.... shall at all times, and forever hereafter, keep the
said 0.... S.... harmless and indemniﬁed of, from, and against all
damages, costs, charges, trouble, and expense, of what nature soever,
which he may be put to, sustain, or suffer by reason of such levy and
seizure, or of the subsequent proceeding thereon, then this obligation
to be void, or otherwise of force.

of

A.
No.

In

.. .

B.

. . .

116-Form of Receipt for Goods Levied Upon.
Ante,

§ 540.

Jus'rIcr-:’s CoUn'r:

A.

. . .

B.

. . .

12.

Execution issued by L.... M. . . ., Esquire, one of the Justices of the
Peace in the County of . . . ., for
Damages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .$28.00
Costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 1.50
C0nstable’s fees for collecting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 1.50
$31.00

Interest on damages, from ... . 19. ., . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..$ . . . .
By virtue of the execution above described, 0. . . . S... ., one of the
constables of the township of ...., in said county, has levied upon
the following goods and chattels, the property of the said C. . . . D. . . .,
to-wit:
(Name the property.)
Received June 6, 19.. of the said 0. .. . S. . .., the goods and chat
tels above mentioned. which I promise to deliver to him at ...., in the
township of ...., in said county, on the
next, or in
day of
default thereof, I do hereby agree with the said 0.... S. ..., to pay
him the said damages and interest, and costs and fees for collection,
above mentioned.

No. 117—Form

of Endorsement

Ante, § 541.

of Levy.

C. L., § 881.

By virtue of the within execution I have this day levied on (name
the property), the property of C.... D...., the defendant within
named.
day of ...., 19..
Dated the
Constable.
0....
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No. 118—Form

TO EXECUTIONS.

of Notice of Gonstable's Sale.

Ante, § 542.

C. L., 5 882.

,

By virtue of

an execution issued out of a Justice's court, against
upon a judgment in a cause wherein A.... B.... was
plaintiff, and the said C.... D.... was defendant, I have seized and
taken (describe the property),
the property of said C.... D....,
which I shall sell at public vendue, to the highest bidder, at ...., in
the township of ...., in the county of ...., Michigan, on the
day of
A. D. 19.., at
o'clock in the
noon.
day of ...., 19..
Dated the
0. . . . S. .. ., Constable.

C.... D....,

No.

119-Form of Return to an Execution,

Where Property

Found.
Ante. §§ 545,

546.

c. L., §§ 884,

888.

I hereby return that I have levied and collected the within
ages, with interest and costs, of the within named 0.... D....,
am within commanded.
Dated

....,

0.... S....,

19..

No. 120—Form

dam
as

I

Constable.

of Return to an Execution Against the Body.

I

dollars, a portion of the dam
hereby return that I have levied
and costs within mentioned; of the goods and chattels of the
within named C.... D...., and, after diligent search, no goods or
chattels being found, whereof I could levy the residue thereof, I have
committed his body to the common jail, as I am within commanded.
,
Dated ...., 19..
0....
Constable.
ages

No. 121—Form

of Return to an Execution Where no Property
Found.
Ante,

§

545.

C. L., § 884.

I

hereby return that after diligent search no goods or chattels of the
named C. . .. D. . . . could be found, whereon to levy the within
speciﬁed damages or costs.
G.... H...., Constable.
19.. .
Dated

within

No. 122—Form

of Renewal of an Execution.

Ante, §

549.

c. L.,

§ s11.

The within execution is this day renewed for sixty days.
L.... M...., Justice of the Peace.
Dated ...., 19. .
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No 123.—Renewa.l Where a Part Has Been Paid or Collected.
Ante, § 549.

C. L., § 877.

The sum of ten dollars remains due on the within execution, and the
said execution is renewed for the collection of that sum with interest
from this date, for sixty days.
L. . . . M. . . ., Justice of the Peace.
Dated . . . ., 19..

of Return of Execution—Goods not Sold,

No. 124—Form

Ante,

§ 549.

c. L.,

§

etc.

sss.

execution I levied upon the goods and chattels
described in the schedule hereunto annexed
., inst., and I do further return that there was
on the . .. . day of
not suﬁicient time, after said levy, and before the return day of said
execution, to advertise and sell such property according to law.
Dated ...., 19..
0.... S...., Constable.

By virtue

of this

oi’ the defendant therein,

No. 125—Form of Schedule of Property Levied Upon.
Ante, § 549.

c. L.,

§ 885.

by 0.
Schedule of property levied upon, on the . . . . day of .
S. . . ., one of the constables of said county, by virtue of the annexed
execution.
.
One brown horse,
Dated

....,

One

19..

red

cow.

0.... S....,

Constable.

on Execution for Beneﬁt of Stay.

No. 126—Endorsement

Ante, § 552.

C. L., § 873.

The within execution is issued for the use of E. . .. F. . . ., the secur
ity tor the stay of execution on the within mentioned judgment.
L....
Justice of the Peace.

IN PROCEEDINGS BY CERTIORARI.
of Intention to Remove

No. 127—Notice

Ante,

§

553.

C. L., §§ 935,

a.

Case by Certiorari.

936.

IN JUs'r1cE’s Comzr:

A.... B....

Before

L....

one of the Justices of the
in and for the County of . . . . ..
SIB—Take notice, that I intend to remove this cause by certiorart,
to the Circuit Court for the County of . . . . ..
Dated ...., 19..
C.... D...., Defendant.
v.

C.... D....

To L. ..

.

M.

}

. . .,

Peace

Justice of

the Peace.

‘
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No. 128—A.ﬂidavit to Obtain Allowance of

STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Conan or . . . .

553.

c. L.,

§ 936.

‘}s8

Ante, §

Writ of Certiorari.

'

this....dayof....,19..
0.... G. . . .,

No.

}

.

2.

1.

.

a

C.... D.... of the township of ...., in said county, being duly
sworn, deposes and says that A.... B.... lately prosecuted this
deponent by summons, returnable on the
. day of .. .. last, at
.
noon, before L.... M...., one of the Justices of
o'clock in the
the Peace of said township, at the oiiice of the said Justice, in said
And this deponent appeared to the said
township, in a plea of
summons, and the said A.... B...., the plaintiff, declared against
this deponent as follows:
(set forth the declaration) to which this
deponent pleaded (set forth the plea). And thereupon the said parties
without a jury. And
proceeded
to trial before the said Justice,
upon the trial the following evidence was given, to-wit:
N. . . . 0.. . .,
on the part of the plaintiff, testiﬁed (set forth the testimony on either
side, and the objections made, and the decisions of the Justice thereon).
And this deponent further saith, that the preceding is
substantial
statement of the testimony and proceedings before the said Justice;
and after the said testimony was given, the cause was submitted to
said justice, who upon said . . . day of . . . ., rendered judgment against
dollars damages, and
this deponent in favor of the plaintiﬂ! for
. . .. dollars costs of suit.
And this deponent further saith, that he is advised and alleges that
the said judgment is erroneous, upon the following grounds, to-wit:
That the said Justice erroneously rejected the testimony of the
witness offered by this deponent.
That the Justice, etc. (state all the errors complained of).
And further this deponent saith not.
C. . .D. . . .
Subscribed and sworn to before me,
Notary Public in and for said County.

129-Bond on Certiorari Where Judgment Was Against
556,

C. L.,

§

Ante,

§

the Party Bringing It.
938-940.

if

.

.

.
.

.
.

D. . ., as principal,
Know all men by these presents, that we, C. .
., in the county
and E. . . . F. . ., as surety, both of the township of .
of ...., are held and ﬁrmly bound unto A.... B...., in the sum of
ﬁfty dollars (or,
the judgment and costs exceed twenty-ﬁve dollars.
then in double the amount of the judgment), to be paid to the said
A.... B...., his certain attorney, executors, administrators, or as
signs; for which payment well and truly to be made, we bind our
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selves, our heirs, executors and administrators, jointly and severally,
ﬁrmly by these presents. Sealed with our seals.
day of ...., 19..
Dated this
Whereas, judgment was rendered on the
day of ...., 19.., by
L. . . . M. . . ., one of the Justices of the Peace of the county of
. in
favor of the said A.... B...., plaintiff, for the sum of
dollars
damages, and
dollars costs, against the said C. . .. D. . . ., defend
ant; and whereas, the said C.... D.... has obtained the allowance
of a certiorari to remove the said judgment into the Circuit Court of
the said county.
Now, therefore, the condition of this obligation is such, that if the
said C.... D.... shall prosecute such certiorari to effect, and shall
abide the judgment of the said Circuit Court therein, and shall pay
the debt (or, damages) and costs that shall be awarded against him,
the said C.... D...., then this obligation to be void, otherwise to
remain in force.

0.... D....

No.

130—Condition

[L. S.]
[L. S.]

of Bond When Judgment Was for the

Party Procuring the Writ.
Ante,

§ 556.

-

C. L., § 940.

Now, therefore, the condition of this obligation is such, that in case
the said judgment shall be aﬂirmed, if the said A.... B.... shall
pay such costs as shall be awarded against him on the afﬁrmance of
such judgment, then this obligation to be void, otherwise to remain
in force.

No. 131-Justiﬁcation
Ante,

of Surety to Be Endorsed on Bond.
§

556.

c. L., § 939.

County of
ss.—E.
the surety in the foregoing bond,
being ﬁrst duly sworn deposes and says that he owns property in this
state of the value of at least
dollars over and above all debts and
demands, and legal exemptions.
Subscribed and sworn to before
day of
this
19..
me}

No. 132—Form
Ante,

I approve of
Dated

...

., 19. .

§

of Approval of Surety.
556.

c. L.,

as surety

L.

§ 938.

in this bond.
M. . . ., Justice of

. . .

the Peace.
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133—Certiﬁca.te

to Suspend Execution
Has Been Issued.
Ante, §

In Jusnci-:’s COURT!
A. . . . B. . . .
v.

C....D....

Before

559.
‘

After Certiorari

C. L., § 943.

L....

one

of the Justices of the

PeaceoftheCountyof......

I certify that a writ of certtorari has been duly issued on the judg
ment in this cause.
L. . . . M. . . ., Justice of the Peace.
Dated . . . ., 19. .
No. 134—Form of Justice's Return to a Certiorari.
Ante,

§ 560.

c. L.,

’

§§ 944, 945.

COUNTY or . . .. ss.—I, L. . . . M... ., the Justice of the Peace named
in the writ hereto annexed, do certify to the Circuit Court of said
county that before coming to me of the said writ, to-wit: on the . . . .
day of
at the request of A.... B.... in the said writ named, I

I

I

I,

I

a

I,

‘if

issued a summons directed to any constable of the said county, com
manding him to summon C.... D.... in the said writ also named,
to appear before me at my ofiice, in the township of . .. ., on the .
day of . . . ., then instant, at
noon, to answer
o'clock in the
the said A. . .. B. . .. in a plea of trespass on the case, to his damage
which summons, on or before the return day
one hundred dollars;
thereof, was delivered to me by 0.... S...., a constable of the said
county, with a return thereon signed by him, that the same was per
sonally served on the said C.... D.... on the
day of ....,
And I do also certify, that at the time and place above
aforesaid.
speciﬁed for the return of the said summons, the said parties appeared
before -me, and the said plaintiff declared against the defendant as
To which declaration the defend
follows:
(Insert the declaration.)
any). And thereupon,
ant pleaded (set forth the plea and notice,
the said Justice proceeded to try the said cause. On the trial of said
cause, M. . .. A. . . ., a witness sworn on the part of the plaintiff, testiﬁed
And thereupon plaintiff rested his
that (set forth the testimony).
cause.
And S. . .. R....,
witness sworn on the part of the defend
ant, testifled that (set forth the testimony).
And
also certify that
the foregoing is all the testimony given on the said trial, and that
after hearing the proofs and allegations of the parties,
the said
Justice, did forthwith render judgment in favor of the plaintiff, against
the defendant, for .
dollars damages, and also
dollars costs.
And in further answer to the facts set forth in the copy of the
affidavit on which the said writ of certiorari was allowed,
do further
certify and return (set forth the facts as to the alleged grounds of
error speciﬁed in the affidavit).
All of which
send with the process, pleadings and other things

r01n1s—m PROCEEDINGS
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touching the annexed proceedings and judgment, as by the said writ
I am commanded.
Given under my hand, the .
day of .. . ., 19. .
L. . .. M... ., Justice of the Peace.
(Form of indorsement of writ.)
The execution of this writ appears by the return hereto annexed.
L. . .. M. . . ., Justice of the Peace.

Writ of Certiorari.

No. 135—Form of Amended Return to
Ante, §

C. L., § 946.

561.

STATE OF MICHIGAN,
A. . . . B. . . ., Plaintiff,

In the Circuit Court for the County
of . . . . ..
Defendant. }
In obedience to a rule of the Circuit Court for the County of
day of ...., I, L.... M...., the justice referred to
made on the
in the said rule, do further certify and return to the writ of certiorari
in this cause, and in compliance with the said rule, that (here set forth
the facts relating to the particular matter as to which further return is
12.

C.... D....,

ordered).
Given under my hand, the

day of

L. ..

.

M.

., 19..
. . .,

Justice of

the Peace.

IN PROCEEDINGS ON APPEAL.
No.

136-Form of Aﬂidavit for Appeal.
Ante, §§

563,

564.

c. L., §§

902,

903.

STATE OF MICHIGAN,

or . . . . . . . . .. }ss'
..
D.
. . ., of said county, being duly sworn, says that a ﬁnal judg
C.
ment was rendered by L. . . . M. . . ., esquire, a Justice of the Péace in
COUNTY
.

day of ...., 19.., upon an issue of
and for said county, on the
fact (or as the case may be) joined between the parties, in favor of
A.... B...., plaintiff, and against this deponent as defendant, for
Deponent further
. dollars costs of suit.
. . . . dollars damages, and
says that such judgment is not in accordance with the just rights
of this deponent, as deponent verily believes, and that said deponent
conceives himself aggrieved thereby, and appeals therefrom to the
and further deponent saith not.
Circuit Court for the County of
C. . . . D. . . .
Subscribed and sworn to before me,

this....dayof....,19..
L.

. . .

M.

. . ..

}

Justice of

the Peace.
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for Special Appeal.

No. 137-—Aﬂ‘ida.vit
Ante,

STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Comwry

on . . . . . . . . . .

c. L.,

§ 564.

§ 903.

}”‘

C. . . . D. . . ., of said county, being duly sworn, says that a ﬁnal judg
ment was rendered by L. . .. M. . . ., Esquire, 9, Justice of the Peace in
and tor said county, on the . . . . day of .. . ., A. D. 19. ., upon an issue
oi’ tact (or as the case may be) joined between the parties, in favor of
A.... B...., plaintiff, and against this deponent as defendant, for
. . .. dollars damages, and . . . . dollars costs of suit.
Deponent further
says that such judgment is not in accordance with the just rights
of this deponent, as deponent verily believes, and that said deponent
conceives himself aggrieved thereby, and appeals therefrom to the
Circuit Court for the County of . . ..
And this deponent further saith, that he alleges that the said judg
ment is erroneous for the following causes, to-wit:
1.
That the said Justice erred in deciding that the return of the
constable was suﬂlcient, although the time of service was not stated.
The said Justice erred, etc. (set forth all the errors complained
2.
of), and further deponent saith not.
Subscribed and sworn to before me,
day of ....,19..
this

L.... M....,

No. 138—Form
Ante,

§ 566.

C....D...

}

Justice of

the Peace.

of Bond on Appeal.
c. L.,

§§ 904-906.

Know all men by these presents, that we, C. . . . D. . . ., as principal,
and
and G.... l-l...., as sureties, allot the
of
in the county of
and state of Michigan, are held and ﬁrmly bound
in the county of
unto A.... B...., of the
of
and state
of Michigan, in the sum of . . .. (not less than ﬁfty dollars and double
the amount of the judgment), to which payment well and truly to be
made, we bind ourselves, our heirs, executors and administrators,
jointly and severally, ﬁrmly by these presents.
day of ...., 19..
Sealed with our seals, and dated the
day of .. . ., 19. ., by
Whereas, judgment was rendered on the
Esq., one of the Justices of the Peace of the County of
L....
aforesaid, in favor of the said A.... B....,
and state of
costs ot suit against
tor the sum of
dollars damages, and
conceiving
the said C.... D....; and whereas, the said C....
himself aggrieved by the said judgment, has appealed therefrom to
the Circuit Court for said County oi.’ . . . . ..
Now, the condition of the above obligation is such, that if the said
C.... D.... shall prosecute his said appeal with all due diligence to
a decision in the said Circuit Court, and it a judgment be rendered

iii
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against him in the said court, shall pay the amount of such judgment
including all costs with interest thereon, and in case the said appeal
shall be discontinued or dismissed, if he, the said C.
D... ., shall
pay the amount of the judgment rendered against him in the Justice’:
court, including all costs with interest thereon, then this obligation
to be void, otherwise in force.

C.... D....

I hereby certify that the sureties in the foregoing
their pecuniary responsibility as such in writing and
Dated

....,

L.... M....,Justice

19..

bond,

justiﬁed

on oath.

of the Peace.
see,
ante,
sureties
No.
of
131.)

(For form of justiﬁcation

No. 139—Justice's Certiﬁcate That an Appeal Has Been Made.
Ante,
Jusrlci-:'s

A.

. . .

§ 569.

C. L., § 911.

Cover:

B.

. . .

\

IN’

L.... M....,

one of the Justices
of the County of
I certify that an appeal to the Circuit Court for the county of . ..
has been duly made in this cause by the defendant.
L.... M....,Justice of the Peace.
Dated ...., 19..
v.

of the
C.... D.... }Before

Peace

No. 140—Return' to an Appeal.
IN

JUsrrci-:’s

Ante,

§ 570-572.

0. L., §§ 912-914.

Comrr:

A.... B....

Before L.... M...., one of the Justices of the
Peace in and for the County of . . . . ..
L.... M....,
An appeal having been made in the above cause,
the Justice before before whom the above cause was tried, do hereby
return to the Circuit Court for the County of . . ., the proceedings had
»
before me therein, as follows:
The parties prosecuted and defended in their individual character.
day of
The cause was commenced by summons issued on the
...., 19.., returnable at my oﬂice in the township of ...., in said
county, on the . . .. day of . . . . aforesaid, at .. . . o'clock in the after
'0.

.

_I,

C.... D....

noon.

if

a

The plaintiffs declaration was in writing, of which the following is
copy; (or, the plaintiﬁ declared verbally as follows: insert the sub
stance of the declaration).
The defendant's plea was in writing, and the following is a copy
verbal, the substance of it).
thereof:
(insert copy of plea; or,
The said cause was tried by jury, and the names of the jurors were
(insert names of jurors), and the jury found a. verdict in favor of the
dollars
plaintiif for
\\

damag\es.

/4
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That on the . . . . day of ...., 19. ., I rendered judgment against the
defendant for . . . . dollars damages and . . . . dollars costs.
And as to the matters and alleged errors stated and set forth in the
do further return:
aﬂidavit to appeal said cause, hereunto/annexed,
(set forth the facts relating to. the points alleged in the a/ﬁdavit to be
erroneous, including copies’ of all process, returns, aﬁldavits, etc., and
decisions, if any, relating to those points),
And I do further return, that the affidavit and bond herewith re
instant, and the
day of
turned, were delivered to me on the .
'
costs of suit and my fees were at the same time paid.
day of ...., 19..
Given under my hand, the

I

L.... M....,

Justice of

the Peace.

RELATING TO PROCEEDINGS AGAINST FRAUDULENT
DEBTORS.
No. 1&1-Form

of Aﬂidavit for Warrant Against Fraudulent
Debtor.

STATE OF MICHIGAN,
COUNTY

or..........

590,

591.

C. L., §§ 9555, 9556.

}ss

Ante, §§

‘

;

a

if

a .

.

a

.

.

.
.

A. . . . B. . . ., being duly sworn, deposes
and says, that C. . . . D. . . ., of the township of . . . ., in said county, is
justly indebted to this deponent in the sum of
dollars, upon
express contract for goods, wares and merchandise, sold and delivered
by this deponent to said C. . . . D. . . . (or upon an account for work and
D. . . . or, upon a judgment
labor performed by deponent for said C. .
rendered by L. . . M. . .,
Justice of the Peace in and for said county
day of ...., 19.., upon a contract for work and
of ...., org the
labor performed by deponent for said 0.... D...., etc.," stating the
demand), for which the said C.... D.... cannot be arrested or im
prisoned according to the provisions of section one of chapter 261 of
the Compiled Laws of 1897, entitled “Of the punishment of fraudulent
debtors;" and that for the recovery of said demand, this deponent has
commenced a suit which is now pending before L. .
M. .., one of the
Justices of the Peace of said county, against the said C. . . . D. . . (or,
judgment has already been obtained, “That he has recovered
judg
ment before L.... M...., one of the Justices of the Peace of said
county, against the said 0.... D...., upon said demand").
And deponent further says, that he has reason to believe and does
believe,
that the said C.... D.... is about to remove his property
(or,
part of his property) out of the jurisdiction of the court in which
said suit is brought (or, judgment was obtained), with intent to de
fraud his creditor (or, creditors).
And deponent further says, that the facts and circumstances con
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are, that the said C. . . . D. . .. has
busily employed during the past week in packing up goods and
merchandise belonging to him in his store in . . . ., and that said goods
were so packed secretly in the night-time, in boxes and trunks con
venient for transportation, and that some of them have already been
conveyed
away secretly in the night-time, and that (state all the
grounds of belief fully and particularly). And further deponentlsays
not.

stituting the grounds of his belief
been

A.... B....

Subscribed and sworn to before me,
day of ...., 19..
this
}
L. . . . M. .. ., Justice of the Peace.

No. 142-Form of

a.

Wa.rra.nt Against Fraudulent Debtor.

Ante, §§ 590-592.

STATE OF MICHIGAN,

0. 'L., §§ 9555-9557.

a

}ss

.

To the Sheriffot the County ot . . . . or
'
to any Constable of said County:
or . . . . . . . . .
Whereas, it satisfactorily appears to me, the subscriber, a justice
of the peace in and for said county of . . . ., and residing in said county,
copy of which accompanies this war
by the aﬂidavit of A. . .. B... .,
rant, that the said A. . .. B. . . . has commenced a suit which is pending
before me, the said justice, against C.... D...., for the recovery of
COUNTY

Ante,

592.

0. L.,

§

of Certiﬁcate to Aﬂidavits for Warrant.
§

No. 143—Form

.

.

dollars, which is due to said A.... B.... from the
the sum of
said C. . . . D. . . . upon an express contract, for goods, wares and mer
chandise sold and delivered to him by the said A... . B. . . ., for
which demand the said C. . . D. . . cannot be arrested or imprisoned,
according to the provisions of section one of chapter 261 of the Com
piled Laws of 1897, entitled "Of the punishment of fraudulent debtors;"
and that the said C. . .. D. . . . is about to remove part of his property
out of the jurisdiction of the court in which said suit is brought and is
pending, with intent to defraud his creditors; you are, therefore, in
the name of the People of the State of Michigan, commanded to arrest
the said C.... D.... and bring him betore me, at my oﬁice, in the
township of
without delay, to answer to said complaint, that such
further proceedings may be had thereon as are authorized by law.
day of ...., 19..
Given under my hand, at ...., this
L. . .. M. . . ., Justice of the Peace.

9557.

I

certify the preceding to be true copies of all the affidavits presented
to me, on which my warrant this day issued against
D.... is
founded.
Dated . . . ., 19.
L. . . . M. . ., Justice of the Peace.
.

.

J....
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No. 144—Form
Ante,

In

DEBTORS.

I"ORl\IS—FR..-IUDULIZNT

JUs'r1cs's Couar:

A.... B....

of Aﬂidavit in Denial.

§ 594

C..

L.,

§ 9559.

L.... M....,

a Justice of the
in and for the County of . . . .
in the matter of the complaint against C. . . . D. . .
C. . . . D. .. .
COUNTY or ...., ss. C.... D...., being duly sworn, deposes and
says, that, etc. (setting forth the denial of the facts and circumstances
contained in the alﬂdavit or alﬁdavits).
_
D
C
Subscribed and sworn to before me,
day of ...., 19..
this
L. . .. M. . . ., Justice of the/Peace.
v.

Before

Peace

No. 145—Form
Ante,

of Oath to Defendant.

§ 594.

c. L.,

§ 9559.

You do solemnly swear (or a/firm) that you will true answers make
to such questions as shall be put to you, touching the matter of the
complaint of A.... B.... against you, now pending before me, and
that therein you will speak the truth, the whole truth and nothing but
the truth.
Note.-—This form can be readily adapted to the case of the witness.

No. 146—Form
Ante,

of Examination of Defendant.
§ 594.

C. L., § 9559.

IN Jnsrrcr-:'s Comrr:

A.... B....

one of the Justices of the
Before L....
D . . ..
Peace in and for the Count y of . . . . . .
In the matter of the complaint of A... . B. . .. against C. . .. D. . . .
C.... D.... having been arrested on a warrant issued by L....
M. . . ., Esq., a Justice of the Peace of the township of . . . . county of
. .. . on a complaint made against him by A... . B... ., who had com
menced a suit against him before the said L.... M...., and having
been brought before the said L. . . . M. . . ., with a view to the proceed
ings authorized by the seventh, eighth, ninth, tenth and eleventh sec
tions of chapter 261, Compiled Laws of 1897 of this state, entitled “Of
the punishment of fraudulent debtors," and the said C.... D....
having made his aﬂidavit in exculpation of himself from the said com
plainant, he was examined by the said A... . B. . .. on oath adminis
day of ...., 19.., and
tered by the said L.... M.... on this
answered and deposed as follows:
(State the testimony, which should
be signed by 0.... D.....)

C..

v.

. .

0.... D....

The foregoing examination of C. . .. D.... reduced to writing and
subscribed by him this'.... day of ...., 19..
L. . . . M. . . ., Justice of the Peace.

mgr

\¢
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No. 147—Form
Ante,

Counrx or .

. . . . . . .

of Recognizance.
c. L.,

§ 9559.

}ss

STATE OF MICHIGAN,

§ 954.

865

DEBTORS.

'

..

day of ...., in the year 19..
that on the
personally
F....
came before me, L....
Esquire, one of the Justices of the Peace of the township of
in
the
said co,unty, and acknowledged themselves to owe to the people
state of Michigan the sum of . . .. dollars, of good and lawful money
of the said state, to be levied of their goods and chattels, lands and
tenements, to the use of the said people, if the said C.
D. . . . shall
fail in performing the condition underwritten.
The condition of the above recognizance is such that if the said
C.... D.... shall personally appear before L.... M...., Esquire,
Justice of the Peace of the township of ...., in said county, at his
instant, at
oﬂice, in the township of . . . ., on the . . .. day of
noon, then and there to answer a complaint pre
o'clock in the
ferred against him before the said Justice, by A. . .. B. . . ., under the
third and fourth sections of chapter 261 of the Compiled Laws of 1897,
entitled “Of the punishment of fraudulent debtors,” and submit him
self to the said Justice in respect to the said complaint, and shall not,
in the meanwhile, secrete, destroy, dispose of, or in any manner make
away with or put out of his; possession any of his property not exempt
from sale or execution, then this recognizance to be void, otherwise
to remain in full force.
C. .. D. . .
Taken and acknowledged before me, the
day and year ﬁrst above written.
,
E. . .. F... .
L. . . M. . ., Justice of the Peace.

it remembered,
C.... D.... and

s%%'£§T$F(;;mCHIGAN’

}ss.

594.

of
c. L.,

.

Subpoena.
§

Ante,

§

No. 148—Form

.

.

}

.

a

5:

Be

9560.

To David Jones.

.

In the name of the people of the state of Michigan, you are hereby
., Esquire, a
commanded personally to appear before me, L....
Justice of the Peace of the township of ...., in said county, at my
ofﬁce, in said township, on the_ . . .. day of . . . ., instant, at ten o'clock
in the forenoon, to testify in respect to the matter of a complaint by
A. . . . B. . .. against C. . . . D. . . ., pending before the said Justice,
under and by virtue of chapter 261 of the Compiled Laws of 1897,
entitled “Of the punishment of fraudulent debtors." And this you are
not to omit under the penalties imposed by law for such omission.
., 19..
day of
Given under my hand, at ...., this
L. . . M. . . ., Justice of the Peace.
55
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No. 149—Form of Commitment.

STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Couury or . . . . . . . . ..

§ 595.

0. L.,

§ 9561.

}8s

Ante,

-

'

.

.

I

I

.

I

.

I

.

a

To the Sheriff of the County of
., or
to any Constable of said County, and to the Keeper of the jail of said
County:
Whereas, A.... B.... heretofore made complaint before me. tho
subscriber,
Justice of the Peace of the township of ...., in said
county, against C.... D. ..., representing that the said A. .. B....
a suit before me for a demand amounting to
had commenced
dollars, due to him on express contract, for goods, wares and merchan
dise sold and delivered by him to the said C.... D...., for which
demand the said C.... D...., could not be arrested or imprisoned,
according to the provisions of chapter 261 of the Compiled laws of 1897,
entitled “Of the punishment of fraudulent debtors," and that the said
C.... D.... was about to remove a part of his property out of the
jurisdiction of the said court in which the said suit was brought, with
intent to defraud the_ said A. . .. B. . .. and the other creditors of the
said C.... D...., and produced before me his aﬁidavit in support of
the said allegations, which was to me satisfactory proof of said allega
tions; whereupon, in pursuance of the said chapter,
issued my war
rant for the apprehension of the said C. . .. D. . .. and he was appre
hended and brought before me, at my oﬂlce in the township of .. .,
proceeded to hear
on the . . . day of . .. . instant, when and where
the said complaint, and the proofs and allegations of the parties in
relation thereto.
(If there was an adjournment, add: and adjourned
the said hearing for further examination to the . . . . day of . . . . instant,
heard the further allegations and
at the same place, when and where
proofs of the parties.)
And upon the said hearing, having duly con
sidered the said allegations and proofs,
was satisﬁed and did deter
mine and decide that the allegations of the said complainant were
substantiated, and that the said C. . . D. . .. is about to remove part
of his property out of the jurisdiction of the court in which the said
suit was commenced, and the said C. . .. D. . . . not having done any of
the acts prescribed in the said chapter to prevent the issuing of the
warrant of commitment therein provided: you are therefore com
manded, in the name of the People of the State of Michigan, to commit
the said C.... D.... to the jail of the county of ...., and you the
keeper of said jail are hereby commanded to receive the said C....
D.... into your custody in said jail, to be there detained until he
shall be discharged according to law. And for so doing, this shall be
your suﬁlcient warrant.
Given under my hand and seal, at . . . ., in said county, this . . . . day
oi’ . . ., 19. .
.

.

L. .. M.

. .,

Justice of the Peace.

Q
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No. 150—Form

of Bond to Assign,
Ante,

§ 595.

etc., to

c. L.,
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DEBTORS.

Avoid Commitment.

§ 9562.

presents, that we, C.... D...., of ...., as
principal, and E. . . . F... . and G. . . . H. .. ., as sureties, are held and
ﬁrmly bound unto A.... B...., of ...., in the sum of
dollars, to
be paid to the said A. . . . B. . . ., or to his certain attorney, executors,
administrators or assigns, for which payment well and truly to be
made, we bind ourselves, our and each of our heirs, executors and
administrators, jointly and severally, ﬁrmly by these presents.
Sealed with our seals, and dated the . . . . day of . . . ., 19. .
Whereas, complaint has been made by the said A... . B. . .. to L. . . .
M... ., Esquire, a Justice of the Peace of the township of .. . ., in the
county of . . . ., against C. .. . D. . . ., under the third and fourth sec
tions of chapter 261 of the Compiled Laws of 1897, entitled “Of the
punishment of fraudulent debtors," and such proceedings have been
had thereon that the said oiﬁcer has decided to grant a warrant of
D. .. . pursuant to the ninth sec
commitment against the said C.
tion of said chapter. Now, therefore, to prevent the granting of such
commitment, the condition of this obligation is such that if the said
C.... D.... shall, within thirty days hereafter, apply for an assign
ment of all of his property, and for a discharge, as provided in chapter
261 of the Compiled Laws of 1897, and diligently prosecute the same
until he obtains such discharge, then this obligation to be void and of
no effect, otherwise to be and remain in full force and virtue.

Know all men

by these

C.... D....

No. 151—Form

of Approval to Be Endorsed on Bond.

I approve of E. . .. F. . .. and G. ..
bond.

Dated the

'

day of

....,

595,

STATE OF MICHIGAN,

H.

. . ., as

sureties, in the within

L.... M....,Justice

of the Peace.

19..

No. 162—Form
Ante, §§

.

596.

of Supersedeas.
C. L., §§ 9561, 9562.

To the Sheriff of said County and to the
Keeper of the jail of the said County:
Whereas, C.... D.... was, by a warrant issued by me, the sub
scriber, a Justice of the Peace of the township of ...., in said county,
and dated on the .. .. day of . . . ., 19. ., committed to your custody on
a certain complaint made before me by A. . . . B. . . ., under the third
and fourth sections of chapter 261 of the Compiled Laws of 1897,
entitled “Of the punishment of fraudulent debtors," which complaint
was founded upon a certain demand upon express contract of the said

Coonrx or.

. . . . . . .. .

}

88'
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A.... B....

against the said C.... D.... for the recovery of which a
commenced
before me, and which warrant was issued
under the ninth section of the said chapter; and whereas, the said
D. .. . has paid the said demand, together with the costs of the
C.
said suit, and of the said proceedings against him; (or, has given
security for the payment of the said demand and costs. as provided in
the tenth section of said chapter; or, has entered into a bond that he
will, within thirty days thereafter, apply for an assignment of all his
property and for a discharge, according to the provisions of said chap
ter); therefore,
In the name of the People of the State of Michigan, you are hereby
commanded that you forbear and cease to arrest, imprison, detain, or
otherwise molest the said C. .. . D.. .. for the said cause speciﬁed in
the said warrant of commitment; and if the said C. . . . D. . . . do remain
in the jail of the said county, for the said cause, and for none other,
that you deliver him thence and suffer him to go at large and be at
liberty, without further delay.
day of .. . ., 19. .
Given under my hand, this
L....
Justice of the Peace.

suit had

been

RELATING T0 THE DOCKET.
No.

153-Form of Entries in Just-ice’s Docket.
Ante,

A.

. . .

B.

§ 600.

C.

L.,

§§ 957, 958.

.. .

v.

September 4th. Summons issued, returnable. September 12th,
.
o'clock p. m., at my oﬂice, in the township of
September 12th.
1905.
Summons returned personally served Sep
tember 5th, 1905, upon the defendant C.... D.... by G.... H... .,
constable; his fees, $0.50.
Parties appeared, defendant in person, and the plaintiff by N....
0.... who proves his authority as attorney for the plaintiff.
Plaintiff declared orally in assumpsit for goods sold and delivered by
him to defendant on the ﬁrst day of June, 1905, and claims $100 dam
ages.
Defendant pleads orally the general issue, and gives notice of
set-oi! for work and labor, and for money lent to the plaintiff.
On
motion of plaintiff and on cause shown on oath, case is adjourned
to September 18, 1905, at 2 o'clock p. m., at my oﬂice, in the township
of 1... Venire issued at the request of the defendant, returnable at
the same time and place, and delivered to 0.... S. .. ., constable, for
service.
September 18. Parties appear and proceed to the trial of the
1905.
cause.
Venire returned. All the jurors named in the venire, to-wit:
K...., etc., were returned summoned by 0....
J.
1905.

at

2

l....,

I-‘ORMS——PROCEEDiNGS
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FOR OONTEMPT.

jurors to try the
constable and all appeared and were sworn as
Witnesses on the part of the plaintiff, sworn and testiﬂed, were
S.... N.... and S.... T.... and on the part of the defendant, R....
S.... and R.... T....
After hearing the testimony and arguments of the parties, the jury
retired to consider of their verdict, under the charge of 0. .. . S.. . .,
constable, duly sworn for that purpose, and after being absent for s
time, returned into court and gave their verdict in favor of the plain
tiif for twenty dollars damages, which was received on the said eigh
teenth day of September, 1905.
Judgment rendered upon said verdict forthwith by me against said
defendant, and in favor of the plaintiﬂf for twenty dollars damages and
ﬁve dollars costs of suit.
Damages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .$20 00
Costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 00
S.

. . .,

cause.

L.

. . .

M...

.,

Justice of

$25 00
the Peace.

RELATING TO PROCEEDINGS FOR GONTEMPT.
of Warrant for Contempt.

No. 154—Form

0. L., §§ 980-983.

OF‘ MICHIGAN,
.
COUNTY or . . . . . .
Whereas, on this day,

STATE

}ss

Ante, §§ 591599.
'

To any Constable of said County:
trial of a cause, between A....
B... ., plaintiff, and C. . .. D. . ., defendant, before me, L. . . . M. . . .,
a Justice of the Peace of the township of . . . ., in said county, at my
the

.

during

I.... J....

in the said township of ....,
did contemptuously,
insolently and in a disorderly manner, so behave and conduct himself
towards the undersigned, as to interrupt the said proceedings on said
trial, and to impair the respect due to the authority of the undersigned,
by declaring in a loud voice, that the said defendant, C.... D....,
could not have justice done him in a court held by the undersigned,
(state the contemptuous conduct, whatever it may be, fully); there
fore, in the name of the People of the State of Michigan, you are
hereby commanded forthwith to apprehend the said
and
bring him before me to answer for the said contempt, and to be further
dealt with according to law.
day of
Given under my hand the
19..
L. . . . M. . . ., Justice of the Peace.
oﬁice

I....

FORMS—PROCEEDINGS
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No. 155—Record

I

of Conviction for a Contempt.

Ante, §§ 597-599.

STATE OF MICHIGAN,

son comsmrr.

c. L.,

§§ 980-983.

88 '

os . . . . . . . . . .
}
remembered,
.
.
.
. day of . . . ., 19. ., during the trial
that
on
this
Be it
of a. cause between A. . .. B. . . ., plaintiff, and C. . .. D. . . ., defendant,
before me, L. . .. M, . . ., a Justice of the Peace of the township of . . . .,
., I. . . .
. ..
in said county, at my oﬂice in the said township of
did contemptuously, insolently, and in a disorderly manner, so behave
and conduct himself towards the undersigned as to interrupt the said
proceedings on the said trial, and to impair the respect due to the
authority of the undersigned by (state the particular circumstances of
And whereas,
the contempt fully and particularly as in the warrant).
was thereupon required, by the undersigned, to
the said
answer for the said contempt, and to show cause why he should not be
convicted thereof (or, having been brought before me and required
to answer for the said contempt, and show cause why he should not be
convicted thereof); and not having purged himself therefrom, I do
. .. of the contempt aforesaid, and do
hereby convict the said I. . ..
adjudge and determine that for the said contempt the said I. . . .
.
pay a ﬁne of ﬁve dollars, and be imprisoned in the county jail
of said county ﬁve days, and until he pay the ﬁne aforesaid or be
duly discharged according to law: Provided, that he shall not remain
imprisoned for the non-payment of said ﬁne more than ten days.
day of
In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand this
. . . ., 19 . .
Justice of the Peace.
, L.

COUNTY

J.

I....

J

J.

of Commitment for

No. 156—Form
-

Ante.

STATE OF MICHIGAN

J...

§§ 597-599.

a Contempt.

C. L., §§ 980-983.

To any Constable of said County, and

the Keeper of the jail of said
County:
., 19. ., during the trial of a cause
Whereas, on this .. .. day of
between A. . . . B. . . ., plaintiff, and C. . . . D. . . ., defendant, before me,
L.... M...., a Justice of the Peace of the township of ...., in said
county, at my oﬁlce in the said township of
I. . ..
. did con
temptuously, insolently, and in a disorderly manner, so behave and
conduct himself towards the undersigned, as to interrupt the said
proceedings on the said trial, and to impair the respect due to the
authority of the undersigned, by (state the particular circumstances
And
of the contempt fully and particularly as in the conviction).
whereas, the said 1....
was thereupon required, by the under
signed, to answer for the said contempt, and to show cause why he
should not be convicted thereof (or, having been brought before me and
required to answer for the said contempt, and show cause why he

Coonrr

1 ss.

or.......... J

_

no

J...

J....
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CHARACTER.

871

and not having purged himself
should not be convicted thereof);
therefrom.
And whereas, upon such conviction, I did adjudge and determine
that for the said contempt, the said I. . . .
. .. pay a ﬁne of twenty
ﬁve dollars, and be imprisoned in the county jail of said county ﬂve
days, and until he pay the ﬁne aforesaid, or be duly discharged accord
ing to law. Provided, That he should not remain imprisoned for the
non~payment of such ﬁne more than ten days.
Therefore, in the name of the People of the State of Michigan, you,
the said constable, are hereby commanded to take, convey and deliver
the said I. . . . J. . .. into the custody of the said keeper of the said jail;
and you, the said keeper, are hereby required to receive the said I. . ..
into your custody in the said jail, and him there safely keep,
during the said term of ﬁve days, and until he pay the said ﬁne, or be
duly discharged according to law:
Provided, That -he shall not be
detained in prison for the non-payment of such ﬁne more than ten
days; and hereof fail not.
Given under my hand, this
day of ...., 19..
'
L.... M. . . ., Justice of the Peace.

J.

J....

BY ONE ACTING IN REPRESENTATIVE

DECLARATION

CHARACTER.

No. 157—Form

of Declaration by Executor.

Ante. §§ 584-588.

In
as

C. L., §§ 704, 780.

Jusrrc1~:’s Comzr:

A.... B....

,

of’

Execuu: '
C. . . . D.

Peace
. . etc"]Before
.

L. ..

. M. . . .,one of the Justices of the
of the County of . . . . ..

County of ...., ss. A.... B...., as executor of the last will and
F...., deceased, plaintiff, complains of C....
testament of
D...., defendant, in a plea of trespass on the case upon promises:
for that whereas, the defendant heretofore and in the life-time of the
F...., to-wit: on the
day of ...., 19.., at ...., in
said
said county, was indebted to the said
in the sum of
F...., by him before that
for the work and labor of the said
time done for the defendant at his request; and being so indebted. he,
the defendant, in consideration thereof, afterwards and in the life-time
F...., to-wit: on the day and year last aforesaid,
of the said
aforesaid, promised the said E. . .. F. . .. to pay him the said
at
sum of money when he, the defendant, should be requested so to do;
yet the defendant hath not paid the said sum of money or any part
thereof to the said E. . .. F... ., in his lifetime, or to the plaintiff as
executor of the said
since his death, although often

I

872
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requested
so to do; but to pay the same or any part thereof, the
defendant has hitherto refused and still refuses, to the damage of the
plaintiff as executor as aforesaid of . . . . dollars, and therefore he brings
suit. And the said plaintiff brings into court here his letters testa
mentary of the said E. . .. F. . . ., deceased, whereby it appears that the
said plaintiff is executor of the last will and testament of the said E. . . .

F.

. . ., deceased.

F....,

No. 158—Declaration
Ante, §§ 584-588.

In

by

a.n

as executor of

Administrator.

C. L., §§ 704, 780.

JUs'r1cs’s Counr:

A. . . . B. . . .
Administrator of

Before L.... M...., one of the Justices of
the Peace in and for the County of . . . . ..

v.

C. . . . D. . . .
%
County of
ss.
A.... B...., as administrator of all and sizi
gular the goods, chattels, and credits which were of
deceased, at the time of his death, who died intestate, complains of
C. . .. D. . . . in a plea of, etc., for that whereas, etc.
(The remainder
of the declaration will be substantially the same as in No. 157.)

RELATING TO PLEADINGS AND PROCEEDINGS
SPECIFIC ACTIONS.
No. 159—Form

In

IN

of Declaration for Assault and Battery.
Ante, §§ 602-607.

Jos'r1cs’s Cover:

A.... B....

L.... M....,

one of the Justices of the
in and for the County of . . . . ..
County of . . . ., ss. A. . .. B. . . ., plaintiff in this suit, complains of
C. . .. D. . . ., the defendant herein, of a plea of trespass: For that the
day of ...., 19.., at ...., in said
said defendant, on, to-wit: the
v.

C.... D....

Before

Peace

county, with force and arms, assaulted the plaintiff, and then and there
with great force and violence, beat, bruised, wounded and ill-treated
him, the said plaintiff, insomuch that by means thereof the said plain
tiff then became and was sick, sore, lame, and disordered, and so re
mained and continued for a long space of time, to-wit, from thence
hitherto, during all of which time the plaintiff thereby suffered great
pain, and was hindered and prevented from performing and transact
ing his necessary affairs and business, by him during that time to be
transacted and performed; and other wrongs to the plaintiff then
and there did; against the peace and dignity of the people of this state;
and to plaintiffs damage of . . .. dollars.
A. . . . B. . . ., Plaintiﬂ’.

ros.us—m spncmo
No.

is

Jus'rIci:’s

ACTIONS.
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160-Form of Declaration in Trover.

Comrr:

Ante, §§ 632-648.

A.... B....

Before L....
one of the Justices of the
Peace in and for the County of . . . . ..
A. . .. B. . . ., plaintiff in this cause, complains of
C. . . . D. .. ., defendant herein, in a plea of trespass on the case: For
day of
., 19. ., at
., in
that the said plaintiff on, to-wit: the
said county, was lawfully possessed‘ as of his own property of one
bay colt, two years old, of the value of eighty dollars; and being so pos
sessed thereof the said plaintiff, afterwards, to-wit: on the day and
at the place last aforesaid, casually lost the same out of his possession;
., 19. ., at
day of
and the said colt afterwards, to-wit, on the
in said county, came to the hands and possession of the said defend
ant by ﬁnding. Yet the said defendant, well knowing the premises, has
not (although often requested so to do) delivered the said colt to said
day of .. . ., 19. ., at . . . .
plaintiff, but afterwards, to-wit, on the
in said county, wrongfully converted and disposed of the same to his
own use, to the damage of plaintiff of eighty dollars.
1:.

C.... D....

}
County of . . . ., ss.

A. . .. B. ..

No.

.,

Plaintiff.

161-Form of Declaration in Trespass to Personal Property.

IN JUs'rxcrc’s

A.... B...

Comm":

Ame. §§ 610-613.

one of the Justices of the
Before L....
Peace in and for the County of . . . . ..
County of ...., ss. A. .. . B. . . ., plaintiff in this suit, complains of
C. . . . D. . . ., the defendant herein, in a plea of trespass.
For that the defendant on, to-wit, the .. ._. day of ...., 19. ., at .. . .,
in said county, with force and arms drove a certain carriage in which
he was then riding along the highway, with great force and violence
against a certain other carriage of the plaintiff of great value, to-wit,
dollars, in which the plaintiff was then riding in
of the value of
said highway, and thereby then and there broke and damaged the plain
tii‘f‘s carriage, by means whereof the plaintiff was compelled to expend
and did expend a large sum, to-wit, . . . . dollars, in repairing his said
carriage. And other wrongs to the plaintiff then and there did, against
the peace of the people of this state, whereof the plaintiff says that he
dollars.
is injured and has sustained damage to the amount of
v.

C.... D....

A.

. . .

B.

. . .,

Plaintiff.
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No. 162-Declaration

SPECIFIC

ACTIONS.

Under the Statute for Cutting Timber,
etc.

Ante,

In

5 618.

c. L.,

§§ 11204, 11205, 11207.

Jusricr-:'s Connr:

A.... B....

L....

one of the Justices of the
of the County of . . . . ..
County of . . . ., ss. A. . . . B. . . ., plaintiff in this cause, complains of
C. . . . D. . . ., the defendant herein, in a plea of trespass.
day of .. . ., 19. ., at
For that the defendant on, to-wit, the
in said county, with force and arms, and contrary to the provisions of
section 11204 of the Compiled Laws of 1897 of this state, did cut down
and carry off, without and against the leave of said plaintiff, the owner
thereof, divers trees, to-wit: twenty oak trees, of great value, to-wit:
dollars, then and there being and standing upon
of the value of
the land of said plaintiff, known and described as being the west half
of the northwest quarter of section number ten, in the township of . . . .,
in said county, by means whereof the plaintiff has lost and been
deprived of said trees, and said lands and premises of the plaintiif
have been greatly injured and depreciated in value: whereby the said
defendant has, by force of said statute, forfeited three times the amount
of damages sustained by said plaintiff by reason of the said premises:
To plaintiffs damage one hundred dollars, and therefore he brings
suit.

Before

12.

C.... D....

Peace

A.

. . .

B...

.,

Plaintiff.

No. 163—Usua1 Form of Declaration for Trespass on Lands.
Ante, §§ 614-617,

In Jus'r1ca’s Counr:
A. . . . B. . . .
v.

C.... D....
County of

Before
Peace

}

....,

ss.

619.

L.... M....,

A....

one of the Justices of the
in and for the County of . . . . ..
B...., plaintiff in this cause, complains

of C. . .. D. . . ., the defendant herein, in plea of trespass:
day of ...., 19. ., with
For that the defendant on, to-wit, the
force and arms, the close of the said plaintiff, situate in the township
of ...., in said county, and known and described as being (describe
the land) broke and entered and with his feet in walking, and with
cattle, to-wit, horses, hogs, and oxen, trod down, trampled upon
destroyed the grass and corn of the said plaintiff there growing.
other injuries to him then and there did against the peace of the
ple of the State of Michigan, and to the plaintiffs damages of
hundred dollars.

A....

and
and

Peo
one

Plaintiﬂ.

FOR.MS—IN
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and Notice of Title.

No. 164—Plea

c. L., §§ 782-788, 790.

Ante, §§ 621-624.

Ix
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ACTIONS.

JUS'1‘IGE’S Comer:

A.

. . .

B.

. . .

Before

v.

C.... D....

L.... M....,

one

of the Justices

of the

in and for the County of . . . . ..
And the said defendant comes and demands a trial of the matters
C. . .. D. .. .
set forth in the plaintiffs declaration.
To the above named plaintiff: Take notice, that on the trial of the
above cause, the defendant will give in evidence that the said close in
(or in the first count of) the plaintiﬂ‘s declaration mentioned, and in
which the injuries complained of are supposed to have been committed,
with the appurtenances, is, and at the time when the said injuries were
}

Peace

to have been committed, was, the close, soil, and freehold of
defendant; and that the said defendant, in his own right, at
time when, etc., as the close, soil and freehold of the said de
broke and entered, and did all and singular the acts whereof
plaintiff in his declaration complains as he lawfully might.
Dated...., 19..
C.... D....,Defendant.
The above plea and notice were delivered to me at the time of joining
issue in the above cause, on the . . .. day of .. . ., 19..

supposed

the said
the said
fendant,
the said

L.

. . .

Justice of

the Peace.

No. 165—Form of Notice of Title to Land to Follow the Plea
of the General Issue.
Ante, §§ 622-624.

C. L., §§ 782-788, 790.

To the above named plaintiff: Take notice, that the defendant on
the trial of the above cause will give inevidence that the saw-logs and
timber mentioned in the ﬁrst count in plaintiff's declaration in this
cause, and therein alleged to have been taken away by the said defend
ant, and converted and disposed of to his own use, were cut and car
ried away by the said defendant from the east half of the south-east
quarter of section number 10, in the township of
and county of
...., and that the said east half of the south-east quarter of section
number ten, at the time the said saw-logs and timber were so cut and
carried away by the said defendant, was, and still is, the close, soil, and
freehold of the said defendant.
Dated...., 19..
C.... D...., Defendant.
No. 166—Form of Bond
.

Ante,

§

With Plea and Notice of Title.

624.

c. L.,

§§ 784-788.

Know all men by these presents, that we, C.... D...., of ...., as
principal, and E. . . . F. . . ., of the same place, as surety, are held and
ﬁrmly bound unto A.... B...., of ...., in the sum of
(not less
than two hundred) dollars, to be paid to the said A. . . . B. . . ., or to his
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certain attorney, executors, administrators or assigns; for which pay
ment well and truly to be made we bind ourselves, our and each of
jointly and severally, ﬁrmly
our heirs, executors, and administrators,
by these presents.
. day of .. . ., 19..
Sealed with our seals, and dated the
Whereas, in a suit before L. . . . M... ., Esquire, one of the Justices
of the Peace of the township of .
in the county of ...., wherein
the above named A. . . . B. . . . is plaintiff, and the above bounden C. . . .
D. . . . is defendant, the above bounden C. . . . D. . . ., under a plea of the
general issue, has given notice showing that the title to lands will
come in question in the said suit.
Now, therefore, the condition of this- obligation is such, that if the
said C. . . . D. . .. shall pay any judgment that may be rendered against
him in such action in the Circuit Court of said County of ...., then
this obligation to be void, otherwise of force.

C.... D....

I approve of E. ..
Dated...., 19..
No.

.

F. ..

. as

surety in the foregoing bond.
L.... M...., Justice of the Peace.

167-Justice's Certiﬁcate to Circuit Court on Plea of Title.
Ante,

§ 624.

c. L.,

§ 785.

In JUs'r1cs’s Counr:

A.... B....

Before L. . . . M. . . ., a Justice of the Peace in and
for the Count y of . . . . . .
County of
I, L.... M...., a Justice of the Peace of said
ss.
county, do certify to the Circuit Court of said County, that on the . . . .
B...., I issued a summons,
day of ...., 19.., at the request of A.
directed to any constable of the said county, commanding him to sum
mon C. . . . D. . .. to appear before me at my oiiice, in the township of
. .. ., on the . . . . day of . . . . then instant, at two o'clock in the after
noon, to answer to the said A. . . . B. . .. in a plea of trespass, to his
damage one hundred dollars; which summons, on or before the return
day thereof, was delivered to me by 0.... S...., a constable of the
said county, with a return thereon, signed by him, that the same was
personally served by hlm on the said C. . ; . D. .. ., on the .. . . day of
. . . . aforesaid. And I do also certify, that at the time and place above
speciﬁed for the return of the said summons, the said parties ap
peared before me, and the said plaintiff declared against the defendant
in writing, which declaration is hereto annexed. The defendant at the
time he was required to join issue in said cause, pleaded the general
issue, and gave notice under said plea, showing that the title to the
land described in said declaration would come in question, which said
plea and notice are also hereunto annexed, and at the time of tendering
to me said plea and notice, the said defendant entered into a bond to
said plaintiff, with one sufilcient surety, approved by me, in the pen

C.

v.

. . .

D.

. . .

_i

_
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alty

of two hundred dollars, conditioned that said defendant would
that might be rendered against him in said action
in the Circuit Court in said County of ...., which said bond is also
hereunto annexed, and the said defendant at the same time paid to me
the plaintiffs costs in said suit, amounting to $. . . ., and one dollar for
this my certiﬁcate, together with the sum of two dollars as an entry
fee for the use of the county.
L. . . . M. . . ., Justice of the Peace.
Dated... ., 19. .

‘pay any judgment

No. 168—Form
Ante, §§ 649-651.

In

Jus'r1cs’s
A.

. . .

B.

'

of Declaration in Replevin.
0. L., §§ 10649-10652, 10670, 10671.

Couar:
. . .

one of the Justices of the
Before L....
Peace in and for the County of . . . . . .
C.
ss.
C.... D.... was summoned to answer A....
County of
B. . . ., the plaintiff herein, in a plea wherefore he detains certain goods
and chattels of said plaintiff, described in the writ of replevin in this
And thereupon the said plaintiff
set forth:
cause, and hereinafter
complains of said C. . . . D. . . ., the defendant herein; for that the said
19.., at the township of
day of
defendant on, to-wit: the
. . . . in said county, received one gelding of great value, to wit: of the
value of . . .. dollars, of the goods and chattels of the said plaintiff, to
be delivered to the said plaintiff when he should afterwards request
the same; but the said defendant, although often requested so to do,
has not delivered the goods and chattels above mentioned to {he plaint
iff, but hath unlawfully detained the same, to the damage of the said
plaintiff one hundred dollars; and therefore he brings his suit, etc.
1:.
. . . D. . . .

A.

. . .

B...

..

Plaintiff.

169-Form of General Issue and Notice of Defense in

No.

Replevin.
Ante,

In

§ 652.

c. L.,

§ 10572.

JUs'r1cE‘s Comvr:

A.... B....

L.... M....,

one of the Justices of the
in and for the County of . . . . ..
And the said defendant comes and demands a trial of the matters
set forth in the plaintiffs declaration.
C. . . . D. . . ., Defendant.
Take notice, that on the trial of
To the above named plaintiff——S1n.:
this cause, the defendant'wiil prove that the said goods and chattels
in the said declaration mentioned, at the time of the detention of the

Before

71.

C.... D....

}

Peace

by the said defendant, were the property of the said defendant
(or, of one E. . . . R. . . .) and not of the said plaintiff.
Dated.... 19..
C.... D...., Defendant.

same
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No. 170—Verdict

for Plaintiff

ACTIONS.

and

Judgment

Thereon,

in

Replevin.
Ante, §§

c. L., §§ 10674-10678.

655.

654,

The jury say that the defendant did unlawfully detain said goods
the damages sustained by the plaintiff by
dollars, be
the unlawful detention of said goods and chattels at
sides his costs.
Therefore, it is considered that the said plaintiff recover against the
said defendant his damages aforesaid, and also
dollars for his
costs by him about his suit in this behalf expended.
and chattels, and they assess

No. 171—Verdict and Judgment for Defendant

in Replevin on

General Issue, with Notice of Property in Defendant.
Ante, §§ 656-658.

C. L., §§ 751, 10679-10684.

The jury say that the defendant did not unlawfully detain said goods
and chattels, and that they find the property in said goods and chat
tels is in the defendant, and they assess the value of said goods and
dollars, and the damages sustained by the defendant
chattels at
by the detention of said goods and chattels at
. dollars, besides the
costs.

Therefore, it is considered that the said defendant have a return of
goods and chattels aforesaid; and that the said defendant do re
cover against the said plaintiff his damages aforesaid, and also
dollars for his costs.
the

No.

172-Verdict for Defendant—Return Wa.ived—Judgment
for Value,
Ante,

§ 656.

etc.

C. L., § 10680.

The jury say that the defendant did not unlawfully detain said goods
and chattels, and that they ﬁnd the property in said goods and chat
tels is in the defendant, and they assess the value of said goods and
chattels at . . . . dollars, and the damages sustained by the defendant by
dollars, besides his
the detention of said goods and chattels, at
costs.

And the said plaintiff waiving any judgment for a return of
and chattels, and praying judgment for the value thereof,
Therefore, it is considered that the said defendant recover against
dollars, the value aforesaid found, and also
said plaintiff
dollars, the damages aforesaid, together with
dollars for
goods

costs.

said
etc.

the
his

FORMS—-IN

No. 173—Execution
Ante, §§

654,

STATE OF MICHIGAN,
COUNTY

or

. . . . . . . . . .

}

s1-sou-'10

.\c'r|oxs.
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for Plaintiﬂ‘ in Replevin.

655.

C. L., §§ 10677, 10678.

SS‘

To any Constable of said County:
In the name of the People of the State of Michigan,

you are com
manded to levy of the goods and chattels of C.
D. . .. (excepting
such goods and chattels as are by law exempted from execution),
19..,
day of
dollars and
cents, with interest from the
which A. . .. B. . . ., lately before me, the undersigned, a Justice of the
Peace in the township of
in said county, recovered against him
for his damages, which he had sustained by the unlawful detention of
certain of the goods and chattels of the said A....
and also
. . . . dollars for his costs, and bring the money before me, at my otﬁce
in the township of . . . ., in sixty days from the date hereof, to render
to the said A.... B....
day of
Given under my hand, at the township aforesaid, the
. . ., 19. .

No. 174—Execution

L. . .. M.
for Defendant

. . .,

Justice of

the Peace.

for Return and for Dam

ages and Costs.
Ante,

§ 656.

C. L., § 10679.

STATE

OF‘ MICHIGAN,
Cousry or . . . . . . . . . . } 88 '
To any Constable of said County:

Whereas, C.... D.... was lately summoned to appear before the
undersigned, one of the Justices of the Peace of said county, to answer
unto A. .. . B. . . . concerning the unlawful detention of certain goods
and chattels; and whereas, on the . . . . day of ...., it was considered
and adjudged by me, that he recover against the said A. . .. B. . . . his
damages,
by reason of the detention of said goods and chattels, as
dollars, and
sessed at
dollars for his costs, therefore,
In the name of the People of the State of Michigan, you are com
manded that you forthwith cause to be returned to the said defendant
the said goods and chattels, to-wit: (specify the property) and in what
manner you shall have executed this writ, do you make return to me,
., in said township, in sixty days from the date hereof.
at
And you are further commanded to levy the damages aforesaid, with
interest, and said costs, of the goods and chattels of the said A....
(excepting such goods and chattels as are by law exempt from
B.
execution), and bring the money before me, at my oﬁlce, in said town
ship, in sixty days from the date hereof, to render to the said C....

D.

. . .

Given under my hand, this

. . . .

day of

L.

. . .

. . . ., 19. .

M.

. .

., Justice of the Peace.
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for Defendant

No. 175—Execution

ACTIONS.

for Value,

Damages and

Costs.
Ante,

§

sss.

c. L., 10679,

10680.

STATE OF MICHIGAN,
COUNTY

or .

. . . . . . . .

.. }s S '

To any Constable of said County:
In the name of the People of the State of Michigan, you are com

manded to levy of the goods and chattels of C.... D.... (excepting
such goods and chattels as are by law exempted from execution), . . . .
. cents, for the value of certain goods and chattels of
dollars and
the said C. . . . D. . . . unjustly detained by the said A. . .. B. . . . from
the said C. . . . D. . . .; and also
. dollars for his damages which he
had sustained on occasion of the detention of said goods and chattels,
day of . .. ., 19. ., and also
and interest from the
dollars for
his costs in a certain action of replevin lately commenced before me,
at the suit of the said A. . .. B.... against the said C.... D...., and
bring the money before me, at my oﬂice, in the township of ...., in
sixty days from the date hereof, to render to the said C. . . . D. . .
day of ...., 19..
Given under my hand at ...., this
L. . . . M. . . ., Justice of the Peace.

No. 176-Decla.ration—Covenant on a Sealed Note.
-

In Jus'ncn’s

Ante,

§ 660.

c. L.,

§ 10417.

Counr:

A.... B....

L.... M....,

one -of the Justices of the
in and for the County of . . . . ..
., ss. A. . . . B.. . ., plaintiff, complains of C.... D....,
County of
defendant herein, in an action of covenant.
D. . . . on, to-wit, the . . . . day of . .. ., 19. ., at
For that the said C.
in writing sealed with his seal (and to
. . . ., by a certain instrument
the court now here shown, the date whereof is the day and year afore
said) for value received, promised to pay to the said A. . .. B. . . . one
hundred dollars, ten days after the date thereof. Yet the said C. . . .
although often requested so to do, has not paid the said sum
of money or any part thereof, but the same to pay has always
refused and still doth refuse. And so the said plaintiff says that the
said defendant has not kept his covenant in the form aforesaid made,
dollars and therefore he brings
to the damage of the plaintiff of .
suit.
v.

C.... D....

Before

Peace

A. . . . B.

. . .,

Plaintiff.

ro1n1s—1:~1
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No. 177—Decla.ration
Ante, §§ 666, 667.
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in Debt—on Bond.
C.

L.

§ 9255.

IN Josrrci-:’s Comrr:
A. . . . B. . . .

v.
Before L.... M...., one of the Justices of the
Peace of the County of . . . . . .
C. . .. D.
}
County of . . . ., ss. A.
B. .. ., plaintiff, complains of C. . . . D. ...,
the defendant herein, in an action of debt, for that whereas, the said
defendant heretofore, to-wit, on the . . . . day of . . . ., 19. ., at the town
ship of
in said county, by his certain bond, sealed with his seal,
and now shown to the court here, the date whereof is the day and year
aforesaid, acknowledged himself to be held and ﬁrmly bound to the
dollars, to be paid to the plaintiff
said plaintiff, in the sum of
when he, the said defendant, should be thereunto afterwards requested.
Yet the said defendant, although often requested so to do, hath not as
dollars or any part thereof, to the said plaint
yet paid the sum of
iif; but so to do hath hitherto wholly refused and still doth refuse, to
dollars, and therefore he brings
the damage of the plaintiff of
suit, etc.

A....

.

No. 178—Declaration
IN Jus'rIci:'s COUa'r:

A.

. . .

B.

in Debt—Assig'ning

Ante, §§

666.

Plaintiff.

Breach of Condition.

C. L., § 10379.
_

. . .

Before L.... M...., one of the Justices of the
Peace in and for the County of . . . . ..
County of
A. . .. B. . . ., plaintiff, complains of C. . . . D. . . .,
the defendant herein, in an action of debt, for that whereas, the said
defendant heretofore, to-wit, on the . . .. day of .. . ., 19. ., at the town
ship of
in said county, by his certain bond, sealed with his seal,
and now shown to the court here, the date whereof is the day and year
aforesaid, acknowledged himself to be held and ﬁrmly bound to the said
plaintiff, in the sum of . . .. dollars, to be paid to the plaintiff, when he,
the said defendant, should be thereunto afterwards requested.
Which
said bond was and is subject to a condition thereunder written, that if
(set out the condition verbatim), as by the said bond and the condi
tion thereof will more fully appear. Yet the said plaintiff in fact saith
By reason of which said breach the said
the (stating the breach).
bond became forfeited, and thereby an action hath accrued to the said
plaintiff to demand and have of and from the said defendant, the said
Yet the said defendant, al
sum of (the penalty) above demanded.
though often requested so to do, has not yet paid to the said plaintiff,
dollars, or any part thereof; but so to do has
the said sum of
hitherto wholly refused and still does refuse, to the damage of the
plaintiff of
dollars, and therefore he brings suit.
v.

C.... D....

}
. . . ., ss.

A.
56

B.

. . .,

Plaintiff.
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No. 179-Declaration

Of

Miﬂllgﬂﬂ

in Debt, for a Penalty.
c. L., §§ 9797, 9798, 9801.

Ante, §§ 671-675.

In Jus'r1ca’s Comer:
The People of the State

ACTIONS.

Before L. . ..
of the Peace

11-

C....D....

of....

in

one of the
and for the

Justices
County

County of
The People of the State of Michigan, plaintiffs
ss.
in this suit, complain of C.... D...., defendant herein, of a plea
dollars, which
that he render to the said plaintiffs the sum of
he owes to and unjustly detains from them.
For that whereas, the
. day of .. . ., in the year
said defendant heretofore, to-wit: on the
in the county aforesaid, was indebted to
. . . ., at the township of
dollars, according to the pro
the said plaintiffs in the sum of
visions of section . . . . of chapter . . . . of the Compiled Laws of 1897, of
this state (or, name the section of the act, giving the title of the act
in full, and the date of its approval), whereby an action hath accrued
to the said plaintiffs to demand and have of and from the said defend
ant the said sum of money, above demanded, according to the pro
visions of the said statute. Nevertheless the said defendant, although
often requested so to do, has not yet paid the said sum of money, above
demanded,
or any part thereof, to the said plaintiffs, but to pay the
same, or any part thereof to the said plaintiffs, he, the said defend
ant, has hitherto wholly refused, and still doth refuse: to the dam
dollars, and therefore they bring their
age of said plaintiffs of
suit, etc.
The People of the State of Michigan.
By A.... B....

No. 180-Declaration
Ante, §§

in

JUs'r1c1:‘s

6714576.

D.

.. .

c. L., §§ 9797, 9802.

Before L. . . . M. .. ., one of the Justices of
the Peace in and for the County of . . . .

v,

. . .

for a Penalty.
'

Cottmz

The People of the State
of Michigan

J.

in Assumpsit

%

The People of the state of Michigan, plaintiffs
County of
ss.
in this suit, complain of C.... D...., defendant in this suit, in a
plea of trespass on the case, upon promises. For that, whereas, the
said defendant heretofore, to-wit, on the . . . . day of ...., 19. ., at the
in the county aforesaid, was indebted to the said
township of
dollars, according to the provisions of
plaintiffs in the sum of
. of chapter . . . . of the Compiled Laws of 1897 of this state,
section
and being so indebted, he, the said defendant, in consideration thereof,
afterwards, to-wit, on the day and year, and at the place aforesaid,
undertook and then and there faithfully promised the said plaintiffs
to pay them the said sum of
. dollars, when he, the said defendant,

FOBMS—IN srncrmo
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should be thereto afterwards requested.
Yet the said defendant, not
regarding his said promise and undertaking, hath not yet paid the
said sum of money, or any part thereof, to the said plaintiffs, although
often requested so to do, to the plaintiff's damage
dollars, and
therefore they bring suit, etc.
The People of the State of Michigan.

ByA.... B....

No. 181—Declaration
Ante,

J

IN us'r1c1=:’s Counr:
The People of the State
of Michigan

in 'h'over for Goods Forfeited.
§ 677.

C. L., § 9803.

Before L.... M...., one of the Justices
of the Peace in and for the County

v.

C....D....

é

of....

County of
The People of the State of Michigan, plaintiffs
ss.
in this uit, complain of C.... D.
the defendant in this suit, in a.
plea of trespass on the case. For that, whereas, heretofore, to wit,
on, etc., at, etc., certain goods and chattels, to-wit (specify the goods),
dollars, were forfeited by
of great value, to wit, of the value of
the said defendant according to the provisions of section
of
chapter (state the chapter or act), of the Compiled Laws of 1897, and
that the said defendant afterwards, to-wit, on the (lay and year afore
said, at the place aforesaid, converted and disposed of the said goods
and chattels to his own use, to the damage of the said plaintiffs of one
hundred dollars, and therefore they bring their suit, etc.
The People of the State of Michigan.
By A. . . . B. . .

N 0. 182-Declaration in Assumpsit—Genera1
.

Form for Breach
of Contract to Deliver Property Sold.
Ante,

§

680-682.

C. L., § 10417, 10054.

IN Jus'rxcs‘s Cousr:

A.... B....

L....

one of the Justices of the
of the County of . . . . ..
County of . . . . ss. A. . . . B. . . ., plaintiff, complains of C. . .. D. . . .
the defendant, in a plea of trespass on the case upon promises. For
19. ., at
.
that, whereas, heretofore, to wit, on the . . .. day of
the said plaintiff, at the defendant's request, bargained with him to
buy of him twenty bushels of wheat, and the said defendant then and
there sold the same to said plaintiff, at the price of two dollars per
bushel, to be delivered by the defendant to the plaintiff within one
week then next following, at . . . .to be paid for on the delivery thereof;
and in consideration that the plaintiff had then and there promised,
at the request of defendant, to accept the same wheat of him, and to
u.

C.... D....

Before

Peace

srscrmo
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pay him for the same the price aforesaid, he, the defendant, promised
And although the
to deliver the same to the plaintiff as aforesaid.
time for said delivery has long since passed, and said plaintiﬂ was
always, within and at the expiration of the said week, ready to receive
and pay for said wheat, and offered the defendant to pay for the same
as aforesaid, to wit: at . . . . etc., yet the the said defendant neglected to
deliver the said wheat as aforesaid, whereby the said plaintiff has lost
the said wheat, and has lost and been deprived of divers great gains
and proﬁts, which might and otherwise would have arisen and accrued
to him from the delivery of said wheat to the said plaintiff as afore
said; to plaintiffs damage . . . . dollars, and therefore he brings suit.
A. . . . B. . . ., Plaintiﬂ’.

No. 183—Decla.ration

on Note—Payee Against Maker.

Ante,

In Jusrrcs’s COUa'r:
A. . . . B. . . .

§§ 697, 698.

L.... M....,

one of the Justices of the
in and for the County of . . . . ..
_
County of . . . . ss. A... . B... ., plaintiff, complains of C.. . . . D. . . .,
the defendant herein, in a plea of trespass on the case on promises.
day of ....,
For that whereas, the said defendant on, to-wit, the .
19. ., at ...., made his promissory note in writing, and delivered the
same to‘ the plaintiff, and thereby promised to pay the plaintiff . . ..
dollars . . .. months after the date thereof, with interest, which period
Yet the said defendant, although often requested
has now elapsedﬁr
yet
paid said sum, or any part thereof, to plaintiff,
do,
has
not
so to
but has hitherto neglected and still does neglect and refuse to pay
dollars, and therefore he brings
the same; to plaintiffs damage
12.

C.... D....

1»

Before

Peace

V

suit.

A.
No. 184—Bond of Indemnity Against
Ante, §§

699,

700.

c. n,

. . .

a.

B.

. . .,

Plaintiff.

Lost Note.

§§ 10183, 10184.

Know all men by these presents, that we, A. . .. B. . . ., as principal,
and G....
as sureties, are held and firmly
and
bound unto C. . .. D. . . . in the sum of (double the amount of the note
at least) dollars, to be paid to the said C. . . . D. . .. or to his certain
attorney, heirs, executors, or administrators, to which payment well
and truly to be made,
we bind ourselves, our heirs, executors
jointly and severally, ﬁrmly by these presents.
and administrators,
. 19. .
Seal-ed with our seals, dated the . . .. day of
The condition of-this-obligation
is such, that if the said A. . .. B. . . .
shall indemnify and save harmless the said C. . .. D. . .. his heirs
and personal representatives, against all claims, by any other person,
on account of a certain promissory -negotiable .note, executed by said
C.... D.... to said A... . B.... for (state the sum as near as may be),
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dated on or about the (give the date as near as possible), and pay
able (state as near as may be, how, when and to whom payable),
which said promissory note has been lost, and against all costs and
expenses
by reason of any such claim, then this obligation
to be
void, otherwise of force.
A.... B
[L S.]

I approve of
going bond.
Dated
19..

and

[L. S.]
[L. S.]

G....

G....

as sureties in the fore

L.... M....

Justice of

the Peace.

No. 185—Dec1aration-Indorsee Against Maker.
Ante

§

703.

to the*, and then) G. . ..
to pay the said G. . . . H. .. ., or order,

(As in No. I83

H.

and thereby promised
dollars . .. . months after
the date thereof, which period has now elapsed, and the said G....
then and there indorsed the same to the plaintiff, whereof the
defendant then and there had notice, and then and there, in consid
eration of the premises, promised to pay the amount of the said note
to the plaintiﬂ! according to the tenor and effect thereof; (closing as
in N0. 183 after thet).

No. 186—Dec1a.ra.tion—Indorsee
Ante,

. . .,

.

Against Indorser.

§ 704.

the‘, and then) G. . .. H. . . ., and thereby promised
dollars, with interest,
., or order,
to pay to the said G....
. .. .months after the date thereof, which period has now elapsed, and
the said G. . . . H. . .. then and there indorsed the same to the defend
ant, who then and there indorsed the same to the plaintiﬂ; and
the said C.... D.... did not pay the amount thereof, although the
same was presented to him on the day when it became due; of all of
which the defendant then and there had notice. By means whereof
the defendant then became liable to pay the amount of said note to
said plaintiff, and being so liable, the defendant, in consideration
thereof, then and there promised to pay the same to the plaintiff on
Yet, etc., (closing as in N0. 188 after thei.)
request.

(As in No.

183 to

No. 187-Declaration
IN

JUS'i‘ICE’S

Cotmrz

A.... B....

Embracing all the Common Counts.

Ante, §§

714

et seq.

L.... M....,

one of the Justices of the
of the County of . . . . ..
B.... plaintiff, complains of C.... D....
COUNTY
the defendant herein, in a plea of trespass on the case upon promises.
For that whereas, the said defendant, on, to-wit, the. . . . day of.
v.

C.... D....

}
0s'...., ss.

Before

Peace

886
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19.... at...., in said county, was indebted to the plaintiff in the
sum of....dollars for goods, wares and merchandise before then bar
gained and sold by the plaintiff to the defendant at his request.
And in the sum of....dollars for goods, wares, and merchandise
before then sold and delivered by the plaintiff to the defendant, and
at his request.
And in the sum of. . . .dollars for work and labor before then done,
and materials for the same, provided by the plaintiff for the_ defend
‘
ant at his request.
And in the sum of....doliars for money before then lent by the
plaintiff to the defendant at his request.
And in the sum of....dollars for money before then paid by the
to and for the defendant at his request.
<plaintiff
And in the sum of....dollars for money before then had and
received by the defendant to and for the use of the plaintiff.
And in the sum of. . . .dollars for money then and there found to be
due from the defendant to the plaintiff on account stated between
them.
And in the sum of....dollars for the use and occupation of a cer
tain piece of land, by and at the request of the said defendant, and
by the permission of the said plaintiff.
And thereupon the said defendant afterwards, and on the day and
year aforesaid, in consideration of the premises respectively, then
and there promised the plaintiff to pay the said several sums of money
respectively, on request: Yet the said defendant has disregarded his
said promises, and has not (although often requested so to do) paid
any of the said sums of money, or any part thereof, to the plaintiff's
damage of three hundred dollars, and therefore he brings suit, etc.
'

A...

No. 188—Form

B...

.,

of Declaration-Action on the
Ante,

In Jnsrrcrfs Cormr:
A. . . . B. . . .

.

§

755

Plaintiff.

Case.

et seq.

Before L.... M...., one of the Justices of the
Peace in and for the County of
COUNTY or. . . . ss.
A. . .. B. . . ., plaintiff, complains of C. . . . D. . ..
the defendant herein, in a plea of trespass on the case.
For that whereas, the plaintiff, on, to-wit, the.... day of...., 19..,
delivered to the defendant a certain horse of the plaintiff to ride
from.... to...., a distance of.... miles; and the said defendant on
the same day, at the county of.... aforesaid, wrongfully rode said
horse immoderately, and with such great and unreasonable speed, that
the said horse, thereafter, on the same day, by reason of such
immoderate and unreasonable riding, died; to the damage of the
plaintiff one hundred dollars, and therefore he brings suit.
'
A.... B.... Plaintiﬂ‘.
v.

C.... D....

1»

O

APPENDIX

B.

CONTAINING THE JUSTICE COURT ACTS OF THE SEVERAL CITIES IN
DIFFERING MATERIALLY
MICHIGAN HAVING SPECIAL PROVISIONS
THEY
FROM THE GENERAL PROVISIONS RELATING TO SUCH COURTS.
OFFICERS,
THE
SALARIED
PROVIDE
FOR
MAKING
JUSTICES
GENERALLY
THEIR JURISDICTION IS USUALLY SOMEWHAT ENLARGED, PROVISION
IS MADE FOR A CLERK, AND IN SOME CASES ONLY ATTORNEYS AT LAW
ARE ELIGIBLE TO THE OFFICE OF JUSTICE.

THE ACT PROVIDING FOR JUSTICES’ COURTS IN
THE CITY OF DETROIT.
Act No.

An act

to establish

475,

Local Acts,

and provide

1903.

justices’

courts in the

City of Detroit, and to repeal act number four hun
of the local acts of nineteen
dred and twenty-six
hundred and one, approved May thirteenth, nineteen
hundred

and one.

The people of the State of Michigan enact:
Section
That there shall be four justices of the
peace in and for the City of Detroit, who shall be elected
at the regular charter election of said city, or at any
general election held therein, in the same manner, pos
sess the same jurisdiction, powers, duties and liabilities
as justices of the peace for townships,
excepting as
otherwise provided by law.
Each of said justices of
the peace shall hold his oﬁice for the term of four years,
commencing on and after the fourth day of July suc
ceeding his election. The four justices of the peace here
tofore elected, and now holding office in said City of
Detroit, shall be and continue to act as justices of the
peace under the provisions of this act until the expira
1.

887

_

15:1;
V

Jurisdiction

Term oromee.
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of their respective terms of oﬂice for which they
have been elected, and until their successors are elected
t'1on

re and

Files

and
cords shall be
safely kept.

I

have

belonging
peace now

The ﬁles, records and dockets
qualiﬁed.
or appertaining to the ofﬁces of justice of the

in oﬂice, and all ﬁles, records and dockets
appertaining to such oiﬁces, shall be ﬁled and
safely kept in the oﬂice of the clerk of said justices’
courts hereinafter mentioned.
At the general election held in November, in
Sec. 2.
the year nineteen hundred and four, and every two years
hereafter, there shall be elected two justices of the
peace, whose terms of office shall commence on the fourth
day of July next succeeding their election, and who
shall hold their oﬂice for a term of four years.
The auditors of the County of Wayne shall
Sec. 3.
provide suitable rooms for the accommodation of said
justices of the peace, and also an oﬂice for the clerks here
inafter mentioned, also such jury rooms as may be neces
sary, which oiiices and rooms shall be as nearly contigu
ous to each other as in the discretion of said auditors,
and the convenient dispatch of the business of said
courts requires.
Said auditors shall also provide neces
and
books, including the Michigan Reports,
sary dockets
blanks, stationery, furniture and fuel, for the use of said
hereafter

Two justices
shall be

elected every
two years.

Auditors
shall provide
suitable
rooms.

Dockets,
books,

etc.

justices
Limit of
jurisdiction.

Sec. 4.
Each of the said justices of the peace elected
in the City of _Detroit, and duly qualiﬁed according to
law, shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions
wherein the debt or damages do notexceed the sum of

hundred dollars; and concurrent jurisdiction in all
civil actions excontractu and exdelicto, wherein the debt
or damages or the property involved does not exceed
the sum of ﬁve hundred dollars, except as provided in
section seven hundred and four of the Compiled Laws of
Michigan, A. D. eighteen hundred ninety-seven.
The said justices of the peace of the City of
Sec. 5.
Detroit, as against all other justices of the peace, shall
have exclusive jurisdiction of all actions and proceed
ings within their jurisdiction, where both of the parties
thereto shall. at the time of the commencement of such
one

Exclusive
jurisdiction.

and clerks.
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action or proceeding, be residents of said city. They shall
also have a like exclusive jurisdiction where the origi
nal cause of action existed in favor of a resident of said
Provided, however,
city, but has been by him assigned:
They shall also
Such assignee resides in Wayne County.
have jurisdiction in all cases where either or any of the
parties reside in said city.
Each of said justices of the peace shall
Sec. 6.
receive from the treasurer of the County of Wayne an
annual salary of two thousand ﬁve hundred dollars, pay
able in semi-monthly installments on the certiﬁcate of
the board of auditors of the County of Wayne.
This act shall in no way affect the fees to
Sec. 7.
which said justices of the peace shall be'entitled on the
performance of marriage ceremonies, taking acknowl
oaths in matters not
edgments, and in administering
connected in any litigation in the said justices’ courts.
Each of the said justices shall have his court
Sec. 8.
room open, and he shall be in attendance at the duties of
his oﬁice therein, from nine o’clock in the forenoon, city
time, until twelve o’clock noon, and from two o’clock
until four o’clock in the afternoon: Provided, That
where either one of said justices is actually engaged in
the trial of a suit, he shall so continue at least until ﬁve
o’clock in the afternoon, when it shall be necessary so to
do in order to ﬁnish the trial of said suit.
There shall be one clerk for said justices,
Sec. 9.

Salary.

for mar
riage cere

Fees

monies,

etc.

Hours court
room shall be
open.

Proviso.

Clerk.

‘

who shall be known as the clerk of the justices’ courts
for Detroit. The office of said clerk shall be open con

tinuously from eight-thirty a. m. until four o’clock p. m.,
city time, each day, excepting legal holidays.
He shall
be appointed by the board of auditors for the County of
Wayne forthwith upon the making and ﬁling with them
of the written recommendation of the majority of said
justices holding oﬁice, on or before December thirty
ﬁrst of each year. If for any reason such recommends»
tion be not made and ﬁled by the said date then the
said auditors shall make such appointment on their own
motion.
The term of oﬁice of said clerk shall be one
on the ﬁrst day of January.
He
year, to commence

How and by
whom ap
pointed.

Term of oﬂice.

890

Salary.

Bond ot clerk.

Condition
of bond.
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shall receive from the treasurer of Wayne County an
annual salary of ﬁfteen hundred dollars, payable in
semi-monthly installments on the certiﬁcate of said audi
tors of Wayne County.
Sec. 10. Before
entering upon the duties of his
oﬁice, the said clerk shall ﬁle in the oﬂice of the clerk of
Wayne County, a surety company bond in the penal sum
of ﬁve thousand dollars, to be approved by the said
auditors of Wayne County, conditioned that the said

clerk shall faithfully

and properly perform the duties
of his said olﬁce, and that he shall well and truly pay
to the treasurer of Wayne County all moneys received
by him or by his deputies under him, as clerk of said jus
tices’ courts, for the use of said county, and that he
shall well and truly pay to the persons entitled thereto
all moneys paid under judgments rendered by said
justices, and all moneys paid under garnishments in said
justices’ courts, and all moneys otherwise received by
virtue of his oﬂice, and otherwise conditioned as the said
shall

prescribe.
shall be the duty of said clerk to keep
a true and complete record of all proceedings before
each of said justices, and to enter all judgments in
auditors

Duties of
clerk.

Sec.

11.

It

the docket of the justice rendering the same in the time
and manner prescribed by law, which judgment shall
be signed by the justice by whom it was rendered, and
such records shall be hereafter indexed in the proper
book to be kept for that purpose, which said index shall
both as to plaintiffs and defendants.
He shall
keep true and correct accounts of all moneys received
by him or his deputies, as court fees for the use of

be kept
Moneys
re
ceived by

clerk.

Clerk to
keep books
and papers.

Shall enter
llst. of juror!

Wayne County, or for any other purpose, and shall prop
erly account for and pay over the same to the party
He shall also ﬁle and safely keep all
entitled thereto.
and appertaining to the said
belonging
books
papers and
justices’ courts, none of which shall be removed from
said oﬁice without the authority in writing of the jus
tice before whom the cause is pending, or the clerk of
said court, nor unless proper receipts be given therefor.
The said clerk shall also enter in a book provided for

SPECIAL JUSTICE COURT

891

ACTS——DETBOiT.

the purpose a list of all jurors that sit in trial of cases
in said justices’ courts, together with the date or dates
and the time during which said jurors served, with a
reference to the page of the docket containing the rec
ord

of the

clerk shall

cause

receive

in

all

which
costs,

said

juror served.

ﬁnes and

Said

dues of every

receive

Shag nes,
all
coats

etc.

description, which are provided by law in all proceed
ings in said justices’ courts, and shall pay the same
weekly to the treasurer of Wayne County, and shall take
All moneys paid under judgments
his receipt therefor.
rendered by said justices, and all moneys paid under
garnishments in said justices’ courts shall be paid to
said clerk, or his deputy or deputies by him authorized
Said clerk shall have power gen
to receive the same.
erally to administer oaths and to take aﬁidavits.
Said clerk shall keep an assignment book
Sec. 12.
or list upon which the names of the justices shall appear,
and as cases are commenced, he shall assign them and
make all writs and process therein returnable to the
said justices in rotation, and as each case is assigned
he shall number the same,

and the said number shall be

Shall keep
assignment

‘

book.

Writs

and
re
turnable in
process

rotation.

All original
designated and known as the ﬁle number.
writs or process issues by said justices shall be return
able at nine o’elock in the morning, city time. If upon
the return day or the adjourned day of any case, the
justice issuing the writ or process therein shall be absent

Writs:
when
returnable.

at the time to which the case has been adjourned or the
writ of process therein made returnable, or be engaged
in the trial of another case, then any of the other jus

absent.

Practice when
justice is

tices present shall have the same jurisdiction to pro
ceed therein as though the case had been originally
commenced before him, and the record thereof shall be
entered in the docket of the justice issuing the original

writ or process:

Provided, That it shall not be neces
sary for the said justices to wait any length of time
after the time ﬁxed by any writ or adjournment to dis
pose of the cases pending before them.
Sec. 13.
Said clerk shall have and is hereby given
the power and authority to appoint such number of
deputies as shall be approved by the board of coimty

Proviso.

Deputy clerks.

_
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Tenn of oﬂlco.

Appointment
and revoca
tlo 11. how
made.

Duties of dep
uty clerks.

Bond.

Chlet deputy.
Salary of
chief deputy.
Salaries 0!
other deputies.

Costs and tees
1n com me ne

lng s\llL

Trial

fee.

Costs

in

nlshment
upon judg
ment.

gar

AC‘TS——DETBOIT.

auditors, whose terms of ofﬁce shall commence on the
ﬁrst day of January of each year, to properly execute
the work of said otﬁce, and said appointment shall not
be for a longer time than his term of ofﬁce, and shall be
subject to revocation at any time, for cause, by said
clerk. Appointments and revocation of appointments of
such deputies shall be made by the certiﬁcate of said
clerk ﬁled with the auditors of Wayne County, and
such certiﬁcates shall be notices of the appointment or
revocation, as the case may be, and the appointment or
revocation shall be operative from the time of the ﬁling
of such certiﬁcate, and the said board of auditors shall
cause payment of salary to such deputies accordingly.
The said deputy clerks shall be under the control and
direction
of the said clerk, and shall perform such
duties as he shall direct, and shall have authority to
administer oaths, take aﬁidavits, and perform generally
the duties of said clerk.
Each of said deputies shall, if
required by said clerk, furnish a good and sufficient bond
for the faithful discharge of his duties, with surety or
sureties in such amount and with such conditions as
said clerk may prescribe.
One of said deputy clerks
shall be designated by said clerk as chief deputy, and
shall receiveasalary of one thousand and two hundred
dollars per annum. The other deputies shall each receive
dollars per annum.
a salary of one thousand
Said
salaries shall be paid in semi-monthly installments by
the treasurer of Wayne County, upon the certiﬁcate of
the auditors of said county.
Before any civil action or proceeding except.
Sec. 1-1.
proceedings in garnishment, shall be commenced in said
justices’ courts, there shall be paid to the clerk of said
court by the party bringing the action, the sum of ﬁfty
cents and the fees of the officer for service of the writ
or process by which such action is commenced, and
before the trial of such action or proceeding shall be
commenced, the further sum of ﬁfty cents; but in cases
of non-suit, no judgment fee shall be required, and pro
ceedings in garnishment shall be treated as part of the
principal case, except garnishment proceedings com
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menced upon judgment rendered prior thereto, in which
cases an entry fee and trial fee shall be paid as in
other actions herein provided, and no additional fee shall
up to and including the entry
be charged therefor

of judgments therein._ The fees paid to the clerk for
service of such writ or process by which the action is
commenced, shall be retained by said clerk until the
writ or process has been returned duly served, or said

Service lees
to be retained
by clerk until
writ of proc
ess served.

is brought to issue, when the said fee or fees shall
be paid by said clerk to the oﬂicer making the service,
taking his receipt therefor and placing the same in the
cause

ﬁles of said cause: Provided, That if it appear by the
ﬁles in said case that no service has been had for three
months after the date of the writ, then the ofﬁcer’s fees
which have been paid into the court shall be returned by
the clerk to the plaintiff in the suit.

Proviso.

may
Sec. 15. If any person shall satisfy one of said jus Writ
issue without
oI
tices by aﬂidavit that he has a good, meritorious cause payment
court fees in
cases.
certain
of action for personal service against another within the
jurisdiction of said courts, and that he has made per
sonal demand for payment thereof of the debtor, and

that

such

payment

has been

refused,

and

that

he

ﬁnancially unable to pay the court costs, and shall
state the name and residence of the debtor, and
amount due over and above all legal set-oﬁs, the
tic to whom such afﬁdavit is presented may in his

is

also
the

jus
dis

cretion endorse on such aﬂidavit directions to the said
clerk to cause to be issued the proper writ in the case
returnable
before one of the other justices, without
charge for court fees for the commencement or trial of
said cause. If the plaintiif in such case recover judg
ment, he shall be entitled to recover his costs therein.
The usual court fees, however, shall also be taxed against
the defendant, but in favor of Wayne County.
If the
defendant obtain judgment in such cause, the said court

in like manner and for the like purpose be
Nothing herein contained
taxed against the plaintiﬁ.
shall be so construed as to prevent the circuit court for
the County of Wayne, on an appeal of any such cause, to

fees shall

Taxation

costs in cer
tain cases.

of

I

\

SPECIAL JUSTICE COURT ACTS-DETROIT.

894

the appellant therein to give security in said
court for costs as in other cases.
The service of a summons under this act
Sec. 16.
may be made in the manner prescribed in section four
teen of act number one hundred and ninety-one of the
require

Manner of
service of
summons.

Fees for serv
ice of costs
and process.

Summons.

Writ of st
tachment

replevin.

or

Mileage fees
outside city
limits.

No additional
compensation.

General

stat

utes govern
in Certain
Cl-5'88.

Jury commis

si on e rs to
select jurors.

public acts of eighteen hundred and seventy-nine, being
section seven hundred and sixteen of the Compiled
Laws of eighteen hundred and ninety-seven.
Constables and other oﬁicers serving writs
Sec. 17.
or process issued out of said justices’ court, shall be
entitled to receive for the service of such writs or
process Within the corporate limits of the City of Detroit,
For the service of a summons by
the following fees:
which suit is commenced, seventy-ﬁve cents for ea/ch
defendant served; for the service of a writ of attach
ment or writ of replevin, two dollars; for the service of
such process, outside said city limits, the oﬁicer shall be
entitled to receive in addition to the above compensa
tion, mileage fees according to the statute regulating
such fees, to be computed from the place of service to
the corporate limits of the City of Detroit. The above
fees shall be in full for all services rendered by the
ofﬁcer or his assistants, and it shall be unlawful in any
case for the officer or his assistants to demand or receive
any compensation
above set forth.

whatsoever

in

addition

to

the fees

For the service of other process or
the performance of other duties, the fees therefor shall
be regulated according to the general statutes provid
ing therefor. Except as herein otherwise provided, this
act shall in no way affect the fees to which constables
or the present method of paying them.
Sec. 18. The board of jury commissioners, as cre
ated by act number two hundred and four of the public
acts of eighteen hundred ninety-three, shall annually or
whenever required by the clerk of said court, in accord
are entitled,

with the method required by that act, select per
sons to serve as jurors for the trial of cases, matters
and proceedings in said justices’ courts, and shall ﬁle a
list of the persons so selected with the clerk of said
justices’ courts. The number to be selected on the third
ance

Number to
be selected.

5

~’

m

__

_

m

_
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Monday of May of
shall be three

each

l1l1I1dl‘6d.

year as provided

895

by said act,

After the ﬁling of such list, the

proceedings for selection, summoning and compelling the
attendance of jurors and talesmen shall be,_ as far as
practicable, the same as provided by law for like pur
poses, as in the circuit court for Wayne County, except
that the attendance of the sheriff shall not be required.
Jurors shall be drawn and summoned for a term of two
months, which shall be the calendar month next suc

Not less than eighteen or more
ceeding such drawing.
jurors
than thirty-six
shall be drawn and summoned for
a term, unless for a special reason the clerk of said
court shall in writing direct that a greater number
shall be drawn and summoned.
The persons so drawn
shall be notiﬁed in writing of their liability to jury

Proceedings to
compel at
tendance
of

jurors.

Term of
jurors.
Number of
jurors tor

each

term.

How persons
drawn shall
be notiﬁed.

duty in the justices’ courts for the calendar months to
be speciﬁed, which notice shall be served personally, if
practicable, upon each person so drawn, by the sheriff
in the manner now provided by law, and a return in
writing, of the time and manner of such service shall

with the clerk of said justices’ courts.
Said jurors shall report for service to the clerk of said
court.
The actual attendance of the persons duly noti
ﬁed for jury service may be required and enforced
according to law. The persons so serving as jurors shall’
be entitled to receive from the County of Wayne the Jury tees.
sum of two dollars and ﬁfty cents each for each day’s
actual attendance, which sum shall be paid by the county
auditors on certiﬁcate of the clerk of said justices’
courts.
Whenever by law, a judge of the circuit court Proceedings
when court
is
for VVayne County is required or directed to be present judge
required to
at or to participate in any part of the proceedings to be present.
select jurors for that court, the clerk of said justices’
court shall perform like duty in like proceedings to select
jurors for said justices’ courts.
Sec. 19.
Juries in said justices’ courts shall be com Qualiﬁcations
of jurors.
posed of six persons, who shall be residents of said City
of Detroit, and shall severally possess the lawful quali
ﬁcations of jurors in the circuit court for the County of
Wayne, and any challenge, which would be valid in said Challenge.
be made and ﬁled
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Limitation of
peremptory
challenges.
Party de
manding jury
must advance
lee.

Amount of

jury

lees.

circuit court, shall be valid and suﬁicient if made in the
said justices’ courts: Provided, however, That but two
peremptory challenges shall be allowed to the plaintiff, and
the like number to the defendant in all trials in said jus
tices’ courts. If any party demands a jury in any action
in said justices’ courts, he shall advance to the clerk the
sum of ﬁve dollars as jury fee, and the same shall belong
to the County of Wayne, and shall be turned over by said
clerk in the same manner as is required in the case of
other moneys received by him: Provided, That in all
where the amoimt involved does not exceed ﬁfty
dollars, the jury fee shall be only three dollars.
Sec. 20.
The jury empaneled in any case as herein
provided, shall determine any and all questions of fact

cases

Jury

to de

questions
oi iact.

cide

Justice to de
cide questions
oi law.

cases, but it‘shall be the duty of the justice
such case to decide all questions of law arising
therein, and it shall also be the duty of the said jus
tice to instruct the jury as to the questions of law

in such
hearing

applicable

to the case.

may
The justice
Sec. 21.
set aside ver
dict and grant been tried and verdict or
new trial.
Justice

Motion to set
aside must be
in writing.

What motion
shall show.
Affidavits to

accompany

motion.

Service

copy

of

~

oi

motion.
When motion
shall be

determined.

Time for tak
ing appeal.

before whom any cause has
judgment rendered, shall have
the same power and authority to set aside the verdict or
and grant a new trial therein upon legal
judgment,
cause shown therefor, as the circuit courts of the State
Provided, That a motion in writing be made
possess:
and ﬁled with the clerk of said justices’ courts within
ﬁve days after the rendition of the verdict or judg
ment in said case. Said motion shall brieﬂy and plainly
set forth the reasons and grounds upon which it is made.
Affidavits upon which the motion is founded shall also

of ﬁling of said motion, and notice
of the hearing of such motion, with copy of the motion
and aﬂidavits ﬁled as aforesaid, shall be served upon
the adverse party or his attorney at least two days before
be ﬁled at the time

Such motion shall be determined
the hearing thereof.
within two days after the same shall have been heard
and submitted, and such motion shall be submitted

within

one week after the same shall have been ﬁled.
The time for taking an appeal from judgment, in case
such motion be not granted, shall begin to rim from
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In no
the time when such motion shall be overruled.
case shall the pendcncy of such motion stay the issuing
and levy of an execution in such case; but in case of a
levy imder execution pending such motion, no sale of
the property so levied on shall be advertised or made
until the ﬁnal determination of such motion.
No appeal shall be taken from any judg
Sec. 22.
ment of any justice of the peace in said City of Detroit,
,
except in the following cases:
First, When said justice shall disallow any claim in
favor of any plaintiff or defendant in any cause in said
justices’ courts, in whole or in part, to the amount of
,
ﬁfty dollars;
Second, When said justice shall render a judgment to
the amount of ﬁfty dollars exclusive of costs; in either
of which cases, the party aggrieved may appeal;
Third, Appeals may be authorized by the circuit court
of the County of \Vayne, when the party making the
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of
motion shall

Pendency

not stay
execution.

Cases in
which appeal
may be taken.

When justice
shall disallow
claim to
amount of
ﬁfty dollars.
When judg
ment shall
amount to
ﬁfty dollars.
When appeal
may be auth
orized by cir
cuit court.

appeal has been prevented from making a defense upon
the merits of the case in which such appeal is taken
by circumstances not under his control; and such appeal
may also be authorized when justice requires that such
appeal should be authorized, and in all cases where the
parties against whom such appeal is sought has ap
peared in said justices’ courts by an attorney or agent,

it will be suﬂicient to serve such attorney or agent with
the notices of all subsequent proceedings in such case
and all orders made therein by said circuit court may
be served on said attorney or agent, and such service
shall have the same effect as though made on the party
against whom such appeal is taken;
Fourth, Under absolutely no circumstances shall any
appeal be allowed or authorized after ﬁve days from
the rendition of judgment,
provided.

except as herein

days.

I

23.

in the circuit court shall

five

otherwise

Before any aﬁidavit for appeal, or writ of
certiorari, shall be served on any' one of said justices, in
addition to the fees allowed by law for making returns
to an appeal or certiorari, the cntry fee for ﬁling the same
Sec.

No appeal
allowed alter

be paid to the said

57

/

clcrk by the

Entry fee
upon appeal
or w rit o f

certiorari.
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(‘lerk shall
tile returns.

Clerk may be
Com P elled
to
make returns.

Fees shall be
of

for use
county.

Taxation of
costs.

in
in criminal
Costs

cases.

Party

may
deposit legal
tender funds
in lieu of
bond.

or
in
garnishment
Money
effects

may be re
leased by ﬂi
ing bond.
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appellant, or plaintiff in error, and the said clerk shall
as early as possible ﬁle a return to such appeal or writ
of certiorari, in the office of the clerk of the circuit court
for Wayne County, and shall pay over to him the fees

as aforesaid, and if said return is not ﬁled
with the clerk of the circuit court within ten days after
the appeal or costs on certiorari shall have been paid, a
writ of mandamus may issue to the clerk of the justices’
courts, compelling him to make such return forthwith,
and he shall be personally liable for the costs if any
shall be awarded in such proceeding.
24.
Sec.
The money paid to the said clerk of the
justices’ courts upon commencement of suit, for trial
fees, jury fees, and fees for making returns to appeal or
writ of certiorari and entry fee for ﬁling same, shall be
for the use of the county, and shall be held to be in full
for all fees in civil actions from the commencement
thereof to and including the issuing of execution therein.
'1‘hc sum or sums so paid, including the jury fees, shall
be taxed as costs of suit in favor of the party paying
the same, if he be the prevailing party in the suit, in
so advanced

addition to any other costs to which he may be entitled
by law. In criminal cases the same costs shall be paid,
and in the same manner as in proceedings before justices
of the peace in townships, except that the same shall be
paid to the said clerk as in civil cases is provided.
In all cases when a party is required or
Sec. 25.
allowed by law to give a bond, as a condition of com
mencing or prosecuting any suit, action or proceeding
in said justices’ courts, such party may execute and
ﬁlg such bond, or he may in the discretion of the court
deposit with the clerk thereof the amount of the bond
required in legal tender funds of the United States. And
in garnishment
proceedings, the principal defendant
may have any money or effects released which have been
garnished, by ﬁling with the justice before whom the
case is pending a surety company bond, approved by
justice, in double the amount of the plaintiﬁ’s
claim stated in his aﬁﬁdavit, and not less than ﬁfty dol
lars, or deposit with the clerk of the court an amount

said
Amount of

such bond.

I
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equal to such a bond, which money shall remain with
said clerk until disposed of by the court according to
A certiﬁcate of such deposit, setting forth the
law.
case in which, the amount thereof, the person by whom,
the purpose for which, and the time when deposited,
shall be given to the party depositing the same by the
clerk of said court. Upon the ﬁnal disposition of the
case, action or proceeding in which such deposit was
made, in case the party making such deposit shall be
adjudged liable to pay the costs of such suit or proceed
ings, or to pay any other sum to secure the payment
of which said deposit was made, then such fund so
deposited shall under the direction of the court be ap
plied in payment and satisfaction of the same.
Should
any surplus remain after satisfying such order of the

Certiﬁcate of

deposit.

Application oi
fund upon
ﬁnal disposi
tion ot case.

Surplus.

court, the same shall be returned to the party depositing
the same.
The justices of the peace mentioned herein
shall have the power to make and adopt such rules of
practice in said justices’ courts as to them may be
Sec.

26.

deemed advisable for the purpose
business of said courts.
Sec. 27.

In

of facilitating

or
practice.

the

shall at any time occur
in the oﬂice of the justice of the peace of the City of
Detroit, by death, resignation, removal or other cause,
it shall be the duty of the common council of the City of
Detroit to ﬁll such vacancy by appointment of some
case

Rules

a vacancy

person, who shall upon duly qualifying there
for ﬁll such vacancy until the next general election,
when a justice of the peace shall be elected to ﬁll the
unexpired term of said oiﬁce.
Sec. 28.
None but attorneys at law of four years’

Common

Council shall
ﬂll vacancy.

suitable

standing shall be eligible to be elected or appointed to
the oﬁice of the justice of the peace under the provi
sions of this act. And no justice of the peace for said
city shall during his term of office act as attorney or
solicitor in any court in the County of Wayne.

Act number ‘four hundred and twenty-six of
the local acts of nineteen hundred and one, being an act
entitled“An act to establish and provide justices’ courts
Sec. 29.

Qualiﬁcation
oi‘ justices.

Repeal of
prior acts.
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inthe City of Detroit, and to repeal act number four hun
dred and sixty of the local acts of eighteen hundred and
ninety-ﬁve, entitled ‘An act to establish and provide
justices’ courts in the City of Detroit,’ and to repeal act
number two hundred and eighty of the local acts of
eighteen hundred and eighty-three, entitled ‘An act rela
tive to justices’ courts in the City of Detroit,’ approved

April twenty-ﬁfth,

eighteen hundred and eighty-three,
and all acts amendatory thereof,” approved June ﬁrst,
eighteen hundred and ninety-ﬁve, and all acts amends

tory thereof,

approved May thirteenth, nineteen hun
dred and one, and all other acts or parts of acts con
travening the provisions of this act, shall be and the
same are hereby repealed.
This act is ordered to take immediate effect.

Approved May

20, 1903.

THE ACT PROVIDING FOR JUSTICES’ COURTS
THE CITY OF GRAND RAPIDS.

IN

‘Act No.’306, Local Acts, 1893, as amended by Act
No. 327. Local Acts. 1897, and Act N0. -198, Local Acts,
1903.
Two justices.

Qualiﬁcations
of, and
elected.

how

Term of oﬂice
of present
justices.
Files,
and

hgw
o .

records

dockets,
disposed

Executions,
by whom
Issued.

Section 1. There shall be two justices of the peace in
and for the city of Grand Rapids, who shall be electors
of the city and actual residents therein; they shall be at
torneys at law, duly admitted to practice their profession
in the several courts of this State, and they shall be
elected in the manner justices of the peace are now
elected in the city. The justices of the peace now hold
ing oﬂice in the city, shall continue to hold the same until
the expiration of their respective terms, and until their
successors are elected and qualiﬁed.
The ﬁles, records
and dockets appertaining to the offices of former justices

of the peace in said city, shall be kept in the office of
the clerk herein provided for. Either of the present or
future justices is empowered to issue an execution, ac

\

)
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cording to law, upon judgments,
dockets,
him.

as

if

such judgments

axrms.
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appearing upon such
had been rendered by

Sec. 2.
Justices of the peace in said city, except to
ﬁll vacancies, shall be elected at the annual municipal
election held in the city, and shall hold their offices for
a term of four years from and after the fourth day of
July succeeding their election, and until their successors

are elected and qualiﬁed.
Sec. 3.
The Common Council of the City of Grand
Rapids shall provide such rooms as shall be suitable for

for holding justice courts, and for jury purposes,
and an oﬁice for the clerk of said courts hereinafter
mentioned.
Such rooms shall be contiguous to each
other. The said Common Council shall also provide the
necessary furniture, ﬁxtures, dockets, books, blanks and

,§,§f,°'-‘gm

°m°°

°'

0,

’,,.‘{,,¢_
,(,l§’,,“,.“,,°,‘,,'

“bl” '°°““"

use

,',“x‘l';"‘rl,__‘s‘f"e*ic_

stationery for use in the business of said courts, and
for the heating and lighting of said rooms.
Each of the justices of the peace of the city ffgagfg °'
Sec. 4.
of Grand Rapids shall receive from the treasury of the
city an annual salary of thirteen hundred dollars, which
No fees.
salary shall be in lieu of all fees, costs and charges to
which said justices would be entitled but for.the provi
sions of this act, except fees for the performance of P'°'“°
ceremonies, for taking acknowledgments, and
oaths in matters not connected with

marriage

for administering

proceedings in justices’ courts in said city;
such salary shall be paid to said justices in monthly
installments,
as other oﬁicers of said city are paid.
of
said
shall be in attendance at his office
justices
Each
on all days, except Sundays and legal holidays, from
suits

or

°m°°

h°""

of nine o’clock in the forenoon until noon,
and from the hour of two o’clock until ﬁve o’clock in the
the hour

afternoon.
Sec.

5.

At the ﬁrst annual municipal election held

after the passage of this act, and every two years thereafter at such election, there shall be elected a clerk for
such justices of the peace, to be known as “The Clerk ox
the Justice Courts of Grand Rapids,” who shall hold
his oﬁice for the term of two years from the ﬁrst Mon

,'§',‘;’,°,"°","o‘,‘§,§‘e
f,§s,§L§"‘f,°§§u_
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Salary of
clerk.

Deputies.

Clerk respon
slble tor acts
0! deputies.
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day in May next succeeding his election and until his
successor is elected and qualiﬁed.
Said clerk shall re
ceive from the treasury of said city an annual salary of
ten hundred dollars, to be paid to him in monthly in
stallments, as other oﬂicers of said city are paid; he shall
have power to appoint one or more deputies and to re
voke any such appointment at pleasure: Provided, how
ever, That the compensation of such deputy or deputies
shall be paid by said clerk and shall not constitute an
additional charge or expense to said city. Any deputy so
appointed shall have power to perform all of the duties
of said clerk, and said clerk shall be responsible for the
acts of any such deputy in respect to the affairs and
duties and administration of the oﬂice to the same extent
for his own acts. Such clerk may require such bonds
or other securities from such deputies as he may deem

Bond of
deputles.

as

Bond 0!
clerk.

proper. Before entering upon the duties of his ofﬁce said
clerk shall ﬁle in the oﬁice of the city clerk of said city
a bond approved by the Common Council of said city in
the penal sum of three thousand dollars, with two or
more sureties, conditioned that he shall well and truly
perform his duties as such clerk, and account for and
pay over all moneys, which shall be received by him, to

Council may
clerk,

remove
when.

the persons lawfully entitled to receive the same.
The
Common Council shall have power to remove such clerk
at any time for causes provided for in the charter of the

City of Grand Rapids.
Duties 0!
clerk.

The oﬁice of said clerk shall be open and
Sec. 6.
said clerk or his deputy shall be in attendance therein,
from eight o’clock in the forenoon until noon, and from
one o’clock until ﬁve o’clock in the afternoon.
It shall

duty of said clerk to assist said justices in the
preparation of process and in keeping full and complete
dockets of the proceedings by and before each of said
justices in the manner provided by law.
Said clerk
shall also ﬁle and safely keep all books and papers be
Said clerk shall also enter in a
longing to said courts.
of
all
who shall sit as jurors in
the
names
persons
book
said courts, in the trials of causes; such names to be
arranged alphabetically, together with the dates that each
be the

Jurors
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so sat, and a reference to the page of the docket
where the proceedings of the trial were entered.
The
said clerk shall receive all fees, costs, ﬁnes and dues of

.
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juror

every description that shall become due and payable on
account of proceedings in said courts, or by or before
said justices, except fees for the performance of marriage
and for ad
ceremonies, for taking acknowledgments,
ministering oaths in matters not connected with suits or
proceedings in said justices’ courts, and shall keep an
account of the same, and pay over all such fees, costs,
ﬁnes, penalties, forfeitures and dues (except such as are
by law required to be paid to the clerk of the circuit

court for the County of Kent upon the removal of causes
from said justices’ court to said circuit; and such as are
by law required to be paid to the county treasurer of
said county) to the treasurer of the City of Grand
Rapids, for the beneﬁt of said city; such payments to be
made weekly.
Said clerk shall also receive all other
moneys paid into such courts, for or on account of pro
ceedings therein, and shall pay over all such moneys to
the person lawfully entitled to the same.
Sec. 7.
Before any civil action or proceeding, except

Fees to be
paid to clerk.

Fees to be
paid by clerk
,ty an d
t o cl
county treas

urers.

Other moneys.

proceedings against a garnishee defendant, shall be com
menced in any of said justices’ courts, there shall be
paid to the clerk of said courts, by the party commenc
ing the same, an entry fee of one dollar, and before the
trial of any such action or /proceedings shall be com
menced, such. party shall pay a judgment fee of one
dollar; but in case of non-suit before the commencement

Entry tees.

Judgment
tees.

of trial, no judgment

fee shall be required.
Proceed
ings in garnishment shall be treated as part of the prin
cipal cause, and no additional fees shall be required
therein, except when an issue of fact shall be joined in
respect to the liability of a garnishee or garnishees;
in such cases a judgment fee of one dollar shall be

paid before such trial shall commence.
The fees pro
vided for in this section shall be in full for all services
and proceedings by and before said justices, to and in

cluding the issuing of execution upon judgment therein,
and shall be taxed in favor of the party paying the same

Garnishee.

Fees to be
in tuil for all

services.
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prevailing party in the suit.

For all serv

ices and proceedings subsequent to the issuing of the
execution, or for the purpose of staying proceedings; or
removing causes to an appellate court, there shall be paid
to the said clerk the fees provided by law: Provided,
That in all causes where the cause of action is for per
sonal work and labor of the plaintiff or any member of
his or her family, upon ﬁling with the clerk of said jus
tice court an aﬁidavit showing that such claim or cause
of action is brought for such personal work and labor as
aforesaid, such action shall, within the discretion of the
court, be commenced and prosecuted to judgment with
out the payment of any entry fee or judgment fee, as
herein required in other causes, but that the costs [which]
shall accrue in such cause of action, including the entry
and judgment fee, as in other causes shall be taxed in

Process issued
from court to
be signed
whom.

by

It justice

is
re

absent

on

turn day, how
to proceed.

favor of the prevailing party.
Sec. 8. Process issued from said

justices’

courts
shall be signed by the justice before whom the cause in
which such process is issued, has been commenced, or is
pending; and said clerk shall assign causes to be begun
before said justices respectively in regular rotation as
If upon the return day or ad
nearly as practicable.
journed day of any cause, the justice by whom the pro
cess therein was issued, shall be absent at the time to
which the same is adjourned, or the process therein is
made returnable, the other justice in the regular order
of issuing writs, if present, shall proceed therein as
though it had been originally commenced before him.
On the return day of any process, before a justice of the
peace to whom the cause has been assigned by said

New assign
ment of jus
tice, when
and how.

clerk,

may have a new assignment of
the same by presenting to such justice an aiﬁdavit there
in, made by such party, his agent or attorney, stating
that the person making such aﬂidavit has good reason to
believe, and does believe, that the said justice to whom
said cause has been assigned is interested in the same or
is biased or prejudiced against the party in whose be
half said affidavit is made; and said justice shall there
upon transfer said cause to the other justice in the reg
any party to said

cause

SPECIAL
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ular order of issuing writs, if present, who shall proceed
therein as if the same had originally been commenced be
fore him.
In all cases Where causes are transferred
from one justice to the other, the docket entries therein
shall be made in the docket of the justice by whom the
original process shall have been issued. Docket entries
of the proceedings had by and before, each of said jus
tices shall be madc and signed by the justice by or be
fore whom such proceedings were had on the day such
\
proceedings were had.
If any party to a cause before either of said Trial
Sec. 9.
justices shall demand a trial by jury, he shall pay the

therefor in advance, and the sum shall be disposed
of by the clerk in the manner now provided by law;
and the moneys paid for jurors shall be taxed ascosts in
favor of the party paying the same, if he be the prevail
ing party in the suit, in addition to such other costs as
he may be entitled to recover.
And in addition to
all other costs there may be, in the discretion of the
justice trying the cause, with or without a jury, taxed
as an attorney fee in favor of the prevailing party, not
exceeding the sum of ﬁve dollars.
Sec. 10. 15 criminal cases the same justice’s fees

by jury.

fees

shall be collected and in the same manner
ceedings before justices of the peace in
cept that the same shall be received by
and paid to the treasurer of said city,

civil suits.

as in such pro

party

11.

so

as provided

It

violating.

12.

It

Costs in crim
inal cases.

Justices, clerk
or deputy
cannot act as
counsel.

_

said judge shall be unable to perform the duties
of his ofﬁce, but in so doing said justices of the peace
cause,

tee.

in

shall be a part of the judicial duties of
said justices of the peace to act in the place of the judge
of the police court of Grand Rapids, whenever from any
Sec.

Attorney

townships, ex
the said clerk

shall be unlawful for said justices of the
peace or said clerk or his deputy or deputies, to act as
counsel, agent or attorney for any party in any matter,
suit, or proceeding, within the jurisdiction of, said courts.
A violation of this provision shall be deemed misconduct
and shall be suﬁicient cause for removal from office of the
Sec.

Costs taxed.

To act as
police
when.

judge,
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shall receive no compensation in addition to their regu
lar salaries as such justices of the peace. At the ﬁrst
regular meeting of the Common Council in each munici
pal year, it shall designate which~one of the justices of
the peace shall act in the place of said police judge,

from any cause said judge shall be tmablc
perform the duties of his oﬂicc; in such ease said
justice of the peace shall exercise the power, author
ity and jurisdiction herein conferred upon said police
Such designation shall be made in writing in
judge.
open session of the Common C0l1l1Cll and shall be en
The present justices of the
tered upon its minutes.
invested, for the time being,
in
are
hereby
city
the
peace
with the power to act in the place of said judge as
aforesaid, until their successors are elected and quali
whenever

to

Designation,
made.

how

Present jus
to act

tices

until, when.

When

council

to designate.

Powers oi,
while s o

acting.

Jurisdiction
oi’.

Justices of

the

peace,

jurisdiction
of.

ﬁed; and immediately upon the passage and taking
eifeet of this act, it shall be the duty of the Common
Council to designate which of said justices of the peace
shall so act until the beginning of the municipal year of
1897, at which time a designation shall be made by the
Common Council for the ensuing municipal year, as
The justice thus designated shall exercise
aforesaid.
the power, authority and jurisdiction of said police judge.
,
as aforesaid, while acting in his place.
Sec. 13. The said justices of the peace of the City
of Grand Rapids shall, as against all other justices of the
peace of the County of Kent and State of Michigan, have
exclusive jurisdiction of all acts and proceedings within
their jurisdiction where both the parties thereto shall, at
the time of the commencement of such action or proceed
They shall also have a
ing, be residents of said city.
like exclusive jurisdiction, as against all other justices of
the peace of the said County of Kent, where the original
cause of action existed in favor of a resident of said city,
but has by him been assigned.
The justices of the peace of said city shall
Sec. 14.
ﬁle their oaths of oﬁice in the office of the clerk of the
County of Kent, and shall have in addition to the duties
conferred by this act on them, the same jurisdiction,
powers, and duties conferred on justices of the peace

§,
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in townships, and that in all civil causes the said jus
tices of the peace shall have concurrent jurisdiction to
the amount of ﬁve hundred dollars.
Sec. 15. It shall be the duty of the justices of the
peace of said city to keep their ofﬁces in said city, and to
attend all complaints of a criminal nature which may
properly come before them.
Sec. 16. Any justice of the peace of the city may
be suspended or removed from his said oﬂice by the cir
cuit court for the County of Kent; for the unfaithful or
insuﬁicient performance of his duties in relation to the
internal police of the State, or for any misconduct, or on
charges specially preferred by said Common Council of
said city, or of any member or officer thereof, or by three
electors of said city, founded on afﬁdavit ﬁled in said cir
cuit court, speciﬁcally stating the charges complained of,
a copy whereof shall be served upon him in such manner
as said circuit court shall direct, and opportunity shall be
given him to be heard in his defense.
Sec. 17. In addition to the security now required
by law to be given by justices of the peace, each of the
justices of the peace shall, before entering upon the
duties of his office, execute a bond to the City of Grand
Rapids, with one or more sufficient sureties, to be ap
proved by the mayor of said city, which approval shall
be endorsed on said bond, in the penalty of one thousand
dollars, conditioned for the faithful performance of his
duties as a police justice of said city, and to pay over the

907

Justices to

keep omcea

in city.

Justices may

be removed
from oﬂice,
how and tor
what cause.

Justices to
execute
to city.

bond

Penalty of.
Conditions oi’.

money so collected as such police justice to the treasurer
of said city within ‘ten days after receipt of the same;
and on the last Saturday in each month the said justices
of the peace shall ﬁle with the clerk of said city a report

of all the moneys

so

collected and paid over to the city

treasurer.

All

dockets and ofﬁce books kept by the
justices of the peace shall at all times be subject to in
spection and examination by the Common Council, or any
member or officer thereof, and it shall be the duty of said
justices of the peace to produce such dockets and books
Sec.

18.

at all times, whenever

and wherever

the said Common

Docket,

etc.,

is subject to
inspection.
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shall require or direct, and if they shall neglect
to produce such dobkets or ofﬁce books as di
rected and required, the circuit judge of the circut court
for the County of Kent "may, on a proper application to
him for the purpose, make an order requiring the same
Council

How produc
tion of books
compelled
when refused.

or refuse

to be produced, and enforce obedience thereto in the
same manner in which other orders made by him are en
forced.
Justices to rs
port
t o goo
retiistive
s
seized as
stolen prop
ertY_

19.
It shall be‘ the duty of each justice of the
at the ﬁrst regular meeting of the Common Coun
cil in each of the months of August, November, Febru
ary and May in every year, to account on oath, before
the Common Council, for all such moneys, goods, wares,

Sec.

peace,

and merchandise, seized as stolen property, as shall then
remain imclaimed in the ofﬁces-of either of said justices
of the peace, and immediately thereafter to give notice

Proviso.

May sell per
ishable prop
e rt y or prop erty expensive
to keep.

once in each week, for four weeks, in one of the oﬂicial
newspapers printed in said city of Grand Rapids, to all
persons interested or claiming such property: Provided,

always, That if any goods, wares, merchandise, or chat
tels of a perishable nature, or which shall be expensive
to keep, shall at any time remain unclaimed in the ofﬁces
of either of said justices, it shall be lawful for such jus
tice to sell the same at public auction at such time and

after such notice
Justice to de
liver stolen

Dro Dert Y ii0
when.

owner,

as to him

and the Common

Council

shall seem proper.
Sec. 20. It shall be the duty of each of the justices
of the peace aforesaid, who may recover or obtain pos
session of any stolen property, on his receiving satisfac
tory proof of property from the owner, to deliver such
property to the owner thereof, on his paying all necessary
and reasonable expenses which may have been incurred
in the recovering, preservation, or sustenance of such
property, and the expense of advertising the same.

Justices to
sell all un
claimed prop
erty

at auc

tion, when,

and pay pro
ceeds to city

treasurer.

Sec.

21.

It

shall be the duty of each of the justices
aforesaid to cause all property unclaimed

of the peace
after the expiration of the notice speciﬁed in section
nineteen of this act, money excepted, to be sold at public
auction to the highest bidder, unless the prosecuting at
torney of the County of Kent shall direct that it shall

—a

L

SPECIAL JUSTICE COURT ACTS——ISlIPEMlNG.
remain unsold for

a

‘in the administration

909

longer period, to be used as evidence
of justice, and the proceeds there

of forthwith to pay to the treasurer of the City of Grand
Rapids, together with all money, if any, which shall re
main in his hands after such notice as aforesaid, ﬁrst
deducting the charges of said notice of sale.
The justices of the peace in said city exer
cising civil jurisdiction, shall be deemed justices of the
peace of the County of Kent, and shall be subject to the
general laws of the State in relation to civil causes before
Sec,

22.

Justices of the
peace

deemed
oi’
the peace oi

justices

Kent County.

of the peace, and appeals from their judgment
may be made to the circuit court for the County of Kent,
in the same manner as appeals from justices’ judgment
in towns are made.
justices

Sec.

23.

The justices

of the

peace

of said city shall

have all the authority of justices of the peace in towns
in criminal matters as well as civil, and shall have all
the authority and perform all the duties hereinbefore

provided and required
Approved March

of them.

10, -1897.

Ordered to take immediate eﬁfect.

JUSTICE’S COURT FOR THE CITY OF ISHPEMING.
That portion of the charter of the City of Ishpeming
providing for a court of a justice of the peace, and being
a portion of Act No. 251 of the Local Acts of 1891, as
amended by Act No. 317 of the Local Acts of 1893; Act
No. 417 of the Local Acts of 1897; Act No. 356 of the
Local Acts of 1901, and by Act No. 346 of the Local Acts
of 1903.
Sections one, three, four and ﬁve of Chapter H. pro
vide for the election and qualiﬁcation of a justice of the
peace.

-

'

Chapter IV. prescribes the “Qualiﬁcations, compensa
tion, powers and duties of oﬁicers,” and Sections 8a
to 8h inclusive are as follows:

Jurisdiction
ot.
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Justlce

of the
peace, pow
ei's, duties,
9tC.

Section 8a. The justice of the peace of the city, ex
cept as herein provided, shall have and exercise herein
and within the County of Marquette the same jurisdic
tion and power in all civil and criminal matters, causes,
suits and proceedings and shall perform the same duties

in all respects as far as occasions may require as are or
may be conferred upon or required of justices of the
peace by the general laws of the State and the pro
ceedings in all suits and actions before said justice
except as otherwise provided in this act, be ac
cording to and governed by the general laws applicable
to justice courts and justices of the peace, and said jus
shall,

tice shall, except as otherwise provided in this act, in
the exercise of the powers and duties conferred upon
or required of him, be governed by the general laws
of the State relative to justice of the peace, and said

.\lay

adopt

rules.

Fees

to be

paid to.

Parties In
suits cntltlcd
to jury.

J urlsdlctlon
of justice.

justice shall have jurisdiction of civil cases where either
of the parties thereto reside in the County of Marquette.
Said justice may, from time to time, make and adopt
rules of practice for the conduct of the business of
said court, not inconsistent with the general laws of the
State or the charter and ordinances of said city, which
rules shall be entered upon the civil docket of said
justice and signed by him. Before any civil suit sh‘all
be commenced in said court, the party bringing the same
shall pay to said justice the sum of one dollar as an
entry fee, and before the trial of any cause, the further
sum of one dollar as a trial fee, which shall be inlieu
of all justice fees except appeal fees and which shall
be deposited to the credit of the city treasurer at the end
of each week.
_
Either party may demand a jury under like
Sec. Sb.
terms, conditions and fees as are now or may hereafter
be required under the general laws of the State relative
to jurors and justice courts.
The said justice in addition to his general
Sec. 8c.
as
powers
justice of the peace shall have exclusive juris
diction except as herein provided, to hear, try and
determine all actions and prosecutions for the recovery
or enforcing of ﬁnes, penalties and forfeitures for vio
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lations of this act, and for encroachments upon and in
juries to any of the streets, alleys and public grounds
within the city, excepting cases where jurisdiction is
given some other court, and to hear, try and determine

all suits and prosecutions for the recovery or enforcing
of ﬁnes, penalties and forfeitures imposed by the ordi
nances of the city and to punish offenders for violations
of such ordinances as in the ordinances prescribed and
directed, subject only to the limitations prescribed in

\
1

this act.
said justice shall

enter in the docket
kept by him the title of all suits and prosecutions com
menced or prosecuted before him for violations of the
Sec.

8d.

'l‘he

Justice to
keep docket.

city charter or ordinances

of the city, all the proceed
ings and the judgment rendered in every such cause, and
the items of all costs taxed or allowed therein, and also
the amounts and dates of payment of all ﬁnes, penal
ties and forfeitures, moneys and costs received by him
on account of any such suit or proceeding.
Such docket
shall be submitted by him at all times for the examina
tion of any person desiring to examine the same, and
shall be produced by him to the Common Council when
ever required.
He shall also keep a docket for civil cases
and criminal cases which shall be kept and submitted the
same

as the docket

for city

cases.

The council of the city shall provide for a
suitable court room and oﬂice for the accommodation
of said justice and all necessary furniture, fuel, light,
record books, blanks and stationery for the use of the
said justice in connection with his office.
Sec.

8e.

All

Council to
provide room,
etc., for
justice.

to said justice except
jury, officer and witness’ fees and except all ﬁnes recov
ered for the violation of penal laws of this State shall
be for the use of the city and shall be paid weekly to

To

the city treasurer: Provided, That all moneys collected
in any case for or on account of services rendered by
constables or other oﬂicers therein shall be for the use
of such oﬁicers, and shall be immediately paid over to
them, except fees in criminal cases on account of serv

Proviso.

Sec.

ices

8f.

moneys

To be open to
public.

paid

of the marshal, deputy marshal and night watch

pay mon
BYE tO tre BSU181‘.
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County to pay
certain ex
penses.
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man, which shall belong to the city and paid by said
The expenses
to the city treasurer each week.
of
of prosecutions for the violations
penal laws of the

justice

It
State shall be paid by the County of Marquette.
shall be the duty of said justice to present in proper
form to the board of supervisors of Marquette County
at each of its meetings, correct statements of costs for

May employ
a clerk.

To be succes
sor to present
Justices.

all violations of the penal laws of this State, which costs
shall include oﬁicers’ fees to which this city is entitled,
and upon receipt of the same he shall deposit said fees
He shall, subject to the conﬁrma
in the city treasury.
tion of the Common Council have authority to employ a.
clerk of said court which clerk shall be under his super
vision and subject to his orders and directions.
The said justice shall be considered the suc
Sec. 8g.
cessor in oﬂice of all the justices of the peace now in
said city, as their respective terms of oﬂice shall expire
by resignation or otherwise, and as such successor in of
ﬁce he shall take possession of their dockets and papers
and possess and exercise the same powers and authority
concerning the same as are now given by the general
laws of this State to successors in oﬁice to a justice
the peace.

Salary 0!
justice.

O!

cleft.

of

-

The justice shall receive an annual salary
of not to exceed twelve hundred dollars per year, the
same to be ﬁxed annually by the Common Council in
the same manner as other salaries are ﬁxed and the
same to be paid out of the treasury of said city in
Sec.

8h.

The said clerk shall receive an
installments.
of
not
to
exceed six hundred dollars per
salary
annual
year to be ﬁxed and paid in the same manner as the
These salaries shall be in full
justice of the peace.
compensation for all services performed by said oﬁicers
in the discharge of the duties of their respective oﬂices,
and they shall make no charge to any person for any
service required of them or either of them by this
monthly

act.
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JUSTICE’S COURT FOR THE CITY OF JACKSON.

\

That portion of the charter of the City of Jackson
providing for a court of a justice of the peace and being
a portion of Act No. 523 of the Local Acts of 1903.
Sections one, seven, twelve and thirteen of Title IV.
provide for the election and qualiﬁcation of a justice of
the peace.

Title V. prescribes the “Duties and compensation of
and Sections 23 to 29 inclusive are as follows:

ofﬁcers”

JUSTICES

OF

THE PEACE.

Section 23. The justices of
in said city, shall be elected in
of the peace are now elected
That no election for justices of

the peace

to be elected

the manner that justices
in said city: Provided,
the peace, except to ﬁll

How elected.

Proviso as to
abolishing
one

oﬂlce.

any vacancy that may occur, shall be held in said city
in the year nineteen hundred four, and the office of
the justice of the peace whose term expires on the

fourth of July, nineteen hundred four,
ished from and after the last named

is hereby

abol

date.
The ﬁles,
to the office of jus
and dockets appertaining
tice of the peace in said city abolished by this act, shall
be transferred
to and kept by the other justice whose
election is herein by this act provided for, and such

records

justice

is empowered

to issue

execution

according

to

law upon judgments appearing upon such dockets so
transferred to him with the same effect as if such judg
ment had been rendered by him. -The justice
peace elected in said city under the provisions

of the
of this

have and exercise therein and within the
the same jurisdiction and powers in all civil
cases, suits and proceedings as are or may be conferred
upon, or required of justices of the peace by the general
laws of the State: Provided, That all actions within
act

shall

Powers, ete.,
of remaining
justice.

county

the jurisdiction of the justices of the peace may be com
menccd and prosecuted in said justice’s court, whenever
the plaintiﬂis or defendants or one of the plaintiffs or de
58

Proviso.
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fendants reside in either the said city or the townships
of Summit, Blackman, Leoni, Spring Arbor or Sand
The proceedings in all suits, ac
stone in said county.
tions and prosecutions before the said justice and in
the exercise of the powers and duties conferred upon
and required of him shall, except as otherwise provided
in this act, be according to and be governed by the
general laws applicable to courts of justices of the peace

Salary.

and to the proceedings before such oﬁicers.
Sec. 24. ‘ Said justice of the peace shall receive from

of the city an annual salary to be ﬁxed
by the council of not less than six hundred dollars nor
more than one thousand dollars, which salary shall be in
lieu of all fees, costs and charges to which said justice
would be entitled, but for the provisions of this act; ex
the treasurer

cept fees for the performance of marriage ceremonies,
for taking acknowledgments and for administering oaths
in matters not connected with suits or proceedings in
courts in said city; such salary shall be paid to said
Oﬂice hours.

Duty as to
docket.

justice in monthly installments as other oﬁicers of said
city are paid; said justice shall be in attendance at his
office on all days except Sundays and legal holidays from
the hour of nine o’clock in the forenoon until noon and
from the hour of two o’clock until ﬁve o’clock in the

Every justice of the peace shall enter in
the docket kept by him the title of all suits and prose
cutions commenced before him and all the proceedings
and the judgment rendered in every cause and the items
of all costs taxed or allowed therein and alo the

afternoon.

amounts and date of payment of all ﬁnes, penalties and
forfeitures, moneys and costs received by him on ac
count of any suit or proceeding.
Such docket shall
be submitted

tion

Clvll actions
when com
menced, etc.

by the justice

of any person desiring

at all times to the examina
to examine the same and

shall be produced by the justice of the peace to the
council whenever required.
Before any civil action or proceeding, ex
Sec. 25.
cept proceedings in garnishment, shall be commenced in

said justice court, there shall be paid to said justice bv
the party commencing the same, an entry fee of one

SPECIAL JUSTICE COURT ACTS—JACKSON.

915

dollar, and before the trial of any such action or pro
ceeding shall be commenced, such party shall pay a
judgment fee of two dollars, except in default cases,
But in
when such judgment fee shall‘ be one dollar.
of trial, no
case of non-suit before the commencemen-t
judgment fee shall be required. Proceedings in garnish Garnlshment
procee dl _ngs,
h 0 w treated.
of
and
be
as
the
part
principal
ment shall
treated
cause,
no additional fee shall be required therein, except when
an issue of fact shall be joined in respect to the liability
of a garnishee or garnishees; in such cases a judgment
fee of two dollars shall be paid before such trial shall
commence. The fees provided for in this section shall
be in full for all services and proceedings by and before
said justice, and include the issuing of execution upon
judgment therein, and shall be taxed in favor of the
party paying the same if he be the prevailing party in
the suit. For all services and proceedings subsequent to
I
the issuing of the execution, or for the purpose of stay
ing proceedings, or removing causes to an appellate
court, there shall be paid to the said justice the fees pro
vided by law.
All costs, feesand moneys for services Costs, etc.,
to whom pald.
collected or received by said justice of the peace for
or on account of the business of his oﬂice except as
herein

otherwise

provided,

shall be paid

over by said

justice to the city treasurer on or before the ﬁrst Mon
day of the month next after the collection or receipt
thereof.
And the justice shall take the receipt of the
city treasurer therefor and ﬁle the same with the
recorder.
The fees of witnesses, jurors, sheriﬂs and
constables

shall be paid to the persons respectively
entitled thereto imder the general laws of the State.
If a party to a cause before any of said jus Trial
Sec. 26.

tices shall demand a triallby jury, he shall pay the fees
therefor in advance, and the sum shall be disposed of by
the justice in the manner now provided by law and the
moneys paid for jurors shall be taxed as costs in favor

of the party paying the same if he be the prevailing
party in the suit, in addition to such other costs as he
may be entitled to recover. In criminal cases the same
costs shall be collected and in the same manner as in

etc.

by jury,

SPECIAL
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Not to act
counsel.

Penalty.
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before justices of the peace in town
such proceedings
i
ships.
1w
It shall be unlawful for said justice of the
Sec. 27.
peace to act as (30l1IlSOl, agent or attorney for any party
in any matter, suit or proceedings, within the jurisdiction
of said courts. A violation of this provision shall be
deemed misconduct in oﬂice and shall be deemed suf
ﬁcient cause for removal from oﬁice of the parties so
violating.

Penalty (or
misconduct.

Report to
council.

justice of the peace who shall be
guilty of misconduct in oﬁicc, and who shall wilfully neg
lect or fefuse to perform or discharge any of the duties
of his ofﬁce required by this act or by any of the ordi
nances of the city, shall be deemed guilty of a. misde
meanor and punishable accordingly, and upon conviction
thereof, by a court of competent jurisdiction may be sus
pended from ofﬁce by the council during its pleasure.
Every justice of the peace shall account on
Sec. 29.
coimcil
at its ﬁrst meeting in each month,
oath to the
for all such moneys, goods, wares and property seized
as stolen property as shall then remain unclaimed at his
Sec.

28.

Any

ofﬁce, and shall make such disposition

prescribed

thereof as shall be

by the council.

JUSTICE’S COURT FOR THE CITY OF LANSING.
That portion of the charter of the City of Lansing
providing for a court of a justice of the peace, and being
a portion of Act No. 405 of the Local Acts of 1893, as
amended by Act N0. 416 of the Local Acts of 1897, and
by Act No. 378 of the Local Acts of 1903.
Section six of Title III. provides for the election
of a single justice of the peace for the whole city.
Sections twenty to thirty inclusive prescribe the pow
ers, duties and compensation» of such justice of the peace
and are as follows:
Justice en
titled to

dockets,
rec
Ords, etc.

The justice of the peace of said city pro
vided for in this act, shall be entitled to receive from
Sec. 20.

/
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the justices of the peace, whose terms shall expire on
the ﬁrst Monday of May, nineteen hundred three, all
ﬁles, records and dockets by them kept appertaining to
their said offices; and said justice shall be and is empow
ered to issue executions according to law upon any judg
ments appearing upon-said dockets with the same ef
fect as if said judgments had been rendered by him;
and any action or proceeding pending before any of said
justices at the time their said terms of office shall expire
sha/ll be transferred to the justice elected under this
act, and he shall have full jurisdiction to proceed with
the same in the same manner as said justices themselves
might have done. The said justice of the peace shall
have and exercise within the County of Ingham the same
jurisdiction in criminal cases, suits and proceedings as

Proceedings
transferred.

Powers, etc.,
Of.

I

are or may be conferred upon or required of justices
of the peace by the charter of the City of Lansing or
by the general laws of this State. He shall have original
jurisdiction of all civil actions not otherwise prohibited
by law, whereinthe debt or damages do not exceed one
hundred dollars and concurrent jurisdiction in all civil
actions upon contract, express or implied, wherein the
debt

or damages

do

not exceed ﬁve hundred

dollars.

He shall have such jurisdiction to hear, try and deter
mine all actions arising within said city for the recovery
of the possession of lands under the provisions of chap
ter two hundred eleven of the Compiled Laws of eighteen
hundred seventy-one and the acts amendatory thereto
as is conferred upon justices of the peace of townships
to hear, try and determine cases arising within town
ships under said chapter and the amendatory acts: Pro
vided, That in case of the absence, disability or dis

qualiﬁcation of the said justice and [a] justice of_ the peace
of the Township of Lansing in said county shall be quali
ﬁed to act in the place of and for said justice in the per
forman-ce of any of the duties devolved upon him under
this act, and shall, when called upon by said justice or
by the circuit judge so act; and while so acting shall be
entitled to receive pro rata for the time he shall so serve,

Proviso as
to absence.
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O

To ills oath,
give bonds,
etc.

Council to
provide

rooms, dock
ets, etc_

Fees,

to

whom paid.

the salary which would otherwise have been payableto
the justice elected under this act.
The justice of the peace of the city shall ﬁle
Sec. 21.
his oath of oﬁice in the office of the county clerk of the
county of Ingham, and in addition to the surety required
by general law to be given by justices of the peace, he

shall,,beforc entering upon the duties of his oﬁice exe
cute a bond to the city of Lansing with one or more
suﬁicient sureties to be approved by the mayor of said
city, which approval shall be endorsed on said bond in a
penalty of one thousand dollars conditioned for the faith
ful performance of the duties of his oﬁice as a police
justice of said city, and to pay over the moneys collected
and to make his reports and veriﬁed statements of his
accounts as in this act required.
The common council of the city of Lansing
Sec. 22.
shall provide and maintain, heat, light and properly fur
nish suitable rooms for the said justice of the peace, and
shall furnish all dockets and legal blanks necessary to
properly conduct his oiﬁce; and shall pay to the said
justice of the peace a salary of twelve hundred dollars
per annum, payable monthly; he shall receive no fees or
perquisites of any kind whatever for the performance of
any duties connected with his oﬁice, except marriage
fees; but all such fees as are hereinafter provided to be
by him taxed and collected in civil cases and all such
fees as are by the general laws of this State properly
taxable by a justice of the peace in criminal cases, shall
be taxed and collected in like case by the justice of the
peace of the city of Lansing, and paid into the city
treasury within ﬁve days after they shall have been so
collected.

Fines, etc., to
whom paid.

Justice to
report to
council.

Sec. 23.
All ﬁnes, penalties or forfeiturcs recovered
before said justice for violation of any city ordinance
shall, when collected, be paid into the city treasury, and
said justice shall report on oath to the common council,
at the ﬁrst regular meeting thereof in each month, during
the term for which he shall perform the duties of such

justice, the number and name of every person against
whom judgment shall have been rendered for such ﬁne,

\
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or forfeiture, and all moneys by him received
or
which may be in his hands, collected on such ﬁne, pen
alty or forfeiture, shall be paid into said city treasury
on the ﬁrst Monday of each and every month during the
time such justice shall exercise the duties of said oiﬁce,
and for any neglect in this particular he may be sus
penalty

for and

on account thereof, which moneys so received

pended or removed as hereinafter provided.
Sec. 24. It shall be the duty of said justice of the
at the ﬁrst regular meeting of the common coun
cil, in each of the months of August, November, Feb
ruary and May in each year, to account on oath, before
peace,

To account to
council for
unclaimed
property.

the common council for all such moneys, goods, wares
and merchandise, seized as stolen property, as shall then
remain unclaimed in the office of said justice of the
and immediately thereafter to give notice for four
weeks in one of the public newspapers printed in said
city, to all persons interested or claiming such property:

peace,

Provided always, That if any goods, wares, merchandise
or chattels of a perishable nature, or which shall be

Proviso.

expensive to keep shall at any time remain unclaimed in
the ofﬁce of said justice, it shall be lawful for such jus
tice to sell the same at public auction, at such time,
and after such notice as to him and the said common
council

proper.
Sec. 25.
It shall be the duty of the justice of the
peace aforesaid, who may recover or obtain possession
of any stolen property, on receiving satisfactory proof
seem

of property from the owner; to deliver such property

When may

restore

stolen

property.

to

the owner thereof, on his paying all necessary and rea
sonable expenses which may have been incurred in the
recovering, preservation, or sustenance of such property,
and the expenses of advertising the same, imless the
attorney of the city or the prosecuting attorney of the
county

of Ingham

shall

otherwise

direct.

Sec.
It shall be the duty of the justice of the
peace as aforesaid, to cause all property unclaimed after
the expiration of the notice speciﬁed in the last preceding
section but one of this act, money excepted, to be sold
at public auction to the highest bidder, unless the prose
26.

When may
sell unclaimed
prope rt y a t
auction.
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To try cases
of violation of

ordinances.

Proviso I8 U0

costs.

When to issue
warrants.
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cuting. attorney of the county of Ingham shall direct
that it shall remain unsold for a longer period, to be
used as evidence in the administration of justice and the
proceeds thereof forthwith to pay to the treasurer of
the said city; together with all the money, if any, which
shall remain in his hands, after such notice, as aforesaid,
ﬁrst deducting the charges of said notices of sale.
Sec. 27.
The justice of the peace of said city shall
have full power and authority, and it is hereby made
the duty of such justice, upon complaint to him in writ
ing, on oath, to inquire into, and try and determine all
offenses which shall be committed
within said city
against any of the by-laws or ordinances which shall
be made by the common council, in pursuance of the
powers granted by this act, and to punish the offenders,
as by said by-laws or ordinances shall be prescribed or
directed; to award all process, take recognizances for
the appearance of the person charged, and upon appeal,
and to commit to prison, as occasion may require: Pro
vided, That any person making said complaint (except
city officers) shall give security for costs in the same
manner as is required in criminal cases under the general
laws of this State, which security shall have the same
force and effect, and judgment shall be rendered against
said complainant
and surety, and execution issued
thereon, when the justice shall be satisﬁed there was not
reasonable cause for making said complaint.
Whenever any person shall be charged with
Sec._28.
having violated any ordinance of the common council,
by which the offender is liable in imprisonment, the jus
tice of the peace of said city, to whom complaint shall
be made in writing, and on oath, shall issue a warrant
directed to the marshal of the city of Lansing or to the
sheriff or any constable of the county of Ingham, com
manding him forthwith to bring the body of such before
him, to be dealt with according to law; and the marshal
or other oﬂicer to whom said warrant shall be delivered
for service, is hereby required to execute the same in
any part of this State, where such offender may be
found, under the penalties which are by law incurred

I

sracru. JUSTICE counr

ACTS—LANSING.

by sheriffs and other officers for neglecting or refusing
to execute other criminal process.
Sec. 29. In every civil action or proceeding, except
commenced in said justice
garnishment
proceedings
court, there shall be paid to said justice by the plaintiff,

dollar and before the trial of any
action or proceeding shall be commenced, such party
shall pay a judgment fee of ‘one dollar in cases where
the defendant shall not appear and join issue, and two
dollars in cases where issue is joined between the parties;
but in case of non-suit before commencement of trial no
judgment fee shall be required; proceedings in garnish
ment shall be treated as part of the principal cause and
no additional fee shall be required therefor, except when
an issue of fact shall be joined in respect to the liability
of any garnishee; in such case, a judgment fee of two
dollars shall be paid before such trial shall commence.
The fees provided in this section shall be in full for all
services and proceedings in said cause to and including
the issue of an execution upon the judgment therein, and
shall be taxed in favor of the party paying the same
if he be the prevailing party in'the suit. The jury and
an entry

fee

of

*;§f§‘§,_"°,m
f1fe‘§§“§ff,f,'m_

one

provided by general law shall be paid in
addition to the foregoing fees. For all services and pro
ceedings subsequent to the issuing of an execution or
for the purpose of staying proceedings or removing
causes to an appellate court, there shall be paid to the
oﬂicers’
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fees

ggersv-hgis-.
paid.

said justice the fees provided by law. In all criminal
cases where a ﬁne may be imposed it shall and may be
lawful to include in the sentence such an amount for
costs as would be taxable under the general laws of the
State, in justices’ courts and all such costs and fees and
moneys collected by such justice for or on account of
the business of his oﬂice, except as herein otherwise
shall be paid over by said justice to the city
as hereinbefore
The fees of witprovided.
nesses and jurors in criminal cases shall be paid in the
same manner as is now provided by law for the payment of
such fees by justices in townships, and all ﬁnes imposed
provided,
treasurer

by the said justice for the violation of any of the crimi

witness

feeg_
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nal laws of this State, except such

Application
of general
law.

)

Justice may
appoint clerk.

as are imposed as
justice of the
shall
the
said
be, by
costs as aforesaid,
peace, paid to the treasurer of the county of Ingham as
required by law. Except as herein otherwise provided,
the general laws of the State with reference to justice
courts and justices of the peace shall be applicable to
the said justice of the peace and the court held by him.
The said justice of the peace shall have power to and
shall appoint some suitable person to act as clerk of

who shall receive such salary
to be paid
monthly, as the common council shall from time to time
determine; said clerk shall hold his oﬁice during the
pleasure of said justice and shall perform such duties
in connection with said justice court as the said justice
of the peace shall require, and shall be in daily attend
ance upon said court and shall in criminal cases make
such report of the proceedings thereof to the prosecut
i.ng attorney of the county of Ingham as is or may be
required by law of justices of the peace in cases brought
said

To present
accounts to
council.

Council to

examine
present

and
to

supervisors.

court

before them.
Sec. 30.
The justice of the peace shall keep a. just
and true account of all fees which by law, he would be
entitled to receive for performing services in criminal
cases if such services were not compensated by salary as
herein provided, and at least ﬁfteen days before the
regular meeting of the board of supervisors in January
and October in each year, he shall present to the com
mon council a veriﬁed statement of such account to
gether with the statement of the consta.ble’s account,
certiﬁed by him as provided in section nineteen, for
examination
and approval; and the common council
shall examine said accounts and may suggest correc
tions or amendments thereto, and said accounts, when
approved by the common council, shall be presented to
the board of supervisors at its then next meeting and
the same shall be audited and the amount justly due
thereon, allowed as other bills of justices of the peace
and constables are allowed for similar services. For the
amount so allowed, a warrant shall be drawn by the
county clerk upon the county treasurer in favor of the

\
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city of Lansing, and delivered to the treasurer thereof.
In case of examination of offenders by said justice for
offenses committed against the criminal laws of this
State where such justice has jurisdiction to examine and
to hold to bail only, it shall be lawful for said justice,
on. motion of the prosecuting
attorney, to cause an
order to be entered in the records of such court before
or during the pendency of said examination, appointing
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When justice
may appoint
stenographer.

stenographer to take down in shorthand
the testimony of such examination;
and such stenog
rapher so appointed shall receive such per diem com
pensation for the time so expended in taking such testi
some

suitable

mony and such price per folio for writing out the same
in longhand, as shall be ﬁxed by the board of super
visors, the same to be allowed and paid out of the
treasury

of said county.

JUSTICES’

COURTS

FOR THE
HURON.

CITY

OF

PORT

That portion of the charter of the city of Port Huron
providing for justices’ courts in that city, and being
chapter XIV of act No. 390 of the Local Acts of 1885
as amended by Act No. 392 of the Local Acts of 1893;
Act No. 4-'15 of the Local Acts of 1897; Act No. 372 of
the Local Acts of 1899; and Act No. 317 of the Local
'
Acts of 1901.
Sec. 1.
At the general charter election held in the
year one thousand eight hundred and ninety-eight and
every fourth year thereafter, there shall be elected in
said city one justice of the peace, who shall be known as
police justice, whose term of oﬁice shall commence on
the ﬁrst day of January next following his election and
continue for four years, and until his successor shall be
elected and qualiﬁed.
He shall be elected on the gen
eral ticket in the manner herein provided for the election

of other city oﬁicers and none but attorneys at law
duly admitted to practice in the Supreme Court of this

When elected.

Must be an
attorney.

924

Assistant
police justice.

Exclusive
jurisdiction.

Concurrent
jurisdiction.

General laws
applicable.

To try viola.
tlons of Ordi
nances.

SPECIAL JUSTICE COURT .\CTS—-PORT HURON.

of at least two years’ good standing shall
to the said oﬂice of justice of the peace in
And there shall be elected at the annual
the year nineteen hundred, and every fourth
year thereafter, one justice of the peace for the term of
four years, to be known as assistant police justice, who
shall be an attorney and counsellor at law, and who
shall exercise, in case of the absence from his ofﬁce or in
case of the death or disability of the police justice, all
duties of police justice.
Sec. 2.
Said police justice and said assistant police
justice shall have the exclusive jurisdiction to hear, try
and determine all charges for offenses and misdemeanors
alleged to have been committed within the city, and
which by the general laws of the State are within the
jurisdiction of justices of the peace. They shall also
have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and examine all
charges for crimes alleged to have been committed
within the city of Port Huron, and which by the gen
eral laws of the State are examinable by and before a
justice of the peace, and to hold to bail, or commit for
trial in the circuit court for the county of St. Clair.
They shall also have concurrent jurisdiction with other
justices of the peace of the county of St. Clair, as to
all crimes, offenses and misdemeanors, when alleged to
have been committed without the city, but within the
county of St. Clair.
The general laws of the state relating to jus
Sec. 3.
tices of the peace shall, in all things, apply to and govern
said justices of the peace except as otherwise provided
in this act.
Said justices of the peace shall have sole and
Sec. 4.
exclusive jurisdiction to hear, try and determine in a
summary manner, and without the aid of a jury, all
charges for violation of city ordinances; and all persons
convicted by or before either of them of a violation of a
city ordinance may be ﬁned or imprisoned, or both,
according to the terms of the ordinance, and if a ﬁne
shall be imposed, it shall be with the costs of prosecution
if the ordinance so provide; and an appeal may be taken
state, and
be eligible
said city.
election in

w
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as in civil cases and such imprison
in
ment may be
St. Clair county jail, or in the city jail.
Sec. 5.
Said justices of the peace shall receive no
fees to their own use, but in lieu thereof shall be paid
by the city an annual salary to be paid monthly.

925

in the circuit court,

There may be a “clerk of the justice court,”
to be appointed by the common council, upon the nomi
nation and recommendation of said police justice, and
who may be suspended or removed by said justice at
any time, and who shall receive an annual salary, ﬁxed
Sec.

6.

by the common council, which may be increased from
time to time as the common council by a two-thirds vote
of the aldermen elect therefor may determine.
Sec. 7.
The common council shall provide and fur
nish for said justices of the peace, suitable and con
venient court rooms with a jury room adjacent, and pro
vide and furnish the same with desks, tables, furniture,
fuel, blanks, and stationery and such other things as may
be required to properly carry on and hold such justice

Compensation.

Council to
appoint clerk.

Salary of
clerk.

Council to
provide oﬂiee.

court.
The chief of police shall detail one or more
policemen, as the said justice of the peace may direct to
attend upon and keep order in said justice court under
the direction of said justice.
Prosecutions under the ordinances of the city
Sec. 9.
Sec.

8.

shall be commenced and carried on in the name of “The
People of the State of Michigan,” and the practice in
such cases shall (except as herein otherwise provided)
be the same as near as may be as in criminal cases cog
by justices of the peace in townships.
Said justices shall qualify in the same man
See. 10.
ner provided by the general laws of the state, but their
bonds or instruments in writing shall be approved by

Court oﬂicer.

Style of
prosecutions.

nizable

the common council.

~

Said clerk shall qualify by taking the con
stitutional oath and giving a bond in such amount and
with such sureties as may be required by the common
Sec.

11.

and conditioned, as provided in section ﬁve of
chapter four of this act, and otherwise conditional as
the council may direct.
council

Justice U0
qualify.

Clerk to
quality.

926
Duties of
clerk.

Warrants,
how directed.

Exclusive
jurisdiction.

J urlsdictlon
oi’ police

justice.
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Said clerk shall, under the direction of the jus
tice, keep three dockets, which dockets shall contain all
that is required to be kept under the general laws of the
state relating to justices. He shall also ﬁle and safely keep
and care for all books, papers, and other things coming
to_ his hands as such clerk, being subject at all times to
the control and direction of said justice, and said dockets
shall be signed by said justice.
In one of said dockets
shall be kept the record of all civil business, in another
all criminal business, and in third all cases under city
ordinances, rules and by-laws.
Sec. 13.
Warrants issued by said justice upon com
made
for violation of any city ordinance shall be
plaints
directed to the chief of police and may be served by any
(said) chief or any policeman, or the sheriff or any
deputy, or any constable, and if served by the chief or
Sec. 12.

any policeman, the fees for such service shall, when col
lected, be paid to the city treasurer.
Said justices of the peace shall have exclu
Sec. 14.
sive jurisdiction of all such civil actions and proceed
ings, as by the general laws of the state are within the
jurisdiction of justices of the peace. The police justice
and assistant police justice elected in the city of Port
Huron and duly qualiﬁed according to law shall have
original jurisdiction of all civil actions wherein the debt
or damages do not exceed the sum of one hundred dol
lars, and concurrent jurisdiction in all civil actions
wherein the debt or damages do not exceed the sum of
ﬁve hundred dollars, except as provided in section seven
hundred and four of the compiled laws of the state of
Michigan of eighteen hundred and ninety-seven.
The

Justice's

oﬂiee not
ailected.

justices of the peace known as police justice and assist
ant police justice now in oﬂice shall continue to hold

their oﬂices until'the expiration of their respective terms,
and until their successors are elected and qualiﬁed as
herein provided.
Issue of civil
process.

Sec.

15.

All original civil process shall

be tested

by
and

the justice of the peace known as police justice,
shall be returned in the same manner as process issued
by justices of the peace under the general laws of the

R
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After the return of such process, the said jus- Qfslgggefgr
State.
tice of the peace known as police justice, may, when- ""1
ever he deems it necessary in order to facilitate the
business of the court, assign civil cases brought in said
court and upon which process has been returned to the
justice of the peace known as assistant police justice
for trial. Such assignment may be made by an order
entered in said cause upon the book in which the minutes
of said cause are kept. When said cause has been so
assigned to said assistant police justice, all further pro
ceedings in said cause shall be carried on by and be
fore the said assistant police justice; and for such pur
pose he shall have all the powers possessed by a justice
of the peace under the general laws of this State to
proceed and determine said cause, to issue process there
in and enforce the collection of such judgment as may
be therein rendered.
Sec. 16.
Before any civil action or proceeding, except proceedings in garnishment, shall be commenced in
said justice’s court there shall be ﬁled with such jus
tice by the party commencing such action, a precipe
for the writ desired to be issued and the party commenc

ing such proceeding shall at the

same time pay or cause
to be paid to the clerk, the sum of ﬁfty cents, and
before the trial of any such action or proceeding shall
be commenced the further sum of ﬁfty cents shall be
paid to said clerk by the party bringing such action,
but in cases of non-suit no judgment fee shall be re
quired. In all cases actually contested by the defendant
there shall be paid to said clerk by the party bringing

such action the sum of one dollar additional.
If more
than one day is occupied in the trial of any case,
there shall be paid to the clerk the sum of one dollar

additional, by the party bringing such action, for each
and every day or part of a day so occupied.
When
in
ever after disclosure ﬁled
garnishment a summons to
show cause shall be desired, the party desiring such sum
mons shall pay or cause to be paid to the clerk of said
court the,sum of twenty-ﬁve cents and before the trial
of the issue under such summons to show cause shall be

Justice's

fees
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commenced, the further sum of twenty-ﬁve cents shall
paid by the party prosecuting such action.
The
amounts herein provided to be paid shall be in lieu of all
other justice’s fees, and there shall be no charge for
be

Security tor
costs.

Appeal.

No ‘process shall be issued out of
issuing executions.
said court until the provisions of this section shall have
been complied with. Security for costs may be required
as under the general laws of the State.
Sec. 17. Any cause tried or determined in said court,
by either of said justices, may be appealed or removed
by eertiorari to the circuit court for the County of St.
Clair, and the general laws of the State relating to ap
peals and certiorari from justices’ court shall apply to
govern such appeals and certiorari, except that
the fees for making a return thereto shall be paid by
the clerk to the city treasurer: Provided, That the re
turn to all such appeals shall be made by the justice
before whom said cause was tried and determined.
It is
and

Proviso.

Purther
proviso.

Dlsallowancc
of claim.

J udgment‘

amount oi’.

when appeal
authorlzedt

further provided that no appeal shall be taken from
any judgment of said justices in the City of Port Huron
except in the following cases:
First, When said justices shall disallow any claim
in favor of any plaintiﬁ’ or defendant in any cause in
the said justice court, in whole or in part, to the amount
of ﬁfty dollars.
Second, When said justice shall render a judgment
to the amount of ﬁfty dollars, exclusive of costs, in either
of which cases the party aggrieved may appeal.
Third, Appeals may be authorized by the circuit court
for the County of St. Clair when the party making the
appeal has been prevented from making a defense upon
the merits of the case in which said appeal was taken,
by circumstances not under his control; and such appeal
may also be authorized when justice requires that such
appeal shall be authorized; and in all cases where the
parties against whom such appeal is sought had ap
peared in said justice court by an attorney or agent, it
will be sufﬁcient to serve such attorney or agent with
notice of all subsequent proceedings in said cause, and
all orders made therein by said circuit court may be
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served upon said attorney or agent, and such service
shall have the same effect as though made on the party
against whom said appeal is taken.
Sec. 18. All fees and costs, except justice’s fees and
costs, shall be disposed of and paid out as is now or
may be provided by the general laws of the State relat
ing to justices, but this act shall in no way aﬁect
the fees to which said justice may be entitled on the
performance of marriage ceremonies, taking acknowl
edgments, and administering oaths in matters not con
nected with any litigation in said justice’s court.
Said police justice shall receive an annual
Sec. 19.
salary of not less than one thousand dollars and not
more than ﬁfteen hundred dollars, and the said assistant
police justice shall receive an annual salary of not less
than four hundred dollars.
Said salary shall be paid
monthly by warrants drawn by the controller on the
city treasurer: Provided, That the total amount paid
for salaries to both said justices shall not exceed the
sum of two thousand dollars per annum.
Sec. 20. A session of said court shall be held every
day, Sundays and legal holidays excepted.
All fees and costs shall be collected by said
Sec. 21.
clerk, and weekly, or oftener if required by the Com
mon Council of said city, he shall pay over to the city
treasurer all moneys received by him belonging to the
city, taking duplicate receipts therefor, and ﬁling one
of such receipts with his sworn statement of the amounts
received with the controller, and he shall not be entitled
to receive his monthly wages or salary until his accounts
for the preceding month are fully settled and all moneys
received by him paid over as aforesaid.
Sec. 22.
Process may be signed in blank in civil
cases and left with said clerk and may be issued by
him on proper application or showing, and said clerk is
authorized to administer oaths in all cases whenever an
oath is required.
Said clerk shall also _have authority,
in the absence of said justice of the peace, to approve
such bonds as require approval in said court.
Process
signed in blank, as aforesaid, shall have the same force
59
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and effect as if ﬁlled by said justice: Provided, That no
process shall be issued by said clerk until the fees there
for shall have been ﬁrst paid and the precipe ﬁled as re
quired in section sixteen.
In case of appeal or certiorari the said clerk
Sec. 23.
may make and certify a return thereto which shall
have the same force and effect as if made and certiﬁed to
by said justice.
In all prosecutions before said justice for :1
Sec. 24.
violation of any of the general laws of the State, the
County of St. Clair shall be liable for justice fees, and
other fees and costs, to the same extent that it is
liable under the general laws of the State for justice
fecs,'and the clerk shall make out and certify such bill
in the name of the justice and present the same to said
board, and said board shall allow the same as in other
cases of bills from justices, and the amount or the order
therefor when received shall be paid over and delivered
to the city treasurer.
Sec. 25.
Said police justice shall have his court
room open and he shall be in attendance at such court
room for the performance of such duties as may be re
quired of him at least from eight-thirty o’elock in the
morning until eleven-thirty o'clock and from one-thirty
to four-thirty in the afternoon of each day except Sun
days and legal holidays; and the said clerk’s oﬁice
shall be open continuously from eight-thirty o’elock a.
m. until four-thirty o’elock p. m. of each and every day
except Sundays and legal holidays and except during the
hours between eleven-thirty a. m. and one p. m.

-
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JUSTICE’S COURT FOR THE CITY OF SAGINAW.
That portion of the charter of the City of Saginaw
providing for a justice ’s court in that city and being a
portion of Act No. 465 of the Local Acts of 1897, and
Title XV. thereof, as amended by Act No. 419I of the
Local Acts of 1901.
The several sections of this title are as follows:
but one justice of the
The said jus
peace in and for the City of Saginaw.
jurisdiction
and
tice shall have and exercise the same
powers in civil and criminal cases and proceedings, and
shall perform the same duties as may be conferred upon
or required of justices of the peace by the laws of this
Section

1.

There

shall

be

oi the
peace, term
oiﬂce,
of
Justice

jurisdiction.

He
except as otherwise provided in this act.
jurisdiction
further
or
as
are
con
have
such
powers
shall
ferred by this aet, and in the absence or inability of
the recorder acting as police judge, said justice of the
peace shall hear and determine all cases pending before
State,

said police

judge,

and

shall

have the same

power

to

issue process and hear and determine cases as said police

If, for any

shall occur in the
office of said justice, the Common CO1l11Cil of said city
may order a special election to be held for the election
of a justice of said court for the remainder of the term
of said justice, which said election, if ordered, shall be

judge.

cause,

a vacancy

Council to

Order

a

spe

cial election
t o ﬂll
vacancy.

conducted in the same manner as the biennial city elec
tions, and the same notice thereof shall be given as for
the biennial city elections.
Said justice of the peace and recorder as
police judge shall each have jurisdiction in all civil cases
cognizable by a justice of the peace where the plaintiﬂs,
or any of them, or the defendants, or any of them, re
side in the County of Saginaw, and in such cases shall
Sec.

2.

have exclusive jurisdiction over any cause or proceed
ings where both parties to the same, reside in the City
of Saginaw at the time of the commencement of the
No justice of the peace of any
proceedings or cause.
township

in the County of Saginaw shall have jurisdic

Jurisdiction.
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tion over any civil cause or proceedings where both
parties to the proceedings reside in the City of Saginaw
at the time of the commencement of said proceedings or
cause.
Plaintiff tq
begin suit,
where.

Records to be
kept by clerk
of police
court.

A plaintiff or plaintiffs, non-residents of the
County of Saginaw, shall bring action before the jus
Sec.

3.

tice of the peace or police judge of the City of Saginaw,
when the defendant or defendants, or either of them,
reside in the City of Saginaw.
The ﬁles, records and
dockets of the justice shall be ﬁled with and kept by
the clerk of the police court, and all dockets now in
possession of the clerk of the justice court, and all execu
issued, shall be issued by the justice
or police judge whose term of oﬁ'ice ﬁrst expires and
who shall be and remain in office, and such justice or
police judge shall have power and authority-to issue
tions

Examination
beiore justice
or the peace.

to

be

executions upon judgments rendered by the police judge
of said city.
Sec. 4. In cases of examination of offenders by the
justice for oifenses committed against the criminal laws
of this State, which are not triable before said jus
tice, but before the circuit court, it shall be lawful for
such justice to cause an order to be entered in the rec
ord of such examination appointing, at the request of
the prosecuting attorney or his assistant, if in the judg
ment of said justice it is in the interest of the public so
to do, some competent stenographer to take in short
hand the testimony given upon such examination, which
shall be written out in long hand upon the written re
quest of the prosecuting attorney, ﬁled in the cause,
and the stenographer so employed shall receive such per
diem compensation for the time expended by him in tak

Justice
have

to
otﬂce in

city hail.

ing such testimony, and such price per folio for writing
it out in long hand, when requested by the prosecut
ing attorney as aforesaid, as shall be ﬁxed by the board
of supervisors of Saginaw County,-the same to be allowed
and paid out of the treasury of said county.
Said justice of the peace shall have his of
Sec. 5.
ﬁce in the city hall, and the Common Council of the
City of Saginaw shall provide the necessary dockets,

Sl‘l'ICI.\L
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books, blanks, stationery, furniture, fuel and lighting
for the use of said justice. And the Michigan Reports
now in the police judge ’s office shall be used in common
by the police judge and the justice of the peace.
Sec. 6.
Said justice of. the peace shall be entitled
to receive from the treasurer of the City of Saginaw an

Salary.

annual salary of twelve hundred dollars, payable month
ly, on the certiﬁcate of the controller, but no such certiﬁ
cate shall be granted by said controller until the jus
tice asking for the same has made and ﬁled with him
his affidavit, setting forth the number of days he has

in actual attendance at his court room ready for
business, during the period for which the certiﬁcate is
intended to cover, and for such time thus spent in at
tendance to business only, shall he be allowed in said
The recorder acting as police judge and the
certiﬁcate.
justice shall each have his court room open and he shall
be in attendance to the duties of his oﬁice therein
been

I

When court
to be open.

from nine o’clock in the morning until twelve o’clock
noon, and from half past one o’clock until ﬁve o’clock in
except on Sundays and legal holidays.
It shall be the duty of the clerk of police
Sec. 7.
court to keep a true record of said justice court and
police court, with the assistance of the justice of the
peace and police judge, and enter all judgments on the
dockets under the direction of the justice and police
judge rendering the same, in the time and manner pro
vided by law, but after such entry, each judgment shall
the afternoon,

justice or police judge by whom it was
rendered.
The said clerk shall also ﬁle and safely keep
all books and papers belonging or appertaining to said
court, and enter in a book provided for that purpose a
list of names of all jurors that sit on the trial of cases
before the said justice or police judge, with names ar
ranged in alphabetical order, together with the date or
dates that each juror so sat, with a reference to the page
of the docket where the proceedings of the trial are en
tered. He shall have power generally to administer oaths
and take aﬂidavits; he shall also ﬁll up processes and
blank forms on request, and make all writs returnable to
be signed by the

Duty or clerk
in regard to
records,
and
powers oi.
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the said justice or police judge in regular rotation; and
upon the adjourned or return day of any cause the

if

justice or police judge issuing the process therein should
the same was adjourned
or made returnable, the justice, and police judge, shall
have the same jurisdiction to proceed therein as though
it had been originally commenced before him, but the
record thereof shall be entered in the docket of the
justice or police judge issuing the original process. The
said clerk shall also receive all costs, ﬁnes and dues of
every description which are provided by law, in all pro
ceedings in said justice court and police court, and shall
pay the said county treasurer of Saginaw County weekly,
all such ﬁnes collected in the State criminal cases,
and shall pay to the treasurer of the City of Saginaw
weekly, all such ﬁnes, costs and dues by him so received,
except ﬁnes in State criminal cases, and shall take the
He shall. ﬁle said
receipts of the said treasurer therefor.
receipts with the city controller of said city, and shall
render to said controller weekly, a report of all busi
ness transacted by the justice of the peace, including a
statement of the receipts and disbursements of his of
be absent at the time to which

ﬁce.
Fees to be
paid to clerk

on commence
ment oi suit.

Before any action or proceeding, except pro
ccedings in garnishment,
replevin, attachment or by
civil warrant, shall be commenced in any of said courts,
Sec.

8.

there shall be paid to said clerk by the said party bring
ing the same, the sum of ﬁfty cents as entry fee, and
in actions of replevin, attachment, or those begun by
civil warrant, there shall be paid, as aforesaid, the
sum of one dollar as entry fee, and at or .before the
trial of any such action or proceeding shall be com
menced, the further sum of one and, one-half dollars,

Proviso.

but in case of non-suit or discontinuance before the com
mencement of the trial, only the entry fee shall be pay
able: Provided, That if there be more than two adjourn
mcnts after the return day of the principal suits or after
joining issue in a galrnishee case, there shall be an ad
journment fee paid by the party procuring said adjourn
ment, of twenty-ﬁve

cents for each adjournment,

\

before
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Proceedings

in garnishment shall be treated as a part of the principal
cause, and no additional fee shall be required therein,
except when an issue of fact shall be joined in respect to
the liability of a garnishee or garnishees; in such ease a
judgment fee of one dollar and one-half shall be paid
If any party demand
before such trial shall commence.
a jury in any civil action in said court, he shall advance
the same fees therefor that are or may be provided by
the general statutes of the State governing justice courts.
The money so paid to said clerk, as herein provided, shall
be for the use of said city, and shall be held to be in
full of all fees in civil actions, including the issuing of
The sum or
executions and satisfaction of judgment.
sums so paid, including the jury fees, shall be taxed as
costs of suit in favor of the party paying the same, if
hc be the prevailing party in the suit. For all services
and proceedings subsequent to the issuing of the execu
tion, or for the purpose of staying proceedings, or
removing causes to the appellate court, there shall be
paid to the said clerk the fees now or hereafter pro
vided by the general statutes of the State governing
the justice courts and returns in appeal cases, and to
writs of certiorari shall be made in the manner therein
In criminal cases the same costs shall be paid,
provided.
and in the same manner as in proceedings before jus
tices of the peace in townships, except that the same
shall be paid to the said clerk.
The fees of said justice of the peace for
Sec. 9.
services hereafter performed in State criminal cases shall
belong to the said City of Saginaw, and after being aud
ited by the board of supervisors of Saginaw County,
shall be paid to the controller and by him to the treas
urer of said City of Saginaw.
Sec. 10.
Said clerk shall on the ﬁrst Monday of
each and every month report in writing to the Common
Council of said city the amount of all costs collected in
civil cases and State criminal cases during the preceding
month in said courts, and shall at the ame time report
in writing to the board of supervisors of Saginaw County

In case party
demands

jury.

a

Fees of

justice to

belong

to city.

Clerk to make
monthly re
port to the
council.
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What tees
not to be
atiected.

the amount of ﬁnes collected by him in State criminal
cases during the preceding month in said courts.
Sec. 11.
This act shall in no way aﬁect the fees to
which justice of the peace or police judge may be
the performance
of marriage ceremonies,
taking acknowledgments
and administering oaths in
matters not connected with litigation in said courts, nor
entitled,

Service of
writs.
Proviso.

on

shall it aﬁfect the fees to which sheriﬁs or constables are
entitled, or the present method of paying them.
Sec. 12. The services of all writs under this act shall

in the manner prescribed by the general laws
of this State: Provided, That for the service of original
writs within said city, no constable or deputy sheriff
be made

be allowed to charge or demand more than ﬁfty
cents as fees for such service.
The circuit court for the County of Sag
Sec. 13.
inaw may prescribe the (rules) rule to govern the prac
tice in the said justices’ courts, not inconsistent with

shall
Circuit court
prescribe
rules to gov
ern Justice's
court.

may

How

may ﬁiustice
e
removed.

Charges to be
ﬂied

in the

circuit court.

the laws of this State. Any justice of the peace of said
city may be removed from his said oﬁice by the circuit
court for the County of Saginaw, for the refusal or neg
lect to pay over, as required by law, any moneys by him
collected for or on account of any ﬁne, penalty, forfeiture
or costs, for the unfaithful or incfﬁcient performance of
his duties, or for any oﬁicial misconduct, upon charges
speciﬁcally preferred against him by the mayor or Coni
mon Council, or by any three electors of said city. Said
charges, upon being duly veriﬁed by oath, shall be ﬁled
in said circuit court, and a copy thereof served personally
upon said justice of the peace against whom the same
are preferred, at least ten days before he is required
to be tried thereon and opportunity shall be given him
to be heard in his defense; and said court shall have
power to make all necessary orders to insure a fair but
summary trial thereof, and upon conviction, to enter the
proper judgment for suspension or removal from his said

Defendant

may have
cnuse trans
ferred.

oﬁicc of the said justice so convicted.
Sec. 14. The defendant in any cause begun before
either said justice or police judge may have the trial
of the case, whether the same be civil or criminal, trans

I

k
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ferred from the justice or police judge who issued the
process by which said suit was begim to the other jus
tice or police judge by ﬁling with the clerk of said court
an aﬂidavit that the defendant has good cause to be
licve and does believe that the said justice or police
judge who issued such process entertains such a preju
dice against said defendant that defendant verily be
lieves that he cannot obtain a fair and impartial trial
before the justice or police judge that issued such
process, at any time before the trial of the case has
actually begun; and upon the ﬁling of such affidavit, the
justice or police judge who issued such process shall
have no further jurisdiction in said cause, but all
further proceedings in said cause shall be conducted by
such other justice or police judge, in the same form and
manner as if such other justice or police judge had is
sued the original process in said cause.
Sec. 15.
The clerks of the justice and police courts
now holding oﬂice under the charter of the City of Sagi
naw of eighteen hundred and eighty-nine, shall be and
remain in and hold their respective oﬁices, and perform
the same duties as required under the charter of the
City of Saginaw of eighteen himdred and ninety-ﬁve,
until the third regular meeting of the Common Council
after the annual city election in the year eighteen hun
dred and ninety-eight,
at which time there shall be
elected by the Common Council of the City of Saginaw,
upon the nomination of the police judge and justice of
the peace, a clerk to act for both justice and police
courts; said clerk to be known as police clerk.

Clerks to per
iorm same
duties as re
quired by
charter of
1895.

~
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ABATEMENT—
Plea of, when defendant misnamed, 32, 183.
When defendant privileged from arrest, 66.
Requisites of plea, and when to be pleaded, 168, 170.
To the disability of the plaintiff, 171; Of the defendant, 172; In
abatement of process, 173; To the action of the process; 174;
Defective service, 173, n. 28.
Accuracy required, 175, 184; Plea. must be veriﬁed, 176.
Non-joinder of plaintiffs, 179; Of de
Plea of coverture, 178;
182;
fendants, 180; Misjoinder,
Pendency of another action,
184.

174,

Evidence in case of, 181; Judgment, 177.
Amendment of pleas is not permitted, 576, 577.

ABBREVIATIONS
May

be

used,

ABSCONDING

when,

136.

DEBTORS—

Attachment

in case of,

69,

n. 1.

ACCEPTANCE-—
Of goods, when suﬂicient to pass title, 688, 689;

ACCORD AND SATISFACTION—
Is what, 198; Is a defense, when,
after suit brought, 199.

198;

May be when, 690.

How pleaded,

199;

How,

Defense of, how established, 199; The satisfaction must be com
plete, 200; When a. less sum will not satisfy a greater, 200.
When by specialty security, 201; When a bill or note will, or
will not operate as a satisfaction, 201.
Requisites of, must be certain, 202; And must be executed, 202;
And proceed from the defendant, 204.
Compromise will operate as, when, 205; Separate compromises by
copartners, joint debtors, ete., 205.
Wrong doers, satisfaction by, ete., 204.

ACCOUNTS
Separate suits on amounts due upon, effect of, 166, 187, 221, n. 48.
When bar-red by the statute of limitations, 232; Interest, whether
chargeable on, 701.
939
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ACCOUNT BOOKS
See Evidence,

390, 391.

ACCOUNT STATED—
Common count on, 744;

Action

on,

744.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT
See Statute of Limitations, 227.
Proof of debt by, 227; Must be in writing,
Raises a new promise, when,
Torts, proof of by, 241.

when, 230.

240.

ACTIONS—
_

See Suit.
Where to be brought, 8.
Local and transitory, what, and when, 16.
Local, to be tried where, 16.
Trespass and case, when local and when transitory,
Against public oﬂlcers, when local, 17.

ACTION

ON

16.

THE CASE

See Carriages.

Comprises actions for torts or injuries without force, 755;
concurrent with trespass, 755.
Negligence, action lies tor, 756.
negligence, 756;
Contributory
imputed negligence, 756,
Negligence cannot be imputed to an infant, 756, n. 5;
gence

deﬂned,

756,

When

5;

n.

Negli

n. 5.

As between employer and employe, 757, and n. 6; “Fellow servant”
doctrine, 757; The doctrine of "safe place,” 757; The declara
tion in actions for negligence, 758.
Bailment relations, actions on the case growing out of, 759; Clas
in each class, 759.
siﬂcation of bailments, 759; Care require
Fraud and deceit, 8Ctl0!1Sﬁo.
Dangerous instruments, action for keeping, 762.
Dangerous animals, action for keeping at common law, 763; By
statute, 764.
_
Common carriers, actions against, 765; Liability of, 766.
Negligent driving on highway, action for, 767; Statutory duty of
persons driving on the highway, 768.

AD DAMNUM—
May apply to what, 167, n.

40.

ADJOURNMENTS—
When process returnable on a holiday, 134; When on the seventh
day of the week, in case of seventh day observers, 135, 289, n. 1.
When sickness, absence or inability of the Justice operate as an
adjournment, 154, 295; In case of vacancy in oﬁlce of the Jus
tice, 154.

4

*—{@l

GENERAL INDEX.
[REFERENCES

941

ARE T0 SECTIONS.]

ADJOURNMENTS—C0ntinued.
When on Justice's own motion, 41, 289; Only on a return
When Justice otherwise engaged, 295, n. 30.
297, n. 36;
When from necessity, 295; To await service of alias process,

day,
41;

When attachment issues for a witness, or he refuses to be
sworn, or to testify, 295, 308.
By agreement of parties, 293; By stipulation in‘ writing, 289, n. 1.
On the application of a. party, 290; On cause for, 289; How cause
shown, 290; When by aﬂidavit, 290, n. 5; How often, 290; For
what length of time, 290; Cause for after a former adjourn
ment, 290; May be refused when, 291, 292.
In suits commenced by warrant, 293; Bond for, 293; On applica
tion by the plaintiﬂ, 293.
_
After jury sworn, 294; Holding cause open, 294, and n. 29, 30.
Irregular Adjournments, 297; Effect of, 297; irregularity, how
waived, 298; Who may object, 298.
No adjournment in absence of plaintiﬁ, 297, n. 38; Nor of the
defendant without cause shown, 297, n. 38.
To what place cause may be adjourned, 309, note.
Docket entry of, to be made, 296; Of execution sale, 544; Of pro
ceedings against fraudulent debtors, 594.

ADMINISTRATOR—
and Administrators.

See Executors

ADMISSIONS—
See Evidence,

By pleading,

412-423.

By general issue, 188, notes 191-2 and notes;
Of corporate existence, 188, n. 4; Of partnership, 191, n. 7; By
record, 413; By payment into court, 414; By estoppel, 416; By
parties, 417; By cotrespassers, 419; By agents, 420; By part
ners, 421; By guardian, 422; By husband and wife, 424; By
former owners, of demand in suit, 423.
412;

'

ADVERTISEMENTS——Publishing and posting, how proved,

AFFI DAVI T—
What suﬂicient,

51;

Oath and

jurat

382.

to,

51;

Not amendable,

69,

n. 1, p. 63.
on contract, 51; For fraud, 51; For tort,
Against fraudulent debtors, 591.
For attachment. 18, 69, n. 1; When to be made, 69, n. 1; Cannot be

For warrant. in actions
52;

amended,

69,

n. 1.

For attachment of witness, 304.
For writ of Replevin, 102.
For writ of Garnishment, 109, 110.
To verify plea in abatement, 176.
When made out of State, proof of, 368.
Of publishing and posting legal notices,

382,

n. 20.

GENERAL INDEX.

942

[asraaencns

am:

T0 si-:crxoNs.]

AFFIDAVIT-—Continued.
Proof of demands in suit by, 393.
For adjournment, 290, n. 5.
For transcript of judgment, 496.
For certiorari, 553.
For appeal, 564.

AFFINITY—
ls what,

2;

0! Justice

to party, 2;

Must be subsisting,

AGENT
Principal bound by acts and admission of, when,
not for his torts, 612.
0t wife as agent of her husband, 424.
ALIAS AND PLURIES WRITS——
In Replevin, 107.
Adjournment

in case of,

2.

420, and notes;

41.

ALTERATION
invalidates, when, 132, n. 2; Oﬂicer not authorized
alter, 132, n. 2.
Of promissory note, invalidates, when, 697, n. 0.

Oi? process,

ALMANAC—
Admissible

in evidence, when,

to

‘

383.

AMENDMEN'I‘S

Powers ot Justice, as to, 573; As
573, 575; Of declaration, 576; By
But not to add a cause of action
of limitations, 576, n. 25; Nor

to process, 29, 32, 37, 161, 162,
adding new counts, 576, n. 25;
which is barred by the statute
to change the cause of action,
576, n. 25; As to damages, 576, n. 25; After demurrer, 280, n. 6.
Of Pleas, 577; Notice of statute of limitations may be added by,
Plea in abatement not amendable, 576, 577.
576, n. 25, 577;
denying
execution, etc., by, 577, n. 27; Bill ot
Whether A/Iidavit
particulars may be, 576, n. 26, 287, n. 10.
Amendments at trial,» 578; On account of variance, 348-9, 578, n. 30.
Of bonds, 77; Of attachments, 80; But not the aiildavit for, 69,
n. 1, p. 63; Of judgments, 580; Of executions, 580, 509.
After verdict, 579.
Amendments relating to death, marriage, etc., 581-583.; Of docket
entries, 600, n. 8; Of return to certiorari, 561.

ANCIENT RIGHTS
Hearsay in case of, 409.

ANIMALS-—
Disposition of in ease of attachment, 94.
Trespass by from adjoining lands -and highways, 627, 628.
Vicious animals, owners when liable for injuries by, 763: Or for
injuring persons or domestic animals. 763; Double damages for

GENERA-L INDEX.
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ANIMALS-—C0ntinued.
when, 764; Costs in action for, 764.
Dogs, killing or worrying sheep, 864.

APPEAL
Relatlonship of Justice may be shown on, 2, n. 14.
From judgment of Justice, when, 563; When after ﬁve days, 565.
General and special appeals, 564, n. 2; In case Justice vacates
oﬂice before appeal, 567.
Affidavit for, 564; Bond on, 566; Sureties on, 566.
Payment of costs on, 568; Service of affidavit and bond on Jus
tice, 569.
Return to, 570; Pleadings to be returned, 570; Filing return in
Circuit Court, 571; Proceedings on, 572.
Release of property from execution on appeal, 569; And money
collected to be returned, 569. n. 12.
From dissolution of attachment, 97.
In garnishee cases, 119, n. 6, 125a.

APPEARANCE

r

How may appear, 142.
What is, 142, note, 149, n. 31; General and special, 149, n. 31.
By parties of full age, 142, 145; By attorney, 143; By married
women, infants, constable, law partner, etc., 144; Same person
not to appear for both parties, 144.
Authority of attorney to appear, proof oi’, 143; When and how
required, 143; When attorney may delegate his power, 143; Au
thority to collect is authority to appear, 144.
Townships, appearance by, 145.
Infant plaintiffs, 146, 147; Next friend, appointment of, 147;
Must be responsible for costs, 147; Appearance without next
friend irregular, 146.
Infant defendants, by guardian, 148; Guardians, when and how
appointed, 148; Proceedings without guardian, 148, n. 29.
Time for appearance, 148 ; Eﬂfect of non-appearance, 149; Absence
of Justice at time for appearance, 149, n. 33; Discretion of Jus
tice in allowing appearance at unseasonable time, 149.

APPLICATION—
Of payments, 218.

For certiorari,

553, 555.

ARBiTRA'I‘ORS—
Procdring attendance of witnesses
ARGUMENT—
To the jury, order of, 343.

before,

301;

Subpoena

for, 301.

ARREST

Who exempt from,
Damages for, 57.

57;

Discharge

of witness

from

illegal,

57;

I
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ARREST—Continued.
Who may be arrested, 58; By whom, 59; When to be made, 60;
Where, 61; How made, 61a; Breaking doors, 61; Exhibiting
warrant, 62; Aid to ofiicer, 63; Of fraudulent debtor, 593.

ASSAULT AND BATTERY—
Deﬁned,
603,

602;

Action

for,

602;

Allegation

of special

damages,

n. 19.

for plaintiff in,

603, and notes;
Malice, aggravation of
Time and place immaterial, 603; What
may be proved, 603; In actions against several, 603.
Evidence for defendant, 604; Criminal prosecution for same act,
no defense, 605;
Evidence in mitigation, 604.
Notice of defense of possession, evidence under, 606; Punishment
of child, servant or pupil, 607.

Evidence

damages,

603,

n.

19;

ASSlGNEE—
Of chose in action may sue how, 25, 682; Declaration on, and
proof of assignment, 25; Set off by, 257, 262, 263, 264.
What may be assigned, 682, and notes; How assignment may be
made, 682, notes; Right of action in tort, 682, n. 3.
Assignee takes subject to defenses, 682, n. 3.
The claims of several may be assigned to the same person for ad
justment in one suit, 682, n. 3.
For benefit of creditors, set off against, 264, n. 7.

ASSUMPSIT—
On simple contracts, 680; Implied contracts, 680,
On contracts under seal, 681; Where action of debt lies,
By assignees of demands, 682.
681, n. 2;
Waiving tort and suing in assumpsit, 683; For trespass upon
lands, 75.
Consideration of contracts, 684; A promise is suﬂicient consider
ation for a promise, 684, n. 3; A compromise is sufiicient, etc.,
Subscription to a. fund, etc., 684, n. 3; Need not be
684, n. 3;
expressed
in writing, when, 684, 695.
Sunday, contracts made on, 685.
Rescinding contracts for fraud, 686.
Writing, when contracts to be in, 687 (see contracts-—statu-te of
frauds); Agreements not to be performed within a year, 687;
Promise to answer for the debt of another, 687; Agreements in
consideration of marriage, 687; Contracts for the sale of goods
for more than ﬁfty dollars, 688, 689.
Delivery and acceptance,
Ernest, 691; Part-payment, 691;
690;
The memorandum, 692.
Sales at auction, contract of, 693.
Representations as to the credit of another, 694.
Leasing contracts oi’, 696.
Action

726;

of, 680;
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ASSUMPSIT——Continued.
Promissory notes, actions on, 697, et seq. (See Bills of Exchange
and Promissory Notes.)
Common counts, 714; Ofﬂce of, when to be used, 714.
Goods bargained and sold, 715'
Goods sold and delivered, 716; Evidence for plaintiff, 717; For
defendant, 718; Against husband for goods furnished to.wife's
child by a former husband, 724; For wife’s debts before mar
riage, 720; For necessaries furnished to wife, 720; When wife
guilty of adultery, 721; When husband ill-treats wife, 721;
After divorce, 722; After separation with allowance, 722; For
funeral expenses of wife, 722; For goods furnished to woman
held out as wife, 723.
For necessaries and support of infant child, 724; When child has
left its father's house, 724.
Work and labor, 725; When count should contain claim for ma
terials, 725; When performed on plaintiff's own materials on
contract, 725, 726, n. 9; For professional services, 725; When
laborer wrongfully quits service, 726; When recovery may be
had, 726; When laborer wrongfully discharged, 726; Refusal to
accept articles upon which labor has been bestowed,
726, n. 9;
Measure of damages, 726, n. 9.
Money lent, count for, 727; Action for, 727; Set-oif as to, 727.
Money paid for the use of another, 728; Count for money paid,
728;
For moneys paid by sureties, 729; Contribution among
sureties, 729; No contribution among wrong-doers, 730.
Money had and received, count for, 731; Action lies when, 731;
For money received from
Does not depend on contract, 731;
plaintiff, 732; Received on plaintiff's account, 733; Received
for plaintiff's property, 734; By stake-holder, 735; Received
under void authority, 736; Or paid on forged instrument, 737;
Or by mistake, 738; Or paid on a consideration that has failed,
739;
For money paid upon misrepresentation, or obtained by
fraud, 740; Or paid by compulsion, 741; Money due on contract
fully performed, 742; Not for money paid under a moral obli
gation, 743.
Account stated, count for, 744; When proper, 744; ' Declaration,
how supported, 744; Defense to, 745.
Use and occupation, count for, 746; Action for lies when, 746;
Must be founded on contract, 747; Relation of landlord and
tenant must have existed, 747, n. 24; In case of tenant at suffer
ance, 747, n. 24; Evidence for plaintiff, 748; Amount recover
Determination of ten
able, 750; Evidence for defendant, 749;
'
ancy, 751; Notice to quit, 747.
On warranties, 752; Implied warranties, 752; What words neces
sary to constitute, 752; When representations will amount to,
60
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ASSUMPSIT—Continued.
752, notes 50, 52; Assertions as to value, 752, n. 52;
Soundness,
warranty as to, 752, n. 4; General warranty, 752; Damages for
breach of, 754, 801; In what case action for maintainable, 854;
Rescission of contract for breach oi! warranty, 754, n. 18; Suing
for breach, aﬂirms the contract, 754, n. 18.
Declaration on, requisites of, 754, n. 10; May declare in assumpsit
for breach, 754, n. 10; And add count for money had and re
ceived, 754; Or declaration may be in case for damages for the

deceit,

754,

n. 10.

ATTACI-IMENT—
Statutory
69,

proceeding,

69;

Statute to be strictly complied

with,

n. 1.

Suit by when deemed commenced, 20.
Attachment when a. summons is returned not served, 48.
In case of fraudulent disposition of property, 70; Removal of
contracted, 72;
property from county, 71; Debt fraudulently
Absconding or non-resident debtors, 73; Foreign corporations,
74; Trespass on land, 75.
Writ of, when to issue, 69; On what demand, 69; For trespass
when tort waived, 75; Proceedings must be strictly according
to the statutes, 69, n. 1.
Against corporations, 74, n. 6, 127; Against partners, 69, n. 1; On
joint

demands,

69,

n. 1.

Demand must be on contract, 69, n. 1; When on judgment, 69, n. 1
Demand need not be liquidated, 69, n. 1; Must be due, 69, n. 1 When is liquidated, 69, n. 1.
Affidavit tor, 69, n. 1; When to be made, 69, n. 1; How facts to be
stated, 69, n. 1; Must exist when, 69, n. 1; Statement of the ac
count of the debt, 69, n. 1; When made by an agent, 69, n. 1;
The demand must be averred to be due, 69, n. 1; And on con
tract or judgment, 69, n. 1; Cause tor issuing how stated, 69,
n. 1; Several causes may be stated, 69, n. 1; Statement as to
non-residence, absconding, etc., 69, n. 1; When against co-part
ners, 69, n. 1.
Truth of, how contested, 69, n. 1; fkflidavit not amendable, 69, n. 1.
76, n. 10;
How
Bond for, 76; Necessary to give jurisdiction,
waived, 76, n. 10; When bond defective, remedy, 77; Seal on,
76; Liability oi sureties, 78.
Con
79_; Damages for when wrongfully issued, 78, n. 17;
tents of writ, 79; When returnable, 79; When amendable, 80;
When and how served, 81; When oﬂicer may require bond of
indemnity, 81; Liability of ofﬁcer, 81, n. 28.

Writ of,

What property may be attached, 82; Property exempt, 82, n. 29;
What exempt to partners, 82, n. 29; Property mortgaged, sub
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ATTACHMEN'l‘—Continued.
ject to, 82, n. 30; On growing crops, 82, n. 30; Partnership
property, 82, n. 30; Goods in custody of the law, 83; Bailee or
receiptor, 85.
Simultaneous attachments, 84.
Successive attachments, 85; How levied, 85; When property in
hands of another oﬂicer, or receiptor, 83.
Service of writ on defendant, 86, and n. 44; When, 86, n. 44; By
copy left at defendant’s residence, 86, n. 45; By copy on person
in possession, 86, n. 45; Or on garnishee, 86.
Disposition oi! property after service, 87.
Bond to prevent removal, 88; In case of growing crops, 88, n. 50 ;
No dissolution after bond, 88, n. 50; Approval of the bond, 88;
Property may be delivered to a receiptor, 89; Bond does not
discharge lien of attachment, 88.
Bond of third person claiming the property, 90 ; Amount of bond,
and sureties, 90.
Lien of attachment, continuance, 91; After decease of defendant,
Keeping animals attached, expense ot, 91, n. 6.
91, n. 4;
Return of the writ, 92; In case of personal service, 92, n. 8; In
case of service of copy at defendant's residence, 92, n. 8;
In
case of service by copy on person in possession, 92, n. 8; When
bond has been given, 92.
Proceedings after return, 93; When the property may be sold,
94; In case of animals, perishable fruits, etc., 94.
Dissolution of the attachment, and bond tor, 95; Order for dis
charge on, 95.
Dissolution by Judge or Commissioner, 96; Not after bond for
release, 88, n. 50; May be applied for when, 96, n. 9; Who may
apply for, 96, n. 9; The application or petition tor, 96, n. 9;
Grounds for dissolution, 96, n. 9.
Citation to plaintitt, 96, n. 9, 486; Service of citation, 96; Hear~
ing on application for, 96, n. 2; Effect of dissolution, 96, n. 2;
Findings and review upon, 96, n. 2; Costs of, 96.
Appeal from proceedings to dissolve, 97.
for plaintiﬂ when, 98; When defendant not served,
When a garnishee shall have been summoned, 98;
Judgment not limited to the amount sworn to in the aﬂidavit,

Judgment
99,

98,

n.

4;

n. 2.

Execution for plaintiff, 99, 502, 510;
property may be taken, 99, and n.
Trespass on lands, attachment tor,

Proceedings

on,

99;

What

4.

75.

Garnishee proceedings in attachment, 126, 127.
Witnesses, attachment tor, 304, 305; Adjournment in case of,
Replevin will not lie for property taken in, 100, 650.

295.
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ATTORNEYS—
Must make disclosures as garnishees, 114, n.; Liability of as gar
nishees, 129; Appearance by, 143; Authority to appear, 143;
Delegating his authority, 143.
AUCTION—-4
What writing necessary to bind purchaser, 693.

BAILEE—
trover, when,

May maintain

633.

BAILMENT—
Is what,

Classiﬁcation

759;

baiiee, 759.

of,

759;

Duties

and

liabilities

of

_

BAR-ROOM—
Justice not to hold court in,

3.
-

BAR—
Suit against

a part only of debtors jointly liable, is a bar to a suit
against the others, when, 180, n. S.
Pleas in, what are, 188; Special pleas in not allowed, 188.
Best evidence rule, 358.

BILL OF PARTICULARS

May be required when, 284; In what cases, 284; When to be
ordered, 284; Of set-oiifs, 271, 284; Oﬂice of the bill, 284, n. 2;
Is no part of the declaration, 286; Evidence when conﬁned to
matters set forth in the bill, 287.
Contents and effect oi! the bill, 287; Must state what, 287, n. 8;
Credits need not be stated in, 287, n. 8; Errors in, effect of, 287.
Amendments to, 287, n. 10, 283, n. 16, 576. n. 26.
At trial considered as incorporated in declaration, 287, n. 13.

BILLS OF EXCHANGE
-

-

AND PROMISSORY

NOTES-

under garnishee law, when, 109; Makers ot bills and
notes not due, not liable as garnishees, 109, n. 4.
Giving a bill or note will operate as payment when, 201, 216, and
notes; When liable to set-oﬂ’, 263, 264.
Promissory note, is what, 697; Requisites ot, 697; Delivery of,
When purchaser takes subject to defenses, 697, n. 0;
697, n. 0;
Alteration of, 697, n. 0; Notes of a partnership, 697, n. 0; Notes
of married women, 697, n. 0; Imports consideration when, 697;
When consideration illegal, 697, n. 17.
Payee v. Maker, 698; Proof oi.’ execution of, 191, 698.
Lost note, action on, 699;_ Bond of indemnity in case ot, 700.
"
Common counts, when suﬂicient, 701.
Interest when recoverable on, 701; Compound interest, 702.
Indorsee v. Maker, 703; Indorsee for collection, 703, n. 49.
Indorsee v. Indorser, 704; Obligation of indorser, 704, n. 51; Im
plied consideration, 704, n. 51; When in blank, 705, n. 51; When

‘Are

ettects

man
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AND PROMISSORY NOTES—Continued.
What will discharge an indorser, 705, n.

51;

What required to hold an indorser, 705, n. 51.
Presentment for payment, 705, n. 51; Oi! note payable on de
mand, 705; Days of grace when allowed, 705; In case of holi
days, 705; Presentment at what time of day, 705; By whom to
be made, 706; At what place, 707; In case two or more liable,
708; Waiver ot demand and notice, 709.
Notice of non-payment and protest, 710; When by mail, 711.
Guaranty of payment of, 712; Verbal guaranty, when good, 694,
Liability of guarantor, 712; Need not be in writing
n. 14;
when, 739, n.; Is negotiable, 712.
Guaranty of collection, 712, n. 37; Sureties, contract and liability
of, 713; How discharged by act or neglect of holder, 713.

BODY
Execution

against, 505,

509.

BOND
Bond required by law may be amended when, 76, 77.
attachment, 7,6; To prevent removal of property, 88; Of third
person claiming property, 90.
In Replevin, 101, 103.
On adjournment in suits commenced by warrant, 293.
In Gertiorari, 556.
On appeals to the Circuit Court, 566.
Amendment of, 77.
For discharge of fraudulent debtor, 595.
With notice of title, 624.
In case of a lost note, 700.
Action of debt upon bonds, 666.
Action of covenant upon bonds, 12, 660.

In

BOOKS OF ACCOUN"i‘—
See Evidence,

383, 390, 391.

BOOKS AND PAPERS
Subpmna
duces tecum for, 300.
When may be taken to jury room, 346.

BOOKS, SCIENTIFIC AND PROFESSIONAL—
Reading of in evidence, 383.

BURDEN OF PROOF
See Evidence,

357.

BREAKING

DOORS
See Doors.

BY-LAWS—
Of cities and villages, proof of, 365; Debt for penalties for breach
of, 679; When judicial notice taken of, 351, n. 4.
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CARE—
Degree of, required in any business, 756, n.

CARRIAGES-—
Injuries from careless driving,
liable for, 767;

action for, 767;
When liable, 767.

CARRIER—
Trover

5.

against for wrong delivery,

When owner not

'

636.

CASE
See

Action on

the Case.

CATTLE

Trespass by, from adjoining lands and highways, 627, 628.

cause OF

ACTlON——

Jurisdiction

as to, 9-16.

CERTIFICATE—

'

conviction by Justice, as evidence, 378; Of marriage, 379; OI
registry of deeds, 380; Notaries’ certiﬁcate, 381; Oi! purchase
of public lands, 382; Sheriﬂ's certiﬁcates of sale, 382.
Of authentication of records and documents, 374; Oi records ot
foreign courts, 369; Ot the records ot courts of other States,
371;
Of Probate records, 373; Of judgments and proceedings
in Justices’ Courts of this State, 374; Of proceedings before
Justices of other States, 375; Of copies of chattel mortgages,

Oi!

376, n. 5.
382; Of copies of records oi.’ deeds, 380;
records of powers of attorney, 384, n. 44.
Certiﬁcates of search for lost papers and records, 396.

Oi patents of lands,

0!

CER'l‘IORARI—
Relationship of Justice to party, how shown on, 2, n. 14.
Object and oﬁice of the writ, what reviewed upon, 553; When and
in what cases allowed, 553; Notice of application tor, 553; At
ﬂdavlt for, 553.
Allegations oi? error, 554; Application for the writ, 555; Bond
tor, 556; Allowance oi writ, 555; Filing aﬂidavit and issuing
writ, 557; Service of writ on Justice, 558.
Writ stays execution when, 559; Suspending service of execution
when, 559.
Return to writ, 560; Filing return, 560; Amending return, 561.
Proceedings in Circuit Court on writ, 562; When judgment will
be reversed, 562.

CHALLENGES—
See

Jury.

CHARACTER
See Oﬂicial Character,

405, 588. -
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CI-IARACTER—Continued.

Questions to witness tending to degrade, 460.
Impeachment for crime, 468; As to general reputation

for truth,

467, 469.

CHARGE—
To the jury, 344.
CHATTEL MORTGAGE

When deemed fraudulent, 530, 531.
Recording, 531; Filing with the clerk, what is, 532;

Renewing,

634.

Attachment of property covered by, 82, n. 30, 522.
Levy of execution upon, 82, n. 30, 522; How sold on, 522; Cred
itors may redeem the property when, 522, n. 48.
Lien of on goods mortgaged, 82, n. 30, 522, n. 48; Interest of the
mortgagee in, 82, n. 30.
Title to property vests in mortgagee when, 82, n. 30, 522, n. 48.
Tender of amount due discharges mortgage, 247, n. 5.
Copies of, how certiﬁed, 376, n.

5.

CHECK-—
Payment by, 217, n. 11.
Should be presented for payment when, 217, n. 11; Delivery
does not change title to money in bank, named in it, 217, n.

of
11.

CI-IOSE IN ACTION—
Assignments of, 682; Subject to equities when, 682; Assignee may
sue on, when, 25, n. 17, 682; Not liable to be taken on execu
tion, 521.

CIRCUIT

COURT—

Transcript of judgment to, 496.
Proceedings in on certiorari, 562.
Proceedings in on appeal, 571, 572.
Proceedings in, when title to lands certiﬁed,

CITATION

624.

to dissolve attachment,

To plaintiﬂ in case of application

96,

n. 9.

CLERGYMAN—
See Evidence,

445.

COINS
Denominations

of, 245;

What are legal tender,

COLLATERAL FACTS—
When

‘

excluded, 353.

COMMENCEMENT—
Suits, how commenced,
garnishees, 112.

19;

COMMISSION-—
.To take depositions, 427.

\

245.

When deemed commenced,

20; Against

GENERAL INDEX.

952

ABE T0 SEC'1'IONB.]

[nan-zasxcas

COMMITMENT
Of fraudulent debtors, 595.
Of one guilty of contempt, 599.
COMMON CARRIER
Undertaking of generally, 765; Who are, 765; Are insurers, 766;
Obligation to carry, 766, n. 36; Liabilities of, 766; Power to
restrict liability, 766; What necessary to render carrier liable,
766.

COMMON COUNTS
See Assumpsii.
COMMON LAW
Of other States and countries, how proved,

COMPETENCY

364.

OF WITNESSES

See Evidence,

435-444.

COMPROMlSE—
Joint debtors compromising

need not be joined as defendants, 28,
Operates as a satisfaction when, 205.
Separate compromises by joint debtors, how accomplished, 205;
Discharge on, how drawn, 220, n. 36.
180, n. 10;

CONDITION PR.ECEDENT—
See

Debt.

How pleaded,
CONFESSION

166.

See Judgment,

11,

482.

CONFIDENTIAL COMMUNICATIONS»
See Evidence,

445,

446, 447.

CONFUSION OF GOODS
See Trover,

642.

CONSANGUINITY—
Is what, 2; Lineal consanguinity,
computed,

2;

Collateral,

2;

Degrees how

2.

CONSENT
Jurisdlction not conferred

by,

when,

6,

18.

'

CONSlDERATION—
1-low alleged in declaration,
consideration, 189, 684;
ation is sufficient, 684;

163, and n. 24;
Seal as evidence of
Must be of value, 684; What consider
Need not be stated in the contract or

writing, 684, 695.
Failure of, how shown, 189; Total, 189; Partial, 189.
Illegality of, how shown, 190.
A promise is suﬂicient for a promise. 684, n. 3; As between signers
to a subscription, the promises are mutually considerations for
each other, 684,

*

is

n. 3.

—

*~——?-pl

\

GENERAL INDEX.
[asmcasncss

ma

953

T0 SEC’1‘IONS.]

CONSTABLES—
May not serve process in his own favor, 39, n. 21; Alteration of
process by, 132, n. 2; Not to appear or advocate for parties,
when, 144.
Duties and liabilities ot, 5; Not to purchase demands for suit, nor
take gratuities, 5; Not to purchase on execution sale, 543.
Fees of, 490.

CONSTRUCTION—
Of pleadings,

158

and n.

8, 162.

CONTEMPTS—
Justice may punish for,

597;
In what cases, 597; But not until
the offender has an opportunity to be,heard, 598.
Eartent of punishment for, 598; Warrant to arrest tor, 599; Rec
ord ot conviction, 598; Commitment for, 599.

CON'I‘RACT—

V

4;

4_;

Attachment in case of demand on, 69, n. 1.
When to be averred to be in writing, 163; Executed by agent,
how alleged, 163, n. 24; Set-otf in cases of demands founded
in, 256.
Damages in case of breach oi, 479; Sale contract, 480.
Debt upon, 665; Assumpsit on, 680; When under seal, 681.
Implied contracts, what are, 680, n. 1; When implied, 680, n. 1.
Made on Sunday, 685.
Sunday contracts, 685, n. 9; Rescinding for fraud,
Rescinding
686; Must be rescinded, when, 686; Suing upon a contract ai
ﬂrms it, 686, n. 12.
Must be in writing, when, 687 ; Agreements not to be performed
in one year, 687; When performance in a year depends upon
a contingency, 687, n. 19.
Promises to answer for the debt of another, 687; Rule applies
only to collateral promises or guaranties, 687, n.
When prom
ise collateral and when original, 687, n.
Verbal guarantee of
a note, when good, 694, n. 14; Verbal promise to pay one‘s own
debt to the creditor of another, 687, n.
Agreements in consideration of marriage, 687.
Promise by executor to pay out of his own estate, 687.
Contracts for the sale of goods for more than ﬁfty dollars, 688 and
notes; Sales at auction, 693; Contracts for goods to be manu
factured, 693.
Representations as to the credit of another, 694.
Contracts for leasing for more than a year, 696; Or for sale of
an interest in lands, 696, n. 16; For the sale of standing trees,
696, n. 16; License to cut trees or ﬂow lands, 696, n. 16.
Consideration necessary, 684; Need not be in writing, 695; A seal
imports, 187, 684.
4.

_
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CONTRIBUTION—
Among sureties, 729;

None among wrong-doers,

trespassers, etc.,

613, 730.

CONVEYANCE—
Conveyance, term embraces what, 662;
'
fraudulent, 530.

Of property, when deemed

CONVERSION—
In trover, what amounts

By wrongful taking, 636;
to, 635, 636;
By wrongful detention, 638; By wrongful dominion, 637; By
accession, or change in form of goods, 642; By confusion oi!
goods,

643.

COPIES
Ot records, inscriptions, etc., when admissible, 358.
Of records and documents, 376; How certiﬁed, 377.

'

CORPOR.ATION—
Jurisdiction of Justice in
21;

Whether

case of, 7; How suits commenced against,
by attachments, 74, n. 6; May be garnisheed,

125, 127.

Allegation in pleading as to incorporation oi’, 164; Existence of,
how denied, 171; Mistake in name of, 171; Existence and name
of when admitted by pleading, 188, n. 4.
Charter of when organized under general law, 400, n. 38.
Evidence of existence of, 188, n. 4, 400; Acts of, 400; Municipal,
when records of not to be varied by parol, 400, n. 43.

COSTS—

tor, when plaintiif non-resident, 21, 140; In other cases.
Discretion of Justices as to, 140; Application for when to
be made, 140; Liability of surety on, 140; Bond tor in attach
ment, 76; Liability oi! bondsmen, 76; In garnishee cases, 120;
In suits tor personal labor, 141.
Allowed in proceedings for dissolution of attachment, 96.
Not allowed in suits on accounts omitted in former suits, 187,
n. 45; Nor on demands omitted to be set off, 269, 488; Accumu
lation of stopped by tender, 249.
Judgment for, when, 488; Execution against surety, 140; For
what amount and what included, 488; For attorney's tees, 488;
Cause to be shown for, 488.
Security
140;

Taxation of 487, n. 30, 495.
Justices. amount of, 489; Constables, 490; Sheriffs, 491; Jurors,
Witnesses, 493; Garnishees, 493.
492;
Double costs, what, and when allowed, 494; In trespass, 626.

COURTS—
Of justices of the peace;
'
are sold, 3.

Not to be held where intoxicating

liquors
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COURTS—Continued.
Vested with all powers necessary to exercise of jurisdiction
given, 6.
Cannot arrest judgment or set aside verdicts, 6.
Records of foreign, proof of, 369; Of other States, proof of, 371;
Of this State, 372; Probate records, 373; In chancery, 372.

COVENANT
Jurisdiction

in, 12; Notice of payment must he given in, 215;
Action of, lies when, 660; When on bond, 12, 660; On implied
covenants, 662.
‘
Parties to, 661.
Plea, what to be shown under general issue, 663; Defense when
performance of covenant impossible, 663; When performance
of condition precedent not excused, 663.

COVERTURE—
Of defendant when pleadable in abatement,

178.

CROPS-—
Growing, attachment of, 82, n. 30; Levy of execution on, 524;
Raised on shares, landlord and tenant are tenants in common
of, 644, n. 64.

CROSS-EXAMINATIONL
See

Evidence,

459, et seq.

CUS'I‘OM—
Evidence of, inadmissible

to vary

writing when,

359.

DAMAGES

Statement of in process, 37; Exceeding the jurisdiction of the
court, effect of, 37; In the declaration, 37, 167 and n 39, 40.
For unlawful arrest, 57.
Allegation of in declaration, 167 and n. 39, 40; Special damages,
how alleged, 167, n. 39; Amount claimed, 167, n. 40; Amend

~
ment as to, 576, n. 25.
Against defaulting witness, 307.
What are damages, 471; Act complained of must be proximate
cause of, 471; Must be compensatory, 471; Not on the theory
of inﬂicting punishment, 471; General, what are, 471; Special,
what are, 471 ; Nominal damages, 471.
Exemplary damages, 472; Theory of, 472.
Stipulated damages, 473; Distinguished from penalty, 473.
Double damages, 474; In case of injuries by dogs,‘ 474; Form of
‘
verdict for, 474.
Treble damages, 475; In case of trespass by despoiling trees, 475,
618; In case of unlawful and forcible ejection from lands, 475,
618; In case of the recovery of possession under Chap. 308, C. L.
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DAMAGES—ontinued.
1897, 475; In case of misconduct of member of board of regis
tration, 475.
Interest as damages, 476; For delay in payment of money, 476;
For failure to deliver goods at time agreed, 476; On value of
property destroyed, 47.6; In case of conversion of chattels, 476.
Proﬁts as damages, 477; Not where they are speculative, 477 ;
Must appear to have been in the contemplation of the parties, 477.
Duty of party asking damages to minimize them, 478; Must not
aggravate them, 478.
For breach oi contract, 479 ; In case of partial performance, 479;
In case of prevention of pertormance of labor contract, 479; In
case of sale contract, 480.
In actions for tort, 481; In case of personal injury, 481; Mitiga
tion of in trover, 647.
In trover, measure of, 646; In trespass, 620; For defective fences
—cattle trespassing, 627-629; In actions tor work and labor, 726.
Damnum absque injuria, 471.

DANGEROUS INSTRUMENTS
Liability of persons for keeping,

762.

DANGEROUS ANIMALS~
See Animals,

763, 764.

DATE
Mistake in, eﬂect of,

33,

n.

33.

DAYS OF GRACE-—

,

See Grace.

DEAF AND DUMB PERSONS—
Competency of as witnesses, 442.

DEATH
Will be presumed, when, 402, n. 3.
Lien of attachment continues after death of defendant,

91, n. 4.

Statute of limitations, how affects running of, 235.
Of party to Judgment, execution after, 501.
Death of constable after levy of execution, 547; Of defendant be
tore and after levy of execution, 509, 543.

DEBT, ACTION 0F—
_

When proper remedy, 664; On simple contracts. 665; On bond,
666; On oﬂicial bonds, 666, n. 15; Extent of sureties‘ liability,
Profert, oyer, etc., of bond, 667; Excuse for not
666, n. 15;
making, 667; Notice of payment must be given, 215.
Evidence for plaintiff, 668; For defendant, 668.
On deeds.

668.

On judgments,

669;

faction, when,

669.

Declaration

on,

670;

Imprisonment

a satis

/

.
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DEBT, ACTION 0F—Continued.
On penal statutes, 14, 671; Who to prosecute, 672; Where action
to be brought, 673; How brought, 674; Form ot declaration in,
675, 676, 677; Plea in, 678.
On by-laws, 679.

DEBTORS, FRAUDULENT—
See Fraudulent Debtors.

WITNESSES

DECEASED

of, when, and how proved,

Testimony

410.

DECEIT-—
Action
760;

tor, 760; For false representations resulting
For suppression of truth, action for, 760.

in injury,

DECLARATION
See Pleadings.

By assignee of a chose in action, 25, n.; When damages claimed
Against defendant
exceed the jurisdiction of the court, 37;
whose name is unknown, 29, 162; Or misnamed in process, 29,
Misspelling of a name, 162, n. 20; Bill of particulars no
162;
part of, 286.
Amendment of, 576 and notes.
In actions by executors, 587; In trover, 677; On statute, 163, n. 22;
For forfeiture, 676; In trespass to real property, 617, 618; In re
plevin, 651; In debt on bond, 666; Assigning breaches, 666;
On judgment, 670; For penalties, 675.
In assumpsit, for penalties, 676; On promissory notes, Payee 12.
Maker, 698; Indorsee 1:. Maker, 703; Indorsee v. lndorser, 704.
On common counts, 714.
On the case, for negligence, 758.

DECLARATIONS
407, n. 21;
To show mental condition, 407;
show physical condition, 407; In case of ancient rights, 409;
to matters of general and public interest, 409.

To show motive,

To

As

DEEDS——

Conveyance of land, how proved, 384; Execution not provable
by parol, 384, n. 40; Record as evidence, 384; To what extent,
384; Recitals in, 415; May show was given as a mortgage, 359;
Debt on deed, 668.

DEFENDANT
where action against to be brought; How named in
When name unknown, 29, 162; Mistake in name,
‘
32, 162; Designating by initial letter, 30, 162.
Partners may be sued by ﬁrm name. 24, 29, 162.
Absconding,
process,

28;
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DELIVERY
When required to make sale valid, 688-690; Goods paid for, title
passes without delivery when, 689;
When delivery does not
pass title, 690, n. 7.

DEMANDS—
in suit, when provable

by affidavits, 393.

DEMAND—
See Promissory

Notes.
trover, when necessary, 640; In replevin, 653.
DEMURRER——
Is what, 280; Is general or special, 280; General demurrer only
allowed in Justices’ Court, 280; When may demur to declara
tion, 163.
When and how pleaded, 280; Joinder in, 280; Proceedings on,
280, n. 2;
How withdrawn, 281, n. 9.
Misjoinder of counts demurrable, 280, n. 2; Non-Joinder of plain
tiffs, when demurrable, 179; Of defendants when, 180; Lies
for improperly joining causes of action, 186, 280, n. 2.
Admits facts pleaded, 280, n. 6; Amendment after demurrer, 280,
n. 6; Amending and pleading‘ anew, 280, n. 6.
Judgment on, effect of, 281.

In

DEPOSITIONS—
See Evidence,

'

426-434.

DESCRIPTION—
Matters of, to be proved as alleged, 355.

DISAGREEMENT—
Of jury,

350.

DISABILITY TO SUE—
How affects running of statute of limitations,

DISCONTINUANCE—
Irregular adjournment

operates as, 297;

225, 233.

Not allowed after notice

of set-off, 273.
Judgments of, 483.

DISSOLUTION—
See Attachment,

88,

n. 50. and 95, 96, 97.

DIVIDING CAUSES OF ACTION
Eifect of,

187,

221

and notes;

In

case of set-off,

273, n. 26.

DOCKET——

Justice required

to keep, 600;
Entries to be made therein, 600;
What the entries should show, 600, n. 3; Effect of’ mistake in
entries, 600, n. 4, 5.
Form of the entries, 594; Should be signed by the Justice, 600,
n. 8; Requisites of entries, what should be included in, 600, n. 8.
Proof of judgment by, 374; When entries may be contradicted,

__

7,,

_

_

__

_
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DOCKET—Continued.

374;
Or mistakes shown, 374, n. 54; Is conclusive when, 374;
When not to be disproved, 600, n. 8; Contents not to be proved
by parol, 374.
Amendment of, whether competent, 600, n. 8.
Index to, 601.

DOGS
When owner liable for injuries committed by, 763; May be killed
when, 764; injuring persons or domestic animals, 763,764; Owner
liable to double damages when, 764.

DOORS
Breaking to make arrest, 61;
serve execution, 538.

To serve writ of replevin, 105;

DOUBLE AND TREBLE COSTS—
What are, and when allowed, 494; in trespass, 626. >
DOUBLE DAMAGES-—
In case of injuries from dogs, 474; Form of verdict for,

349,

To

n. 22,

474.

DRUGGISTS—
Liability tor carelessness or mistake in selling drugs,
‘

DRUNKENNESS—

invalidates contracts when, 253;
torts, 253, n. 31.

Drunken

755, n. 2.

persons are liable

tor

DURESS—

Deﬁned, 206; Bond or contract procured by, void, 206; Duress by
means of legal process, 206; By threats, 207.

EARNEST—

Payment of, when necessary, 691; What amounts to, eﬂfect of,

ERASURE—
in books of account,

.

691”.

390.

ESTOPPEL—

_

See Evidence, 413, 416.
When wife estopped by husband's sale of her property, 424, n. 28.

ESTRAYS—
Trover for,

EVIDENCE
is what,
10.

n. 25.

Substance of the issue must be proved, 310, 354; The
knowledge of facts will not dispense with proof, 311.

352;

Justices’
n.

634,

Relevancy of, 353; Must correspond with the allegations and be
confined to the point in issue, 353; What admissible, 353; When
relevancy not apparent, 353; Collateral facts, when excluded, 353;
Bill of particulars limits range of, 287.
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EVIDENCE—Continued.
Attendant circumstances, when admissible, 353; Evidence to im
peach or show hostility is relevant, 353.
Substance of the issue only, need be proved, 354; All material alle
gations must be, 354; Immaterial averments need not be, 354;
Of facts not pleaded of no avail, 354.
Matter of substance and description, distinction between, 354.
Material averments, what, 354; Time, place, quantity and value,
when, 354; Proof, extent of, required, 354.
Variance, what, 355; When fatal, 355; Variance as to consideration,
355, n. 37; When stated under a vldelicet, 355, n. 37.
Matters of description to be strictly proved, 355; Variance or mis
take when disregarded, 356.
Burden of proof, 357; On party holding the atﬁrmative, 357; Affirm
ative, how ascertained, 357 ; Who to begin, 357; Party beginning
to introduce all his evidence, 357; But need not anticipate the
defense, 357; Negative allegations, proof of, 357.
Best evidence only, admissible, 358; Primary and secondary evi
between,
358;
dence, distinction
Contents of a writing, how
proved, 358; The best evidence attainable suﬂlcient, 358; Excep
tions to the rule requiring the best evidence, 358; Copies of rec
ords and inscriptions when admissible, 358; No degrees of sec
ondary evidence, 358, n. 23; 398, n. 25.
Matters noticed judicially, 351; Of the statues, 351; Divisions of
the State, 351; Of acts organizing towns, 351; Of oﬁicers of the
court, 351; Of the signatures of ofilcers and attorneys, 351, n. 11;
Of the general duties and character of professional employments,
351, n. 12; Of present methods of business, 351, n. 12; Of the
meaning of current phrases, 351, n. 12; Of what constitutes negli
gence, 351, n. 12; As to by-laws of corporations, 351, n. 4; Of
foreign laws, 351, n. 5; Of the laws of nature, 351, n. 5; Of the
courts of other States, 351, n. 5.
Judges personal knowledge of facts will not dispense with proofs,
351.

evidence, contents of writing not provable by parol, 360;
Except when, 360, 358; Where the law requires a writing, 360,

Written
397.

Statutes of this State, 361.
Statutes of other States, 362.
Statutes of foreign countries, 363.
Common law of other States and countries, 364.
Ordinances of cities and villages, 365.
Public documents and records, 366.
Affidavits made out of the State, 368.
Court records of foreign courts,369; Copiesof, 370; Of other States,
371; Decisions of the courts of other States, 371; Court records

\
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EVIDENCE—Continued.
of this State, 372; Judgment record, 372; Judgments of the Cir
cuit Court, how proved, 372; In chancery, 372; Probate records,
373.

_

Justices‘ judgments, etc., of this State, 374; Transcript ot, 374; By
the docket, 374; Contradicting
docket entries, or showing mis
takes in, 374; Parol evidence of contents of docket inadmissible,
374; Proof by Justice's minutes, 374; By oath of Justice, 374.
Justices‘ judgments and proceeding of other States, 375.
Copies of records and documents, 376; How certiﬁed, 377.
Certiﬁcate of conviction by justice, 378.
Record of conviction, 378.
Marriage certiﬁcates, 379.
Register ot deeds’ certiﬁcates, 380.
Notaries‘ certiﬁcate, 381.
Certiﬁcates of purchase of public lands, 382.
Sheriff's certiﬁcates of sale, 382.
Notices and advertisements, 382.
Tax receipts, 382.
Books kept in oﬂice of State Treasurer, 382.
Printed reports of State oﬂicers, 382.
Aﬁldavits of publishing and posting legal notices, 382, n. 20.
Almanac, 383; Poll books, 383; Postmarks, 383.
'
Newspaper market reports, 383.
Maps, 383.
Teleph-onic communications, 383.
Professional and scientiﬁc books, 383.
Photographs, 383.
Stenographer's notes of testimony, 383.
Patents for lands from U. S., 382.
Deeds and conveyances ot lands, 384; Execution of when not prova
ble by parol, 384, n. 40;
Records of deeds, etc., 384; Certiﬁed
copies, 384 ; Are evidence of what, 384 ; Powers of attorney and
executory contracts, 384; Town plats, 384, n. 41.
Other instruments when acknowledged, 385.
Subscribing witnesses, proof by, 386; Must be produced when, 386;
To lost instrument, 386, n. 46; It witness dead or out of State,
386; When there are several, 386; When the Justice is, 386, n. 48.
When subscribing witness dispensed with, 387.
Handwriting, proof of, 388; Opinion of witness as to, 388; By com
parison, 388; Not with letter-press copies, 388, n. 1, nor with
papers not in the case for some other purpose or admitted, 388,
n. 1.

Wills that have

been recorded, 389.
Books of account, when admissible, 390; Are evidence of what, 390;
When erasures appear, 390; Entries are evidence for opposite
61
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EVIDENCE-—Continued.

party, when, 390; Proof preliminary to introduction of books of
account, 391; Entries in other than books of account, 392.
Aﬂidavits, proof of demands and set-oﬂfs, by, 393.
Records not evidence unless made so by law, 394; Records and
papers, when presumed never to have existed, 395.
Lost records and papers, 396; Certiﬁcate of search for, 396; Restor
ing, when and how, 397; Contents of, how proved, 398; Oi.’ lost
complaints and warrants, 398, n. 25.
Proof of lost paper by parol, after proof of loss and search, 398;
What search required, 398, and n. 25, 26; Subscribing witness
not required, 398, n. 25; Of paper destroyed by agreement 0!
parties, 398, n. 25.
Papers in possession of opposite party, 399; How proved, 399;
When without notice, 399; Of contracts in duplicate, 399.
Parol evidence to vary writings and records not admissible, 359;
Rule excludes what, 359; In case of an unambiguous contract,
359, n. 27; 359, n. 3; Legal meaning or construction of a con
tract cannot be aided by parol, 359, n. 3; When admissible to
show fraud or alteration, 359, and 11. 1.
Contemporaneous verbal agreements and understandings not admis
sible to vary writing, 359; But subsequent verbal agreements are,
359, n. 3.

byparol to have been given as a mortgage,
And that the assignment of a mortgage was made for a
security merely, 359, n. 8.
The sense in which equivocal words were used may be shown by
parol, 359, n. 13.
A latent ambiguity in a writing may be explained by, 359, n. 14;
And where there is want ot certainty in the instrument, 359,

A

deed may be shown

359;

n. 13.

Custom, evidence of not admissible to vary writing, 359; Except
when, 359.
Corporations, existence of how proved, 400; When organized under
general law, 400; Statutory provision for proving, 400; Religious
societies, 400, n. 37; National Banks, 400, n. 38; Railroad com
°
panies, 400.
Partnership, how proved, 401.
Presumptive evidence, what, 402; Grounds of presumptive, 402;
What facts may be proved to raise, 402; Not allowed if better
evidence attainable, 402, n. 3; Not where law requires a record to
be kept, 402, n. 3.
.
Consequences of acts presumed to have been intended, 402, n. 3.
Death presumed when, 402, n. 3.
Name used presumed to be the right name, 402, n. 3; Presumptions
must be reasonable, 402, n. 3; Motives presumed good until con
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EVIDENCE-Continued.
trary shown, 402,

n. 3; Fraud, presumption as to, 402, n. 3.
Classiﬁcation of presumptions, 403; Presumptions of law, 403;
Conclusive, 403, 404; Disputable, 403, 405.
Official character, 405; Persons acting as ofﬁcers presumed to be
such, when, 405; Evidence of reputation, 405; Right to ofiice not
405; Acts of incumbent, when
to be inquired into collaterally,
valid, 405; Executors cannot prove their oﬂice by reputation, 405,
n. 11.

Hearsay evidence, what, 406; When admissible and when not, 406;
Hearsay when a part of the transaction, 406, 407; Statements
tending to show motive, 407, n. 21; Statements showing mental
‘
condition, and expressions of pain, 407.
Pedigree, 408; Matters of public and general interest, 409; In case
of ancient rights, 409.
Deceased witness, evidence of, 410; How proved, 410.
Witnesses. who competent, 435; Parties, when, 436; When suit by
or against representatives of a deceased person, 437.
Competency of witness and admissibility of his testimony for the
Court, 438; Weight and credibility of testimony for the jury,
438; Religious opinions of witness not to be inquired into, 439.
Husband and wife, competency of as witnesses for and against each
other, 440; As to communications to each other, 440; As to
rights of property between, 440; In case of personal wrongs or
injury, or refusal to support, 440.
‘
Infants, competency of, 441.
Deaf and dumb persons, 442.
Intoxicated persons, 443.
Idiots and lunatics, 444.
Clergymen, communications to, 445; Not to disclose what, 445.
Physicians, not to disclose what, 446.
to, 447;
Attorneys, conﬁdential communications
When for an
unlawful purpose, 447; To prosecuting attorney in criminal mat
ters, 447.

Examination of witnesses, when privileged from answering, 448;
When answers may disclose a civil liability, 448; Not compelled
to criminate himself, 448; Parties to be examined as other wit
nesses,

448, n. 25.

Examination

-

of separately, 449;

Through

interpreters,

450.

in chief, 451; By leading questions, 451; When
Examination
allowed, 451; Discretion of the Court as to, 451; Reasons for
recollection may be given when, 452; Refreshing memory, when
proper, 453; How and by what means, 453.
Knowledge, witness must testify from, 454; Mere impression is not
sumcient, 454, n. 44.
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EVlDENCE—Continued.
Opinions of witnesses, when admissible, 455; As experts, 455;
Who are experts, 455; When opinion may be given on a hypothe
sis, 455; The expert must be shown qualiﬁed, 456; Opinions by
others than experts, 455; The hypothetical question, 457.
Objections to evidence, grounds to be stated, 458; To leading ques
tions, 458; When to formal proof of a paper, 458; To irrelevant
testimony, 458.
Cross-examination, 459; Leading questions proper, 459; Extent
and range of, 459.
Re Direct examination, 461.
Recalling of witnesses, 462.
Rebutting testimony, 462.
Impeachment of witnesses, 463, et seq; What it is to impeach. 463;
Party calling a witness cannot impeach him, 463; Diiierent
methods of impeachment, 463.
Bias or corruption, impeachment by showing, 464; How shown,

'

464.

Error, impeachment by showing,

464.

Inconsistent statements, impeachment by showing, 465.
Mental incapacity, showing of, to impeach, 466.
Moral obliquity, showing of for impeachment, 467.
Conviction of crime as an impeachment, 468.
General bad reputation, showing of to impeach, 469; Sustaining
an impeached witness, 470; Cannot by showing consistent state
ments, 470.
When witness privileged from answering, 460; It is the privilege
of the witness alone, 460; Not privileged because answer might
degrade, 460; Nor because might expose civil liability, 460.
Admissions by pleading, 412; At trial, 412; By stipulation, 412;
By plea in abatement, 481; By demurrer, 280, 413; General issue
admits what, 191; Admits execution of written instrument, 191.
Admissions by record, 413;- By ﬁnding of verdict, 413.
By notice of tender, 214; By payment of money into Court, 414;
Effect of payment into Court, 414.
By deed, 415; By recitals in deed, 415; By consideration stated,
415,

n. 9.

By matter in pals,
acted,

By party

416;

By statement upon which another has

416.

to the record, 417 ; When evidence for opposite party
and when not, 417; Oral admissions, 417, n. 15; By one of sev
eral parties on the same side, 417; By one interested but not
a party to the record, 418.
By cotrespasser, or joint wrong-doer, 419.
By agents, 420; When binding on principals, 420; Agency must be
proved, 420.
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EVIDENCE-—Continued.
By partners when engaged in the business of

the ﬁrm, 421; Admis
sion of indebtedness after dissolution, 421; Cannot revive a debt
against other partners, except when, 421, n. 25.
By guardian, ward not bound when, 422.
By husband and wife, 424; By wife as agent of husband, 424;
When wife not bound by admissions of husband, 424; When wife
estopped by husband's acts or sale of her property, 424, n. 32.
By former owner oi! demand in suit, 423; As against an adminis
'
trator, 423, n. 28.
Admissions, how construed, extent of, 425; The whole to be taken
together, 425, and n. 23; It in several conversations all must be
taken together, 425, n. 36.
Taking of depositions, how regulated, 426; De bene esse, 426 ; In
memoriam perpetuam, 426 ; Under what circumstances may be
taken, 426; In what proceedings may be used, 426; Before whom
may be taken, 426; What shall be evidence of oﬂicers' author
ity to take deposition, 426.
Notice to be given, 426; Contents of, 426; When impracticable to
serve the regular notice judge may prescribe a special notice,
426 ; Compelling attendance of witnesses, 426.
By commission, 427; Aﬁidavit showing reason for issuing, 427;
Who may issue, 427; interrogatories may be attached, 427.
Depositions to be used in courts of other States, compelling attend
ance of witnesses for taking, 428.
Swearing and examination of witnesses, 429.
Return of the deposition, 430; Transmission of, 430.
Depositions in perpetuam memoriam not to be taken for use in jus
tice's court, 432.
Taking of depositions by agreement, 432.
Use of depositions and authority ot the court over, 433.
Fees for taking, 434.
'

EXAMINATION—
See Evidence,

EXECUTION—

“

448-462.
.

On judgments in attachment, 99, 502, 510; Against garnishees, 120;
May be stayed, 120; Against defaulting witness, 306.
On judgments generally, 500; To issue at whose request, 510;
When at the end of the ﬁve days, 510; When sooner, 510; In case
of change of parties after judgment, 509; When within six years,
511; Issuing of does not stop the running oi.’ a statute ot limita
tions, 223, n. 10.
Against principal and surety, 503; Against principal and surety for
stay, 508; Against the body, 505, 509; Not against body of female
except, etc., 506; To whom directed, 504; Form oif, 504.
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EXECUTION—Contlnued.
How collected, 503; interest

on, 507;
Death of judgment debtor,
Death after levy, 509; When ofﬁcer protected, 521.
Variance between execution and judgment, 509; Amendment when
not allowed, 509.
Stay or, when allowed, 512; When not, 513; No stay of execution
for labor debts, 513; Stay may be for what time, 512; How
stayed, 512, 514; Recalling after stay, 515; Issuing notwithstand
ing stay, 516; Further security for stay, 517; When security for
stay insuﬂicient, 518; Remedy for stay who has paid the judg
ment, 519, 552; Stay on allowance of certiorari, 559.
Execution against joint debtors, 520; Names not served and not
appearing to be indorsed, 520.
Stay in garnishee proceedings, 120.
Service of execution, when, how, etc., 521, 546, 547; When to take
the body, 521; When goods and chattels, 521; Goods and chat
tels, what are, 521;
Order for payment of money, promissory
note, or chose in action not subject to levy, 521; Interest of lessee
may be taken when, 521, n. 45.
Upon mortgaged property when, 522; Property pledged, 522; Part
nership property, 523; Growing crops, 524; Fixtures, 525.
Exempt property, what, 526; To a householder, and who is, 526;
Team and stock in trade and mechanical tools, 526.
Exemption may be waived when, 527; Is personal privilege, 527.
~
Selection of exempt property, 528.
Goods in custody of law not to be taken, 529.
Property fraudulently
transferred or incumbered may be, 530;
Mortgage of, when deemed fradulent, 531; Filing of, 532; Re
newal, 534; Eﬁect of failure to renew, 535; Eitect of actual
'
notice of lien, 533.
Priority of execution, 536.
Levy, how made, 537; When not to be, 545; Breaking doors to
Indemnity to ofﬁcer, 539; Disposition ot property
levy, 538;
after levy, 540; Receptor, 540; Endorsement of levy, 541.
Sale, notice of, 542; When and how sale to be made, 543; When
separately or in lots, 543; Constable not to purchase, 543; When
defendant shall die after levy, 543.
Adjournment of sale, 544.
Return of execution, 545; When not sumcient time to sell after
levy, 545, 549; When no goods found, in case of body execution,
546; When oﬁ‘1cer’s term expires before completing service, 547;
If officer dies, 547; Return when property not sold, 549.
,7
Effect of levy. satisﬁes judgment when, 548, 549.
Liability of ofiicer on levy, 551; Neglecting to return, 551 A.
Renewing executions, 549.
Of setting off executions, 550.
effect of, 501;

d
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EXECUTION—Continued.
Remedy for security for stay of execution,
Amendment of, 509, 580;
on certiorari, 559.

519, 552.

Release of property from, on appeal, 569;

EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS—
Jurisdiction of Justices in case of, 7; Liability of

as garnishees,
Judgment in case of, 268.
May sue, but cannot be sued in Justices’ Courts, 584; May sue in
their representative character, 584; When in their own names,
587; Replevin by and against, 100‘, 584 ; May recover for torts,
129; Set-offs against, 268, 584;

586.

Declaration in actions by, 587 ; Cause of action how stated, 587.
Profert of letters by, 587.
~
Estate of deceased vests in when, 587.
Evidence, cause of action how proved, 588; General issue admits
oﬂicial character, 588; Denial of oﬂioial character should be
pleaded when, 588; Proof of oﬂicial character, how made, 588;
Not by reputation, 405, n. 11.

EXEMPLARY DAMAGES
When recoverable, 472; Theory of, 472.

EXEMPTIONS—
From arrest, 57; From serving on juries, 317; From attachment,
82;
In case of _partners, 82, n. 29; From levy on execution,
526;
Selection of exempt property, 528; Waiving exemption,
527; Married women may sue for exempt property of husband,
178, 526, n. 25.

EXPERTS-—
See Evidence,

455-457.

FALSE IMPRlSONMEN'l‘—
Is what, action for,

608;

Defense under general issue,‘609.

FALSE RETURN
When and how shown, remedy, 139.

FEES
Of Justices, 489; Of constables, 490; Of sheriffs performing the
duties of constables, 491; Of jurors, 314, 492; Of witnesses, 303,
Garnishees, 112, 493; For taking depositions, 434.
493;

FEMALES-—
Not to be imprisoned, when,

57.

FENCES
Lawful

fence, what, 628; Partition fences,
Not required in highway, 629.
Common Law liability in respect to, 627.

duty to maintain,

FILING
What constitutes,

51;

Chattel mortgage is filed when, 532.

628;
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FINDINGS-—
Of commissioner
96, n..2.

FINE—

for dissolution

on application
’

of attachment,

‘

For defaulting

as a witness, 306.

FiXTURES—
What are, 525; When tenant may remove,
on execution, 525.

525;

Not subject to levy

FOLIO—
What is a, 489.

FORCIBLE ENTRY AND DETAINER—
Forcible

ejection;

Forcible entry and detainer, damages for, 618.

FOREIGN LAW
Judicial notice not taken of,

351,

n. 5.

FORFEITURES—
Actions

for, 675, 676.

FORMER RECOVERY—'
When a bar, 221; When a judgment for nonsuit not, 221; And
when for costs not, 221, n. 46; Former judgment on point in
issue, 221; If on the merits, 221; And also as to matters which
might have been litigated in the former suit, 221.
Judgment by confession is a bar when, 221, n. 48; But not if suit
is for an installment, 221, n. 48; Against joint wrong-doers, 221,
n. 48.

On demand fradulently concealed, 221, n. 48.
Splitting demands and judgment only on part, 221, n. 48; Judg
ment for part only of an open account, 166.
Cause of action same when evidence same, 221.
Set oﬂ‘ when once used barred, 221.
Void judgment no bar, 221 ; Former recovery no bar to a new suit
on the judgment, 221.
Appeal, effect of on bar, 221, n. 4.

FRAUD—
Recoupment in case of 276, n. 7; Parol evidence to prove writing
procured by, 359.
Property, when deemed fraudulently conveyed, 530.
Rescinding contract for, 686; Trover for goods obtained by, 633;
Action for money obtained by fraud, 740.

FRAUDS, STATUTE OF-—
Writing, when agreement required to
to be performed within a year, 687;

Agreements not
To answer for the debt or
default or misdoings of another, 687; Agreements on considera
tion of marriage, 687; By executor, etc., to pay debt of deceased.
687; Contracts for the sale of goods for the price of titty dollars
be in, 687;
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FRAUDS, STATUTE OF—Continued.
or more, 688; Delivery and acceptance, 690; Earnest and
payment, 691; The memorandum, 692; Sales at auction, 693;
resentations as to the credit of another, 694; Contracts for
ing for more than a year, 696; Verbal guaranty of note on
thereof, 694, n. 14.
Consideration, need not be expressed in written contract, 695.

part
Rep
leas

sale

FRAUDULENT DEBTORS—

'
May be imprisoned when, 589.
Warrant for, when and how applied for, 590; Upon what evidence,
591; Aﬂldavit for, 591.
When warrant to issue, 592; Arrest of defendant, 593; Proceed
ings after arrest, 594; Denial by defendant, 594.
Adjournment during proceedings, 594; Commitment of defendant,
595; Discharge after commitment, 595; Bond for, 595; Proceed
ings on application for discharge, 596.

'

FRUITS
Disposition

of perishable, in case of attachment, 95.

GARNISHMENT-—~
'
Proceedings, when to be taken, 109; In case of joint contractors or
joint debtors, 109; Bills and notes are effects, when, 109; What
may be reached by, 109, n. 1, 121.
Proceedings, aﬂidavit for, 110; Summons to garnishee, 111; Service
and return of, 112; Suit when deemed commenced, 112; Liabil
ity of garnishee, 113; Garnishee neglecting to appear, 114;
Wararnt for, 114.
Ezcamination of garnishee, 115; Garnishee may be contradicted by
plaintiff, 115.
Proceedings on closing examination, 116; What deemed a discon
tinuance, 117; Second summons, 118.
Pleadings and trial, 119; Further disclosure, 119.
Execution thereon and stay,
Judgment against garnishee, 120;
120; Appeal and certlorari, 119, n. 6.
Costs when allowed garnishee, 120; Fees of as witness, 493.
Liability of garnishee to principal debtor, 121, n. 18.
Demands not due, how reached, 122.
When effects garnished are claimed by a third person, 123.
Corporations may be garnlsheed, when, 124; Service of process on,
124, n. 23, 125.

Garnishee, when released,

125

A.

Attachment, garnishee proceedings in, 126;
foreign corporations,,127.

‘

In

attachment against

Justices of the peace, 128;
oﬂlcers, when liable as, 128;
129;
Guardians, executors, and administrators,
Assignees, 128,
n. 32; Judgment debtors, 1‘.‘8. n. 34; Attorneys, 129.

Public
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GAR.NISHMEN'i‘—Continued.
Demands in suit, whether liable,

130; Rent not due, 130; Work not
completed, 130.
Liability of debtor not changed by garnishment, 130.
Set off, right of garnishee to, 131; Not of unliquidated demands
for torts, 131.
Defense by garnishee, what may be shown, 131.
Garnishee cannot waive legal service of process, 139, n. 14.
Executors and
as garnishees, 129.
administrators

GENERAL DAMAGES—
What are, 471.

GENERAL APPEAL
Nature of, 564, n.

2.

GENERAL ISSUE—
otlice of, 188; What may be shown under, 179, 188, n. 4;
Waives objection to jurisdiction,
Denies what, 188, n. 4;
when, 188, n. 4; And to process and service thereof, 188, n. 4;
Waives formal defects in declaration, 188, n. 4.
Admits what, 188, n. 4; Admits execution of written instrument
when, 188, n. 4, 191; In suits by executors, admits their oﬂicial
character, 188, n. 4; And existence of corporation when, 188,

Is what,

n. 4.

Failure of consideration, defence under,
Denies what, in assumpsit, 192; In debt,
trover, 195; in trespass, 196.

189;
193;

illegality of,
In covenant,

190.
194;

in

Notice of special matter under, 188, n. 5; Object and requisites of
notice, 188, n. 5; is not a pleading, 188, n. 5; No issue founded
on it, 188, n. 5.
What defenses must be given under notioe, 188, n. 5; Notice may
be amended, 188, n. 5.
Denial of execution of written instrument, when aiiidavit required,
191; in trover,—and trespass, what defenses require notice, 195-6.
GIFT——

Verbal gift without delivery passes no title,
GOODS BARGAINED AND SOLD
Action for, 715; When contract complete,

633.

715.

GOODS AND CHATTELS—
What included in the term, 521.
GOODS

SOLD AND DELiVERED—

See Assumpsit.
Action for, 716;
717;

How to declare for, 716;

For defendant,

GRACE, DAYS'OF—
See Assumpsit,

705.

718.

Evidence

for plaintiff,
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82, n. 30.

GUARANTY—
Verbal guaranty of note on sale of same, when good, 694, n. 14;
What is, and effect of, 712, n.; Of payment of note, 712, n. 36;
Guaranty assignable, 712; Guaranty of collection, 712, and n. 37.

‘

GUARDIAN—
Appointment
shees,

of for infant defendants, 148; Liability of as garni
'

129.

HANDWRITING—
See Evidence, 388.

HEARSAY—
See Evidence,

406

et seq._

HIGHWAY-—
Carriages meeting in, to turn to the right, 768;

Collisions

in,

768.

HIRER——

Liability for articles hired,

759.

HOLDING OF CAUSE 0PEN—
After trial commenced, when allowable,

_

294, n. 29, 30.

HOLIDAYS-—
What days are, 134, 289, n. 1; To be treated as Sunday, 134; Ad
journment of suits returnable on, or adjoined to, 134, 289, n. 1.
Promissory Notes, presentation for payment, and notice of dishonor
upon, 705.
'

HORSES—
See Warranty.

HOUSEI-IOLDER—
Who deemed to be, 526, n.

20.

HUSBAND AND WIFE
Replevin by, 649, n. 9, 10.
When husband not liable_for debts and engagements of his wife,
178; Not liable for money loaned to her on her own credit, 178,
n. 1; Nor to her for her use without his knowledge, 178, n. 1.
May sue alone for damages for injuries to wife, 178, n. 0.
Husband and wife as witnesses for and against each other, 440;
Admissions and acts of when binding on each other, 424.
Not liable for support of wife's children by a former husband, 724;
Nor to pay wife’s debts before marriage, 720.
Is liable for wife's necessaries, 720; And while living apart by
reason of his cruelty, 721; And during cohabitation, 723.

n
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I_-IUSBAND AND WIFE—Continued.
But not while she is living in adultery, 721;
722; Or separation with allowance, 722.
Not liable for torts of wife, 723, n. 28.

Nor after divorce,

IDIOTS AND LUNATICS—
Competency as witnesses, 444;

IMPEACHMENT—See Evidence,

Tender for, 243, n. 36.

r
463-470.

IMPRISONMENT—
See False Imprisonment.
Of defendants on execution when, 505, 521, 546; Is a satisfaction
of the judgment when, 669; .Of husband for torts of wife, 505,
n. 1; Of females, 506.

IMPLIED CONTRACTS
What are,

680,

n. 1;

When not implied, 680, n.

1.

INDEMNITY
To oﬁicer levying execution, 539;
suit on lost note, 700.

Or attachment, 81;

Bond of in

INDORSEMENT—
Payment may be proved by,

215,

n. 2.

INDORSER—
See Bills of Exchange and Promissory

'

Notes.

INFANT

Plaintlif, appearance by, 146, 147; Defendant, appearance by, 148.
Effect of infancy on power to contract, 208; When a contract is for
necessaries, 209; What are necessaries, 209; When for wife or
child of infant, 209; In case infant live at home and is fur
nished by father, 209.
Contracts of, are voidable, 210; Except in case of contract for nec
essaries, 210; What essential to avoid infants’ contract, 211;
Must restore what he has received if able to do so, 211; note of
infant, though negotiable, is voidahle, 211; Only the infant can
avoid the contract, 210, n. 13; Contracts which cannot possibly
be regarded as beneﬁcial to the infant are void, 210, n. 21.
Is liable for his torts, 212; Growing out of contract relations, 212;
ls liable for his negligence, 213; Burden of proof and evidence,
214; Ratiﬁcation after infant reaches his majority, 214.
Partnership contracts of, 210, n. 21; Tender for, 243, n. 36.
Judgment against, 485.
As witnesses, competency of, 441.

INTEREST

See Usury.
Disqualiﬁes justice, 2.
Rate of, 701; When recoverable, 701; Not to be recovered on usu
rious contracts, 250; On installments of interest, 251.
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IN'I‘EREST——Continued
On judgments and executions, 507, 701; On contracts and promis
sory notes, 701; By custom, on accounts, 701.
Compound interest, 251, 702.

As

damages,

476.

INTERPRETER—
Examination

ot witnesses through,

INTOXICATED PERSONS
Competency of as witnesses, 443;
Contracts by—See Drunkenness.

450.

As jurors, 327, n.

4.

INVENTORY
Of property taken on attachment, 786; Of property seized on execu
tion when exemption claimed, 528; Inventory of property re
turned not sold on execution, 549.

IRREGULARI'1*Y—
What is, 139, n. 13; May be waived, 18, 139; When garnishee can
‘not waive, 139, n. 14.
Waiver in service of process, 139; In adjournments, 297; How
waived, 298.
Objection to irregularity, when to be taken. 139: Irregularity in
service of process, remedy for, 139 ; In summoning jurors, 322.

JOINDER OF CAUSE OF ACTION—
When, and what allowable,
divided, 187.

185;

Causes of action should not be

JOINDER OF PLEAS

Several defendants may plead joint and several pleas. 197.

JOINT CONTRACTORS
Joint contractors compromising

need not be joined as defendants,
when, 29, n. 24; 80, n. 11, 205; Set-oi! in case of, 261, n. 28.
As garnishees, all joint debtors must be summoned, 109.
'

JOINT DEBTORS—

Attachment against, 69, n. 1; As garnishees, 109; Compromise by,
effect of, 29, n. 24; 180, n. 11, 205; How made, 220, n. 36; Non
joinder of, in suits by and against, effect of, 180.
Release to one of several, effect of, 220, n. 36.
Statute of limitations as to, 228, 234, n. 26, 238; Set-oﬂ in case oi,
261,

n. 28.

Judgments against, 485; When only a part served with process,
'
485; How enforced, 485.
Execution against, 520.

JOINT OWNERS—
Replevin by, 100,

JOINT

649.

TENANTS—

Replevin

by,

100,

649.
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JOINT TRESPASSERS—
Judgment against, 613, 619;

No contribution

between,

613.

J UDGES—

Cannot act on personal knowledge,

351.

JUDGMENT—
Attachment
When void

on, 69, n. 1.

if Justice

related to a party, 2, -n. 14.
When action on barred, 223, and notes.
Of nonsuit tor want of appearance, 149-; May be rendered when,
312, 342; In what cases, 482.
By confession, jurisdiction in 11; When, upon what demands and
how, 482; When confession to be in writing, 482.
On plea in abatement, 177.
On demurrer, 281.
In attachment, 93, n. 3; 98, n. 4, 486; Not limited to amount stated
in the affidavit, 98, n. 2.
In replevin. 108, 654-657; In trespass, 612, 613; In trover, 612, 613.
Against garnishees, 120.
In case of set-oﬂ, 27; Used as a set-of! is extinguished, 274.
In case of recoupment, 277.
When to be rendered, 312, 484; When within four days, 312; Is
complete when announced, 314, n. 15; When to be entered, 484,

How

165;

pleaded,

487.

joint debtors,

Against
process,

48B;

When

part

only

were served

with

485.

When defendant an infant, 485;

In force only against those served,

485.

Against surety for costs, 140, 141.
For costs. when, 488; For what amount, 488; When tor attorney's
fees, 488; For double costs, 494.
Judgments may be used as set-oﬂ, 256.
Amendment of, 580.
Proof of Justice's judgments of this State, 374; Of other States,
375.

Transcripts of, ﬁling, etc., 496; Transcript,
how obtained, 497;
Ettect of ﬁling, 497, 498; Transcript from Docket oi’ one Justice
to that of another, 499.
Satisfaction
ment,

of by levy on personal property,

548;

By imprison

669.

Debt, judgment in actions of, 669.
In case of removal by certiorari, 562.

JUDGMENT RECORD
What constitutes, 372;
372.

Of judgments in Circuit Court. how proved,

»

-

‘—

T.§_-.1
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JUDICIAL ACTS—
What are, 4; Liability of Justice or oﬂicer for,

I
4.

JUDICIAL NOTICE

Courts take judicial notice of the extent of their powers,
What will be noticed judicially, 351.
See Evidence, 351.

6, n. 34;

JURISDICTION
Is what,

6; Of Justice,

is conferred by statute, 6; Not by consent,
Not by implication, nor to be presumed, 6; Must appear
aﬂirmatively, 6.
As to amount in controversy, 9, 11-15.
Of what persons, 7; School districts, 7; Corporations, 7; Voluntary
associations, 7; Executors and administrators, 7.
Residence of parties, effect of as to jurisdiction, 8.
Cause of action and amount, 9; Sum claimed is the test as to
amount, 9, n. 46.
What actions not within jurisdiction, 10.
Re
On confession of judgment, 11; Covenant on bond, 12;
plevin, 13; Actions for penalties and forfeitures, 14; in tort, 15.
Proceedings without jurisdiction, 18.
In attachment, aﬁidavit essential to, 69; So a bond, 76, n. 10.
Objections to jurisdiction may be taken when and how, 170.
Pleas to, 168, 169.
6, 18;

J"URORS—
Who competent as, 316; Number required, 315, 319, 333.
Exemptions from serving as, 317; Who may be excused, 318; For
intoxication, 327, n. 4; Challenge for having served on former
juries within a year, 328; For having formed or expressed an
opinion, 327; Peremptory, 325.
_
For bias or partiality, 327.
Penalty for non-attendance, 335.
Fees of,

492.
'

JURY——

Trial

by, when, 314;

Number required, 315, 319, 333; When to be
When deemed waived, 314, 322; May be allowed
after issue joined, 315, n. 18.
Venire for, 319; Second venire, when, 323; Payment of jury fees,
demanded,

314;

314.

Selection of jurors, 315, 319; Oath to constable, 319; Number of
jurors, 315, 319, 333; Parties may agree upon, 320.
Summoning, 319; Return of venire, 321; irregularities in sum
moning, how waived, 322, n. 34.
Summoning talesmen, 323.
Peremptory challenges of talesmen only, 325; Each defendant

Q
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JURY—Continued.
pleading separately has full number of peremptory challenges al
'
lowed by law, 325, n. 45.
Challenges for cause, 324, 326, 327; To the Array, 326; To the
polls, 327; Because not qualiﬁed, 327; Because of bias or par
tiality, 327; Because of kin to a party, 327 ; Because of interest
in the suit, 327 ; Because in the service of a party, tenant of a
party, has a considered opinion as to the rights of the parties,
and the like, 327; Inhabitants of a municipality not disqualified
because municipality a party, 327; service on former juries as a
Exemption from service does not dis
328;
disqualiﬁcation,
qualify, 328; When challenge is for cause ground to be imme
diately assigned, 329; Distinction between challenge for principal
cause and to the favor abolished, 329.
When challenge to be made, 330.
How to be made, 331; How tried, 332.

Swearing the jury, 334.
335.
Penalty for ‘non-attendance,
Are judges of the law and the facts, 344, 346;

Charging

the jury,

344.

Deliberations
the

jury

of the jury, 345;

room,

May take documentary evidence to

346.

Verdict of, 348; May be received on Sunday, 349.
Disagreement and discharge of the jury, 350.
Misconduct of jury, and effect of, 347.

JUSTICE
depends on statute, 1; Must reside where elected, 1;
Removal vacates oﬁice, 1; Change of boundaries vacates, 1; Can
not adt in his own cause, 2; Nor when interested, 2; Nor when
related to either party, unless by consent, 2; When related by
consanguinity or affinity, 2; Judgments of void when, 2, n. 14;
Not to hold court in a bar-room, 3; Acts of are judicial and min
isterial, 4; Is liable for ministerial acts when, 4; Not for judi
cial, 4.
Not buy cause of action to bring suit on it,5 ; Not to purchase judg
ment rendered by him, 5; Not to be witness in case before him,

Jurisdiction of

311, n. 10.

Jurisdiction of, whence derived,

5; .When not conferred by consent.
Of what parties, 7.
As to residence of parties, 8; Absconding parties, 8; Of parties
residing in another county, 35.
As to cause of action, 9; And amount, 9; As to subject matter, 9.
6;

10, 14.

Proceedings before, without jurisdiction,
Justices’ courts, powers of, 156, n. 6.

18.
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J'USTICE—Continued.

'

Fees oi’, 489.
Sickness of operates to cause adjournment, 154, 295;
or inability or vacancy in oﬂice, 154, 295.
When may adjourn on his own m_otion, 41, 289.

So of absence

LAND—
Trespass on.

See

Trespass to Real Property.

LAW OF THE ROAD—
See Carriages.

LANDLORD

AND TENANT—

See Use and Occupation.

LEADING QUESTIONS—
See Evidence,

451.

LEASE
For more than

one year to be

in writing,

696.

l_.ESSOR——

W hen cannot maintain trespass, 615.

LEVY
See Replevin,

Execution,

537-539, and Attachment.

LIABILITY
Of Justice proceeding

without

jurisdiction,

18;

For ministerial

acts, 4, 5.

Ofoﬂlcers, protected by process, when, 138.
Of constables, and his sureties, on execution, 551.

LICENSE

630; Writing not necessary, 630; irrevocable
Not assignable, 630.
'
When a defense in trespass, 630.

Is what,

when, 630;

LIEN—
0t attachment, 91, 99.
When discharged by tender, 247, note.
Oi chattel mortgage, 82, n. 30; 522, n.

LIMITATIONS, STATUTE
oi

48.

OF——

222; Construed with
favor, 222; May be retroactive, 223; Cannot escape bar of, by
'
amendment, 222.
What actions barred in six years, 223; What in two years, 223;
What in three years, 223; What in ten years, 223; On sealed in
struments, 223, n. 11 and 14; On Justices’ judgments, 223, n. 10;
On Justices’ judgments docketed in Circuit Court, 223, n. 10;
On bank notes and bills, 223.
Issuing execution does not prevent the running oi the statute, 223,

_Stautes

n. 10.
62

repose

as well as of presumption,

GENERAL INDEX.

978

[usrsaancas

ABE T0 SECTIONS.]

LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OF—Continued.
In suits tor penalties, 223; When suit
people,

223;

served, 238;

brought in the name of the
234, n. 20, 238; Or not
be accounted for, 239,

joint debtors, 228,
On receipts for property to

In

case of

n. 28.

.

actions barred in another State, 234; In case ot joint debtors
residing out of State, 234.
When statute begins to run, 224, n. 19, 232, 234, n. 18; How time
computed, 224, n. 19, 233, 239.
Statute runs without interruption, 225, 233; When disability pre
vents running, 225, 233; Successive disabilities do not, 233.
Notice of the defense must be given, 225; May be given by amend
ment, 225, n. 23.
Statute how avoided by proof of cause within six years, 226; By
proving new promise, 227; New promise must be in writing, 227;
By partial payments, 227, n. 26; 231.
New promise by one of several joint debtors, 228, 235-6, n.; 231, n.
47; By admission that debt is unpaid, 230; Creditor cannot apply
a payment to an outlawed debt, when, 231.
New promise by indorsement of payment, 227, n. 25; 231; By ad
mission of breach of contract, 240; By admission of tort, 241.
Mutual open accounts, 232.
Running of the statute, how affected by plaintiﬂ's disability to sue,
233; Cumulative disabilities, 233.
Defendant’s absence from the State, 234; In case of joint debtors,
234; In case of torts, 234.
Death of claimant or debtor, 235.
Failure to serve process, 236; Reversal of judgment, 236.
Stay of proceedings by injunction, 236.
Fraudulent concealment of cause of action, 237.
Set-oﬁs, when barred, 238.
Breach of contract. when action for barred, 240; Effect of acknowl
edgment of cause of action in case of tort, 241.

In

LIQUIDATED DEMANDS—

'

What are, 69, n. 1; 254, n. 1.
Attachment, will lie on other than,

69,

n. 1.

LOCAL ACTIONS-—
What are,

LOST

16.

BILL OR NOTE—

Action on, how maintained,

699,

700.

LOST PAPERS
Proof of’, 396-398.
Malice

as

affecting

MAPS
As evidence,

383.

damages,

603,

n.

19.
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MARRIAGE-—
Certificate of, proof of, 379.
Agreement in consideration

of to be in writing, 687.
'

MARRIED WOMEN—

Appearance by, 144.
Her power over her real and personal estate, 178; Not liable for
debts of husband, 178; May contract when, 178;
Contracts of
married women residing in other States, 178, n. 45; May sue
and be sued, 178; Husband may be her agent, 178, n. 48.
May carry on business in her own name, 178, n. 48; But can con
tract only in respect to her sole property, 178, n. 0; When liable
for necessaries purchased by her, 178, n. 0.
May mortgage her property to secure her husband's debts, 178, n. 0;
But cannot make herself liable by signing a note with him for
his debt, 178, n. 0; Nor on a contract of suretyship for another,
178, n. 0.

May sue alone for injuries to herself, 178, n. 0; And for exempt
property of her husband taken on execution against him, 178,
n. 0;

526, n. 25.

MASTER AND SERVANT

Llability of master for negligence of servant, 757; Not liable to
servant for the negligence of his fellow servant, 757; When
liable for injuries to servant arising in the course of employ
ment, 757.
When liable for acts of incompetent servant, 757.

MATERIAL AVERMENTS—
See Evidence, 354.

MINISTER OF THE GOSPEL
See Glergymen.

MINISTERIAL

_

ACTS——

What are, 4;

Liability for,

4, 138,

n.

11.

MISJOINDER—

Of parties, pleadable in abatement, 182; Effect of,
Of causes of action, demurrable, 186, 280, n. 2.

MISNOMER—
In process,

32;

182.

_

In pleading in abatement,

172.

MISTAKE
In name of party,

32, 172;

Action for money paid

MONEY COUNTS—
See

Assumpsit,

727-743.

MONEY HAD AND RECEIVED-—
See Assumpsit,

731-743.

by, 738.
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MONEY LENT AND ADVANCED
See Assumpsit,

727.

MONEY PAID, LAID OUT, ETC.-—
See Assumpsit,

728-730.

MORTGAGE
Discharge of by tender, 247, n. 5; Deed may be shown to be a
mortgage, 359.
Attachment in case of property subject to. 82.

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-—

Justices have no jurisdiction over, 7,
NAME
But one Christian name recognized,
27, 162, n.

20;

name unknown,
162;

Public

Defendants, 28,
29; Partnership

officers,

n. 38.
227;

Plaintiffs, how named,

20;
When defendant's
name may be used, when, 24,

162,

n.

31.

in name of party, 32; If defendant sued by wrong name,
162;
Named by initial letter, 30, 161.
The name is the same when the pronunciation is the same, 162,
n. 20; Misspelling of, when material, 162, n. 20.
Fictitious name, use of, 29, 162, n. 17.

Mistake

Amendment as to, 30, 32.

NECESSARIES— .
See

Infant, Husband and Wife.

NEGATIVE ALLEGATIONS——
Proof of, 357.

NEGLIGENCE
Recoupment in case of, 276, n. 7.
_L1ability of party guilty of, 755, 756; When plaintiff's negligence
contributed to the injury, 756.
Employer, when liable for negligence of employee, 757; Not liable
to one servant for the negligence of another, when, 757, n. 7.

NEWSPAPERS
Market

reports in, when admissible

NEXT FRIEND
Appointment

of for infant plaintiif,

in evidence,

383.

147.

NOMINAL

DAMAGES——
When allowed, 471.

NON-ATTENDANCE
Of witness, may attach and ﬁne for,

306.

NON-RESIDENTS——
Plaintiff, suit by, 21; Defendant, suit against, 21; Security for
costs by non-resident plaintiff, 21; Attachment in case of, 69,
n. 1; I-iow the statute of limitations affects, 234.

-

'
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NON-JOINDER—
Of plaintiffs, when pleadable in abatement, 179; When objection
for may be taken advantage of under the general issue, 179; Or
by demurrer, 179; How at trial, 179; In replevin, 649.
Of defendants, effect of, 180.
Of causes of action, 185.

NONSUIT-—
For want of appearance, 149; When_ judgment of may
dered, 312, 342; When plaintiff may submit to, 312, 342.

be

ren

NOTARY
Certiﬂcates of proof of, 381.

NOTICE
Of defense under the general issue, 188; Must be given, when, 188;
Notice of the statute of limitations, 225; May be given by amend
ment, 225, n. 23; Of tender, 248; Of set-oil, 255, 270, 271; Of
recoupment, 278.
.
Of application for certiorari, 553.
Of title to land in trespass, 622; Forms of the notice, 622.
Written notice, when provable without producing it, 360.
Notice to quit, 747; May be proved orally, 360.
Published, proof of, 382.
Of taking deposition, 426.

NUISANCE—
Abatement of, 631.
OATH-—
See Affidavit.
Oaths and aiiirmations, how administered,
Witness must take, or aﬂirm, 340.

51.

OBJECTIONS—
See Evidence,

458.

For irregularities,

when to be taken,

139.

OFFiCE‘R—
Actions against, where to be tried, 17; Public oﬂicers and boards,
how suits brought by, 23.
Process protects oﬂicer, when, 138.
‘
Liability of, on levy of execution, 551; When protected by, 138,
509; Indemnity to, 539; Not to purchase property on execution
sale, 543.

Death or expiration of term of oﬂice before return of execution,
When liable to garnishment, 128.
To attend jury, 345.

OFFICIAL CHARACTER
Proof of,

405,

588;

Admitted

by general issue when, 588.

547.
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OF CITIES AND VlLLAGES—

How proved,

365.

OPINIONS OF WITNESSES—
See Evidence,

388,

455.

'

OYER—
Is what, 667; When to be given, 667.
PARENT AND CHILD-—
Liability of parent to maintain child,
debts

of child,

PAROL EVIDENCE—See Evidence,

To vary or

724;

When not liable

for

724.
"
_

359.

359; To explain alterations and eras
ures, 359, n. 1; Of general custom, admissible when, 359; Ad
missible to show sense in which equivocal words were used, 359;
And to show that a deed was given as a mortgage, 359.
add to writings,

PARTIES—
How named in suits, 22, 25; Only one Christian name recognized,
27; Description of in process, 27; When defendant’s name not
known, 29; Designating by initial letter, 30; Fictitious name
may be used, when, 29; Partners may sue by ﬁrm name when,
29;
Public oﬂicers, how named, 23, 31; Mistake in name of
party, 32.
When a joint debtor has compromised, 29, n. 24.
Refusing to be sworn on trial, eﬂect of, 448, n. 25.

PARTNERS
Sults by and against, 24; May be sued in ﬁrm name, when, 24, 29;
Surviving partner may sue alone, 24.
Compromising, need not be sued, when, 29, n. 24; 178, n.; Separate
compromises by, 205; How effected, 205; Admissions by, 421.
Attachments against, 69, n. 1; Set-offs by and against, 261, n.
28; 262.

PARTNERSHIP
Proof of, how

PATENTS FROM
l-low proved,

made, 401;

Property of, levy of execution on, 523.

U. S. FOR LANDS—
382.

PAYING MONEY INTO COURT
When to be paid in, 248;
admits what, 248, n. 10.

PAYMENT—
Bill ot exchange

With notice ot tender,

248;

Eﬂect of,

or note given, operates as, when, 201, 216.
Before suit may be shown under the general issue, 215; In cove~
nant and debt, when notice must be given, 215; And after action
brought, 215.
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By and to whom to
accepted,

215,
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be made,

215;

Money

'or

thing paid must be

n. 50.

How proved, 215; By receipt or indorsement, 215 and n. 2.
worthless bills, not good, 215, n. 1, 216; When payment in chat
tels good, 216; What may be accepted by attorney, 216, n. 6.
Promissory note given will not operate as, unless accepted as pay
ment, 216; When acceptance as, presumed, 216, n. 7; Note not
produced presumed paid, 216, n. 8; Payment of mortgage will
be a payment of the note collateral thereto, 216, n. 8.
By check, when deemed, 216, n. 11.
When presumed from lapse of time, 217; When from usual course
of dealing, 217; From receipts and settlements, 217.
Application of, debtor has right to make, 218; When creditor may
make, 218; Presumption as to application of, 218 ; How applied
by the law, 218.
Notice of payment and proof of, 215, 219.
Statute of limitations, running of, how affected by, 227, n. 26, 231.

In

PEDIGREE-—

-

How proved,

408.

PENALTY—

.

Jurisdiction of justices in,
assumpsit, 676.
Against defaulting

14,

671;

witnesses, 306;

Recovery of, in debt, 671;

Jurors,

In

335.

PENAL STATUTES—
action of on, 14, 671; Assumpsit on, 676-678;
limitations runs against action on when, 223.

Debt,

Statute of

PENDENCY—
Ot another action, or on appeal,
abatement,

PEREMPTORY
See Jury.

174,

or certiorari,

when pleadable in

184.

CHALLENGES—~

PERISHABLE PROPERTY
Disposition

of, on attachment, 94.

,

PHYSICIANS
See Evidence,

446.

Prohibited from disclosing information acquired in the perform
ance of professional duties in certain cases, 446.

PLAINTIFF—
Suit by non-resident, 21; Security for costs by, 21.
How described in summons, 22, 27; When contract has been as
signed, 25; Designating by initial letter, 30.

GENERAL INDEX.
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PLEA—
How named in process, 36; Puis darrein continuance, 282;
jurisdiction and in abatement, see Pleadings.

To the

Pl.~EADINGS—
Are what, 157; In garnishee cases, 119, 121.
When pleadings to be made, 155, 168; Object of, 157, n. 7; In Jus
tice’s Court should be construed liberally, 158 and n. 8; lnsuﬂi
ciency of may be waived, 158, n. 9; Date from time of ﬁling,
158, h. 9.

May be verbal, or in writing, 159; If verbal, substance of to be
entered, 159; Form and sufficiency of, 160, 167.
Declaration deﬁned, 160; Requisites of, 160; Parties how named
in. 160-1; In tort when all the defendants not served, 162; When
defendant's name unknown, or initial of defendant's name used,
162; Misspelling of name, 162, n. 20.
Variance between declaration and process, when material, 162.
Declaration must contain a substantial statement of cause of action,
163, and n. 22;
Substance sufficient, 163, n. 22; How to declare
on statutes, 163, n. 22; When technical nicety will be disre
garded, 162; When contract must be averred to be in writing,
163; If declaration insuﬂicient the defendant may demur, 163;
Will be held suﬂicient when, 163; Pleadings in actions by and
against corporations, 164.
Judgments, how pleaded, 165; Performance of condition precedent,
166; On open accounts, must embrace all, when, 166;
On con
tracts executed by agents, 163, n. 24.
Consideration, ho_w alleged, 163, n. 24; Statement of place where
cause of action arose, 167, n. 35.
Videlicet, use of, 167, n. 35.
Damages, allegation as to, 167, n. 39, 40; Special damages must
be alleged, 167, n. 39; Whether statement of the amount claimed,
necessary, 167, n. 40; Amount claimed must not exceed the
jurisdiction of the Court, 167, n. 40.
Ad damnum clause, may apply to what, 167, n. 40.
Pleas to the jurisdiction, 168, 169; What is jurisdiction, 169; Or
der of pleading, 168; To the jurisdiction or in abatement, not
to be pleaded with a plea in bar, 168; Plea in bar waives ob
jection to the jurisdiction, 168; When objections to jurisdiction
to be made, 170; Effect of absence of jurisdiction, 170.
Pleas in abatement to disability of plaintiff, 171; When existence
oi’ corporation denied, 171; Mistake in naming corporation, 171;
if plaintiff insane, 171, n. 18.

To disability of defendant, ground for,
joinder of defendants, when cause
misnarncd, 172.

172;

for plea,

Non-joinlder or mis
172;
If defendant
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PLEADINGS—Continued.
In abatement of process, grounds for, 173; To the action of the
process, 174; That another suit, appeal or certiorari is pend
ing, 174; Accuracy and certainty required in plea, 175, 184, n.
31; Everything necessary to the defense under the plea must be
set forth, 175; Plea must be veriﬁed, 176; Requisites of aﬂidavit
for, 176; By whom to be made, 176; Judgment in, 177.
Coverture, when pleadable in abatement, 178; Replication to, 178.
Non-joinder of plaintiffs, ground for, 179; When the objection may
be taken under the general issue, 179; In actions for torts, 179;
Effect of non-joinder when plea not interposed, 179.
Non-joinder of defendants in actions on contract, 180; Effect when
no plea interposed, 179; Suit a bar when, 179; Must be pleaded
in abatement when, 180; In case of compromise by joint debtors,
180, n. 10;
In tort, not pleadable in abatement when, 180; Sep
arate owners of several animals trespassing, not to be joined,
180, n. 11.

All joint

contractors must be named in plea, 180; When plea not
sustained, 180.
Evidence to support plea. 181; Plea admits plaintiffs claims, but
not the amount of it, 181.

Misjoinder of parties, eifect of,

182.

Misnomer. plea as to, 183.
Pendency of another action, 174, 184;

‘

In garnishee

cases,

184,

n.

27.

Joinder of causes of action, 185.
Misjoinder of causes of action,‘
Dividing causes of action, 187.
Puts darrein continuance, 282,

186.

283.

PLEAS IN BAR
See Pleadings.
Oﬂice and purpose of, 188;

Special pleas in bar abolished,

188.

General issue, what, 188; Denies what, 188, and n. 4, 192; What
defenses may be shown under, 188, n. 4, 192; Failure of consid
eration, 189.
Notice of defense

under,

188,

n. 5.

Accord and satisfaction, 198-205; Duress, 206, 207; Infancy, 208
Payment, 215, 219; Release, 220; Former recovery, 221;
214;
Statute of limitations, 222-241; Tender, 232, 249; Usury, 250
252; Drunkenness, 252.
Amendment of,

PLEAS

TO

577.

THE JURISDICTION—

See Pleadings.

i
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PLEA PUIS DARREIN CONTINUANCE—
See puis darrein

continuance.

PLEDGE
Is what,

522; Property pledged is liable to attachment and levy
of execution, 22, 82, n. 30.
Property pledged, stocks, bonds, notes, etc., how disposed of, 818,
819.

POSSESSION
Suﬂicient to maintain trespass, 615;

Or trover, 634.

POST MARKS
On letters, as evidence, 383.

POWERS OF ATTORNEY—
Proof of, 384.
PRESUMPTIONS—
What
404;

they are, 402; Classiﬁcation of, 403;
Disputable, of law, 405; Presumption

Conclusive, of law,
must be reasonable,

402, n. 3.
See Evidence,

402, 405

PRIMARY EVIDENCE—
What is, 358;

Differs from secondary how, 358.

PRINCIPAL AND SURETY—
Of makers of promissory notes,
Execution in case of, 503, 508.

liability and discharge of,

713;

PR.IORITY~—
Of executions, 536.

PROCESS
See Summons, Warrant, Attachment, etc.
When service may be dispensed with, 19, n. 1.
Summons, essentials of, 21; Plaintiffs, how named and described
in, 27; Defendants, how named, 28.
Amendment of, 29, 32, 37, 161, 162, 573, 575; To be in English,
38,

136.

Must be signed, 132; Sealing, 132; Alteration vitiates when, 132.
n. 2; Not to be issued or served on Sunday, 133.
Seventh day observers, process against, 135.
Return day, 33; Time of return on long summons, 34;
Short
summons, 34; If on seventh day, cause continued, 135:
Deputing persons to serve process, 39 ; In what cases, 137; Who
may be authorized, 137.
Who may serve, 39; Constables, 39; Sheriﬁs and deputies, 39;
Any competent person, when, 39, 137; Persons deputed, 39, 137.
When to be served, 40, 44, 132; Not on Sunday, 42, 133.
'
when, 138.
Protects

office‘

GENERAL INDEX.
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PROCESS—Continued.
Irregularity in, is what, 139; Objection for, when to be taken, 139;
Waiver of, 139; Remedy for, 139.
Return of service, 47; When returnable on seventh day, ete., 135.
Return may be shown to be untrue, 139; But not collaterally, 139;
Remedy for false return, 139.
Security for costs on issuing, 21, 140; Liability of surety, 140 ; In
actions for personal labor, 141.
Plea in abatement of, 173, 174.

PRODUCTION OF PAPERS
Subpoena

to witness for, 300.

PROFERT—
What, and when to be made, 667;
administration, 587.

PROFESSIONAL
Reading
dence,

Of letters testamentary and of

AND SCIENTIFIC BOOKS
As to the admissibility

of to the jury, 383;

of in evi

383.

PROFITS AS DAMAGES
When recoverable, 477.

PROOF
Extent of required, 354.

PROTEST—
See Promissory

Notes,

705,

710.

PUBLIC 0FFICE‘R.S—
See Officers.

Actions against, where to be brought, 17.
Suits by public ofﬁcers and boards, 23;
named, 31.
Not liable as garnishees, 128.

As defendants, how

PUBLIC DOCUMENTS AND RECORDS
Proof of,

366.

PROMISSORY NOTE
See Bills of Exchange.
PUIS DARREIN CONTINUANCE—

Plea of, when proper, 282; May be in bar or abatement, 282; Ef
fect of the plea, 282; Must be veriﬁed, 283; In case of set-off
pleaded,

272.

RAILROAD COMPANIES
Service of process

upon, 43;

Incorporation

of how proven,

RECEIPT
Payment may be proved without producing, 360.
Receipt may be contradicted or explained, 215, n.
Tam receipts, 382.

2.

400.
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RECEIPTOR—
Of goods attached, 85; Successive attachments when property
hands of, 83.
Of goods taken in execution, 540; May sue in trespass, 612.

in

RECITALS-—

In

deeds, evidence against party, 668.

RECORDS AND DOCUMENTS
See Evidence.

To be proved as a whole, 366.
0f Foreign Courts, 369; Copies of,

370;

Of courts of other states,

Of this state, 372.
Judgment record, what is, 372.
Probate records, 373; Of Justices‘ Courts, 374; Of proceedings be
fore justices of other states, 375.
Copies of records, 376; How certiﬁed, 377; Of chattel mortgages,
how certiﬁed, 376, n. 5.
Of conviction, 378.
Of deeds and copies, 384.
Of other instruments, when acknowledged, 384. \
Records not made evidence, 394.
Non-existence of records, presumption as to, 395.
Lost records and papers, how proved, 396, 398; Restoring lost rec
ords and papers, 397.
371;

RECOUPMENT-—
How distinguished
What is, 276; When allowable, 276;
from
setoif, 276, n. 1; Is conﬁned to claims arising out of actions
sued upon, 276.
In case of fraud and negligence, 276, n. 7; Not in case of tort,
276,

n. 8.

Who may recoup, 276, n. 8.
Notice of the defense, 278.
Judgment in, 277; Defendant may have judgment
his favor, 277.

for balance in

RELATIONSHIP-—
By consanguinity, 2; Degrees of, how computed, 2.
Of Justice to parties, disqualiﬂes, when, 2; How shown on appeal
for certiorari, 2, n. 14.
By afiinity, 2;

RELEASE—By one joint plaintiff,
ors,

effect of, 220;

To

_

one of several

joint debt

220.

Covenant not to sue, deemed a release, 220; When not, 220; Is a
bar when, 220; When without consideration, 220; Effect of a
general release, 220; Not to be varied by parol, 220, n. 44;
When obtained by fraud, 220, n. 45.
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RELEVANCY—
Of evidence,

353.

REMOVAL-—
Of justice, vacates his office,

REPLEVIN-—
Jurisdiction in,
commenced,

13;

Action,

1.

local,

20.

16,

n.

4;

When

suit

deemed

_

Action of, 100, 649; Lies when, 100, 649; Chapters 294 and 295,
C. L. 1897, applicable to justice’s courts, 100; Plaintiffs interest
in the property, 100, 649; By executors, 100; For what prop
erty, 100, 649; For property sold on Sunday, 100, n. 3; Not for
property in plaintiffs »possession, 100, n. 3; Nor for property
taken for a tax, or upon execution, 100, and n. 5, 650; Or taken
on attachment, or execution, 100, 650 ; Lies for personal chattels
only, 100, 649; By joint owners, joint tenants, tenants in com
mon, 100, 649; But not by a part owner, 100, 649; Nor by hus
band alone for property of the wife, 649, n. 10; When husband
and wife may join in, 649, n. 9; For goods attached, 650, 658.
Writ of, when and how issued, 101; When returnable, 104; Aﬂ‘.i
davit for, 102.
Bond for, 103; Liability of sureties in, 103, 659; Action on, 659.
Breaking doors, 105;
Service and execution of the writ, 105;
Summons to defendant, 105.
Return of writ, 106.
Alias and pluries writs, 107.
Proceedings when goods not replevied, 108; Declaration in, 651;
Description of property, 651.
Plea and notice, 652; Non-joinder of plaintiffs, abatement for, 179.
Demand, when necessary, 653.
'
Verdict, ass.
Judgment in, 108; For plaintiff, 654; In case goods not found,
655;
Execution in such cases, 655; Judgment for defendant,
656; When parties have liens only, 657.

REPLICATION——
Aboiished, except

RESCINDING

to pleas in abatement, 279.

CONTRACTS

When allowable for fraud, 686; When made on Sunday, 685;
breach of warranty, 754, n. 18.

For

RESIDENCE OF PARTIES—
Of justice, 1.
Effect of on jurisdiction of Justice,

8.

RETURN—
Of service of summons, 47; Of warrant, 64; Of attachment, 92;
Replevin, 106; In garnishment, 112; Of executions, 545-549.
I

.
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560.

To appeal, 570, 571.

'

SALE—-

What is, 689, n. 5; Of property on execution, 542, 543; Of prop
erty not in existence, passes no title, 633; Delivery, when neces
sary, 690, n. 7; At auction, 693.
Of property of the value of ﬁfty dollars, etc., 688.

SATISFACTION-—
See Accord

and Satisfaction.

SCHO0LMASTER—
of scholar by, 607.

Punishment

SCHOOL DISTRICT
Jurisdiction of Justices in
against,

SCIENTIFIC

cases

of, 7;

Suits

by,

23;

Process

21.

BOOKS-—

As evidence,

383.

SEAL—
want of does not invalidate, 76; Process, whether to be
132; What is a sufficient seal, 66; As evidence of con
sideration, 189.
384,
When necessary to a clerk’s certiﬁcate of authentication,
n. 39; Or to deed executed in another State, 384, n. 39.

When

sealed,

SEAL INSTRUMENTS—
Action on, when barred,

SECONDARY

223,

n.

11

and

14.

EVIDENCE—

Distinguished

from primary,

358;

No degrees

of, 358, n. 23; 398,

n. 25.

SECURITY
For

costs,

140, 141.

SERVICE
Of summons, who may serve, 39; Where and how served, 40, 41;
Not on Sunday, 42, 133, or on election days, 46.
On corporations, 43; On railroad companies, 43; On school dis
tricts, 43.
Return of service, 47; Time for, how computed, 34; Long sum
mons, 34; Short summons, 34.
Warrant, service of, 56.
Attachment, when and how served, 86 and n. 44.
Writ of replevin, 105, 107.
Garnishment, service of writ, 112, 139, n. 14.
Of execution, 521, 546, 547.
Of certiorari on justice, 558.

Q
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SERVICE—Oontinued.
By persons deputized,

137; by private persons, 137, n. 6; by officer,
of process in his own favor, 137, 39, n. 21.
Irregularity in service, 139.
Defective service, how objected to, 139, n. 14; 171, 173, n. 28;
Return of service may be shown to be false, 139, 173.
Subpoena, service of, 303.

SET-OFF——
Deﬁned, 254, and recoupment distinguished, 276, n. 1.
In garnishee proceedings, 131.
When barred, 275; By statute of limitations, 236.
When set-off allowed, 254; Notice of must be given, 255.
What demands may be set off, 254, 256, 258; Must be on judgment
or contract, 256; And owing to the defendant as original cred
itor, or as assignee of the demand, 257, 262; Joint debt not to
be set off against a separate demand, 257, n. 13, 261; Note when
joint and several, 261, n. 28; Assigned demands, 257, 262; Debt
due to defendant as surviving partner or surviving joint cred
itor, 256, n. 13; Must be due to all the defendants and owing
by all the plaintiffs, 261.
Must be liquidated, when, 254, 258; Must have existed at the
commencement of the suit and must then have belonged to the
defendant, 259.
Against what demands allowed, 260; Debt of partner not against
demand of ﬁrm, 261, n. 28, 262; Against note signed by sure
ties,

266.

‘

When allowable against assigned contracts, etc., 263;
When
against assignee, 263; Against note transferred after due, 263,
264; When against note transferred before due, 264.
Against plaintiff who is trustee for another, 265; Against assignee
for the beneﬁt of creditors, 264, n. 7.
Judgment in case of set-off, 267; When for defendant, 267 ; In set
off against executors, 268.
Neglect to set off demands. costs, etc., 269.
Notice of set-off, when to be given, 270; Bill of particulars of, 271,
284; Form of the notice, 271.
.
Plea puts darrein continuance in case of notice of, 272.
Discontinuance of suit not allowed after notice of set-off given, 273.
Splitting demands offered as set-off, 273, n. 26.
Tort, claims for not matters of set-oif, 274.
Emecutors, set-offs by, 268, 584.
Judgments used as set-offs extinguished, 274.
Executions, setting off, 550.

SEVENTH DAY OBSERVERS—
Process against, 135;

When cause to be adjourned, 135,

289,

n. 1.
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SHEEP
Killing

Dog may be killed, when, 764;
by dogs, 763, 764.

by dogs, 763, 764;

for killing or worrying

Damages

sheep,

SHERIFF-

May serve process, when, 39; Fees of, 491;
sue in trespass, 612.
Certiﬁcate of sale as evidence, 382.

Or constable

may

SICKNESS-—
in

Of justice, adjournment

case of, 154, 295.

SPECIAL APPEALS—
Nature of, 564, n.

2.

How alleged,

n. 39;

SPECIAL DAMAGES
cases,

603,

167,

What are, 471;

In

assault and battery

n. 19.

SPECIAL PLEAS IN
Not allowed,

BAR-—

188.

SPLITTING DEMANDS—
Not allowable,

effect

of,

187, 221,

In

and notes;

case

of setoffs,

273, n. 26.

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS—
See

I

Limitations.

STATUTES

Declaring‘ on, 163, n. 22.
How proved, 361, 362, 363;

STAY OF EXECUTION
See Execution,

In garnishee

Judicial notice of,

351.

512-519, 552, 559.

cases, 120.

STENOGR.APHER’S

NOTES—

.

Stenographer's notes of testimony, not receivable in evidence gen
erally, 383; May be used when, 383; Must be veriﬁed, and shown
to be accurate, 383, n. 37.
When witness has left the jurisdiction of the Court, 383, n. 37.
Stenographefs minutes are not depositions, 383, n. 37.

STIPULATED DAMAGES,
STIPULATION—
For adjournment
STOLEN GOODS—
Trover for, 633;
,

to be
'

in writing,

Purchaser

STRAY ANIMALS

'

473.

289,

n. 1.

of acquires no property in, 633.

When person in possession may maintain

SUBPOENA—
When Justice may

trover for, 634.

issue, 299;
Number of witnesses in, 302; To
produce books and papers, 300; To appear before arbitrators,
301;
Service of, 303; Fees to be paid, 303, 493; Compelling
obedience to, 304; Attachment for, 304, 305.
Return to, 304; Proof of service of, 304.
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SUBSCRIBING WITNESS—
Proof of execution of instrument

by, 386;

When dispensed with,

387.

When witness is out of the State, 386; Or dead, or insane, 386,
n. 48; Or if the instrument is lost, 386; Not required to prove
contents of lost instrument, 386, n. 46.

SUIT
How commenced, 19; When deemed
cases, 112; By public ofﬁcers, 23 ;
24;
By school districts, 23; On
when process delivered to oﬂicer,
before brought, 242, et seq.

commenced,
20; In garnishee
And boards, 23 ; By partners,
assigned demands, 25; Time
how shown, 20, n. 2; Tender

SUMMONS—
What, 21;
20, n. 2;

When deemed commencement of suit, 20; When not,
Not issued, when, 20, n. 2; May be issued on a holiday,

20, n. 2.

Time of issuing, how shown, 20, n. 2.
ls ﬁrst process against a corporation, 21; And against a. school
district, 21.
Returnable, when, 21;, When one of the parties a non-resident, 21.
Plaintiff, how named in, 27; How described in, 27; When name
unknown, 29; Copartners, how named, 24; Public oiiicers, 23,
31; Designation of by initial letter, 30;
Mistake in name of
party, 32; When ﬁctitious name may be used, 29.
Return day of, 33; Time and place of appearance to be stated, 33.
Long summons, time of return, 34; Time, how computed, 34.
Short summons, time of return and how computed, 34.
Plea, how stated in summons, 36.
Damages, statement of, 37; When damages claimed exceed the
jurisdiction of the Court, 37.
Service of, who may serve, 39; Constable, sheriff, deputy sheriff,
By person deputized, 39, 137; By any competent person
39;
when appointed by the Justice, 39.
Where and how served, 40; When in an adjoining county, 41.
When to be served, 40; Not on election day, 46; Not on Sunday, 42.
Time of service before return day, how computed, 34, n.; 44, n.
Service on corporations, 43; On railroad companies, 43; On school
districts, 43; By copy, 45; Can be served by copy, when, 40, n.; 43.
Return of service, how made, 47; Must show what, 47, 41; In case
of domestic corporations, 47; Foreign corporations, 47, n. 14;
When only a part of the defendants served, 47; When no service
obtained, 48.
Proceedings after return of service by copy, 48; Second summons
to issue, when, 48; Attachment to issue, when, 48.
63
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SUMMONS—Continued.
I1-regularity in service and return,
waived, 47, n. 11.
Alteration of summons, 132, n. 2.
For jurors, 321, 323.

47,

SUNDAY—

n. 10, 11;

How and when

.

When to be counted in computing time, 34, 487, n. 29; Process
not to be issued or served on, 133.
Holidays, when considered as, 134, 705; Seventh day of the week
to be treated as, when, 135.
Courts not to be open on, 133, 349; Verdict may be received on, 349.
Contracts made on, void, 685; Resclnding, 685, n. 9; No action
for deceit practiced on, 685; Replevin tor property sold on,
100, n. 3.

SUR.ETY—
For costs,

‘

against surety, 503; For stay of
execution, 512, 519, 552; Set-oft in case of note signed by, 266;
Contribution among, 729; Action for money paid by, 729.
221,

140;

Executions

TALESMEN—

Jurors, Jury,
TAXATION OF COSTS—
e

Procedure upon, 495.

TAX RECEIPTS—
As evidence,

382.

TENANTS—

Joint, replevin by, 100.
In common, when trover maintainable

by, 644; Replevin by, 100,
Not to deny landlord’s title, 747, n. 24; Relation 0! land
lord and tenant must exist to support the action of use and
occupation, 747, n. 24.
At suﬁerance, whether liable for rent, 747.
Notice to quit, 747; What will end tenancy, 747.
'649;

TENDER—

Before suit, when to be made, 242; In what cases, 242; By whom
to be made, 243; For an infant, or idiot, 243, n. 36; To whom
to be made, 244; Where to be made, 244, n. 41.
Must be in money, when, 245; How made, 246; What will excuse
an actual offer of money, 246, n. 1; 343-2.
May be coupled with a condition
246;
Must be unconditional,
which the party has a right to make, 246, n. 4.
Objections to tender should be stated, 246.
Tender must be kept good, 247; Beneﬁt of tender, how lost. 247.
Effect of tender, 247; Discharges the lien of a mortgage, 247;
Satisfles contract when, 247.
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TENDER—Continued.
Notice of tender must be accompanied with payment of money
into Court, 248; Requisites of the notice, 248, n. 10.
Tender after suit brought, 249; Effect of such tender, 249; Re
fusal to accept, effect of, 249; As to costs, 249.

THREATS
See Duress.
‘

TIMBER—

Unlawful cutting, treble damages for, 618; Waiving trespass and
suing in assumpsit, 75, 618; Attachment tor, 75; Trover for, 633.

TIME—
For return of

'

.

How computed,

Sunday,
34, 35, 41;
when to be counted, 34; When last day ot grace falls on, 705;
In computing time tor rendering judgment, 487, n. 29; Month,
year, meaning ot, 35; Fractions of a day, when regarded, 44;
When need not be proved as laid, 354.
For the appearance of parties, 149.
How computed on statute of limitations, 224, n. 19, 233, 239.
process,

33,

34;

TITLE T0 LANDS
See Trespass to Real Property»

Title gives constructive possession when, 619.
Plea or notice of in trespass, 619, 621, 625.
TORTS—
Jurisdiction in

case of, 15; Actions for, assignable, 682; Persons
committing may be sued jointly and severally, 180; If severally,
plaintiﬂ! to elect which judgment to pursue, 180, n. 11; Effect of
joining, 180.
Demands tor, not proper subjects ot set-oﬂ, 274; Nor ot recoup
ment, 276, n. 8.
Damages in actions tor, 481.
Executors and administrators actions for, 586.
Waiving tort and suing in assumpsit, 75, 683; For cutting timber
or other trespass, 75, 618.
Contribution for among wrong-doers not enforcible, 730.
Statute ot limitations in actions for, 234.

TOWNSHIP
Appearance in suits by, 145.
Plats of, as evidence to identity lands, 384, n.

41.

TRANSCRIPT—
judgment, must show what, 374.
Court, when, 496; Aﬂidavit for, 496; Requisites
of transcript, 496; How obtained, 497; Eﬂect of, 497, 498.
From the docket of one justice to another, 499.
Of Justice's

Filing in Circuit
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by warrant to another Justice, 68; Cause for,

150.

In

suits commenced by other process, 151; Amdavit for, 151;
When application for to be made, 151.
Cause for, 151; That Justice is a material witness, 151; Or has
advised in the case, 151; Absent on day of trial, 152; Vacancy

in

office, 153.

When causes to be deemed transferred by reason of vacancy in
oiﬁce, sickness or absence of Justice, or inability to attend, etc.,
154.

TRANSITORY ACTIONS
What are,

16.

TREBLE DAMAGES
When allowed, 475, 618, see Damages; How to declare for under
the statute, 618; How judgment taken for, 620.

TRESPASS,

PERSONAIr—

-

See Assault and battery, False imprisonment.
When local and when transitory, 16.
To personal property, 610; Lies when, 610; By whom maintain
able, 612;
Plaintiff's interest in the property, 612; Possession
is suiﬁcient, 612; Sheriff or constable may maintain, 612; A
receiptor may maintain, 612.
Against whom, 612; For acts of a party's servant, 612, and n. 13;
Or agent, 612; Intent immaterial, 612, 620; Except to enhance
or mitigate damages, 612, n. 17; 620; Return of goods taken no
bar, 612.
No contribution among cotrespassers, 613.
Evidence for plaintiff, 611.
Plea and notice under, 611.
Judgment, effect of, 612, 613, n. 22; Vests property in defendant,
when, 612, 613, n. 22.
Execution against one joint trespasser releases the others, when,
613,

n. 22.

TO REAL PROPERTY
When transitory, 16; What amounts to, 614; Party having pos~
session or title may maintain, 615; When lessor cannot, 615;
Who liable for, 615.
Declaration and description of the land, 617.
Cutting timber and treble damages for, 475, 618; When single
only,618; Waiving trespass and suing in assumpsit, 75.
damages
618;
For forcible and unlawful ejectment and holding by
force, 618.
Declaration for treble damages must refer to the statute, 618;
When damages not trebled, 618.

TRESPASS

—

-

0
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REAL PROPERTY—Continued.
for plaintiff, 619; When conﬁned

TO

to one trespass, 619;
When several may be proved, 619.
That the trespass was committed by the defendant or his order,
619; When the action is against several, 619.
That the trespass was committed upon the land described, etc., 619.
Plaintiifs possession, 619; When proof of title suﬂicient, 619;
Proof of possession, 619.
Damages, 620; Evidence to enhance or mitigate, 620 ; Measure of,
620; Treble, 618, 620; How trebled, 620.
Defense, what may be shown, 621; Notice of title, 622.
Title, when shown by plaintiffs evidence to be in question, 619;
Plea and notice of title in defendant, 622; When to be given,
622; How given, 622; When declaration contains several counts,
623;
Bond to be given with, 624; Justice to proceed if bond
not given, 624.
Cause to be certiﬁed to Circuit Court when, 624; Pieadings in the
Circuit Court on notice of title, 624; When plaintiff to have
double costs in Circuit, 626.
When plaintii.‘f’s proofs show title in question, 625; Proof of title
when not disputed, 625.
Defective fences, trespass resulting from, 627; Partition fences,
who to maintain, 628; When party liable for not repairing, 628;
For his cattle trespassing on adjoining lands, 628; From cattle
trespassing from the highway, 629.
License, when defense to action of trespass, 630; Revocable when,
630.

Nuisance, trespass in abating, 631.
Attachment for, when tort waived, 75.

TRESPASSER—
Justice is when proceeding without jurisdiction,

18; Or for issuing
without an aﬁidavit, 51, n. 21.
Cotrespassers, when bound by acts of each other, 419.
a warrant

TRIAL-—
When, on arrest on warrant, 67.
When, upon issue joined, 309; Or on defendant's failure to appear,
310; Where to be had, 309; Must be closed on a week day, 349.
When by Justice, and when by jury, 314.
By jury, see Jury.
Seggregation of witness on the, 338.
Proceedings on, 336; Who to begin, 336; Plaintitfs evidence, 336,
310, 354, n. 29;
Should introduce all, 341; Evidence inadvert
ently omitted, 341.
Defense stated, 337; Evidence for, 337.
Evidence in reply, 337, 341.

‘
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TRIAL—Continued.
Excluding witnesses,

338;
Swearing witnesses, 340;
Recalling
witnesses, 341.
Non-suit, plaintiff may submit to, 312, 342; But not after notice
of set-off given, except by consent of the defendant, 273.
Argument to the jury, 343; Charge to the jury, 344; Jury are
judges of the law and the facts, 344.
Deliberations of the jury, 345; Oﬂicer to attend them, 345; May
take books and papers to jury room, 346.
Verdict, how delivered and recorded, 848; Plaintiff should be pres
ent, 348, n. 30; Verdict may be corrected when, 348; How ren
dered in case of double damages, 348, n. 32; Sealed verdict, 348;
Polling the jury, 348, n. 33; Verdict may be received on Sun
day, 349; Must be general, 348.
Disagreement of the jury, 350.
Amendment on, 578.

TROVER—
For goods of

a deceased person, 587, n. 31.
Nature of the action, 632; Concurrent with trespass, 632.
Lies for personal property only, 632; And in what cases, 632, n. 1;
When owner has repossessed himself of his property, 632; For
goods forfeited, 677.
Right of property is in issue, 633, n. 5.
Who may maintain the action, 633; What interest the plaintiﬂf
must have, 633; Bailee may bring, 633; For goods stolen, 633;
And for goods obtained by fraud, 633; When by vendee, 633;
By landlord for timber wrongfully cut, 633; Person in posses
sion of estrays may maintain when, 634, n. 25; Lies against a
carrier for delivering goods to a wrong person, 636; Possession
or special property in gives right of action, 634.
Must be a conversion before suit, 635; What amounts to a con
version, 635.
By wrongful taking, 636; Wrongful dominion, 637; Wrongful de
tention, 638.
Demand, when necessary, 639; How made and what is suﬂicient,
'

639.

Refusal

to deliver,

when evidence of conversion, 640;

When not,

641.

Conversion
Tenants in
raised by
Measure of

by accession, 642;

By confusion of goods, 643.
action by when maintainable, 644; For crops
on shares, 644, n. 64.
damages, 646; Mitigation of, 647.

common,

Judgment, effect of, 648;
when, 648.

Payment of vests property in defendant

GENERAL INDEX.
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TRUSTEE—
against, 265.

Set-off

USE AND OCCUPATION—
Action for, 746; Count for,
See Assumpsit, 746-751.

746.

USURY—
Effect of, 250; Defense of, who may
On what contracts, 250; Interest on install

Does not avoid contract, 250;

make,

250,

n. 21;

ments of interest, 251.
On contracts payable in other States, 252;
other States, 252.

On contracts made in

VARlANCE—
Variance between summons and declaration or plea, 36, 162.
Between pleadings and proofs, 355; Between execution and judg
ment,

509.

Amendments to avoid, 356, 578, n. 30.
VENlRE——
When and how issued and returned, 319;
when, 323.

New venire may issue

VENUE-—
Averment

of, when necessary,

163,

167.

VERDICT
Of jury, 348, 349; May be received on Sunday, 349;
conduct will defeat, 347; Amendments after, 579.

What mis

VIDELlCET—
Effect of,

167,

n. 35.

VOID AND VOIDABLE—-

-

Distinction between void and voidable proceedings, 18, n. 18.
As applied to contracts of infants, married women, ete., 178,

2101.

WAIVER

Want of jurisdiction, not to be waived, 6,
Irregularitiesiilay be waived, 18, 139, 158,

18.

n. 9, 298;

Of exceptions,

527.

Oi’

jury trial,

314,

322.

Of tort and suing in assumpsit, 75,

618,

683.

WARRANT
Suit

by,

void,

In

when deemed

commenced,

20;

Issued without

18, n. 17, 50.

Affidavit for, 50,
Affidavit for, 51.
In actions for torts, penalties, ete., 52.
Against defendant by ﬁctitious name, 53.
actions on contract, 50;

In' actions for fraud,

51;

51.

afﬁdavit,

GENERAL INDEX.
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WARR.AN'l‘—Continued.

V

Defective affidavit, 54.
Form and contents of warrant, 55; When returnable, 55, n. 35.
Service of, 56; Arrest of defendant, 56; Who exempt from arrest,
57; Discharge of from unlawful arrest, 57;
Aiﬁdavit for, 57;
Who may be arrested, 58; By whom, 59; When, 60; Where, 61;
Breaking doors to arrest, 61; How made, 61 a; When privilege
from arrest should be claimed, 66.
Exhibiting warrant at arrest, when required, 62.
Aid to arrest,- when officer may require, 63.
Return of warrant, and disposition of defendant, 64; Notice of at
rest to plaintiff, 65; Return to, how made, 66.
Cause to be tried, when, 67.
_
Transfer of cause to another Justice, 68; Aﬂidavit tor, 68; When
Justice absent, disabled, sick, etc., 154.
Custody of defendant during adjournment, 66, 293.
Against fradulent debtor, 590-595.
Against one guilty of contempt, 599.

WARRANTY
Of title implied on sale of chattel, 752; In what cases warranty
implied, and when not, 752, 753; That provisions are wholesome,
753, n. 11; No warranty implied where an express warranty is
given, 753.
What amounts to a warranty, 752; A mere assertion of opinion is
not, 752, n. 52; Horses. warranty of soundness, 752, n. 4.
General warranty, extends to what, 753.
Measure 0! damages for breach of, 754; Return of goods war
ranted, 754; suit for damages for breach of warranty aﬂirms
sale,

754, n. 18.

Declaration

WEARING

for breach,

754, n. 10.

APPAREL

Exempt from execution, 526.

WIFE
See Husband and Wife.
Has the same rights over her own property as ii‘ she were unmar

ried, 178; Her property not liable for her husband's debts, 178.
May sue and be sued, 178.
May contract in relation to her sole property, 178, n. 48; But has
no power to contract except concerning her separate estate, 178,
n. 48; May contract with her husband, 178, n. 48; May carry on
business in her own name, 178, n. 48; May employ her husband
as her agent, 178, n. 48.
Wife's note given for property purchased by her is valid; May
bind herself by her indorsement of a note belonging to her, 170;

GENERAL INDEX.
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debt of her husband
surety
for
another
will not bind her,
or any other person, or as
except upon a consideration given therefor to herself, 178, n. 0.
Not liable in a covenant in her husband’s deed signed by her, 178,
to a note given for the

n. 0.

WILL
Record of, or transcript

of recorded

as evidence, 373, 389.

WITNESSES
'

‘

Exemption from arrest, 57.
Subpoena for, 299-303; When within thirty miles, 299; To produce
books and papers, 300; And to appear before arbitrators, 301;
'
Single subpoena for several, 302.
Subpoena, how served, 303; Fees to be paid, 303.
Attachment for, 304; Proof and aiﬁdavit for, 304; Form of, 304;
When returnable, 304; How executed, 305.
Non-attendance, penalty for, 306; Fine, 306; How collected, 306;
Execution for, 306; Adjournment in case of, 295.
Ref-using to testify, 306, 307; Fine for, 306; Collection of and com
mitment for, 306, 308; Adjournment in case of, 295.
Damages against for refusing to be sworn or to testify, 307.
Must be sworn, 311; By whom, 311; Justice not to be a witness,
311, n. 10; May be excluded at trial, when, 338;
Mode of swear
ing, 340.
Subscribing witness, proof by, 386; When dispensed with, 386, 387.
witness, when testimony of may be used, 401.
Deceased
Competency of witnesses, 435; Parties as, 436; Husband and wife,
Infants, 441; Deal and dumb persons, 442; Intoxicated
440;
persons, 443;
Clergymen,
Idiots and lunatics, 444;
445;
Physicians, 446; Attorneys, 447; Religious opinions, 439.
Examination, 48; In chief, 451; Giving reasons for recollection,
Refreshing recollection, 453; Statements on knowledge,
452;
454; Giving opinions when, 455.
Cross-examination of, 459; Questions exposing to penal liability,
460; Questions tending to degrade the witness, 460.
Re-examination of, 461.
Impeachment of, 463; As to general reputation for truth, 469; By
proof of contradictory statements, 465; Discrediting
witness,
463; Evidence to sustain witness, 470.
Interpreters for witnesses, 450.
Depositions, 426, 434.
Fees of, 493

WORK AND LABOR—
See Assumpsit,

725, 726.
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WR.IT——

Of attachment,
Of replevin, 101.

69.

(See “Attachment.")
(See “Replevin.")

WRITTEN INSTRUMENTS

General issue does not deny executions of when, 191; When execu
tion admitted if not denied on oath, 191.
“Then afiidavit of denial is required, 191; Denial, when to be made,
191; When instrument offered as a set-off, 191; Denial by one of
several partners, 191.
Contents of, how proved, 358, 360; Not by parol, 360.
Acknowledged, admitted in evidence, when, 385.
Proof of by subscribing witnesses, 386.
Not to be varied by parol, 359.
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ABATEMENT—

Plea of non-joinder in assumpsit, 47.
Affidavit to verify plea, 47.
Replication to, 48.
49.
Plea of pendency of another action,
‘
Replication to, 50.

ACTION ON THE CASE
Form

oi‘.

declaration

in, 188.

ADJOURNMENT
Oath for, form of, 59.
Bond on adjournment,
Oath of surety in, 61.

60.

AFFIDAVIT

‘For warrant on contract, 6.
In case of fraud, 7.
In case of tort, 8.
That justice is a material witness, 12.
For attachment, 13.
For writ of replevin, 26.
Of garnishment, 33.
Transfer of cause, aﬂidavit for, 45.
Abatement—Aﬂidavit to verify plea, 47.
Subpcena—Aﬂidavit of service of, 67.
For commission to take deposition, 88.
Of service of notice of application for execution,
By surety applying for execution, 110.
For certiorari, 128.
For appeal, 136.
For special appeal, 137.
For warrant against fraudulent debtor, 141.
Denying that is fraudulent debtor, 144.

AFFIRMATION—

To witness on the trial, 74.

APPEAL—
Form of aflidavit for appeal,
Aﬂidavit

for special appeal,

136.
137.

1003
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APPEAL-Continued.
Bond on appeal,

138.

Justice's certiﬁcate of making appeal,
Return to appeal, 140.

139.

ASSAULT AND BATTERY—
Declaration

in,

159.

ASSUMPSIT—
Declaration in for penalty on statute, 180.
General form of declaration, 182.
Declaration—Payee
vs. maker, 183.
Bond of indemnity against lost note, 184.
Declaration—Indorsee
vs. maker, 185.
Indorsee vs. indorser, _ 186.
On common counts, 187.

ATTACHMENT
Atiidavit for, 13.
Bond for, 14.
Writ of attachment, 15.
Docket entry of successive attachments, 16.
Copy of inventory to return with attachment, 17.
Bond to prevent removal of property, 18.
By claimant of property, 19.
Return of writ—personal service, 20.
When bond is given, 21.
When defendant not found, 22.
Order of sale of perishable property, 23.
Bond on dissolution of, 24.
Order of discharge of property on dissolution, 25.
Defaulting witness—Attachment
for, 68; Return to, 69.

BILL OF PARTICULARS-—
General form,

58.

BOND—
For writ of attachment, 14.
For defendant, to prevent removal of property,
By claimant of property attached, 19.
On dissolution of attachment, 24.
In replevin, 27.
On adjournment, bond in, 60.
Of indemnity on execution, 115.
On removal by certiorari, 129, 130.
Justiﬂcaton of surety on, 131.
On appeal, 138.
To assign in case of fraudulent debtors,
Approval to be indorsed on, 151.

18.

150.

_-

‘J
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BOND—Continued.
In case of notice of title to lands,
Declaration in debt on, 177.
Of indemnity on lost note, 184.

166.

CERTIFICATE—
To

.

be attached to deposition by oﬁicer taking, 86.
Of clerk to be attached to certiﬁcate of oﬂicer, 87.
Of commissioner taking deposition, 91.
To be attached to transcript of judgment, 98.
To be attached to transcript where judgment by another justice,
99.

To suspend execution, 133.
That appeal has been taken, 139.
To aﬂidavits for warrant against fraudulent
CERTIORARI—
Notice of intention to remove by certiorari,
Aﬂidavit for allowance of writ, 128.
Bond on certiorari, 129, 130.
Justiﬁcation of surety on, 131.
Approval of bond, 132.
Certiﬁcate to suspend execution on, 133.
Return to certiorari, 134.
Amended return, 135.

debtor, 143.
127.

COMMISSION
To take testimony, 89.
Aﬂidavit for, 88.
Certiﬁcate of taking depositions by, 91.

COMMITMENT
Of defaulting witness, 73.
Of fraudulent debtor, 149.
For contempt, 156.
COMMON COUNTS—
Form of declaration on, 187.

CONSTABLE

Oath to before selecting jury, 75.
Oath to on taking charge of jury,

81.

CONTEMPT—
Warrant for persons charged with contempt,
Record of conviction for contempt, 155.
Commitment for contempt, 156.
CONVIC'I‘ION—
Of defaulting witness, 70.
COSTS
Security for—-Non-resident, before suit, 39.
Non-resident, after suit, 40.
Plaintiff having removed, 41.

1

154.
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in, 176.

I

DEBT

Declaration in, onbond, 177.
Assigning breaches, 178.
On statute for penalty, 179.

'

DECLARATlON—

General form of, 46.
By executor or administrator, 157, 158.
For assault and battery, 159.
In trover, 160; For goods forfeited, 181.
In trespass to personal property, 161.
For cutting timber, 162.
On lands, 163.
In replevin, 168.
In covenant, 176.
In debt—On bond, 177.
Assigning breaches, 178.
On statute for penalty, 179.
In assumpsit—For penalty on statute, 180.
General form of declaration in, 182.

.

Payee vs. maker of note, 183.
Indorsee vs. maker, 185.
*
Indorsee vs. indorser, 186.
On the common counts, 187.
Trespass on the case—General form of declaration, 188.

DEMURRER—
.

Form of demurrer, 55.
Of joinder in, 56.

DEPOSITIONS

OF WI'i‘NESSES—

Stipulation to take on oral interrogatories, 83.
Stipulation to take on written interrogatories, 84.
Notice of taking, 85.
'
Certiﬁcate of oflicer taking, 86.
Certiﬁcate of clerk to be attached to certiﬁcate of oﬂcer,
Aﬁidavit for commission to take, 88.
Commission to take, 89.
Notice of taking by commission, 90.
Certiﬁcate of commissioner taking, 91.
Indorsement and address for return of, 92.
Notice of ﬁling of, 93.
Objections to, 94.

DSCHARGE—
Order of, from attachment, 25.

87.

INDEX
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DOCKET
Form of docket entries, 153.
Form of docket entry in case of successive attachments, 16.
Form of entry in, in case of conviction for contempt, 155.
EXECUTION——
Form of execution, 100.
Endorsement on, when against principal and surety, 101.
Form of execution against the body, 102.
Against principal and surety, after stay, 103.
Notice of intention to apply for execution, 104.
Aﬂidavit of service of notice, 105.
.Oath on application for execution, 106.
Security for stay of execution, 107.
Form of stay entered on docket, 108.
‘
Order recalling execution after stay, 109.
stay,
Aﬂidavit tor execution after
110.
Endorsement on execution against joint debtors, 111.
Exemptions—Inventory
ot property levied on, 112.
Oath to appraisers of property, 113.
Appraisal to be endorsed on inventory, 114.
Bond of indemnity to oﬂicer levying, 115.
[Receipt for goods after levy, 116.
Endorsement of levy on the execution, 117.
Notice of sale oi.’ property levied on, 118.
Return to execution, 119.
Return to execution against the body, 120.
Return to execution, no property found, 121.
Renewal of execution, 122, 123.
Return when goods not sold, 124.
Schedule of property remaining unsold, 125.
Endorsement on execution for beneﬁt of stay, 126.
Execution against defaulting witness, 71.

In replevin——For plaintiﬁ,
For defendant for return,
For value, damages, etc.,

173.

damages,

etc., 174.

175.

FRAUDULENT DEBTORS—
Form of aﬂidavit for warrant for, 141.
Warrant for arrest of, 142.
Certiﬁcate to atiidavit, 143.
Affidavit of denial by defendant, 144.
Oath to defendant, 145.
Examination oi! defendant, 146.
Recognizance for adjournment, 147.
Subpmna for witnesses, 148.
Commitment of defendant, 149.
Bond to assign property, 150.

,
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FRAUDULENT DEBTORS—Continued.
Approval to be endorsed
Supersedeas, 152.

on, 151.

GARNISHMENT—
Aﬂidavit in, 33.
Summons to garnishee, 34.
Return to summons, 35.
Warrant against garnishee,
Return to warrant, 112.

36.

GUARDIAN
Consent and appointment

of,

44.

INFANTS—
Next friend, consent and appointment of,
In case issue joined without process, 43.
Guardian, consent and appointment of, 44.

42.

INTERPRETER——
Oath to,

82.

INVENTORY
In attachment, copy of to return, 17.
Of property taken on execution, 112,

125.

JUDGMENT
Form of confession of judgment, 95.
Docket entry of judgment by confession, 96.
Transcript of judgment—Aﬂidavit
for transcript, 97
Certiﬁcate to transcript, 98.
When judgment rendered by another Justice, 99.
In replevin, 170, 171, 172.

JURORS—
Oath to constable on selection, 75.
Oath to on challenge, 78.
To witness on trial of challenge, 79.
To jurors before trial, 80.
Oath to constable attending jurors, 81.

LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OF
Notice of defense under,

52.

NEXT FRIEND
Consent and appointment of, 42.
In case» issue joined without process,

43.

NOTICE
Of
Of
Of
Of
Ot

intention to remove by certiorari, 127.
intention to apply for execution, 104.
taking depositions without commission,
taking depositions by commission, 90.
ﬁling depositions, 93.

85.
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NOTICE-—Continued.
Of defense under the general issue, 51.
Of defense of statute of limitations, 52.
Of set-off, 53.
Of recoupment, 54.
Of defense puis darrein continuance, 57.
On oral showing for adjournment, 59.
To surety in bond for adjournment, 61.
In case of attachment for witness, 66.
Of materiality of witness, 72.
To witness on the trial, 74.
To constable before selecting jury, 75.
To juror on challenge, 78.
To witness on trial of challenge, 79.
To jurors for the trial, 80.
To constable in charge of jury, 81.
On application for execution, 106.
To appraisers, 114.
To alleged fraudulent debtor, 145.
Of title to lands in trespass, 164.
Of title to lands in trover, 165.

1

OATH—

'

ORDER.

In attachment for sale of personal property,
For discharge of property, 25.
Recalling

23.

execution, 109.

PARTICULARS—
Bill of, 58.
PLEAS
In abatement—

;

I")

In

Of non-joiniier of a co-contractor, 47.
Of pendency of another action, 49.
bar-—

General issue-—And notice under, 51.
In replevin, and notice under, 169.
And notice of statute of limitations, 52.
And notice of set-off, 53.
And notice puis darrein continuance, 57.
And notice of recoupment, 54.
And notice of title to land in trespass, 164.
And notice of title to land in trover, 165.
of, 55.
Demurrer—Form
‘Form of joinder in, 56.
Puis darrein continuance—F'orm of notice of defense
64
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of,

57.
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PROCESS-—
Form of deputation to serve,

PROMISSORY NOTES
on

Declaration

(see

ARE TO NUMBEBSJ

38.

Assumpsit.)

PUIS DARREIN CONTINUANCE—
Notice of defense

RECOGNIZANCE—
For adjournment,

RECEIPT
For

goods

of,

57.

fraudulent

levied upon,

RECOUPMENT—
Notice of defense

of,

debt/or proceedings, 147.

116.

54.

REPLEVIN—

»

Affidavit for, 26.
Bond in replevin, 27.
Writ of replevin, 28.
summoned, 29.
Return to-—Goods found, defendant
found,
30.
found,
defendant
not
Goods
not, 31.
_
Goods found, defendant
found,"
Summons to defendant, after return of “not
168.
in.
Form of declaration
General issue and notice of defense, 169.
on, 170.
Verdict for plaintiff and judgment
For defendant, 171.
For defendant, return waived, 172.
Execution for plaintiff, 173.
'
For defendant for return, etc., 174.
For defendant for value, damages, etc., 175.

32.

REPLICATiON—

To pleas in abatement,

48,

50.

RETURN
Of
Of
Of
Of
To
To
To

personal service of summons, 2.
made, 3.
service of summons not personally
several,
4.
against
summons
service of
5.
corporations,
on
summons
of
service
warrant-—Service of, 10.
warrant when justice issuing is absent, 11.
service, 20.
attachment——Personal

When bond given, 21.
When defendant not found, 22.
found, defendant summoned,
To writ of replevin——Goods
found, 30.
Goods not found, defendant
31.
not.
Goods found, defendant
\

29
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'

RETURN—Continued.
Garnishment—Summons,
return to, 35.
Warrant, return to, 37.
Subp(ena—Form of return to, 65.
Attachment for witness—Return
to, 69.
To venire, 77.
To execution, 119.
To execution against body, 120.
To execution, no property found, 121.
To execution, goods not sold, 124.
To certiorari, 134.
Amended, to certiorari, 135.
To appeal, 140.

SECURITY FOR COSTS
Before suit,

39.

After suit brought, 40.
Plaintiff having removed,

41.

SET-OFF
Notice of defense of,

53.

STAY OF EXECUTION—
To be ﬁled, 107.
To be entered on docket,

SUBP(ENA—
Form of,

108.

62.

Subptena duces tecum, 63.
To appear before arbitrators, 64.
Return to—General form, 65.
In fraudulent debtor proceedings,

148.

SUMMONS—
General

form

of,

1.

Return of summons personally served,
Of service by copy, 3.
Of summons against several persons,
Of service on corporations, 5.
in, 32.
Replevin—Summons
in, 34.
Garnishment—Summons

SUPERSEDEAS—
In fraudulent

debtor proceedings,

2.

4.

152.

TRANSFER OF CAUSE—
Aﬂidavit for,

45.

TRANSCRIPT
Of judgment, aﬂidavit for, 97.
Certiﬁcate to be attached to, 98.
Where judgment rendered by another justice,

I

99.

IUIZ

INT/EX
[narasancas

TO

FORMS.
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TRESPASS
in, 161.
To personal property+Declaration
To real property—I)eclaration
for cutting timber, 162.
Declaration for trespass on lands, usual form, 163.
Plea or notice of title to land in, 164.
‘
Bond with notice of title, 166.
Justice's certiﬁcate on receiving notice of title, 167.

'I‘ROVER—
Declaration in, 160.
Plea or notice of title to land in,
Declaration for goods forfeited,

165.
181.

VENIRE—
Form of, 76.
Return to, 71.

'

VERDICT
In replevin,

170, 171, 172.

WARRANT——
General form of, 9.
Aﬁidavlt for, on contract,
For, in case of fraud, 7.
For, in cast of tort, 8.
Return to warrant, 10.

6.

Return to warrant when justice issuing is absent, 11.
Aﬁidavlt that justice is a. material witness, 12.
in, 36.
Garnishment—Warrant
Witness refusing to testify—Warrant to commit,
73.
‘
Against fraudulent debtor, 142.
Certiﬁcate to affidavits for, 143.
For contempt, 154.

WITNESSES
for—General form, 62.
To produce books and papers, 63.
To appear before arbitrators, 64.
Return to subpoena, 65.
Compelling attendance of—Oath to procure attachment for,
Aﬂidavit of service of subpoena, 67.
Attachment for witness, 68.
Return to attachment, 69.
'
Conviction of defaulting witness, 70.
Execution for ﬁne and costs against, 71.
_
Oath of materiality of witness, 72.
Commitment of witness—Form of, 73.
At trial—Oath or affirmation to witness, 74.
~
Interpreter, oath to, 82.
Depositions of, forms for (see Depositions.)
Subpoena

66
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